linux/fs/bcachefs/fs-ioctl.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
#ifndef NO_BCACHEFS_FS
#include "bcachefs.h"
#include "chardev.h"
#include "dirent.h"
#include "fs.h"
#include "fs-common.h"
#include "fs-ioctl.h"
#include "quota.h"
#include <linux/compat.h>
#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/namei.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/writeback.h>
#define FS_IOC_GOINGDOWN _IOR('X', 125, __u32)
#define FSOP_GOING_FLAGS_DEFAULT 0x0 /* going down */
#define FSOP_GOING_FLAGS_LOGFLUSH 0x1 /* flush log but not data */
#define FSOP_GOING_FLAGS_NOLOGFLUSH 0x2 /* don't flush log nor data */
struct flags_set {
unsigned mask;
unsigned flags;
unsigned projid;
bool set_projinherit;
bool projinherit;
};
static int bch2_inode_flags_set(struct btree_trans *trans,
struct bch_inode_info *inode,
struct bch_inode_unpacked *bi,
void *p)
{
struct bch_fs *c = inode->v.i_sb->s_fs_info;
/*
* We're relying on btree locking here for exclusion with other ioctl
* calls - use the flags in the btree (@bi), not inode->i_flags:
*/
struct flags_set *s = p;
unsigned newflags = s->flags;
unsigned oldflags = bi->bi_flags & s->mask;
if (((newflags ^ oldflags) & (BCH_INODE_append|BCH_INODE_immutable)) &&
!capable(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE))
return -EPERM;
if (!S_ISREG(bi->bi_mode) &&
!S_ISDIR(bi->bi_mode) &&
(newflags & (BCH_INODE_nodump|BCH_INODE_noatime)) != newflags)
return -EINVAL;
if (s->set_projinherit) {
bi->bi_fields_set &= ~(1 << Inode_opt_project);
bi->bi_fields_set |= ((int) s->projinherit << Inode_opt_project);
}
bi->bi_flags &= ~s->mask;
bi->bi_flags |= newflags;
bi->bi_ctime = timespec_to_bch2_time(c, current_time(&inode->v));
return 0;
}
static int bch2_ioc_getflags(struct bch_inode_info *inode, int __user *arg)
{
unsigned flags = map_flags(bch_flags_to_uflags, inode->ei_inode.bi_flags);
return put_user(flags, arg);
}
static int bch2_ioc_setflags(struct bch_fs *c,
struct file *file,
struct bch_inode_info *inode,
void __user *arg)
{
struct flags_set s = { .mask = map_defined(bch_flags_to_uflags) };
unsigned uflags;
int ret;
if (get_user(uflags, (int __user *) arg))
return -EFAULT;
s.flags = map_flags_rev(bch_flags_to_uflags, uflags);
if (uflags)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
ret = mnt_want_write_file(file);
if (ret)
return ret;
inode_lock(&inode->v);
if (!inode_owner_or_capable(file_mnt_idmap(file), &inode->v)) {
ret = -EACCES;
goto setflags_out;
}
mutex_lock(&inode->ei_update_lock);
ret = bch2_subvol_is_ro(c, inode->ei_subvol) ?:
bch2_write_inode(c, inode, bch2_inode_flags_set, &s,
ATTR_CTIME);
mutex_unlock(&inode->ei_update_lock);
setflags_out:
inode_unlock(&inode->v);
mnt_drop_write_file(file);
return ret;
}
static int bch2_ioc_fsgetxattr(struct bch_inode_info *inode,
struct fsxattr __user *arg)
{
struct fsxattr fa = { 0 };
fa.fsx_xflags = map_flags(bch_flags_to_xflags, inode->ei_inode.bi_flags);
if (inode->ei_inode.bi_fields_set & (1 << Inode_opt_project))
fa.fsx_xflags |= FS_XFLAG_PROJINHERIT;
fa.fsx_projid = inode->ei_qid.q[QTYP_PRJ];
if (copy_to_user(arg, &fa, sizeof(fa)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
static int fssetxattr_inode_update_fn(struct btree_trans *trans,
struct bch_inode_info *inode,
struct bch_inode_unpacked *bi,
void *p)
{
struct flags_set *s = p;
if (s->projid != bi->bi_project) {
bi->bi_fields_set |= 1U << Inode_opt_project;
bi->bi_project = s->projid;
}
return bch2_inode_flags_set(trans, inode, bi, p);
}
