2010-08-04 18:16:33 +04:00
/* Key type used to cache DNS lookups made by the kernel
*
2020-04-28 01:01:32 +03:00
* See Documentation / networking / dns_resolver . rst
2010-08-04 18:16:33 +04:00
*
* Copyright ( c ) 2007 Igor Mammedov
* Author ( s ) : Igor Mammedov ( niallain @ gmail . com )
* Steve French ( sfrench @ us . ibm . com )
* Wang Lei ( wang840925 @ gmail . com )
* David Howells ( dhowells @ redhat . com )
*
* This library is free software ; you can redistribute it and / or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published
* by the Free Software Foundation ; either version 2.1 of the License , or
* ( at your option ) any later version .
*
* This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful ,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY ; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE . See
* the GNU Lesser General Public License for more details .
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License
2013-12-06 21:13:44 +04:00
* along with this library ; if not , see < http : //www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
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*/
# include <linux/module.h>
# include <linux/moduleparam.h>
# include <linux/slab.h>
# include <linux/string.h>
# include <linux/kernel.h>
# include <linux/keyctl.h>
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# include <linux/err.h>
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# include <linux/seq_file.h>
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# include <linux/dns_resolver.h>
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# include <keys/dns_resolver-type.h>
# include <keys/user-type.h>
# include "internal.h"
MODULE_DESCRIPTION ( " DNS Resolver " ) ;
MODULE_AUTHOR ( " Wang Lei " ) ;
MODULE_LICENSE ( " GPL " ) ;
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unsigned int dns_resolver_debug ;
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module_param_named ( debug , dns_resolver_debug , uint , 0644 ) ;
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MODULE_PARM_DESC ( debug , " DNS Resolver debugging mask " ) ;
const struct cred * dns_resolver_cache ;
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# define DNS_ERRORNO_OPTION "dnserror"
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/*
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* Preparse instantiation data for a dns_resolver key .
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*
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* For normal hostname lookups , the data must be a NUL - terminated string , with
* the NUL char accounted in datalen .
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*
* If the data contains a ' # ' characters , then we take the clause after each
* one to be an option of the form ' key = value ' . The actual data of interest is
* the string leading up to the first ' # ' . For instance :
*
* " ip1,ip2,...#foo=bar "
2018-10-04 16:27:55 +03:00
*
* For server list requests , the data must begin with a NUL char and be
* followed by a byte indicating the version of the data format . Version 1
* looks something like ( note this is packed ) :
*
* u8 Non - string marker ( ie . 0 )
* u8 Content ( DNS_PAYLOAD_IS_ * )
* u8 Version ( e . g . 1 )
* u8 Source of server list
* u8 Lookup status of server list
* u8 Number of servers
* foreach - server {
* __le16 Name length
* __le16 Priority ( as per SRV record , low first )
* __le16 Weight ( as per SRV record , higher first )
* __le16 Port
* u8 Source of address list
* u8 Lookup status of address list
* u8 Protocol ( DNS_SERVER_PROTOCOL_ * )
* u8 Number of addresses
* char [ ] Name ( not NUL - terminated )
* foreach - address {
* u8 Family ( DNS_ADDRESS_IS_ * )
* union {
* u8 [ 4 ] ipv4_addr
* u8 [ 16 ] ipv6_addr
* }
* }
* }
*
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*/
static int
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dns_resolver_preparse ( struct key_preparsed_payload * prep )
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{
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const struct dns_payload_header * bin ;
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struct user_key_payload * upayload ;
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unsigned long derrno ;
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int ret ;
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int datalen = prep - > datalen , result_len = 0 ;
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const char * data = prep - > data , * end , * opt ;
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2018-10-04 16:27:55 +03:00
if ( datalen < = 1 | | ! data )
return - EINVAL ;
if ( data [ 0 ] = = 0 ) {
/* It may be a server list. */
if ( datalen < = sizeof ( * bin ) )
return - EINVAL ;
bin = ( const struct dns_payload_header * ) data ;
kenter ( " [%u,%u],%u " , bin - > content , bin - > version , datalen ) ;
if ( bin - > content ! = DNS_PAYLOAD_IS_SERVER_LIST ) {
pr_warn_ratelimited (
" dns_resolver: Unsupported content type (%u) \n " ,
bin - > content ) ;
return - EINVAL ;
}
if ( bin - > version ! = 1 ) {
pr_warn_ratelimited (
" dns_resolver: Unsupported server list version (%u) \n " ,
bin - > version ) ;
return - EINVAL ;
}
result_len = datalen ;
goto store_result ;
}
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kenter ( " '%*.*s',%u " , datalen , datalen , data , datalen ) ;
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2018-10-04 16:27:55 +03:00
if ( ! data | | data [ datalen - 1 ] ! = ' \0 ' )
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return - EINVAL ;
datalen - - ;
/* deal with any options embedded in the data */
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end = data + datalen ;
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opt = memchr ( data , ' # ' , datalen ) ;
if ( ! opt ) {
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/* no options: the entire data is the result */
kdebug ( " no options " ) ;
result_len = datalen ;
} else {
const char * next_opt ;
result_len = opt - data ;
opt + + ;
kdebug ( " options: '%s' " , opt ) ;
do {
KEYS: DNS: fix parsing multiple options
My recent fix for dns_resolver_preparse() printing very long strings was
incomplete, as shown by syzbot which still managed to hit the
WARN_ONCE() in set_precision() by adding a crafted "dns_resolver" key:
precision 50001 too large
WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 864 at lib/vsprintf.c:2164 vsnprintf+0x48a/0x5a0
The bug this time isn't just a printing bug, but also a logical error
when multiple options ("#"-separated strings) are given in the key
payload. Specifically, when separating an option string into name and
value, if there is no value then the name is incorrectly considered to
end at the end of the key payload, rather than the end of the current
option. This bypasses validation of the option length, and also means
that specifying multiple options is broken -- which presumably has gone
unnoticed as there is currently only one valid option anyway.
