strace/process.c

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1999-02-19 03:21:36 +03:00
/*
* Copyright (c) 1991, 1992 Paul Kranenburg <pk@cs.few.eur.nl>
* Copyright (c) 1993 Branko Lankester <branko@hacktic.nl>
* Copyright (c) 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996 Rick Sladkey <jrs@world.std.com>
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* Copyright (c) 1996-1999 Wichert Akkerman <wichert@cistron.nl>
* Copyright (c) 1999 IBM Deutschland Entwicklung GmbH, IBM Corporation
* Linux for s390 port by D.J. Barrow
* <barrow_dj@mail.yahoo.com,djbarrow@de.ibm.com>
* Copyright (c) 2000 PocketPenguins Inc. Linux for Hitachi SuperH
* port by Greg Banks <gbanks@pocketpenguins.com>
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*
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* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products
* derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "defs.h"
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <sys/utsname.h>
#include <sys/user.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_REG_H
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# include <sys/reg.h>
# ifndef PTRACE_PEEKUSR
# define PTRACE_PEEKUSR PTRACE_PEEKUSER
# endif
# ifndef PTRACE_POKEUSR
# define PTRACE_POKEUSR PTRACE_POKEUSER
# endif
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#endif
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#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_PTRACE_H
# undef PTRACE_SYSCALL
# ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_IA64_FPREG
# define ia64_fpreg XXX_ia64_fpreg
# endif
# ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PT_ALL_USER_REGS
# define pt_all_user_regs XXX_pt_all_user_regs
# endif
# include <linux/ptrace.h>
# undef ia64_fpreg
# undef pt_all_user_regs
#endif
#if defined(SPARC64)
2004-07-07 David S. Miller <davem@nuts.davemloft.net> * linux/sparc/syscallent.h: Sync with reality. * linux/sparc/syscall.h (sys_sendfile64, sys_futex, sys_gettid, sys_sched_setaffinity, sys_sched_getaffinity, sys_setxattr, sys_lsetxattr, sys_fsetxattr, sys_getxattr, sys_lgetxattr, sys_fgetxattr, sys_listxattr, sys_llistxattr, sys_flistxattr, sys_removexattr, sys_lremovexattr, sys_fremovexattr, sys_remap_file_pages, sys_readahead, sys_tgkill, sys_statfs64, sys_fstatfs64, sys_clock_settime, sys_clock_gettime, sys_clock_getres, sys_clock_nanosleep, sys_timer_create, sys_timer_settime, sys_timer_gettime): New declarations. * linux/sparc64/dummy2.h, linux/sparc64/syscallent2.h, linux/sparc64/syscall.h, linux/sparc64/errnoent.h, linux/sparc64/errnoent1.h, linux/sparc64/errnoent2.h, linux/sparc64/ioctlent.h, linux/sparc64/ioctlent1.h, linux/sparc64/ioctlent2.h, linux/sparc64/signalent.h, linux/sparc64/signalent.h, linux/sparc64/signalent.h, linux/sparc64/signalent1.h, linux/sparc64/signalent2.h, linux/sparc64/syscall1.h, linux/sparc64/syscallent.h, linux/sparc64/syscallent1.h: New files. * defs.h (LINUXSPARC): Define also when SPARC64. (LINUX && SPARC64): Set SUPPORTED_PERSONALITIES to 3. Ignore SIGTRAP after execve by defining TCB_WAITEXECVE. Define possibly missing __NR_exit_group. Declare getrval2. * configure.ac (sparc64): New architecture case. * config.h.in (SPARC64): New define. * file.c (stat_sparc64): New structure. (printstat_sparc64): New output routine for that. (printstat): Call it, if personality is 2. (printstat64): Likewise. * util.c: Conditionalize ptrace defines on LINUXSPARC not LINUX && SPARC. (SPARC64 && LINUX): Define r_pc to r_tpc, and PTRACE_FOOREGS to PTRACE_FOOREGS64 so that more sparc code can be shared between 64-bit and 32-bit. (_hack_syscall5): Correct trap number when SPARC64. (PTRACE_WRITE{TEXT,DATA}): Add SPARC64 to ifdef guard. (getpc): Handle SPARC64 && LINUX. (printcall): Likewise. (arg fetching/setting): Use same code for SPARC64 LINUX as for SPARC. (setbpt): Handle SPARC64 && LINUX. (clearbpt): Likewise. * signal.c: Conditionalize ptrace defines on SPARC and SPARC64. (SPARC64 && LINUX): Define r_pc to r_tpc, and PTRACE_FOOREGS to PTRACE_FOOREGS64 so that more sparc code can be shared between 64-bit and 32-bit. (m_siginfo): Use same definition on SPARC64 as SPARC. (sys_sigreturn): Handle LINUX && SPARC64. * syscall.c: Conditionalize ptrace defines on SPARC and SPARC64. (SPARC64 && LINUX): Define r_pc to r_tpc, and PTRACE_FOOREGS to PTRACE_FOOREGS64 so that more sparc code can be shared between 64-bit and 32-bit. (getscno): Use same static state on SPARC64 as SPARC, and add SPARC64 handling. (get_error): Handle LINUX && SPARC64. (force_result): Likewise. (syscall_enter): Likewise. (trace_syscall): Handle sys_socketcall and sys_ipc on SPARC64 just like SPARC. (getrval2): Handle LINUX && SPARC64. * process.c: Conditionalize ptrace defines on SPARC and SPARC64. (SPARC64 && LINUX): Define r_pc to r_tpc, and PTRACE_FOOREGS to PTRACE_FOOREGS64 so that more sparc code can be shared between 64-bit and 32-bit. (change_syscall): Handle LINUX && SPARC64. (struct_user_offsets): Ifdef out those which do not exist on SPARC64. * net.c (sys_pipe): Handle LINUX && SPARC64. * ioctl.c: Fix initializer typo for nioctlents2, was nioctlents1 by accident.
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# define r_pc r_tpc
# undef PTRACE_GETREGS
# define PTRACE_GETREGS PTRACE_GETREGS64
# undef PTRACE_SETREGS
# define PTRACE_SETREGS PTRACE_SETREGS64
#endif
2004-07-07 David S. Miller <davem@nuts.davemloft.net> * linux/sparc/syscallent.h: Sync with reality. * linux/sparc/syscall.h (sys_sendfile64, sys_futex, sys_gettid, sys_sched_setaffinity, sys_sched_getaffinity, sys_setxattr, sys_lsetxattr, sys_fsetxattr, sys_getxattr, sys_lgetxattr, sys_fgetxattr, sys_listxattr, sys_llistxattr, sys_flistxattr, sys_removexattr, sys_lremovexattr, sys_fremovexattr, sys_remap_file_pages, sys_readahead, sys_tgkill, sys_statfs64, sys_fstatfs64, sys_clock_settime, sys_clock_gettime, sys_clock_getres, sys_clock_nanosleep, sys_timer_create, sys_timer_settime, sys_timer_gettime): New declarations. * linux/sparc64/dummy2.h, linux/sparc64/syscallent2.h, linux/sparc64/syscall.h, linux/sparc64/errnoent.h, linux/sparc64/errnoent1.h, linux/sparc64/errnoent2.h, linux/sparc64/ioctlent.h, linux/sparc64/ioctlent1.h, linux/sparc64/ioctlent2.h, linux/sparc64/signalent.h, linux/sparc64/signalent.h, linux/sparc64/signalent.h, linux/sparc64/signalent1.h, linux/sparc64/signalent2.h, linux/sparc64/syscall1.h, linux/sparc64/syscallent.h, linux/sparc64/syscallent1.h: New files. * defs.h (LINUXSPARC): Define also when SPARC64. (LINUX && SPARC64): Set SUPPORTED_PERSONALITIES to 3. Ignore SIGTRAP after execve by defining TCB_WAITEXECVE. Define possibly missing __NR_exit_group. Declare getrval2. * configure.ac (sparc64): New architecture case. * config.h.in (SPARC64): New define. * file.c (stat_sparc64): New structure. (printstat_sparc64): New output routine for that. (printstat): Call it, if personality is 2. (printstat64): Likewise. * util.c: Conditionalize ptrace defines on LINUXSPARC not LINUX && SPARC. (SPARC64 && LINUX): Define r_pc to r_tpc, and PTRACE_FOOREGS to PTRACE_FOOREGS64 so that more sparc code can be shared between 64-bit and 32-bit. (_hack_syscall5): Correct trap number when SPARC64. (PTRACE_WRITE{TEXT,DATA}): Add SPARC64 to ifdef guard. (getpc): Handle SPARC64 && LINUX. (printcall): Likewise. (arg fetching/setting): Use same code for SPARC64 LINUX as for SPARC. (setbpt): Handle SPARC64 && LINUX. (clearbpt): Likewise. * signal.c: Conditionalize ptrace defines on SPARC and SPARC64. (SPARC64 && LINUX): Define r_pc to r_tpc, and PTRACE_FOOREGS to PTRACE_FOOREGS64 so that more sparc code can be shared between 64-bit and 32-bit. (m_siginfo): Use same definition on SPARC64 as SPARC. (sys_sigreturn): Handle LINUX && SPARC64. * syscall.c: Conditionalize ptrace defines on SPARC and SPARC64. (SPARC64 && LINUX): Define r_pc to r_tpc, and PTRACE_FOOREGS to PTRACE_FOOREGS64 so that more sparc code can be shared between 64-bit and 32-bit. (getscno): Use same static state on SPARC64 as SPARC, and add SPARC64 handling. (get_error): Handle LINUX && SPARC64. (force_result): Likewise. (syscall_enter): Likewise. (trace_syscall): Handle sys_socketcall and sys_ipc on SPARC64 just like SPARC. (getrval2): Handle LINUX && SPARC64. * process.c: Conditionalize ptrace defines on SPARC and SPARC64. (SPARC64 && LINUX): Define r_pc to r_tpc, and PTRACE_FOOREGS to PTRACE_FOOREGS64 so that more sparc code can be shared between 64-bit and 32-bit. (change_syscall): Handle LINUX && SPARC64. (struct_user_offsets): Ifdef out those which do not exist on SPARC64. * net.c (sys_pipe): Handle LINUX && SPARC64. * ioctl.c: Fix initializer typo for nioctlents2, was nioctlents1 by accident.
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#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_FUTEX_H
# include <linux/futex.h>
#endif
#ifndef FUTEX_WAIT
# define FUTEX_WAIT 0
#endif
#ifndef FUTEX_WAKE
# define FUTEX_WAKE 1
#endif
#ifndef FUTEX_FD
# define FUTEX_FD 2
#endif
#ifndef FUTEX_REQUEUE
# define FUTEX_REQUEUE 3
#endif
#include <sched.h>
#include <asm/posix_types.h>
#undef GETGROUPS_T
#define GETGROUPS_T __kernel_gid_t
#undef GETGROUPS32_T
#define GETGROUPS32_T __kernel_gid32_t
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#if defined(IA64)
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# include <asm/ptrace_offsets.h>
# include <asm/rse.h>
#endif
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#ifdef HAVE_PRCTL
# include <sys/prctl.h>
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static const struct xlat prctl_options[] = {
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#ifdef PR_MAXPROCS
{ PR_MAXPROCS, "PR_MAXPROCS" },
#endif
#ifdef PR_ISBLOCKED
{ PR_ISBLOCKED, "PR_ISBLOCKED" },
#endif
#ifdef PR_SETSTACKSIZE
{ PR_SETSTACKSIZE, "PR_SETSTACKSIZE" },
#endif
#ifdef PR_GETSTACKSIZE
{ PR_GETSTACKSIZE, "PR_GETSTACKSIZE" },
#endif
#ifdef PR_MAXPPROCS
{ PR_MAXPPROCS, "PR_MAXPPROCS" },
#endif
#ifdef PR_UNBLKONEXEC
{ PR_UNBLKONEXEC, "PR_UNBLKONEXEC" },
#endif
#ifdef PR_ATOMICSIM
{ PR_ATOMICSIM, "PR_ATOMICSIM" },
#endif
#ifdef PR_SETEXITSIG
{ PR_SETEXITSIG, "PR_SETEXITSIG" },
#endif
#ifdef PR_RESIDENT
{ PR_RESIDENT, "PR_RESIDENT" },
#endif
#ifdef PR_ATTACHADDR
{ PR_ATTACHADDR, "PR_ATTACHADDR" },
#endif
#ifdef PR_DETACHADDR
{ PR_DETACHADDR, "PR_DETACHADDR" },
#endif
#ifdef PR_TERMCHILD
{ PR_TERMCHILD, "PR_TERMCHILD" },
#endif
#ifdef PR_GETSHMASK
{ PR_GETSHMASK, "PR_GETSHMASK" },
#endif
#ifdef PR_GETNSHARE
{ PR_GETNSHARE, "PR_GETNSHARE" },
#endif
#ifdef PR_COREPID
{ PR_COREPID, "PR_COREPID" },
#endif
#ifdef PR_ATTACHADDRPERM
{ PR_ATTACHADDRPERM, "PR_ATTACHADDRPERM" },
#endif
#ifdef PR_PTHREADEXIT
{ PR_PTHREADEXIT, "PR_PTHREADEXIT" },
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#endif
#ifdef PR_SET_PDEATHSIG
{ PR_SET_PDEATHSIG, "PR_SET_PDEATHSIG" },
#endif
#ifdef PR_GET_PDEATHSIG
{ PR_GET_PDEATHSIG, "PR_GET_PDEATHSIG" },
#endif
#ifdef PR_GET_DUMPABLE
{ PR_GET_DUMPABLE, "PR_GET_DUMPABLE" },
#endif
#ifdef PR_SET_DUMPABLE
{ PR_SET_DUMPABLE, "PR_SET_DUMPABLE" },
#endif
#ifdef PR_GET_UNALIGN
{ PR_GET_UNALIGN, "PR_GET_UNALIGN" },
#endif
#ifdef PR_SET_UNALIGN
{ PR_SET_UNALIGN, "PR_SET_UNALIGN" },
#endif
#ifdef PR_GET_KEEPCAPS
{ PR_GET_KEEPCAPS, "PR_GET_KEEPCAPS" },
#endif
#ifdef PR_SET_KEEPCAPS
{ PR_SET_KEEPCAPS, "PR_SET_KEEPCAPS" },
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#endif
#ifdef PR_GET_FPEMU
{ PR_GET_FPEMU, "PR_GET_FPEMU" },
#endif
#ifdef PR_SET_FPEMU
{ PR_SET_FPEMU, "PR_SET_FPEMU" },
#endif
#ifdef PR_GET_FPEXC
{ PR_GET_FPEXC, "PR_GET_FPEXC" },
#endif
#ifdef PR_SET_FPEXC
{ PR_SET_FPEXC, "PR_SET_FPEXC" },
#endif
#ifdef PR_GET_TIMING
{ PR_GET_TIMING, "PR_GET_TIMING" },
#endif
#ifdef PR_SET_TIMING
{ PR_SET_TIMING, "PR_SET_TIMING" },
#endif
#ifdef PR_SET_NAME
{ PR_SET_NAME, "PR_SET_NAME" },
#endif
#ifdef PR_GET_NAME
{ PR_GET_NAME, "PR_GET_NAME" },
#endif
#ifdef PR_GET_ENDIAN
{ PR_GET_ENDIAN, "PR_GET_ENDIAN" },
#endif
#ifdef PR_SET_ENDIAN
{ PR_SET_ENDIAN, "PR_SET_ENDIAN" },
#endif
#ifdef PR_GET_SECCOMP
{ PR_GET_SECCOMP, "PR_GET_SECCOMP" },
#endif
#ifdef PR_SET_SECCOMP
{ PR_SET_SECCOMP, "PR_SET_SECCOMP" },
#endif
#ifdef PR_GET_TSC
{ PR_GET_TSC, "PR_GET_TSC" },
#endif
#ifdef PR_SET_TSC
{ PR_SET_TSC, "PR_SET_TSC" },
#endif
#ifdef PR_GET_SECUREBITS
{ PR_GET_SECUREBITS, "PR_GET_SECUREBITS" },
#endif
#ifdef PR_SET_SECUREBITS
{ PR_SET_SECUREBITS, "PR_SET_SECUREBITS" },
#endif
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{ 0, NULL },
};
static const char *
unalignctl_string(unsigned int ctl)
{
static char buf[sizeof(int)*2 + 2];
switch (ctl) {
#ifdef PR_UNALIGN_NOPRINT
case PR_UNALIGN_NOPRINT:
return "NOPRINT";
#endif
#ifdef PR_UNALIGN_SIGBUS
case PR_UNALIGN_SIGBUS:
return "SIGBUS";
#endif
default:
break;
}
sprintf(buf, "%x", ctl);
return buf;
}
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int
sys_prctl(struct tcb *tcp)
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{
int i;
if (entering(tcp)) {
printxval(prctl_options, tcp->u_arg[0], "PR_???");
switch (tcp->u_arg[0]) {
#ifdef PR_GETNSHARE
case PR_GETNSHARE:
break;
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#endif
#ifdef PR_SET_PDEATHSIG
case PR_SET_PDEATHSIG:
tprintf(", %lu", tcp->u_arg[1]);
break;
#endif
#ifdef PR_GET_PDEATHSIG
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case PR_GET_PDEATHSIG:
break;
#endif
#ifdef PR_SET_DUMPABLE
case PR_SET_DUMPABLE:
tprintf(", %lu", tcp->u_arg[1]);
break;
#endif
#ifdef PR_GET_DUMPABLE
case PR_GET_DUMPABLE:
break;
#endif
#ifdef PR_SET_UNALIGN
case PR_SET_UNALIGN:
tprintf(", %s", unalignctl_string(tcp->u_arg[1]));
break;
#endif
#ifdef PR_GET_UNALIGN
case PR_GET_UNALIGN:
tprintf(", %#lx", tcp->u_arg[1]);
break;
#endif
#ifdef PR_SET_KEEPCAPS
case PR_SET_KEEPCAPS:
tprintf(", %lu", tcp->u_arg[1]);
break;
#endif
#ifdef PR_GET_KEEPCAPS
case PR_GET_KEEPCAPS:
break;
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#endif
default:
for (i = 1; i < tcp->u_nargs; i++)
tprintf(", %#lx", tcp->u_arg[i]);
break;
}
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} else {
switch (tcp->u_arg[0]) {
#ifdef PR_GET_PDEATHSIG
case PR_GET_PDEATHSIG:
if (umove(tcp, tcp->u_arg[1], &i) < 0)
tprintf(", %#lx", tcp->u_arg[1]);
else
tprintf(", {%u}", i);
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break;
#endif
#ifdef PR_GET_DUMPABLE
case PR_GET_DUMPABLE:
return RVAL_UDECIMAL;
#endif
#ifdef PR_GET_UNALIGN
case PR_GET_UNALIGN:
if (syserror(tcp) || umove(tcp, tcp->u_arg[1], &i) < 0)
break;
tcp->auxstr = unalignctl_string(i);
return RVAL_STR;
#endif
#ifdef PR_GET_KEEPCAPS
case PR_GET_KEEPCAPS:
return RVAL_UDECIMAL;
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#endif
default:
break;
}
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}
return 0;
}
#endif /* HAVE_PRCTL */
int
sys_sethostname(struct tcb *tcp)
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{
if (entering(tcp)) {
printpathn(tcp, tcp->u_arg[0], tcp->u_arg[1]);
tprintf(", %lu", tcp->u_arg[1]);
}
return 0;
}
#if defined(ALPHA)
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int
sys_gethostname(struct tcb *tcp)
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{
if (exiting(tcp)) {
if (syserror(tcp))
tprintf("%#lx", tcp->u_arg[0]);
else
printpath(tcp, tcp->u_arg[0]);
tprintf(", %lu", tcp->u_arg[1]);
}
return 0;
}
#endif
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int
sys_setdomainname(struct tcb *tcp)
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{
if (entering(tcp)) {
printpathn(tcp, tcp->u_arg[0], tcp->u_arg[1]);
tprintf(", %lu", tcp->u_arg[1]);
}
return 0;
}
int
sys_exit(struct tcb *tcp)
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{
if (exiting(tcp)) {
fprintf(stderr, "_exit returned!\n");
return -1;
}
/* special case: we stop tracing this process, finish line now */
tprintf("%ld) ", tcp->u_arg[0]);
tabto();
tprints("= ?\n");
line_ended();
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return 0;
}
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/* defines copied from linux/sched.h since we can't include that
* ourselves (it conflicts with *lots* of libc includes)
*/
#define CSIGNAL 0x000000ff /* signal mask to be sent at exit */
#define CLONE_VM 0x00000100 /* set if VM shared between processes */
#define CLONE_FS 0x00000200 /* set if fs info shared between processes */
