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/*
* linux / net / sunrpc / auth . c
*
* Generic RPC client authentication API .
*
* Copyright ( C ) 1996 , Olaf Kirch < okir @ monad . swb . de >
*/
# include <linux/types.h>
# include <linux/sched.h>
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# include <linux/cred.h>
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# include <linux/module.h>
# include <linux/slab.h>
# include <linux/errno.h>
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# include <linux/hash.h>
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# include <linux/sunrpc/clnt.h>
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# include <linux/sunrpc/gss_api.h>
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# include <linux/spinlock.h>
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# if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SUNRPC_DEBUG)
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# define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_AUTH
# endif
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# define RPC_CREDCACHE_DEFAULT_HASHBITS (4)
struct rpc_cred_cache {
struct hlist_head * hashtable ;
unsigned int hashbits ;
spinlock_t lock ;
} ;
static unsigned int auth_hashbits = RPC_CREDCACHE_DEFAULT_HASHBITS ;
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static DEFINE_SPINLOCK ( rpc_authflavor_lock ) ;
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static const struct rpc_authops * auth_flavors [ RPC_AUTH_MAXFLAVOR ] = {
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& authnull_ops , /* AUTH_NULL */
& authunix_ops , /* AUTH_UNIX */
NULL , /* others can be loadable modules */
} ;
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static LIST_HEAD ( cred_unused ) ;
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static unsigned long number_cred_unused ;
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# define MAX_HASHTABLE_BITS (14)
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static int param_set_hashtbl_sz ( const char * val , const struct kernel_param * kp )
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{
unsigned long num ;
unsigned int nbits ;
int ret ;
if ( ! val )
goto out_inval ;
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ret = kstrtoul ( val , 0 , & num ) ;
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if ( ret = = - EINVAL )
goto out_inval ;
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nbits = fls ( num - 1 ) ;
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if ( nbits > MAX_HASHTABLE_BITS | | nbits < 2 )
goto out_inval ;
* ( unsigned int * ) kp - > arg = nbits ;
return 0 ;
out_inval :
return - EINVAL ;
}
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static int param_get_hashtbl_sz ( char * buffer , const struct kernel_param * kp )
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{
unsigned int nbits ;
nbits = * ( unsigned int * ) kp - > arg ;
return sprintf ( buffer , " %u " , 1U < < nbits ) ;
}
# define param_check_hashtbl_sz(name, p) __param_check(name, p, unsigned int);
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static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_hashtbl_sz = {
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. set = param_set_hashtbl_sz ,
. get = param_get_hashtbl_sz ,
} ;
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module_param_named ( auth_hashtable_size , auth_hashbits , hashtbl_sz , 0644 ) ;
MODULE_PARM_DESC ( auth_hashtable_size , " RPC credential cache hashtable size " ) ;
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static unsigned long auth_max_cred_cachesize = ULONG_MAX ;
module_param ( auth_max_cred_cachesize , ulong , 0644 ) ;
MODULE_PARM_DESC ( auth_max_cred_cachesize , " RPC credential maximum total cache size " ) ;
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static u32
pseudoflavor_to_flavor ( u32 flavor ) {
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if ( flavor > RPC_AUTH_MAXFLAVOR )
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return RPC_AUTH_GSS ;
return flavor ;
}
int
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rpcauth_register ( const struct rpc_authops * ops )
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{
rpc_authflavor_t flavor ;
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int ret = - EPERM ;
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if ( ( flavor = ops - > au_flavor ) > = RPC_AUTH_MAXFLAVOR )
return - EINVAL ;
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spin_lock ( & rpc_authflavor_lock ) ;
if ( auth_flavors [ flavor ] = = NULL ) {
auth_flavors [ flavor ] = ops ;
ret = 0 ;
}
spin_unlock ( & rpc_authflavor_lock ) ;
return ret ;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL ( rpcauth_register ) ;
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int
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rpcauth_unregister ( const struct rpc_authops * ops )
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{
rpc_authflavor_t flavor ;
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int ret = - EPERM ;
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if ( ( flavor = ops - > au_flavor ) > = RPC_AUTH_MAXFLAVOR )
return - EINVAL ;
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spin_lock ( & rpc_authflavor_lock ) ;
if ( auth_flavors [ flavor ] = = ops ) {
auth_flavors [ flavor ] = NULL ;
ret = 0 ;
}
spin_unlock ( & rpc_authflavor_lock ) ;
return ret ;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL ( rpcauth_unregister ) ;
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/**
* rpcauth_get_pseudoflavor - check if security flavor is supported
* @ flavor : a security flavor
* @ info : a GSS mech OID , quality of protection , and service value
*
* Verifies that an appropriate kernel module is available or already loaded .
* Returns an equivalent pseudoflavor , or RPC_AUTH_MAXFLAVOR if " flavor " is
* not supported locally .
*/
rpc_authflavor_t
rpcauth_get_pseudoflavor ( rpc_authflavor_t flavor , struct rpcsec_gss_info * info )
{
const struct rpc_authops * ops ;
rpc_authflavor_t pseudoflavor ;
ops = auth_flavors [ flavor ] ;
if ( ops = = NULL )
request_module ( " rpc-auth-%u " , flavor ) ;
spin_lock ( & rpc_authflavor_lock ) ;
ops = auth_flavors [ flavor ] ;
if ( ops = = NULL | | ! try_module_get ( ops - > owner ) ) {
spin_unlock ( & rpc_authflavor_lock ) ;
return RPC_AUTH_MAXFLAVOR ;
}
spin_unlock ( & rpc_authflavor_lock ) ;
pseudoflavor = flavor ;
if ( ops - > info2flavor ! = NULL )
pseudoflavor = ops - > info2flavor ( info ) ;
module_put ( ops - > owner ) ;
return pseudoflavor ;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL ( rpcauth_get_pseudoflavor ) ;
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/**
* rpcauth_get_gssinfo - find GSS tuple matching a GSS pseudoflavor
* @ pseudoflavor : GSS pseudoflavor to match
* @ info : rpcsec_gss_info structure to fill in
*
* Returns zero and fills in " info " if pseudoflavor matches a
* supported mechanism .