A similar problem also applied to option values, as the kstrtoul() when
parsing the "dnserror" option will read past the end of the current
option and into the next option.
Fix these bugs by correctly computing the length of the option name and
by copying the option value, null-terminated, into a temporary buffer.
Reproducer for the WARN_ONCE() that syzbot hit:
perl -e 'print "#A#", "\0" x 50000' | keyctl padd dns_resolver desc @s
Reproducer for "dnserror" option being parsed incorrectly (expected
behavior is to fail when seeing the unknown option "foo", actual
behavior was to read the dnserror value as "1#foo" and fail there):
perl -e 'print "#dnserror=1#foo\0"' | keyctl padd dns_resolver desc @s
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Fixes: 4a2d789267e0 ("DNS: If the DNS server returns an error, allow that to be cached [ver #2]")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-07-11 20:46:29 +03:00
int opt_len , opt_nlen ;
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const char * eq ;
KEYS: DNS: fix parsing multiple options
My recent fix for dns_resolver_preparse() printing very long strings was
incomplete, as shown by syzbot which still managed to hit the
WARN_ONCE() in set_precision() by adding a crafted "dns_resolver" key:
precision 50001 too large
WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 864 at lib/vsprintf.c:2164 vsnprintf+0x48a/0x5a0
The bug this time isn't just a printing bug, but also a logical error
when multiple options ("#"-separated strings) are given in the key
payload. Specifically, when separating an option string into name and
value, if there is no value then the name is incorrectly considered to
end at the end of the key payload, rather than the end of the current
option. This bypasses validation of the option length, and also means
that specifying multiple options is broken -- which presumably has gone
unnoticed as there is currently only one valid option anyway.
A similar problem also applied to option values, as the kstrtoul() when
parsing the "dnserror" option will read past the end of the current
option and into the next option.
Fix these bugs by correctly computing the length of the option name and
by copying the option value, null-terminated, into a temporary buffer.
Reproducer for the WARN_ONCE() that syzbot hit:
perl -e 'print "#A#", "\0" x 50000' | keyctl padd dns_resolver desc @s
Reproducer for "dnserror" option being parsed incorrectly (expected
behavior is to fail when seeing the unknown option "foo", actual
behavior was to read the dnserror value as "1#foo" and fail there):
perl -e 'print "#dnserror=1#foo\0"' | keyctl padd dns_resolver desc @s
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Fixes: 4a2d789267e0 ("DNS: If the DNS server returns an error, allow that to be cached [ver #2]")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-07-11 20:46:29 +03:00
char optval [ 128 ] ;
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next_opt = memchr ( opt , ' # ' , end - opt ) ? : end ;
opt_len = next_opt - opt ;
KEYS: DNS: fix parsing multiple options
My recent fix for dns_resolver_preparse() printing very long strings was
incomplete, as shown by syzbot which still managed to hit the
WARN_ONCE() in set_precision() by adding a crafted "dns_resolver" key:
precision 50001 too large
WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 864 at lib/vsprintf.c:2164 vsnprintf+0x48a/0x5a0
The bug this time isn't just a printing bug, but also a logical error
when multiple options ("#"-separated strings) are given in the key
payload. Specifically, when separating an option string into name and
value, if there is no value then the name is incorrectly considered to
end at the end of the key payload, rather than the end of the current
option. This bypasses validation of the option length, and also means
that specifying multiple options is broken -- which presumably has gone
unnoticed as there is currently only one valid option anyway.
A similar problem also applied to option values, as the kstrtoul() when
parsing the "dnserror" option will read past the end of the current
option and into the next option.
Fix these bugs by correctly computing the length of the option name and
by copying the option value, null-terminated, into a temporary buffer.