#define CLONE_FILES 0x00000400 /* set if open files shared between processes */
#define CLONE_SIGHAND 0x00000800 /* set if signal handlers shared */
#define CLONE_IDLETASK 0x00001000 /* kernel-only flag */
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#define CLONE_PTRACE 0x00002000 /* set if we want to let tracing continue on the child too */
#define CLONE_VFORK 0x00004000 /* set if the parent wants the child to wake it up on mm_release */
#define CLONE_PARENT 0x00008000 /* set if we want to have the same parent as the cloner */
#define CLONE_THREAD 0x00010000 /* Same thread group? */
#define CLONE_NEWNS 0x00020000 /* New namespace group? */
#define CLONE_SYSVSEM 0x00040000 /* share system V SEM_UNDO semantics */
#define CLONE_SETTLS 0x00080000 /* create a new TLS for the child */
#define CLONE_PARENT_SETTID 0x00100000 /* set the TID in the parent */
#define CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID 0x00200000 /* clear the TID in the child */
#define CLONE_UNTRACED 0x00800000 /* set if the tracing process can't force CLONE_PTRACE on this clone */
#define CLONE_CHILD_SETTID 0x01000000 /* set the TID in the child */
#define CLONE_STOPPED 0x02000000 /* Start in stopped state */
#define CLONE_NEWUTS 0x04000000 /* New utsname group? */
#define CLONE_NEWIPC 0x08000000 /* New ipcs */
#define CLONE_NEWUSER 0x10000000 /* New user namespace */
#define CLONE_NEWPID 0x20000000 /* New pid namespace */
#define CLONE_NEWNET 0x40000000 /* New network namespace */
#define CLONE_IO 0x80000000 /* Clone io context */
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static const struct xlat clone_flags[] = {
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{ CLONE_VM, "CLONE_VM" },
{ CLONE_FS, "CLONE_FS" },
{ CLONE_FILES, "CLONE_FILES" },
{ CLONE_SIGHAND, "CLONE_SIGHAND" },
{ CLONE_IDLETASK, "CLONE_IDLETASK"},
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{ CLONE_PTRACE, "CLONE_PTRACE" },
{ CLONE_VFORK, "CLONE_VFORK" },
{ CLONE_PARENT, "CLONE_PARENT" },
{ CLONE_THREAD, "CLONE_THREAD" },
{ CLONE_NEWNS, "CLONE_NEWNS" },
{ CLONE_SYSVSEM, "CLONE_SYSVSEM" },
{ CLONE_SETTLS, "CLONE_SETTLS" },
{ CLONE_PARENT_SETTID,"CLONE_PARENT_SETTID" },
{ CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID,"CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID" },
{ CLONE_UNTRACED, "CLONE_UNTRACED" },
{ CLONE_CHILD_SETTID,"CLONE_CHILD_SETTID" },
{ CLONE_STOPPED, "CLONE_STOPPED" },
{ CLONE_NEWUTS, "CLONE_NEWUTS" },
{ CLONE_NEWIPC, "CLONE_NEWIPC" },
{ CLONE_NEWUSER, "CLONE_NEWUSER" },
{ CLONE_NEWPID, "CLONE_NEWPID" },
{ CLONE_NEWNET, "CLONE_NEWNET" },
{ CLONE_IO, "CLONE_IO" },
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{ 0, NULL },
};
#ifdef I386
# include <asm/ldt.h>
# ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_USER_DESC
# define modify_ldt_ldt_s user_desc
# endif
extern void print_ldt_entry();
#endif
#if defined IA64
# define ARG_FLAGS 0
# define ARG_STACK 1
# define ARG_STACKSIZE (tcp->scno == SYS_clone2 ? 2 : -1)
# define ARG_PTID (tcp->scno == SYS_clone2 ? 3 : 2)
# define ARG_CTID (tcp->scno == SYS_clone2 ? 4 : 3)
# define ARG_TLS (tcp->scno == SYS_clone2 ? 5 : 4)
#elif defined S390 || defined S390X || defined CRISV10 || defined CRISV32
# define ARG_STACK 0
# define ARG_FLAGS 1
# define ARG_PTID 2
# define ARG_CTID 3
# define ARG_TLS 4
#elif defined X86_64 || defined ALPHA
# define ARG_FLAGS 0
# define ARG_STACK 1
# define ARG_PTID 2
# define ARG_CTID 3
# define ARG_TLS 4
#else
# define ARG_FLAGS 0
# define ARG_STACK 1
# define ARG_PTID 2
# define ARG_TLS 3
# define ARG_CTID 4
#endif
2000-02-04 00:58:30 +03:00
int
sys_clone(struct tcb *tcp)
2000-02-04 00:58:30 +03:00
{
if (exiting(tcp)) {
const char *sep = "|";
unsigned long flags = tcp->u_arg[ARG_FLAGS];
tprintf("child_stack=%#lx, ", tcp->u_arg[ARG_STACK]);
#ifdef ARG_STACKSIZE
if (ARG_STACKSIZE != -1)
tprintf("stack_size=%#lx, ",
tcp->u_arg[ARG_STACKSIZE]);
#endif
tprints("flags=");
if (!printflags(clone_flags, flags &~ CSIGNAL, NULL))
sep = "";
if ((flags & CSIGNAL) != 0)
tprintf("%s%s", sep, signame(flags & CSIGNAL));
if ((flags & (CLONE_PARENT_SETTID|CLONE_CHILD_SETTID
|CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID|CLONE_SETTLS)) == 0)
return 0;
if (flags & CLONE_PARENT_SETTID)
tprintf(", parent_tidptr=%#lx", tcp->u_arg[ARG_PTID]);
if (flags & CLONE_SETTLS) {
#ifdef I386
struct modify_ldt_ldt_s copy;
if (umove(tcp, tcp->u_arg[ARG_TLS], &copy) != -1) {
tprintf(", {entry_number:%d, ",
copy.entry_number);
if (!verbose(tcp))
tprints("...}");
else
print_ldt_entry(&copy);
}
else
#endif
2003-03-12 12:58:14 +03:00
tprintf(", tls=%#lx", tcp->u_arg[ARG_TLS]);
}
if (flags & (CLONE_CHILD_SETTID|CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID))
tprintf(", child_tidptr=%#lx", tcp->u_arg[ARG_CTID]);
2000-02-04 00:58:30 +03:00
}
return 0;
}
2006-10-13 Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com> Bernhard Kaindl <bk@suse.de> Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Michael Holzheu <holzheu@de.ibm.com> Add hooks for new syscalls. Add decoders for *at, inotify*, pselect6, ppoll and unshare syscalls. * defs.h: Declare print_sigset. * desc.c (sys_pselect6): New function. * file.c (decode_open, decode_access, decode_mkdir, decode_readlink, decode_chmod, decode_utimes, decode_mknod): New functions. (sys_open, sys_access, sys_mkdir, sys_readlink, sys_chmod, sys_utimes, sys_mknod): Use them. [LINUX] (fstatatflags, unlinkatflags, inotify_modes): New variables. [LINUX] (print_dirfd, sys_openat, sys_faccessat, sys_newfstatat, sys_mkdirat, sys_linkat, sys_unlinkat, sys_symlinkat, sys_readlinkat, sys_renameat, sys_fchownat, sys_fchmodat, sys_futimesat, sys_mknodat, sys_inotify_add_watch, sys_inotify_rm_watch): New functions. * process.c [LINUX] (sys_unshare): New function. * signal.c (print_sigset): New function. (sys_sigprocmask): Use it. * stream.c (decode_poll): New function. (sys_poll): Use it. [LINUX] (sys_ppoll): New function. * linux/syscall.h: Delcare new syscall handlers. * linux/syscallent.h: Hook up new syscalls. * linux/alpha/syscallent.h: Likewise. * linux/hppa/syscallent.h: Likewise. * linux/ia64/syscallent.h: Likewise. * linux/mips/syscallent.h: Likewise. * linux/powerpc/syscallent.h: Likewise. * linux/s390/syscallent.h: Likewise. * linux/s390x/syscallent.h: Likewise. * linux/sparc/syscallent.h: Likewise. * linux/sparc64/syscallent.h: Likewise. * linux/x86_64/syscallent.h: Likewise. Fixes RH#178633.
2006-10-14 00:25:12 +04:00
int
sys_unshare(struct tcb *tcp)
{
if (entering(tcp))
printflags(clone_flags, tcp->u_arg[0], "CLONE_???");
return 0;
}
1999-12-23 18:08:17 +03:00
1999-02-19 03:21:36 +03:00
int
sys_fork(struct tcb *tcp)
1999-02-19 03:21:36 +03:00
{
if (exiting(tcp))
return RVAL_UDECIMAL;
return 0;
}
int
change_syscall(struct tcb *tcp, int new)
{
#if defined(I386)
/* Attempt to make vfork into fork, which we can follow. */
if (ptrace(PTRACE_POKEUSER, tcp->pid, (char*)(ORIG_EAX * 4), new) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
#elif defined(X86_64)
/* Attempt to make vfork into fork, which we can follow. */
if (ptrace(PTRACE_POKEUSER, tcp->pid, (char*)(ORIG_RAX * 8), new) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
#elif defined(POWERPC)
if (ptrace(PTRACE_POKEUSER, tcp->pid,
(char*)(sizeof(unsigned long)*PT_R0), new) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
#elif defined(S390) || defined(S390X)
/* s390 linux after 2.4.7 has a hook in entry.S to allow this */
2011-06-07 14:13:24 +04:00
if (ptrace(PTRACE_POKEUSER, tcp->pid, (char*)(PT_GPR2), new) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
#elif defined(M68K)
2011-06-07 14:13:24 +04:00
if (ptrace(PTRACE_POKEUSER, tcp->pid, (char*)(4*PT_ORIG_D0), new) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
2004-07-07 David S. Miller <davem@nuts.davemloft.net> * linux/sparc/syscallent.h: Sync with reality. * linux/sparc/syscall.h (sys_sendfile64, sys_futex, sys_gettid, sys_sched_setaffinity, sys_sched_getaffinity, sys_setxattr, sys_lsetxattr, sys_fsetxattr, sys_getxattr, sys_lgetxattr, sys_fgetxattr, sys_listxattr, sys_llistxattr, sys_flistxattr, sys_removexattr, sys_lremovexattr, sys_fremovexattr, sys_remap_file_pages, sys_readahead, sys_tgkill, sys_statfs64, sys_fstatfs64, sys_clock_settime, sys_clock_gettime, sys_clock_getres, sys_clock_nanosleep, sys_timer_create, sys_timer_settime, sys_timer_gettime): New declarations. * linux/sparc64/dummy2.h, linux/sparc64/syscallent2.h, linux/sparc64/syscall.h, linux/sparc64/errnoent.h, linux/sparc64/errnoent1.h, linux/sparc64/errnoent2.h, linux/sparc64/ioctlent.h, linux/sparc64/ioctlent1.h, linux/sparc64/ioctlent2.h, linux/sparc64/signalent.h, linux/sparc64/signalent.h, linux/sparc64/signalent.h, linux/sparc64/signalent1.h, linux/sparc64/signalent2.h, linux/sparc64/syscall1.h, linux/sparc64/syscallent.h, linux/sparc64/syscallent1.h: New files. * defs.h (LINUXSPARC): Define also when SPARC64. (LINUX && SPARC64): Set SUPPORTED_PERSONALITIES to 3. Ignore SIGTRAP after execve by defining TCB_WAITEXECVE. Define possibly missing __NR_exit_group. Declare getrval2. * configure.ac (sparc64): New architecture case. * config.h.in (SPARC64): New define. * file.c (stat_sparc64): New structure. (printstat_sparc64): New output routine for that. (printstat): Call it, if personality is 2. (printstat64): Likewise. * util.c: Conditionalize ptrace defines on LINUXSPARC not LINUX && SPARC. (SPARC64 && LINUX): Define r_pc to r_tpc, and PTRACE_FOOREGS to PTRACE_FOOREGS64 so that more sparc code can be shared between 64-bit and 32-bit. (_hack_syscall5): Correct trap number when SPARC64. (PTRACE_WRITE{TEXT,DATA}): Add SPARC64 to ifdef guard. (getpc): Handle SPARC64 && LINUX. (printcall): Likewise. (arg fetching/setting): Use same code for SPARC64 LINUX as for SPARC. (setbpt): Handle SPARC64 && LINUX. (clearbpt): Likewise. * signal.c: Conditionalize ptrace defines on SPARC and SPARC64. (SPARC64 && LINUX): Define r_pc to r_tpc, and PTRACE_FOOREGS to PTRACE_FOOREGS64 so that more sparc code can be shared between 64-bit and 32-bit. (m_siginfo): Use same definition on SPARC64 as SPARC. (sys_sigreturn): Handle LINUX && SPARC64. * syscall.c: Conditionalize ptrace defines on SPARC and SPARC64. (SPARC64 && LINUX): Define r_pc to r_tpc, and PTRACE_FOOREGS to PTRACE_FOOREGS64 so that more sparc code can be shared between 64-bit and 32-bit. (getscno): Use same static state on SPARC64 as SPARC, and add SPARC64 handling. (get_error): Handle LINUX && SPARC64. (force_result): Likewise. (syscall_enter): Likewise. (trace_syscall): Handle sys_socketcall and sys_ipc on SPARC64 just like SPARC. (getrval2): Handle LINUX && SPARC64. * process.c: Conditionalize ptrace defines on SPARC and SPARC64. (SPARC64 && LINUX): Define r_pc to r_tpc, and PTRACE_FOOREGS to PTRACE_FOOREGS64 so that more sparc code can be shared between 64-bit and 32-bit. (change_syscall): Handle LINUX && SPARC64. (struct_user_offsets): Ifdef out those which do not exist on SPARC64. * net.c (sys_pipe): Handle LINUX && SPARC64. * ioctl.c: Fix initializer typo for nioctlents2, was nioctlents1 by accident.
2004-07-12 11:44:08 +04:00
#elif defined(SPARC) || defined(SPARC64)
struct pt_regs regs;
2011-06-07 14:13:24 +04:00
if (ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGS, tcp->pid, (char*)&regs, 0) < 0)
return -1;
regs.u_regs[U_REG_G1] = new;
2011-06-07 14:13:24 +04:00
if (ptrace(PTRACE_SETREGS, tcp->pid, (char*)&regs, 0) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
#elif defined(MIPS)
2011-06-07 14:13:24 +04:00
if (ptrace(PTRACE_POKEUSER, tcp->pid, (char*)(REG_V0), new) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
#elif defined(ALPHA)
2011-06-07 14:13:24 +04:00
if (ptrace(PTRACE_POKEUSER, tcp->pid, (char*)(REG_A3), new) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
#elif defined(AVR32)
if (ptrace(PTRACE_POKEUSER, tcp->pid, (char*)(REG_R8), new) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
#elif defined(BFIN)
2011-06-07 14:13:24 +04:00
if (ptrace(PTRACE_POKEUSER, tcp->pid, (char*)(REG_P0), new) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
#elif defined(IA64)
if (ia32) {
switch (new) {
case 2:
break; /* x86 SYS_fork */
case SYS_clone:
new = 120;
break;
default:
fprintf(stderr, "%s: unexpected syscall %d\n",
__FUNCTION__, new);
return -1;
}
2011-06-07 14:13:24 +04:00
if (ptrace(PTRACE_POKEUSER, tcp->pid, (char*)(PT_R1), new) < 0)
return -1;
2011-06-07 14:13:24 +04:00
} else if (ptrace(PTRACE_POKEUSER, tcp->pid, (char*)(PT_R15), new) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
#elif defined(HPPA)
2011-06-07 14:13:24 +04:00
if (ptrace(PTRACE_POKEUSER, tcp->pid, (char*)(PT_GR20), new) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
#elif defined(SH)
2011-06-07 14:13:24 +04:00
if (ptrace(PTRACE_POKEUSER, tcp->pid, (char*)(4*(REG_REG0+3)), new) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
#elif defined(SH64)
/* Top half of reg encodes the no. of args n as 0x1n.
Assume 0 args as kernel never actually checks... */
if (ptrace(PTRACE_POKEUSER, tcp->pid, (char*)(REG_SYSCALL),
0x100000 | new) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
#elif defined(CRISV10) || defined(CRISV32)
if (ptrace(PTRACE_POKEUSER, tcp->pid, (char*)(4*PT_R9), new) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
#elif defined(ARM)
/* Some kernels support this, some (pre-2.6.16 or so) don't. */
# ifndef PTRACE_SET_SYSCALL
# define PTRACE_SET_SYSCALL 23
# endif
2011-06-07 14:13:24 +04:00
if (ptrace(PTRACE_SET_SYSCALL, tcp->pid, 0, new & 0xffff) != 0)
return -1;
return 0;
#elif defined(TILE)
if (ptrace(PTRACE_POKEUSER, tcp->pid,
(char*)PTREGS_OFFSET_REG(0),
new) != 0)
return -1;
return 0;
#elif defined(MICROBLAZE)
2011-06-07 14:13:24 +04:00
if (ptrace(PTRACE_POKEUSER, tcp->pid, (char*)(PT_GPR(0)), new) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
#else
#warning Do not know how to handle change_syscall for this architecture
#endif /* architecture */
return -1;
}
1999-12-23 18:08:17 +03:00
int
internal_fork(struct tcb *tcp)
1999-12-23 18:08:17 +03:00
{
if ((ptrace_setoptions
& (PTRACE_O_TRACECLONE | PTRACE_O_TRACEFORK | PTRACE_O_TRACEVFORK))
== (PTRACE_O_TRACECLONE | PTRACE_O_TRACEFORK | PTRACE_O_TRACEVFORK))
return 0;
if (!followfork)
return 0;
1999-12-23 18:08:17 +03:00
if (entering(tcp)) {
/*
Remove TCB_SUSPENDED constant and related code. Since we no longer suspend waitpid'ing tracees, we have only one case when we suspend tracee: when we pick up a new tracee created by clone/fork/vfork. Background: on some other OSes, attach to child is done this way: get fork's result (pid), loop ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH) until you hook up new process/thread. This is ugly and not safe, but what matters for us is that it doesn't require suspending. Suspending is required on Linux only, because on Linux attach to child is done differently. On Linux, we use two methods of catching new tracee: adding CLONE_THREAD bit to syscall (if needed, we change [v]fork into clone before that), or using ptrace options. In both cases, it may be so that new tracee appears before one which created it returns from syscall. In this case, current code suspends new tracee until its creator returns. Only then strace can determine who is its parent (it needs child's pid for this, which is visible in parent's [v]fork/clone result). This is inherently racy. For example, what if SIGKILL kills creator after it succeeded creating child, but before it returns? Looks like we will have child suspended forever. But after previous commit, we DO NOT NEED parent<->child link for anything. Therefore we do not need suspending too. Bingo! This patch removes suspending code. Now new tracees will be continued right away. Next patch will remove tcp->parent member. * defs.h: Remove TCB_SUSPENDED constant * process.c (handle_new_child): Delete this function. (internal_fork): Do not call handle_new_child on syscall exit. * strace.c (handle_ptrace_event): Delete this function. (trace): Do not suspend new child; remove all handling of now impossible TCB_SUSPENDED condition. Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
2011-08-17 13:30:56 +04:00
* We won't see the new child if clone is called with
* CLONE_UNTRACED, so we keep the same logic with that option
* and don't trace it.
