linux/arch/powerpc/kernel/signal.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
/*
* Common signal handling code for both 32 and 64 bits
*
* Copyright (c) 2007 Benjamin Herrenschmidt, IBM Corporation
* Extracted from signal_32.c and signal_64.c
*/
#include <linux/resume_user_mode.h>
#include <linux/signal.h>
#include <linux/uprobes.h>
#include <linux/key.h>
#include <linux/context_tracking.h>
#include <linux/livepatch.h>
powerpc: Check address limit on user-mode return (TIF_FSCHECK) set_fs() sets the addr_limit, which is used in access_ok() to determine if an address is a user or kernel address. Some code paths use set_fs() to temporarily elevate the addr_limit so that kernel code can read/write kernel memory as if it were user memory. That is fine as long as the code can't ever return to userspace with the addr_limit still elevated. If that did happen, then userspace can read/write kernel memory as if it were user memory, eg. just with write(2). In case it's not clear, that is very bad. It has also happened in the past due to bugs. Commit 5ea0727b163c ("x86/syscalls: Check address limit on user-mode return") added a mechanism to check the addr_limit value before returning to userspace. Any call to set_fs() sets a thread flag, TIF_FSCHECK, and if we see that on the return to userspace we go out of line to check that the addr_limit value is not elevated. For further info see the above commit, as well as: https://lwn.net/Articles/722267/ https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=990 Verified to work on 64-bit Book3S using a POC that objdumps the system call handler, and a modified lkdtm_CORRUPT_USER_DS() that doesn't kill the caller. Before: $ sudo ./test-tif-fscheck ... 0000000000000000 <.data>: 0: e1 f7 8a 79 rldicl. r10,r12,30,63 4: 80 03 82 40 bne 0x384 8: 00 40 8a 71 andi. r10,r12,16384 c: 78 0b 2a 7c mr r10,r1 10: 10 fd 21 38 addi r1,r1,-752 14: 08 00 c2 41 beq- 0x1c 18: 58 09 2d e8 ld r1,2392(r13) 1c: 00 00 41 f9 std r10,0(r1) 20: 70 01 61 f9 std r11,368(r1) 24: 78 01 81 f9 std r12,376(r1) 28: 70 00 01 f8 std r0,112(r1) 2c: 78 00 41 f9 std r10,120(r1) 30: 20 00 82 41 beq 0x50 34: a6 42 4c 7d mftb r10 After: $ sudo ./test-tif-fscheck Killed And in dmesg: Invalid address limit on user-mode return WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 3689 at ../include/linux/syscalls.h:260 do_notify_resume+0x140/0x170 ... NIP [c00000000001ee50] do_notify_resume+0x140/0x170 LR [c00000000001ee4c] do_notify_resume+0x13c/0x170 Call Trace: do_notify_resume+0x13c/0x170 (unreliable) ret_from_except_lite+0x70/0x74 Performance overhead is essentially zero in the usual case, because the bit is checked as part of the existing _TIF_USER_WORK_MASK check. Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2018-05-14 16:03:16 +03:00
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <asm/hw_breakpoint.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/switch_to.h>
#include <asm/unistd.h>
#include <asm/debug.h>
#include <asm/tm.h>
#include "signal.h"
#ifdef CONFIG_VSX
unsigned long copy_fpr_to_user(void __user *to,
struct task_struct *task)
{
u64 buf[ELF_NFPREG];
int i;
/* save FPR copy to local buffer then write to the thread_struct */
for (i = 0; i < (ELF_NFPREG - 1) ; i++)
buf[i] = task->thread.TS_FPR(i);
buf[i] = task->thread.fp_state.fpscr;
return __copy_to_user(to, buf, ELF_NFPREG * sizeof(double));
}
unsigned long copy_fpr_from_user(struct task_struct *task,
void __user *from)
{
u64 buf[ELF_NFPREG];
int i;
if (__copy_from_user(buf, from, ELF_NFPREG * sizeof(double)))
return 1;
for (i = 0; i < (ELF_NFPREG - 1) ; i++)
task->thread.TS_FPR(i) = buf[i];
task->thread.fp_state.fpscr = buf[i];
return 0;
}
unsigned long copy_vsx_to_user(void __user *to,
struct task_struct *task)
{
u64 buf[ELF_NVSRHALFREG];
int i;
/* save FPR copy to local buffer then write to the thread_struct */
for (i = 0; i < ELF_NVSRHALFREG; i++)
buf[i] = task->thread.fp_state.fpr[i][TS_VSRLOWOFFSET];
return __copy_to_user(to, buf, ELF_NVSRHALFREG * sizeof(double));
}
unsigned long copy_vsx_from_user(struct task_struct *task,
void __user *from)
{
u64 buf[ELF_NVSRHALFREG];
int i;
if (__copy_from_user(buf, from, ELF_NVSRHALFREG * sizeof(double)))
return 1;
for (i = 0; i < ELF_NVSRHALFREG ; i++)
task->thread.fp_state.fpr[i][TS_VSRLOWOFFSET] = buf[i];
return 0;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM
unsigned long copy_ckfpr_to_user(void __user *to,
struct task_struct *task)
{
u64 buf[ELF_NFPREG];
int i;
/* save FPR copy to local buffer then write to the thread_struct */
for (i = 0; i < (ELF_NFPREG - 1) ; i++)
buf[i] = task->thread.TS_CKFPR(i);
buf[i] = task->thread.ckfp_state.fpscr;
return __copy_to_user(to, buf, ELF_NFPREG * sizeof(double));
}
unsigned long copy_ckfpr_from_user(struct task_struct *task,
void __user *from)
{
u64 buf[ELF_NFPREG];
int i;
if (__copy_from_user(buf, from, ELF_NFPREG * sizeof(double)))
return 1;
for (i = 0; i < (ELF_NFPREG - 1) ; i++)
task->thread.TS_CKFPR(i) = buf[i];
task->thread.ckfp_state.fpscr = buf[i];
return 0;
}
unsigned long copy_ckvsx_to_user(void __user *to,
struct task_struct *task)
{
u64 buf[ELF_NVSRHALFREG];
int i;
/* save FPR copy to local buffer then write to the thread_struct */
for (i = 0; i < ELF_NVSRHALFREG; i++)
buf[i] = task->thread.ckfp_state.fpr[i][TS_VSRLOWOFFSET];
return __copy_to_user(to, buf, ELF_NVSRHALFREG * sizeof(double));
}
unsigned long copy_ckvsx_from_user(struct task_struct *task,
void __user *from)
{
u64 buf[ELF_NVSRHALFREG];
int i;
if (__copy_from_user(buf, from, ELF_NVSRHALFREG * sizeof(double)))
return 1;
for (i = 0; i < ELF_NVSRHALFREG ; i++)
task->thread.ckfp_state.fpr[i][TS_VSRLOWOFFSET] = buf[i];
return 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM */
#endif
/* Log an error when sending an unhandled signal to a process. Controlled
* through debug.exception-trace sysctl.