Reproducer for the WARN_ONCE() that syzbot hit:
perl -e 'print "#A#", "\0" x 50000' | keyctl padd dns_resolver desc @s
Reproducer for "dnserror" option being parsed incorrectly (expected
behavior is to fail when seeing the unknown option "foo", actual
behavior was to read the dnserror value as "1#foo" and fail there):
perl -e 'print "#dnserror=1#foo\0"' | keyctl padd dns_resolver desc @s
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Fixes: 4a2d789267e0 ("DNS: If the DNS server returns an error, allow that to be cached [ver #2]")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-07-11 20:46:29 +03:00
if ( opt_len < = 0 | | opt_len > sizeof ( optval ) ) {
2018-04-17 22:07:06 +03:00
pr_warn_ratelimited ( " Invalid option length (%d) for dns_resolver key \n " ,
opt_len ) ;
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return - EINVAL ;
}
KEYS: DNS: fix parsing multiple options
My recent fix for dns_resolver_preparse() printing very long strings was
incomplete, as shown by syzbot which still managed to hit the
WARN_ONCE() in set_precision() by adding a crafted "dns_resolver" key:
precision 50001 too large
WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 864 at lib/vsprintf.c:2164 vsnprintf+0x48a/0x5a0
The bug this time isn't just a printing bug, but also a logical error
when multiple options ("#"-separated strings) are given in the key
payload. Specifically, when separating an option string into name and
value, if there is no value then the name is incorrectly considered to
end at the end of the key payload, rather than the end of the current
option. This bypasses validation of the option length, and also means
that specifying multiple options is broken -- which presumably has gone
unnoticed as there is currently only one valid option anyway.
A similar problem also applied to option values, as the kstrtoul() when
parsing the "dnserror" option will read past the end of the current
option and into the next option.
Fix these bugs by correctly computing the length of the option name and
by copying the option value, null-terminated, into a temporary buffer.
Reproducer for the WARN_ONCE() that syzbot hit:
perl -e 'print "#A#", "\0" x 50000' | keyctl padd dns_resolver desc @s
Reproducer for "dnserror" option being parsed incorrectly (expected
behavior is to fail when seeing the unknown option "foo", actual
behavior was to read the dnserror value as "1#foo" and fail there):
perl -e 'print "#dnserror=1#foo\0"' | keyctl padd dns_resolver desc @s
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Fixes: 4a2d789267e0 ("DNS: If the DNS server returns an error, allow that to be cached [ver #2]")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-07-11 20:46:29 +03:00
eq = memchr ( opt , ' = ' , opt_len ) ;
if ( eq ) {
opt_nlen = eq - opt ;
eq + + ;
memcpy ( optval , eq , next_opt - eq ) ;
optval [ next_opt - eq ] = ' \0 ' ;
} else {
opt_nlen = opt_len ;
optval [ 0 ] = ' \0 ' ;
}
2010-08-11 12:37:58 +04:00
KEYS: DNS: fix parsing multiple options
My recent fix for dns_resolver_preparse() printing very long strings was
incomplete, as shown by syzbot which still managed to hit the
WARN_ONCE() in set_precision() by adding a crafted "dns_resolver" key:
precision 50001 too large
WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 864 at lib/vsprintf.c:2164 vsnprintf+0x48a/0x5a0
The bug this time isn't just a printing bug, but also a logical error
when multiple options ("#"-separated strings) are given in the key
payload. Specifically, when separating an option string into name and
value, if there is no value then the name is incorrectly considered to
end at the end of the key payload, rather than the end of the current
option. This bypasses validation of the option length, and also means
that specifying multiple options is broken -- which presumably has gone
unnoticed as there is currently only one valid option anyway.
A similar problem also applied to option values, as the kstrtoul() when
parsing the "dnserror" option will read past the end of the current
option and into the next option.
Fix these bugs by correctly computing the length of the option name and
by copying the option value, null-terminated, into a temporary buffer.
Reproducer for the WARN_ONCE() that syzbot hit:
perl -e 'print "#A#", "\0" x 50000' | keyctl padd dns_resolver desc @s
Reproducer for "dnserror" option being parsed incorrectly (expected
behavior is to fail when seeing the unknown option "foo", actual
behavior was to read the dnserror value as "1#foo" and fail there):
perl -e 'print "#dnserror=1#foo\0"' | keyctl padd dns_resolver desc @s
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Fixes: 4a2d789267e0 ("DNS: If the DNS server returns an error, allow that to be cached [ver #2]")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-07-11 20:46:29 +03:00
kdebug ( " option '%*.*s' val '%s' " ,
opt_nlen , opt_nlen , opt , optval ) ;
2010-08-11 12:37:58 +04:00
/* see if it's an error number representing a DNS error
* that ' s to be recorded as the result in this key */
if ( opt_nlen = = sizeof ( DNS_ERRORNO_OPTION ) - 1 & &
memcmp ( opt , DNS_ERRORNO_OPTION , opt_nlen ) = = 0 ) {
kdebug ( " dns error number option " ) ;
KEYS: DNS: fix parsing multiple options
My recent fix for dns_resolver_preparse() printing very long strings was
incomplete, as shown by syzbot which still managed to hit the
WARN_ONCE() in set_precision() by adding a crafted "dns_resolver" key:
precision 50001 too large
WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 864 at lib/vsprintf.c:2164 vsnprintf+0x48a/0x5a0
The bug this time isn't just a printing bug, but also a logical error
when multiple options ("#"-separated strings) are given in the key
payload. Specifically, when separating an option string into name and
value, if there is no value then the name is incorrectly considered to
end at the end of the key payload, rather than the end of the current
option. This bypasses validation of the option length, and also means
that specifying multiple options is broken -- which presumably has gone
unnoticed as there is currently only one valid option anyway.