*/
if ((sysent[tcp->scno].sys_func == sys_clone) &&
(tcp->u_arg[ARG_FLAGS] & CLONE_UNTRACED))
return 0;
setbpt(tcp);
1999-12-23 18:08:17 +03:00
} else {
Remove TCB_SUSPENDED constant and related code. Since we no longer suspend waitpid'ing tracees, we have only one case when we suspend tracee: when we pick up a new tracee created by clone/fork/vfork. Background: on some other OSes, attach to child is done this way: get fork's result (pid), loop ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH) until you hook up new process/thread. This is ugly and not safe, but what matters for us is that it doesn't require suspending. Suspending is required on Linux only, because on Linux attach to child is done differently. On Linux, we use two methods of catching new tracee: adding CLONE_THREAD bit to syscall (if needed, we change [v]fork into clone before that), or using ptrace options. In both cases, it may be so that new tracee appears before one which created it returns from syscall. In this case, current code suspends new tracee until its creator returns. Only then strace can determine who is its parent (it needs child's pid for this, which is visible in parent's [v]fork/clone result). This is inherently racy. For example, what if SIGKILL kills creator after it succeeded creating child, but before it returns? Looks like we will have child suspended forever. But after previous commit, we DO NOT NEED parent<->child link for anything. Therefore we do not need suspending too. Bingo! This patch removes suspending code. Now new tracees will be continued right away. Next patch will remove tcp->parent member. * defs.h: Remove TCB_SUSPENDED constant * process.c (handle_new_child): Delete this function. (internal_fork): Do not call handle_new_child on syscall exit. * strace.c (handle_ptrace_event): Delete this function. (trace): Do not suspend new child; remove all handling of now impossible TCB_SUSPENDED condition. Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
2011-08-17 13:30:56 +04:00
if (tcp->flags & TCB_BPTSET)
clearbpt(tcp);
}
1999-12-23 18:08:17 +03:00
return 0;
}
1999-02-19 03:21:36 +03:00
int
sys_vfork(struct tcb *tcp)
1999-02-19 03:21:36 +03:00
{
if (exiting(tcp))
return RVAL_UDECIMAL;
return 0;
}
int sys_getuid(struct tcb *tcp)
{
if (exiting(tcp))
tcp->u_rval = (uid_t) tcp->u_rval;
return RVAL_UDECIMAL;
}
int sys_setfsuid(struct tcb *tcp)
{
if (entering(tcp))
tprintf("%u", (uid_t) tcp->u_arg[0]);
else
tcp->u_rval = (uid_t) tcp->u_rval;
return RVAL_UDECIMAL;
}
1999-02-19 03:21:36 +03:00
int
sys_setuid(struct tcb *tcp)
1999-02-19 03:21:36 +03:00
{
if (entering(tcp)) {
tprintf("%u", (uid_t) tcp->u_arg[0]);
}
return 0;
}
int
sys_getresuid(struct tcb *tcp)
1999-02-19 03:21:36 +03:00
{
if (exiting(tcp)) {
__kernel_uid_t uid;
if (syserror(tcp))
tprintf("%#lx, %#lx, %#lx", tcp->u_arg[0],
tcp->u_arg[1], tcp->u_arg[2]);
else {
if (umove(tcp, tcp->u_arg[0], &uid) < 0)
tprintf("%#lx, ", tcp->u_arg[0]);
else
tprintf("[%lu], ", (unsigned long) uid);
if (umove(tcp, tcp->u_arg[1], &uid) < 0)
tprintf("%#lx, ", tcp->u_arg[1]);
else
tprintf("[%lu], ", (unsigned long) uid);
if (umove(tcp, tcp->u_arg[2], &uid) < 0)
tprintf("%#lx", tcp->u_arg[2]);
else
tprintf("[%lu]", (unsigned long) uid);
}
1999-02-19 03:21:36 +03:00
}
return 0;
}
int
sys_setreuid(struct tcb *tcp)
1999-02-19 03:21:36 +03:00
{
if (entering(tcp)) {
printuid("", tcp->u_arg[0]);
printuid(", ", tcp->u_arg[1]);
1999-02-19 03:21:36 +03:00
}
return 0;
}
int
sys_setresuid(struct tcb *tcp)
1999-02-19 03:21:36 +03:00
{
if (entering(tcp)) {
printuid("", tcp->u_arg[0]);
printuid(", ", tcp->u_arg[1]);
printuid(", ", tcp->u_arg[2]);
1999-02-19 03:21:36 +03:00
}
return 0;
}
int
sys_setgroups(struct tcb *tcp)
1999-02-19 03:21:36 +03:00
{
if (entering(tcp)) {
2005-05-31 Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Deal with memory management issues. * defs.h (tprint_iov): Update prototype. * desc.c (sys_epoll_wait) [HAVE_SYS_EPOLL_H]: Do not allocate epoll_event array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * file.c (print_xattr_val): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * io.c (tprint_iov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change iovec array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * mem.c (get_nodes) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during size calculation and do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * net.c (printcmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. Do not trust cmsg.cmsg_len to avoid read beyond the end of allocated object. (printmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Update tprint_iov() usage. * process.c (sys_setgroups): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change gid_t array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. (sys_getgroups): Likewise. (sys_setgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. (sys_getgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. * stream.c (sys_poll) [HAVE_SYS_POLL_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change pollfd array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * system.c (sys_sysctl) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * util.c (dumpiov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Fixes RH#159196.
2005-06-01 23:22:06 +04:00
unsigned long len, size, start, cur, end, abbrev_end;
GETGROUPS_T gid;
int failed = 0;
1999-02-19 03:21:36 +03:00
len = tcp->u_arg[0];
2005-05-31 Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Deal with memory management issues. * defs.h (tprint_iov): Update prototype. * desc.c (sys_epoll_wait) [HAVE_SYS_EPOLL_H]: Do not allocate epoll_event array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * file.c (print_xattr_val): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * io.c (tprint_iov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change iovec array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * mem.c (get_nodes) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during size calculation and do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * net.c (printcmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. Do not trust cmsg.cmsg_len to avoid read beyond the end of allocated object. (printmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Update tprint_iov() usage. * process.c (sys_setgroups): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change gid_t array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. (sys_getgroups): Likewise. (sys_setgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. (sys_getgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. * stream.c (sys_poll) [HAVE_SYS_POLL_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change pollfd array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * system.c (sys_sysctl) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * util.c (dumpiov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Fixes RH#159196.
2005-06-01 23:22:06 +04:00
tprintf("%lu, ", len);
if (len == 0) {
tprints("[]");
1999-02-19 03:21:36 +03:00
return 0;
}
2005-05-31 Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Deal with memory management issues. * defs.h (tprint_iov): Update prototype. * desc.c (sys_epoll_wait) [HAVE_SYS_EPOLL_H]: Do not allocate epoll_event array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * file.c (print_xattr_val): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * io.c (tprint_iov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change iovec array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * mem.c (get_nodes) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during size calculation and do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * net.c (printcmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. Do not trust cmsg.cmsg_len to avoid read beyond the end of allocated object. (printmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Update tprint_iov() usage. * process.c (sys_setgroups): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change gid_t array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. (sys_getgroups): Likewise. (sys_setgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. (sys_getgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. * stream.c (sys_poll) [HAVE_SYS_POLL_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change pollfd array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * system.c (sys_sysctl) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * util.c (dumpiov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Fixes RH#159196.
2005-06-01 23:22:06 +04:00
start = tcp->u_arg[1];
if (start == 0) {
tprints("NULL");
2005-05-31 Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Deal with memory management issues. * defs.h (tprint_iov): Update prototype. * desc.c (sys_epoll_wait) [HAVE_SYS_EPOLL_H]: Do not allocate epoll_event array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * file.c (print_xattr_val): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * io.c (tprint_iov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change iovec array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * mem.c (get_nodes) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during size calculation and do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * net.c (printcmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. Do not trust cmsg.cmsg_len to avoid read beyond the end of allocated object. (printmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Update tprint_iov() usage. * process.c (sys_setgroups): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change gid_t array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. (sys_getgroups): Likewise. (sys_setgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. (sys_getgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. * stream.c (sys_poll) [HAVE_SYS_POLL_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change pollfd array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * system.c (sys_sysctl) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * util.c (dumpiov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Fixes RH#159196.
2005-06-01 23:22:06 +04:00
return 0;
1999-02-19 03:21:36 +03:00
}
2005-05-31 Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Deal with memory management issues. * defs.h (tprint_iov): Update prototype. * desc.c (sys_epoll_wait) [HAVE_SYS_EPOLL_H]: Do not allocate epoll_event array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * file.c (print_xattr_val): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * io.c (tprint_iov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change iovec array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * mem.c (get_nodes) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during size calculation and do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * net.c (printcmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. Do not trust cmsg.cmsg_len to avoid read beyond the end of allocated object. (printmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Update tprint_iov() usage. * process.c (sys_setgroups): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change gid_t array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. (sys_getgroups): Likewise. (sys_setgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. (sys_getgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. * stream.c (sys_poll) [HAVE_SYS_POLL_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change pollfd array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * system.c (sys_sysctl) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * util.c (dumpiov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Fixes RH#159196.
2005-06-01 23:22:06 +04:00
size = len * sizeof(gid);
end = start + size;
if (!verbose(tcp) || size / sizeof(gid) != len || end < start) {
tprintf("%#lx", start);
return 0;
}
if (abbrev(tcp)) {
abbrev_end = start + max_strlen * sizeof(gid);
if (abbrev_end < start)
abbrev_end = end;
} else {
abbrev_end = end;
}
tprints("[");
2005-05-31 Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Deal with memory management issues. * defs.h (tprint_iov): Update prototype. * desc.c (sys_epoll_wait) [HAVE_SYS_EPOLL_H]: Do not allocate epoll_event array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * file.c (print_xattr_val): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * io.c (tprint_iov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change iovec array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * mem.c (get_nodes) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during size calculation and do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * net.c (printcmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. Do not trust cmsg.cmsg_len to avoid read beyond the end of allocated object. (printmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Update tprint_iov() usage. * process.c (sys_setgroups): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change gid_t array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. (sys_getgroups): Likewise. (sys_setgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. (sys_getgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. * stream.c (sys_poll) [HAVE_SYS_POLL_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change pollfd array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * system.c (sys_sysctl) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * util.c (dumpiov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Fixes RH#159196.
2005-06-01 23:22:06 +04:00
for (cur = start; cur < end; cur += sizeof(gid)) {
if (cur > start)
tprints(", ");
2005-05-31 Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Deal with memory management issues. * defs.h (tprint_iov): Update prototype. * desc.c (sys_epoll_wait) [HAVE_SYS_EPOLL_H]: Do not allocate epoll_event array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * file.c (print_xattr_val): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * io.c (tprint_iov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change iovec array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * mem.c (get_nodes) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during size calculation and do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * net.c (printcmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. Do not trust cmsg.cmsg_len to avoid read beyond the end of allocated object. (printmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Update tprint_iov() usage. * process.c (sys_setgroups): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change gid_t array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. (sys_getgroups): Likewise. (sys_setgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. (sys_getgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. * stream.c (sys_poll) [HAVE_SYS_POLL_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change pollfd array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * system.c (sys_sysctl) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * util.c (dumpiov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Fixes RH#159196.
2005-06-01 23:22:06 +04:00
if (cur >= abbrev_end) {
tprints("...");
2005-05-31 Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Deal with memory management issues. * defs.h (tprint_iov): Update prototype. * desc.c (sys_epoll_wait) [HAVE_SYS_EPOLL_H]: Do not allocate epoll_event array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * file.c (print_xattr_val): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * io.c (tprint_iov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change iovec array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * mem.c (get_nodes) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during size calculation and do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * net.c (printcmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. Do not trust cmsg.cmsg_len to avoid read beyond the end of allocated object. (printmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Update tprint_iov() usage. * process.c (sys_setgroups): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change gid_t array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. (sys_getgroups): Likewise. (sys_setgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. (sys_getgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. * stream.c (sys_poll) [HAVE_SYS_POLL_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change pollfd array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * system.c (sys_sysctl) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * util.c (dumpiov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Fixes RH#159196.
2005-06-01 23:22:06 +04:00
break;
}
if (umoven(tcp, cur, sizeof(gid), (char *) &gid) < 0) {
tprints("?");
2005-05-31 Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Deal with memory management issues. * defs.h (tprint_iov): Update prototype. * desc.c (sys_epoll_wait) [HAVE_SYS_EPOLL_H]: Do not allocate epoll_event array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * file.c (print_xattr_val): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * io.c (tprint_iov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change iovec array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * mem.c (get_nodes) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during size calculation and do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * net.c (printcmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. Do not trust cmsg.cmsg_len to avoid read beyond the end of allocated object. (printmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Update tprint_iov() usage. * process.c (sys_setgroups): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change gid_t array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. (sys_getgroups): Likewise. (sys_setgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. (sys_getgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. * stream.c (sys_poll) [HAVE_SYS_POLL_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change pollfd array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * system.c (sys_sysctl) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * util.c (dumpiov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Fixes RH#159196.
2005-06-01 23:22:06 +04:00
failed = 1;
break;
}
tprintf("%lu", (unsigned long) gid);
1999-02-19 03:21:36 +03:00
}
tprints("]");
2005-05-31 Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Deal with memory management issues. * defs.h (tprint_iov): Update prototype. * desc.c (sys_epoll_wait) [HAVE_SYS_EPOLL_H]: Do not allocate epoll_event array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * file.c (print_xattr_val): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * io.c (tprint_iov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change iovec array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * mem.c (get_nodes) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during size calculation and do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * net.c (printcmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. Do not trust cmsg.cmsg_len to avoid read beyond the end of allocated object. (printmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Update tprint_iov() usage. * process.c (sys_setgroups): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change gid_t array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. (sys_getgroups): Likewise. (sys_setgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. (sys_getgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. * stream.c (sys_poll) [HAVE_SYS_POLL_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change pollfd array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * system.c (sys_sysctl) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * util.c (dumpiov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Fixes RH#159196.
2005-06-01 23:22:06 +04:00
if (failed)
tprintf(" %#lx", tcp->u_arg[1]);
1999-02-19 03:21:36 +03:00
}
return 0;
}
int
sys_getgroups(struct tcb *tcp)
1999-02-19 03:21:36 +03:00
{
2005-05-31 Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Deal with memory management issues. * defs.h (tprint_iov): Update prototype. * desc.c (sys_epoll_wait) [HAVE_SYS_EPOLL_H]: Do not allocate epoll_event array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * file.c (print_xattr_val): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * io.c (tprint_iov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change iovec array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * mem.c (get_nodes) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during size calculation and do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * net.c (printcmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. Do not trust cmsg.cmsg_len to avoid read beyond the end of allocated object. (printmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Update tprint_iov() usage. * process.c (sys_setgroups): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change gid_t array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. (sys_getgroups): Likewise. (sys_setgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. (sys_getgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. * stream.c (sys_poll) [HAVE_SYS_POLL_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change pollfd array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * system.c (sys_sysctl) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * util.c (dumpiov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Fixes RH#159196.
2005-06-01 23:22:06 +04:00
unsigned long len;
1999-02-19 03:21:36 +03:00
if (entering(tcp)) {
len = tcp->u_arg[0];
2005-05-31 Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Deal with memory management issues. * defs.h (tprint_iov): Update prototype. * desc.c (sys_epoll_wait) [HAVE_SYS_EPOLL_H]: Do not allocate epoll_event array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * file.c (print_xattr_val): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * io.c (tprint_iov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change iovec array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * mem.c (get_nodes) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during size calculation and do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * net.c (printcmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. Do not trust cmsg.cmsg_len to avoid read beyond the end of allocated object. (printmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Update tprint_iov() usage. * process.c (sys_setgroups): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change gid_t array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. (sys_getgroups): Likewise. (sys_setgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. (sys_getgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. * stream.c (sys_poll) [HAVE_SYS_POLL_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change pollfd array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * system.c (sys_sysctl) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * util.c (dumpiov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Fixes RH#159196.
2005-06-01 23:22:06 +04:00
tprintf("%lu, ", len);
1999-02-19 03:21:36 +03:00
} else {
2005-05-31 Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Deal with memory management issues. * defs.h (tprint_iov): Update prototype. * desc.c (sys_epoll_wait) [HAVE_SYS_EPOLL_H]: Do not allocate epoll_event array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * file.c (print_xattr_val): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * io.c (tprint_iov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change iovec array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * mem.c (get_nodes) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during size calculation and do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * net.c (printcmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. Do not trust cmsg.cmsg_len to avoid read beyond the end of allocated object. (printmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Update tprint_iov() usage. * process.c (sys_setgroups): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change gid_t array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. (sys_getgroups): Likewise. (sys_setgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. (sys_getgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. * stream.c (sys_poll) [HAVE_SYS_POLL_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change pollfd array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * system.c (sys_sysctl) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * util.c (dumpiov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Fixes RH#159196.
2005-06-01 23:22:06 +04:00
unsigned long size, start, cur, end, abbrev_end;
GETGROUPS_T gid;
int failed = 0;
1999-02-19 03:21:36 +03:00
len = tcp->u_rval;
2005-05-31 Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Deal with memory management issues. * defs.h (tprint_iov): Update prototype. * desc.c (sys_epoll_wait) [HAVE_SYS_EPOLL_H]: Do not allocate epoll_event array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * file.c (print_xattr_val): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * io.c (tprint_iov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change iovec array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * mem.c (get_nodes) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during size calculation and do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * net.c (printcmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. Do not trust cmsg.cmsg_len to avoid read beyond the end of allocated object. (printmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Update tprint_iov() usage. * process.c (sys_setgroups): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change gid_t array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. (sys_getgroups): Likewise. (sys_setgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. (sys_getgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. * stream.c (sys_poll) [HAVE_SYS_POLL_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change pollfd array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * system.c (sys_sysctl) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * util.c (dumpiov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Fixes RH#159196.
2005-06-01 23:22:06 +04:00
if (len == 0) {
tprints("[]");
1999-02-19 03:21:36 +03:00
return 0;
}
2005-05-31 Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Deal with memory management issues. * defs.h (tprint_iov): Update prototype. * desc.c (sys_epoll_wait) [HAVE_SYS_EPOLL_H]: Do not allocate epoll_event array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * file.c (print_xattr_val): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * io.c (tprint_iov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change iovec array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * mem.c (get_nodes) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during size calculation and do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * net.c (printcmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. Do not trust cmsg.cmsg_len to avoid read beyond the end of allocated object. (printmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Update tprint_iov() usage. * process.c (sys_setgroups): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change gid_t array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. (sys_getgroups): Likewise. (sys_setgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. (sys_getgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. * stream.c (sys_poll) [HAVE_SYS_POLL_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change pollfd array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * system.c (sys_sysctl) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * util.c (dumpiov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Fixes RH#159196.
2005-06-01 23:22:06 +04:00
start = tcp->u_arg[1];
if (start == 0) {
tprints("NULL");
2005-05-31 Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Deal with memory management issues. * defs.h (tprint_iov): Update prototype. * desc.c (sys_epoll_wait) [HAVE_SYS_EPOLL_H]: Do not allocate epoll_event array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * file.c (print_xattr_val): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * io.c (tprint_iov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change iovec array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * mem.c (get_nodes) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during size calculation and do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * net.c (printcmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. Do not trust cmsg.cmsg_len to avoid read beyond the end of allocated object. (printmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Update tprint_iov() usage. * process.c (sys_setgroups): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change gid_t array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. (sys_getgroups): Likewise. (sys_setgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. (sys_getgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. * stream.c (sys_poll) [HAVE_SYS_POLL_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change pollfd array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * system.c (sys_sysctl) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * util.c (dumpiov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Fixes RH#159196.
2005-06-01 23:22:06 +04:00
return 0;
}
if (tcp->u_arg[0] == 0) {
tprintf("%#lx", start);
return 0;
}
size = len * sizeof(gid);
end = start + size;
if (!verbose(tcp) || tcp->u_arg[0] == 0 ||
size / sizeof(gid) != len || end < start) {
tprintf("%#lx", start);
return 0;
}
if (abbrev(tcp)) {
abbrev_end = start + max_strlen * sizeof(gid);
if (abbrev_end < start)
abbrev_end = end;
} else {
abbrev_end = end;
}
tprints("[");
2005-05-31 Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Deal with memory management issues. * defs.h (tprint_iov): Update prototype. * desc.c (sys_epoll_wait) [HAVE_SYS_EPOLL_H]: Do not allocate epoll_event array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * file.c (print_xattr_val): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * io.c (tprint_iov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change iovec array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * mem.c (get_nodes) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during size calculation and do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * net.c (printcmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. Do not trust cmsg.cmsg_len to avoid read beyond the end of allocated object. (printmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Update tprint_iov() usage. * process.c (sys_setgroups): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change gid_t array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. (sys_getgroups): Likewise. (sys_setgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. (sys_getgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. * stream.c (sys_poll) [HAVE_SYS_POLL_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change pollfd array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * system.c (sys_sysctl) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * util.c (dumpiov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Fixes RH#159196.
2005-06-01 23:22:06 +04:00
for (cur = start; cur < end; cur += sizeof(gid)) {
if (cur > start)
tprints(", ");
2005-05-31 Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Deal with memory management issues. * defs.h (tprint_iov): Update prototype. * desc.c (sys_epoll_wait) [HAVE_SYS_EPOLL_H]: Do not allocate epoll_event array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * file.c (print_xattr_val): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * io.c (tprint_iov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change iovec array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * mem.c (get_nodes) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during size calculation and do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * net.c (printcmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. Do not trust cmsg.cmsg_len to avoid read beyond the end of allocated object. (printmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Update tprint_iov() usage. * process.c (sys_setgroups): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change gid_t array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. (sys_getgroups): Likewise. (sys_setgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. (sys_getgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. * stream.c (sys_poll) [HAVE_SYS_POLL_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change pollfd array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * system.c (sys_sysctl) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * util.c (dumpiov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Fixes RH#159196.
2005-06-01 23:22:06 +04:00
if (cur >= abbrev_end) {
tprints("...");
2005-05-31 Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Deal with memory management issues. * defs.h (tprint_iov): Update prototype. * desc.c (sys_epoll_wait) [HAVE_SYS_EPOLL_H]: Do not allocate epoll_event array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * file.c (print_xattr_val): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * io.c (tprint_iov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change iovec array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * mem.c (get_nodes) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during size calculation and do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * net.c (printcmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. Do not trust cmsg.cmsg_len to avoid read beyond the end of allocated object. (printmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Update tprint_iov() usage. * process.c (sys_setgroups): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change gid_t array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. (sys_getgroups): Likewise. (sys_setgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. (sys_getgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. * stream.c (sys_poll) [HAVE_SYS_POLL_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change pollfd array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * system.c (sys_sysctl) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * util.c (dumpiov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Fixes RH#159196.
2005-06-01 23:22:06 +04:00
break;
}
if (umoven(tcp, cur, sizeof(gid), (char *) &gid) < 0) {
tprints("?");
2005-05-31 Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Deal with memory management issues. * defs.h (tprint_iov): Update prototype. * desc.c (sys_epoll_wait) [HAVE_SYS_EPOLL_H]: Do not allocate epoll_event array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * file.c (print_xattr_val): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * io.c (tprint_iov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change iovec array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * mem.c (get_nodes) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during size calculation and do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * net.c (printcmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. Do not trust cmsg.cmsg_len to avoid read beyond the end of allocated object. (printmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Update tprint_iov() usage. * process.c (sys_setgroups): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change gid_t array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. (sys_getgroups): Likewise. (sys_setgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. (sys_getgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. * stream.c (sys_poll) [HAVE_SYS_POLL_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change pollfd array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * system.c (sys_sysctl) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * util.c (dumpiov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Fixes RH#159196.