*/
int
rpcauth_get_gssinfo ( rpc_authflavor_t pseudoflavor , struct rpcsec_gss_info * info )
{
rpc_authflavor_t flavor = pseudoflavor_to_flavor ( pseudoflavor ) ;
const struct rpc_authops * ops ;
int result ;
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if ( flavor > = RPC_AUTH_MAXFLAVOR )
return - EINVAL ;
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ops = auth_flavors [ flavor ] ;
if ( ops = = NULL )
request_module ( " rpc-auth-%u " , flavor ) ;
spin_lock ( & rpc_authflavor_lock ) ;
ops = auth_flavors [ flavor ] ;
if ( ops = = NULL | | ! try_module_get ( ops - > owner ) ) {
spin_unlock ( & rpc_authflavor_lock ) ;
return - ENOENT ;
}
spin_unlock ( & rpc_authflavor_lock ) ;
result = - ENOENT ;
if ( ops - > flavor2info ! = NULL )
result = ops - > flavor2info ( pseudoflavor , info ) ;
module_put ( ops - > owner ) ;
return result ;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL ( rpcauth_get_gssinfo ) ;
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/**
* rpcauth_list_flavors - discover registered flavors and pseudoflavors
* @ array : array to fill in
* @ size : size of " array "
*
* Returns the number of array items filled in , or a negative errno .
*
* The returned array is not sorted by any policy . Callers should not
* rely on the order of the items in the returned array .
*/
int
rpcauth_list_flavors ( rpc_authflavor_t * array , int size )
{
rpc_authflavor_t flavor ;
int result = 0 ;
spin_lock ( & rpc_authflavor_lock ) ;
for ( flavor = 0 ; flavor < RPC_AUTH_MAXFLAVOR ; flavor + + ) {
const struct rpc_authops * ops = auth_flavors [ flavor ] ;
rpc_authflavor_t pseudos [ 4 ] ;
int i , len ;
if ( result > = size ) {
result = - ENOMEM ;
break ;
}
if ( ops = = NULL )
continue ;
if ( ops - > list_pseudoflavors = = NULL ) {
array [ result + + ] = ops - > au_flavor ;
continue ;
}
len = ops - > list_pseudoflavors ( pseudos , ARRAY_SIZE ( pseudos ) ) ;
if ( len < 0 ) {
result = len ;
break ;
}
for ( i = 0 ; i < len ; i + + ) {
if ( result > = size ) {
result = - ENOMEM ;
break ;
}
array [ result + + ] = pseudos [ i ] ;
}
}
spin_unlock ( & rpc_authflavor_lock ) ;
dprintk ( " RPC: %s returns %d \n " , __func__ , result ) ;
return result ;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL ( rpcauth_list_flavors ) ;
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struct rpc_auth *
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rpcauth_create ( struct rpc_auth_create_args * args , struct rpc_clnt * clnt )
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{
struct rpc_auth * auth ;
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const struct rpc_authops * ops ;
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u32 flavor = pseudoflavor_to_flavor ( args - > pseudoflavor ) ;
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auth = ERR_PTR ( - EINVAL ) ;
if ( flavor > = RPC_AUTH_MAXFLAVOR )
goto out ;
if ( ( ops = auth_flavors [ flavor ] ) = = NULL )
request_module ( " rpc-auth-%u " , flavor ) ;
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spin_lock ( & rpc_authflavor_lock ) ;
ops = auth_flavors [ flavor ] ;
if ( ops = = NULL | | ! try_module_get ( ops - > owner ) ) {
spin_unlock ( & rpc_authflavor_lock ) ;
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goto out ;
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}
spin_unlock ( & rpc_authflavor_lock ) ;
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auth = ops - > create ( args , clnt ) ;
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module_put ( ops - > owner ) ;
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if ( IS_ERR ( auth ) )
return auth ;
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if ( clnt - > cl_auth )
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rpcauth_release ( clnt - > cl_auth ) ;
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clnt - > cl_auth = auth ;
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out :
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return auth ;
}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL ( rpcauth_create ) ;
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void
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rpcauth_release ( struct rpc_auth * auth )
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{
if ( ! atomic_dec_and_test ( & auth - > au_count ) )
return ;
auth - > au_ops - > destroy ( auth ) ;
}
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK ( rpc_credcache_lock ) ;
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static void
rpcauth_unhash_cred_locked ( struct rpc_cred * cred )
{
hlist_del_rcu ( & cred - > cr_hash ) ;
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smp_mb__before_atomic ( ) ;
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clear_bit ( RPCAUTH_CRED_HASHED , & cred - > cr_flags ) ;
}
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static int
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rpcauth_unhash_cred ( struct rpc_cred * cred )
{
spinlock_t * cache_lock ;
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int ret ;
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cache_lock = & cred - > cr_auth - > au_credcache - > lock ;
spin_lock ( cache_lock ) ;
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ret = atomic_read ( & cred - > cr_count ) = = 0 ;
if ( ret )
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rpcauth_unhash_cred_locked ( cred ) ;
spin_unlock ( cache_lock ) ;
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return ret ;
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}
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/*
* Initialize RPC credential cache
*/
int
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rpcauth_init_credcache ( struct rpc_auth * auth )
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{
struct rpc_cred_cache * new ;
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unsigned int hashsize ;
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new = kmalloc ( sizeof ( * new ) , GFP_KERNEL ) ;
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if ( ! new )
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goto out_nocache ;
new - > hashbits = auth_hashbits ;
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hashsize = 1U < < new - > hashbits ;
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new - > hashtable = kcalloc ( hashsize , sizeof ( new - > hashtable [ 0 ] ) , GFP_KERNEL ) ;
if ( ! new - > hashtable )
goto out_nohashtbl ;
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spin_lock_init ( & new - > lock ) ;
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auth - > au_credcache = new ;
return 0 ;
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out_nohashtbl :
kfree ( new ) ;
out_nocache :
return - ENOMEM ;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL ( rpcauth_init_credcache ) ;
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/*
* Setup a credential key lifetime timeout notification
*/
int
rpcauth_key_timeout_notify ( struct rpc_auth * auth , struct rpc_cred * cred )
{
if ( ! cred - > cr_auth - > au_ops - > key_timeout )
return 0 ;
return cred - > cr_auth - > au_ops - > key_timeout ( auth , cred ) ;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL ( rpcauth_key_timeout_notify ) ;
bool
sunrpc: move NO_CRKEY_TIMEOUT to the auth->au_flags
A generic_cred can be used to look up a unx_cred or a gss_cred, so it's
not really safe to use the the generic_cred->acred->ac_flags to store
the NO_CRKEY_TIMEOUT flag. A lookup for a unx_cred triggered while the
KEY_EXPIRE_SOON flag is already set will cause both NO_CRKEY_TIMEOUT and
KEY_EXPIRE_SOON to be set in the ac_flags, leaving the user associated
with the auth_cred to be in a state where they're perpetually doing 4K
NFS_FILE_SYNC writes.
