2006-07-12 06:29:38 +04:00
/*
* Cryptographic API .
*
* Support for VIA PadLock hardware crypto engine .
*
* Copyright ( c ) 2006 Michal Ludvig < michal @ logix . cz >
*
* This program is free software ; you can redistribute it and / or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation ; either version 2 of the License , or
* ( at your option ) any later version .
*
*/
2009-07-10 13:26:44 +04:00
# include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
2011-01-07 06:52:00 +03:00
# include <crypto/padlock.h>
2007-10-09 18:43:13 +04:00
# include <crypto/sha.h>
2006-08-26 12:34:10 +04:00
# include <linux/err.h>
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# include <linux/module.h>
# include <linux/init.h>
# include <linux/errno.h>
# include <linux/interrupt.h>
# include <linux/kernel.h>
# include <linux/scatterlist.h>
2012-01-26 03:09:06 +04:00
# include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
crypto: padlock - fix VIA PadLock instruction usage with irq_ts_save/restore()
Wolfgang Walter reported this oops on his via C3 using padlock for
AES-encryption:
##################################################################
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 000001f0
IP: [<c01028c5>] __switch_to+0x30/0x117
*pde = 00000000
Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT
Modules linked in:
Pid: 2071, comm: sleep Not tainted (2.6.26 #11)
EIP: 0060:[<c01028c5>] EFLAGS: 00010002 CPU: 0
EIP is at __switch_to+0x30/0x117
EAX: 00000000 EBX: c0493300 ECX: dc48dd00 EDX: c0493300
ESI: dc48dd00 EDI: c0493530 EBP: c04cff8c ESP: c04cff7c
DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 0033 SS: 0068
Process sleep (pid: 2071, ti=c04ce000 task=dc48dd00 task.ti=d2fe6000)
Stack: dc48df30 c0493300 00000000 00000000 d2fe7f44 c03b5b43 c04cffc8 00000046
c0131856 0000005a dc472d3c c0493300 c0493470 d983ae00 00002696 00000000
c0239f54 00000000 c04c4000 c04cffd8 c01025fe c04f3740 00049800 c04cffe0
Call Trace:
[<c03b5b43>] ? schedule+0x285/0x2ff
[<c0131856>] ? pm_qos_requirement+0x3c/0x53
[<c0239f54>] ? acpi_processor_idle+0x0/0x434
[<c01025fe>] ? cpu_idle+0x73/0x7f
[<c03a4dcd>] ? rest_init+0x61/0x63
=======================
Wolfgang also found out that adding kernel_fpu_begin() and kernel_fpu_end()
around the padlock instructions fix the oops.
Suresh wrote:
These padlock instructions though don't use/touch SSE registers, but it behaves
similar to other SSE instructions. For example, it might cause DNA faults
when cr0.ts is set. While this is a spurious DNA trap, it might cause
oops with the recent fpu code changes.
This is the code sequence that is probably causing this problem:
a) new app is getting exec'd and it is somewhere in between
start_thread() and flush_old_exec() in the load_xyz_binary()
b) At pont "a", task's fpu state (like TS_USEDFPU, used_math() etc) is
cleared.
c) Now we get an interrupt/softirq which starts using these encrypt/decrypt
routines in the network stack. This generates a math fault (as
cr0.ts is '1') which sets TS_USEDFPU and restores the math that is
in the task's xstate.
d) Return to exec code path, which does start_thread() which does
free_thread_xstate() and sets xstate pointer to NULL while
the TS_USEDFPU is still set.
e) At the next context switch from the new exec'd task to another task,
we have a scenarios where TS_USEDFPU is set but xstate pointer is null.
This can cause an oops during unlazy_fpu() in __switch_to()
Now:
1) This should happen with or with out pre-emption. Viro also encountered
similar problem with out CONFIG_PREEMPT.
2) kernel_fpu_begin() and kernel_fpu_end() will fix this problem, because
kernel_fpu_begin() will manually do a clts() and won't run in to the
situation of setting TS_USEDFPU in step "c" above.
3) This was working before the fpu changes, because its a spurious
math fault which doesn't corrupt any fpu/sse registers and the task's
math state was always in an allocated state.
With out the recent lazy fpu allocation changes, while we don't see oops,
there is a possible race still present in older kernels(for example,
while kernel is using kernel_fpu_begin() in some optimized clear/copy
page and an interrupt/softirq happens which uses these padlock
instructions generating DNA fault).
This is the failing scenario that existed even before the lazy fpu allocation
changes:
0. CPU's TS flag is set
1. kernel using FPU in some optimized copy routine and while doing
kernel_fpu_begin() takes an interrupt just before doing clts()
2. Takes an interrupt and ipsec uses padlock instruction. And we
take a DNA fault as TS flag is still set.
3. We handle the DNA fault and set TS_USEDFPU and clear cr0.ts
4. We complete the padlock routine
5. Go back to step-1, which resumes clts() in kernel_fpu_begin(), finishes
the optimized copy routine and does kernel_fpu_end(). At this point,
we have cr0.ts again set to '1' but the task's TS_USEFPU is stilll
set and not cleared.
6. Now kernel resumes its user operation. And at the next context
switch, kernel sees it has do a FP save as TS_USEDFPU is still set
and then will do a unlazy_fpu() in __switch_to(). unlazy_fpu()
will take a DNA fault, as cr0.ts is '1' and now, because we are
in __switch_to(), math_state_restore() will get confused and will
restore the next task's FP state and will save it in prev tasks's FP state.
Remember, in __switch_to() we are already on the stack of the next task
but take a DNA fault for the prev task.
This causes the fpu leakage.
Fix the padlock instruction usage by calling them inside the
context of new routines irq_ts_save/restore(), which clear/restore cr0.ts
manually in the interrupt context. This will not generate spurious DNA
in the context of the interrupt which will fix the oops encountered and
the possible FPU leakage issue.
Reported-and-bisected-by: Wolfgang Walter <wolfgang.walter@stwm.de>
Signed-off-by: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2008-08-13 16:02:26 +04:00
# include <asm/i387.h>
2009-09-22 10:21:53 +04:00
2009-07-11 14:16:16 +04:00
struct padlock_sha_desc {
struct shash_desc fallback ;
2006-07-12 06:29:38 +04:00
} ;
2009-07-11 14:16:16 +04:00
struct padlock_sha_ctx {
struct crypto_shash * fallback ;
} ;
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2009-07-11 14:16:16 +04:00
static int padlock_sha_init ( struct shash_desc * desc )
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{
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struct padlock_sha_desc * dctx = shash_desc_ctx ( desc ) ;
struct padlock_sha_ctx * ctx = crypto_shash_ctx ( desc - > tfm ) ;
2006-07-12 06:29:38 +04:00
2009-07-11 14:16:16 +04:00
dctx - > fallback . tfm = ctx - > fallback ;
dctx - > fallback . flags = desc - > flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP ;
return crypto_shash_init ( & dctx - > fallback ) ;
2006-07-12 06:29:38 +04:00
}
2009-07-11 14:16:16 +04:00
static int padlock_sha_update ( struct shash_desc * desc ,
const u8 * data , unsigned int length )
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{
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struct padlock_sha_desc * dctx = shash_desc_ctx ( desc ) ;
2006-07-12 06:29:38 +04:00
2009-07-11 14:16:16 +04:00
dctx - > fallback . flags = desc - > flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP ;
return crypto_shash_update ( & dctx - > fallback , data , length ) ;
2006-07-12 06:29:38 +04:00
}
2010-02-01 01:17:56 +03:00
static int padlock_sha_export ( struct shash_desc * desc , void * out )
{
struct padlock_sha_desc * dctx = shash_desc_ctx ( desc ) ;
return crypto_shash_export ( & dctx - > fallback , out ) ;
}
static int padlock_sha_import ( struct shash_desc * desc , const void * in )
{
struct padlock_sha_desc * dctx = shash_desc_ctx ( desc ) ;
struct padlock_sha_ctx * ctx = crypto_shash_ctx ( desc - > tfm ) ;
dctx - > fallback . tfm = ctx - > fallback ;
dctx - > fallback . flags = desc - > flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP ;
return crypto_shash_import ( & dctx - > fallback , in ) ;
}
2006-07-12 06:29:38 +04:00
static inline void padlock_output_block ( uint32_t * src ,
uint32_t * dst , size_t count )
{
while ( count - - )
* dst + + = swab32 ( * src + + ) ;
}
2009-07-11 14:16:16 +04:00
static int padlock_sha1_finup ( struct shash_desc * desc , const u8 * in ,
unsigned int count , u8 * out )
2006-07-12 06:29:38 +04:00
{
/* We can't store directly to *out as it may be unaligned. */
/* BTW Don't reduce the buffer size below 128 Bytes!
