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linux/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S

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treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 234 Based on 1 normalized pattern(s): this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as published by the free software foundation this program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful but without any warranty without even the implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose see the gnu general public license for more details you should have received a copy of the gnu general public license along with this program if not see http www gnu org licenses extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-only has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 503 file(s). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Alexios Zavras <alexios.zavras@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Reviewed-by: Enrico Weigelt <info@metux.net> Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190602204653.811534538@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-06-03 07:44:50 +02:00
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
arm64: KVM: HYP mode entry points Add the entry points for HYP mode (both for hypercalls and exception handling). Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
2015-10-25 08:01:56 +00:00
/*
arm64: Move the content of bpi.S to hyp-entry.S bpi.S was introduced as we were starting to build the Spectre v2 mitigation framework, and it was rather unclear that it would become strictly KVM specific. Now that the picture is a lot clearer, let's move the content of that file to hyp-entry.S, where it actually belong. Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2018-04-10 11:36:45 +01:00
* Copyright (C) 2015-2018 - ARM Ltd
arm64: KVM: HYP mode entry points Add the entry points for HYP mode (both for hypercalls and exception handling). Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
2015-10-25 08:01:56 +00:00
* Author: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
*/
arm64: KVM: Add SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 fast handling We want SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 to be fast. As fast as possible. So let's intercept it as early as we can by testing for the function call number as soon as we've identified a HVC call coming from the guest. Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2018-02-06 17:56:15 +00:00
#include <linux/arm-smccc.h>
arm64: KVM: HYP mode entry points Add the entry points for HYP mode (both for hypercalls and exception handling). Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
2015-10-25 08:01:56 +00:00
#include <linux/linkage.h>
#include <asm/alternative.h>
#include <asm/assembler.h>
#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
#include <asm/kvm_arm.h>
#include <asm/kvm_asm.h>
arm64: Move the content of bpi.S to hyp-entry.S bpi.S was introduced as we were starting to build the Spectre v2 mitigation framework, and it was rather unclear that it would become strictly KVM specific. Now that the picture is a lot clearer, let's move the content of that file to hyp-entry.S, where it actually belong. Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2018-04-10 11:36:45 +01:00
#include <asm/mmu.h>
KVM: arm64: Move BP hardening helpers into spectre.h The BP hardening helpers are an integral part of the Spectre-v2 mitigation, so move them into asm/spectre.h and inline the arm64_get_bp_hardening_data() function at the same time. Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Cc: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201113113847.21619-6-will@kernel.org
2020-11-13 11:38:42 +00:00
#include <asm/spectre.h>
arm64: KVM: HYP mode entry points Add the entry points for HYP mode (both for hypercalls and exception handling). Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
2015-10-25 08:01:56 +00:00
KVM: arm64: Add kvm_extable for vaxorcism code KVM has a one instruction window where it will allow an SError exception to be consumed by the hypervisor without treating it as a hypervisor bug. This is used to consume asynchronous external abort that were caused by the guest. As we are about to add another location that survives unexpected exceptions, generalise this code to make it behave like the host's extable. KVM's version has to be mapped to EL2 to be accessible on nVHE systems. The SError vaxorcism code is a one instruction window, so has two entries in the extable. Because the KVM code is copied for VHE and nVHE, we end up with four entries, half of which correspond with code that isn't mapped. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2020-08-21 15:07:05 +01:00
.macro save_caller_saved_regs_vect
/* x0 and x1 were saved in the vector entry */
stp x2, x3, [sp, #-16]!
stp x4, x5, [sp, #-16]!
stp x6, x7, [sp, #-16]!
stp x8, x9, [sp, #-16]!
stp x10, x11, [sp, #-16]!
stp x12, x13, [sp, #-16]!
stp x14, x15, [sp, #-16]!
stp x16, x17, [sp, #-16]!
.endm
.macro restore_caller_saved_regs_vect
ldp x16, x17, [sp], #16
ldp x14, x15, [sp], #16
ldp x12, x13, [sp], #16
ldp x10, x11, [sp], #16
ldp x8, x9, [sp], #16
ldp x6, x7, [sp], #16
ldp x4, x5, [sp], #16
ldp x2, x3, [sp], #16
ldp x0, x1, [sp], #16
.endm
arm64: KVM: HYP mode entry points Add the entry points for HYP mode (both for hypercalls and exception handling). Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
2015-10-25 08:01:56 +00:00
.text
el1_sync: // Guest trapped into EL2
KVM: arm64: Avoid storing the vcpu pointer on the stack We already have the percpu area for the host cpu state, which points to the VCPU, so there's no need to store the VCPU pointer on the stack on every context switch. We can be a little more clever and just use tpidr_el2 for the percpu offset and load the VCPU pointer from the host context. This has the benefit of being able to retrieve the host context even when our stack is corrupted, and it has a potential performance benefit because we trade a store plus a load for an mrs and a load on a round trip to the guest. This does require us to calculate the percpu offset without including the offset from the kernel mapping of the percpu array to the linear mapping of the array (which is what we store in tpidr_el1), because a PC-relative generated address in EL2 is already giving us the hyp alias of the linear mapping of a kernel address. We do this in __cpu_init_hyp_mode() by using kvm_ksym_ref(). The code that accesses ESR_EL2 was previously using an alternative to use the _EL1 accessor on VHE systems, but this was actually unnecessary as the _EL1 accessor aliases the ESR_EL2 register on VHE, and the _EL2 accessor does the same thing on both systems. Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
2017-10-08 17:01:56 +02:00
mrs x0, esr_el2
lsr x0, x0, #ESR_ELx_EC_SHIFT
arm64: KVM: Optimize __guest_enter/exit() to save a few instructions We are doing an unnecessary stack push/pop operation when restoring the guest registers x0-x18 in __guest_enter(). This patch saves the two instructions by using x18 as a base register. No need to store the vcpu context pointer in stack because it is redundant, the same information is available in tpidr_el2. The function __guest_exit() calling convention is slightly modified, caller only pushes the regs x0-x1 to stack instead of regs x0-x3. Signed-off-by: Shanker Donthineni <shankerd@codeaurora.org> Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
2016-08-30 21:08:32 -05:00
cmp x0, #ESR_ELx_EC_HVC64
arm64: KVM: Add SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 fast handling We want SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 to be fast. As fast as possible. So let's intercept it as early as we can by testing for the function call number as soon as we've identified a HVC call coming from the guest. Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2018-02-06 17:56:15 +00:00
ccmp x0, #ESR_ELx_EC_HVC32, #4, ne
arm64: KVM: HYP mode entry points Add the entry points for HYP mode (both for hypercalls and exception handling). Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
2015-10-25 08:01:56 +00:00
b.ne el1_trap
arm64: KVM: Add SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 fast handling We want SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 to be fast. As fast as possible. So let's intercept it as early as we can by testing for the function call number as soon as we've identified a HVC call coming from the guest. Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2018-02-06 17:56:15 +00:00
/*
* Fastest possible path for ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1.
* The workaround has already been applied on the host,
* so let's quickly get back to the guest. We don't bother
* restoring x1, as it can be clobbered anyway.