*/
int show_unhandled_signals = 1;
unsigned long get_min_sigframe_size(void)
{
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PPC64))
return get_min_sigframe_size_64();
else
return get_min_sigframe_size_32();
}
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
unsigned long get_min_sigframe_size_compat(void)
{
return get_min_sigframe_size_32();
}
#endif
/*
* Allocate space for the signal frame
*/
static unsigned long get_tm_stackpointer(struct task_struct *tsk);
void __user *get_sigframe(struct ksignal *ksig, struct task_struct *tsk,
size_t frame_size, int is_32)
{
unsigned long oldsp, newsp;
unsigned long sp = get_tm_stackpointer(tsk);
/* Default to using normal stack */
if (is_32)
oldsp = sp & 0x0ffffffffUL;
else
oldsp = sp;
oldsp = sigsp(oldsp, ksig);
newsp = (oldsp - frame_size) & ~0xFUL;
return (void __user *)newsp;
}
static void check_syscall_restart(struct pt_regs *regs, struct k_sigaction *ka,
int has_handler)
{
unsigned long ret = regs->gpr[3];
int restart = 1;
/* syscall ? */
if (!trap_is_syscall(regs))
return;
if (trap_norestart(regs))
return;
/* error signalled ? */
if (trap_is_scv(regs)) {
/* 32-bit compat mode sign extend? */
if (!IS_ERR_VALUE(ret))
return;
ret = -ret;
} else if (!(regs->ccr & 0x10000000)) {
return;
}
switch (ret) {
case ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK:
case ERESTARTNOHAND:
/* ERESTARTNOHAND means that the syscall should only be
* restarted if there was no handler for the signal, and since
* we only get here if there is a handler, we dont restart.
*/
restart = !has_handler;
break;
case ERESTARTSYS:
/* ERESTARTSYS means to restart the syscall if there is no
* handler or the handler was registered with SA_RESTART
*/
restart = !has_handler || (ka->sa.sa_flags & SA_RESTART) != 0;
break;
case ERESTARTNOINTR:
/* ERESTARTNOINTR means that the syscall should be
* called again after the signal handler returns.
*/
break;
default:
return;
}
if (restart) {
if (ret == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
regs->gpr[0] = __NR_restart_syscall;
else
regs->gpr[3] = regs->orig_gpr3;
regs_add_return_ip(regs, -4);
regs->result = 0;
} else {
if (trap_is_scv(regs)) {
regs->result = -EINTR;
regs->gpr[3] = -EINTR;
} else {
regs->result = -EINTR;
regs->gpr[3] = EINTR;
regs->ccr |= 0x10000000;
}
}
}
static void do_signal(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
sigset_t *oldset = sigmask_to_save();
struct ksignal ksig = { .sig = 0 };
int ret;
BUG_ON(tsk != current);
get_signal(&ksig);
/* Is there any syscall restart business here ? */
check_syscall_restart(tsk->thread.regs, &ksig.ka, ksig.sig > 0);
if (ksig.sig <= 0) {
/* No signal to deliver -- put the saved sigmask back */
restore_saved_sigmask();
set_trap_norestart(tsk->thread.regs);
return; /* no signals delivered */
}
/*
* Reenable the DABR before delivering the signal to
* user space. The DABR will have been cleared if it
* triggered inside the kernel.