* PadLock microcode needs it that big . */
2009-09-22 10:21:53 +04:00
char buf [ 128 + PADLOCK_ALIGNMENT - STACK_ALIGN ] __attribute__
( ( aligned ( STACK_ALIGN ) ) ) ;
char * result = PTR_ALIGN ( & buf [ 0 ] , PADLOCK_ALIGNMENT ) ;
2009-07-11 14:16:16 +04:00
struct padlock_sha_desc * dctx = shash_desc_ctx ( desc ) ;
struct sha1_state state ;
unsigned int space ;
unsigned int leftover ;
crypto: padlock - fix VIA PadLock instruction usage with irq_ts_save/restore()
Wolfgang Walter reported this oops on his via C3 using padlock for
AES-encryption:
##################################################################
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 000001f0
IP: [<c01028c5>] __switch_to+0x30/0x117
*pde = 00000000
Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT
Modules linked in:
Pid: 2071, comm: sleep Not tainted (2.6.26 #11)
EIP: 0060:[<c01028c5>] EFLAGS: 00010002 CPU: 0
EIP is at __switch_to+0x30/0x117
EAX: 00000000 EBX: c0493300 ECX: dc48dd00 EDX: c0493300
ESI: dc48dd00 EDI: c0493530 EBP: c04cff8c ESP: c04cff7c
DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 0033 SS: 0068
Process sleep (pid: 2071, ti=c04ce000 task=dc48dd00 task.ti=d2fe6000)
Stack: dc48df30 c0493300 00000000 00000000 d2fe7f44 c03b5b43 c04cffc8 00000046
c0131856 0000005a dc472d3c c0493300 c0493470 d983ae00 00002696 00000000
c0239f54 00000000 c04c4000 c04cffd8 c01025fe c04f3740 00049800 c04cffe0
Call Trace:
[<c03b5b43>] ? schedule+0x285/0x2ff
[<c0131856>] ? pm_qos_requirement+0x3c/0x53
[<c0239f54>] ? acpi_processor_idle+0x0/0x434
[<c01025fe>] ? cpu_idle+0x73/0x7f
[<c03a4dcd>] ? rest_init+0x61/0x63
=======================
Wolfgang also found out that adding kernel_fpu_begin() and kernel_fpu_end()
around the padlock instructions fix the oops.
Suresh wrote:
These padlock instructions though don't use/touch SSE registers, but it behaves
similar to other SSE instructions. For example, it might cause DNA faults
when cr0.ts is set. While this is a spurious DNA trap, it might cause
oops with the recent fpu code changes.
This is the code sequence that is probably causing this problem:
a) new app is getting exec'd and it is somewhere in between
start_thread() and flush_old_exec() in the load_xyz_binary()
b) At pont "a", task's fpu state (like TS_USEDFPU, used_math() etc) is
cleared.
c) Now we get an interrupt/softirq which starts using these encrypt/decrypt
routines in the network stack. This generates a math fault (as
cr0.ts is '1') which sets TS_USEDFPU and restores the math that is
in the task's xstate.
d) Return to exec code path, which does start_thread() which does
free_thread_xstate() and sets xstate pointer to NULL while
the TS_USEDFPU is still set.
e) At the next context switch from the new exec'd task to another task,
we have a scenarios where TS_USEDFPU is set but xstate pointer is null.
This can cause an oops during unlazy_fpu() in __switch_to()
Now:
1) This should happen with or with out pre-emption. Viro also encountered
similar problem with out CONFIG_PREEMPT.
2) kernel_fpu_begin() and kernel_fpu_end() will fix this problem, because
kernel_fpu_begin() will manually do a clts() and won't run in to the
situation of setting TS_USEDFPU in step "c" above.
3) This was working before the fpu changes, because its a spurious
math fault which doesn't corrupt any fpu/sse registers and the task's
math state was always in an allocated state.
With out the recent lazy fpu allocation changes, while we don't see oops,
there is a possible race still present in older kernels(for example,
while kernel is using kernel_fpu_begin() in some optimized clear/copy
page and an interrupt/softirq happens which uses these padlock
instructions generating DNA fault).
This is the failing scenario that existed even before the lazy fpu allocation
changes:
0. CPU's TS flag is set
1. kernel using FPU in some optimized copy routine and while doing
kernel_fpu_begin() takes an interrupt just before doing clts()
2. Takes an interrupt and ipsec uses padlock instruction. And we
take a DNA fault as TS flag is still set.
3. We handle the DNA fault and set TS_USEDFPU and clear cr0.ts
4. We complete the padlock routine
5. Go back to step-1, which resumes clts() in kernel_fpu_begin(), finishes
the optimized copy routine and does kernel_fpu_end(). At this point,
we have cr0.ts again set to '1' but the task's TS_USEFPU is stilll
set and not cleared.
6. Now kernel resumes its user operation. And at the next context
switch, kernel sees it has do a FP save as TS_USEDFPU is still set
and then will do a unlazy_fpu() in __switch_to(). unlazy_fpu()
will take a DNA fault, as cr0.ts is '1' and now, because we are
in __switch_to(), math_state_restore() will get confused and will
restore the next task's FP state and will save it in prev tasks's FP state.
Remember, in __switch_to() we are already on the stack of the next task
but take a DNA fault for the prev task.
This causes the fpu leakage.
Fix the padlock instruction usage by calling them inside the
context of new routines irq_ts_save/restore(), which clear/restore cr0.ts
manually in the interrupt context. This will not generate spurious DNA
in the context of the interrupt which will fix the oops encountered and
the possible FPU leakage issue.