*/
ldr x1, [sp] // Guest's x0
eor w1, w1, #ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1
arm64: KVM: Handle guest's ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 requests In order to forward the guest's ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 calls to EL3, add a small(-ish) sequence to handle it at EL2. Special care must be taken to track the state of the guest itself by updating the workaround flags. We also rely on patching to enable calls into the firmware. Note that since we need to execute branches, this always executes after the Spectre-v2 mitigation has been applied. Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2018-05-29 13:11:17 +01:00
cbz w1, wa_epilogue
/* ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 handling */
eor w1, w1, #(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 ^ \
ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2)
arm64: KVM: Add SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 fast handling We want SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 to be fast. As fast as possible. So let's intercept it as early as we can by testing for the function call number as soon as we've identified a HVC call coming from the guest. Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2018-02-06 17:56:15 +00:00
cbnz w1, el1_trap
arm64: KVM: Handle guest's ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 requests In order to forward the guest's ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 calls to EL3, add a small(-ish) sequence to handle it at EL2. Special care must be taken to track the state of the guest itself by updating the workaround flags. We also rely on patching to enable calls into the firmware. Note that since we need to execute branches, this always executes after the Spectre-v2 mitigation has been applied. Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2018-05-29 13:11:17 +01:00
wa_epilogue:
mov x0, xzr
arm64: KVM: Add SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 fast handling We want SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 to be fast. As fast as possible. So let's intercept it as early as we can by testing for the function call number as soon as we've identified a HVC call coming from the guest. Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2018-02-06 17:56:15 +00:00
add sp, sp, #16
eret
arm64: entry: Place an SB sequence following an ERET instruction Some CPUs can speculate past an ERET instruction and potentially perform speculative accesses to memory before processing the exception return. Since the register state is often controlled by a lower privilege level at the point of an ERET, this could potentially be used as part of a side-channel attack. This patch emits an SB sequence after each ERET so that speculation is held up on exception return. Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2018-06-14 11:23:38 +01:00
sb
arm64: KVM: Add SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 fast handling We want SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 to be fast. As fast as possible. So let's intercept it as early as we can by testing for the function call number as soon as we've identified a HVC call coming from the guest. Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2018-02-06 17:56:15 +00:00
arm64: KVM: HYP mode entry points Add the entry points for HYP mode (both for hypercalls and exception handling). Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
2015-10-25 08:01:56 +00:00
el1_trap:
KVM: arm64: Avoid storing the vcpu pointer on the stack We already have the percpu area for the host cpu state, which points to the VCPU, so there's no need to store the VCPU pointer on the stack on every context switch. We can be a little more clever and just use tpidr_el2 for the percpu offset and load the VCPU pointer from the host context. This has the benefit of being able to retrieve the host context even when our stack is corrupted, and it has a potential performance benefit because we trade a store plus a load for an mrs and a load on a round trip to the guest. This does require us to calculate the percpu offset without including the offset from the kernel mapping of the percpu array to the linear mapping of the array (which is what we store in tpidr_el1), because a PC-relative generated address in EL2 is already giving us the hyp alias of the linear mapping of a kernel address. We do this in __cpu_init_hyp_mode() by using kvm_ksym_ref(). The code that accesses ESR_EL2 was previously using an alternative to use the _EL1 accessor on VHE systems, but this was actually unnecessary as the _EL1 accessor aliases the ESR_EL2 register on VHE, and the _EL2 accessor does the same thing on both systems. Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
2017-10-08 17:01:56 +02:00
get_vcpu_ptr x1, x0
arm64: KVM: Optimize __guest_enter/exit() to save a few instructions We are doing an unnecessary stack push/pop operation when restoring the guest registers x0-x18 in __guest_enter(). This patch saves the two instructions by using x18 as a base register. No need to store the vcpu context pointer in stack because it is redundant, the same information is available in tpidr_el2. The function __guest_exit() calling convention is slightly modified, caller only pushes the regs x0-x1 to stack instead of regs x0-x3. Signed-off-by: Shanker Donthineni <shankerd@codeaurora.org> Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
2016-08-30 21:08:32 -05:00
mov x0, #ARM_EXCEPTION_TRAP
arm64: KVM: HYP mode entry points Add the entry points for HYP mode (both for hypercalls and exception handling). Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
2015-10-25 08:01:56 +00:00
b __guest_exit
el1_irq:
KVM: arm64: Handle physical FIQ as an IRQ while running a guest As we we now entertain the possibility of FIQ being used on the host, treat the signalling of a FIQ while running a guest as an IRQ, causing an exit instead of a HYP panic. Reviewed-by: Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
2021-02-19 16:39:31 +00:00
el1_fiq:
KVM: arm64: Avoid storing the vcpu pointer on the stack We already have the percpu area for the host cpu state, which points to the VCPU, so there's no need to store the VCPU pointer on the stack on every context switch. We can be a little more clever and just use tpidr_el2 for the percpu offset and load the VCPU pointer from the host context. This has the benefit of being able to retrieve the host context even when our stack is corrupted, and it has a potential performance benefit because we trade a store plus a load for an mrs and a load on a round trip to the guest. This does require us to calculate the percpu offset without including the offset from the kernel mapping of the percpu array to the linear mapping of the array (which is what we store in tpidr_el1), because a PC-relative generated address in EL2 is already giving us the hyp alias of the linear mapping of a kernel address. We do this in __cpu_init_hyp_mode() by using kvm_ksym_ref(). The code that accesses ESR_EL2 was previously using an alternative to use the _EL1 accessor on VHE systems, but this was actually unnecessary as the _EL1 accessor aliases the ESR_EL2 register on VHE, and the _EL2 accessor does the same thing on both systems. Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
2017-10-08 17:01:56 +02:00
get_vcpu_ptr x1, x0
arm64: KVM: Optimize __guest_enter/exit() to save a few instructions We are doing an unnecessary stack push/pop operation when restoring the guest registers x0-x18 in __guest_enter(). This patch saves the two instructions by using x18 as a base register. No need to store the vcpu context pointer in stack because it is redundant, the same information is available in tpidr_el2. The function __guest_exit() calling convention is slightly modified, caller only pushes the regs x0-x1 to stack instead of regs x0-x3. Signed-off-by: Shanker Donthineni <shankerd@codeaurora.org> Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
2016-08-30 21:08:32 -05:00
mov x0, #ARM_EXCEPTION_IRQ
arm64: KVM: HYP mode entry points Add the entry points for HYP mode (both for hypercalls and exception handling). Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
2015-10-25 08:01:56 +00:00
b __guest_exit
arm64: KVM: Route asynchronous aborts As we now have some basic handling to EL1-triggered aborts, we can actually report them to KVM. Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