A similar problem also applied to option values, as the kstrtoul() when
parsing the "dnserror" option will read past the end of the current
option and into the next option.
Fix these bugs by correctly computing the length of the option name and
by copying the option value, null-terminated, into a temporary buffer.
Reproducer for the WARN_ONCE() that syzbot hit:
perl -e 'print "#A#", "\0" x 50000' | keyctl padd dns_resolver desc @s
Reproducer for "dnserror" option being parsed incorrectly (expected
behavior is to fail when seeing the unknown option "foo", actual
behavior was to read the dnserror value as "1#foo" and fail there):
perl -e 'print "#dnserror=1#foo\0"' | keyctl padd dns_resolver desc @s
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Fixes: 4a2d789267e0 ("DNS: If the DNS server returns an error, allow that to be cached [ver #2]")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-07-11 20:46:29 +03:00
ret = kstrtoul ( optval , 10 , & derrno ) ;
2010-08-11 12:37:58 +04:00
if ( ret < 0 )
goto bad_option_value ;
if ( derrno < 1 | | derrno > 511 )
goto bad_option_value ;
kdebug ( " dns error no. = %lu " , derrno ) ;
2015-10-21 16:04:48 +03:00
prep - > payload . data [ dns_key_error ] = ERR_PTR ( - derrno ) ;
2010-08-11 12:37:58 +04:00
continue ;
}
bad_option_value :
2018-04-17 22:07:06 +03:00
pr_warn_ratelimited ( " Option '%*.*s' to dns_resolver key: bad/missing value \n " ,
opt_nlen , opt_nlen , opt ) ;
2010-08-11 12:37:58 +04:00
return - EINVAL ;
} while ( opt = next_opt + 1 , opt < end ) ;
2010-08-04 18:16:33 +04:00
}
2010-08-11 12:37:58 +04:00
/* don't cache the result if we're caching an error saying there's no
* result */
2015-10-21 16:04:48 +03:00
if ( prep - > payload . data [ dns_key_error ] ) {
kleave ( " = 0 [h_error %ld] " , PTR_ERR ( prep - > payload . data [ dns_key_error ] ) ) ;
2010-08-11 12:37:58 +04:00
return 0 ;
}
2018-10-04 16:27:55 +03:00
store_result :
2010-08-11 12:37:58 +04:00
kdebug ( " store result " ) ;
2014-07-18 21:56:36 +04:00
prep - > quotalen = result_len ;
2010-08-04 18:16:33 +04:00
upayload = kmalloc ( sizeof ( * upayload ) + result_len + 1 , GFP_KERNEL ) ;
if ( ! upayload ) {
kleave ( " = -ENOMEM " ) ;
return - ENOMEM ;
}
upayload - > datalen = result_len ;
memcpy ( upayload - > data , data , result_len ) ;
upayload - > data [ result_len ] = ' \0 ' ;
2015-10-21 16:04:48 +03:00
prep - > payload . data [ dns_key_data ] = upayload ;
2010-08-04 18:16:33 +04:00
kleave ( " = 0 " ) ;
return 0 ;
}
2014-07-18 21:56:36 +04:00
/*
* Clean up the preparse data
*/
static void dns_resolver_free_preparse ( struct key_preparsed_payload * prep )
{
pr_devel ( " ==>%s() \n " , __func__ ) ;
2015-10-21 16:04:48 +03:00
kfree ( prep - > payload . data [ dns_key_data ] ) ;
2014-07-18 21:56:36 +04:00
}
2010-08-04 18:16:33 +04:00
/*
* The description is of the form " [<type>:]<domain_name> "
*
* The domain name may be a simple name or an absolute domain name ( which
* should end with a period ) . The domain name is case - independent .
*/
2014-09-16 20:36:08 +04:00
static bool dns_resolver_cmp ( const struct key * key ,
const struct key_match_data * match_data )
2010-08-04 18:16:33 +04:00
{
int slen , dlen , ret = 0 ;
2014-09-16 20:36:02 +04:00
const char * src = key - > description , * dsp = match_data - > raw_data ;
2010-08-04 18:16:33 +04:00
kenter ( " %s,%s " , src , dsp ) ;
if ( ! src | | ! dsp )
goto no_match ;
if ( strcasecmp ( src , dsp ) = = 0 )
goto matched ;
slen = strlen ( src ) ;
dlen = strlen ( dsp ) ;
if ( slen < = 0 | | dlen < = 0 )
goto no_match ;
if ( src [ slen - 1 ] = = ' . ' )
slen - - ;
if ( dsp [ dlen - 1 ] = = ' . ' )
dlen - - ;
if ( slen ! = dlen | | strncasecmp ( src , dsp , slen ) ! = 0 )
goto no_match ;
matched :
ret = 1 ;
no_match :
kleave ( " = %d " , ret ) ;
return ret ;
}
2014-09-16 20:36:06 +04:00
/*
* Preparse the match criterion .