This can be reproduced as follows:
1. Mount two NFS filesystems, one with sec=krb5 and one with sec=sys.
They do not need to be the same export, nor do they even need to be from
the same NFS server. Also, v3 is fine.
$ sudo mount -o v3,sec=krb5 server1:/export /mnt/krb5
$ sudo mount -o v3,sec=sys server2:/export /mnt/sys
2. As the normal user, before accessing the kerberized mount, kinit with
a short lifetime (but not so short that renewing the ticket would leave
you within the 4-minute window again by the time the original ticket
expires), e.g.
$ kinit -l 10m -r 60m
3. Do some I/O to the kerberized mount and verify that the writes are
wsize, UNSTABLE:
$ dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/krb5/file bs=1M count=1
4. Wait until you're within 4 minutes of key expiry, then do some more
I/O to the kerberized mount to ensure that RPC_CRED_KEY_EXPIRE_SOON gets
set. Verify that the writes are 4K, FILE_SYNC:
$ dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/krb5/file bs=1M count=1
5. Now do some I/O to the sec=sys mount. This will cause
RPC_CRED_NO_CRKEY_TIMEOUT to be set:
$ dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/sys/file bs=1M count=1
6. Writes for that user will now be permanently 4K, FILE_SYNC for that
user, regardless of which mount is being written to, until you reboot
the client. Renewing the kerberos ticket (assuming it hasn't already
expired) will have no effect. Grabbing a new kerberos ticket at this
point will have no effect either.
Move the flag to the auth->au_flags field (which is currently unused)
and rename it slightly to reflect that it's no longer associated with
the auth_cred->ac_flags. Add the rpc_auth to the arg list of
rpcauth_cred_key_to_expire and check the au_flags there too. Finally,
add the inode to the arg list of nfs_ctx_key_to_expire so we can
determine the rpc_auth to pass to rpcauth_cred_key_to_expire.
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
2016-06-07 22:14:48 +03:00
rpcauth_cred_key_to_expire ( struct rpc_auth * auth , struct rpc_cred * cred )
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{
sunrpc: move NO_CRKEY_TIMEOUT to the auth->au_flags
A generic_cred can be used to look up a unx_cred or a gss_cred, so it's
not really safe to use the the generic_cred->acred->ac_flags to store
the NO_CRKEY_TIMEOUT flag. A lookup for a unx_cred triggered while the
KEY_EXPIRE_SOON flag is already set will cause both NO_CRKEY_TIMEOUT and
KEY_EXPIRE_SOON to be set in the ac_flags, leaving the user associated
with the auth_cred to be in a state where they're perpetually doing 4K
NFS_FILE_SYNC writes.
This can be reproduced as follows:
1. Mount two NFS filesystems, one with sec=krb5 and one with sec=sys.
They do not need to be the same export, nor do they even need to be from
the same NFS server. Also, v3 is fine.
$ sudo mount -o v3,sec=krb5 server1:/export /mnt/krb5
$ sudo mount -o v3,sec=sys server2:/export /mnt/sys
2. As the normal user, before accessing the kerberized mount, kinit with
a short lifetime (but not so short that renewing the ticket would leave
you within the 4-minute window again by the time the original ticket
expires), e.g.
$ kinit -l 10m -r 60m
3. Do some I/O to the kerberized mount and verify that the writes are
wsize, UNSTABLE:
$ dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/krb5/file bs=1M count=1
4. Wait until you're within 4 minutes of key expiry, then do some more
I/O to the kerberized mount to ensure that RPC_CRED_KEY_EXPIRE_SOON gets
set. Verify that the writes are 4K, FILE_SYNC:
$ dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/krb5/file bs=1M count=1
5. Now do some I/O to the sec=sys mount. This will cause
RPC_CRED_NO_CRKEY_TIMEOUT to be set:
$ dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/sys/file bs=1M count=1
6. Writes for that user will now be permanently 4K, FILE_SYNC for that
user, regardless of which mount is being written to, until you reboot
the client. Renewing the kerberos ticket (assuming it hasn't already
expired) will have no effect. Grabbing a new kerberos ticket at this
point will have no effect either.
Move the flag to the auth->au_flags field (which is currently unused)
and rename it slightly to reflect that it's no longer associated with
the auth_cred->ac_flags. Add the rpc_auth to the arg list of
rpcauth_cred_key_to_expire and check the au_flags there too. Finally,
add the inode to the arg list of nfs_ctx_key_to_expire so we can
determine the rpc_auth to pass to rpcauth_cred_key_to_expire.
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
2016-06-07 22:14:48 +03:00
if ( auth - > au_flags & RPCAUTH_AUTH_NO_CRKEY_TIMEOUT )
return false ;
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if ( ! cred - > cr_ops - > crkey_to_expire )
return false ;
return cred - > cr_ops - > crkey_to_expire ( cred ) ;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL ( rpcauth_cred_key_to_expire ) ;
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char *
rpcauth_stringify_acceptor ( struct rpc_cred * cred )
{
if ( ! cred - > cr_ops - > crstringify_acceptor )
return NULL ;
return cred - > cr_ops - > crstringify_acceptor ( cred ) ;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL ( rpcauth_stringify_acceptor ) ;
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/*
* Destroy a list of credentials
*/
static inline
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void rpcauth_destroy_credlist ( struct list_head * head )
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{
struct rpc_cred * cred ;
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while ( ! list_empty ( head ) ) {
cred = list_entry ( head - > next , struct rpc_cred , cr_lru ) ;
list_del_init ( & cred - > cr_lru ) ;
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put_rpccred ( cred ) ;
}
}
/*
* Clear the RPC credential cache , and delete those credentials
* that are not referenced .