2016-09-06 14:02:04 +01:00
el1_error:
KVM: arm64: Avoid storing the vcpu pointer on the stack We already have the percpu area for the host cpu state, which points to the VCPU, so there's no need to store the VCPU pointer on the stack on every context switch. We can be a little more clever and just use tpidr_el2 for the percpu offset and load the VCPU pointer from the host context. This has the benefit of being able to retrieve the host context even when our stack is corrupted, and it has a potential performance benefit because we trade a store plus a load for an mrs and a load on a round trip to the guest. This does require us to calculate the percpu offset without including the offset from the kernel mapping of the percpu array to the linear mapping of the array (which is what we store in tpidr_el1), because a PC-relative generated address in EL2 is already giving us the hyp alias of the linear mapping of a kernel address. We do this in __cpu_init_hyp_mode() by using kvm_ksym_ref(). The code that accesses ESR_EL2 was previously using an alternative to use the _EL1 accessor on VHE systems, but this was actually unnecessary as the _EL1 accessor aliases the ESR_EL2 register on VHE, and the _EL2 accessor does the same thing on both systems. Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
2017-10-08 17:01:56 +02:00
get_vcpu_ptr x1, x0
arm64: KVM: Route asynchronous aborts As we now have some basic handling to EL1-triggered aborts, we can actually report them to KVM. Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
2016-09-06 14:02:04 +01:00
mov x0, #ARM_EXCEPTION_EL1_SERROR
b __guest_exit
KVM: arm64: Safety check PSTATE when entering guest and handle IL This commit adds a paranoid check when entering the guest to make sure we don't attempt running guest code in an equally or more privilged mode than the hypervisor. We also catch other accidental programming of the SPSR_EL2 which results in an illegal exception return and report this safely back to the user. Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
2018-10-17 20:21:16 +02:00
el2_sync:
KVM: arm64: Survive synchronous exceptions caused by AT instructions KVM doesn't expect any synchronous exceptions when executing, any such exception leads to a panic(). AT instructions access the guest page tables, and can cause a synchronous external abort to be taken. The arm-arm is unclear on what should happen if the guest has configured the hardware update of the access-flag, and a memory type in TCR_EL1 that does not support atomic operations. B2.2.6 "Possible implementation restrictions on using atomic instructions" from DDI0487F.a lists synchronous external abort as a possible behaviour of atomic instructions that target memory that isn't writeback cacheable, but the page table walker may behave differently. Make KVM robust to synchronous exceptions caused by AT instructions. Add a get_user() style helper for AT instructions that returns -EFAULT if an exception was generated. While KVM's version of the exception table mixes synchronous and asynchronous exceptions, only one of these can occur at each location. Re-enter the guest when the AT instructions take an exception on the assumption the guest will take the same exception. This isn't guaranteed to make forward progress, as the AT instructions may always walk the page tables, but guest execution may use the translation cached in the TLB. This isn't a problem, as since commit 5dcd0fdbb492 ("KVM: arm64: Defer guest entry when an asynchronous exception is pending"), KVM will return to the host to process IRQs allowing the rest of the system to keep running. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # <v5.3: 5dcd0fdbb492 ("KVM: arm64: Defer guest entry when an asynchronous exception is pending") Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2020-08-21 15:07:06 +01:00
/* Check for illegal exception return */
KVM: arm64: Safety check PSTATE when entering guest and handle IL This commit adds a paranoid check when entering the guest to make sure we don't attempt running guest code in an equally or more privilged mode than the hypervisor. We also catch other accidental programming of the SPSR_EL2 which results in an illegal exception return and report this safely back to the user. Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
2018-10-17 20:21:16 +02:00
mrs x0, spsr_el2
KVM: arm64: Survive synchronous exceptions caused by AT instructions KVM doesn't expect any synchronous exceptions when executing, any such exception leads to a panic(). AT instructions access the guest page tables, and can cause a synchronous external abort to be taken. The arm-arm is unclear on what should happen if the guest has configured the hardware update of the access-flag, and a memory type in TCR_EL1 that does not support atomic operations. B2.2.6 "Possible implementation restrictions on using atomic instructions" from DDI0487F.a lists synchronous external abort as a possible behaviour of atomic instructions that target memory that isn't writeback cacheable, but the page table walker may behave differently. Make KVM robust to synchronous exceptions caused by AT instructions. Add a get_user() style helper for AT instructions that returns -EFAULT if an exception was generated. While KVM's version of the exception table mixes synchronous and asynchronous exceptions, only one of these can occur at each location. Re-enter the guest when the AT instructions take an exception on the assumption the guest will take the same exception. This isn't guaranteed to make forward progress, as the AT instructions may always walk the page tables, but guest execution may use the translation cached in the TLB. This isn't a problem, as since commit 5dcd0fdbb492 ("KVM: arm64: Defer guest entry when an asynchronous exception is pending"), KVM will return to the host to process IRQs allowing the rest of the system to keep running. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # <v5.3: 5dcd0fdbb492 ("KVM: arm64: Defer guest entry when an asynchronous exception is pending") Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2020-08-21 15:07:06 +01:00
tbnz x0, #20, 1f
KVM: arm64: Safety check PSTATE when entering guest and handle IL This commit adds a paranoid check when entering the guest to make sure we don't attempt running guest code in an equally or more privilged mode than the hypervisor. We also catch other accidental programming of the SPSR_EL2 which results in an illegal exception return and report this safely back to the user. Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
2018-10-17 20:21:16 +02:00
KVM: arm64: Survive synchronous exceptions caused by AT instructions KVM doesn't expect any synchronous exceptions when executing, any such exception leads to a panic(). AT instructions access the guest page tables, and can cause a synchronous external abort to be taken. The arm-arm is unclear on what should happen if the guest has configured the hardware update of the access-flag, and a memory type in TCR_EL1 that does not support atomic operations. B2.2.6 "Possible implementation restrictions on using atomic instructions" from DDI0487F.a lists synchronous external abort as a possible behaviour of atomic instructions that target memory that isn't writeback cacheable, but the page table walker may behave differently. Make KVM robust to synchronous exceptions caused by AT instructions. Add a get_user() style helper for AT instructions that returns -EFAULT if an exception was generated. While KVM's version of the exception table mixes synchronous and asynchronous exceptions, only one of these can occur at each location. Re-enter the guest when the AT instructions take an exception on the assumption the guest will take the same exception. This isn't guaranteed to make forward progress, as the AT instructions may always walk the page tables, but guest execution may use the translation cached in the TLB. This isn't a problem, as since commit 5dcd0fdbb492 ("KVM: arm64: Defer guest entry when an asynchronous exception is pending"), KVM will return to the host to process IRQs allowing the rest of the system to keep running. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # <v5.3: 5dcd0fdbb492 ("KVM: arm64: Defer guest entry when an asynchronous exception is pending") Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2020-08-21 15:07:06 +01:00
save_caller_saved_regs_vect
stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]!