Reported-and-bisected-by: Wolfgang Walter <wolfgang.walter@stwm.de>
Signed-off-by: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2008-08-13 16:02:26 +04:00
int ts_state ;
2009-07-11 14:16:16 +04:00
int err ;
dctx - > fallback . flags = desc - > flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP ;
err = crypto_shash_export ( & dctx - > fallback , & state ) ;
if ( err )
goto out ;
if ( state . count + count > ULONG_MAX )
return crypto_shash_finup ( & dctx - > fallback , in , count , out ) ;
leftover = ( ( state . count - 1 ) & ( SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE - 1 ) ) + 1 ;
space = SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE - leftover ;
if ( space ) {
if ( count > space ) {
err = crypto_shash_update ( & dctx - > fallback , in , space ) ? :
crypto_shash_export ( & dctx - > fallback , & state ) ;
if ( err )
goto out ;
count - = space ;
in + = space ;
} else {
memcpy ( state . buffer + leftover , in , count ) ;
in = state . buffer ;
count + = leftover ;
2009-07-16 06:33:27 +04:00
state . count & = ~ ( SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE - 1 ) ;
2009-07-11 14:16:16 +04:00
}
}
memcpy ( result , & state . state , SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE ) ;
2006-07-12 06:29:38 +04:00
crypto: padlock - fix VIA PadLock instruction usage with irq_ts_save/restore()
Wolfgang Walter reported this oops on his via C3 using padlock for
AES-encryption:
##################################################################
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 000001f0
IP: [<c01028c5>] __switch_to+0x30/0x117
*pde = 00000000
Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT
Modules linked in:
Pid: 2071, comm: sleep Not tainted (2.6.26 #11)
EIP: 0060:[<c01028c5>] EFLAGS: 00010002 CPU: 0
EIP is at __switch_to+0x30/0x117
EAX: 00000000 EBX: c0493300 ECX: dc48dd00 EDX: c0493300
ESI: dc48dd00 EDI: c0493530 EBP: c04cff8c ESP: c04cff7c
DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 0033 SS: 0068
Process sleep (pid: 2071, ti=c04ce000 task=dc48dd00 task.ti=d2fe6000)
Stack: dc48df30 c0493300 00000000 00000000 d2fe7f44 c03b5b43 c04cffc8 00000046
c0131856 0000005a dc472d3c c0493300 c0493470 d983ae00 00002696 00000000
c0239f54 00000000 c04c4000 c04cffd8 c01025fe c04f3740 00049800 c04cffe0
Call Trace:
[<c03b5b43>] ? schedule+0x285/0x2ff
[<c0131856>] ? pm_qos_requirement+0x3c/0x53
[<c0239f54>] ? acpi_processor_idle+0x0/0x434
[<c01025fe>] ? cpu_idle+0x73/0x7f
[<c03a4dcd>] ? rest_init+0x61/0x63
=======================
Wolfgang also found out that adding kernel_fpu_begin() and kernel_fpu_end()
around the padlock instructions fix the oops.
Suresh wrote:
These padlock instructions though don't use/touch SSE registers, but it behaves
similar to other SSE instructions. For example, it might cause DNA faults
when cr0.ts is set. While this is a spurious DNA trap, it might cause
oops with the recent fpu code changes.
This is the code sequence that is probably causing this problem:
a) new app is getting exec'd and it is somewhere in between
start_thread() and flush_old_exec() in the load_xyz_binary()
b) At pont "a", task's fpu state (like TS_USEDFPU, used_math() etc) is
cleared.
c) Now we get an interrupt/softirq which starts using these encrypt/decrypt
routines in the network stack. This generates a math fault (as
cr0.ts is '1') which sets TS_USEDFPU and restores the math that is
in the task's xstate.
d) Return to exec code path, which does start_thread() which does
free_thread_xstate() and sets xstate pointer to NULL while
the TS_USEDFPU is still set.
e) At the next context switch from the new exec'd task to another task,
we have a scenarios where TS_USEDFPU is set but xstate pointer is null.
This can cause an oops during unlazy_fpu() in __switch_to()
Now:
1) This should happen with or with out pre-emption. Viro also encountered
similar problem with out CONFIG_PREEMPT.
2) kernel_fpu_begin() and kernel_fpu_end() will fix this problem, because
kernel_fpu_begin() will manually do a clts() and won't run in to the
situation of setting TS_USEDFPU in step "c" above.
3) This was working before the fpu changes, because its a spurious
math fault which doesn't corrupt any fpu/sse registers and the task's
math state was always in an allocated state.
With out the recent lazy fpu allocation changes, while we don't see oops,
there is a possible race still present in older kernels(for example,
while kernel is using kernel_fpu_begin() in some optimized clear/copy
page and an interrupt/softirq happens which uses these padlock
instructions generating DNA fault).
This is the failing scenario that existed even before the lazy fpu allocation
changes:
0. CPU's TS flag is set
1. kernel using FPU in some optimized copy routine and while doing
kernel_fpu_begin() takes an interrupt just before doing clts()
2. Takes an interrupt and ipsec uses padlock instruction. And we
take a DNA fault as TS flag is still set.
3. We handle the DNA fault and set TS_USEDFPU and clear cr0.ts
4. We complete the padlock routine
5. Go back to step-1, which resumes clts() in kernel_fpu_begin(), finishes
the optimized copy routine and does kernel_fpu_end(). At this point,
we have cr0.ts again set to '1' but the task's TS_USEFPU is stilll
set and not cleared.
6. Now kernel resumes its user operation. And at the next context
switch, kernel sees it has do a FP save as TS_USEDFPU is still set
and then will do a unlazy_fpu() in __switch_to(). unlazy_fpu()
will take a DNA fault, as cr0.ts is '1' and now, because we are
in __switch_to(), math_state_restore() will get confused and will
restore the next task's FP state and will save it in prev tasks's FP state.
Remember, in __switch_to() we are already on the stack of the next task
but take a DNA fault for the prev task.
This causes the fpu leakage.
Fix the padlock instruction usage by calling them inside the
context of new routines irq_ts_save/restore(), which clear/restore cr0.ts
manually in the interrupt context. This will not generate spurious DNA
in the context of the interrupt which will fix the oops encountered and
the possible FPU leakage issue.
Reported-and-bisected-by: Wolfgang Walter <wolfgang.walter@stwm.de>
Signed-off-by: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2008-08-13 16:02:26 +04:00
/* prevent taking the spurious DNA fault with padlock. */
ts_state = irq_ts_save ( ) ;
2006-07-12 06:29:38 +04:00
asm volatile ( " .byte 0xf3,0x0f,0xa6,0xc8 " /* rep xsha1 */
2009-07-11 14:16:16 +04:00
: \
2009-07-15 14:37:48 +04:00
: " c " ( ( unsigned long ) state . count + count ) , \
" a " ( ( unsigned long ) state . count ) , \
2009-07-11 14:16:16 +04:00
" S " ( in ) , " D " ( result ) ) ;
crypto: padlock - fix VIA PadLock instruction usage with irq_ts_save/restore()
Wolfgang Walter reported this oops on his via C3 using padlock for
AES-encryption:
##################################################################
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 000001f0
IP: [<c01028c5>] __switch_to+0x30/0x117
*pde = 00000000
Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT
Modules linked in:
Pid: 2071, comm: sleep Not tainted (2.6.26 #11)
EIP: 0060:[<c01028c5>] EFLAGS: 00010002 CPU: 0
EIP is at __switch_to+0x30/0x117
EAX: 00000000 EBX: c0493300 ECX: dc48dd00 EDX: c0493300
ESI: dc48dd00 EDI: c0493530 EBP: c04cff8c ESP: c04cff7c
DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 0033 SS: 0068
Process sleep (pid: 2071, ti=c04ce000 task=dc48dd00 task.ti=d2fe6000)
Stack: dc48df30 c0493300 00000000 00000000 d2fe7f44 c03b5b43 c04cffc8 00000046
c0131856 0000005a dc472d3c c0493300 c0493470 d983ae00 00002696 00000000
c0239f54 00000000 c04c4000 c04cffd8 c01025fe c04f3740 00049800 c04cffe0
Call Trace:
[<c03b5b43>] ? schedule+0x285/0x2ff
[<c0131856>] ? pm_qos_requirement+0x3c/0x53
[<c0239f54>] ? acpi_processor_idle+0x0/0x434
[<c01025fe>] ? cpu_idle+0x73/0x7f
[<c03a4dcd>] ? rest_init+0x61/0x63
=======================
Wolfgang also found out that adding kernel_fpu_begin() and kernel_fpu_end()
around the padlock instructions fix the oops.
Suresh wrote:
These padlock instructions though don't use/touch SSE registers, but it behaves
similar to other SSE instructions. For example, it might cause DNA faults
when cr0.ts is set. While this is a spurious DNA trap, it might cause
oops with the recent fpu code changes.