static int bch2_ioc_fssetxattr(struct bch_fs *c,
struct file *file,
struct bch_inode_info *inode,
struct fsxattr __user *arg)
{
struct flags_set s = { .mask = map_defined(bch_flags_to_xflags) };
struct fsxattr fa;
int ret;
if (copy_from_user(&fa, arg, sizeof(fa)))
return -EFAULT;
s.set_projinherit = true;
s.projinherit = (fa.fsx_xflags & FS_XFLAG_PROJINHERIT) != 0;
fa.fsx_xflags &= ~FS_XFLAG_PROJINHERIT;
s.flags = map_flags_rev(bch_flags_to_xflags, fa.fsx_xflags);
if (fa.fsx_xflags)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (fa.fsx_projid >= U32_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
/*
* inode fields accessible via the xattr interface are stored with a +1
* bias, so that 0 means unset:
*/
s.projid = fa.fsx_projid + 1;
ret = mnt_want_write_file(file);
if (ret)
return ret;
inode_lock(&inode->v);
if (!inode_owner_or_capable(file_mnt_idmap(file), &inode->v)) {
ret = -EACCES;
goto err;
}
mutex_lock(&inode->ei_update_lock);
ret = bch2_subvol_is_ro(c, inode->ei_subvol) ?:
bch2_set_projid(c, inode, fa.fsx_projid) ?:
bch2_write_inode(c, inode, fssetxattr_inode_update_fn, &s,
ATTR_CTIME);
mutex_unlock(&inode->ei_update_lock);
err:
inode_unlock(&inode->v);
mnt_drop_write_file(file);
return ret;
}
static int bch2_reinherit_attrs_fn(struct btree_trans *trans,
struct bch_inode_info *inode,
struct bch_inode_unpacked *bi,
void *p)
{
struct bch_inode_info *dir = p;
return !bch2_reinherit_attrs(bi, &dir->ei_inode);
}
static int bch2_ioc_reinherit_attrs(struct bch_fs *c,
struct file *file,
struct bch_inode_info *src,
const char __user *name)
{
struct bch_hash_info hash = bch2_hash_info_init(c, &src->ei_inode);
struct bch_inode_info *dst;
struct inode *vinode = NULL;
char *kname = NULL;
struct qstr qstr;
int ret = 0;
subvol_inum inum;
kname = kmalloc(BCH_NAME_MAX + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!kname)
return -ENOMEM;
ret = strncpy_from_user(kname, name, BCH_NAME_MAX);
if (unlikely(ret < 0))
goto err1;
qstr.len = ret;
qstr.name = kname;
ret = bch2_dirent_lookup(c, inode_inum(src), &hash, &qstr, &inum);
if (ret)
goto err1;
vinode = bch2_vfs_inode_get(c, inum);
ret = PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(vinode);
if (ret)
goto err1;
dst = to_bch_ei(vinode);
ret = mnt_want_write_file(file);
if (ret)
goto err2;
bch2_lock_inodes(INODE_UPDATE_LOCK, src, dst);
if (inode_attr_changing(src, dst, Inode_opt_project)) {
ret = bch2_fs_quota_transfer(c, dst,
src->ei_qid,
1 << QTYP_PRJ,
KEY_TYPE_QUOTA_PREALLOC);
if (ret)
goto err3;
}
ret = bch2_write_inode(c, dst, bch2_reinherit_attrs_fn, src, 0);
err3:
bch2_unlock_inodes(INODE_UPDATE_LOCK, src, dst);
/* return true if we did work */
if (ret >= 0)
ret = !ret;
mnt_drop_write_file(file);
err2:
iput(vinode);
err1:
kfree(kname);
return ret;
}
static int bch2_ioc_goingdown(struct bch_fs *c, u32 __user *arg)
{
u32 flags;
int ret = 0;
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (get_user(flags, arg))
return -EFAULT;
bch_notice(c, "shutdown by ioctl type %u", flags);
switch (flags) {
case FSOP_GOING_FLAGS_DEFAULT:
ret = bdev_freeze(c->vfs_sb->s_bdev);
if (ret)
break;
bch2_journal_flush(&c->journal);
bch2_fs_emergency_read_only(c);
bdev_thaw(c->vfs_sb->s_bdev);
break;
case FSOP_GOING_FLAGS_LOGFLUSH:
bch2_journal_flush(&c->journal);
fallthrough;
case FSOP_GOING_FLAGS_NOLOGFLUSH:
bch2_fs_emergency_read_only(c);
break;
default:
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
return ret;
}
static long __bch2_ioctl_subvolume_create(struct bch_fs *c, struct file *filp,
struct bch_ioctl_subvolume arg)