bl kvm_unexpected_el2_exception
ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16
restore_caller_saved_regs_vect
eret
KVM: arm64: Safety check PSTATE when entering guest and handle IL This commit adds a paranoid check when entering the guest to make sure we don't attempt running guest code in an equally or more privilged mode than the hypervisor. We also catch other accidental programming of the SPSR_EL2 which results in an illegal exception return and report this safely back to the user. Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
2018-10-17 20:21:16 +02:00
KVM: arm64: Survive synchronous exceptions caused by AT instructions KVM doesn't expect any synchronous exceptions when executing, any such exception leads to a panic(). AT instructions access the guest page tables, and can cause a synchronous external abort to be taken. The arm-arm is unclear on what should happen if the guest has configured the hardware update of the access-flag, and a memory type in TCR_EL1 that does not support atomic operations. B2.2.6 "Possible implementation restrictions on using atomic instructions" from DDI0487F.a lists synchronous external abort as a possible behaviour of atomic instructions that target memory that isn't writeback cacheable, but the page table walker may behave differently. Make KVM robust to synchronous exceptions caused by AT instructions. Add a get_user() style helper for AT instructions that returns -EFAULT if an exception was generated. While KVM's version of the exception table mixes synchronous and asynchronous exceptions, only one of these can occur at each location. Re-enter the guest when the AT instructions take an exception on the assumption the guest will take the same exception. This isn't guaranteed to make forward progress, as the AT instructions may always walk the page tables, but guest execution may use the translation cached in the TLB. This isn't a problem, as since commit 5dcd0fdbb492 ("KVM: arm64: Defer guest entry when an asynchronous exception is pending"), KVM will return to the host to process IRQs allowing the rest of the system to keep running. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # <v5.3: 5dcd0fdbb492 ("KVM: arm64: Defer guest entry when an asynchronous exception is pending") Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2020-08-21 15:07:06 +01:00
1:
KVM: arm64: Safety check PSTATE when entering guest and handle IL This commit adds a paranoid check when entering the guest to make sure we don't attempt running guest code in an equally or more privilged mode than the hypervisor. We also catch other accidental programming of the SPSR_EL2 which results in an illegal exception return and report this safely back to the user. Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
2018-10-17 20:21:16 +02:00
/* Let's attempt a recovery from the illegal exception return */
get_vcpu_ptr x1, x0
mov x0, #ARM_EXCEPTION_IL
b __guest_exit
arm64: KVM: Handle async aborts delivered while at EL2 If EL1 generates an asynchronous abort and then traps into EL2 before the abort has been delivered, we may end-up with the abort firing at the worse possible place: on the host. In order to avoid this, it is necessary to take the abort at EL2, by clearing the PSTATE.A bit. In order to survive this abort, we do it at a point where we're in a known state with respect to the world switch, and handle the resulting exception, overloading the exit code in the process. Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
2016-09-06 14:02:07 +01:00
el2_error:
KVM: arm64: Add kvm_extable for vaxorcism code KVM has a one instruction window where it will allow an SError exception to be consumed by the hypervisor without treating it as a hypervisor bug. This is used to consume asynchronous external abort that were caused by the guest. As we are about to add another location that survives unexpected exceptions, generalise this code to make it behave like the host's extable. KVM's version has to be mapped to EL2 to be accessible on nVHE systems. The SError vaxorcism code is a one instruction window, so has two entries in the extable. Because the KVM code is copied for VHE and nVHE, we end up with four entries, half of which correspond with code that isn't mapped. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2020-08-21 15:07:05 +01:00
save_caller_saved_regs_vect
stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]!
bl kvm_unexpected_el2_exception
ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16
restore_caller_saved_regs_vect
arm64: KVM: Move stashing of x0/x1 into the vector code itself All our useful entry points into the hypervisor are starting by saving x0 and x1 on the stack. Let's move those into the vectors by introducing macros that annotate whether a vector is valid or not, thus indicating whether we want to stash registers or not. The only drawback is that we now also stash registers for el2_error, but this should never happen, and we pop them back right at the start of the handling sequence. Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
2018-02-12 17:53:00 +00:00
arm64: KVM: Handle async aborts delivered while at EL2 If EL1 generates an asynchronous abort and then traps into EL2 before the abort has been delivered, we may end-up with the abort firing at the worse possible place: on the host. In order to avoid this, it is necessary to take the abort at EL2, by clearing the PSTATE.A bit. In order to survive this abort, we do it at a point where we're in a known state with respect to the world switch, and handle the resulting exception, overloading the exit code in the process. Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
2016-09-06 14:02:07 +01:00
eret
arm64: entry: Place an SB sequence following an ERET instruction Some CPUs can speculate past an ERET instruction and potentially perform speculative accesses to memory before processing the exception return. Since the register state is often controlled by a lower privilege level at the point of an ERET, this could potentially be used as part of a side-channel attack. This patch emits an SB sequence after each ERET so that speculation is held up on exception return. Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2018-06-14 11:23:38 +01:00
sb
arm64: KVM: Handle async aborts delivered while at EL2 If EL1 generates an asynchronous abort and then traps into EL2 before the abort has been delivered, we may end-up with the abort firing at the worse possible place: on the host. In order to avoid this, it is necessary to take the abort at EL2, by clearing the PSTATE.A bit. In order to survive this abort, we do it at a point where we're in a known state with respect to the world switch, and handle the resulting exception, overloading the exit code in the process. Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
2016-09-06 14:02:07 +01:00
KVM: arm64: Restore hyp when panicking in guest context If the guest context is loaded when a panic is triggered, restore the hyp context so e.g. the shadow call stack works when hyp_panic() is called and SP_EL0 is valid when the host's panic() is called. Use the hyp context's __hyp_running_vcpu field to track when hyp transitions to and from the guest vcpu so the exception handlers know whether the context needs to be restored. Signed-off-by: Andrew Scull <ascull@google.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200915104643.2543892-11-ascull@google.com
2020-09-15 11:46:34 +01:00
.macro invalid_vector label, target = __guest_exit_panic
arm64: KVM: HYP mode entry points Add the entry points for HYP mode (both for hypercalls and exception handling). Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
2015-10-25 08:01:56 +00:00
.align 2
KVM: arm64: make the hyp vector table entries local Make the hyp vector table entries local functions so they are not accidentally referred to outside of this file. Using SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL matches the other vector tables (in hyp-stub.S, hibernate-asm.S and entry.S) Signed-off-by: Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210222164956.43514-1-joey.gouly@arm.com Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
2021-02-22 16:49:56 +00:00
SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(\label)
arm64: KVM: HYP mode entry points Add the entry points for HYP mode (both for hypercalls and exception handling). Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
2015-10-25 08:01:56 +00:00
b \target
arm64: kvm: Annotate assembly using modern annoations In an effort to clarify and simplify the annotation of assembly functions in the kernel new macros have been introduced. These replace ENTRY and ENDPROC with separate annotations for standard C callable functions, data and code with different calling conventions. Update the more straightforward annotations in the kvm code to the new macros. Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
2020-02-18 19:58:37 +00:00
SYM_CODE_END(\label)
arm64: KVM: HYP mode entry points Add the entry points for HYP mode (both for hypercalls and exception handling). Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
2015-10-25 08:01:56 +00:00
.endm
/* None of these should ever happen */
invalid_vector el2t_sync_invalid
invalid_vector el2t_irq_invalid
invalid_vector el2t_fiq_invalid
invalid_vector el2t_error_invalid
invalid_vector el2h_irq_invalid
invalid_vector el2h_fiq_invalid
.ltorg
.align 11