This is the code sequence that is probably causing this problem:
a) new app is getting exec'd and it is somewhere in between
start_thread() and flush_old_exec() in the load_xyz_binary()
b) At pont "a", task's fpu state (like TS_USEDFPU, used_math() etc) is
cleared.
c) Now we get an interrupt/softirq which starts using these encrypt/decrypt
routines in the network stack. This generates a math fault (as
cr0.ts is '1') which sets TS_USEDFPU and restores the math that is
in the task's xstate.
d) Return to exec code path, which does start_thread() which does
free_thread_xstate() and sets xstate pointer to NULL while
the TS_USEDFPU is still set.
e) At the next context switch from the new exec'd task to another task,
we have a scenarios where TS_USEDFPU is set but xstate pointer is null.
This can cause an oops during unlazy_fpu() in __switch_to()
Now:
1) This should happen with or with out pre-emption. Viro also encountered
similar problem with out CONFIG_PREEMPT.
2) kernel_fpu_begin() and kernel_fpu_end() will fix this problem, because
kernel_fpu_begin() will manually do a clts() and won't run in to the
situation of setting TS_USEDFPU in step "c" above.
3) This was working before the fpu changes, because its a spurious
math fault which doesn't corrupt any fpu/sse registers and the task's
math state was always in an allocated state.
With out the recent lazy fpu allocation changes, while we don't see oops,
there is a possible race still present in older kernels(for example,
while kernel is using kernel_fpu_begin() in some optimized clear/copy
page and an interrupt/softirq happens which uses these padlock
instructions generating DNA fault).
This is the failing scenario that existed even before the lazy fpu allocation
changes:
0. CPU's TS flag is set
1. kernel using FPU in some optimized copy routine and while doing
kernel_fpu_begin() takes an interrupt just before doing clts()
2. Takes an interrupt and ipsec uses padlock instruction. And we
take a DNA fault as TS flag is still set.
3. We handle the DNA fault and set TS_USEDFPU and clear cr0.ts
4. We complete the padlock routine
5. Go back to step-1, which resumes clts() in kernel_fpu_begin(), finishes
the optimized copy routine and does kernel_fpu_end(). At this point,
we have cr0.ts again set to '1' but the task's TS_USEFPU is stilll
set and not cleared.
6. Now kernel resumes its user operation. And at the next context
switch, kernel sees it has do a FP save as TS_USEDFPU is still set
and then will do a unlazy_fpu() in __switch_to(). unlazy_fpu()
will take a DNA fault, as cr0.ts is '1' and now, because we are
in __switch_to(), math_state_restore() will get confused and will
restore the next task's FP state and will save it in prev tasks's FP state.
Remember, in __switch_to() we are already on the stack of the next task
but take a DNA fault for the prev task.
This causes the fpu leakage.
Fix the padlock instruction usage by calling them inside the
context of new routines irq_ts_save/restore(), which clear/restore cr0.ts
manually in the interrupt context. This will not generate spurious DNA
in the context of the interrupt which will fix the oops encountered and
the possible FPU leakage issue.
Reported-and-bisected-by: Wolfgang Walter <wolfgang.walter@stwm.de>
Signed-off-by: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2008-08-13 16:02:26 +04:00
irq_ts_restore ( ts_state ) ;
2006-07-12 06:29:38 +04:00
padlock_output_block ( ( uint32_t * ) result , ( uint32_t * ) out , 5 ) ;
2009-07-11 14:16:16 +04:00
out :
return err ;
2006-07-12 06:29:38 +04:00
}
2009-07-11 14:16:16 +04:00
static int padlock_sha1_final ( struct shash_desc * desc , u8 * out )
{
u8 buf [ 4 ] ;
return padlock_sha1_finup ( desc , buf , 0 , out ) ;
}
static int padlock_sha256_finup ( struct shash_desc * desc , const u8 * in ,
unsigned int count , u8 * out )
2006-07-12 06:29:38 +04:00
{
/* We can't store directly to *out as it may be unaligned. */
/* BTW Don't reduce the buffer size below 128 Bytes!
* PadLock microcode needs it that big . */
2009-09-22 10:21:53 +04:00
char buf [ 128 + PADLOCK_ALIGNMENT - STACK_ALIGN ] __attribute__
( ( aligned ( STACK_ALIGN ) ) ) ;
char * result = PTR_ALIGN ( & buf [ 0 ] , PADLOCK_ALIGNMENT ) ;
2009-07-11 14:16:16 +04:00
struct padlock_sha_desc * dctx = shash_desc_ctx ( desc ) ;
struct sha256_state state ;
unsigned int space ;
unsigned int leftover ;
crypto: padlock - fix VIA PadLock instruction usage with irq_ts_save/restore()
Wolfgang Walter reported this oops on his via C3 using padlock for
AES-encryption:
##################################################################
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 000001f0
IP: [<c01028c5>] __switch_to+0x30/0x117
*pde = 00000000
Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT
Modules linked in:
Pid: 2071, comm: sleep Not tainted (2.6.26 #11)
EIP: 0060:[<c01028c5>] EFLAGS: 00010002 CPU: 0
EIP is at __switch_to+0x30/0x117
EAX: 00000000 EBX: c0493300 ECX: dc48dd00 EDX: c0493300
ESI: dc48dd00 EDI: c0493530 EBP: c04cff8c ESP: c04cff7c
DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 0033 SS: 0068
Process sleep (pid: 2071, ti=c04ce000 task=dc48dd00 task.ti=d2fe6000)
Stack: dc48df30 c0493300 00000000 00000000 d2fe7f44 c03b5b43 c04cffc8 00000046
c0131856 0000005a dc472d3c c0493300 c0493470 d983ae00 00002696 00000000
c0239f54 00000000 c04c4000 c04cffd8 c01025fe c04f3740 00049800 c04cffe0
Call Trace:
[<c03b5b43>] ? schedule+0x285/0x2ff
[<c0131856>] ? pm_qos_requirement+0x3c/0x53
[<c0239f54>] ? acpi_processor_idle+0x0/0x434
[<c01025fe>] ? cpu_idle+0x73/0x7f
[<c03a4dcd>] ? rest_init+0x61/0x63
=======================
Wolfgang also found out that adding kernel_fpu_begin() and kernel_fpu_end()
around the padlock instructions fix the oops.
Suresh wrote:
These padlock instructions though don't use/touch SSE registers, but it behaves
similar to other SSE instructions. For example, it might cause DNA faults
when cr0.ts is set. While this is a spurious DNA trap, it might cause
oops with the recent fpu code changes.
This is the code sequence that is probably causing this problem:
a) new app is getting exec'd and it is somewhere in between
start_thread() and flush_old_exec() in the load_xyz_binary()
b) At pont "a", task's fpu state (like TS_USEDFPU, used_math() etc) is
cleared.
c) Now we get an interrupt/softirq which starts using these encrypt/decrypt
routines in the network stack. This generates a math fault (as
cr0.ts is '1') which sets TS_USEDFPU and restores the math that is
in the task's xstate.
d) Return to exec code path, which does start_thread() which does
free_thread_xstate() and sets xstate pointer to NULL while
the TS_USEDFPU is still set.
e) At the next context switch from the new exec'd task to another task,
we have a scenarios where TS_USEDFPU is set but xstate pointer is null.
This can cause an oops during unlazy_fpu() in __switch_to()
Now:
1) This should happen with or with out pre-emption. Viro also encountered
similar problem with out CONFIG_PREEMPT.
2) kernel_fpu_begin() and kernel_fpu_end() will fix this problem, because
kernel_fpu_begin() will manually do a clts() and won't run in to the
situation of setting TS_USEDFPU in step "c" above.