*/
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PPC_ADV_DEBUG_REGS)) {
int i;
for (i = 0; i < nr_wp_slots(); i++) {
if (tsk->thread.hw_brk[i].address && tsk->thread.hw_brk[i].type)
__set_breakpoint(i, &tsk->thread.hw_brk[i]);
}
}
/* Re-enable the breakpoints for the signal stack */
thread_change_pc(tsk, tsk->thread.regs);
rseq_signal_deliver(&ksig, tsk->thread.regs);
2018-06-02 15:44:00 +03:00
if (is_32bit_task()) {
if (ksig.ka.sa.sa_flags & SA_SIGINFO)
ret = handle_rt_signal32(&ksig, oldset, tsk);
else
ret = handle_signal32(&ksig, oldset, tsk);
} else {
ret = handle_rt_signal64(&ksig, oldset, tsk);
}
set_trap_norestart(tsk->thread.regs);
signal_setup_done(ret, &ksig, test_thread_flag(TIF_SINGLESTEP));
}
void do_notify_resume(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long thread_info_flags)
{
if (thread_info_flags & _TIF_UPROBE)
uprobe_notify_resume(regs);
livepatch: send a fake signal to all blocking tasks Live patching consistency model is of LEAVE_PATCHED_SET and SWITCH_THREAD. This means that all tasks in the system have to be marked one by one as safe to call a new patched function. Safe means when a task is not (sleeping) in a set of patched functions. That is, no patched function is on the task's stack. Another clearly safe place is the boundary between kernel and userspace. The patching waits for all tasks to get outside of the patched set or to cross the boundary. The transition is completed afterwards. The problem is that a task can block the transition for quite a long time, if not forever. It could sleep in a set of patched functions, for example. Luckily we can force the task to leave the set by sending it a fake signal, that is a signal with no data in signal pending structures (no handler, no sign of proper signal delivered). Suspend/freezer use this to freeze the tasks as well. The task gets TIF_SIGPENDING set and is woken up (if it has been sleeping in the kernel before) or kicked by rescheduling IPI (if it was running on other CPU). This causes the task to go to kernel/userspace boundary where the signal would be handled and the task would be marked as safe in terms of live patching. There are tasks which are not affected by this technique though. The fake signal is not sent to kthreads. They should be handled differently. They can be woken up so they leave the patched set and their TIF_PATCH_PENDING can be cleared thanks to stack checking. For the sake of completeness, if the task is in TASK_RUNNING state but not currently running on some CPU it doesn't get the IPI, but it would eventually handle the signal anyway. Second, if the task runs in the kernel (in TASK_RUNNING state) it gets the IPI, but the signal is not handled on return from the interrupt. It would be handled on return to the userspace in the future when the fake signal is sent again. Stack checking deals with these cases in a better way. If the task was sleeping in a syscall it would be woken by our fake signal, it would check if TIF_SIGPENDING is set (by calling signal_pending() predicate) and return ERESTART* or EINTR. Syscalls with ERESTART* return values are restarted in case of the fake signal (see do_signal()). EINTR is propagated back to the userspace program. This could disturb the program, but... * each process dealing with signals should react accordingly to EINTR return values. * syscalls returning EINTR happen to be quite common situation in the system even if no fake signal is sent. * freezer sends the fake signal and does not deal with EINTR anyhow. Thus EINTR values are returned when the system is resumed. The very safe marking is done in architectures' "entry" on syscall and interrupt/exception exit paths, and in a stack checking functions of livepatch. TIF_PATCH_PENDING is cleared and the next recalc_sigpending() drops TIF_SIGPENDING. In connection with this, also call klp_update_patch_state() before do_signal(), so that recalc_sigpending() in dequeue_signal() can clear TIF_PATCH_PENDING immediately and thus prevent a double call of do_signal(). Note that the fake signal is not sent to stopped/traced tasks. Such task prevents the patching to finish till it continues again (is not traced anymore). Last, sending the fake signal is not automatic. It is done only when admin requests it by writing 1 to signal sysfs attribute in livepatch sysfs directory. Signed-off-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Cc: x86@kernel.org Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> (powerpc) Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
2017-11-15 16:50:13 +03:00
if (thread_info_flags & _TIF_PATCH_PENDING)
klp_update_patch_state(current);
if (thread_info_flags & (_TIF_SIGPENDING | _TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL)) {
BUG_ON(regs != current->thread.regs);
do_signal(current);
}
if (thread_info_flags & _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME)
resume_user_mode_work(regs);
}
static unsigned long get_tm_stackpointer(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
/* When in an active transaction that takes a signal, we need to be
* careful with the stack. It's possible that the stack has moved back
* up after the tbegin. The obvious case here is when the tbegin is
* called inside a function that returns before a tend. In this case,
* the stack is part of the checkpointed transactional memory state.
* If we write over this non transactionally or in suspend, we are in
* trouble because if we get a tm abort, the program counter and stack
* pointer will be back at the tbegin but our in memory stack won't be
* valid anymore.
*
* To avoid this, when taking a signal in an active transaction, we
* need to use the stack pointer from the checkpointed state, rather
* than the speculated state. This ensures that the signal context
* (written tm suspended) will be written below the stack required for
* the rollback. The transaction is aborted because of the treclaim,
* so any memory written between the tbegin and the signal will be
* rolled back anyway.
*
* For signals taken in non-TM or suspended mode, we use the
* normal/non-checkpointed stack pointer.