2005-06-01 23:22:06 +04:00
failed = 1;
break;
}
tprintf("%lu", (unsigned long) gid);
1999-02-19 03:21:36 +03:00
}
tprints("]");
2005-05-31 Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Deal with memory management issues. * defs.h (tprint_iov): Update prototype. * desc.c (sys_epoll_wait) [HAVE_SYS_EPOLL_H]: Do not allocate epoll_event array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * file.c (print_xattr_val): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * io.c (tprint_iov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change iovec array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * mem.c (get_nodes) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during size calculation and do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * net.c (printcmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. Do not trust cmsg.cmsg_len to avoid read beyond the end of allocated object. (printmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Update tprint_iov() usage. * process.c (sys_setgroups): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change gid_t array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. (sys_getgroups): Likewise. (sys_setgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. (sys_getgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. * stream.c (sys_poll) [HAVE_SYS_POLL_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change pollfd array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * system.c (sys_sysctl) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * util.c (dumpiov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Fixes RH#159196.
2005-06-01 23:22:06 +04:00
if (failed)
tprintf(" %#lx", tcp->u_arg[1]);
1999-02-19 03:21:36 +03:00
}
return 0;
}
int
sys_setgroups32(struct tcb *tcp)
{
if (entering(tcp)) {
2005-05-31 Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Deal with memory management issues. * defs.h (tprint_iov): Update prototype. * desc.c (sys_epoll_wait) [HAVE_SYS_EPOLL_H]: Do not allocate epoll_event array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * file.c (print_xattr_val): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * io.c (tprint_iov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change iovec array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * mem.c (get_nodes) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during size calculation and do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * net.c (printcmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. Do not trust cmsg.cmsg_len to avoid read beyond the end of allocated object. (printmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Update tprint_iov() usage. * process.c (sys_setgroups): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change gid_t array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. (sys_getgroups): Likewise. (sys_setgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. (sys_getgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. * stream.c (sys_poll) [HAVE_SYS_POLL_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change pollfd array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * system.c (sys_sysctl) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * util.c (dumpiov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Fixes RH#159196.
2005-06-01 23:22:06 +04:00
unsigned long len, size, start, cur, end, abbrev_end;
GETGROUPS32_T gid;
int failed = 0;
len = tcp->u_arg[0];
2005-05-31 Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Deal with memory management issues. * defs.h (tprint_iov): Update prototype. * desc.c (sys_epoll_wait) [HAVE_SYS_EPOLL_H]: Do not allocate epoll_event array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * file.c (print_xattr_val): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * io.c (tprint_iov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change iovec array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * mem.c (get_nodes) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during size calculation and do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * net.c (printcmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. Do not trust cmsg.cmsg_len to avoid read beyond the end of allocated object. (printmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Update tprint_iov() usage. * process.c (sys_setgroups): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change gid_t array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. (sys_getgroups): Likewise. (sys_setgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. (sys_getgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. * stream.c (sys_poll) [HAVE_SYS_POLL_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change pollfd array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * system.c (sys_sysctl) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * util.c (dumpiov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Fixes RH#159196.
2005-06-01 23:22:06 +04:00
tprintf("%lu, ", len);
if (len == 0) {
tprints("[]");
return 0;
}
2005-05-31 Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Deal with memory management issues. * defs.h (tprint_iov): Update prototype. * desc.c (sys_epoll_wait) [HAVE_SYS_EPOLL_H]: Do not allocate epoll_event array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * file.c (print_xattr_val): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * io.c (tprint_iov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change iovec array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * mem.c (get_nodes) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during size calculation and do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * net.c (printcmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. Do not trust cmsg.cmsg_len to avoid read beyond the end of allocated object. (printmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Update tprint_iov() usage. * process.c (sys_setgroups): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change gid_t array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. (sys_getgroups): Likewise. (sys_setgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. (sys_getgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. * stream.c (sys_poll) [HAVE_SYS_POLL_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change pollfd array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * system.c (sys_sysctl) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * util.c (dumpiov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Fixes RH#159196.
2005-06-01 23:22:06 +04:00
start = tcp->u_arg[1];
if (start == 0) {
tprints("NULL");
2005-05-31 Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Deal with memory management issues. * defs.h (tprint_iov): Update prototype. * desc.c (sys_epoll_wait) [HAVE_SYS_EPOLL_H]: Do not allocate epoll_event array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * file.c (print_xattr_val): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * io.c (tprint_iov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change iovec array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * mem.c (get_nodes) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during size calculation and do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * net.c (printcmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. Do not trust cmsg.cmsg_len to avoid read beyond the end of allocated object. (printmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Update tprint_iov() usage. * process.c (sys_setgroups): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change gid_t array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. (sys_getgroups): Likewise. (sys_setgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. (sys_getgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. * stream.c (sys_poll) [HAVE_SYS_POLL_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change pollfd array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * system.c (sys_sysctl) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * util.c (dumpiov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Fixes RH#159196.
2005-06-01 23:22:06 +04:00
return 0;
}
2005-05-31 Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Deal with memory management issues. * defs.h (tprint_iov): Update prototype. * desc.c (sys_epoll_wait) [HAVE_SYS_EPOLL_H]: Do not allocate epoll_event array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * file.c (print_xattr_val): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * io.c (tprint_iov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change iovec array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * mem.c (get_nodes) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during size calculation and do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * net.c (printcmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. Do not trust cmsg.cmsg_len to avoid read beyond the end of allocated object. (printmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Update tprint_iov() usage. * process.c (sys_setgroups): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change gid_t array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. (sys_getgroups): Likewise. (sys_setgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. (sys_getgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. * stream.c (sys_poll) [HAVE_SYS_POLL_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change pollfd array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * system.c (sys_sysctl) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * util.c (dumpiov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Fixes RH#159196.
2005-06-01 23:22:06 +04:00
size = len * sizeof(gid);
end = start + size;
if (!verbose(tcp) || size / sizeof(gid) != len || end < start) {
tprintf("%#lx", start);
return 0;
}
if (abbrev(tcp)) {
abbrev_end = start + max_strlen * sizeof(gid);
if (abbrev_end < start)
abbrev_end = end;
} else {
abbrev_end = end;
}
tprints("[");
2005-05-31 Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Deal with memory management issues. * defs.h (tprint_iov): Update prototype. * desc.c (sys_epoll_wait) [HAVE_SYS_EPOLL_H]: Do not allocate epoll_event array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * file.c (print_xattr_val): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * io.c (tprint_iov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change iovec array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * mem.c (get_nodes) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during size calculation and do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * net.c (printcmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. Do not trust cmsg.cmsg_len to avoid read beyond the end of allocated object. (printmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Update tprint_iov() usage. * process.c (sys_setgroups): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change gid_t array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. (sys_getgroups): Likewise. (sys_setgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. (sys_getgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. * stream.c (sys_poll) [HAVE_SYS_POLL_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change pollfd array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * system.c (sys_sysctl) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * util.c (dumpiov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Fixes RH#159196.
2005-06-01 23:22:06 +04:00
for (cur = start; cur < end; cur += sizeof(gid)) {
if (cur > start)
tprints(", ");
2005-05-31 Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Deal with memory management issues. * defs.h (tprint_iov): Update prototype. * desc.c (sys_epoll_wait) [HAVE_SYS_EPOLL_H]: Do not allocate epoll_event array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * file.c (print_xattr_val): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * io.c (tprint_iov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change iovec array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * mem.c (get_nodes) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during size calculation and do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * net.c (printcmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. Do not trust cmsg.cmsg_len to avoid read beyond the end of allocated object. (printmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Update tprint_iov() usage. * process.c (sys_setgroups): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change gid_t array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. (sys_getgroups): Likewise. (sys_setgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. (sys_getgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. * stream.c (sys_poll) [HAVE_SYS_POLL_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change pollfd array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * system.c (sys_sysctl) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * util.c (dumpiov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Fixes RH#159196.
2005-06-01 23:22:06 +04:00
if (cur >= abbrev_end) {
tprints("...");
2005-05-31 Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Deal with memory management issues. * defs.h (tprint_iov): Update prototype. * desc.c (sys_epoll_wait) [HAVE_SYS_EPOLL_H]: Do not allocate epoll_event array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * file.c (print_xattr_val): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * io.c (tprint_iov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change iovec array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * mem.c (get_nodes) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during size calculation and do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * net.c (printcmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. Do not trust cmsg.cmsg_len to avoid read beyond the end of allocated object. (printmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Update tprint_iov() usage. * process.c (sys_setgroups): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change gid_t array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. (sys_getgroups): Likewise. (sys_setgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. (sys_getgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. * stream.c (sys_poll) [HAVE_SYS_POLL_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change pollfd array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * system.c (sys_sysctl) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * util.c (dumpiov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Fixes RH#159196.
2005-06-01 23:22:06 +04:00
break;
}
if (umoven(tcp, cur, sizeof(gid), (char *) &gid) < 0) {
tprints("?");
2005-05-31 Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Deal with memory management issues. * defs.h (tprint_iov): Update prototype. * desc.c (sys_epoll_wait) [HAVE_SYS_EPOLL_H]: Do not allocate epoll_event array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * file.c (print_xattr_val): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * io.c (tprint_iov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change iovec array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * mem.c (get_nodes) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during size calculation and do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * net.c (printcmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. Do not trust cmsg.cmsg_len to avoid read beyond the end of allocated object. (printmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Update tprint_iov() usage. * process.c (sys_setgroups): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change gid_t array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. (sys_getgroups): Likewise. (sys_setgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. (sys_getgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. * stream.c (sys_poll) [HAVE_SYS_POLL_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change pollfd array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * system.c (sys_sysctl) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * util.c (dumpiov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Fixes RH#159196.
2005-06-01 23:22:06 +04:00
failed = 1;
break;
}
tprintf("%lu", (unsigned long) gid);
}
tprints("]");
2005-05-31 Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Deal with memory management issues. * defs.h (tprint_iov): Update prototype. * desc.c (sys_epoll_wait) [HAVE_SYS_EPOLL_H]: Do not allocate epoll_event array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * file.c (print_xattr_val): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * io.c (tprint_iov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change iovec array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * mem.c (get_nodes) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during size calculation and do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * net.c (printcmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. Do not trust cmsg.cmsg_len to avoid read beyond the end of allocated object. (printmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Update tprint_iov() usage. * process.c (sys_setgroups): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change gid_t array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. (sys_getgroups): Likewise. (sys_setgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. (sys_getgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. * stream.c (sys_poll) [HAVE_SYS_POLL_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change pollfd array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * system.c (sys_sysctl) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * util.c (dumpiov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Fixes RH#159196.
2005-06-01 23:22:06 +04:00
if (failed)
tprintf(" %#lx", tcp->u_arg[1]);
}
return 0;
}
int
sys_getgroups32(struct tcb *tcp)
{
2005-05-31 Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Deal with memory management issues. * defs.h (tprint_iov): Update prototype. * desc.c (sys_epoll_wait) [HAVE_SYS_EPOLL_H]: Do not allocate epoll_event array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * file.c (print_xattr_val): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * io.c (tprint_iov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change iovec array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * mem.c (get_nodes) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during size calculation and do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * net.c (printcmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. Do not trust cmsg.cmsg_len to avoid read beyond the end of allocated object. (printmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Update tprint_iov() usage. * process.c (sys_setgroups): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change gid_t array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. (sys_getgroups): Likewise. (sys_setgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. (sys_getgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. * stream.c (sys_poll) [HAVE_SYS_POLL_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change pollfd array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * system.c (sys_sysctl) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * util.c (dumpiov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Fixes RH#159196.
2005-06-01 23:22:06 +04:00
unsigned long len;
if (entering(tcp)) {
len = tcp->u_arg[0];
2005-05-31 Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Deal with memory management issues. * defs.h (tprint_iov): Update prototype. * desc.c (sys_epoll_wait) [HAVE_SYS_EPOLL_H]: Do not allocate epoll_event array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * file.c (print_xattr_val): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * io.c (tprint_iov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change iovec array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * mem.c (get_nodes) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during size calculation and do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * net.c (printcmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. Do not trust cmsg.cmsg_len to avoid read beyond the end of allocated object. (printmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Update tprint_iov() usage. * process.c (sys_setgroups): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change gid_t array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. (sys_getgroups): Likewise. (sys_setgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. (sys_getgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. * stream.c (sys_poll) [HAVE_SYS_POLL_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change pollfd array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * system.c (sys_sysctl) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * util.c (dumpiov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Fixes RH#159196.
2005-06-01 23:22:06 +04:00
tprintf("%lu, ", len);
} else {
2005-05-31 Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Deal with memory management issues. * defs.h (tprint_iov): Update prototype. * desc.c (sys_epoll_wait) [HAVE_SYS_EPOLL_H]: Do not allocate epoll_event array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * file.c (print_xattr_val): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * io.c (tprint_iov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change iovec array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * mem.c (get_nodes) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during size calculation and do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * net.c (printcmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. Do not trust cmsg.cmsg_len to avoid read beyond the end of allocated object. (printmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Update tprint_iov() usage. * process.c (sys_setgroups): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change gid_t array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. (sys_getgroups): Likewise. (sys_setgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. (sys_getgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. * stream.c (sys_poll) [HAVE_SYS_POLL_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change pollfd array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * system.c (sys_sysctl) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * util.c (dumpiov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Fixes RH#159196.
2005-06-01 23:22:06 +04:00
unsigned long size, start, cur, end, abbrev_end;
GETGROUPS32_T gid;
int failed = 0;
len = tcp->u_rval;
2005-05-31 Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Deal with memory management issues. * defs.h (tprint_iov): Update prototype. * desc.c (sys_epoll_wait) [HAVE_SYS_EPOLL_H]: Do not allocate epoll_event array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * file.c (print_xattr_val): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * io.c (tprint_iov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change iovec array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * mem.c (get_nodes) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during size calculation and do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * net.c (printcmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. Do not trust cmsg.cmsg_len to avoid read beyond the end of allocated object. (printmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Update tprint_iov() usage. * process.c (sys_setgroups): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change gid_t array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. (sys_getgroups): Likewise. (sys_setgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. (sys_getgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. * stream.c (sys_poll) [HAVE_SYS_POLL_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change pollfd array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * system.c (sys_sysctl) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * util.c (dumpiov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Fixes RH#159196.
2005-06-01 23:22:06 +04:00
if (len == 0) {
tprints("[]");
return 0;
}
2005-05-31 Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Deal with memory management issues. * defs.h (tprint_iov): Update prototype. * desc.c (sys_epoll_wait) [HAVE_SYS_EPOLL_H]: Do not allocate epoll_event array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * file.c (print_xattr_val): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * io.c (tprint_iov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change iovec array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * mem.c (get_nodes) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during size calculation and do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * net.c (printcmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. Do not trust cmsg.cmsg_len to avoid read beyond the end of allocated object. (printmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Update tprint_iov() usage. * process.c (sys_setgroups): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change gid_t array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. (sys_getgroups): Likewise. (sys_setgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. (sys_getgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. * stream.c (sys_poll) [HAVE_SYS_POLL_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change pollfd array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * system.c (sys_sysctl) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * util.c (dumpiov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Fixes RH#159196.
2005-06-01 23:22:06 +04:00
start = tcp->u_arg[1];
if (start == 0) {
tprints("NULL");
2005-05-31 Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Deal with memory management issues. * defs.h (tprint_iov): Update prototype. * desc.c (sys_epoll_wait) [HAVE_SYS_EPOLL_H]: Do not allocate epoll_event array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * file.c (print_xattr_val): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * io.c (tprint_iov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change iovec array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * mem.c (get_nodes) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during size calculation and do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * net.c (printcmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. Do not trust cmsg.cmsg_len to avoid read beyond the end of allocated object. (printmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Update tprint_iov() usage. * process.c (sys_setgroups): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change gid_t array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. (sys_getgroups): Likewise. (sys_setgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. (sys_getgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. * stream.c (sys_poll) [HAVE_SYS_POLL_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change pollfd array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * system.c (sys_sysctl) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * util.c (dumpiov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Fixes RH#159196.
2005-06-01 23:22:06 +04:00
return 0;
}
size = len * sizeof(gid);
end = start + size;
if (!verbose(tcp) || tcp->u_arg[0] == 0 ||
size / sizeof(gid) != len || end < start) {
tprintf("%#lx", start);
return 0;
}
if (abbrev(tcp)) {
abbrev_end = start + max_strlen * sizeof(gid);
if (abbrev_end < start)
abbrev_end = end;
} else {
abbrev_end = end;
}
tprints("[");
2005-05-31 Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Deal with memory management issues. * defs.h (tprint_iov): Update prototype. * desc.c (sys_epoll_wait) [HAVE_SYS_EPOLL_H]: Do not allocate epoll_event array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * file.c (print_xattr_val): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * io.c (tprint_iov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change iovec array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * mem.c (get_nodes) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during size calculation and do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * net.c (printcmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. Do not trust cmsg.cmsg_len to avoid read beyond the end of allocated object. (printmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Update tprint_iov() usage. * process.c (sys_setgroups): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change gid_t array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. (sys_getgroups): Likewise. (sys_setgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. (sys_getgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. * stream.c (sys_poll) [HAVE_SYS_POLL_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change pollfd array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * system.c (sys_sysctl) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * util.c (dumpiov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Fixes RH#159196.
2005-06-01 23:22:06 +04:00
for (cur = start; cur < end; cur += sizeof(gid)) {
if (cur > start)
tprints(", ");
2005-05-31 Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Deal with memory management issues. * defs.h (tprint_iov): Update prototype. * desc.c (sys_epoll_wait) [HAVE_SYS_EPOLL_H]: Do not allocate epoll_event array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * file.c (print_xattr_val): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * io.c (tprint_iov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change iovec array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * mem.c (get_nodes) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during size calculation and do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * net.c (printcmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. Do not trust cmsg.cmsg_len to avoid read beyond the end of allocated object. (printmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Update tprint_iov() usage. * process.c (sys_setgroups): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change gid_t array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. (sys_getgroups): Likewise. (sys_setgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. (sys_getgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. * stream.c (sys_poll) [HAVE_SYS_POLL_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change pollfd array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * system.c (sys_sysctl) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * util.c (dumpiov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Fixes RH#159196.
2005-06-01 23:22:06 +04:00
if (cur >= abbrev_end) {
tprints("...");
2005-05-31 Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Deal with memory management issues. * defs.h (tprint_iov): Update prototype. * desc.c (sys_epoll_wait) [HAVE_SYS_EPOLL_H]: Do not allocate epoll_event array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * file.c (print_xattr_val): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * io.c (tprint_iov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change iovec array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * mem.c (get_nodes) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during size calculation and do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * net.c (printcmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. Do not trust cmsg.cmsg_len to avoid read beyond the end of allocated object. (printmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Update tprint_iov() usage. * process.c (sys_setgroups): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change gid_t array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. (sys_getgroups): Likewise. (sys_setgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. (sys_getgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. * stream.c (sys_poll) [HAVE_SYS_POLL_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change pollfd array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * system.c (sys_sysctl) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * util.c (dumpiov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Fixes RH#159196.
2005-06-01 23:22:06 +04:00
break;
}
if (umoven(tcp, cur, sizeof(gid), (char *) &gid) < 0) {
tprints("?");
2005-05-31 Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Deal with memory management issues. * defs.h (tprint_iov): Update prototype. * desc.c (sys_epoll_wait) [HAVE_SYS_EPOLL_H]: Do not allocate epoll_event array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * file.c (print_xattr_val): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * io.c (tprint_iov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change iovec array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * mem.c (get_nodes) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during size calculation and do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * net.c (printcmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. Do not trust cmsg.cmsg_len to avoid read beyond the end of allocated object. (printmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Update tprint_iov() usage. * process.c (sys_setgroups): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change gid_t array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. (sys_getgroups): Likewise. (sys_setgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. (sys_getgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. * stream.c (sys_poll) [HAVE_SYS_POLL_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change pollfd array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * system.c (sys_sysctl) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * util.c (dumpiov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Fixes RH#159196.
2005-06-01 23:22:06 +04:00
failed = 1;
break;
}
tprintf("%lu", (unsigned long) gid);
}
tprints("]");
2005-05-31 Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Deal with memory management issues. * defs.h (tprint_iov): Update prototype. * desc.c (sys_epoll_wait) [HAVE_SYS_EPOLL_H]: Do not allocate epoll_event array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * file.c (print_xattr_val): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * io.c (tprint_iov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change iovec array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * mem.c (get_nodes) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during size calculation and do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. * net.c (printcmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Do not allocate array of arbitrary size on the stack, to avoid stack overflow. Do not trust cmsg.cmsg_len to avoid read beyond the end of allocated object. (printmsghdr) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Update tprint_iov() usage. * process.c (sys_setgroups): Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change gid_t array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. (sys_getgroups): Likewise. (sys_setgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. (sys_getgroups32) [LINUX]: Likewise. * stream.c (sys_poll) [HAVE_SYS_POLL_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Change pollfd array handling to avoid heap memory allocation. * system.c (sys_sysctl) [LINUX]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. * util.c (dumpiov) [HAVE_SYS_UIO_H]: Check for integer overflow during malloc size calculation, to avoid heap corruption. Fixes RH#159196.