{
struct inode *dir;
struct bch_inode_info *inode;
struct user_namespace *s_user_ns;
struct dentry *dst_dentry;
struct path src_path, dst_path;
int how = LOOKUP_FOLLOW;
int error;
subvol_inum snapshot_src = { 0 };
unsigned lookup_flags = 0;
unsigned create_flags = BCH_CREATE_SUBVOL;
if (arg.flags & ~(BCH_SUBVOL_SNAPSHOT_CREATE|
BCH_SUBVOL_SNAPSHOT_RO))
return -EINVAL;
if (!(arg.flags & BCH_SUBVOL_SNAPSHOT_CREATE) &&
(arg.src_ptr ||
(arg.flags & BCH_SUBVOL_SNAPSHOT_RO)))
return -EINVAL;
if (arg.flags & BCH_SUBVOL_SNAPSHOT_CREATE)
create_flags |= BCH_CREATE_SNAPSHOT;
if (arg.flags & BCH_SUBVOL_SNAPSHOT_RO)
create_flags |= BCH_CREATE_SNAPSHOT_RO;
bcachefs: grab s_umount only if snapshotting When I was testing mongodb over bcachefs with compression, there is a lockdep warning when snapshotting mongodb data volume. $ cat test.sh prog=bcachefs $prog subvolume create /mnt/data $prog subvolume create /mnt/data/snapshots while true;do $prog subvolume snapshot /mnt/data /mnt/data/snapshots/$(date +%s) sleep 1s done $ cat /etc/mongodb.conf systemLog: destination: file logAppend: true path: /mnt/data/mongod.log storage: dbPath: /mnt/data/ lockdep reports: [ 3437.452330] ====================================================== [ 3437.452750] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 3437.453168] 6.7.0-rc7-custom+ #85 Tainted: G E [ 3437.453562] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 3437.453981] bcachefs/35533 is trying to acquire lock: [ 3437.454325] ffffa0a02b2b1418 (sb_writers#10){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: filename_create+0x62/0x190 [ 3437.454875] but task is already holding lock: [ 3437.455268] ffffa0a02b2b10e0 (&type->s_umount_key#48){.+.+}-{3:3}, at: bch2_fs_file_ioctl+0x232/0xc90 [bcachefs] [ 3437.456009] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 3437.456553] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 3437.457054] -> #3 (&type->s_umount_key#48){.+.+}-{3:3}: [ 3437.457507] down_read+0x3e/0x170 [ 3437.457772] bch2_fs_file_ioctl+0x232/0xc90 [bcachefs] [ 3437.458206] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x93/0xd0 [ 3437.458498] do_syscall_64+0x42/0xf0 [ 3437.458779] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 [ 3437.459155] -> #2 (&c->snapshot_create_lock){++++}-{3:3}: [ 3437.459615] down_read+0x3e/0x170 [ 3437.459878] bch2_truncate+0x82/0x110 [bcachefs] [ 3437.460276] bchfs_truncate+0x254/0x3c0 [bcachefs] [ 3437.460686] notify_change+0x1f1/0x4a0 [ 3437.461283] do_truncate+0x7f/0xd0 [ 3437.461555] path_openat+0xa57/0xce0 [ 3437.461836] do_filp_open+0xb4/0x160 [ 3437.462116] do_sys_openat2+0x91/0xc0 [ 3437.462402] __x64_sys_openat+0x53/0xa0 [ 3437.462701] do_syscall_64+0x42/0xf0 [ 3437.462982] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 [ 3437.463359] -> #1 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#15){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 3437.463843] down_write+0x3b/0xc0 [ 3437.464223] bch2_write_iter+0x5b/0xcc0 [bcachefs] [ 3437.464493] vfs_write+0x21b/0x4c0 [ 3437.464653] ksys_write+0x69/0xf0 [ 3437.464839] do_syscall_64+0x42/0xf0 [ 3437.465009] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 [ 3437.465231] -> #0 (sb_writers#10){.+.