*/
void
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rpcauth_clear_credcache ( struct rpc_cred_cache * cache )
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{
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LIST_HEAD ( free ) ;
struct hlist_head * head ;
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struct rpc_cred * cred ;
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unsigned int hashsize = 1U < < cache - > hashbits ;
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int i ;
spin_lock ( & rpc_credcache_lock ) ;
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spin_lock ( & cache - > lock ) ;
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for ( i = 0 ; i < hashsize ; i + + ) {
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head = & cache - > hashtable [ i ] ;
while ( ! hlist_empty ( head ) ) {
cred = hlist_entry ( head - > first , struct rpc_cred , cr_hash ) ;
get_rpccred ( cred ) ;
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if ( ! list_empty ( & cred - > cr_lru ) ) {
list_del ( & cred - > cr_lru ) ;
number_cred_unused - - ;
}
list_add_tail ( & cred - > cr_lru , & free ) ;
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rpcauth_unhash_cred_locked ( cred ) ;
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}
}
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spin_unlock ( & cache - > lock ) ;
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spin_unlock ( & rpc_credcache_lock ) ;
rpcauth_destroy_credlist ( & free ) ;
}
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/*
* Destroy the RPC credential cache
*/
void
rpcauth_destroy_credcache ( struct rpc_auth * auth )
{
struct rpc_cred_cache * cache = auth - > au_credcache ;
if ( cache ) {
auth - > au_credcache = NULL ;
rpcauth_clear_credcache ( cache ) ;
2010-07-31 22:29:08 +04:00
kfree ( cache - > hashtable ) ;
2007-06-09 23:41:42 +04:00
kfree ( cache ) ;
}
}
2007-07-14 23:39:59 +04:00
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL ( rpcauth_destroy_credcache ) ;
2007-06-09 23:41:42 +04:00
2008-04-15 02:13:37 +04:00
# define RPC_AUTH_EXPIRY_MORATORIUM (60 * HZ)
2007-06-24 03:45:36 +04:00
/*
* Remove stale credentials . Avoid sleeping inside the loop .
*/
2013-08-28 04:18:14 +04:00
static long
2007-06-26 01:11:20 +04:00
rpcauth_prune_expired ( struct list_head * free , int nr_to_scan )
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
{
2007-06-24 23:57:57 +04:00
spinlock_t * cache_lock ;
2008-10-28 22:21:41 +03:00
struct rpc_cred * cred , * next ;
2008-04-15 02:13:37 +04:00
unsigned long expired = jiffies - RPC_AUTH_EXPIRY_MORATORIUM ;
2013-08-28 04:18:14 +04:00
long freed = 0 ;
2007-06-24 03:45:36 +04:00
2008-10-28 22:21:41 +03:00
list_for_each_entry_safe ( cred , next , & cred_unused , cr_lru ) {
2010-05-13 20:51:06 +04:00
if ( nr_to_scan - - = = 0 )
break ;
2010-05-13 20:51:06 +04:00
/*
* Enforce a 60 second garbage collection moratorium
* Note that the cred_unused list must be time - ordered .
*/
2010-04-22 23:35:55 +04:00
if ( time_in_range ( cred - > cr_expire , expired , jiffies ) & &
2017-01-06 06:19:58 +03:00
test_bit ( RPCAUTH_CRED_HASHED , & cred - > cr_flags ) ! = 0 ) {
freed = SHRINK_STOP ;
2013-08-28 04:18:14 +04:00
break ;
2017-01-06 06:19:58 +03:00
}
2008-10-28 22:21:41 +03:00
2007-06-24 03:45:36 +04:00
list_del_init ( & cred - > cr_lru ) ;
2007-06-26 01:11:20 +04:00
number_cred_unused - - ;
2013-08-28 04:18:14 +04:00
freed + + ;
2007-06-24 03:45:36 +04:00
if ( atomic_read ( & cred - > cr_count ) ! = 0 )
continue ;
2008-10-28 22:21:41 +03:00
2007-06-24 23:57:57 +04:00
cache_lock = & cred - > cr_auth - > au_credcache - > lock ;
spin_lock ( cache_lock ) ;
if ( atomic_read ( & cred - > cr_count ) = = 0 ) {
get_rpccred ( cred ) ;
list_add_tail ( & cred - > cr_lru , free ) ;
rpcauth_unhash_cred_locked ( cred ) ;
}
spin_unlock ( cache_lock ) ;
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
}
2013-08-28 04:18:14 +04:00
return freed ;
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
}
2014-07-21 21:32:42 +04:00
static unsigned long
rpcauth_cache_do_shrink ( int nr_to_scan )
{
LIST_HEAD ( free ) ;
unsigned long freed ;
spin_lock ( & rpc_credcache_lock ) ;
freed = rpcauth_prune_expired ( & free , nr_to_scan ) ;
spin_unlock ( & rpc_credcache_lock ) ;
rpcauth_destroy_credlist ( & free ) ;
return freed ;
}
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
/*
2007-06-26 01:11:20 +04:00
* Run memory cache shrinker .