3) This was working before the fpu changes, because its a spurious
math fault which doesn't corrupt any fpu/sse registers and the task's
math state was always in an allocated state.
With out the recent lazy fpu allocation changes, while we don't see oops,
there is a possible race still present in older kernels(for example,
while kernel is using kernel_fpu_begin() in some optimized clear/copy
page and an interrupt/softirq happens which uses these padlock
instructions generating DNA fault).
This is the failing scenario that existed even before the lazy fpu allocation
changes:
0. CPU's TS flag is set
1. kernel using FPU in some optimized copy routine and while doing
kernel_fpu_begin() takes an interrupt just before doing clts()
2. Takes an interrupt and ipsec uses padlock instruction. And we
take a DNA fault as TS flag is still set.
3. We handle the DNA fault and set TS_USEDFPU and clear cr0.ts
4. We complete the padlock routine
5. Go back to step-1, which resumes clts() in kernel_fpu_begin(), finishes
the optimized copy routine and does kernel_fpu_end(). At this point,
we have cr0.ts again set to '1' but the task's TS_USEFPU is stilll
set and not cleared.
6. Now kernel resumes its user operation. And at the next context
switch, kernel sees it has do a FP save as TS_USEDFPU is still set
and then will do a unlazy_fpu() in __switch_to(). unlazy_fpu()
will take a DNA fault, as cr0.ts is '1' and now, because we are
in __switch_to(), math_state_restore() will get confused and will
restore the next task's FP state and will save it in prev tasks's FP state.
Remember, in __switch_to() we are already on the stack of the next task
but take a DNA fault for the prev task.
This causes the fpu leakage.
Fix the padlock instruction usage by calling them inside the
context of new routines irq_ts_save/restore(), which clear/restore cr0.ts
manually in the interrupt context. This will not generate spurious DNA
in the context of the interrupt which will fix the oops encountered and
the possible FPU leakage issue.
Reported-and-bisected-by: Wolfgang Walter <wolfgang.walter@stwm.de>
Signed-off-by: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2008-08-13 16:02:26 +04:00
int ts_state ;
2009-07-11 14:16:16 +04:00
int err ;
2006-07-12 06:29:38 +04:00
2009-07-11 14:16:16 +04:00
dctx - > fallback . flags = desc - > flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP ;
err = crypto_shash_export ( & dctx - > fallback , & state ) ;
if ( err )
goto out ;
if ( state . count + count > ULONG_MAX )
return crypto_shash_finup ( & dctx - > fallback , in , count , out ) ;
leftover = ( ( state . count - 1 ) & ( SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE - 1 ) ) + 1 ;
space = SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE - leftover ;
if ( space ) {
if ( count > space ) {
err = crypto_shash_update ( & dctx - > fallback , in , space ) ? :
crypto_shash_export ( & dctx - > fallback , & state ) ;
if ( err )
goto out ;
count - = space ;
in + = space ;
} else {
memcpy ( state . buf + leftover , in , count ) ;
in = state . buf ;
count + = leftover ;
2009-07-16 06:33:27 +04:00
state . count & = ~ ( SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE - 1 ) ;
2009-07-11 14:16:16 +04:00
}
}
memcpy ( result , & state . state , SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE ) ;
2006-07-12 06:29:38 +04:00
crypto: padlock - fix VIA PadLock instruction usage with irq_ts_save/restore()
Wolfgang Walter reported this oops on his via C3 using padlock for
AES-encryption:
##################################################################
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 000001f0
IP: [<c01028c5>] __switch_to+0x30/0x117
*pde = 00000000
Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT
Modules linked in:
Pid: 2071, comm: sleep Not tainted (2.6.26 #11)
EIP: 0060:[<c01028c5>] EFLAGS: 00010002 CPU: 0
EIP is at __switch_to+0x30/0x117
EAX: 00000000 EBX: c0493300 ECX: dc48dd00 EDX: c0493300
ESI: dc48dd00 EDI: c0493530 EBP: c04cff8c ESP: c04cff7c
DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 0033 SS: 0068
Process sleep (pid: 2071, ti=c04ce000 task=dc48dd00 task.ti=d2fe6000)
Stack: dc48df30 c0493300 00000000 00000000 d2fe7f44 c03b5b43 c04cffc8 00000046
c0131856 0000005a dc472d3c c0493300 c0493470 d983ae00 00002696 00000000
c0239f54 00000000 c04c4000 c04cffd8 c01025fe c04f3740 00049800 c04cffe0
Call Trace:
[<c03b5b43>] ? schedule+0x285/0x2ff
[<c0131856>] ? pm_qos_requirement+0x3c/0x53
[<c0239f54>] ? acpi_processor_idle+0x0/0x434
[<c01025fe>] ? cpu_idle+0x73/0x7f
[<c03a4dcd>] ? rest_init+0x61/0x63
=======================
Wolfgang also found out that adding kernel_fpu_begin() and kernel_fpu_end()
around the padlock instructions fix the oops.
Suresh wrote:
These padlock instructions though don't use/touch SSE registers, but it behaves
similar to other SSE instructions. For example, it might cause DNA faults
when cr0.ts is set. While this is a spurious DNA trap, it might cause
oops with the recent fpu code changes.
This is the code sequence that is probably causing this problem:
a) new app is getting exec'd and it is somewhere in between
start_thread() and flush_old_exec() in the load_xyz_binary()
b) At pont "a", task's fpu state (like TS_USEDFPU, used_math() etc) is
cleared.
c) Now we get an interrupt/softirq which starts using these encrypt/decrypt
routines in the network stack. This generates a math fault (as
cr0.ts is '1') which sets TS_USEDFPU and restores the math that is
in the task's xstate.
d) Return to exec code path, which does start_thread() which does
free_thread_xstate() and sets xstate pointer to NULL while
the TS_USEDFPU is still set.
e) At the next context switch from the new exec'd task to another task,
we have a scenarios where TS_USEDFPU is set but xstate pointer is null.
This can cause an oops during unlazy_fpu() in __switch_to()
Now:
1) This should happen with or with out pre-emption. Viro also encountered
similar problem with out CONFIG_PREEMPT.
2) kernel_fpu_begin() and kernel_fpu_end() will fix this problem, because
kernel_fpu_begin() will manually do a clts() and won't run in to the
situation of setting TS_USEDFPU in step "c" above.
3) This was working before the fpu changes, because its a spurious
math fault which doesn't corrupt any fpu/sse registers and the task's
math state was always in an allocated state.
With out the recent lazy fpu allocation changes, while we don't see oops,
there is a possible race still present in older kernels(for example,
while kernel is using kernel_fpu_begin() in some optimized clear/copy
page and an interrupt/softirq happens which uses these padlock
instructions generating DNA fault).
This is the failing scenario that existed even before the lazy fpu allocation
changes:
0. CPU's TS flag is set
1. kernel using FPU in some optimized copy routine and while doing
kernel_fpu_begin() takes an interrupt just before doing clts()
2. Takes an interrupt and ipsec uses padlock instruction. And we
take a DNA fault as TS flag is still set.
3. We handle the DNA fault and set TS_USEDFPU and clear cr0.ts
4. We complete the padlock routine
5. Go back to step-1, which resumes clts() in kernel_fpu_begin(), finishes
the optimized copy routine and does kernel_fpu_end(). At this point,
we have cr0.ts again set to '1' but the task's TS_USEFPU is stilll
set and not cleared.
6. Now kernel resumes its user operation. And at the next context
switch, kernel sees it has do a FP save as TS_USEDFPU is still set
and then will do a unlazy_fpu() in __switch_to(). unlazy_fpu()
will take a DNA fault, as cr0.ts is '1' and now, because we are
in __switch_to(), math_state_restore() will get confused and will
restore the next task's FP state and will save it in prev tasks's FP state.
