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{
" map element value illegal alu op, 1 " ,
. insns = {
BPF_MOV64_REG ( BPF_REG_2 , BPF_REG_10 ) ,
BPF_ALU64_IMM ( BPF_ADD , BPF_REG_2 , - 8 ) ,
BPF_ST_MEM ( BPF_DW , BPF_REG_2 , 0 , 0 ) ,
BPF_LD_MAP_FD ( BPF_REG_1 , 0 ) ,
BPF_EMIT_CALL ( BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem ) ,
BPF_JMP_IMM ( BPF_JEQ , BPF_REG_0 , 0 , 2 ) ,
BPF_ALU64_IMM ( BPF_AND , BPF_REG_0 , 8 ) ,
BPF_ST_MEM ( BPF_DW , BPF_REG_0 , 0 , 22 ) ,
BPF_EXIT_INSN ( ) ,
} ,
. fixup_map_hash_48b = { 3 } ,
. errstr = " R0 bitwise operator &= on pointer " ,
. result = REJECT ,
} ,
{
" map element value illegal alu op, 2 " ,
. insns = {
BPF_MOV64_REG ( BPF_REG_2 , BPF_REG_10 ) ,
BPF_ALU64_IMM ( BPF_ADD , BPF_REG_2 , - 8 ) ,
BPF_ST_MEM ( BPF_DW , BPF_REG_2 , 0 , 0 ) ,
BPF_LD_MAP_FD ( BPF_REG_1 , 0 ) ,
BPF_EMIT_CALL ( BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem ) ,
BPF_JMP_IMM ( BPF_JEQ , BPF_REG_0 , 0 , 2 ) ,
BPF_ALU32_IMM ( BPF_ADD , BPF_REG_0 , 0 ) ,
BPF_ST_MEM ( BPF_DW , BPF_REG_0 , 0 , 22 ) ,
BPF_EXIT_INSN ( ) ,
} ,
. fixup_map_hash_48b = { 3 } ,
. errstr = " R0 32-bit pointer arithmetic prohibited " ,
. result = REJECT ,
} ,
{
" map element value illegal alu op, 3 " ,
. insns = {
BPF_MOV64_REG ( BPF_REG_2 , BPF_REG_10 ) ,
BPF_ALU64_IMM ( BPF_ADD , BPF_REG_2 , - 8 ) ,
BPF_ST_MEM ( BPF_DW , BPF_REG_2 , 0 , 0 ) ,
BPF_LD_MAP_FD ( BPF_REG_1 , 0 ) ,
BPF_EMIT_CALL ( BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem ) ,
BPF_JMP_IMM ( BPF_JEQ , BPF_REG_0 , 0 , 2 ) ,
BPF_ALU64_IMM ( BPF_DIV , BPF_REG_0 , 42 ) ,
BPF_ST_MEM ( BPF_DW , BPF_REG_0 , 0 , 22 ) ,
BPF_EXIT_INSN ( ) ,
} ,
. fixup_map_hash_48b = { 3 } ,
. errstr = " R0 pointer arithmetic with /= operator " ,
. result = REJECT ,
} ,
{
" map element value illegal alu op, 4 " ,
. insns = {
BPF_MOV64_REG ( BPF_REG_2 , BPF_REG_10 ) ,
BPF_ALU64_IMM ( BPF_ADD , BPF_REG_2 , - 8 ) ,
BPF_ST_MEM ( BPF_DW , BPF_REG_2 , 0 , 0 ) ,
BPF_LD_MAP_FD ( BPF_REG_1 , 0 ) ,
BPF_EMIT_CALL ( BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem ) ,
BPF_JMP_IMM ( BPF_JEQ , BPF_REG_0 , 0 , 2 ) ,
BPF_ENDIAN ( BPF_FROM_BE , BPF_REG_0 , 64 ) ,
BPF_ST_MEM ( BPF_DW , BPF_REG_0 , 0 , 22 ) ,
BPF_EXIT_INSN ( ) ,
} ,
. fixup_map_hash_48b = { 3 } ,
. errstr_unpriv = " R0 pointer arithmetic prohibited " ,
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. errstr = " invalid mem access 'scalar' " ,
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. result = REJECT ,
. result_unpriv = REJECT ,
. flags = F_NEEDS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS ,
} ,
{
" map element value illegal alu op, 5 " ,
. insns = {
BPF_MOV64_REG ( BPF_REG_2 , BPF_REG_10 ) ,
BPF_ALU64_IMM ( BPF_ADD , BPF_REG_2 , - 8 ) ,
BPF_ST_MEM ( BPF_DW , BPF_REG_2 , 0 , 0 ) ,
BPF_LD_MAP_FD ( BPF_REG_1 , 0 ) ,
BPF_EMIT_CALL ( BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem ) ,
BPF_JMP_IMM ( BPF_JEQ , BPF_REG_0 , 0 , 7 ) ,
BPF_MOV64_IMM ( BPF_REG_3 , 4096 ) ,
BPF_MOV64_REG ( BPF_REG_2 , BPF_REG_10 ) ,
BPF_ALU64_IMM ( BPF_ADD , BPF_REG_2 , - 8 ) ,
BPF_STX_MEM ( BPF_DW , BPF_REG_2 , BPF_REG_0 , 0 ) ,
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BPF_ATOMIC_OP ( BPF_DW , BPF_ADD , BPF_REG_2 , BPF_REG_3 , 0 ) ,