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
*/
2013-08-28 04:18:14 +04:00
static unsigned long
rpcauth_cache_shrink_scan ( struct shrinker * shrink , struct shrink_control * sc )
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
{
2013-08-28 04:18:14 +04:00
if ( ( sc - > gfp_mask & GFP_KERNEL ) ! = GFP_KERNEL )
return SHRINK_STOP ;
2007-06-26 01:11:20 +04:00
2013-08-28 04:18:14 +04:00
/* nothing left, don't come back */
2007-06-26 01:11:20 +04:00
if ( list_empty ( & cred_unused ) )
2013-08-28 04:18:14 +04:00
return SHRINK_STOP ;
2014-07-21 21:32:42 +04:00
return rpcauth_cache_do_shrink ( sc - > nr_to_scan ) ;
2013-08-28 04:18:14 +04:00
}
static unsigned long
rpcauth_cache_shrink_count ( struct shrinker * shrink , struct shrink_control * sc )
{
2017-01-06 06:19:58 +03:00
return number_cred_unused * sysctl_vfs_cache_pressure / 100 ;
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
}
2014-07-21 21:32:42 +04:00
static void
rpcauth_cache_enforce_limit ( void )
{
unsigned long diff ;
unsigned int nr_to_scan ;
if ( number_cred_unused < = auth_max_cred_cachesize )
return ;
diff = number_cred_unused - auth_max_cred_cachesize ;
nr_to_scan = 100 ;
if ( diff < nr_to_scan )
nr_to_scan = diff ;
rpcauth_cache_do_shrink ( nr_to_scan ) ;
}
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
/*
* Look up a process ' credentials in the authentication cache
*/
struct rpc_cred *
rpcauth_lookup_credcache ( struct rpc_auth * auth , struct auth_cred * acred ,
2016-04-22 03:51:54 +03:00
int flags , gfp_t gfp )
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
{
2007-06-24 03:45:36 +04:00
LIST_HEAD ( free ) ;
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
struct rpc_cred_cache * cache = auth - > au_credcache ;
2007-06-24 23:55:26 +04:00
struct rpc_cred * cred = NULL ,
* entry , * new ;
2008-03-12 21:40:14 +03:00
unsigned int nr ;
2016-09-29 18:44:41 +03:00
nr = auth - > au_ops - > hash_cred ( acred , cache - > hashbits ) ;
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
2007-06-24 23:55:26 +04:00
rcu_read_lock ( ) ;
hlist: drop the node parameter from iterators
I'm not sure why, but the hlist for each entry iterators were conceived
list_for_each_entry(pos, head, member)
The hlist ones were greedy and wanted an extra parameter:
hlist_for_each_entry(tpos, pos, head, member)
Why did they need an extra pos parameter? I'm not quite sure. Not only
they don't really need it, it also prevents the iterator from looking
exactly like the list iterator, which is unfortunate.
Besides the semantic patch, there was some manual work required:
- Fix up the actual hlist iterators in linux/list.h
- Fix up the declaration of other iterators based on the hlist ones.
- A very small amount of places were using the 'node' parameter, this
was modified to use 'obj->member' instead.
- Coccinelle didn't handle the hlist_for_each_entry_safe iterator
properly, so those had to be fixed up manually.
The semantic patch which is mostly the work of Peter Senna Tschudin is here:
@@
iterator name hlist_for_each_entry, hlist_for_each_entry_continue, hlist_for_each_entry_from, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh, for_each_busy_worker, ax25_uid_for_each, ax25_for_each, inet_bind_bucket_for_each, sctp_for_each_hentry, sk_for_each, sk_for_each_rcu, sk_for_each_from, sk_for_each_safe, sk_for_each_bound, hlist_for_each_entry_safe, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu, nr_neigh_for_each, nr_neigh_for_each_safe, nr_node_for_each, nr_node_for_each_safe, for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp, for_each_gfn_sp, for_each_host;
type T;
expression a,c,d,e;
identifier b;
statement S;
@@
-T b;
<+... when != b
(
hlist_for_each_entry(a,
- b,
c, d) S
|
hlist_for_each_entry_continue(a,
- b,
c) S
|
hlist_for_each_entry_from(a,
- b,
c) S
|
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(a,
- b,
c, d) S
|
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh(a,
- b,
c, d) S
|
hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh(a,
- b,
c) S
|
for_each_busy_worker(a, c,
- b,
d) S
|
ax25_uid_for_each(a,
- b,
c) S
|
ax25_for_each(a,
- b,
c) S
|
inet_bind_bucket_for_each(a,
- b,
c) S
|
sctp_for_each_hentry(a,
- b,
c) S
|
sk_for_each(a,
- b,
c) S
|
sk_for_each_rcu(a,
- b,
c) S
|
sk_for_each_from
-(a, b)
+(a)
S
+ sk_for_each_from(a) S
|
sk_for_each_safe(a,
- b,
c, d) S
|
sk_for_each_bound(a,
- b,
c) S
|
hlist_for_each_entry_safe(a,
- b,
c, d, e) S
|
hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu(a,
- b,
c) S
|
nr_neigh_for_each(a,
- b,
c) S
|
nr_neigh_for_each_safe(a,
- b,
c, d) S
|
nr_node_for_each(a,
- b,
c) S
|
nr_node_for_each_safe(a,
- b,
c, d) S
|
- for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d, b) S
+ for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d) S
|
- for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d, b) S
+ for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d) S
|
for_each_host(a,
- b,
c) S
|
for_each_host_safe(a,
- b,
c, d) S
|
for_each_mesh_entry(a,
- b,
c, d) S
)
...+>
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus change from net/ipv4/raw.c]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus hunk from net/ipv6/raw.c]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warnings]
[akpm@linux-foudnation.org: redo intrusive kvm changes]
Tested-by: Peter Senna Tschudin <peter.senna@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-02-28 05:06:00 +04:00
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu ( entry , & cache - > hashtable [ nr ] , cr_hash ) {
2007-06-24 03:45:36 +04:00
if ( ! entry - > cr_ops - > crmatch ( acred , entry , flags ) )
continue ;
2014-07-14 05:28:20 +04:00
if ( flags & RPCAUTH_LOOKUP_RCU ) {
if ( test_bit ( RPCAUTH_CRED_HASHED , & entry - > cr_flags ) & &
! test_bit ( RPCAUTH_CRED_NEW , & entry - > cr_flags ) )
cred = entry ;
break ;
}
2007-06-24 23:57:57 +04:00
spin_lock ( & cache - > lock ) ;
2007-06-24 23:55:26 +04:00
if ( test_bit ( RPCAUTH_CRED_HASHED , & entry - > cr_flags ) = = 0 ) {
2007-06-24 23:57:57 +04:00
spin_unlock ( & cache - > lock ) ;
2007-06-24 23:55:26 +04:00
continue ;
}
2007-06-24 03:45:36 +04:00
cred = get_rpccred ( entry ) ;
2007-06-24 23:57:57 +04:00
spin_unlock ( & cache - > lock ) ;
2007-06-24 03:45:36 +04:00
break ;
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
}
2007-06-24 23:55:26 +04:00
rcu_read_unlock ( ) ;
2007-06-24 23:57:57 +04:00
if ( cred ! = NULL )
2007-06-24 23:55:26 +04:00
goto found ;
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
2014-07-14 05:28:20 +04:00
if ( flags & RPCAUTH_LOOKUP_RCU )
return ERR_PTR ( - ECHILD ) ;
2016-04-22 03:51:54 +03:00
new = auth - > au_ops - > crcreate ( auth , acred , flags , gfp ) ;
2007-06-24 23:55:26 +04:00
if ( IS_ERR ( new ) ) {
cred = new ;
goto out ;
}
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
2007-06-24 23:57:57 +04:00
spin_lock ( & cache - > lock ) ;
hlist: drop the node parameter from iterators
I'm not sure why, but the hlist for each entry iterators were conceived
list_for_each_entry(pos, head, member)
The hlist ones were greedy and wanted an extra parameter:
hlist_for_each_entry(tpos, pos, head, member)
Why did they need an extra pos parameter? I'm not quite sure. Not only
they don't really need it, it also prevents the iterator from looking
exactly like the list iterator, which is unfortunate.