*/
struct pt_regs *regs = tsk->thread.regs;
unsigned long ret = regs->gpr[1];
powerpc/tm: Fix clearing MSR[TS] in current when reclaiming on signal delivery After a treclaim, we expect to be in non-transactional state. If we don't clear the current thread's MSR[TS] before we get preempted, then tm_recheckpoint_new_task() will recheckpoint and we get rescheduled in suspended transaction state. When handling a signal caught in transactional state, handle_rt_signal64() calls get_tm_stackpointer() that treclaims the transaction using tm_reclaim_current() but without clearing the thread's MSR[TS]. This can cause the TM Bad Thing exception below if later we pagefault and get preempted trying to access the user's sigframe, using __put_user(). Afterwards, when we are rescheduled back into do_page_fault() (but now in suspended state since the thread's MSR[TS] was not cleared), upon executing 'rfid' after completion of the page fault handling, the exception is raised because a transition from suspended to non-transactional state is invalid. Unexpected TM Bad Thing exception at c00000000000de44 (msr 0x8000000302a03031) tm_scratch=800000010280b033 Oops: Unrecoverable exception, sig: 6 [#1] LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries CPU: 25 PID: 15547 Comm: a.out Not tainted 5.4.0-rc2 #32 NIP: c00000000000de44 LR: c000000000034728 CTR: 0000000000000000 REGS: c00000003fe7bd70 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (5.4.0-rc2) MSR: 8000000302a03031 <SF,VEC,VSX,FP,ME,IR,DR,LE,TM[SE]> CR: 44000884 XER: 00000000 CFAR: c00000000000dda4 IRQMASK: 0 PACATMSCRATCH: 800000010280b033 GPR00: c000000000034728 c000000f65a17c80 c000000001662800 00007fffacf3fd78 GPR04: 0000000000001000 0000000000001000 0000000000000000 c000000f611f8af0 GPR08: 0000000000000000 0000000078006001 0000000000000000 000c000000000000 GPR12: c000000f611f84b0 c00000003ffcb200 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 c000000f611f8140 GPR24: 0000000000000000 00007fffacf3fd68 c000000f65a17d90 c000000f611f7800 GPR28: c000000f65a17e90 c000000f65a17e90 c000000001685e18 00007fffacf3f000 NIP [c00000000000de44] fast_exception_return+0xf4/0x1b0 LR [c000000000034728] handle_rt_signal64+0x78/0xc50 Call Trace: [c000000f65a17c80] [c000000000034710] handle_rt_signal64+0x60/0xc50 (unreliable) [c000000f65a17d30] [c000000000023640] do_notify_resume+0x330/0x460 [c000000f65a17e20] [c00000000000dcc4] ret_from_except_lite+0x70/0x74 Instruction dump: 7c4ff120 e8410170 7c5a03a6 38400000 f8410060 e8010070 e8410080 e8610088 60000000 60000000 e8810090 e8210078 <4c000024> 48000000 e8610178 88ed0989 ---[ end trace 93094aa44b442f87 ]--- The simplified sequence of events that triggers the above exception is: ... # userspace in NON-TRANSACTIONAL state tbegin # userspace in TRANSACTIONAL state signal delivery # kernelspace in SUSPENDED state handle_rt_signal64() get_tm_stackpointer() treclaim # kernelspace in NON-TRANSACTIONAL state __put_user() page fault happens. We will never get back here because of the TM Bad Thing exception. page fault handling kicks in and we voluntarily preempt ourselves do_page_fault() __schedule() __switch_to(other_task) our task is rescheduled and we recheckpoint because the thread's MSR[TS] was not cleared __switch_to(our_task) switch_to_tm() tm_recheckpoint_new_task() trechkpt # kernelspace in SUSPENDED state The page fault handling resumes, but now we are in suspended transaction state do_page_fault() completes rfid <----- trying to get back where the page fault happened (we were non-transactional back then) TM Bad Thing # illegal transition from suspended to non-transactional This patch fixes that issue by clearing the current thread's MSR[TS] just after treclaim in get_tm_stackpointer() so that we stay in non-transactional state in case we are preempted. In order to make treclaim and clearing the thread's MSR[TS] atomic from a preemption perspective when CONFIG_PREEMPT is set, preempt_disable/enable() is used. It's also necessary to save the previous value of the thread's MSR before get_tm_stackpointer() is called so that it can be exposed to the signal handler later in setup_tm_sigcontexts() to inform the userspace MSR at the moment of the signal delivery. Found with tm-signal-context-force-tm kernel selftest. Fixes: 2b0a576d15e0 ("powerpc: Add new transactional memory state to the signal context") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.9 Signed-off-by: Gustavo Luiz Duarte <gustavold@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200211033831.11165-1-gustavold@linux.ibm.com
2020-02-11 06:38:29 +03:00
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM
BUG_ON(tsk != current);
if (MSR_TM_ACTIVE(regs->msr)) {
powerpc/tm: Fix clearing MSR[TS] in current when reclaiming on signal delivery After a treclaim, we expect to be in non-transactional state. If we don't clear the current thread's MSR[TS] before we get preempted, then tm_recheckpoint_new_task() will recheckpoint and we get rescheduled in suspended transaction state. When handling a signal caught in transactional state, handle_rt_signal64() calls get_tm_stackpointer() that treclaims the transaction using tm_reclaim_current() but without clearing the thread's MSR[TS]. This can cause the TM Bad Thing exception below if later we pagefault and get preempted trying to access the user's sigframe, using __put_user(). Afterwards, when we are rescheduled back into do_page_fault() (but now in suspended state since the thread's MSR[TS] was not cleared), upon executing 'rfid' after completion of the page fault handling, the exception is raised because a transition from suspended to non-transactional state is invalid. Unexpected TM Bad Thing exception at c00000000000de44 (msr 0x8000000302a03031) tm_scratch=800000010280b033 Oops: Unrecoverable exception, sig: 6 [#1] LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries CPU: 25 PID: 15547 Comm: a.out Not tainted 5.4.0-rc2 #32 NIP: c00000000000de44 LR: c000000000034728 CTR: 0000000000000000 REGS: c00000003fe7bd70 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (5.4.0-rc2) MSR: 8000000302a03031 <SF,VEC,VSX,FP,ME,IR,DR,LE,TM[SE]> CR: 44000884 XER: 00000000 CFAR: c00000000000dda4 