2005-06-01 23:22:06 +04:00
if (failed)
tprintf(" %#lx", tcp->u_arg[1]);
}
return 0;
}
1999-02-19 03:21:36 +03:00
static void
printargv(struct tcb *tcp, long addr)
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{
union {
unsigned int p32;
unsigned long p64;
char data[sizeof(long)];
} cp;
const char *sep;
int n = 0;
unsigned wordsize = personality_wordsize[current_personality];
1999-02-19 03:21:36 +03:00
cp.p64 = 1;
for (sep = ""; !abbrev(tcp) || n < max_strlen / 2; sep = ", ", ++n) {
if (umoven(tcp, addr, wordsize, cp.data) < 0) {
1999-02-19 03:21:36 +03:00
tprintf("%#lx", addr);
return;
}
if (wordsize == 4)
cp.p64 = cp.p32;
if (cp.p64 == 0)
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break;
tprints(sep);
printstr(tcp, cp.p64, -1);
addr += wordsize;
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}
if (cp.p64)
tprintf("%s...", sep);
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}
static void
printargc(const char *fmt, struct tcb *tcp, long addr)
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{
int count;
char *cp;
for (count = 0; umove(tcp, addr, &cp) >= 0 && cp != NULL; count++) {
addr += sizeof(char *);
}
tprintf(fmt, count, count == 1 ? "" : "s");
}
#if defined(SPARC) || defined(SPARC64)
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int
sys_execv(struct tcb *tcp)
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{
if (entering(tcp)) {
printpath(tcp, tcp->u_arg[0]);
if (!verbose(tcp))
tprintf(", %#lx", tcp->u_arg[1]);
else {
tprints(", [");
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printargv(tcp, tcp->u_arg[1]);
tprints("]");
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}
}
return 0;
}
#endif
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int
sys_execve(struct tcb *tcp)
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{
if (entering(tcp)) {
printpath(tcp, tcp->u_arg[0]);
if (!verbose(tcp))
tprintf(", %#lx", tcp->u_arg[1]);
else {
tprints(", [");
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printargv(tcp, tcp->u_arg[1]);
tprints("]");
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}
if (!verbose(tcp))
tprintf(", %#lx", tcp->u_arg[2]);
else if (abbrev(tcp))
printargc(", [/* %d var%s */]", tcp, tcp->u_arg[2]);
else {
tprints(", [");
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printargv(tcp, tcp->u_arg[2]);
tprints("]");
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}
}
return 0;
}
#if defined(TCB_WAITEXECVE)
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int
internal_exec(struct tcb *tcp)
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{
if (exiting(tcp) && syserror(tcp))
tcp->flags &= ~TCB_WAITEXECVE;
else {
/* Maybe we have post-execve SIGTRAP suppressed? */
if (!(ptrace_setoptions & PTRACE_O_TRACEEXEC))
tcp->flags |= TCB_WAITEXECVE; /* no */
}
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return 0;
}
#endif
1999-02-19 03:21:36 +03:00
#ifndef __WNOTHREAD
#define __WNOTHREAD 0x20000000
#endif
#ifndef __WALL
#define __WALL 0x40000000
#endif
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#ifndef __WCLONE
#define __WCLONE 0x80000000
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#endif
static const struct xlat wait4_options[] = {
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{ WNOHANG, "WNOHANG" },
#ifndef WSTOPPED
{ WUNTRACED, "WUNTRACED" },
#endif
#ifdef WEXITED
{ WEXITED, "WEXITED" },
#endif
#ifdef WTRAPPED
{ WTRAPPED, "WTRAPPED" },
#endif
#ifdef WSTOPPED
{ WSTOPPED, "WSTOPPED" },
#endif
#ifdef WCONTINUED
{ WCONTINUED, "WCONTINUED" },
#endif
#ifdef WNOWAIT
{ WNOWAIT, "WNOWAIT" },
#endif
#ifdef __WCLONE
{ __WCLONE, "__WCLONE" },
#endif
#ifdef __WALL
{ __WALL, "__WALL" },
#endif
#ifdef __WNOTHREAD
{ __WNOTHREAD, "__WNOTHREAD" },
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#endif
{ 0, NULL },
};
#if !defined WCOREFLAG && defined WCOREFLG
# define WCOREFLAG WCOREFLG
#endif
#ifndef WCOREFLAG
# define WCOREFLAG 0x80
#endif
#ifndef WCOREDUMP
# define WCOREDUMP(status) ((status) & 0200)
#endif
#ifndef W_STOPCODE
#define W_STOPCODE(sig) ((sig) << 8 | 0x7f)
#endif
#ifndef W_EXITCODE
#define W_EXITCODE(ret, sig) ((ret) << 8 | (sig))
#endif
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static int
printstatus(int status)
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{
int exited = 0;
/*
* Here is a tricky presentation problem. This solution
* is still not entirely satisfactory but since there
* are no wait status constructors it will have to do.
*/
if (WIFSTOPPED(status)) {
tprintf("[{WIFSTOPPED(s) && WSTOPSIG(s) == %s}",
signame(WSTOPSIG(status)));
status &= ~W_STOPCODE(WSTOPSIG(status));
}
else if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
tprintf("[{WIFSIGNALED(s) && WTERMSIG(s) == %s%s}",
signame(WTERMSIG(status)),
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WCOREDUMP(status) ? " && WCOREDUMP(s)" : "");
status &= ~(W_EXITCODE(0, WTERMSIG(status)) | WCOREFLAG);
}
else if (WIFEXITED(status)) {
tprintf("[{WIFEXITED(s) && WEXITSTATUS(s) == %d}",
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WEXITSTATUS(status));
exited = 1;
status &= ~W_EXITCODE(WEXITSTATUS(status), 0);
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}
else {
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tprintf("[%#x]", status);
return 0;
}
if (status == 0)
tprints("]");
else
tprintf(" | %#x]", status);
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return exited;
}
static int
printwaitn(struct tcb *tcp, int n, int bitness)
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{
int status;
if (entering(tcp)) {
/* On Linux, kernel-side pid_t is typedef'ed to int
* on all arches. Also, glibc-2.8 truncates wait3 and wait4
* pid argument to int on 64bit arches, producing,
* for example, wait4(4294967295, ...) instead of -1
* in strace. We have to use int here, not long.
*/
int pid = tcp->u_arg[0];
tprintf("%d, ", pid);
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} else {
/* status */
if (!tcp->u_arg[1])
tprints("NULL");
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else if (syserror(tcp) || tcp->u_rval == 0)
tprintf("%#lx", tcp->u_arg[1]);
else if (umove(tcp, tcp->u_arg[1], &status) < 0)
tprints("[?]");
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else
printstatus(status);
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/* options */
tprints(", ");
2005-05-31 Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> * util.c (printxval): Change third argument from "char *" to "const char *". (printflags): Add third argument, "const char *", with similar meaning to the third argument of printxval(). * defs.h (printxval): Change third argument from "char *" to "const char *". (printflags): Add third argument. * bjm.c (sys_query_module) [LINUX]: Pass third argument to printflags(). * desc.c (sys_fcntl): Likewise. (sys_flock) [LOCK_SH]: Likewise. (print_epoll_event) [HAVE_SYS_EPOLL_H]: Likewise. * file.c (sys_open): Likewise. (solaris_open) [LINUXSPARC]: Likewise. (sys_access): Likewise. (sys_chflags, sys_fchflags) [FREEBSD]: Likewise. (realprintstat) [HAVE_LONG_LONG_OFF_T && HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_FLAGS]: Likewise. (printstat64) [HAVE_STAT64 && HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_FLAGS]: Likewise. (sys_setxattr, sys_fsetxattr): Likewise. * ipc.c (sys_msgget, sys_msgsnd, sys_msgrcv, sys_semget, sys_shmget, sys_shmat) [LINUX || SUNOS4 || FREEBSD]: Likewise. (sys_mq_open) [LINUX]: Likewise. (printmqattr) [HAVE_MQUEUE_H]: Likewise. * mem.c (print_mmap) [!HAVE_LONG_LONG_OFF_T]: Likewise. (sys_mmap64) [_LFS64_LARGEFILE || HAVE_LONG_LONG_OFF_T]: Likewise. (sys_mprotect): Likewise. (sys_mremap, sys_madvise, sys_mlockall) [LINUX]: Likewise. (sys_msync) [MS_ASYNC]: Likewise. (sys_mctl) [MC_SYNC]: Likewise. (sys_remap_file_pages, sys_mbind, sys_get_mempolicy) [LINUX]: Likewise. * net.c (printmsghdr) [HAVE_STRUCT_MSGHDR_MSG_CONTROL]: Likewise. (sys_send, sys_sendto): Likewise. (sys_sendmsg) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Likewise. (sys_recv, sys_recvfrom): Likewise. (sys_recvmsg) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Likewise. (printicmpfilter) [ICMP_FILTER]: Likewise. * proc.c (proc_ioctl) [SVR4 && !HAVE_MP_PROCFS || FREEBSD]: Likewise. * process.c (sys_clone) [LINUX]: Likewise. (printwaitn): Likewise. (sys_waitid) [SVR4 || LINUX]: Likewise. * signal.c (sys_sigvec) [SUNOS4 || FREEBSD]: Likewise. (sys_sigaction): Likewise. (printcontext) [SVR4]: Likewise. (print_stack_t) [LINUX) || FREEBSD]: Likewise. (sys_rt_sigaction) [LINUX]: Likewise. * sock.c (sock_ioctl) [LINUX]: Likewise. * stream.c (sys_putmsg, sys_getmsg): Likewise. (sys_putpmsg) [SYS_putpmsg]: Likewise. (sys_getpmsg) [SYS_getpmsg]: Likewise. (sys_poll): Likewise. (print_transport_message) [TI_BIND]: Likewise. (stream_ioctl): Likewise. * system.c (sys_mount, sys_reboot): Likewise. (sys_cacheflush) [LINUX && M68K]: Likewise. (sys_capget, sys_capset) [SYS_capget]: Likewise. * term.c (term_ioctl) [TIOCMGET]: Likewise. * time.c (sys_clock_nanosleep, sys_timer_settime) [LINUX]: Likewise. Fixes RH#159310.
2005-06-01 23:02:36 +04:00
printflags(wait4_options, tcp->u_arg[2], "W???");
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if (n == 4) {
tprints(", ");
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/* usage */
if (!tcp->u_arg[3])
tprints("NULL");
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else if (tcp->u_rval > 0) {
#ifdef ALPHA
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if (bitness)
printrusage32(tcp, tcp->u_arg[3]);
else
#endif
printrusage(tcp, tcp->u_arg[3]);
}
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else
tprintf("%#lx", tcp->u_arg[3]);
}
}
return 0;
}
int
sys_waitpid(struct tcb *tcp)
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{
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return printwaitn(tcp, 3, 0);
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}
int
sys_wait4(struct tcb *tcp)
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{
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return printwaitn(tcp, 4, 0);
}
#ifdef ALPHA
int
sys_osf_wait4(struct tcb *tcp)
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{
return printwaitn(tcp, 4, 1);
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}
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#endif
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static const struct xlat waitid_types[] = {
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{ P_PID, "P_PID" },
#ifdef P_PPID
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{ P_PPID, "P_PPID" },
#endif
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{ P_PGID, "P_PGID" },
#ifdef P_SID
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{ P_SID, "P_SID" },
#endif
#ifdef P_CID
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{ P_CID, "P_CID" },
#endif
#ifdef P_UID
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{ P_UID, "P_UID" },
#endif
#ifdef P_GID
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{ P_GID, "P_GID" },
#endif
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{ P_ALL, "P_ALL" },
#ifdef P_LWPID
{ P_LWPID, "P_LWPID" },
#endif
{ 0, NULL },
};
int
sys_waitid(struct tcb *tcp)
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{
siginfo_t si;
if (entering(tcp)) {
printxval(waitid_types, tcp->u_arg[0], "P_???");
tprintf(", %ld, ", tcp->u_arg[1]);
}
else {
/* siginfo */
if (!tcp->u_arg[2])
tprints("NULL");
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else if (syserror(tcp))
tprintf("%#lx", tcp->u_arg[2]);
else if (umove(tcp, tcp->u_arg[2], &si) < 0)
tprints("{???}");
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else
printsiginfo(&si, verbose(tcp));
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/* options */
tprints(", ");
2005-05-31 Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> * util.c (printxval): Change third argument from "char *" to "const char *". (printflags): Add third argument, "const char *", with similar meaning to the third argument of printxval(). * defs.h (printxval): Change third argument from "char *" to "const char *". (printflags): Add third argument. * bjm.c (sys_query_module) [LINUX]: Pass third argument to printflags(). * desc.c (sys_fcntl): Likewise. (sys_flock) [LOCK_SH]: Likewise. (print_epoll_event) [HAVE_SYS_EPOLL_H]: Likewise. * file.c (sys_open): Likewise. (solaris_open) [LINUXSPARC]: Likewise. (sys_access): Likewise. (sys_chflags, sys_fchflags) [FREEBSD]: Likewise. (realprintstat) [HAVE_LONG_LONG_OFF_T && HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_FLAGS]: Likewise. (printstat64) [HAVE_STAT64 && HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_FLAGS]: Likewise. (sys_setxattr, sys_fsetxattr): Likewise. * ipc.c (sys_msgget, sys_msgsnd, sys_msgrcv, sys_semget, sys_shmget, sys_shmat) [LINUX || SUNOS4 || FREEBSD]: Likewise. (sys_mq_open) [LINUX]: Likewise. (printmqattr) [HAVE_MQUEUE_H]: Likewise. * mem.c (print_mmap) [!HAVE_LONG_LONG_OFF_T]: Likewise. (sys_mmap64) [_LFS64_LARGEFILE || HAVE_LONG_LONG_OFF_T]: Likewise. (sys_mprotect): Likewise. (sys_mremap, sys_madvise, sys_mlockall) [LINUX]: Likewise. (sys_msync) [MS_ASYNC]: Likewise. (sys_mctl) [MC_SYNC]: Likewise. (sys_remap_file_pages, sys_mbind, sys_get_mempolicy) [LINUX]: Likewise. * net.c (printmsghdr) [HAVE_STRUCT_MSGHDR_MSG_CONTROL]: Likewise. (sys_send, sys_sendto): Likewise. (sys_sendmsg) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Likewise. (sys_recv, sys_recvfrom): Likewise. (sys_recvmsg) [HAVE_SENDMSG]: Likewise. (printicmpfilter) [ICMP_FILTER]: Likewise. * proc.c (proc_ioctl) [SVR4 && !HAVE_MP_PROCFS || FREEBSD]: Likewise. * process.c (sys_clone) [LINUX]: Likewise. (printwaitn): Likewise. (sys_waitid) [SVR4 || LINUX]: Likewise. * signal.c (sys_sigvec) [SUNOS4 || FREEBSD]: Likewise. (sys_sigaction): Likewise. (printcontext) [SVR4]: Likewise. (print_stack_t) [LINUX) || FREEBSD]: Likewise. (sys_rt_sigaction) [LINUX]: Likewise. * sock.c (sock_ioctl) [LINUX]: Likewise. * stream.c (sys_putmsg, sys_getmsg): Likewise. (sys_putpmsg) [SYS_putpmsg]: Likewise. (sys_getpmsg) [SYS_getpmsg]: Likewise. (sys_poll): Likewise. (print_transport_message) [TI_BIND]: Likewise. (stream_ioctl): Likewise. * system.c (sys_mount, sys_reboot): Likewise. (sys_cacheflush) [LINUX && M68K]: Likewise. (sys_capget, sys_capset) [SYS_capget]: Likewise. * term.c (term_ioctl) [TIOCMGET]: Likewise. * time.c (sys_clock_nanosleep, sys_timer_settime) [LINUX]: Likewise. Fixes RH#159310.