Besides the semantic patch, there was some manual work required:
- Fix up the actual hlist iterators in linux/list.h
- Fix up the declaration of other iterators based on the hlist ones.
- A very small amount of places were using the 'node' parameter, this
was modified to use 'obj->member' instead.
- Coccinelle didn't handle the hlist_for_each_entry_safe iterator
properly, so those had to be fixed up manually.
The semantic patch which is mostly the work of Peter Senna Tschudin is here:
@@
iterator name hlist_for_each_entry, hlist_for_each_entry_continue, hlist_for_each_entry_from, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh, for_each_busy_worker, ax25_uid_for_each, ax25_for_each, inet_bind_bucket_for_each, sctp_for_each_hentry, sk_for_each, sk_for_each_rcu, sk_for_each_from, sk_for_each_safe, sk_for_each_bound, hlist_for_each_entry_safe, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu, nr_neigh_for_each, nr_neigh_for_each_safe, nr_node_for_each, nr_node_for_each_safe, for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp, for_each_gfn_sp, for_each_host;
type T;
expression a,c,d,e;
identifier b;
statement S;
@@
-T b;
<+... when != b
(
hlist_for_each_entry(a,
- b,
c, d) S
|
hlist_for_each_entry_continue(a,
- b,
c) S
|
hlist_for_each_entry_from(a,
- b,
c) S
|
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(a,
- b,
c, d) S
|
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh(a,
- b,
c, d) S
|
hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh(a,
- b,
c) S
|
for_each_busy_worker(a, c,
- b,
d) S
|
ax25_uid_for_each(a,
- b,
c) S
|
ax25_for_each(a,
- b,
c) S
|
inet_bind_bucket_for_each(a,
- b,
c) S
|
sctp_for_each_hentry(a,
- b,
c) S
|
sk_for_each(a,
- b,
c) S
|
sk_for_each_rcu(a,
- b,
c) S
|
sk_for_each_from
-(a, b)
+(a)
S
+ sk_for_each_from(a) S
|
sk_for_each_safe(a,
- b,
c, d) S
|
sk_for_each_bound(a,
- b,
c) S
|
hlist_for_each_entry_safe(a,
- b,
c, d, e) S
|
hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu(a,
- b,
c) S
|
nr_neigh_for_each(a,
- b,
c) S
|
nr_neigh_for_each_safe(a,
- b,
c, d) S
|
nr_node_for_each(a,
- b,
c) S
|
nr_node_for_each_safe(a,
- b,
c, d) S
|
- for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d, b) S
+ for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d) S
|
- for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d, b) S
+ for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d) S
|
for_each_host(a,
- b,
c) S
|
for_each_host_safe(a,
- b,
c, d) S
|
for_each_mesh_entry(a,
- b,
c, d) S
)
...+>
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus change from net/ipv4/raw.c]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus hunk from net/ipv6/raw.c]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warnings]
[akpm@linux-foudnation.org: redo intrusive kvm changes]
Tested-by: Peter Senna Tschudin <peter.senna@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-02-28 05:06:00 +04:00
hlist_for_each_entry ( entry , & cache - > hashtable [ nr ] , cr_hash ) {
2007-06-24 23:55:26 +04:00
if ( ! entry - > cr_ops - > crmatch ( acred , entry , flags ) )
continue ;
cred = get_rpccred ( entry ) ;
break ;
}
if ( cred = = NULL ) {
2007-06-24 03:55:31 +04:00
cred = new ;
2007-06-24 23:55:26 +04:00
set_bit ( RPCAUTH_CRED_HASHED , & cred - > cr_flags ) ;
hlist_add_head_rcu ( & cred - > cr_hash , & cache - > hashtable [ nr ] ) ;
} else
list_add_tail ( & new - > cr_lru , & free ) ;
2007-06-24 23:57:57 +04:00
spin_unlock ( & cache - > lock ) ;
2014-07-21 21:32:42 +04:00
rpcauth_cache_enforce_limit ( ) ;
2007-06-24 23:55:26 +04:00
found :
2009-11-30 03:55:45 +03:00
if ( test_bit ( RPCAUTH_CRED_NEW , & cred - > cr_flags ) & &
cred - > cr_ops - > cr_init ! = NULL & &
! ( flags & RPCAUTH_LOOKUP_NEW ) ) {
2006-02-01 20:19:27 +03:00
int res = cred - > cr_ops - > cr_init ( auth , cred ) ;
if ( res < 0 ) {
put_rpccred ( cred ) ;
cred = ERR_PTR ( res ) ;
}
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
}
2007-06-24 23:55:26 +04:00
rpcauth_destroy_credlist ( & free ) ;
out :
return cred ;
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
}
2007-07-14 23:39:59 +04:00
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL ( rpcauth_lookup_credcache ) ;
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
struct rpc_cred *
2006-02-01 20:18:36 +03:00
rpcauth_lookupcred ( struct rpc_auth * auth , int flags )
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
{
2008-11-14 02:39:18 +03:00
struct auth_cred acred ;
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
struct rpc_cred * ret ;
2008-11-14 02:39:18 +03:00
const struct cred * cred = current_cred ( ) ;
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
2007-01-31 20:14:08 +03:00
dprintk ( " RPC: looking up %s cred \n " ,
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
auth - > au_ops - > au_name ) ;
2008-11-14 02:39:18 +03:00
memset ( & acred , 0 , sizeof ( acred ) ) ;
acred . uid = cred - > fsuid ;
acred . gid = cred - > fsgid ;
2014-08-04 10:24:00 +04:00
acred . group_info = cred - > group_info ;
2006-02-01 20:18:36 +03:00
ret = auth - > au_ops - > lookup_cred ( auth , & acred , flags ) ;
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
return ret ;
}
2014-06-12 23:02:32 +04:00
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL ( rpcauth_lookupcred ) ;
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
2007-06-24 03:55:31 +04:00
void
rpcauth_init_cred ( struct rpc_cred * cred , const struct auth_cred * acred ,
struct rpc_auth * auth , const struct rpc_credops * ops )
{
INIT_HLIST_NODE ( & cred - > cr_hash ) ;
2007-06-24 03:45:36 +04:00
INIT_LIST_HEAD ( & cred - > cr_lru ) ;
2007-06-24 03:55:31 +04:00
atomic_set ( & cred - > cr_count , 1 ) ;
cred - > cr_auth = auth ;
cred - > cr_ops = ops ;
cred - > cr_expire = jiffies ;
cred - > cr_uid = acred - > uid ;
}
2007-07-14 23:39:59 +04:00
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL ( rpcauth_init_cred ) ;
2007-06-24 03:55:31 +04:00
2010-07-31 22:29:08 +04:00
struct rpc_cred *