IRQMASK: 0 PACATMSCRATCH: 800000010280b033 GPR00: c000000000034728 c000000f65a17c80 c000000001662800 00007fffacf3fd78 GPR04: 0000000000001000 0000000000001000 0000000000000000 c000000f611f8af0 GPR08: 0000000000000000 0000000078006001 0000000000000000 000c000000000000 GPR12: c000000f611f84b0 c00000003ffcb200 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 c000000f611f8140 GPR24: 0000000000000000 00007fffacf3fd68 c000000f65a17d90 c000000f611f7800 GPR28: c000000f65a17e90 c000000f65a17e90 c000000001685e18 00007fffacf3f000 NIP [c00000000000de44] fast_exception_return+0xf4/0x1b0 LR [c000000000034728] handle_rt_signal64+0x78/0xc50 Call Trace: [c000000f65a17c80] [c000000000034710] handle_rt_signal64+0x60/0xc50 (unreliable) [c000000f65a17d30] [c000000000023640] do_notify_resume+0x330/0x460 [c000000f65a17e20] [c00000000000dcc4] ret_from_except_lite+0x70/0x74 Instruction dump: 7c4ff120 e8410170 7c5a03a6 38400000 f8410060 e8010070 e8410080 e8610088 60000000 60000000 e8810090 e8210078 <4c000024> 48000000 e8610178 88ed0989 ---[ end trace 93094aa44b442f87 ]--- The simplified sequence of events that triggers the above exception is: ... # userspace in NON-TRANSACTIONAL state tbegin # userspace in TRANSACTIONAL state signal delivery # kernelspace in SUSPENDED state handle_rt_signal64() get_tm_stackpointer() treclaim # kernelspace in NON-TRANSACTIONAL state __put_user() page fault happens. We will never get back here because of the TM Bad Thing exception. page fault handling kicks in and we voluntarily preempt ourselves do_page_fault() __schedule() __switch_to(other_task) our task is rescheduled and we recheckpoint because the thread's MSR[TS] was not cleared __switch_to(our_task) switch_to_tm() tm_recheckpoint_new_task() trechkpt # kernelspace in SUSPENDED state The page fault handling resumes, but now we are in suspended transaction state do_page_fault() completes rfid <----- trying to get back where the page fault happened (we were non-transactional back then) TM Bad Thing # illegal transition from suspended to non-transactional This patch fixes that issue by clearing the current thread's MSR[TS] just after treclaim in get_tm_stackpointer() so that we stay in non-transactional state in case we are preempted. In order to make treclaim and clearing the thread's MSR[TS] atomic from a preemption perspective when CONFIG_PREEMPT is set, preempt_disable/enable() is used. It's also necessary to save the previous value of the thread's MSR before get_tm_stackpointer() is called so that it can be exposed to the signal handler later in setup_tm_sigcontexts() to inform the userspace MSR at the moment of the signal delivery. Found with tm-signal-context-force-tm kernel selftest. Fixes: 2b0a576d15e0 ("powerpc: Add new transactional memory state to the signal context") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.9 Signed-off-by: Gustavo Luiz Duarte <gustavold@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200211033831.11165-1-gustavold@linux.ibm.com
2020-02-11 06:38:29 +03:00
preempt_disable();
powerpc: Don't corrupt transactional state when using FP/VMX in kernel Currently, when we have a process using the transactional memory facilities on POWER8 (that is, the processor is in transactional or suspended state), and the process enters the kernel and the kernel then uses the floating-point or vector (VMX/Altivec) facility, we end up corrupting the user-visible FP/VMX/VSX state. This happens, for example, if a page fault causes a copy-on-write operation, because the copy_page function will use VMX to do the copy on POWER8. The test program below demonstrates the bug. The bug happens because when FP/VMX state for a transactional process is stored in the thread_struct, we store the checkpointed state in .fp_state/.vr_state and the transactional (current) state in .transact_fp/.transact_vr. However, when the kernel wants to use FP/VMX, it calls enable_kernel_fp() or enable_kernel_altivec(), which saves the current state in .fp_state/.vr_state. Furthermore, when we return to the user process we return with FP/VMX/VSX disabled. The next time the process uses FP/VMX/VSX, we don't know which set of state (the current register values, .fp_state/.vr_state, or .transact_fp/.transact_vr) we should be using, since we have no way to tell if we are still in the same transaction, and if not, whether the previous transaction succeeded or failed. Thus it is necessary to strictly adhere to the rule that if FP has been enabled at any point in a transaction, we must keep FP enabled for the user process with the current transactional state in the FP registers, until we detect that it is no longer in a transaction. Similarly for VMX; once enabled it must stay enabled until the process is no longer transactional. In order to keep this rule, we add a new thread_info flag which we test when returning from the kernel to userspace, called TIF_RESTORE_TM. This flag indicates that there is FP/VMX/VSX state to be restored before entering userspace, and when it is set the .tm_orig_msr field in the thread_struct indicates what state needs to be restored. The restoration is done by restore_tm_state(). The TIF_RESTORE_TM bit is set by new giveup_fpu/altivec_maybe_transactional helpers, which are called from enable_kernel_fp/altivec, giveup_vsx, and flush_fp/altivec_to_thread instead of giveup_fpu/altivec. The other thing to be done is to get the transactional FP/VMX/VSX state from .fp_state/.vr_state when doing reclaim, if that state has been saved there by giveup_fpu/altivec_maybe_transactional. Having done this, we set the FP/VMX bit in the thread's MSR after reclaim to indicate that that part of the state is now valid (having been reclaimed from the processor's checkpointed state). Finally, in the signal handling code, we move the clearing of the transactional state bits in the thread's MSR a bit earlier, before calling flush_fp_to_thread(), so that we don't unnecessarily set the TIF_RESTORE_TM bit. This is the test program: /* Michael Neuling 4/12/2013 * * See if the altivec state is leaked out of an aborted transaction due to * kernel vmx copy loops. * * gcc -m64 htm_vmxcopy.c -o htm_vmxcopy * */ /* We don't