e08f8eb7c9
Signed-off-by: Lon Hohberger <lhh@redhat.com>
127 lines
5.7 KiB
Plaintext
127 lines
5.7 KiB
Plaintext
We need a fencing agent which can work in a variety of guest cluster
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configurations and host configurations.
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Requirements
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1. Nonrequirement of guest to host networking. Virtual machines
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may be configured to run using a nework unknown to the host
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operating system. Therefore, the ability to run without network
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communication between the guest and the hsot is required.
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2. Ease of configuration. The absolute minimum possible configuration
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must be available.
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3. Nonrequirement of host clustering software. Multiple layers of
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configuration sucks. While I fundamentally disagree with the general
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idea that running CMAN on the host constitutes a "heavyweight
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cluster", customer perception is important.
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4. Support for RHEV-M. Be able to send fencing requests up to RHEV-M
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for execution. This is beneficial from a security standpoint.
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5. Upgrade compatibility with fence_xvm from a configuration standpoint.
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This may be provided by a symlink over fence_xvm. If this feature
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can not be provided as a matter of design, a method to convert an
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existing fence_xvm/fence_xvmd configuration to fence_virt must be
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present.
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Guest to Host Interaction
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-------------------------
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The proposal is to use various communications media plugins in order
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to facilitate flexibility with respect to how virtual machine
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environments are configured.
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There are at least 3 simple plugins for guest/client to host/server
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communications:
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* Direct serial. The guest sends fencing requests out via /dev/ttySX
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in the guest. The host is listening on a Unix domain socket[1],
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and forwards fencing requests accordingly.
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This satisifies most of the requirements, but adds a conundrum
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when configuring guest clusters, as /dev/ttySX may be /dev/ttySY
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on another guest. So, either we must account for this per-guest
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configuration discrepancy or we must make it an administrative
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requirement to provide the same serial device on each host
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* Multicast. This violates the networking requirement, but this is
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okay since this method of operation is optional. This operational
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mode provides for one of the simpler configurations: all that is
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needed is the guest's name or UUID. The guest to host
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communications operates in the same manner as fence_xvm/fence_xvmd,
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except that there is an implied requirement on restricting the
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multicast packets accepted to be from the local guests.
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* VM Channel over Serial. This works like direct serial, but
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instead of owning the whole device, the device may be shared between
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multiple applications. The server subscribes to a channel and
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listens for fencing requests on the channel; the client in the
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guest OS connects to the channel and issues fencing requests across
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it. One interesting thing is that it may be possible to provide
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unprivileged users the ability to fence using this method (I
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do not claim to know if this is useful or not).
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Host to Hypervisor interaction
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------------------------------
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Similar to the way we have plugins for guest to host interaction,
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we also have plugins which actually do the real work. These plugins
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are responsible for all of the actual real work performed, including
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tracking VMs if required, forwarding requests to the appropriate hosts
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or management services, and handling the responses.
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We propose at 5 plugins in this case:
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* Libvirt (local-only). There is no intracommunication and no
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migration support is provided
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* Cluster checkpoint (+ libvirt). This the way fence_xvmd
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operates today. This setup has the most requirements on the
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infrastructure, as it requires guest to host networking _and_
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host-to-host clustering in order to keep track of virtual
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machines. The benefit is that it is self-contained and requires
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no external management nodes. VM states are stored in checkpoints
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so that other hosts know the locations of other VMs and can make
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some decisions about whether a VM is dead based on whether a host
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is dead (i.e. if fencing is in use or can be performed on the
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host).
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* Libvirt-QMF ... ??? Subscription to the appropriate cluster
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specific AMQP channel is required on the host side, but this
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handles routing the message very easily. The fencing request
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is forwarded to the other listeners on the channel, the VM owner
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takes the action requested and returns a value. When new VMs
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are created, the event is broadcast out via the AMQP channel so
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other hosts know the locations of other VMs and can make some
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decisions about whether a VM is dead based on whether a host
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is dead (i.e. if fencing is in use or can be performed on the
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host).
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* oVirt Manager. The request is forwarded to the oVirt Manager
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and the oVirt manager is responsible for taking the appropriate
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action and responding to the request.
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* RHEV-M. The request is forwarded to the RHEV-M node, which is
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responsible for taking the appropriate action and responding to
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the request.
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These plugins have no requirements on which guest to host communication
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plugin is used (you could, if you wanted, use 'direct serial' with
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'cluster checkpoint', or 'multicast' with 'RHEV-H' for example).
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These plugins must also be able to discover where appropriate. For
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example, the Checkpoint plugin can only be used if corosync/openais
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is running. Likewise, the RHEV-M plugin may only be used in the
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cases where the host operating system is a RHEV-H. A defined plugin
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preference order should be specified/documented so that the host
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daemon behaves in a predictable manner in absence of host-side
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configuration data (about which plugin to use).
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[1] TCP was also explored, however, the security is much better
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using a Unix domain socket, despite the additional complexity
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of listening for VM creation events.
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