KVM: arm64: Abstract the size of the HYP vectors pre-amble The EL2 vector hardening feature causes KVM to generate vectors for each type of CPU present in the system. The generated sequences already do some of the early guest-exit work (i.e. saving registers). To avoid duplication the generated vectors branch to the original vector just after the preamble. This size is hard coded. Adding new instructions to the HYP vector causes strange side effects, which are difficult to debug as the affected code is patched in at runtime. Add KVM_VECTOR_PREAMBLE to tell kvm_patch_vector_branch() how big the preamble is. The valid_vect macro can then validate this at build time. Reviewed-by: Julien Thierry <julien.thierry@arm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
2019-06-18 16:17:34 +01:00
.macro check_preamble_length start, end
/* kvm_patch_vector_branch() generates code that jumps over the preamble. */
.if ((\end-\start) != KVM_VECTOR_PREAMBLE)
.error "KVM vector preamble length mismatch"
.endif
.endm
arm64: KVM: Move stashing of x0/x1 into the vector code itself All our useful entry points into the hypervisor are starting by saving x0 and x1 on the stack. Let's move those into the vectors by introducing macros that annotate whether a vector is valid or not, thus indicating whether we want to stash registers or not. The only drawback is that we now also stash registers for el2_error, but this should never happen, and we pop them back right at the start of the handling sequence. Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
2018-02-12 17:53:00 +00:00
.macro valid_vect target
.align 7
KVM: arm64: Abstract the size of the HYP vectors pre-amble The EL2 vector hardening feature causes KVM to generate vectors for each type of CPU present in the system. The generated sequences already do some of the early guest-exit work (i.e. saving registers). To avoid duplication the generated vectors branch to the original vector just after the preamble. This size is hard coded. Adding new instructions to the HYP vector causes strange side effects, which are difficult to debug as the affected code is patched in at runtime. Add KVM_VECTOR_PREAMBLE to tell kvm_patch_vector_branch() how big the preamble is. The valid_vect macro can then validate this at build time. Reviewed-by: Julien Thierry <julien.thierry@arm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
2019-06-18 16:17:34 +01:00
661:
KVM: arm64: Consume pending SError as early as possible On systems with v8.2 we switch the 'vaxorcism' of guest SError with an alternative sequence that uses the ESB-instruction, then reads DISR_EL1. This saves the unmasking and remasking of asynchronous exceptions. We do this after we've saved the guest registers and restored the host's. Any SError that becomes pending due to this will be accounted to the guest, when it actually occurred during host-execution. Move the ESB-instruction as early as possible. Any guest SError will become pending due to this ESB-instruction and then consumed to DISR_EL1 before the host touches anything. This lets us account for host/guest SError precisely on the guest exit exception boundary. Because the ESB-instruction now lands in the preamble section of the vectors, we need to add it to the unpatched indirect vectors too, and to any sequence that may be patched in over the top. The ESB-instruction always lives in the head of the vectors, to be before any memory write. Whereas the register-store always lives in the tail. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
2019-06-18 16:17:36 +01:00
esb
arm64: KVM: Move stashing of x0/x1 into the vector code itself All our useful entry points into the hypervisor are starting by saving x0 and x1 on the stack. Let's move those into the vectors by introducing macros that annotate whether a vector is valid or not, thus indicating whether we want to stash registers or not. The only drawback is that we now also stash registers for el2_error, but this should never happen, and we pop them back right at the start of the handling sequence. Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
2018-02-12 17:53:00 +00:00
stp x0, x1, [sp, #-16]!
KVM: arm64: Abstract the size of the HYP vectors pre-amble The EL2 vector hardening feature causes KVM to generate vectors for each type of CPU present in the system. The generated sequences already do some of the early guest-exit work (i.e. saving registers). To avoid duplication the generated vectors branch to the original vector just after the preamble. This size is hard coded. Adding new instructions to the HYP vector causes strange side effects, which are difficult to debug as the affected code is patched in at runtime. Add KVM_VECTOR_PREAMBLE to tell kvm_patch_vector_branch() how big the preamble is. The valid_vect macro can then validate this at build time. Reviewed-by: Julien Thierry <julien.thierry@arm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
2019-06-18 16:17:34 +01:00
662:
arm64: KVM: Move stashing of x0/x1 into the vector code itself All our useful entry points into the hypervisor are starting by saving x0 and x1 on the stack. Let's move those into the vectors by introducing macros that annotate whether a vector is valid or not, thus indicating whether we want to stash registers or not. The only drawback is that we now also stash registers for el2_error, but this should never happen, and we pop them back right at the start of the handling sequence. Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
2018-02-12 17:53:00 +00:00
b \target
KVM: arm64: Abstract the size of the HYP vectors pre-amble The EL2 vector hardening feature causes KVM to generate vectors for each type of CPU present in the system. The generated sequences already do some of the early guest-exit work (i.e. saving registers). To avoid duplication the generated vectors branch to the original vector just after the preamble. This size is hard coded. Adding new instructions to the HYP vector causes strange side effects, which are difficult to debug as the affected code is patched in at runtime. Add KVM_VECTOR_PREAMBLE to tell kvm_patch_vector_branch() how big the preamble is. The valid_vect macro can then validate this at build time. Reviewed-by: Julien Thierry <julien.thierry@arm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
2019-06-18 16:17:34 +01:00
check_preamble_length 661b, 662b
arm64: KVM: Move stashing of x0/x1 into the vector code itself All our useful entry points into the hypervisor are starting by saving x0 and x1 on the stack. Let's move those into the vectors by introducing macros that annotate whether a vector is valid or not, thus indicating whether we want to stash registers or not. The only drawback is that we now also stash registers for el2_error, but this should never happen, and we pop them back right at the start of the handling sequence. Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
2018-02-12 17:53:00 +00:00
.endm
.macro invalid_vect target
.align 7
KVM: arm64: Abstract the size of the HYP vectors pre-amble The EL2 vector hardening feature causes KVM to generate vectors for each type of CPU present in the system. The generated sequences already do some of the early guest-exit work (i.e. saving registers). To avoid duplication the generated vectors branch to the original vector just after the preamble. This size is hard coded. Adding new instructions to the HYP vector causes strange side effects, which are difficult to debug as the affected code is patched in at runtime. Add KVM_VECTOR_PREAMBLE to tell kvm_patch_vector_branch() how big the preamble is. The valid_vect macro can then validate this at build time. Reviewed-by: Julien Thierry <julien.thierry@arm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
2019-06-18 16:17:34 +01:00
661:
KVM: arm64: Consume pending SError as early as possible On systems with v8.2 we switch the 'vaxorcism' of guest SError with an alternative sequence that uses the ESB-instruction, then reads DISR_EL1. This saves the unmasking and remasking of asynchronous exceptions. We do this after we've saved the guest registers and restored the host's. Any SError that becomes pending due to this will be accounted to the guest, when it actually occurred during host-execution. Move the ESB-instruction as early as possible. Any guest SError will become pending due to this ESB-instruction and then consumed to DISR_EL1 before the host touches anything. This lets us account for host/guest SError precisely on the guest exit exception boundary. Because the ESB-instruction now lands in the preamble section of the vectors, we need to add it to the unpatched indirect vectors too, and to any sequence that may be patched in over the top. The ESB-instruction always lives in the head of the vectors, to be before any memory write. Whereas the register-store always lives in the tail. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
2019-06-18 16:17:36 +01:00
nop
KVM: arm64: Restore hyp when panicking in guest context If the guest context is loaded when a panic is triggered, restore the hyp context so e.g. the shadow call stack works when hyp_panic() is called and SP_EL0 is valid when the host's panic() is called. Use the hyp context's __hyp_running_vcpu field to track when hyp transitions to and from the guest vcpu so the exception handlers know whether the context needs to be restored. Signed-off-by: Andrew Scull <ascull@google.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200915104643.2543892-11-ascull@google.com
2020-09-15 11:46:34 +01:00
stp x0, x1, [sp, #-16]!