use all of these, but for reference: */ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { long double vecin = 1.3; long double vecout; unsigned long pgsize = getpagesize(); int i; int fd; int size = pgsize*16; char tmpfile[] = "/tmp/page_faultXXXXXX"; char buf[pgsize]; char *a; uint64_t aborted = 0; fd = mkstemp(tmpfile); assert(fd >= 0); memset(buf, 0, pgsize); for (i = 0; i < size; i += pgsize) assert(write(fd, buf, pgsize) == pgsize); unlink(tmpfile); a = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0); assert(a != MAP_FAILED); asm __volatile__( "lxvd2x 40,0,%[vecinptr] ; " // set 40 to initial value TBEGIN "beq 3f ;" TSUSPEND "xxlxor 40,40,40 ; " // set 40 to 0 "std 5, 0(%[map]) ;" // cause kernel vmx copy page TABORT TRESUME TEND "li %[res], 0 ;" "b 5f ;" "3: ;" // Abort handler "li %[res], 1 ;" "5: ;" "stxvd2x 40,0,%[vecoutptr] ; " : [res]"=r"(aborted) : [vecinptr]"r"(&vecin), [vecoutptr]"r"(&vecout), [map]"r"(a) : "memory", "r0", "r3", "r4", "r5", "r6", "r7"); if (aborted && (vecin != vecout)){ printf("FAILED: vector state leaked on abort %f != %f\n", (double)vecin, (double)vecout); exit(1); } munmap(a, size); close(fd); printf("PASSED!\n"); return 0; } Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
2014-01-13 08:56:29 +04:00
tm_reclaim_current(TM_CAUSE_SIGNAL);
if (MSR_TM_TRANSACTIONAL(regs->msr))
powerpc/tm: Fix clearing MSR[TS] in current when reclaiming on signal delivery After a treclaim, we expect to be in non-transactional state. If we don't clear the current thread's MSR[TS] before we get preempted, then tm_recheckpoint_new_task() will recheckpoint and we get rescheduled in suspended transaction state. When handling a signal caught in transactional state, handle_rt_signal64() calls get_tm_stackpointer() that treclaims the transaction using tm_reclaim_current() but without clearing the thread's MSR[TS]. This can cause the TM Bad Thing exception below if later we pagefault and get preempted trying to access the user's sigframe, using __put_user(). Afterwards, when we are rescheduled back into do_page_fault() (but now in suspended state since the thread's MSR[TS] was not cleared), upon executing 'rfid' after completion of the page fault handling, the exception is raised because a transition from suspended to non-transactional state is invalid. Unexpected TM Bad Thing exception at c00000000000de44 (msr 0x8000000302a03031) tm_scratch=800000010280b033 Oops: Unrecoverable exception, sig: 6 [#1] LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries CPU: 25 PID: 15547 Comm: a.out Not tainted 5.4.0-rc2 #32 NIP: c00000000000de44 LR: c000000000034728 CTR: 0000000000000000 REGS: c00000003fe7bd70 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (5.4.0-rc2) MSR: 8000000302a03031 <SF,VEC,VSX,FP,ME,IR,DR,LE,TM[SE]> CR: 44000884 XER: 00000000 CFAR: c00000000000dda4 IRQMASK: 0 PACATMSCRATCH: 800000010280b033 GPR00: c000000000034728 c000000f65a17c80 c000000001662800 00007fffacf3fd78 GPR04: 0000000000001000 0000000000001000 0000000000000000 c000000f611f8af0 GPR08: 0000000000000000 0000000078006001 0000000000000000 000c000000000000 GPR12: c000000f611f84b0 c00000003ffcb200 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 c000000f611f8140 GPR24: 0000000000000000 00007fffacf3fd68 c000000f65a17d90 c000000f611f7800 GPR28: c000000f65a17e90 c000000f65a17e90 c000000001685e18 00007fffacf3f000 NIP [c00000000000de44] fast_exception_return+0xf4/0x1b0 LR [c000000000034728] handle_rt_signal64+0x78/0xc50 Call Trace: [c000000f65a17c80] [c000000000034710] handle_rt_signal64+0x60/0xc50 (unreliable) [c000000f65a17d30] [c000000000023640] do_notify_resume+0x330/0x460 [c000000f65a17e20] [c00000000000dcc4] ret_from_except_lite+0x70/0x74 Instruction dump: 7c4ff120 e8410170 7c5a03a6 38400000 f8410060 e8010070 e8410080 e8610088 60000000 60000000 e8810090 e8210078 <4c000024> 48000000 e8610178 88ed0989 ---[ end trace 93094aa44b442f87 ]--- The simplified sequence of events that triggers the above exception is: ... # userspace in NON-TRANSACTIONAL state tbegin # userspace in TRANSACTIONAL state signal delivery # kernelspace in SUSPENDED state handle_rt_signal64() get_tm_stackpointer() treclaim # kernelspace in NON-TRANSACTIONAL state __put_user() page fault happens. We will never get back here because of the TM Bad Thing exception. page fault handling kicks in and we voluntarily preempt ourselves do_page_fault() __schedule() __switch_to(other_task) our task is rescheduled and we recheckpoint because the thread's MSR[TS] was not cleared __switch_to(our_task) switch_to_tm() tm_recheckpoint_new_task() trechkpt # kernelspace in SUSPENDED state The page fault handling resumes, but now we are in suspended transaction state do_page_fault() completes rfid <----- trying to get back where the page fault happened (we were non-transactional back then) TM Bad Thing # illegal transition from suspended to non-transactional This patch fixes that issue by clearing the current thread's MSR[TS] just after treclaim in get_tm_stackpointer() so that we stay in non-transactional state in case we are preempted. In order to make treclaim and clearing the thread's MSR[TS] atomic from a preemption perspective when CONFIG_PREEMPT is set, preempt_disable/enable() is used. It's also necessary to save the previous value of the thread's MSR before get_tm_stackpointer() is called so that it can be exposed to the signal handler later in setup_tm_sigcontexts() to inform the userspace MSR at the moment of the signal delivery. Found with tm-signal-context-force-tm kernel selftest. Fixes: 2b0a576d15e0 ("powerpc: Add new transactional memory state to the signal context") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.9 Signed-off-by: Gustavo Luiz Duarte <gustavold@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200211033831.11165-1-gustavold@linux.ibm.com
2020-02-11 06:38:29 +03:00
ret = tsk->thread.ckpt_regs.gpr[1];
/*
* If we treclaim, we must clear the current thread's TM bits
* before re-enabling preemption. Otherwise we might be
* preempted and have the live MSR[TS] changed behind our back
* (tm_recheckpoint_new_task() would recheckpoint). Besides, we
* enter the signal handler in non-transactional state.