Remember, in __switch_to() we are already on the stack of the next task
but take a DNA fault for the prev task.
This causes the fpu leakage.
Fix the padlock instruction usage by calling them inside the
context of new routines irq_ts_save/restore(), which clear/restore cr0.ts
manually in the interrupt context. This will not generate spurious DNA
in the context of the interrupt which will fix the oops encountered and
the possible FPU leakage issue.
Reported-and-bisected-by: Wolfgang Walter <wolfgang.walter@stwm.de>
Signed-off-by: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2008-08-13 16:02:26 +04:00
/* prevent taking the spurious DNA fault with padlock. */
ts_state = irq_ts_save ( ) ;
2006-07-12 06:29:38 +04:00
asm volatile ( " .byte 0xf3,0x0f,0xa6,0xd0 " /* rep xsha256 */
2009-07-11 14:16:16 +04:00
: \
2009-07-15 14:37:48 +04:00
: " c " ( ( unsigned long ) state . count + count ) , \
" a " ( ( unsigned long ) state . count ) , \
2009-07-11 14:16:16 +04:00
" S " ( in ) , " D " ( result ) ) ;
crypto: padlock - fix VIA PadLock instruction usage with irq_ts_save/restore()
Wolfgang Walter reported this oops on his via C3 using padlock for
AES-encryption:
##################################################################
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 000001f0
IP: [<c01028c5>] __switch_to+0x30/0x117
*pde = 00000000
Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT
Modules linked in:
Pid: 2071, comm: sleep Not tainted (2.6.26 #11)
EIP: 0060:[<c01028c5>] EFLAGS: 00010002 CPU: 0
EIP is at __switch_to+0x30/0x117
EAX: 00000000 EBX: c0493300 ECX: dc48dd00 EDX: c0493300
ESI: dc48dd00 EDI: c0493530 EBP: c04cff8c ESP: c04cff7c
DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 0033 SS: 0068
Process sleep (pid: 2071, ti=c04ce000 task=dc48dd00 task.ti=d2fe6000)
Stack: dc48df30 c0493300 00000000 00000000 d2fe7f44 c03b5b43 c04cffc8 00000046
c0131856 0000005a dc472d3c c0493300 c0493470 d983ae00 00002696 00000000
c0239f54 00000000 c04c4000 c04cffd8 c01025fe c04f3740 00049800 c04cffe0
Call Trace:
[<c03b5b43>] ? schedule+0x285/0x2ff
[<c0131856>] ? pm_qos_requirement+0x3c/0x53
[<c0239f54>] ? acpi_processor_idle+0x0/0x434
[<c01025fe>] ? cpu_idle+0x73/0x7f
[<c03a4dcd>] ? rest_init+0x61/0x63
=======================
Wolfgang also found out that adding kernel_fpu_begin() and kernel_fpu_end()
around the padlock instructions fix the oops.
Suresh wrote:
These padlock instructions though don't use/touch SSE registers, but it behaves
similar to other SSE instructions. For example, it might cause DNA faults
when cr0.ts is set. While this is a spurious DNA trap, it might cause
oops with the recent fpu code changes.
This is the code sequence that is probably causing this problem:
a) new app is getting exec'd and it is somewhere in between
start_thread() and flush_old_exec() in the load_xyz_binary()
b) At pont "a", task's fpu state (like TS_USEDFPU, used_math() etc) is
cleared.
c) Now we get an interrupt/softirq which starts using these encrypt/decrypt
routines in the network stack. This generates a math fault (as
cr0.ts is '1') which sets TS_USEDFPU and restores the math that is
in the task's xstate.
d) Return to exec code path, which does start_thread() which does
free_thread_xstate() and sets xstate pointer to NULL while
the TS_USEDFPU is still set.
e) At the next context switch from the new exec'd task to another task,
we have a scenarios where TS_USEDFPU is set but xstate pointer is null.
This can cause an oops during unlazy_fpu() in __switch_to()
Now:
1) This should happen with or with out pre-emption. Viro also encountered
similar problem with out CONFIG_PREEMPT.
2) kernel_fpu_begin() and kernel_fpu_end() will fix this problem, because
kernel_fpu_begin() will manually do a clts() and won't run in to the
situation of setting TS_USEDFPU in step "c" above.
3) This was working before the fpu changes, because its a spurious
math fault which doesn't corrupt any fpu/sse registers and the task's
math state was always in an allocated state.
With out the recent lazy fpu allocation changes, while we don't see oops,
there is a possible race still present in older kernels(for example,
while kernel is using kernel_fpu_begin() in some optimized clear/copy
page and an interrupt/softirq happens which uses these padlock
instructions generating DNA fault).
This is the failing scenario that existed even before the lazy fpu allocation
changes:
0. CPU's TS flag is set
1. kernel using FPU in some optimized copy routine and while doing
kernel_fpu_begin() takes an interrupt just before doing clts()
2. Takes an interrupt and ipsec uses padlock instruction. And we
take a DNA fault as TS flag is still set.
3. We handle the DNA fault and set TS_USEDFPU and clear cr0.ts
4. We complete the padlock routine
5. Go back to step-1, which resumes clts() in kernel_fpu_begin(), finishes
the optimized copy routine and does kernel_fpu_end(). At this point,
we have cr0.ts again set to '1' but the task's TS_USEFPU is stilll
set and not cleared.
6. Now kernel resumes its user operation. And at the next context
switch, kernel sees it has do a FP save as TS_USEDFPU is still set
and then will do a unlazy_fpu() in __switch_to(). unlazy_fpu()
will take a DNA fault, as cr0.ts is '1' and now, because we are
in __switch_to(), math_state_restore() will get confused and will
restore the next task's FP state and will save it in prev tasks's FP state.
Remember, in __switch_to() we are already on the stack of the next task
but take a DNA fault for the prev task.
This causes the fpu leakage.
Fix the padlock instruction usage by calling them inside the
context of new routines irq_ts_save/restore(), which clear/restore cr0.ts
manually in the interrupt context. This will not generate spurious DNA
in the context of the interrupt which will fix the oops encountered and
the possible FPU leakage issue.