+}-{0:0}: [ 3437.465471] __lock_acquire+0x1455/0x21b0 [ 3437.465656] lock_acquire+0xc6/0x2b0 [ 3437.465822] mnt_want_write+0x46/0x1a0 [ 3437.465996] filename_create+0x62/0x190 [ 3437.466175] user_path_create+0x2d/0x50 [ 3437.466352] bch2_fs_file_ioctl+0x2ec/0xc90 [bcachefs] [ 3437.466617] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x93/0xd0 [ 3437.466791] do_syscall_64+0x42/0xf0 [ 3437.466957] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 [ 3437.467180] other info that might help us debug this: [ 3437.469670] 2 locks held by bcachefs/35533: other info that might help us debug this: [ 3437.467507] Chain exists of: sb_writers#10 --> &c->snapshot_create_lock --> &type->s_umount_key#48 [ 3437.467979] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 3437.468223] CPU0 CPU1 [ 3437.468405] ---- ---- [ 3437.468585] rlock(&type->s_umount_key#48); [ 3437.468758] lock(&c->snapshot_create_lock); [ 3437.469030] lock(&type->s_umount_key#48); [ 3437.469291] rlock(sb_writers#10); [ 3437.469434] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 3437.469670] 2 locks held by bcachefs/35533: [ 3437.469838] #0: ffffa0a02ce00a88 (&c->snapshot_create_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: bch2_fs_file_ioctl+0x1e3/0xc90 [bcachefs] [ 3437.470294] #1: ffffa0a02b2b10e0 (&type->s_umount_key#48){.+.+}-{3:3}, at: bch2_fs_file_ioctl+0x232/0xc90 [bcachefs] [ 3437.470744] stack backtrace: [ 3437.470922] CPU: 7 PID: 35533 Comm: bcachefs Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 6.7.0-rc7-custom+ #85 [ 3437.471313] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014 [ 3437.471694] Call Trace: [ 3437.471795] <TASK> [ 3437.471884] dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x90 [ 3437.472035] check_noncircular+0x132/0x150 [ 3437.472202] __lock_acquire+0x1455/0x21b0 [ 3437.472369] lock_acquire+0xc6/0x2b0 [ 3437.472518] ? filename_create+0x62/0x190 [ 3437.472683] ? lock_is_held_type+0x97/0x110 [ 3437.472856] mnt_want_write+0x46/0x1a0 [ 3437.473025] ? filename_create+0x62/0x190 [ 3437.473204] filename_create+0x62/0x190 [ 3437.473380] user_path_create+0x2d/0x50 [ 3437.473555] bch2_fs_file_ioctl+0x2ec/0xc90 [bcachefs] [ 3437.473819] ? lock_acquire+0xc6/0x2b0 [ 3437.474002] ? __fget_files+0x2a/0x190 [ 3437.474195] ? __fget_files+0xbc/0x190 [ 3437.474380] ? lock_release+0xc5/0x270 [ 3437.474567] ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0x93/0xd0 [ 3437.474764] ? __pfx_bch2_fs_file_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [bcachefs] [ 3437.475090] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x93/0xd0 [ 3437.475277] do_syscall_64+0x42/0xf0 [ 3437.475454] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 [ 3437.475691] RIP: 0033:0x7f2743c313af ====================================================== In __bch2_ioctl_subvolume_create(), we grab s_umount unconditionally and unlock it at the end of the function. There is a comment "why do we need this lock?" about the lock coming from commit 42d237320e98 ("bcachefs: Snapshot creation, deletion") The reason is that __bch2_ioctl_subvolume_create() calls sync_inodes_sb() which enforce locked s_umount to writeback all dirty nodes before doing snapshot works. Fix it by read locking s_umount for snapshotting only and unlocking s_umount after sync_inodes_sb(). Signed-off-by: Su Yue <glass.su@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev>
2024-01-15 05:21:25 +03:00
if (arg.flags & BCH_SUBVOL_SNAPSHOT_CREATE) {
/* sync_inodes_sb enforce s_umount is locked */
down_read(&c->vfs_sb->s_umount);
sync_inodes_sb(c->vfs_sb);