2005-06-01 23:02:36 +04:00
printflags(wait4_options, tcp->u_arg[3], "W???");
if (tcp->u_nargs > 4) {
/* usage */
tprints(", ");
if (!tcp->u_arg[4])
tprints("NULL");
else if (tcp->u_error)
tprintf("%#lx", tcp->u_arg[4]);
else
printrusage(tcp, tcp->u_arg[4]);
}
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}
return 0;
}
int
sys_uname(struct tcb *tcp)
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{
struct utsname uname;
if (exiting(tcp)) {
if (syserror(tcp) || !verbose(tcp))
tprintf("%#lx", tcp->u_arg[0]);
else if (umove(tcp, tcp->u_arg[0], &uname) < 0)
tprints("{...}");
1999-02-19 03:21:36 +03:00
else if (!abbrev(tcp)) {
tprintf("{sysname=\"%s\", nodename=\"%s\", ",
uname.sysname, uname.nodename);
tprintf("release=\"%s\", version=\"%s\", ",
uname.release, uname.version);
tprintf("machine=\"%s\"", uname.machine);
#ifndef __GLIBC__
tprintf(", domainname=\"%s\"", uname.domainname);
#endif
tprints("}");
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}
else
tprintf("{sys=\"%s\", node=\"%s\", ...}",
uname.sysname, uname.nodename);
}
return 0;
}
2009-06-03 03:49:22 +04:00
static const struct xlat ptrace_cmds[] = {
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{ PTRACE_TRACEME, "PTRACE_TRACEME" },
{ PTRACE_PEEKTEXT, "PTRACE_PEEKTEXT" },
{ PTRACE_PEEKDATA, "PTRACE_PEEKDATA" },
{ PTRACE_PEEKUSER, "PTRACE_PEEKUSER" },
{ PTRACE_POKETEXT, "PTRACE_POKETEXT" },
{ PTRACE_POKEDATA, "PTRACE_POKEDATA" },
{ PTRACE_POKEUSER, "PTRACE_POKEUSER" },
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{ PTRACE_CONT, "PTRACE_CONT" },
{ PTRACE_KILL, "PTRACE_KILL" },
{ PTRACE_SINGLESTEP, "PTRACE_SINGLESTEP" },
{ PTRACE_ATTACH, "PTRACE_ATTACH" },
{ PTRACE_DETACH, "PTRACE_DETACH" },
# ifdef PTRACE_GETREGS
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{ PTRACE_GETREGS, "PTRACE_GETREGS" },
# endif
# ifdef PTRACE_SETREGS
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{ PTRACE_SETREGS, "PTRACE_SETREGS" },
# endif
# ifdef PTRACE_GETFPREGS
{ PTRACE_GETFPREGS, "PTRACE_GETFPREGS" },
# endif
# ifdef PTRACE_SETFPREGS
{ PTRACE_SETFPREGS, "PTRACE_SETFPREGS" },
# endif
# ifdef PTRACE_GETFPXREGS
{ PTRACE_GETFPXREGS, "PTRACE_GETFPXREGS" },
# endif
# ifdef PTRACE_SETFPXREGS
{ PTRACE_SETFPXREGS, "PTRACE_SETFPXREGS" },
# endif
# ifdef PTRACE_GETVRREGS
{ PTRACE_GETVRREGS, "PTRACE_GETVRREGS" },
# endif
# ifdef PTRACE_SETVRREGS
{ PTRACE_SETVRREGS, "PTRACE_SETVRREGS" },
# endif
# ifdef PTRACE_SETOPTIONS
{ PTRACE_SETOPTIONS, "PTRACE_SETOPTIONS" },
# endif
# ifdef PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG
{ PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG, "PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG" },
# endif
# ifdef PTRACE_GETSIGINFO
{ PTRACE_GETSIGINFO, "PTRACE_GETSIGINFO" },
# endif
# ifdef PTRACE_SETSIGINFO
{ PTRACE_SETSIGINFO, "PTRACE_SETSIGINFO" },
# endif
# ifdef PTRACE_GETREGSET
{ PTRACE_GETREGSET, "PTRACE_GETREGSET" },
# endif
# ifdef PTRACE_SETREGSET
{ PTRACE_SETREGSET, "PTRACE_SETREGSET" },
# endif
# ifdef PTRACE_SET_SYSCALL
{ PTRACE_SET_SYSCALL, "PTRACE_SET_SYSCALL" },
# endif
Add experimental code to use PTRACE_SEIZE, disabled by default All new code is predicated on "ifdef USE_SEIZE". If it is not defined, behavior is not changed. If USE_SEIZE is enabled and run-time check shows that PTRACE_SEIZE works, then: - All attaching is done with PTRACE_SEIZE + PTRACE_INTERRUPT. This means that we no longer generate (and possibly race with) SIGSTOP. - PTRACE_EVENT_STOP will be generated if tracee is group-stopped. When we detect it, we issue PTRACE_LISTEN instead of PTRACE_SYSCALL. This leaves tracee stopped. This fixes the inability to SIGSTOP or ^Z a straced process. * defs.h: Add commented-out "define USE_SEIZE 1" and define PTRACE_SEIZE and related constants. * strace.c: New variable post_attach_sigstop shows whether we age going to expect SIGSTOP on attach (IOW: are we going to use PTRACE_SEIZE). (ptrace_attach_or_seize): New function. Uses PTRACE_ATTACH or PTRACE_SEIZE + PTRACE_INTERRUPT to attach to given pid. (startup_attach): Use ptrace_attach_or_seize() instead of ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH). (startup_child): Conditionally use alternative attach method using PTRACE_SEIZE. (test_ptrace_setoptions_followfork): More robust parameters to PTRACE_TRACEME. (test_ptrace_seize): New function to test whether PTRACE_SEIZE works. (main): Call test_ptrace_seize() while initializing. (trace): If PTRACE_EVENT_STOP is seen, restart using PTRACE_LISTEN in order to not let tracee run. * process.c: Decode PTRACE_SEIZE, PTRACE_INTERRUPT, PTRACE_LISTEN. * util.c (ptrace_restart): Add "LISTEN" to a possible error message. Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>
2012-01-29 05:01:44 +04:00
# ifdef PTRACE_SEIZE
{ PTRACE_SEIZE, "PTRACE_SEIZE" },
# endif
# ifdef PTRACE_INTERRUPT
{ PTRACE_INTERRUPT, "PTRACE_INTERRUPT" },
# endif
# ifdef PTRACE_LISTEN
{ PTRACE_LISTEN, "PTRACE_LISTEN" },
# endif
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{ PTRACE_SYSCALL, "PTRACE_SYSCALL" },
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{ 0, NULL },
};
# ifdef PTRACE_SETOPTIONS
static const struct xlat ptrace_setoptions_flags[] = {
# ifdef PTRACE_O_TRACESYSGOOD
{ PTRACE_O_TRACESYSGOOD,"PTRACE_O_TRACESYSGOOD" },
# endif
# ifdef PTRACE_O_TRACEFORK
{ PTRACE_O_TRACEFORK, "PTRACE_O_TRACEFORK" },
# endif
# ifdef PTRACE_O_TRACEVFORK
{ PTRACE_O_TRACEVFORK, "PTRACE_O_TRACEVFORK" },
# endif
# ifdef PTRACE_O_TRACECLONE
{ PTRACE_O_TRACECLONE, "PTRACE_O_TRACECLONE" },
# endif
# ifdef PTRACE_O_TRACEEXEC
{ PTRACE_O_TRACEEXEC, "PTRACE_O_TRACEEXEC" },
# endif
# ifdef PTRACE_O_TRACEVFORKDONE
{ PTRACE_O_TRACEVFORKDONE,"PTRACE_O_TRACEVFORKDONE"},
# endif
# ifdef PTRACE_O_TRACEEXIT
{ PTRACE_O_TRACEEXIT, "PTRACE_O_TRACEEXIT" },
# endif
{ 0, NULL },
};
# endif /* PTRACE_SETOPTIONS */
const struct xlat struct_user_offsets[] = {
# if defined(S390) || defined(S390X)
1999-12-23 17:20:14 +03:00
{ PT_PSWMASK, "psw_mask" },
{ PT_PSWADDR, "psw_addr" },
{ PT_GPR0, "gpr0" },
{ PT_GPR1, "gpr1" },
{ PT_GPR2, "gpr2" },
{ PT_GPR3, "gpr3" },
{ PT_GPR4, "gpr4" },
{ PT_GPR5, "gpr5" },
{ PT_GPR6, "gpr6" },
{ PT_GPR7, "gpr7" },
{ PT_GPR8, "gpr8" },
{ PT_GPR9, "gpr9" },
{ PT_GPR10, "gpr10" },
{ PT_GPR11, "gpr11" },
{ PT_GPR12, "gpr12" },
{ PT_GPR13, "gpr13" },
{ PT_GPR14, "gpr14" },
{ PT_GPR15, "gpr15" },
{ PT_ACR0, "acr0" },
{ PT_ACR1, "acr1" },
{ PT_ACR2, "acr2" },
{ PT_ACR3, "acr3" },
{ PT_ACR4, "acr4" },
{ PT_ACR5, "acr5" },
{ PT_ACR6, "acr6" },
{ PT_ACR7, "acr7" },
{ PT_ACR8, "acr8" },
{ PT_ACR9, "acr9" },
{ PT_ACR10, "acr10" },
{ PT_ACR11, "acr11" },
{ PT_ACR12, "acr12" },
{ PT_ACR13, "acr13" },
{ PT_ACR14, "acr14" },
{ PT_ACR15, "acr15" },
{ PT_ORIGGPR2, "orig_gpr2" },
{ PT_FPC, "fpc" },
# if defined(S390)
1999-12-23 17:20:14 +03:00
{ PT_FPR0_HI, "fpr0.hi" },
{ PT_FPR0_LO, "fpr0.lo" },
{ PT_FPR1_HI, "fpr1.hi" },
{ PT_FPR1_LO, "fpr1.lo" },
{ PT_FPR2_HI, "fpr2.hi" },
{ PT_FPR2_LO, "fpr2.lo" },
{ PT_FPR3_HI, "fpr3.hi" },
{ PT_FPR3_LO, "fpr3.lo" },
{ PT_FPR4_HI, "fpr4.hi" },
{ PT_FPR4_LO, "fpr4.lo" },
{ PT_FPR5_HI, "fpr5.hi" },
{ PT_FPR5_LO, "fpr5.lo" },
{ PT_FPR6_HI, "fpr6.hi" },
{ PT_FPR6_LO, "fpr6.lo" },
{ PT_FPR7_HI, "fpr7.hi" },
{ PT_FPR7_LO, "fpr7.lo" },
{ PT_FPR8_HI, "fpr8.hi" },
{ PT_FPR8_LO, "fpr8.lo" },
{ PT_FPR9_HI, "fpr9.hi" },
{ PT_FPR9_LO, "fpr9.lo" },
{ PT_FPR10_HI, "fpr10.hi" },
{ PT_FPR10_LO, "fpr10.lo" },
{ PT_FPR11_HI, "fpr11.hi" },
{ PT_FPR11_LO, "fpr11.lo" },
{ PT_FPR12_HI, "fpr12.hi" },
{ PT_FPR12_LO, "fpr12.lo" },
{ PT_FPR13_HI, "fpr13.hi" },
{ PT_FPR13_LO, "fpr13.lo" },
{ PT_FPR14_HI, "fpr14.hi" },
{ PT_FPR14_LO, "fpr14.lo" },
{ PT_FPR15_HI, "fpr15.hi" },
{ PT_FPR15_LO, "fpr15.lo" },
# endif
# if defined(S390X)
{ PT_FPR0, "fpr0" },
{ PT_FPR1, "fpr1" },
{ PT_FPR2, "fpr2" },
{ PT_FPR3, "fpr3" },
{ PT_FPR4, "fpr4" },
{ PT_FPR5, "fpr5" },
{ PT_FPR6, "fpr6" },
{ PT_FPR7, "fpr7" },
{ PT_FPR8, "fpr8" },
{ PT_FPR9, "fpr9" },
{ PT_FPR10, "fpr10" },
{ PT_FPR11, "fpr11" },
{ PT_FPR12, "fpr12" },
{ PT_FPR13, "fpr13" },
{ PT_FPR14, "fpr14" },
{ PT_FPR15, "fpr15" },
# endif
1999-12-23 17:20:14 +03:00
{ PT_CR_9, "cr9" },
{ PT_CR_10, "cr10" },
{ PT_CR_11, "cr11" },
2011-06-07 14:13:24 +04:00
{ PT_IEEE_IP, "ieee_exception_ip" },
# elif defined(SPARC)
1999-02-19 03:21:36 +03:00
/* XXX No support for these offsets yet. */
# elif defined(HPPA)
/* XXX No support for these offsets yet. */
# elif defined(POWERPC)
# ifndef PT_ORIG_R3
# define PT_ORIG_R3 34
# endif
# define REGSIZE (sizeof(unsigned long))
{ REGSIZE*PT_R0, "r0" },
{ REGSIZE*PT_R1, "r1" },
{ REGSIZE*PT_R2, "r2" },
{ REGSIZE*PT_R3, "r3" },
{ REGSIZE*PT_R4, "r4" },
{ REGSIZE*PT_R5, "r5" },
{ REGSIZE*PT_R6, "r6" },
{ REGSIZE*PT_R7, "r7" },
{ REGSIZE*PT_R8, "r8" },
{ REGSIZE*PT_R9, "r9" },
{ REGSIZE*PT_R10, "r10" },
{ REGSIZE*PT_R11, "r11" },
{ REGSIZE*PT_R12, "r12" },
{ REGSIZE*PT_R13, "r13" },
{ REGSIZE*PT_R14, "r14" },
{ REGSIZE*PT_R15, "r15" },
{ REGSIZE*PT_R16, "r16" },
{ REGSIZE*PT_R17, "r17" },
{ REGSIZE*PT_R18, "r18" },
{ REGSIZE*PT_R19, "r19" },
{ REGSIZE*PT_R20, "r20" },
{ REGSIZE*PT_R21, "r21" },
{ REGSIZE*PT_R22, "r22" },
{ REGSIZE*PT_R23, "r23" },
{ REGSIZE*PT_R24, "r24" },
{ REGSIZE*PT_R25, "r25" },
{ REGSIZE*PT_R26, "r26" },
{ REGSIZE*PT_R27, "r27" },
{ REGSIZE*PT_R28, "r28" },
{ REGSIZE*PT_R29, "r29" },
{ REGSIZE*PT_R30, "r30" },
{ REGSIZE*PT_R31, "r31" },
{ REGSIZE*PT_NIP, "NIP" },
{ REGSIZE*PT_MSR, "MSR" },
{ REGSIZE*PT_ORIG_R3, "ORIG_R3" },
{ REGSIZE*PT_CTR, "CTR" },
{ REGSIZE*PT_LNK, "LNK" },
{ REGSIZE*PT_XER, "XER" },
{ REGSIZE*PT_CCR, "CCR" },
{ REGSIZE*PT_FPR0, "FPR0" },
# undef REGSIZE
# elif defined(ALPHA)
1999-12-23 17:20:14 +03:00
{ 0, "r0" },
{ 1, "r1" },
{ 2, "r2" },
{ 3, "r3" },
{ 4, "r4" },
{ 5, "r5" },
{ 6, "r6" },
{ 7, "r7" },
{ 8, "r8" },
{ 9, "r9" },
{ 10, "r10" },
{ 11, "r11" },
{ 12, "r12" },
{ 13, "r13" },
{ 14, "r14" },
{ 15, "r15" },
{ 16, "r16" },
{ 17, "r17" },
{ 18, "r18" },
{ 19, "r19" },
{ 20, "r20" },
{ 21, "r21" },
{ 22, "r22" },
{ 23, "r23" },
{ 24, "r24" },
{ 25, "r25" },
{ 26, "r26" },
{ 27, "r27" },
{ 28, "r28" },
{ 29, "gp" },
{ 30, "fp" },
{ 31, "zero" },
{ 32, "fp0" },
{ 33, "fp" },
{ 34, "fp2" },
{ 35, "fp3" },
{ 36, "fp4" },
{ 37, "fp5" },
{ 38, "fp6" },
{ 39, "fp7" },
{ 40, "fp8" },
{ 41, "fp9" },
{ 42, "fp10" },
{ 43, "fp11" },
{ 44, "fp12" },
{ 45, "fp13" },
{ 46, "fp14" },
{ 47, "fp15" },
{ 48, "fp16" },
{ 49, "fp17" },
{ 50, "fp18" },
{ 51, "fp19" },
{ 52, "fp20" },
{ 53, "fp21" },
{ 54, "fp22" },
{ 55, "fp23" },
{ 56, "fp24" },
{ 57, "fp25" },
{ 58, "fp26" },
{ 59, "fp27" },
{ 60, "fp28" },
{ 61, "fp29" },
{ 62, "fp30" },
{ 63, "fp31" },
{ 64, "pc" },
# elif defined(IA64)
2000-02-04 00:58:30 +03:00
{ PT_F32, "f32" }, { PT_F33, "f33" }, { PT_F34, "f34" },
{ PT_F35, "f35" }, { PT_F36, "f36" }, { PT_F37, "f37" },
{ PT_F38, "f38" }, { PT_F39, "f39" }, { PT_F40, "f40" },
{ PT_F41, "f41" }, { PT_F42, "f42" }, { PT_F43, "f43" },
{ PT_F44, "f44" }, { PT_F45, "f45" }, { PT_F46, "f46" },
{ PT_F47, "f47" }, { PT_F48, "f48" }, { PT_F49, "f49" },
{ PT_F50, "f50" }, { PT_F51, "f51" }, { PT_F52, "f52" },
{ PT_F53, "f53" }, { PT_F54, "f54" }, { PT_F55, "f55" },
{ PT_F56, "f56" }, { PT_F57, "f57" }, { PT_F58, "f58" },
{ PT_F59, "f59" }, { PT_F60, "f60" }, { PT_F61, "f61" },
{ PT_F62, "f62" }, { PT_F63, "f63" }, { PT_F64, "f64" },
{ PT_F65, "f65" }, { PT_F66, "f66" }, { PT_F67, "f67" },
{ PT_F68, "f68" }, { PT_F69, "f69" }, { PT_F70, "f70" },
{ PT_F71, "f71" }, { PT_F72, "f72" }, { PT_F73, "f73" },
{ PT_F74, "f74" }, { PT_F75, "f75" }, { PT_F76, "f76" },
{ PT_F77, "f77" }, { PT_F78, "f78" }, { PT_F79, "f79" },
{ PT_F80, "f80" }, { PT_F81, "f81" }, { PT_F82, "f82" },
{ PT_F83, "f83" }, { PT_F84, "f84" }, { PT_F85, "f85" },
{ PT_F86, "f86" }, { PT_F87, "f87" }, { PT_F88, "f88" },
{ PT_F89, "f89" }, { PT_F90, "f90" }, { PT_F91, "f91" },
{ PT_F92, "f92" }, { PT_F93, "f93" }, { PT_F94, "f94" },
{ PT_F95, "f95" }, { PT_F96, "f96" }, { PT_F97, "f97" },
{ PT_F98, "f98" }, { PT_F99, "f99" }, { PT_F100, "f100" },
{ PT_F101, "f101" }, { PT_F102, "f102" }, { PT_F103, "f103" },
{ PT_F104, "f104" }, { PT_F105, "f105" }, { PT_F106, "f106" },
{ PT_F107, "f107" }, { PT_F108, "f108" }, { PT_F109, "f109" },
{ PT_F110, "f110" }, { PT_F111, "f111" }, { PT_F112, "f112" },
{ PT_F113, "f113" }, { PT_F114, "f114" }, { PT_F115, "f115" },
{ PT_F116, "f116" }, { PT_F117, "f117" }, { PT_F118, "f118" },
{ PT_F119, "f119" }, { PT_F120, "f120" }, { PT_F121, "f121" },
{ PT_F122, "f122" }, { PT_F123, "f123" }, { PT_F124, "f124" },
{ PT_F125, "f125" }, { PT_F126, "f126" }, { PT_F127, "f127" },
/* switch stack: */
{ PT_F2, "f2" }, { PT_F3, "f3" }, { PT_F4, "f4" },
{ PT_F5, "f5" }, { PT_F10, "f10" }, { PT_F11, "f11" },
{ PT_F12, "f12" }, { PT_F13, "f13" }, { PT_F14, "f14" },
{ PT_F15, "f15" }, { PT_F16, "f16" }, { PT_F17, "f17" },
{ PT_F18, "f18" }, { PT_F19, "f19" }, { PT_F20, "f20" },
{ PT_F21, "f21" }, { PT_F22, "f22" }, { PT_F23, "f23" },
{ PT_F24, "f24" }, { PT_F25, "f25" }, { PT_F26, "f26" },
{ PT_F27, "f27" }, { PT_F28, "f28" }, { PT_F29, "f29" },
{ PT_F30, "f30" }, { PT_F31, "f31" }, { PT_R4, "r4" },
{ PT_R5, "r5" }, { PT_R6, "r6" }, { PT_R7, "r7" },
{ PT_B1, "b1" }, { PT_B2, "b2" }, { PT_B3, "b3" },
{ PT_B4, "b4" }, { PT_B5, "b5" },
{ PT_AR_EC, "ar.ec" }, { PT_AR_LC, "ar.lc" },
2000-02-04 00:58:30 +03:00
/* pt_regs */
{ PT_CR_IPSR, "psr" }, { PT_CR_IIP, "ip" },
{ PT_CFM, "cfm" }, { PT_AR_UNAT, "ar.unat" },
2000-02-04 00:58:30 +03:00
{ PT_AR_PFS, "ar.pfs" }, { PT_AR_RSC, "ar.rsc" },
{ PT_AR_RNAT, "ar.rnat" }, { PT_AR_BSPSTORE, "ar.bspstore" },
{ PT_PR, "pr" }, { PT_B6, "b6" }, { PT_AR_BSP, "ar.bsp" },
{ PT_R1, "r1" }, { PT_R2, "r2" }, { PT_R3, "r3" },
{ PT_R12, "r12" }, { PT_R13, "r13" }, { PT_R14, "r14" },
{ PT_R15, "r15" }, { PT_R8, "r8" }, { PT_R9, "r9" },
{ PT_R10, "r10" }, { PT_R11, "r11" }, { PT_R16, "r16" },
{ PT_R17, "r17" }, { PT_R18, "r18" }, { PT_R19, "r19" },
{ PT_R20, "r20" }, { PT_R21, "r21" }, { PT_R22, "r22" },
{ PT_R23, "r23" }, { PT_R24, "r24" }, { PT_R25, "r25" },
{ PT_R26, "r26" }, { PT_R27, "r27" }, { PT_R28, "r28" },
{ PT_R29, "r29" }, { PT_R30, "r30" }, { PT_R31, "r31" },
{ PT_AR_CCV, "ar.ccv" }, { PT_AR_FPSR, "ar.fpsr" },
{ PT_B0, "b0" }, { PT_B7, "b7" }, { PT_F6, "f6" },
{ PT_F7, "f7" }, { PT_F8, "f8" }, { PT_F9, "f9" },
# ifdef PT_AR_CSD
{ PT_AR_CSD, "ar.csd" },
# endif
# ifdef PT_AR_SSD
{ PT_AR_SSD, "ar.ssd" },
# endif
{ PT_DBR, "dbr" }, { PT_IBR, "ibr" }, { PT_PMD, "pmd" },
# elif defined(I386)
1999-02-19 03:21:36 +03:00
{ 4*EBX, "4*EBX" },
{ 4*ECX, "4*ECX" },
{ 4*EDX, "4*EDX" },
{ 4*ESI, "4*ESI" },
{ 4*EDI, "4*EDI" },
{ 4*EBP, "4*EBP" },
{ 4*EAX, "4*EAX" },
{ 4*DS, "4*DS" },
{ 4*ES, "4*ES" },
{ 4*FS, "4*FS" },
{ 4*GS, "4*GS" },
{ 4*ORIG_EAX, "4*ORIG_EAX" },
{ 4*EIP, "4*EIP" },
{ 4*CS, "4*CS" },
{ 4*EFL, "4*EFL" },
{ 4*UESP, "4*UESP" },
{ 4*SS, "4*SS" },
# elif defined(X86_64)
2011-06-07 14:13:24 +04:00
{ 8*R15, "8*R15" },
{ 8*R14, "8*R14" },
{ 8*R13, "8*R13" },
{ 8*R12, "8*R12" },
{ 8*RBP, "8*RBP" },
{ 8*RBX, "8*RBX" },
{ 8*R11, "8*R11" },
{ 8*R10, "8*R10" },
{ 8*R9, "8*R9" },
{ 8*R8, "8*R8" },
{ 8*RAX, "8*RAX" },
{ 8*RCX, "8*RCX" },
{ 8*RDX, "8*RDX" },
{ 8*RSI, "8*RSI" },
{ 8*RDI, "8*RDI" },
{ 8*ORIG_RAX, "8*ORIG_RAX" },
{ 8*RIP, "8*RIP" },
{ 8*CS, "8*CS" },
{ 8*EFLAGS, "8*EFL" },
{ 8*RSP, "8*RSP" },
{ 8*SS, "8*SS" },
# elif defined(M68K)
1999-02-19 03:21:36 +03:00
{ 4*PT_D1, "4*PT_D1" },
{ 4*PT_D2, "4*PT_D2" },
{ 4*PT_D3, "4*PT_D3" },
{ 4*PT_D4, "4*PT_D4" },
{ 4*PT_D5, "4*PT_D5" },
{ 4*PT_D6, "4*PT_D6" },
{ 4*PT_D7, "4*PT_D7" },
{ 4*PT_A0, "4*PT_A0" },
{ 4*PT_A1, "4*PT_A1" },
{ 4*PT_A2, "4*PT_A2" },
{ 4*PT_A3, "4*PT_A3" },
{ 4*PT_A4, "4*PT_A4" },
{ 4*PT_A5, "4*PT_A5" },
{ 4*PT_A6, "4*PT_A6" },
{ 4*PT_D0, "4*PT_D0" },
{ 4*PT_USP, "4*PT_USP" },
{ 4*PT_ORIG_D0, "4*PT_ORIG_D0" },
{ 4*PT_SR, "4*PT_SR" },
{ 4*PT_PC, "4*PT_PC" },
# elif defined(SH)
2011-06-07 14:13:24 +04:00
{ 4*REG_REG0, "4*REG_REG0" },
{ 4*(REG_REG0+1), "4*REG_REG1" },
{ 4*(REG_REG0+2), "4*REG_REG2" },
{ 4*(REG_REG0+3), "4*REG_REG3" },
{ 4*(REG_REG0+4), "4*REG_REG4" },
{ 4*(REG_REG0+5), "4*REG_REG5" },
{ 4*(REG_REG0+6), "4*REG_REG6" },
{ 4*(REG_REG0+7), "4*REG_REG7" },
{ 4*(REG_REG0+8), "4*REG_REG8" },
{ 4*(REG_REG0+9), "4*REG_REG9" },
{ 4*(REG_REG0+10), "4*REG_REG10" },
{ 4*(REG_REG0+11), "4*REG_REG11" },
{ 4*(REG_REG0+12), "4*REG_REG12" },