Reported-and-bisected-by: Wolfgang Walter <wolfgang.walter@stwm.de>
Signed-off-by: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2008-08-13 16:02:26 +04:00
irq_ts_restore ( ts_state ) ;
2006-07-12 06:29:38 +04:00
padlock_output_block ( ( uint32_t * ) result , ( uint32_t * ) out , 8 ) ;
2009-07-11 14:16:16 +04:00
out :
return err ;
2006-07-12 06:29:38 +04:00
}
2009-07-11 14:16:16 +04:00
static int padlock_sha256_final ( struct shash_desc * desc , u8 * out )
2006-07-12 06:29:38 +04:00
{
2009-07-11 14:16:16 +04:00
u8 buf [ 4 ] ;
2006-07-12 06:29:38 +04:00
2009-07-11 14:16:16 +04:00
return padlock_sha256_finup ( desc , buf , 0 , out ) ;
2006-07-12 06:29:38 +04:00
}
2006-08-26 12:34:10 +04:00
static int padlock_cra_init ( struct crypto_tfm * tfm )
2006-07-12 06:29:38 +04:00
{
2009-07-11 14:16:16 +04:00
struct crypto_shash * hash = __crypto_shash_cast ( tfm ) ;
2014-05-14 13:41:02 +04:00
const char * fallback_driver_name = crypto_tfm_alg_name ( tfm ) ;
2009-07-11 14:16:16 +04:00
struct padlock_sha_ctx * ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx ( tfm ) ;
2009-07-10 13:26:44 +04:00
struct crypto_shash * fallback_tfm ;
int err = - ENOMEM ;
2006-08-26 12:34:10 +04:00
2006-07-12 06:29:38 +04:00
/* Allocate a fallback and abort if it failed. */
2009-07-10 13:26:44 +04:00
fallback_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash ( fallback_driver_name , 0 ,
CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK ) ;
2006-08-26 12:34:10 +04:00
if ( IS_ERR ( fallback_tfm ) ) {
2006-07-12 06:29:38 +04:00
printk ( KERN_WARNING PFX " Fallback driver '%s' could not be loaded! \n " ,
fallback_driver_name ) ;
2009-07-10 13:26:44 +04:00
err = PTR_ERR ( fallback_tfm ) ;
2009-07-11 14:16:16 +04:00
goto out ;
2006-07-12 06:29:38 +04:00
}
2009-07-11 14:16:16 +04:00
ctx - > fallback = fallback_tfm ;
hash - > descsize + = crypto_shash_descsize ( fallback_tfm ) ;
2006-07-12 06:29:38 +04:00
return 0 ;
2009-07-10 13:26:44 +04:00
out :
return err ;
2006-07-12 06:29:38 +04:00
}
static void padlock_cra_exit ( struct crypto_tfm * tfm )
{
2009-07-11 14:16:16 +04:00
struct padlock_sha_ctx * ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx ( tfm ) ;
2009-07-10 13:26:44 +04:00
2009-07-11 14:16:16 +04:00
crypto_free_shash ( ctx - > fallback ) ;
2006-07-12 06:29:38 +04:00
}
2009-07-11 14:16:16 +04:00
static struct shash_alg sha1_alg = {
. digestsize = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE ,
. init = padlock_sha_init ,
. update = padlock_sha_update ,
. finup = padlock_sha1_finup ,
. final = padlock_sha1_final ,
2010-02-01 01:17:56 +03:00
. export = padlock_sha_export ,
. import = padlock_sha_import ,
2009-07-11 14:16:16 +04:00
. descsize = sizeof ( struct padlock_sha_desc ) ,
2010-02-01 01:17:56 +03:00
. statesize = sizeof ( struct sha1_state ) ,
2009-07-11 14:16:16 +04:00
. base = {
. cra_name = " sha1 " ,
. cra_driver_name = " sha1-padlock " ,
. cra_priority = PADLOCK_CRA_PRIORITY ,
. cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SHASH |
CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK ,
. cra_blocksize = SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE ,
. cra_ctxsize = sizeof ( struct padlock_sha_ctx ) ,
. cra_module = THIS_MODULE ,
. cra_init = padlock_cra_init ,
. cra_exit = padlock_cra_exit ,
2006-07-12 06:29:38 +04:00
}
} ;
2009-07-11 14:16:16 +04:00
static struct shash_alg sha256_alg = {
. digestsize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE ,
. init = padlock_sha_init ,
. update = padlock_sha_update ,
. finup = padlock_sha256_finup ,
. final = padlock_sha256_final ,
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. export = padlock_sha_export ,
. import = padlock_sha_import ,
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. descsize = sizeof ( struct padlock_sha_desc ) ,
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. statesize = sizeof ( struct sha256_state ) ,
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. base = {
. cra_name = " sha256 " ,
. cra_driver_name = " sha256-padlock " ,
. cra_priority = PADLOCK_CRA_PRIORITY ,
. cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SHASH |
CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK ,
. cra_blocksize = SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE ,
. cra_ctxsize = sizeof ( struct padlock_sha_ctx ) ,
. cra_module = THIS_MODULE ,
. cra_init = padlock_cra_init ,
. cra_exit = padlock_cra_exit ,
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}
} ;
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/* Add two shash_alg instance for hardware-implemented *
* multiple - parts hash supported by VIA Nano Processor . */
static int padlock_sha1_init_nano ( struct shash_desc * desc )
{
struct sha1_state * sctx = shash_desc_ctx ( desc ) ;
* sctx = ( struct sha1_state ) {
. state = { SHA1_H0 , SHA1_H1 , SHA1_H2 , SHA1_H3 , SHA1_H4 } ,
} ;
return 0 ;
}
static int padlock_sha1_update_nano ( struct shash_desc * desc ,
const u8 * data , unsigned int len )
{
struct sha1_state * sctx = shash_desc_ctx ( desc ) ;
unsigned int partial , done ;
const u8 * src ;
/*The PHE require the out buffer must 128 bytes and 16-bytes aligned*/
u8 buf [ 128 + PADLOCK_ALIGNMENT - STACK_ALIGN ] __attribute__
( ( aligned ( STACK_ALIGN ) ) ) ;
u8 * dst = PTR_ALIGN ( & buf [ 0 ] , PADLOCK_ALIGNMENT ) ;
int ts_state ;
partial = sctx - > count & 0x3f ;
sctx - > count + = len ;
done = 0 ;
src = data ;
memcpy ( dst , ( u8 * ) ( sctx - > state ) , SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE ) ;
if ( ( partial + len ) > = SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE ) {
/* Append the bytes in state's buffer to a block to handle */
if ( partial ) {
done = - partial ;
memcpy ( sctx - > buffer + partial , data ,
done + SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE ) ;
src = sctx - > buffer ;
ts_state = irq_ts_save ( ) ;
asm volatile ( " .byte 0xf3,0x0f,0xa6,0xc8 "
: " +S " ( src ) , " +D " ( dst ) \
: " a " ( ( long ) - 1 ) , " c " ( ( unsigned long ) 1 ) ) ;
irq_ts_restore ( ts_state ) ;
done + = SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE ;
src = data + done ;
}
/* Process the left bytes from the input data */
if ( len - done > = SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE ) {
ts_state = irq_ts_save ( ) ;
asm volatile ( " .byte 0xf3,0x0f,0xa6,0xc8 "
: " +S " ( src ) , " +D " ( dst )
: " a " ( ( long ) - 1 ) ,
" c " ( ( unsigned long ) ( ( len - done ) / SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE ) ) ) ;
irq_ts_restore ( ts_state ) ;
done + = ( ( len - done ) - ( len - done ) % SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE ) ;
src = data + done ;
}
partial = 0 ;
}
memcpy ( ( u8 * ) ( sctx - > state ) , dst , SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE ) ;
memcpy ( sctx - > buffer + partial , src , len - done ) ;
return 0 ;
}
static int padlock_sha1_final_nano ( struct shash_desc * desc , u8 * out )
{
struct sha1_state * state = ( struct sha1_state * ) shash_desc_ctx ( desc ) ;
unsigned int partial , padlen ;
__be64 bits ;
static const u8 padding [ 64 ] = { 0x80 , } ;
bits = cpu_to_be64 ( state - > count < < 3 ) ;
/* Pad out to 56 mod 64 */
partial = state - > count & 0x3f ;
padlen = ( partial < 56 ) ? ( 56 - partial ) : ( ( 64 + 56 ) - partial ) ;
padlock_sha1_update_nano ( desc , padding , padlen ) ;
/* Append length field bytes */