*/
regs_set_return_msr(regs, regs->msr & ~MSR_TS_MASK);
powerpc/tm: Fix clearing MSR[TS] in current when reclaiming on signal delivery After a treclaim, we expect to be in non-transactional state. If we don't clear the current thread's MSR[TS] before we get preempted, then tm_recheckpoint_new_task() will recheckpoint and we get rescheduled in suspended transaction state. When handling a signal caught in transactional state, handle_rt_signal64() calls get_tm_stackpointer() that treclaims the transaction using tm_reclaim_current() but without clearing the thread's MSR[TS]. This can cause the TM Bad Thing exception below if later we pagefault and get preempted trying to access the user's sigframe, using __put_user(). Afterwards, when we are rescheduled back into do_page_fault() (but now in suspended state since the thread's MSR[TS] was not cleared), upon executing 'rfid' after completion of the page fault handling, the exception is raised because a transition from suspended to non-transactional state is invalid. Unexpected TM Bad Thing exception at c00000000000de44 (msr 0x8000000302a03031) tm_scratch=800000010280b033 Oops: Unrecoverable exception, sig: 6 [#1] LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries CPU: 25 PID: 15547 Comm: a.out Not tainted 5.4.0-rc2 #32 NIP: c00000000000de44 LR: c000000000034728 CTR: 0000000000000000 REGS: c00000003fe7bd70 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (5.4.0-rc2) MSR: 8000000302a03031 <SF,VEC,VSX,FP,ME,IR,DR,LE,TM[SE]> CR: 44000884 XER: 00000000 CFAR: c00000000000dda4 IRQMASK: 0 PACATMSCRATCH: 800000010280b033 GPR00: c000000000034728 c000000f65a17c80 c000000001662800 00007fffacf3fd78 GPR04: 0000000000001000 0000000000001000 0000000000000000 c000000f611f8af0 GPR08: 0000000000000000 0000000078006001 0000000000000000 000c000000000000 GPR12: c000000f611f84b0 c00000003ffcb200 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 c000000f611f8140 GPR24: 0000000000000000 00007fffacf3fd68 c000000f65a17d90 c000000f611f7800 GPR28: c000000f65a17e90 c000000f65a17e90 c000000001685e18 00007fffacf3f000 NIP [c00000000000de44] fast_exception_return+0xf4/0x1b0 LR [c000000000034728] handle_rt_signal64+0x78/0xc50 Call Trace: [c000000f65a17c80] [c000000000034710] handle_rt_signal64+0x60/0xc50 (unreliable) [c000000f65a17d30] [c000000000023640] do_notify_resume+0x330/0x460 [c000000f65a17e20] [c00000000000dcc4] ret_from_except_lite+0x70/0x74 Instruction dump: 7c4ff120 e8410170 7c5a03a6 38400000 f8410060 e8010070 e8410080 e8610088 60000000 60000000 e8810090 e8210078 <4c000024> 48000000 e8610178 88ed0989 ---[ end trace 93094aa44b442f87 ]--- The simplified sequence of events that triggers the above exception is: ... # userspace in NON-TRANSACTIONAL state tbegin # userspace in TRANSACTIONAL state signal delivery # kernelspace in SUSPENDED state handle_rt_signal64() get_tm_stackpointer() treclaim # kernelspace in NON-TRANSACTIONAL state __put_user() page fault happens. We will never get back here because of the TM Bad Thing exception. page fault handling kicks in and we voluntarily preempt ourselves do_page_fault() __schedule() __switch_to(other_task) our task is rescheduled and we recheckpoint because the thread's MSR[TS] was not cleared __switch_to(our_task) switch_to_tm() tm_recheckpoint_new_task() trechkpt # kernelspace in SUSPENDED state The page fault handling resumes, but now we are in suspended transaction state do_page_fault() completes rfid <----- trying to get back where the page fault happened (we were non-transactional back then) TM Bad Thing # illegal transition from suspended to non-transactional This patch fixes that issue by clearing the current thread's MSR[TS] just after treclaim in get_tm_stackpointer() so that we stay in non-transactional state in case we are preempted. In order to make treclaim and clearing the thread's MSR[TS] atomic from a preemption perspective when CONFIG_PREEMPT is set, preempt_disable/enable() is used. It's also necessary to save the previous value of the thread's MSR before get_tm_stackpointer() is called so that it can be exposed to the signal handler later in setup_tm_sigcontexts() to inform the userspace MSR at the moment of the signal delivery. Found with tm-signal-context-force-tm kernel selftest. Fixes: 2b0a576d15e0 ("powerpc: Add new transactional memory state to the signal context") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.9 Signed-off-by: Gustavo Luiz Duarte <gustavold@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200211033831.11165-1-gustavold@linux.ibm.com
2020-02-11 06:38:29 +03:00
preempt_enable();
}
#endif