{ 4*(REG_REG0+13), "4*REG_REG13" },
{ 4*(REG_REG0+14), "4*REG_REG14" },
{ 4*REG_REG15, "4*REG_REG15" },
{ 4*REG_PC, "4*REG_PC" },
{ 4*REG_PR, "4*REG_PR" },
{ 4*REG_SR, "4*REG_SR" },
{ 4*REG_GBR, "4*REG_GBR" },
{ 4*REG_MACH, "4*REG_MACH" },
{ 4*REG_MACL, "4*REG_MACL" },
{ 4*REG_SYSCALL, "4*REG_SYSCALL" },
{ 4*REG_FPUL, "4*REG_FPUL" },
{ 4*REG_FPREG0, "4*REG_FPREG0" },
{ 4*(REG_FPREG0+1), "4*REG_FPREG1" },
{ 4*(REG_FPREG0+2), "4*REG_FPREG2" },
{ 4*(REG_FPREG0+3), "4*REG_FPREG3" },
{ 4*(REG_FPREG0+4), "4*REG_FPREG4" },
{ 4*(REG_FPREG0+5), "4*REG_FPREG5" },
{ 4*(REG_FPREG0+6), "4*REG_FPREG6" },
{ 4*(REG_FPREG0+7), "4*REG_FPREG7" },
{ 4*(REG_FPREG0+8), "4*REG_FPREG8" },
{ 4*(REG_FPREG0+9), "4*REG_FPREG9" },
{ 4*(REG_FPREG0+10), "4*REG_FPREG10" },
{ 4*(REG_FPREG0+11), "4*REG_FPREG11" },
{ 4*(REG_FPREG0+12), "4*REG_FPREG12" },
{ 4*(REG_FPREG0+13), "4*REG_FPREG13" },
{ 4*(REG_FPREG0+14), "4*REG_FPREG14" },
{ 4*REG_FPREG15, "4*REG_FPREG15" },
# ifdef REG_XDREG0
2011-06-07 14:13:24 +04:00
{ 4*REG_XDREG0, "4*REG_XDREG0" },
{ 4*(REG_XDREG0+2), "4*REG_XDREG2" },
{ 4*(REG_XDREG0+4), "4*REG_XDREG4" },
{ 4*(REG_XDREG0+6), "4*REG_XDREG6" },
{ 4*(REG_XDREG0+8), "4*REG_XDREG8" },
{ 4*(REG_XDREG0+10), "4*REG_XDREG10" },
{ 4*(REG_XDREG0+12), "4*REG_XDREG12" },
{ 4*REG_XDREG14, "4*REG_XDREG14" },
# endif
2011-06-07 14:13:24 +04:00
{ 4*REG_FPSCR, "4*REG_FPSCR" },
# elif defined(SH64)
2011-06-07 14:13:24 +04:00
{ 0, "PC(L)" },
{ 4, "PC(U)" },
{ 8, "SR(L)" },
{ 12, "SR(U)" },
{ 16, "syscall no.(L)" },
{ 20, "syscall_no.(U)" },
{ 24, "R0(L)" },
{ 28, "R0(U)" },
{ 32, "R1(L)" },
{ 36, "R1(U)" },
{ 40, "R2(L)" },
{ 44, "R2(U)" },
{ 48, "R3(L)" },
{ 52, "R3(U)" },
{ 56, "R4(L)" },
{ 60, "R4(U)" },
{ 64, "R5(L)" },
{ 68, "R5(U)" },
{ 72, "R6(L)" },
{ 76, "R6(U)" },
{ 80, "R7(L)" },
{ 84, "R7(U)" },
{ 88, "R8(L)" },
{ 92, "R8(U)" },
{ 96, "R9(L)" },
{ 100, "R9(U)" },
{ 104, "R10(L)" },
{ 108, "R10(U)" },
{ 112, "R11(L)" },
{ 116, "R11(U)" },
{ 120, "R12(L)" },
{ 124, "R12(U)" },
{ 128, "R13(L)" },
{ 132, "R13(U)" },
{ 136, "R14(L)" },
{ 140, "R14(U)" },
{ 144, "R15(L)" },
{ 148, "R15(U)" },
{ 152, "R16(L)" },
{ 156, "R16(U)" },
{ 160, "R17(L)" },
{ 164, "R17(U)" },
{ 168, "R18(L)" },
{ 172, "R18(U)" },
{ 176, "R19(L)" },
{ 180, "R19(U)" },
{ 184, "R20(L)" },
{ 188, "R20(U)" },
{ 192, "R21(L)" },
{ 196, "R21(U)" },
{ 200, "R22(L)" },
{ 204, "R22(U)" },
{ 208, "R23(L)" },
{ 212, "R23(U)" },
{ 216, "R24(L)" },
{ 220, "R24(U)" },
{ 224, "R25(L)" },
{ 228, "R25(U)" },
{ 232, "R26(L)" },
{ 236, "R26(U)" },
{ 240, "R27(L)" },
{ 244, "R27(U)" },
{ 248, "R28(L)" },
{ 252, "R28(U)" },
{ 256, "R29(L)" },
{ 260, "R29(U)" },
{ 264, "R30(L)" },
{ 268, "R30(U)" },
{ 272, "R31(L)" },
{ 276, "R31(U)" },
{ 280, "R32(L)" },
{ 284, "R32(U)" },
{ 288, "R33(L)" },
{ 292, "R33(U)" },
{ 296, "R34(L)" },
{ 300, "R34(U)" },
{ 304, "R35(L)" },
{ 308, "R35(U)" },
{ 312, "R36(L)" },
{ 316, "R36(U)" },
{ 320, "R37(L)" },
{ 324, "R37(U)" },
{ 328, "R38(L)" },
{ 332, "R38(U)" },
{ 336, "R39(L)" },
{ 340, "R39(U)" },
{ 344, "R40(L)" },
{ 348, "R40(U)" },
{ 352, "R41(L)" },
{ 356, "R41(U)" },
{ 360, "R42(L)" },
{ 364, "R42(U)" },
{ 368, "R43(L)" },
{ 372, "R43(U)" },
{ 376, "R44(L)" },
{ 380, "R44(U)" },
{ 384, "R45(L)" },
{ 388, "R45(U)" },
{ 392, "R46(L)" },
{ 396, "R46(U)" },
{ 400, "R47(L)" },
{ 404, "R47(U)" },
{ 408, "R48(L)" },
{ 412, "R48(U)" },
{ 416, "R49(L)" },
{ 420, "R49(U)" },
{ 424, "R50(L)" },
{ 428, "R50(U)" },
{ 432, "R51(L)" },
{ 436, "R51(U)" },
{ 440, "R52(L)" },
{ 444, "R52(U)" },
{ 448, "R53(L)" },
{ 452, "R53(U)" },
{ 456, "R54(L)" },
{ 460, "R54(U)" },
{ 464, "R55(L)" },
{ 468, "R55(U)" },
{ 472, "R56(L)" },
{ 476, "R56(U)" },
{ 480, "R57(L)" },
{ 484, "R57(U)" },
{ 488, "R58(L)" },
{ 492, "R58(U)" },
{ 496, "R59(L)" },
{ 500, "R59(U)" },
{ 504, "R60(L)" },
{ 508, "R60(U)" },
{ 512, "R61(L)" },
{ 516, "R61(U)" },
{ 520, "R62(L)" },
{ 524, "R62(U)" },
{ 528, "TR0(L)" },
{ 532, "TR0(U)" },
{ 536, "TR1(L)" },
{ 540, "TR1(U)" },
{ 544, "TR2(L)" },
{ 548, "TR2(U)" },
{ 552, "TR3(L)" },
{ 556, "TR3(U)" },
{ 560, "TR4(L)" },
{ 564, "TR4(U)" },
{ 568, "TR5(L)" },
{ 572, "TR5(U)" },
{ 576, "TR6(L)" },
{ 580, "TR6(U)" },
{ 584, "TR7(L)" },
{ 588, "TR7(U)" },
/* This entry is in case pt_regs contains dregs (depends on
the kernel build options). */
2011-06-07 14:13:24 +04:00
{ uoff(regs), "offsetof(struct user, regs)" },
{ uoff(fpu), "offsetof(struct user, fpu)" },
# elif defined(ARM)
{ uoff(regs.ARM_r0), "r0" },
{ uoff(regs.ARM_r1), "r1" },
{ uoff(regs.ARM_r2), "r2" },
{ uoff(regs.ARM_r3), "r3" },
{ uoff(regs.ARM_r4), "r4" },
{ uoff(regs.ARM_r5), "r5" },
{ uoff(regs.ARM_r6), "r6" },
{ uoff(regs.ARM_r7), "r7" },
{ uoff(regs.ARM_r8), "r8" },
{ uoff(regs.ARM_r9), "r9" },
{ uoff(regs.ARM_r10), "r10" },
{ uoff(regs.ARM_fp), "fp" },
{ uoff(regs.ARM_ip), "ip" },
{ uoff(regs.ARM_sp), "sp" },
{ uoff(regs.ARM_lr), "lr" },
{ uoff(regs.ARM_pc), "pc" },
{ uoff(regs.ARM_cpsr), "cpsr" },
# elif defined(AVR32)
{ uoff(regs.sr), "sr" },
{ uoff(regs.pc), "pc" },
{ uoff(regs.lr), "lr" },
{ uoff(regs.sp), "sp" },
{ uoff(regs.r12), "r12" },
{ uoff(regs.r11), "r11" },
{ uoff(regs.r10), "r10" },
{ uoff(regs.r9), "r9" },
{ uoff(regs.r8), "r8" },
{ uoff(regs.r7), "r7" },
{ uoff(regs.r6), "r6" },
{ uoff(regs.r5), "r5" },
{ uoff(regs.r4), "r4" },
{ uoff(regs.r3), "r3" },
{ uoff(regs.r2), "r2" },
{ uoff(regs.r1), "r1" },
{ uoff(regs.r0), "r0" },
{ uoff(regs.r12_orig), "orig_r12" },
# elif defined(MIPS)
{ 0, "r0" },
{ 1, "r1" },
{ 2, "r2" },
{ 3, "r3" },
{ 4, "r4" },
{ 5, "r5" },
{ 6, "r6" },
{ 7, "r7" },
{ 8, "r8" },
{ 9, "r9" },
{ 10, "r10" },
{ 11, "r11" },
{ 12, "r12" },
{ 13, "r13" },
{ 14, "r14" },
{ 15, "r15" },
{ 16, "r16" },
{ 17, "r17" },
{ 18, "r18" },
{ 19, "r19" },
{ 20, "r20" },
{ 21, "r21" },
{ 22, "r22" },
{ 23, "r23" },
{ 24, "r24" },
{ 25, "r25" },
{ 26, "r26" },
{ 27, "r27" },
{ 28, "r28" },
{ 29, "r29" },
{ 30, "r30" },
{ 31, "r31" },
{ 32, "f0" },
{ 33, "f1" },
{ 34, "f2" },
{ 35, "f3" },
{ 36, "f4" },
{ 37, "f5" },
{ 38, "f6" },
{ 39, "f7" },
{ 40, "f8" },
{ 41, "f9" },
{ 42, "f10" },
{ 43, "f11" },
{ 44, "f12" },
{ 45, "f13" },
{ 46, "f14" },
{ 47, "f15" },
{ 48, "f16" },
{ 49, "f17" },
{ 50, "f18" },
{ 51, "f19" },
{ 52, "f20" },
{ 53, "f21" },
{ 54, "f22" },
{ 55, "f23" },
{ 56, "f24" },
{ 57, "f25" },
{ 58, "f26" },
{ 59, "f27" },
{ 60, "f28" },
{ 61, "f29" },
{ 62, "f30" },
{ 63, "f31" },
{ 64, "pc" },
{ 65, "cause" },
{ 66, "badvaddr" },
{ 67, "mmhi" },
{ 68, "mmlo" },
{ 69, "fpcsr" },
{ 70, "fpeir" },
# elif defined(TILE)
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_REG(0), "r0" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_REG(1), "r1" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_REG(2), "r2" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_REG(3), "r3" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_REG(4), "r4" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_REG(5), "r5" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_REG(6), "r6" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_REG(7), "r7" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_REG(8), "r8" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_REG(9), "r9" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_REG(10), "r10" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_REG(11), "r11" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_REG(12), "r12" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_REG(13), "r13" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_REG(14), "r14" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_REG(15), "r15" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_REG(16), "r16" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_REG(17), "r17" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_REG(18), "r18" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_REG(19), "r19" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_REG(20), "r20" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_REG(21), "r21" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_REG(22), "r22" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_REG(23), "r23" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_REG(24), "r24" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_REG(25), "r25" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_REG(26), "r26" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_REG(27), "r27" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_REG(28), "r28" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_REG(29), "r29" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_REG(30), "r30" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_REG(31), "r31" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_REG(32), "r32" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_REG(33), "r33" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_REG(34), "r34" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_REG(35), "r35" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_REG(36), "r36" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_REG(37), "r37" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_REG(38), "r38" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_REG(39), "r39" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_REG(40), "r40" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_REG(41), "r41" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_REG(42), "r42" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_REG(43), "r43" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_REG(44), "r44" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_REG(45), "r45" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_REG(46), "r46" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_REG(47), "r47" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_REG(48), "r48" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_REG(49), "r49" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_REG(50), "r50" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_REG(51), "r51" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_REG(52), "r52" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_TP, "tp" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_SP, "sp" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_LR, "lr" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_PC, "pc" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_EX1, "ex1" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_FAULTNUM, "faultnum" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_ORIG_R0, "orig_r0" },
{ PTREGS_OFFSET_FLAGS, "flags" },
# endif
# ifdef CRISV10
{ 4*PT_FRAMETYPE, "4*PT_FRAMETYPE" },
{ 4*PT_ORIG_R10, "4*PT_ORIG_R10" },
{ 4*PT_R13, "4*PT_R13" },
{ 4*PT_R12, "4*PT_R12" },
{ 4*PT_R11, "4*PT_R11" },
{ 4*PT_R10, "4*PT_R10" },
{ 4*PT_R9, "4*PT_R9" },
{ 4*PT_R8, "4*PT_R8" },
{ 4*PT_R7, "4*PT_R7" },
{ 4*PT_R6, "4*PT_R6" },
{ 4*PT_R5, "4*PT_R5" },
{ 4*PT_R4, "4*PT_R4" },
{ 4*PT_R3, "4*PT_R3" },
{ 4*PT_R2, "4*PT_R2" },
{ 4*PT_R1, "4*PT_R1" },
{ 4*PT_R0, "4*PT_R0" },
{ 4*PT_MOF, "4*PT_MOF" },
{ 4*PT_DCCR, "4*PT_DCCR" },
{ 4*PT_SRP, "4*PT_SRP" },
{ 4*PT_IRP, "4*PT_IRP" },
{ 4*PT_CSRINSTR, "4*PT_CSRINSTR" },
{ 4*PT_CSRADDR, "4*PT_CSRADDR" },
{ 4*PT_CSRDATA, "4*PT_CSRDATA" },
{ 4*PT_USP, "4*PT_USP" },
# endif
# ifdef CRISV32
{ 4*PT_ORIG_R10, "4*PT_ORIG_R10" },
{ 4*PT_R0, "4*PT_R0" },
{ 4*PT_R1, "4*PT_R1" },
{ 4*PT_R2, "4*PT_R2" },
{ 4*PT_R3, "4*PT_R3" },
{ 4*PT_R4, "4*PT_R4" },
{ 4*PT_R5, "4*PT_R5" },
{ 4*PT_R6, "4*PT_R6" },
{ 4*PT_R7, "4*PT_R7" },
{ 4*PT_R8, "4*PT_R8" },
{ 4*PT_R9, "4*PT_R9" },
{ 4*PT_R10, "4*PT_R10" },
{ 4*PT_R11, "4*PT_R11" },
{ 4*PT_R12, "4*PT_R12" },
{ 4*PT_R13, "4*PT_R13" },
{ 4*PT_ACR, "4*PT_ACR" },
{ 4*PT_SRS, "4*PT_SRS" },
{ 4*PT_MOF, "4*PT_MOF" },
{ 4*PT_SPC, "4*PT_SPC" },
{ 4*PT_CCS, "4*PT_CCS" },
{ 4*PT_SRP, "4*PT_SRP" },
{ 4*PT_ERP, "4*PT_ERP" },
{ 4*PT_EXS, "4*PT_EXS" },
{ 4*PT_EDA, "4*PT_EDA" },
{ 4*PT_USP, "4*PT_USP" },
{ 4*PT_PPC, "4*PT_PPC" },
{ 4*PT_BP_CTRL, "4*PT_BP_CTRL" },
{ 4*PT_BP+4, "4*PT_BP+4" },
{ 4*PT_BP+8, "4*PT_BP+8" },
{ 4*PT_BP+12, "4*PT_BP+12" },
{ 4*PT_BP+16, "4*PT_BP+16" },
{ 4*PT_BP+20, "4*PT_BP+20" },
{ 4*PT_BP+24, "4*PT_BP+24" },
{ 4*PT_BP+28, "4*PT_BP+28" },
{ 4*PT_BP+32, "4*PT_BP+32" },
{ 4*PT_BP+36, "4*PT_BP+36" },
{ 4*PT_BP+40, "4*PT_BP+40" },
{ 4*PT_BP+44, "4*PT_BP+44" },
{ 4*PT_BP+48, "4*PT_BP+48" },
{ 4*PT_BP+52, "4*PT_BP+52" },
{ 4*PT_BP+56, "4*PT_BP+56" },
# endif
# ifdef MICROBLAZE
{ PT_GPR(0), "r0" },
{ PT_GPR(1), "r1" },
{ PT_GPR(2), "r2" },
{ PT_GPR(3), "r3" },
{ PT_GPR(4), "r4" },
{ PT_GPR(5), "r5" },
{ PT_GPR(6), "r6" },
{ PT_GPR(7), "r7" },
{ PT_GPR(8), "r8" },
{ PT_GPR(9), "r9" },
{ PT_GPR(10), "r10" },
{ PT_GPR(11), "r11" },
{ PT_GPR(12), "r12" },
{ PT_GPR(13), "r13" },
{ PT_GPR(14), "r14" },
{ PT_GPR(15), "r15" },
{ PT_GPR(16), "r16" },
{ PT_GPR(17), "r17" },
{ PT_GPR(18), "r18" },
{ PT_GPR(19), "r19" },
{ PT_GPR(20), "r20" },
{ PT_GPR(21), "r21" },
{ PT_GPR(22), "r22" },
{ PT_GPR(23), "r23" },
{ PT_GPR(24), "r24" },
{ PT_GPR(25), "r25" },
{ PT_GPR(26), "r26" },
{ PT_GPR(27), "r27" },
{ PT_GPR(28), "r28" },
{ PT_GPR(29), "r29" },
{ PT_GPR(30), "r30" },
{ PT_GPR(31), "r31" },
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{ PT_PC, "rpc", },
{ PT_MSR, "rmsr", },
{ PT_EAR, "rear", },
{ PT_ESR, "resr", },
{ PT_FSR, "rfsr", },
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{ PT_KERNEL_MODE, "kernel_mode", },
# endif
# if !defined(SPARC) && !defined(HPPA) && !defined(POWERPC) \
&& !defined(ALPHA) && !defined(IA64) \
&& !defined(CRISV10) && !defined(CRISV32) && !defined(MICROBLAZE)
# if !defined(S390) && !defined(S390X) && !defined(MIPS) && !defined(SPARC64) && !defined(AVR32) && !defined(BFIN) && !defined(TILE)
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{ uoff(u_fpvalid), "offsetof(struct user, u_fpvalid)" },
# endif
# if defined(I386) || defined(X86_64)
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{ uoff(i387), "offsetof(struct user, i387)" },
# endif
# if defined(M68K)
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{ uoff(m68kfp), "offsetof(struct user, m68kfp)" },
# endif
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{ uoff(u_tsize), "offsetof(struct user, u_tsize)" },
{ uoff(u_dsize), "offsetof(struct user, u_dsize)" },
{ uoff(u_ssize), "offsetof(struct user, u_ssize)" },
# if !defined(SPARC64)
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{ uoff(start_code), "offsetof(struct user, start_code)" },
# endif
# if defined(AVR32) || defined(SH64)
{ uoff(start_data), "offsetof(struct user, start_data)" },
# endif
# if !defined(SPARC64)
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{ uoff(start_stack), "offsetof(struct user, start_stack)" },
# endif
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{ uoff(signal), "offsetof(struct user, signal)" },
# if !defined(AVR32) && !defined(S390) && !defined(S390X) && !defined(MIPS) && !defined(SH) && !defined(SH64) && !defined(SPARC64) && !defined(TILE)
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{ uoff(reserved), "offsetof(struct user, reserved)" },
# endif
# if !defined(SPARC64)
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{ uoff(u_ar0), "offsetof(struct user, u_ar0)" },
# endif
# if !defined(ARM) && !defined(AVR32) && !defined(MIPS) && !defined(S390) && !defined(S390X) && !defined(SPARC64) && !defined(BFIN) && !defined(TILE)
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{ uoff(u_fpstate), "offsetof(struct user, u_fpstate)" },
# endif
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{ uoff(magic), "offsetof(struct user, magic)" },
{ uoff(u_comm), "offsetof(struct user, u_comm)" },
# if defined(I386) || defined(X86_64)
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{ uoff(u_debugreg), "offsetof(struct user, u_debugreg)" },
# endif
# endif /* !defined(many arches) */
# ifndef HPPA
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{ sizeof(struct user), "sizeof(struct user)" },
# endif
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{ 0, NULL },
};
int
sys_ptrace(struct tcb *tcp)
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{
const struct xlat *x;
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long addr;
if (entering(tcp)) {
printxval(ptrace_cmds, tcp->u_arg[0],
"PTRACE_???"