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BPF_LDX_MEM ( BPF_DW , BPF_REG_0 , BPF_REG_2 , 0 ) ,
BPF_ST_MEM ( BPF_DW , BPF_REG_0 , 0 , 22 ) ,
BPF_EXIT_INSN ( ) ,
} ,
. fixup_map_hash_48b = { 3 } ,
bpf: Forbid XADD on spilled pointers for unprivileged users
When check_xadd() verifies an XADD operation on a pointer to a stack slot
containing a spilled pointer, check_stack_read() verifies that the read,
which is part of XADD, is valid. However, since the placeholder value -1 is
passed as `value_regno`, check_stack_read() can only return a binary
decision and can't return the type of the value that was read. The intent
here is to verify whether the value read from the stack slot may be used as
a SCALAR_VALUE; but since check_stack_read() doesn't check the type, and
the type information is lost when check_stack_read() returns, this is not
enforced, and a malicious user can abuse XADD to leak spilled kernel
pointers.
Fix it by letting check_stack_read() verify that the value is usable as a
SCALAR_VALUE if no type information is passed to the caller.
To be able to use __is_pointer_value() in check_stack_read(), move it up.
Fix up the expected unprivileged error message for a BPF selftest that,
until now, assumed that unprivileged users can use XADD on stack-spilled
pointers. This also gives us a test for the behavior introduced in this
patch for free.
In theory, this could also be fixed by forbidding XADD on stack spills
entirely, since XADD is a locked operation (for operations on memory with
concurrency) and there can't be any concurrency on the BPF stack; but
Alexei has said that he wants to keep XADD on stack slots working to avoid
changes to the test suite [1].
The following BPF program demonstrates how to leak a BPF map pointer as an
unprivileged user using this bug:
// r7 = map_pointer
BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_7, small_map),
// r8 = launder(map_pointer)
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_FP, BPF_REG_7, -8),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_1, 0),
((struct bpf_insn) {
.code = BPF_STX | BPF_DW | BPF_XADD,
.dst_reg = BPF_REG_FP,
.src_reg = BPF_REG_1,
.off = -8
}),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_8, BPF_REG_FP, -8),
// store r8 into map
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_ARG1, BPF_REG_7),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_ARG2, BPF_REG_FP),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_ARG2, -4),
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_ARG2, 0, 0),
BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_8, 0),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN()
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200416211116.qxqcza5vo2ddnkdq@ast-mbp.dhcp.thefacebook.com/
Fixes: 17a5267067f3 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200417000007.10734-1-jannh@google.com
2020-04-17 03:00:06 +03:00
. errstr_unpriv = " leaking pointer from stack off -8 " ,
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. errstr = " R0 invalid mem access 'scalar' " ,
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. result = REJECT ,
. flags = F_NEEDS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS ,
} ,