KVM: arm64: Abstract the size of the HYP vectors pre-amble The EL2 vector hardening feature causes KVM to generate vectors for each type of CPU present in the system. The generated sequences already do some of the early guest-exit work (i.e. saving registers). To avoid duplication the generated vectors branch to the original vector just after the preamble. This size is hard coded. Adding new instructions to the HYP vector causes strange side effects, which are difficult to debug as the affected code is patched in at runtime. Add KVM_VECTOR_PREAMBLE to tell kvm_patch_vector_branch() how big the preamble is. The valid_vect macro can then validate this at build time. Reviewed-by: Julien Thierry <julien.thierry@arm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
2019-06-18 16:17:34 +01:00
662:
arm64: KVM: Allow far branches from vector slots to the main vectors So far, the branch from the vector slots to the main vectors can at most be 4GB from the main vectors (the reach of ADRP), and this distance is known at compile time. If we were to remap the slots to an unrelated VA, things would break badly. A way to achieve VA independence would be to load the absolute address of the vectors (__kvm_hyp_vector), either using a constant pool or a series of movs, followed by an indirect branch. This patches implements the latter solution, using another instance of a patching callback. Note that since we have to save a register pair on the stack, we branch to the *second* instruction in the vectors in order to compensate for it. This also results in having to adjust this balance in the invalid vector entry point. Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
2018-02-27 17:38:08 +00:00
b \target
KVM: arm64: Abstract the size of the HYP vectors pre-amble The EL2 vector hardening feature causes KVM to generate vectors for each type of CPU present in the system. The generated sequences already do some of the early guest-exit work (i.e. saving registers). To avoid duplication the generated vectors branch to the original vector just after the preamble. This size is hard coded. Adding new instructions to the HYP vector causes strange side effects, which are difficult to debug as the affected code is patched in at runtime. Add KVM_VECTOR_PREAMBLE to tell kvm_patch_vector_branch() how big the preamble is. The valid_vect macro can then validate this at build time. Reviewed-by: Julien Thierry <julien.thierry@arm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
2019-06-18 16:17:34 +01:00
check_preamble_length 661b, 662b
arm64: KVM: Move stashing of x0/x1 into the vector code itself All our useful entry points into the hypervisor are starting by saving x0 and x1 on the stack. Let's move those into the vectors by introducing macros that annotate whether a vector is valid or not, thus indicating whether we want to stash registers or not. The only drawback is that we now also stash registers for el2_error, but this should never happen, and we pop them back right at the start of the handling sequence. Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
2018-02-12 17:53:00 +00:00
.endm
arm64: kvm: Annotate assembly using modern annoations In an effort to clarify and simplify the annotation of assembly functions in the kernel new macros have been introduced. These replace ENTRY and ENDPROC with separate annotations for standard C callable functions, data and code with different calling conventions. Update the more straightforward annotations in the kvm code to the new macros. Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
2020-02-18 19:58:37 +00:00
SYM_CODE_START(__kvm_hyp_vector)
arm64: KVM: Move stashing of x0/x1 into the vector code itself All our useful entry points into the hypervisor are starting by saving x0 and x1 on the stack. Let's move those into the vectors by introducing macros that annotate whether a vector is valid or not, thus indicating whether we want to stash registers or not. The only drawback is that we now also stash registers for el2_error, but this should never happen, and we pop them back right at the start of the handling sequence. Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
2018-02-12 17:53:00 +00:00
invalid_vect el2t_sync_invalid // Synchronous EL2t
invalid_vect el2t_irq_invalid // IRQ EL2t
invalid_vect el2t_fiq_invalid // FIQ EL2t
invalid_vect el2t_error_invalid // Error EL2t
KVM: arm64: Safety check PSTATE when entering guest and handle IL This commit adds a paranoid check when entering the guest to make sure we don't attempt running guest code in an equally or more privilged mode than the hypervisor. We also catch other accidental programming of the SPSR_EL2 which results in an illegal exception return and report this safely back to the user. Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
2018-10-17 20:21:16 +02:00
valid_vect el2_sync // Synchronous EL2h
arm64: KVM: Move stashing of x0/x1 into the vector code itself All our useful entry points into the hypervisor are starting by saving x0 and x1 on the stack. Let's move those into the vectors by introducing macros that annotate whether a vector is valid or not, thus indicating whether we want to stash registers or not. The only drawback is that we now also stash registers for el2_error, but this should never happen, and we pop them back right at the start of the handling sequence. Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
2018-02-12 17:53:00 +00:00
invalid_vect el2h_irq_invalid // IRQ EL2h
invalid_vect el2h_fiq_invalid // FIQ EL2h
valid_vect el2_error // Error EL2h
valid_vect el1_sync // Synchronous 64-bit EL1
valid_vect el1_irq // IRQ 64-bit EL1
KVM: arm64: Handle physical FIQ as an IRQ while running a guest As we we now entertain the possibility of FIQ being used on the host, treat the signalling of a FIQ while running a guest as an IRQ, causing an exit instead of a HYP panic. Reviewed-by: Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
2021-02-19 16:39:31 +00:00
valid_vect el1_fiq // FIQ 64-bit EL1
arm64: KVM: Move stashing of x0/x1 into the vector code itself All our useful entry points into the hypervisor are starting by saving x0 and x1 on the stack. Let's move those into the vectors by introducing macros that annotate whether a vector is valid or not, thus indicating whether we want to stash registers or not. The only drawback is that we now also stash registers for el2_error, but this should never happen, and we pop them back right at the start of the handling sequence. Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
2018-02-12 17:53:00 +00:00
valid_vect el1_error // Error 64-bit EL1
valid_vect el1_sync // Synchronous 32-bit EL1
valid_vect el1_irq // IRQ 32-bit EL1
KVM: arm64: Handle physical FIQ as an IRQ while running a guest As we we now entertain the possibility of FIQ being used on the host, treat the signalling of a FIQ while running a guest as an IRQ, causing an exit instead of a HYP panic. Reviewed-by: Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
2021-02-19 16:39:31 +00:00
valid_vect el1_fiq // FIQ 32-bit EL1
arm64: KVM: Move stashing of x0/x1 into the vector code itself All our useful entry points into the hypervisor are starting by saving x0 and x1 on the stack. Let's move those into the vectors by introducing macros that annotate whether a vector is valid or not, thus indicating whether we want to stash registers or not. The only drawback is that we now also stash registers for el2_error, but this should never happen, and we pop them back right at the start of the handling sequence. Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
2018-02-12 17:53:00 +00:00
valid_vect el1_error // Error 32-bit EL1
arm64: kvm: Annotate assembly using modern annoations In an effort to clarify and simplify the annotation of assembly functions in the kernel new macros have been introduced. These replace ENTRY and ENDPROC with separate annotations for standard C callable functions, data and code with different calling conventions. Update the more straightforward annotations in the kvm code to the new macros. Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
2020-02-18 19:58:37 +00:00
SYM_CODE_END(__kvm_hyp_vector)