padlock_sha1_update_nano ( desc , ( const u8 * ) & bits , sizeof ( bits ) ) ;
/* Swap to output */
padlock_output_block ( ( uint32_t * ) ( state - > state ) , ( uint32_t * ) out , 5 ) ;
return 0 ;
}
static int padlock_sha256_init_nano ( struct shash_desc * desc )
{
struct sha256_state * sctx = shash_desc_ctx ( desc ) ;
* sctx = ( struct sha256_state ) {
. state = { SHA256_H0 , SHA256_H1 , SHA256_H2 , SHA256_H3 , \
SHA256_H4 , SHA256_H5 , SHA256_H6 , SHA256_H7 } ,
} ;
return 0 ;
}
static int padlock_sha256_update_nano ( struct shash_desc * desc , const u8 * data ,
unsigned int len )
{
struct sha256_state * sctx = shash_desc_ctx ( desc ) ;
unsigned int partial , done ;
const u8 * src ;
/*The PHE require the out buffer must 128 bytes and 16-bytes aligned*/
u8 buf [ 128 + PADLOCK_ALIGNMENT - STACK_ALIGN ] __attribute__
( ( aligned ( STACK_ALIGN ) ) ) ;
u8 * dst = PTR_ALIGN ( & buf [ 0 ] , PADLOCK_ALIGNMENT ) ;
int ts_state ;
partial = sctx - > count & 0x3f ;
sctx - > count + = len ;
done = 0 ;
src = data ;
memcpy ( dst , ( u8 * ) ( sctx - > state ) , SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE ) ;
if ( ( partial + len ) > = SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE ) {
/* Append the bytes in state's buffer to a block to handle */
if ( partial ) {
done = - partial ;
memcpy ( sctx - > buf + partial , data ,
done + SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE ) ;
src = sctx - > buf ;
ts_state = irq_ts_save ( ) ;
asm volatile ( " .byte 0xf3,0x0f,0xa6,0xd0 "
: " +S " ( src ) , " +D " ( dst )
: " a " ( ( long ) - 1 ) , " c " ( ( unsigned long ) 1 ) ) ;
irq_ts_restore ( ts_state ) ;
done + = SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE ;
src = data + done ;
}
/* Process the left bytes from input data*/
if ( len - done > = SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE ) {
ts_state = irq_ts_save ( ) ;
asm volatile ( " .byte 0xf3,0x0f,0xa6,0xd0 "
: " +S " ( src ) , " +D " ( dst )
: " a " ( ( long ) - 1 ) ,
" c " ( ( unsigned long ) ( ( len - done ) / 64 ) ) ) ;
irq_ts_restore ( ts_state ) ;
done + = ( ( len - done ) - ( len - done ) % 64 ) ;
src = data + done ;
}
partial = 0 ;
}
memcpy ( ( u8 * ) ( sctx - > state ) , dst , SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE ) ;
memcpy ( sctx - > buf + partial , src , len - done ) ;
return 0 ;
}
static int padlock_sha256_final_nano ( struct shash_desc * desc , u8 * out )
{
struct sha256_state * state =
( struct sha256_state * ) shash_desc_ctx ( desc ) ;
unsigned int partial , padlen ;
__be64 bits ;
static const u8 padding [ 64 ] = { 0x80 , } ;
bits = cpu_to_be64 ( state - > count < < 3 ) ;
/* Pad out to 56 mod 64 */
partial = state - > count & 0x3f ;
padlen = ( partial < 56 ) ? ( 56 - partial ) : ( ( 64 + 56 ) - partial ) ;
padlock_sha256_update_nano ( desc , padding , padlen ) ;
/* Append length field bytes */
padlock_sha256_update_nano ( desc , ( const u8 * ) & bits , sizeof ( bits ) ) ;
/* Swap to output */
padlock_output_block ( ( uint32_t * ) ( state - > state ) , ( uint32_t * ) out , 8 ) ;
return 0 ;
}
static int padlock_sha_export_nano ( struct shash_desc * desc ,
void * out )
{
int statesize = crypto_shash_statesize ( desc - > tfm ) ;
void * sctx = shash_desc_ctx ( desc ) ;
memcpy ( out , sctx , statesize ) ;
return 0 ;
}
static int padlock_sha_import_nano ( struct shash_desc * desc ,
const void * in )
{
int statesize = crypto_shash_statesize ( desc - > tfm ) ;
void * sctx = shash_desc_ctx ( desc ) ;
memcpy ( sctx , in , statesize ) ;
return 0 ;
}
static struct shash_alg sha1_alg_nano = {
. digestsize = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE ,
. init = padlock_sha1_init_nano ,
. update = padlock_sha1_update_nano ,
. final = padlock_sha1_final_nano ,
. export = padlock_sha_export_nano ,
. import = padlock_sha_import_nano ,
. descsize = sizeof ( struct sha1_state ) ,
. statesize = sizeof ( struct sha1_state ) ,
. base = {
. cra_name = " sha1 " ,
. cra_driver_name = " sha1-padlock-nano " ,
. cra_priority = PADLOCK_CRA_PRIORITY ,
. cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SHASH ,
. cra_blocksize = SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE ,
. cra_module = THIS_MODULE ,
}
} ;
static struct shash_alg sha256_alg_nano = {
. digestsize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE ,
. init = padlock_sha256_init_nano ,
. update = padlock_sha256_update_nano ,
. final = padlock_sha256_final_nano ,
. export = padlock_sha_export_nano ,
. import = padlock_sha_import_nano ,
. descsize = sizeof ( struct sha256_state ) ,
. statesize = sizeof ( struct sha256_state ) ,
. base = {
. cra_name = " sha256 " ,
. cra_driver_name = " sha256-padlock-nano " ,
. cra_priority = PADLOCK_CRA_PRIORITY ,
. cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SHASH ,
. cra_blocksize = SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE ,
. cra_module = THIS_MODULE ,
}
} ;
2012-01-26 03:09:06 +04:00
static struct x86_cpu_id padlock_sha_ids [ ] = {
X86_FEATURE_MATCH ( X86_FEATURE_PHE ) ,
{ }
} ;
MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE ( x86cpu , padlock_sha_ids ) ;
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static int __init padlock_init ( void )
{
int rc = - ENODEV ;
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struct cpuinfo_x86 * c = & cpu_data ( 0 ) ;
struct shash_alg * sha1 ;
struct shash_alg * sha256 ;
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2012-01-26 03:09:06 +04:00
if ( ! x86_match_cpu ( padlock_sha_ids ) | | ! cpu_has_phe_enabled )
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return - ENODEV ;
2011-03-27 06:45:00 +04:00
/* Register the newly added algorithm module if on *
* VIA Nano processor , or else just do as before */
if ( c - > x86_model < 0x0f ) {
sha1 = & sha1_alg ;
sha256 = & sha256_alg ;
} else {
sha1 = & sha1_alg_nano ;
sha256 = & sha256_alg_nano ;
}
rc = crypto_register_shash ( sha1 ) ;
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if ( rc )
goto out ;
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rc = crypto_register_shash ( sha256 ) ;
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if ( rc )
goto out_unreg1 ;
printk ( KERN_NOTICE PFX " Using VIA PadLock ACE for SHA1/SHA256 algorithms. \n " ) ;
return 0 ;
out_unreg1 :
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crypto_unregister_shash ( sha1 ) ;
2006-07-12 06:29:38 +04:00
out :
printk ( KERN_ERR PFX " VIA PadLock SHA1/SHA256 initialization failed. \n " ) ;
return rc ;
}
static void __exit padlock_fini ( void )
{
2011-03-27 06:45:00 +04:00
struct cpuinfo_x86 * c = & cpu_data ( 0 ) ;
if ( c - > x86_model > = 0x0f ) {
crypto_unregister_shash ( & sha1_alg_nano ) ;
crypto_unregister_shash ( & sha256_alg_nano ) ;
} else {
crypto_unregister_shash ( & sha1_alg ) ;
crypto_unregister_shash ( & sha256_alg ) ;
}
2006-07-12 06:29:38 +04:00
}
module_init ( padlock_init ) ;
module_exit ( padlock_fini ) ;
MODULE_DESCRIPTION ( " VIA PadLock SHA1/SHA256 algorithms support. " ) ;
MODULE_LICENSE ( " GPL " ) ;
MODULE_AUTHOR ( " Michal Ludvig " ) ;
2014-11-21 04:05:53 +03:00
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO ( " sha1-all " ) ;
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO ( " sha256-all " ) ;
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO ( " sha1-padlock " ) ;
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO ( " sha256-padlock " ) ;