auth-api: use constant time comparison for csrf tokens
by using openssl's `memcmp::eq()` we can avoid potential side-channel attack on the csrf token comparison. this comparison's runtime only depends on the length of the two byte vectors, not their contents. Signed-off-by: Stefan Sterz <s.sterz@proxmox.com>
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@ -286,14 +286,15 @@ fn verify_csrf_prevention_token_do(
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}
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let timestamp = parts.pop_front().unwrap();
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let sig = parts.pop_front().unwrap();
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let sig = parts.pop_front().unwrap().as_bytes();
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let ttime = i64::from_str_radix(timestamp, 16)
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.map_err(|err| format_err!("timestamp format error - {}", err))?;
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let digest = compute_csrf_secret_digest(ttime, secret, userid);
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let digest = digest.as_bytes();
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if digest != sig {
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if digest.len() != sig.len() || !openssl::memcmp::eq(digest, sig) {
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bail!("invalid signature.");
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}
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