2009-09-15 21:32:13 +04:00
rpcauth_generic_bind_cred ( struct rpc_task * task , struct rpc_cred * cred , int lookupflags )
2008-03-12 23:20:55 +03:00
{
dprintk ( " RPC: %5u holding %s cred %p \n " , task - > tk_pid ,
cred - > cr_auth - > au_ops - > au_name , cred ) ;
2010-07-31 22:29:08 +04:00
return get_rpccred ( cred ) ;
2008-03-12 23:20:55 +03:00
}
2008-03-12 23:21:07 +03:00
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL ( rpcauth_generic_bind_cred ) ;
2008-03-12 23:20:55 +03:00
2010-07-31 22:29:08 +04:00
static struct rpc_cred *
2009-09-15 21:32:13 +04:00
rpcauth_bind_root_cred ( struct rpc_task * task , int lookupflags )
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
{
2007-06-27 22:29:04 +04:00
struct rpc_auth * auth = task - > tk_client - > cl_auth ;
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
struct auth_cred acred = {
2013-02-02 03:55:38 +04:00
. uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID ,
. gid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID ,
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
} ;
2007-01-31 20:14:08 +03:00
dprintk ( " RPC: %5u looking up %s cred \n " ,
2007-06-27 22:29:04 +04:00
task - > tk_pid , task - > tk_client - > cl_auth - > au_ops - > au_name ) ;
2010-07-31 22:29:08 +04:00
return auth - > au_ops - > lookup_cred ( auth , & acred , lookupflags ) ;
2008-03-12 19:12:16 +03:00
}
2010-07-31 22:29:08 +04:00
static struct rpc_cred *
2009-09-15 21:32:13 +04:00
rpcauth_bind_new_cred ( struct rpc_task * task , int lookupflags )
2008-03-12 19:12:16 +03:00
{
struct rpc_auth * auth = task - > tk_client - > cl_auth ;
dprintk ( " RPC: %5u looking up %s cred \n " ,
task - > tk_pid , auth - > au_ops - > au_name ) ;
2010-07-31 22:29:08 +04:00
return rpcauth_lookupcred ( auth , lookupflags ) ;
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}
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static int
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rpcauth_bindcred ( struct rpc_task * task , struct rpc_cred * cred , int flags )
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{
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struct rpc_rqst * req = task - > tk_rqstp ;
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struct rpc_cred * new ;
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int lookupflags = 0 ;
if ( flags & RPC_TASK_ASYNC )
lookupflags | = RPCAUTH_LOOKUP_NEW ;
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if ( cred ! = NULL )
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new = cred - > cr_ops - > crbind ( task , cred , lookupflags ) ;
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else if ( flags & RPC_TASK_ROOTCREDS )
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new = rpcauth_bind_root_cred ( task , lookupflags ) ;
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else
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new = rpcauth_bind_new_cred ( task , lookupflags ) ;
if ( IS_ERR ( new ) )
return PTR_ERR ( new ) ;
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put_rpccred ( req - > rq_cred ) ;
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req - > rq_cred = new ;
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return 0 ;
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}
void
put_rpccred ( struct rpc_cred * cred )
{
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if ( cred = = NULL )
return ;
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/* Fast path for unhashed credentials */
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if ( test_bit ( RPCAUTH_CRED_HASHED , & cred - > cr_flags ) = = 0 ) {
if ( atomic_dec_and_test ( & cred - > cr_count ) )
cred - > cr_ops - > crdestroy ( cred ) ;
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return ;
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}
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if ( ! atomic_dec_and_lock ( & cred - > cr_count , & rpc_credcache_lock ) )
return ;
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if ( ! list_empty ( & cred - > cr_lru ) ) {
number_cred_unused - - ;
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list_del_init ( & cred - > cr_lru ) ;
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}
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if ( test_bit ( RPCAUTH_CRED_HASHED , & cred - > cr_flags ) ! = 0 ) {
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if ( test_bit ( RPCAUTH_CRED_UPTODATE , & cred - > cr_flags ) ! = 0 ) {
cred - > cr_expire = jiffies ;
list_add_tail ( & cred - > cr_lru , & cred_unused ) ;
number_cred_unused + + ;
goto out_nodestroy ;
}
if ( ! rpcauth_unhash_cred ( cred ) ) {
/* We were hashed and someone looked us up... */
goto out_nodestroy ;
}
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}
spin_unlock ( & rpc_credcache_lock ) ;
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cred - > cr_ops - > crdestroy ( cred ) ;
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return ;
out_nodestroy :
spin_unlock ( & rpc_credcache_lock ) ;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL ( put_rpccred ) ;
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__be32 *
rpcauth_marshcred ( struct rpc_task * task , __be32 * p )
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{
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struct rpc_cred * cred = task - > tk_rqstp - > rq_cred ;
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dprintk ( " RPC: %5u marshaling %s cred %p \n " ,
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task - > tk_pid , cred - > cr_auth - > au_ops - > au_name , cred ) ;
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return cred - > cr_ops - > crmarshal ( task , p ) ;
}
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__be32 *
rpcauth_checkverf ( struct rpc_task * task , __be32 * p )
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{
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struct rpc_cred * cred = task - > tk_rqstp - > rq_cred ;