*/
static int dns_resolver_match_preparse ( struct key_match_data * match_data )
{
match_data - > lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_ITERATE ;
match_data - > cmp = dns_resolver_cmp ;
return 0 ;
}
2010-08-11 12:37:58 +04:00
/*
* Describe a DNS key
*/
static void dns_resolver_describe ( const struct key * key , struct seq_file * m )
{
seq_puts ( m , key - > description ) ;
2017-10-04 18:43:25 +03:00
if ( key_is_positive ( key ) ) {
2015-10-21 16:04:48 +03:00
int err = PTR_ERR ( key - > payload . data [ dns_key_error ] ) ;
2011-03-11 20:57:23 +03:00
if ( err )
seq_printf ( m , " : %d " , err ) ;
else
seq_printf ( m , " : %u " , key - > datalen ) ;
}
2010-08-11 12:37:58 +04:00
}
DNS: Fix a NULL pointer deref when trying to read an error key [CVE-2011-1076]
When a DNS resolver key is instantiated with an error indication, attempts to
read that key will result in an oops because user_read() is expecting there to
be a payload - and there isn't one [CVE-2011-1076].
Give the DNS resolver key its own read handler that returns the error cached in
key->type_data.x[0] as an error rather than crashing.
Also make the kenter() at the beginning of dns_resolver_instantiate() limit the
amount of data it prints, since the data is not necessarily NUL-terminated.
The buggy code was added in:
commit 4a2d789267e00b5a1175ecd2ddefcc78b83fbf09
Author: Wang Lei <wang840925@gmail.com>
Date: Wed Aug 11 09:37:58 2010 +0100
Subject: DNS: If the DNS server returns an error, allow that to be cached [ver #2]
This can trivially be reproduced by any user with the following program
compiled with -lkeyutils:
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
#include <err.h>
static char payload[] = "#dnserror=6";
int main()
{
key_serial_t key;
key = add_key("dns_resolver", "a", payload, sizeof(payload),
KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING);
if (key == -1)
err(1, "add_key");
if (keyctl_read(key, NULL, 0) == -1)
err(1, "read_key");
return 0;
}
What should happen is that keyctl_read() reports error 6 (ENXIO) to the user:
dns-break: read_key: No such device or address
but instead the kernel oopses.
This cannot be reproduced with the 'keyutils add' or 'keyutils padd' commands
as both of those cut the data down below the NUL termination that must be
included in the data. Without this dns_resolver_instantiate() will return
-EINVAL and the key will not be instantiated such that it can be read.
The oops looks like:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010
IP: [<ffffffff811b99f7>] user_read+0x4f/0x8f
PGD 3bdf8067 PUD 385b9067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
last sysfs file: /sys/devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:19.0/irq
CPU 0
Modules linked in:
Pid: 2150, comm: dns-break Not tainted 2.6.38-rc7-cachefs+ #468 /DG965RY
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff811b99f7>] [<ffffffff811b99f7>] user_read+0x4f/0x8f
RSP: 0018:ffff88003bf47f08 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff88003b5ea378 RCX: ffffffff81972368
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88003b5ea378
RBP: ffff88003bf47f28 R08: ffff88003be56620 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000395 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffffffffffffa1
FS: 00007feab5751700(0000) GS:ffff88003e000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 000000003de40000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process dns-break (pid: 2150, threadinfo ffff88003bf46000, task ffff88003be56090)
Stack:
ffff88003b5ea378 ffff88003b5ea3a0 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
ffff88003bf47f68 ffffffff811b708e ffff88003c442bc8 0000000000000000
00000000004005a0 00007fffba368060 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff811b708e>] keyctl_read_key+0xac/0xcf
[<ffffffff811b7c07>] sys_keyctl+0x75/0xb6
[<ffffffff81001f7b>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Code: 75 1f 48 83 7b 28 00 75 18 c6 05 58 2b fb 00 01 be bb 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 76 1c 75 81 e8 13 c2 e9 ff 4c 8b b3 e0 00 00 00 4d 85 ed <41> 0f b7 5e 10 74 2d 4d 85 e4 74 28 e8 98 79 ee ff 49 39 dd 48
RIP [<ffffffff811b99f7>] user_read+0x4f/0x8f
RSP <ffff88003bf47f08>
CR2: 0000000000000010
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
cc: Wang Lei <wang840925@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2011-03-03 14:28:58 +03:00
/*
* read the DNS data
* - the key ' s semaphore is read - locked
*/
static long dns_resolver_read ( const struct key * key ,
2020-03-22 04:11:24 +03:00
char * buffer , size_t buflen )
DNS: Fix a NULL pointer deref when trying to read an error key [CVE-2011-1076]
When a DNS resolver key is instantiated with an error indication, attempts to
read that key will result in an oops because user_read() is expecting there to
be a payload - and there isn't one [CVE-2011-1076].
Give the DNS resolver key its own read handler that returns the error cached in
key->type_data.x[0] as an error rather than crashing.