bcachefs: grab s_umount only if snapshotting When I was testing mongodb over bcachefs with compression, there is a lockdep warning when snapshotting mongodb data volume. $ cat test.sh prog=bcachefs $prog subvolume create /mnt/data $prog subvolume create /mnt/data/snapshots while true;do $prog subvolume snapshot /mnt/data /mnt/data/snapshots/$(date +%s) sleep 1s done $ cat /etc/mongodb.conf systemLog: destination: file logAppend: true path: /mnt/data/mongod.log storage: dbPath: /mnt/data/ lockdep reports: [ 3437.452330] ====================================================== [ 3437.452750] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 3437.453168] 6.7.0-rc7-custom+ #85 Tainted: G E [ 3437.453562] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 3437.453981] bcachefs/35533 is trying to acquire lock: [ 3437.454325] ffffa0a02b2b1418 (sb_writers#10){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: filename_create+0x62/0x190 [ 3437.454875] but task is already holding lock: [ 3437.455268] ffffa0a02b2b10e0 (&type->s_umount_key#48){.+.+}-{3:3}, at: bch2_fs_file_ioctl+0x232/0xc90 [bcachefs] [ 3437.456009] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 3437.456553] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 3437.457054] -> #3 (&type->s_umount_key#48){.+.+}-{3:3}: [ 3437.457507] down_read+0x3e/0x170 [ 3437.457772] bch2_fs_file_ioctl+0x232/0xc90 [bcachefs] [ 3437.458206] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x93/0xd0 [ 3437.458498] do_syscall_64+0x42/0xf0 [ 3437.458779] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 [ 3437.459155] -> #2 (&c->snapshot_create_lock){++++}-{3:3}: [ 3437.459615] down_read+0x3e/0x170 [ 3437.459878] bch2_truncate+0x82/0x110 [bcachefs] [ 3437.460276] bchfs_truncate+0x254/0x3c0 [bcachefs] [ 3437.460686] notify_change+0x1f1/0x4a0 [ 3437.461283] do_truncate+0x7f/0xd0 [ 3437.461555] path_openat+0xa57/0xce0 [ 3437.461836] do_filp_open+0xb4/0x160 [ 3437.462116] do_sys_openat2+0x91/0xc0 [ 3437.462402] __x64_sys_openat+0x53/0xa0 [ 3437.462701] do_syscall_64+0x42/0xf0 [ 3437.462982] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 [ 3437.463359] -> #1 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#15){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 3437.463843] down_write+0x3b/0xc0 [ 3437.464223] bch2_write_iter+0x5b/0xcc0 [bcachefs] [ 3437.464493] vfs_write+0x21b/0x4c0 [ 3437.464653] ksys_write+0x69/0xf0 [ 3437.464839] do_syscall_64+0x42/0xf0 [ 3437.465009] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 [ 3437.465231] -> #0 (sb_writers#10){.+.+}-{0:0}: [ 3437.465471] __lock_acquire+0x1455/0x21b0 [ 3437.465656] lock_acquire+0xc6/0x2b0 [ 3437.465822] mnt_want_write+0x46/0x1a0 [ 3437.465996] filename_create+0x62/0x190 [ 3437.466175] user_path_create+0x2d/0x50 [ 3437.466352] bch2_fs_file_ioctl+0x2ec/0xc90 [bcachefs] [ 3437.466617] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x93/0xd0 [ 3437.466791] do_syscall_64+0x42/0xf0 [ 3437.466957] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 [ 3437.467180] other info that might help us debug this: [ 3437.469670] 2 locks held by bcachefs/35533: other info that might help us debug this: [ 3437.467507] Chain exists of: sb_writers#10 --> &c->snapshot_create_lock --> &type->s_umount_key#48 [ 3437.467979] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 3437.468223] CPU0 CPU1 [ 3437.468405] ---- ---- [ 3437.468585] rlock(&type->s_umount_key#48); [ 3437.468758] lock(&c->snapshot_create_lock); [ 3437.469030] lock(&type->s_umount_key#48); [ 3437.469291] rlock(sb_writers#10); [ 3437.469434] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 3437.469670] 2 locks held by bcachefs/35533: [ 3437.469838] #0: ffffa0a02ce00a88 (&c->snapshot_create_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: bch2_fs_file_ioctl+0x1e3/0xc90 [bcachefs] [ 3437.470294] #1: ffffa0a02b2b10e0 (&type->s_umount_key#48){.