powerpc/tm: Fix clearing MSR[TS] in current when reclaiming on signal delivery After a treclaim, we expect to be in non-transactional state. If we don't clear the current thread's MSR[TS] before we get preempted, then tm_recheckpoint_new_task() will recheckpoint and we get rescheduled in suspended transaction state. When handling a signal caught in transactional state, handle_rt_signal64() calls get_tm_stackpointer() that treclaims the transaction using tm_reclaim_current() but without clearing the thread's MSR[TS]. This can cause the TM Bad Thing exception below if later we pagefault and get preempted trying to access the user's sigframe, using __put_user(). Afterwards, when we are rescheduled back into do_page_fault() (but now in suspended state since the thread's MSR[TS] was not cleared), upon executing 'rfid' after completion of the page fault handling, the exception is raised because a transition from suspended to non-transactional state is invalid. Unexpected TM Bad Thing exception at c00000000000de44 (msr 0x8000000302a03031) tm_scratch=800000010280b033 Oops: Unrecoverable exception, sig: 6 [#1] LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries CPU: 25 PID: 15547 Comm: a.out Not tainted 5.4.0-rc2 #32 NIP: c00000000000de44 LR: c000000000034728 CTR: 0000000000000000 REGS: c00000003fe7bd70 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (5.4.0-rc2) MSR: 8000000302a03031 <SF,VEC,VSX,FP,ME,IR,DR,LE,TM[SE]> CR: 44000884 XER: 00000000 CFAR: c00000000000dda4 IRQMASK: 0 PACATMSCRATCH: 800000010280b033 GPR00: c000000000034728 c000000f65a17c80 c000000001662800 00007fffacf3fd78 GPR04: 0000000000001000 0000000000001000 0000000000000000 c000000f611f8af0 GPR08: 0000000000000000 0000000078006001 0000000000000000 000c000000000000 GPR12: c000000f611f84b0 c00000003ffcb200 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 c000000f611f8140 GPR24: 0000000000000000 00007fffacf3fd68 c000000f65a17d90 c000000f611f7800 GPR28: c000000f65a17e90 c000000f65a17e90 c000000001685e18 00007fffacf3f000 NIP [c00000000000de44] fast_exception_return+0xf4/0x1b0 LR [c000000000034728] handle_rt_signal64+0x78/0xc50 Call Trace: [c000000f65a17c80] [c000000000034710] handle_rt_signal64+0x60/0xc50 (unreliable) [c000000f65a17d30] [c000000000023640] do_notify_resume+0x330/0x460 [c000000f65a17e20] [c00000000000dcc4] ret_from_except_lite+0x70/0x74 Instruction dump: 7c4ff120 e8410170 7c5a03a6 38400000 f8410060 e8010070 e8410080 e8610088 60000000 60000000 e8810090 e8210078 <4c000024> 48000000 e8610178 88ed0989 ---[ end trace 93094aa44b442f87 ]--- The simplified sequence of events that triggers the above exception is: ... # userspace in NON-TRANSACTIONAL state tbegin # userspace in TRANSACTIONAL state signal delivery # kernelspace in SUSPENDED state handle_rt_signal64() get_tm_stackpointer() treclaim # kernelspace in NON-TRANSACTIONAL state __put_user() page fault happens. We will never get back here because of the TM Bad Thing exception. page fault handling kicks in and we voluntarily preempt ourselves do_page_fault() __schedule() __switch_to(other_task) our task is rescheduled and we recheckpoint because the thread's MSR[TS] was not cleared __switch_to(our_task) switch_to_tm() tm_recheckpoint_new_task() trechkpt # kernelspace in SUSPENDED state The page fault handling resumes, but now we are in suspended transaction state do_page_fault() completes rfid <----- trying to get back where the page fault happened (we were non-transactional back then) TM Bad Thing # illegal transition from suspended to non-transactional This patch fixes that issue by clearing the current thread's MSR[TS] just after treclaim in get_tm_stackpointer() so that we stay in non-transactional state in case we are preempted. In order to make treclaim and clearing the thread's MSR[TS] atomic from a preemption perspective when CONFIG_PREEMPT is set, preempt_disable/enable() is used. It's also necessary to save the previous value of the thread's MSR before get_tm_stackpointer() is called so that it can be exposed to the signal handler later in setup_tm_sigcontexts() to inform the userspace MSR at the moment of the signal delivery. Found with tm-signal-context-force-tm kernel selftest. Fixes: 2b0a576d15e0 ("powerpc: Add new transactional memory state to the signal context") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.9 Signed-off-by: Gustavo Luiz Duarte <gustavold@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200211033831.11165-1-gustavold@linux.ibm.com
2020-02-11 06:38:29 +03:00
return ret;
}
static const char fm32[] = KERN_INFO "%s[%d]: bad frame in %s: %p nip %08lx lr %08lx\n";
static const char fm64[] = KERN_INFO "%s[%d]: bad frame in %s: %p nip %016lx lr %016lx\n";
void signal_fault(struct task_struct *tsk, struct pt_regs *regs,
const char *where, void __user *ptr)
{
if (show_unhandled_signals)
printk_ratelimited(regs->msr & MSR_64BIT ? fm64 : fm32, tsk->comm,
task_pid_nr(tsk), where, ptr, regs->nip, regs->link);
}