Also make the kenter() at the beginning of dns_resolver_instantiate() limit the
amount of data it prints, since the data is not necessarily NUL-terminated.
The buggy code was added in:
commit 4a2d789267e00b5a1175ecd2ddefcc78b83fbf09
Author: Wang Lei <wang840925@gmail.com>
Date: Wed Aug 11 09:37:58 2010 +0100
Subject: DNS: If the DNS server returns an error, allow that to be cached [ver #2]
This can trivially be reproduced by any user with the following program
compiled with -lkeyutils:
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
#include <err.h>
static char payload[] = "#dnserror=6";
int main()
{
key_serial_t key;
key = add_key("dns_resolver", "a", payload, sizeof(payload),
KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING);
if (key == -1)
err(1, "add_key");
if (keyctl_read(key, NULL, 0) == -1)
err(1, "read_key");
return 0;
}
What should happen is that keyctl_read() reports error 6 (ENXIO) to the user:
dns-break: read_key: No such device or address
but instead the kernel oopses.
This cannot be reproduced with the 'keyutils add' or 'keyutils padd' commands
as both of those cut the data down below the NUL termination that must be
included in the data. Without this dns_resolver_instantiate() will return
-EINVAL and the key will not be instantiated such that it can be read.
The oops looks like:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010
IP: [<ffffffff811b99f7>] user_read+0x4f/0x8f
PGD 3bdf8067 PUD 385b9067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
last sysfs file: /sys/devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:19.0/irq
CPU 0
Modules linked in:
Pid: 2150, comm: dns-break Not tainted 2.6.38-rc7-cachefs+ #468 /DG965RY
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff811b99f7>] [<ffffffff811b99f7>] user_read+0x4f/0x8f
RSP: 0018:ffff88003bf47f08 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff88003b5ea378 RCX: ffffffff81972368
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88003b5ea378
RBP: ffff88003bf47f28 R08: ffff88003be56620 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000395 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffffffffffffa1
FS: 00007feab5751700(0000) GS:ffff88003e000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 000000003de40000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process dns-break (pid: 2150, threadinfo ffff88003bf46000, task ffff88003be56090)
Stack:
ffff88003b5ea378 ffff88003b5ea3a0 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
ffff88003bf47f68 ffffffff811b708e ffff88003c442bc8 0000000000000000
00000000004005a0 00007fffba368060 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff811b708e>] keyctl_read_key+0xac/0xcf
[<ffffffff811b7c07>] sys_keyctl+0x75/0xb6
[<ffffffff81001f7b>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Code: 75 1f 48 83 7b 28 00 75 18 c6 05 58 2b fb 00 01 be bb 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 76 1c 75 81 e8 13 c2 e9 ff 4c 8b b3 e0 00 00 00 4d 85 ed <41> 0f b7 5e 10 74 2d 4d 85 e4 74 28 e8 98 79 ee ff 49 39 dd 48
RIP [<ffffffff811b99f7>] user_read+0x4f/0x8f
RSP <ffff88003bf47f08>
CR2: 0000000000000010
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
cc: Wang Lei <wang840925@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2011-03-03 14:28:58 +03:00
{
2015-10-21 16:04:48 +03:00
int err = PTR_ERR ( key - > payload . data [ dns_key_error ] ) ;
if ( err )
return err ;
DNS: Fix a NULL pointer deref when trying to read an error key [CVE-2011-1076]
When a DNS resolver key is instantiated with an error indication, attempts to
read that key will result in an oops because user_read() is expecting there to
be a payload - and there isn't one [CVE-2011-1076].
Give the DNS resolver key its own read handler that returns the error cached in
key->type_data.x[0] as an error rather than crashing.
Also make the kenter() at the beginning of dns_resolver_instantiate() limit the
amount of data it prints, since the data is not necessarily NUL-terminated.
The buggy code was added in:
commit 4a2d789267e00b5a1175ecd2ddefcc78b83fbf09
Author: Wang Lei <wang840925@gmail.com>
Date: Wed Aug 11 09:37:58 2010 +0100
Subject: DNS: If the DNS server returns an error, allow that to be cached [ver #2]
This can trivially be reproduced by any user with the following program
compiled with -lkeyutils:
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
#include <err.h>
static char payload[] = "#dnserror=6";
int main()
{
key_serial_t key;
key = add_key("dns_resolver", "a", payload, sizeof(payload),
KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING);
if (key == -1)
err(1, "add_key");
if (keyctl_read(key, NULL, 0) == -1)
err(1, "read_key");
return 0;
}
What should happen is that keyctl_read() reports error 6 (ENXIO) to the user:
dns-break: read_key: No such device or address
but instead the kernel oopses.
This cannot be reproduced with the 'keyutils add' or 'keyutils padd' commands
as both of those cut the data down below the NUL termination that must be
included in the data. Without this dns_resolver_instantiate() will return
-EINVAL and the key will not be instantiated such that it can be read.