+.+}-{3:3}, at: bch2_fs_file_ioctl+0x232/0xc90 [bcachefs] [ 3437.470744] stack backtrace: [ 3437.470922] CPU: 7 PID: 35533 Comm: bcachefs Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 6.7.0-rc7-custom+ #85 [ 3437.471313] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014 [ 3437.471694] Call Trace: [ 3437.471795] <TASK> [ 3437.471884] dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x90 [ 3437.472035] check_noncircular+0x132/0x150 [ 3437.472202] __lock_acquire+0x1455/0x21b0 [ 3437.472369] lock_acquire+0xc6/0x2b0 [ 3437.472518] ? filename_create+0x62/0x190 [ 3437.472683] ? lock_is_held_type+0x97/0x110 [ 3437.472856] mnt_want_write+0x46/0x1a0 [ 3437.473025] ? filename_create+0x62/0x190 [ 3437.473204] filename_create+0x62/0x190 [ 3437.473380] user_path_create+0x2d/0x50 [ 3437.473555] bch2_fs_file_ioctl+0x2ec/0xc90 [bcachefs] [ 3437.473819] ? lock_acquire+0xc6/0x2b0 [ 3437.474002] ? __fget_files+0x2a/0x190 [ 3437.474195] ? __fget_files+0xbc/0x190 [ 3437.474380] ? lock_release+0xc5/0x270 [ 3437.474567] ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0x93/0xd0 [ 3437.474764] ? __pfx_bch2_fs_file_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [bcachefs] [ 3437.475090] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x93/0xd0 [ 3437.475277] do_syscall_64+0x42/0xf0 [ 3437.475454] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 [ 3437.475691] RIP: 0033:0x7f2743c313af ====================================================== In __bch2_ioctl_subvolume_create(), we grab s_umount unconditionally and unlock it at the end of the function. There is a comment "why do we need this lock?" about the lock coming from commit 42d237320e98 ("bcachefs: Snapshot creation, deletion") The reason is that __bch2_ioctl_subvolume_create() calls sync_inodes_sb() which enforce locked s_umount to writeback all dirty nodes before doing snapshot works. Fix it by read locking s_umount for snapshotting only and unlocking s_umount after sync_inodes_sb(). Signed-off-by: Su Yue <glass.su@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev>
2024-01-15 05:21:25 +03:00
up_read(&c->vfs_sb->s_umount);
}
retry:
if (arg.src_ptr) {
error = user_path_at(arg.dirfd,
(const char __user *)(unsigned long)arg.src_ptr,
how, &src_path);
if (error)
goto err1;
if (src_path.dentry->d_sb->s_fs_info != c) {
path_put(&src_path);
error = -EXDEV;
goto err1;
}
snapshot_src = inode_inum(to_bch_ei(src_path.dentry->d_inode));
}
dst_dentry = user_path_create(arg.dirfd,
(const char __user *)(unsigned long)arg.dst_ptr,
&dst_path, lookup_flags);
error = PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(dst_dentry);
if (error)
goto err2;
if (dst_dentry->d_sb->s_fs_info != c) {
error = -EXDEV;
goto err3;
}
if (dst_dentry->d_inode) {
error = -EEXIST;
goto err3;
}
dir = dst_path.dentry->d_inode;
if (IS_DEADDIR(dir)) {
error = -BCH_ERR_ENOENT_directory_dead;
goto err3;
}
s_user_ns = dir->i_sb->s_user_ns;
if (!kuid_has_mapping(s_user_ns, current_fsuid()) ||
!kgid_has_mapping(s_user_ns, current_fsgid())) {
error = -EOVERFLOW;
goto err3;
}
error = inode_permission(file_mnt_idmap(filp),
dir, MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC);
if (error)
goto err3;
if (!IS_POSIXACL(dir))
arg.mode &= ~current_umask();
error = security_path_mkdir(&dst_path, dst_dentry, arg.mode);
if (error)
goto err3;