arm64: Move the content of bpi.S to hyp-entry.S bpi.S was introduced as we were starting to build the Spectre v2 mitigation framework, and it was rather unclear that it would become strictly KVM specific. Now that the picture is a lot clearer, let's move the content of that file to hyp-entry.S, where it actually belong. Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2018-04-10 11:36:45 +01:00
KVM: arm64: Allocate hyp vectors statically The EL2 vectors installed when a guest is running point at one of the following configurations for a given CPU: - Straight at __kvm_hyp_vector - A trampoline containing an SMC sequence to mitigate Spectre-v2 and then a direct branch to __kvm_hyp_vector - A dynamically-allocated trampoline which has an indirect branch to __kvm_hyp_vector - A dynamically-allocated trampoline containing an SMC sequence to mitigate Spectre-v2 and then an indirect branch to __kvm_hyp_vector The indirect branches mean that VA randomization at EL2 isn't trivially bypassable using Spectre-v3a (where the vector base is readable by the guest). Rather than populate these vectors dynamically, configure everything statically and use an enumerated type to identify the vector "slot" corresponding to one of the configurations above. This both simplifies the code, but also makes it much easier to implement at EL2 later on. Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> [maz: fixed double call to kvm_init_vector_slots() on nVHE] Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Cc: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201113113847.21619-8-will@kernel.org
2020-11-13 11:38:44 +00:00
.macro spectrev2_smccc_wa1_smc
sub sp, sp, #(8 * 4)
stp x2, x3, [sp, #(8 * 0)]
stp x0, x1, [sp, #(8 * 2)]
mov w0, #ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1
smc #0
ldp x2, x3, [sp, #(8 * 0)]
add sp, sp, #(8 * 2)
.endm
.macro hyp_ventry indirect, spectrev2
.align 7
KVM: arm64: Consume pending SError as early as possible On systems with v8.2 we switch the 'vaxorcism' of guest SError with an alternative sequence that uses the ESB-instruction, then reads DISR_EL1. This saves the unmasking and remasking of asynchronous exceptions. We do this after we've saved the guest registers and restored the host's. Any SError that becomes pending due to this will be accounted to the guest, when it actually occurred during host-execution. Move the ESB-instruction as early as possible. Any guest SError will become pending due to this ESB-instruction and then consumed to DISR_EL1 before the host touches anything. This lets us account for host/guest SError precisely on the guest exit exception boundary. Because the ESB-instruction now lands in the preamble section of the vectors, we need to add it to the unpatched indirect vectors too, and to any sequence that may be patched in over the top. The ESB-instruction always lives in the head of the vectors, to be before any memory write. Whereas the register-store always lives in the tail. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
2019-06-18 16:17:36 +01:00
1: esb
KVM: arm64: Allocate hyp vectors statically The EL2 vectors installed when a guest is running point at one of the following configurations for a given CPU: - Straight at __kvm_hyp_vector - A trampoline containing an SMC sequence to mitigate Spectre-v2 and then a direct branch to __kvm_hyp_vector - A dynamically-allocated trampoline which has an indirect branch to __kvm_hyp_vector - A dynamically-allocated trampoline containing an SMC sequence to mitigate Spectre-v2 and then an indirect branch to __kvm_hyp_vector The indirect branches mean that VA randomization at EL2 isn't trivially bypassable using Spectre-v3a (where the vector base is readable by the guest). Rather than populate these vectors dynamically, configure everything statically and use an enumerated type to identify the vector "slot" corresponding to one of the configurations above. This both simplifies the code, but also makes it much easier to implement at EL2 later on. Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> [maz: fixed double call to kvm_init_vector_slots() on nVHE] Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Cc: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201113113847.21619-8-will@kernel.org
2020-11-13 11:38:44 +00:00
.if \spectrev2 != 0
spectrev2_smccc_wa1_smc
.else
KVM: arm64: Make indirect vectors preamble behaviour symmetric The KVM indirect vectors support is a little complicated. Different CPUs may use different exception vectors for KVM that are generated at boot. Adding new instructions involves checking all the possible combinations do the right thing. To make changes here easier to review lets state what we expect of the preamble: 1. The first vector run, must always run the preamble. 2. Patching the head or tail of the vector shouldn't remove preamble instructions. Today, this is easy as we only have one instruction in the preamble. Change the unpatched tail of the indirect vector so that it always runs this, regardless of patching. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
2019-06-18 16:17:35 +01:00
stp x0, x1, [sp, #-16]!
KVM: arm64: Allocate hyp vectors statically The EL2 vectors installed when a guest is running point at one of the following configurations for a given CPU: - Straight at __kvm_hyp_vector - A trampoline containing an SMC sequence to mitigate Spectre-v2 and then a direct branch to __kvm_hyp_vector - A dynamically-allocated trampoline which has an indirect branch to __kvm_hyp_vector - A dynamically-allocated trampoline containing an SMC sequence to mitigate Spectre-v2 and then an indirect branch to __kvm_hyp_vector The indirect branches mean that VA randomization at EL2 isn't trivially bypassable using Spectre-v3a (where the vector base is readable by the guest). Rather than populate these vectors dynamically, configure everything statically and use an enumerated type to identify the vector "slot" corresponding to one of the configurations above. This both simplifies the code, but also makes it much easier to implement at EL2 later on. Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> [maz: fixed double call to kvm_init_vector_slots() on nVHE] Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Cc: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201113113847.21619-8-will@kernel.org
2020-11-13 11:38:44 +00:00
.endif
.if \indirect != 0
alternative_cb kvm_patch_vector_branch
/*
arm64: spectre: Rename ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS to ARM64_SPECTRE_V3A Since ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS is really a mitigation for Spectre-v3a, rename it accordingly for consistency with the v2 and v4 mitigation. Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Cc: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201113113847.21619-9-will@kernel.org
2020-11-13 11:38:45 +00:00
* For ARM64_SPECTRE_V3A configurations, these NOPs get replaced with:
KVM: arm64: Allocate hyp vectors statically The EL2 vectors installed when a guest is running point at one of the following configurations for a given CPU: - Straight at __kvm_hyp_vector - A trampoline containing an SMC sequence to mitigate Spectre-v2 and then a direct branch to __kvm_hyp_vector - A dynamically-allocated trampoline which has an indirect branch to __kvm_hyp_vector - A dynamically-allocated trampoline containing an SMC sequence to mitigate Spectre-v2 and then an indirect branch to __kvm_hyp_vector The indirect branches mean that VA randomization at EL2 isn't trivially bypassable using Spectre-v3a (where the vector base is readable by the guest). Rather than populate these vectors dynamically, configure everything statically and use an enumerated type to identify the vector "slot" corresponding to one of the configurations above. This both simplifies the code, but also makes it much easier to implement at EL2 later on. Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> [maz: fixed double call to kvm_init_vector_slots() on nVHE] Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Cc: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201113113847.21619-8-will@kernel.org
2020-11-13 11:38:44 +00:00
*
* movz x0, #(addr & 0xffff)
* movk x0, #((addr >> 16) & 0xffff), lsl #16
* movk x0, #((addr >> 32) & 0xffff), lsl #32
* br x0
*
* Where:
* addr = kern_hyp_va(__kvm_hyp_vector) + vector-offset + KVM_VECTOR_PREAMBLE.
* See kvm_patch_vector_branch for details.