The oops looks like:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010
IP: [<ffffffff811b99f7>] user_read+0x4f/0x8f
PGD 3bdf8067 PUD 385b9067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
last sysfs file: /sys/devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:19.0/irq
CPU 0
Modules linked in:
Pid: 2150, comm: dns-break Not tainted 2.6.38-rc7-cachefs+ #468 /DG965RY
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff811b99f7>] [<ffffffff811b99f7>] user_read+0x4f/0x8f
RSP: 0018:ffff88003bf47f08 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff88003b5ea378 RCX: ffffffff81972368
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88003b5ea378
RBP: ffff88003bf47f28 R08: ffff88003be56620 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000395 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffffffffffffa1
FS: 00007feab5751700(0000) GS:ffff88003e000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 000000003de40000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process dns-break (pid: 2150, threadinfo ffff88003bf46000, task ffff88003be56090)
Stack:
ffff88003b5ea378 ffff88003b5ea3a0 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
ffff88003bf47f68 ffffffff811b708e ffff88003c442bc8 0000000000000000
00000000004005a0 00007fffba368060 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff811b708e>] keyctl_read_key+0xac/0xcf
[<ffffffff811b7c07>] sys_keyctl+0x75/0xb6
[<ffffffff81001f7b>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Code: 75 1f 48 83 7b 28 00 75 18 c6 05 58 2b fb 00 01 be bb 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 76 1c 75 81 e8 13 c2 e9 ff 4c 8b b3 e0 00 00 00 4d 85 ed <41> 0f b7 5e 10 74 2d 4d 85 e4 74 28 e8 98 79 ee ff 49 39 dd 48
RIP [<ffffffff811b99f7>] user_read+0x4f/0x8f
RSP <ffff88003bf47f08>
CR2: 0000000000000010
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
cc: Wang Lei <wang840925@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2011-03-03 14:28:58 +03:00
return user_read ( key , buffer , buflen ) ;
}
2010-08-04 18:16:33 +04:00
struct key_type key_type_dns_resolver = {
. name = " dns_resolver " ,
2019-06-26 23:02:33 +03:00
. flags = KEY_TYPE_NET_DOMAIN ,
2014-07-18 21:56:36 +04:00
. preparse = dns_resolver_preparse ,
. free_preparse = dns_resolver_free_preparse ,
. instantiate = generic_key_instantiate ,
2014-09-16 20:36:06 +04:00
. match_preparse = dns_resolver_match_preparse ,
2010-08-04 18:16:33 +04:00
. revoke = user_revoke ,
. destroy = user_destroy ,
2010-08-11 12:37:58 +04:00
. describe = dns_resolver_describe ,
DNS: Fix a NULL pointer deref when trying to read an error key [CVE-2011-1076]
When a DNS resolver key is instantiated with an error indication, attempts to
read that key will result in an oops because user_read() is expecting there to
be a payload - and there isn't one [CVE-2011-1076].
Give the DNS resolver key its own read handler that returns the error cached in
key->type_data.x[0] as an error rather than crashing.
Also make the kenter() at the beginning of dns_resolver_instantiate() limit the
amount of data it prints, since the data is not necessarily NUL-terminated.
The buggy code was added in:
commit 4a2d789267e00b5a1175ecd2ddefcc78b83fbf09
Author: Wang Lei <wang840925@gmail.com>
Date: Wed Aug 11 09:37:58 2010 +0100
Subject: DNS: If the DNS server returns an error, allow that to be cached [ver #2]
This can trivially be reproduced by any user with the following program
compiled with -lkeyutils:
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
#include <err.h>
static char payload[] = "#dnserror=6";
int main()
{
key_serial_t key;
key = add_key("dns_resolver", "a", payload, sizeof(payload),
KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING);
if (key == -1)
err(1, "add_key");
if (keyctl_read(key, NULL, 0) == -1)
err(1, "read_key");
return 0;
}
What should happen is that keyctl_read() reports error 6 (ENXIO) to the user:
dns-break: read_key: No such device or address
but instead the kernel oopses.
This cannot be reproduced with the 'keyutils add' or 'keyutils padd' commands
as both of those cut the data down below the NUL termination that must be
included in the data. Without this dns_resolver_instantiate() will return
-EINVAL and the key will not be instantiated such that it can be read.