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2007-01-31 20:14:08 +03:00
dprintk ( " RPC: %5u validating %s cred %p \n " ,
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task - > tk_pid , cred - > cr_auth - > au_ops - > au_name , cred ) ;
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return cred - > cr_ops - > crvalidate ( task , p ) ;
}
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static void rpcauth_wrap_req_encode ( kxdreproc_t encode , struct rpc_rqst * rqstp ,
__be32 * data , void * obj )
{
struct xdr_stream xdr ;
xdr_init_encode ( & xdr , & rqstp - > rq_snd_buf , data ) ;
encode ( rqstp , & xdr , obj ) ;
}
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int
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rpcauth_wrap_req ( struct rpc_task * task , kxdreproc_t encode , void * rqstp ,
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__be32 * data , void * obj )
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{
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struct rpc_cred * cred = task - > tk_rqstp - > rq_cred ;
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2007-01-31 20:14:08 +03:00
dprintk ( " RPC: %5u using %s cred %p to wrap rpc data \n " ,
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task - > tk_pid , cred - > cr_ops - > cr_name , cred ) ;
if ( cred - > cr_ops - > crwrap_req )
return cred - > cr_ops - > crwrap_req ( task , encode , rqstp , data , obj ) ;
/* By default, we encode the arguments normally. */
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rpcauth_wrap_req_encode ( encode , rqstp , data , obj ) ;
return 0 ;
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}
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static int
rpcauth_unwrap_req_decode ( kxdrdproc_t decode , struct rpc_rqst * rqstp ,
__be32 * data , void * obj )
{
struct xdr_stream xdr ;
xdr_init_decode ( & xdr , & rqstp - > rq_rcv_buf , data ) ;
return decode ( rqstp , & xdr , obj ) ;
}
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int
2010-12-14 17:59:29 +03:00
rpcauth_unwrap_resp ( struct rpc_task * task , kxdrdproc_t decode , void * rqstp ,
2006-09-27 09:29:38 +04:00
__be32 * data , void * obj )
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{
2010-07-31 22:29:08 +04:00
struct rpc_cred * cred = task - > tk_rqstp - > rq_cred ;
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
2007-01-31 20:14:08 +03:00
dprintk ( " RPC: %5u using %s cred %p to unwrap rpc data \n " ,
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task - > tk_pid , cred - > cr_ops - > cr_name , cred ) ;
if ( cred - > cr_ops - > crunwrap_resp )
return cred - > cr_ops - > crunwrap_resp ( task , decode , rqstp ,
data , obj ) ;
/* By default, we decode the arguments normally. */
2010-12-14 17:59:29 +03:00
return rpcauth_unwrap_req_decode ( decode , rqstp , data , obj ) ;
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
}
int
rpcauth_refreshcred ( struct rpc_task * task )
{
2010-10-25 02:00:46 +04:00
struct rpc_cred * cred ;
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
int err ;
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cred = task - > tk_rqstp - > rq_cred ;
if ( cred = = NULL ) {
err = rpcauth_bindcred ( task , task - > tk_msg . rpc_cred , task - > tk_flags ) ;
if ( err < 0 )
goto out ;
cred = task - > tk_rqstp - > rq_cred ;
2011-06-03 15:51:19 +04:00
}
2007-01-31 20:14:08 +03:00
dprintk ( " RPC: %5u refreshing %s cred %p \n " ,
2007-06-27 22:29:04 +04:00
task - > tk_pid , cred - > cr_auth - > au_ops - > au_name , cred ) ;
2005-11-02 00:53:32 +03:00
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
err = cred - > cr_ops - > crrefresh ( task ) ;
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out :
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if ( err < 0 )
task - > tk_status = err ;
return err ;
}
void
rpcauth_invalcred ( struct rpc_task * task )
{
2010-07-31 22:29:08 +04:00
struct rpc_cred * cred = task - > tk_rqstp - > rq_cred ;
2007-06-25 18:15:15 +04:00
2007-01-31 20:14:08 +03:00
dprintk ( " RPC: %5u invalidating %s cred %p \n " ,
2007-06-27 22:29:04 +04:00
task - > tk_pid , cred - > cr_auth - > au_ops - > au_name , cred ) ;
2007-06-25 18:15:15 +04:00
if ( cred )
clear_bit ( RPCAUTH_CRED_UPTODATE , & cred - > cr_flags ) ;
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
}
int
rpcauth_uptodatecred ( struct rpc_task * task )
{
2010-07-31 22:29:08 +04:00
struct rpc_cred * cred = task - > tk_rqstp - > rq_cred ;
2007-06-25 18:15:15 +04:00
return cred = = NULL | |
test_bit ( RPCAUTH_CRED_UPTODATE , & cred - > cr_flags ) ! = 0 ;
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
}
2007-06-26 01:11:20 +04:00
2007-07-17 15:03:17 +04:00
static struct shrinker rpc_cred_shrinker = {
2013-08-28 04:18:14 +04:00
. count_objects = rpcauth_cache_shrink_count ,
. scan_objects = rpcauth_cache_shrink_scan ,
2007-07-17 15:03:17 +04:00
. seeks = DEFAULT_SEEKS ,
} ;
2007-06-26 01:11:20 +04:00
2010-07-31 22:29:07 +04:00
int __init rpcauth_init_module ( void )
2007-06-26 01:11:20 +04:00
{
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int err ;
err = rpc_init_authunix ( ) ;
if ( err < 0 )
goto out1 ;
err = rpc_init_generic_auth ( ) ;
if ( err < 0 )
goto out2 ;
2017-02-07 16:46:39 +03:00
err = register_shrinker ( & rpc_cred_shrinker ) ;
if ( err < 0 )
goto out3 ;
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return 0 ;
2017-02-07 16:46:39 +03:00
out3 :
rpc_destroy_generic_auth ( ) ;
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out2 :
rpc_destroy_authunix ( ) ;
out1 :
return err ;
2007-06-26 01:11:20 +04:00
}
2010-09-29 08:16:57 +04:00
void rpcauth_remove_module ( void )
2007-06-26 01:11:20 +04:00
{
2010-07-31 22:29:07 +04:00
rpc_destroy_authunix ( ) ;
rpc_destroy_generic_auth ( ) ;
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unregister_shrinker ( & rpc_cred_shrinker ) ;
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}