);
tprintf(", %lu, ", tcp->u_arg[1]);
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addr = tcp->u_arg[2];
if (tcp->u_arg[0] == PTRACE_PEEKUSER
|| tcp->u_arg[0] == PTRACE_POKEUSER) {
for (x = struct_user_offsets; x->str; x++) {
if (x->val >= addr)
break;
}
if (!x->str)
tprintf("%#lx, ", addr);
else if (x->val > addr && x != struct_user_offsets) {
x--;
tprintf("%s + %ld, ", x->str, addr - x->val);
}
else
tprintf("%s, ", x->str);
}
else
tprintf("%#lx, ", tcp->u_arg[2]);
switch (tcp->u_arg[0]) {
# ifndef IA64
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case PTRACE_PEEKDATA:
case PTRACE_PEEKTEXT:
case PTRACE_PEEKUSER:
break;
# endif
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case PTRACE_CONT:
case PTRACE_SINGLESTEP:
case PTRACE_SYSCALL:
case PTRACE_DETACH:
printsignal(tcp->u_arg[3]);
break;
# ifdef PTRACE_SETOPTIONS
case PTRACE_SETOPTIONS:
printflags(ptrace_setoptions_flags, tcp->u_arg[3], "PTRACE_O_???");
break;
# endif
# ifdef PTRACE_SETSIGINFO
case PTRACE_SETSIGINFO: {
siginfo_t si;
if (!tcp->u_arg[3])
tprints("NULL");
else if (syserror(tcp))
tprintf("%#lx", tcp->u_arg[3]);
else if (umove(tcp, tcp->u_arg[3], &si) < 0)
tprints("{???}");
else
printsiginfo(&si, verbose(tcp));
break;
}
# endif
# ifdef PTRACE_GETSIGINFO
case PTRACE_GETSIGINFO:
/* Don't print anything, do it at syscall return. */
break;
# endif
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default:
tprintf("%#lx", tcp->u_arg[3]);
break;
}
} else {
switch (tcp->u_arg[0]) {
case PTRACE_PEEKDATA:
case PTRACE_PEEKTEXT:
case PTRACE_PEEKUSER:
# ifdef IA64
return RVAL_HEX;
# else
printnum(tcp, tcp->u_arg[3], "%#lx");
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break;
# endif
# ifdef PTRACE_GETSIGINFO
case PTRACE_GETSIGINFO: {
siginfo_t si;
if (!tcp->u_arg[3])
tprints("NULL");
else if (syserror(tcp))
tprintf("%#lx", tcp->u_arg[3]);
else if (umove(tcp, tcp->u_arg[3], &si) < 0)
tprints("{???}");
else
printsiginfo(&si, verbose(tcp));
break;
}
# endif
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}
}
return 0;
}
# ifndef FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE
# define FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE 4
# endif
# ifndef FUTEX_WAKE_OP
# define FUTEX_WAKE_OP 5
# endif
# ifndef FUTEX_LOCK_PI
# define FUTEX_LOCK_PI 6
# define FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI 7
# define FUTEX_TRYLOCK_PI 8
# endif
# ifndef FUTEX_WAIT_BITSET
# define FUTEX_WAIT_BITSET 9
# endif
# ifndef FUTEX_WAKE_BITSET
# define FUTEX_WAKE_BITSET 10
# endif
# ifndef FUTEX_WAIT_REQUEUE_PI
# define FUTEX_WAIT_REQUEUE_PI 11
# endif
# ifndef FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE_PI
# define FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE_PI 12
# endif
# ifndef FUTEX_PRIVATE_FLAG
# define FUTEX_PRIVATE_FLAG 128
# endif
# ifndef FUTEX_CLOCK_REALTIME
# define FUTEX_CLOCK_REALTIME 256
# endif
static const struct xlat futexops[] = {
{ FUTEX_WAIT, "FUTEX_WAIT" },
{ FUTEX_WAKE, "FUTEX_WAKE" },
{ FUTEX_FD, "FUTEX_FD" },
{ FUTEX_REQUEUE, "FUTEX_REQUEUE" },
{ FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE, "FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE" },
{ FUTEX_WAKE_OP, "FUTEX_WAKE_OP" },
{ FUTEX_LOCK_PI, "FUTEX_LOCK_PI" },
{ FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI, "FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI" },
{ FUTEX_TRYLOCK_PI, "FUTEX_TRYLOCK_PI" },
{ FUTEX_WAIT_BITSET, "FUTEX_WAIT_BITSET" },
{ FUTEX_WAKE_BITSET, "FUTEX_WAKE_BITSET" },
{ FUTEX_WAIT_REQUEUE_PI, "FUTEX_WAIT_REQUEUE_PI" },
{ FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE_PI, "FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE_PI" },
{ FUTEX_WAIT|FUTEX_PRIVATE_FLAG, "FUTEX_WAIT_PRIVATE" },
{ FUTEX_WAKE|FUTEX_PRIVATE_FLAG, "FUTEX_WAKE_PRIVATE" },
{ FUTEX_FD|FUTEX_PRIVATE_FLAG, "FUTEX_FD_PRIVATE" },
{ FUTEX_REQUEUE|FUTEX_PRIVATE_FLAG, "FUTEX_REQUEUE_PRIVATE" },
{ FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE|FUTEX_PRIVATE_FLAG, "FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE_PRIVATE" },
{ FUTEX_WAKE_OP|FUTEX_PRIVATE_FLAG, "FUTEX_WAKE_OP_PRIVATE" },
{ FUTEX_LOCK_PI|FUTEX_PRIVATE_FLAG, "FUTEX_LOCK_PI_PRIVATE" },
{ FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI|FUTEX_PRIVATE_FLAG, "FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI_PRIVATE" },
{ FUTEX_TRYLOCK_PI|FUTEX_PRIVATE_FLAG, "FUTEX_TRYLOCK_PI_PRIVATE" },
{ FUTEX_WAIT_BITSET|FUTEX_PRIVATE_FLAG, "FUTEX_WAIT_BITSET_PRIVATE" },
{ FUTEX_WAKE_BITSET|FUTEX_PRIVATE_FLAG, "FUTEX_WAKE_BITSET_PRIVATE" },
{ FUTEX_WAIT_REQUEUE_PI|FUTEX_PRIVATE_FLAG, "FUTEX_WAIT_REQUEUE_PI_PRIVATE" },
{ FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE_PI|FUTEX_PRIVATE_FLAG, "FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE_PI_PRIVATE" },
{ FUTEX_WAIT_BITSET|FUTEX_CLOCK_REALTIME, "FUTEX_WAIT_BITSET|FUTEX_CLOCK_REALTIME" },
{ FUTEX_WAIT_BITSET|FUTEX_PRIVATE_FLAG|FUTEX_CLOCK_REALTIME, "FUTEX_WAIT_BITSET_PRIVATE|FUTEX_CLOCK_REALTIME" },
{ FUTEX_WAIT_REQUEUE_PI|FUTEX_CLOCK_REALTIME, "FUTEX_WAIT_REQUEUE_PI|FUTEX_CLOCK_REALTIME" },
{ FUTEX_WAIT_REQUEUE_PI|FUTEX_PRIVATE_FLAG|FUTEX_CLOCK_REALTIME, "FUTEX_WAIT_REQUEUE_PI_PRIVATE|FUTEX_CLOCK_REALTIME" },
{ 0, NULL }
};
# ifndef FUTEX_OP_SET
# define FUTEX_OP_SET 0
# define FUTEX_OP_ADD 1
# define FUTEX_OP_OR 2
# define FUTEX_OP_ANDN 3
# define FUTEX_OP_XOR 4
# define FUTEX_OP_CMP_EQ 0
# define FUTEX_OP_CMP_NE 1
# define FUTEX_OP_CMP_LT 2
# define FUTEX_OP_CMP_LE 3
# define FUTEX_OP_CMP_GT 4
# define FUTEX_OP_CMP_GE 5
# endif
static const struct xlat futexwakeops[] = {
{ FUTEX_OP_SET, "FUTEX_OP_SET" },
{ FUTEX_OP_ADD, "FUTEX_OP_ADD" },
{ FUTEX_OP_OR, "FUTEX_OP_OR" },
{ FUTEX_OP_ANDN, "FUTEX_OP_ANDN" },
{ FUTEX_OP_XOR, "FUTEX_OP_XOR" },
{ 0, NULL }
};
static const struct xlat futexwakecmps[] = {
{ FUTEX_OP_CMP_EQ, "FUTEX_OP_CMP_EQ" },
{ FUTEX_OP_CMP_NE, "FUTEX_OP_CMP_NE" },
{ FUTEX_OP_CMP_LT, "FUTEX_OP_CMP_LT" },
{ FUTEX_OP_CMP_LE, "FUTEX_OP_CMP_LE" },
{ FUTEX_OP_CMP_GT, "FUTEX_OP_CMP_GT" },
{ FUTEX_OP_CMP_GE, "FUTEX_OP_CMP_GE" },
{ 0, NULL }
};
int
sys_futex(struct tcb *tcp)
{
if (entering(tcp)) {
long int cmd = tcp->u_arg[1] & 127;
tprintf("%p, ", (void *) tcp->u_arg[0]);
printxval(futexops, tcp->u_arg[1], "FUTEX_???");
tprintf(", %ld", tcp->u_arg[2]);
if (cmd == FUTEX_WAKE_BITSET)
tprintf(", %lx", tcp->u_arg[5]);
else if (cmd == FUTEX_WAIT) {
tprints(", ");
printtv(tcp, tcp->u_arg[3]);
} else if (cmd == FUTEX_WAIT_BITSET) {
tprints(", ");
printtv(tcp, tcp->u_arg[3]);
tprintf(", %lx", tcp->u_arg[5]);
} else if (cmd == FUTEX_REQUEUE)
tprintf(", %ld, %p", tcp->u_arg[3], (void *) tcp->u_arg[4]);
else if (cmd == FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE || cmd == FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE_PI)
tprintf(", %ld, %p, %ld", tcp->u_arg[3], (void *) tcp->u_arg[4], tcp->u_arg[5]);
else if (cmd == FUTEX_WAKE_OP) {
tprintf(", %ld, %p, {", tcp->u_arg[3], (void *) tcp->u_arg[4]);
if ((tcp->u_arg[5] >> 28) & 8)
tprints("FUTEX_OP_OPARG_SHIFT|");
printxval(futexwakeops, (tcp->u_arg[5] >> 28) & 0x7, "FUTEX_OP_???");
tprintf(", %ld, ", (tcp->u_arg[5] >> 12) & 0xfff);
if ((tcp->u_arg[5] >> 24) & 8)
tprints("FUTEX_OP_OPARG_SHIFT|");
printxval(futexwakecmps, (tcp->u_arg[5] >> 24) & 0x7, "FUTEX_OP_CMP_???");
tprintf(", %ld}", tcp->u_arg[5] & 0xfff);
} else if (cmd == FUTEX_WAIT_REQUEUE_PI) {
tprints(", ");
printtv(tcp, tcp->u_arg[3]);
tprintf(", %p", (void *) tcp->u_arg[4]);
}
}
return 0;
}
static void
print_affinitylist(struct tcb *tcp, long list, unsigned int len)
{
int first = 1;
unsigned long w, min_len;
if (abbrev(tcp) && len / sizeof(w) > max_strlen)
min_len = len - max_strlen * sizeof(w);
else
min_len = 0;
for (; len >= sizeof(w) && len > min_len;
len -= sizeof(w), list += sizeof(w)) {
if (umove(tcp, list, &w) < 0)
break;
if (first)
tprints("{");
else
tprints(", ");
first = 0;
tprintf("%lx", w);
}
if (len) {
if (first)
tprintf("%#lx", list);
else
tprintf(", %s}", (len >= sizeof(w) && len > min_len ?
"???" : "..."));
} else {
tprints(first ? "{}" : "}");
}
}
int
sys_sched_setaffinity(struct tcb *tcp)
{
if (entering(tcp)) {
tprintf("%ld, %lu, ", tcp->u_arg[0], tcp->u_arg[1]);
print_affinitylist(tcp, tcp->u_arg[2], tcp->u_arg[1]);
}
return 0;
}
int
sys_sched_getaffinity(struct tcb *tcp)
{
if (entering(tcp)) {
tprintf("%ld, %lu, ", tcp->u_arg[0], tcp->u_arg[1]);
} else {
if (tcp->u_rval == -1)
tprintf("%#lx", tcp->u_arg[2]);
else
print_affinitylist(tcp, tcp->u_arg[2], tcp->u_rval);
}
return 0;
}
int
sys_get_robust_list(struct tcb *tcp)
{
if (entering(tcp)) {
tprintf("%ld, ", (long) (pid_t) tcp->u_arg[0]);
} else {
void *addr;
size_t len;
if (syserror(tcp) ||
!tcp->u_arg[1] ||
umove(tcp, tcp->u_arg[1], &addr) < 0) {
tprintf("%#lx, ", tcp->u_arg[1]);
} else {
tprintf("[%p], ", addr);
}
if (syserror(tcp) ||
!tcp->u_arg[2] ||
umove(tcp, tcp->u_arg[2], &len) < 0) {
tprintf("%#lx", tcp->u_arg[2]);
} else {
tprintf("[%lu]", (unsigned long) len);
}
}
return 0;
}
static const struct xlat schedulers[] = {
{ SCHED_OTHER, "SCHED_OTHER" },
{ SCHED_RR, "SCHED_RR" },
{ SCHED_FIFO, "SCHED_FIFO" },
{ 0, NULL }
};
int
sys_sched_getscheduler(struct tcb *tcp)
{
if (entering(tcp)) {
tprintf("%d", (int) tcp->u_arg[0]);
} else if (!syserror(tcp)) {
2011-06-07 14:13:24 +04:00
tcp->auxstr = xlookup(schedulers, tcp->u_rval);
if (tcp->auxstr != NULL)
return RVAL_STR;
}
return 0;
}
int
sys_sched_setscheduler(struct tcb *tcp)
{
if (entering(tcp)) {
struct sched_param p;
tprintf("%d, ", (int) tcp->u_arg[0]);
printxval(schedulers, tcp->u_arg[1], "SCHED_???");
if (umove(tcp, tcp->u_arg[2], &p) < 0)
tprintf(", %#lx", tcp->u_arg[2]);
else
tprintf(", { %d }", p.__sched_priority);
}
return 0;
}
int
sys_sched_getparam(struct tcb *tcp)
{
if (entering(tcp)) {
tprintf("%d, ", (int) tcp->u_arg[0]);
} else {
struct sched_param p;
if (umove(tcp, tcp->u_arg[1], &p) < 0)
tprintf("%#lx", tcp->u_arg[1]);
else
tprintf("{ %d }", p.__sched_priority);
}
return 0;
}
int
sys_sched_setparam(struct tcb *tcp)
{
if (entering(tcp)) {
struct sched_param p;
if (umove(tcp, tcp->u_arg[1], &p) < 0)
tprintf("%d, %#lx", (int) tcp->u_arg[0], tcp->u_arg[1]);
else
tprintf("%d, { %d }", (int) tcp->u_arg[0], p.__sched_priority);
}
return 0;
}
int
sys_sched_get_priority_min(struct tcb *tcp)
{
if (entering(tcp)) {
printxval(schedulers, tcp->u_arg[0], "SCHED_???");
}
return 0;
}
int
sys_sched_rr_get_interval(struct tcb *tcp)
{
if (entering(tcp)) {
tprintf("%ld, ", (long) (pid_t) tcp->u_arg[0]);
} else {
if (syserror(tcp))
tprintf("%#lx", tcp->u_arg[1]);
else
print_timespec(tcp, tcp->u_arg[1]);
}
return 0;
}
# ifdef X86_64
# include <asm/prctl.h>
static const struct xlat archvals[] = {
{ ARCH_SET_GS, "ARCH_SET_GS" },
{ ARCH_SET_FS, "ARCH_SET_FS" },
{ ARCH_GET_FS, "ARCH_GET_FS" },
{ ARCH_GET_GS, "ARCH_GET_GS" },
{ 0, NULL },
};
int
sys_arch_prctl(struct tcb *tcp)
{
if (entering(tcp)) {
printxval(archvals, tcp->u_arg[0], "ARCH_???");
if (tcp->u_arg[0] == ARCH_SET_GS
|| tcp->u_arg[0] == ARCH_SET_FS
) {
tprintf(", %#lx", tcp->u_arg[1]);
}
} else {
if (tcp->u_arg[0] == ARCH_GET_GS
|| tcp->u_arg[0] == ARCH_GET_FS
) {
long int v;
if (!syserror(tcp) && umove(tcp, tcp->u_arg[1], &v) != -1)
tprintf(", [%#lx]", v);
else
tprintf(", %#lx", tcp->u_arg[1]);
}
}
return 0;
}
# endif /* X86_64 */
int
sys_getcpu(struct tcb *tcp)
{
if (exiting(tcp)) {
unsigned u;
if (tcp->u_arg[0] == 0)
tprints("NULL, ");
else if (umove(tcp, tcp->u_arg[0], &u) < 0)
tprintf("%#lx, ", tcp->u_arg[0]);
else
tprintf("[%u], ", u);
if (tcp->u_arg[1] == 0)
tprints("NULL, ");
else if (umove(tcp, tcp->u_arg[1], &u) < 0)
tprintf("%#lx, ", tcp->u_arg[1]);
else
tprintf("[%u], ", u);
tprintf("%#lx", tcp->u_arg[2]);
}
return 0;
}
int
sys_process_vm_readv(struct tcb *tcp)
{
if (entering(tcp)) {
/* arg 1: pid */
tprintf("%ld, ", tcp->u_arg[0]);
} else {
/* arg 2: local iov */
if (syserror(tcp)) {
tprintf("%#lx", tcp->u_arg[1]);
} else {
tprint_iov(tcp, tcp->u_arg[2], tcp->u_arg[1], 1);
}
/* arg 3: local iovcnt */
tprintf(", %lu, ", tcp->u_arg[2]);
/* arg 4: remote iov */
if (syserror(tcp)) {
tprintf("%#lx", tcp->u_arg[3]);
} else {
tprint_iov(tcp, tcp->u_arg[4], tcp->u_arg[3], 0);
}
/* arg 5: remote iovcnt */
/* arg 6: flags */
tprintf(", %lu, %lu", tcp->u_arg[4], tcp->u_arg[5]);
}
return 0;
}
int
sys_process_vm_writev(struct tcb *tcp)
{
if (entering(tcp)) {
/* arg 1: pid */
tprintf("%ld, ", tcp->u_arg[0]);
/* arg 2: local iov */
if (syserror(tcp))
tprintf("%#lx", tcp->u_arg[1]);
else
tprint_iov(tcp, tcp->u_arg[2], tcp->u_arg[1], 1);
/* arg 3: local iovcnt */
tprintf(", %lu, ", tcp->u_arg[2]);
/* arg 4: remote iov */
if (syserror(tcp))
tprintf("%#lx", tcp->u_arg[3]);
else
tprint_iov(tcp, tcp->u_arg[4], tcp->u_arg[3], 0);
/* arg 5: remote iovcnt */
/* arg 6: flags */
tprintf(", %lu, %lu", tcp->u_arg[4], tcp->u_arg[5]);
}
return 0;
}