The oops looks like:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010
IP: [<ffffffff811b99f7>] user_read+0x4f/0x8f
PGD 3bdf8067 PUD 385b9067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
last sysfs file: /sys/devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:19.0/irq
CPU 0
Modules linked in:
Pid: 2150, comm: dns-break Not tainted 2.6.38-rc7-cachefs+ #468 /DG965RY
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff811b99f7>] [<ffffffff811b99f7>] user_read+0x4f/0x8f
RSP: 0018:ffff88003bf47f08 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff88003b5ea378 RCX: ffffffff81972368
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88003b5ea378
RBP: ffff88003bf47f28 R08: ffff88003be56620 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000395 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffffffffffffa1
FS: 00007feab5751700(0000) GS:ffff88003e000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 000000003de40000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process dns-break (pid: 2150, threadinfo ffff88003bf46000, task ffff88003be56090)
Stack:
ffff88003b5ea378 ffff88003b5ea3a0 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
ffff88003bf47f68 ffffffff811b708e ffff88003c442bc8 0000000000000000
00000000004005a0 00007fffba368060 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff811b708e>] keyctl_read_key+0xac/0xcf
[<ffffffff811b7c07>] sys_keyctl+0x75/0xb6
[<ffffffff81001f7b>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Code: 75 1f 48 83 7b 28 00 75 18 c6 05 58 2b fb 00 01 be bb 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 76 1c 75 81 e8 13 c2 e9 ff 4c 8b b3 e0 00 00 00 4d 85 ed <41> 0f b7 5e 10 74 2d 4d 85 e4 74 28 e8 98 79 ee ff 49 39 dd 48
RIP [<ffffffff811b99f7>] user_read+0x4f/0x8f
RSP <ffff88003bf47f08>
CR2: 0000000000000010
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
cc: Wang Lei <wang840925@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2011-03-03 14:28:58 +03:00
. read = dns_resolver_read ,
2010-08-04 18:16:33 +04:00
} ;
static int __init init_dns_resolver ( void )
{
struct cred * cred ;
struct key * keyring ;
int ret ;
/* create an override credential set with a special thread keyring in
* which DNS requests are cached
*
* this is used to prevent malicious redirections from being installed
* with add_key ( ) .
*/
cred = prepare_kernel_cred ( NULL ) ;
if ( ! cred )
return - ENOMEM ;
2012-12-17 03:40:50 +04:00
keyring = keyring_alloc ( " .dns_resolver " ,
GLOBAL_ROOT_UID , GLOBAL_ROOT_GID , cred ,
2019-07-11 04:43:43 +03:00
( KEY_POS_ALL & ~ KEY_POS_SETATTR ) |
KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ ,
KEYS: Add a facility to restrict new links into a keyring
Add a facility whereby proposed new links to be added to a keyring can be
vetted, permitting them to be rejected if necessary. This can be used to
block public keys from which the signature cannot be verified or for which
the signature verification fails. It could also be used to provide
blacklisting.
This affects operations like add_key(), KEYCTL_LINK and KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE.
To this end:
(1) A function pointer is added to the key struct that, if set, points to
the vetting function. This is called as:
int (*restrict_link)(struct key *keyring,
const struct key_type *key_type,
unsigned long key_flags,
const union key_payload *key_payload),
where 'keyring' will be the keyring being added to, key_type and
key_payload will describe the key being added and key_flags[*] can be
AND'ed with KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED.
[*] This parameter will be removed in a later patch when
KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED is removed.
The function should return 0 to allow the link to take place or an
error (typically -ENOKEY, -ENOPKG or -EKEYREJECTED) to reject the
link.
The pointer should not be set directly, but rather should be set
through keyring_alloc().
Note that if called during add_key(), preparse is called before this
method, but a key isn't actually allocated until after this function
is called.
(2) KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION is added. This can be passed to
key_create_or_update() or key_instantiate_and_link() to bypass the
restriction check.
(3) KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY is removed. The entire contents of a keyring
with this restriction emplaced can be considered 'trustworthy' by
virtue of being in the keyring when that keyring is consulted.
(4) key_alloc() and keyring_alloc() take an extra argument that will be
used to set restrict_link in the new key. This ensures that the
pointer is set before the key is published, thus preventing a window
of unrestrictedness. Normally this argument will be NULL.
(5) As a temporary affair, keyring_restrict_trusted_only() is added. It
should be passed to keyring_alloc() as the extra argument instead of
setting KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY on a keyring. This will be replaced in
a later patch with functions that look in the appropriate places for
authoritative keys.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2016-04-06 18:14:24 +03:00
KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA , NULL , NULL ) ;
2010-08-04 18:16:33 +04:00
if ( IS_ERR ( keyring ) ) {
ret = PTR_ERR ( keyring ) ;
goto failed_put_cred ;
}
ret = register_key_type ( & key_type_dns_resolver ) ;
if ( ret < 0 )
goto failed_put_key ;
/* instruct request_key() to use this special keyring as a cache for
* the results it looks up */
2012-01-18 19:31:45 +04:00
set_bit ( KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_CLEAR , & keyring - > flags ) ;
2010-08-04 18:16:33 +04:00
cred - > thread_keyring = keyring ;
cred - > jit_keyring = KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING ;
dns_resolver_cache = cred ;
kdebug ( " DNS resolver keyring: %d \n " , key_serial ( keyring ) ) ;
return 0 ;
failed_put_key :
key_put ( keyring ) ;
failed_put_cred :
put_cred ( cred ) ;
return ret ;
}
static void __exit exit_dns_resolver ( void )
{
key_revoke ( dns_resolver_cache - > thread_keyring ) ;
unregister_key_type ( & key_type_dns_resolver ) ;
put_cred ( dns_resolver_cache ) ;
}
module_init ( init_dns_resolver )
module_exit ( exit_dns_resolver )
MODULE_LICENSE ( " GPL " ) ;