if ((arg.flags & BCH_SUBVOL_SNAPSHOT_CREATE) &&
!arg.src_ptr)
snapshot_src.subvol = inode_inum(to_bch_ei(dir)).subvol;
inode = __bch2_create(file_mnt_idmap(filp), to_bch_ei(dir),
dst_dentry, arg.mode|S_IFDIR,
0, snapshot_src, create_flags);
error = PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(inode);
if (error)
goto err3;
d_instantiate(dst_dentry, &inode->v);
fsnotify_mkdir(dir, dst_dentry);
err3:
done_path_create(&dst_path, dst_dentry);
err2:
if (arg.src_ptr)
path_put(&src_path);
if (retry_estale(error, lookup_flags)) {
lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_REVAL;
goto retry;
}
err1:
return error;
}
static long bch2_ioctl_subvolume_create(struct bch_fs *c, struct file *filp,
struct bch_ioctl_subvolume arg)
{
down_write(&c->snapshot_create_lock);
long ret = __bch2_ioctl_subvolume_create(c, filp, arg);
up_write(&c->snapshot_create_lock);
return ret;
}
static long bch2_ioctl_subvolume_destroy(struct bch_fs *c, struct file *filp,
struct bch_ioctl_subvolume arg)
{
const char __user *name = (void __user *)(unsigned long)arg.dst_ptr;
struct path path;
struct inode *dir;
struct dentry *victim;
int ret = 0;
if (arg.flags)
return -EINVAL;
victim = user_path_locked_at(arg.dirfd, name, &path);
if (IS_ERR(victim))
return PTR_ERR(victim);
dir = d_inode(path.dentry);
if (victim->d_sb->s_fs_info != c) {
ret = -EXDEV;
goto err;
}
if (!d_is_positive(victim)) {
ret = -ENOENT;
goto err;
}
ret = __bch2_unlink(dir, victim, true);
if (!ret) {
fsnotify_rmdir(dir, victim);
d_delete(victim);
}
err:
inode_unlock(dir);
dput(victim);
path_put(&path);
return ret;
}
long bch2_fs_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct bch_inode_info *inode = file_bch_inode(file);
struct bch_fs *c = inode->v.i_sb->s_fs_info;
long ret;
switch (cmd) {
case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS:
ret = bch2_ioc_getflags(inode, (int __user *) arg);
break;
case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS:
ret = bch2_ioc_setflags(c, file, inode, (int __user *) arg);
break;
case FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR:
ret = bch2_ioc_fsgetxattr(inode, (void __user *) arg);
break;
case FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR:
ret = bch2_ioc_fssetxattr(c, file, inode,
(void __user *) arg);
break;
case BCHFS_IOC_REINHERIT_ATTRS:
ret = bch2_ioc_reinherit_attrs(c, file, inode,
(void __user *) arg);
break;
case FS_IOC_GETVERSION:
ret = -ENOTTY;
break;
case FS_IOC_SETVERSION:
ret = -ENOTTY;
break;
case FS_IOC_GOINGDOWN:
ret = bch2_ioc_goingdown(c, (u32 __user *) arg);
break;
case BCH_IOCTL_SUBVOLUME_CREATE: {
struct bch_ioctl_subvolume i;
ret = copy_from_user(&i, (void __user *) arg, sizeof(i))
? -EFAULT
: bch2_ioctl_subvolume_create(c, file, i);
break;
}
case BCH_IOCTL_SUBVOLUME_DESTROY: {
struct bch_ioctl_subvolume i;
ret = copy_from_user(&i, (void __user *) arg, sizeof(i))
? -EFAULT
: bch2_ioctl_subvolume_destroy(c, file, i);
break;
}
default:
ret = bch2_fs_ioctl(c, cmd, (void __user *) arg);
break;
}
return bch2_err_class(ret);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
long bch2_compat_fs_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
/* These are just misnamed, they actually get/put from/to user an int */
switch (cmd) {
case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS:
cmd = FS_IOC_GETFLAGS;
break;
case FS_IOC32_SETFLAGS:
cmd = FS_IOC_SETFLAGS;
break;
default:
return -ENOIOCTLCMD;
}
return bch2_fs_file_ioctl(file, cmd, (unsigned long) compat_ptr(arg));
}
#endif
#endif /* NO_BCACHEFS_FS */