*/
arm64: Move the content of bpi.S to hyp-entry.S bpi.S was introduced as we were starting to build the Spectre v2 mitigation framework, and it was rather unclear that it would become strictly KVM specific. Now that the picture is a lot clearer, let's move the content of that file to hyp-entry.S, where it actually belong. Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2018-04-10 11:36:45 +01:00
nop
nop
nop
KVM: arm64: Allocate hyp vectors statically The EL2 vectors installed when a guest is running point at one of the following configurations for a given CPU: - Straight at __kvm_hyp_vector - A trampoline containing an SMC sequence to mitigate Spectre-v2 and then a direct branch to __kvm_hyp_vector - A dynamically-allocated trampoline which has an indirect branch to __kvm_hyp_vector - A dynamically-allocated trampoline containing an SMC sequence to mitigate Spectre-v2 and then an indirect branch to __kvm_hyp_vector The indirect branches mean that VA randomization at EL2 isn't trivially bypassable using Spectre-v3a (where the vector base is readable by the guest). Rather than populate these vectors dynamically, configure everything statically and use an enumerated type to identify the vector "slot" corresponding to one of the configurations above. This both simplifies the code, but also makes it much easier to implement at EL2 later on. Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> [maz: fixed double call to kvm_init_vector_slots() on nVHE] Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Cc: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201113113847.21619-8-will@kernel.org
2020-11-13 11:38:44 +00:00
nop
alternative_cb_end
.endif
b __kvm_hyp_vector + (1b - 0b + KVM_VECTOR_PREAMBLE)
arm64: Move the content of bpi.S to hyp-entry.S bpi.S was introduced as we were starting to build the Spectre v2 mitigation framework, and it was rather unclear that it would become strictly KVM specific. Now that the picture is a lot clearer, let's move the content of that file to hyp-entry.S, where it actually belong. Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2018-04-10 11:36:45 +01:00
.endm
KVM: arm64: Allocate hyp vectors statically The EL2 vectors installed when a guest is running point at one of the following configurations for a given CPU: - Straight at __kvm_hyp_vector - A trampoline containing an SMC sequence to mitigate Spectre-v2 and then a direct branch to __kvm_hyp_vector - A dynamically-allocated trampoline which has an indirect branch to __kvm_hyp_vector - A dynamically-allocated trampoline containing an SMC sequence to mitigate Spectre-v2 and then an indirect branch to __kvm_hyp_vector The indirect branches mean that VA randomization at EL2 isn't trivially bypassable using Spectre-v3a (where the vector base is readable by the guest). Rather than populate these vectors dynamically, configure everything statically and use an enumerated type to identify the vector "slot" corresponding to one of the configurations above. This both simplifies the code, but also makes it much easier to implement at EL2 later on. Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> [maz: fixed double call to kvm_init_vector_slots() on nVHE] Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Cc: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201113113847.21619-8-will@kernel.org
2020-11-13 11:38:44 +00:00
.macro generate_vectors indirect, spectrev2
arm64: Move the content of bpi.S to hyp-entry.S bpi.S was introduced as we were starting to build the Spectre v2 mitigation framework, and it was rather unclear that it would become strictly KVM specific. Now that the picture is a lot clearer, let's move the content of that file to hyp-entry.S, where it actually belong. Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2018-04-10 11:36:45 +01:00
0:
.rept 16
KVM: arm64: Allocate hyp vectors statically The EL2 vectors installed when a guest is running point at one of the following configurations for a given CPU: - Straight at __kvm_hyp_vector - A trampoline containing an SMC sequence to mitigate Spectre-v2 and then a direct branch to __kvm_hyp_vector - A dynamically-allocated trampoline which has an indirect branch to __kvm_hyp_vector - A dynamically-allocated trampoline containing an SMC sequence to mitigate Spectre-v2 and then an indirect branch to __kvm_hyp_vector The indirect branches mean that VA randomization at EL2 isn't trivially bypassable using Spectre-v3a (where the vector base is readable by the guest). Rather than populate these vectors dynamically, configure everything statically and use an enumerated type to identify the vector "slot" corresponding to one of the configurations above. This both simplifies the code, but also makes it much easier to implement at EL2 later on. Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> [maz: fixed double call to kvm_init_vector_slots() on nVHE] Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Cc: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201113113847.21619-8-will@kernel.org
2020-11-13 11:38:44 +00:00
hyp_ventry \indirect, \spectrev2
arm64: Move the content of bpi.S to hyp-entry.S bpi.S was introduced as we were starting to build the Spectre v2 mitigation framework, and it was rather unclear that it would become strictly KVM specific. Now that the picture is a lot clearer, let's move the content of that file to hyp-entry.S, where it actually belong. Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2018-04-10 11:36:45 +01:00
.endr
.org 0b + SZ_2K // Safety measure
.endm
.align 11
arm64: kvm: Modernize annotation for __bp_harden_hyp_vecs We have recently introduced new macros for annotating assembly symbols for things that aren't C functions, SYM_CODE_START() and SYM_CODE_END(), in an effort to clarify and simplify our annotations of assembly files. Using these for __bp_harden_hyp_vecs is more involved than for most symbols as this symbol is annotated quite unusually as rather than just have the explicit symbol we define _start and _end symbols which we then use to compute the length. This does not play at all nicely with the new style macros. Since the size of the vectors is a known constant which won't vary the simplest thing to do is simply to drop the separate _start and _end symbols and just use a #define for the size. Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
2020-02-18 19:58:38 +00:00
SYM_CODE_START(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs)
KVM: arm64: Allocate hyp vectors statically The EL2 vectors installed when a guest is running point at one of the following configurations for a given CPU: - Straight at __kvm_hyp_vector - A trampoline containing an SMC sequence to mitigate Spectre-v2 and then a direct branch to __kvm_hyp_vector - A dynamically-allocated trampoline which has an indirect branch to __kvm_hyp_vector - A dynamically-allocated trampoline containing an SMC sequence to mitigate Spectre-v2 and then an indirect branch to __kvm_hyp_vector The indirect branches mean that VA randomization at EL2 isn't trivially bypassable using Spectre-v3a (where the vector base is readable by the guest). Rather than populate these vectors dynamically, configure everything statically and use an enumerated type to identify the vector "slot" corresponding to one of the configurations above. This both simplifies the code, but also makes it much easier to implement at EL2 later on. Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> [maz: fixed double call to kvm_init_vector_slots() on nVHE] Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Cc: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201113113847.21619-8-will@kernel.org
2020-11-13 11:38:44 +00:00
generate_vectors indirect = 0, spectrev2 = 1 // HYP_VECTOR_SPECTRE_DIRECT
generate_vectors indirect = 1, spectrev2 = 0 // HYP_VECTOR_INDIRECT
generate_vectors indirect = 1, spectrev2 = 1 // HYP_VECTOR_SPECTRE_INDIRECT
arm64: kvm: Modernize annotation for __bp_harden_hyp_vecs We have recently introduced new macros for annotating assembly symbols for things that aren't C functions, SYM_CODE_START() and SYM_CODE_END(), in an effort to clarify and simplify our annotations of assembly files. Using these for __bp_harden_hyp_vecs is more involved than for most symbols as this symbol is annotated quite unusually as rather than just have the explicit symbol we define _start and _end symbols which we then use to compute the length. This does not play at all nicely with the new style macros. Since the size of the vectors is a known constant which won't vary the simplest thing to do is simply to drop the separate _start and _end symbols and just use a #define for the size. Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
2020-02-18 19:58:38 +00:00
1: .org __bp_harden_hyp_vecs + __BP_HARDEN_HYP_VECS_SZ
.org 1b
SYM_CODE_END(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs)
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