2011-03-09 22:13:22 +03:00
/*
* Copyright ( C ) 2009 - 2010 IBM Corporation
*
* Authors :
* Mimi Zohar < zohar @ us . ibm . com >
*
* This program is free software ; you can redistribute it and / or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
* published by the Free Software Foundation , version 2 of the
* License .
*
*/
# include <linux/types.h>
# include <linux/integrity.h>
# include <crypto/sha.h>
2013-02-07 02:12:08 +04:00
# include <linux/key.h>
2011-03-09 22:13:22 +03:00
2012-09-12 21:51:32 +04:00
/* iint action cache flags */
2012-12-05 18:29:09 +04:00
# define IMA_MEASURE 0x00000001
# define IMA_MEASURED 0x00000002
# define IMA_APPRAISE 0x00000004
# define IMA_APPRAISED 0x00000008
/*#define IMA_COLLECT 0x00000010 do not use this flag */
# define IMA_COLLECTED 0x00000020
# define IMA_AUDIT 0x00000040
# define IMA_AUDITED 0x00000080
2012-09-12 21:51:32 +04:00
2011-03-09 22:13:22 +03:00
/* iint cache flags */
2012-12-05 18:29:09 +04:00
# define IMA_ACTION_FLAGS 0xff000000
# define IMA_DIGSIG 0x01000000
# define IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED 0x02000000
ima: audit log files opened with O_DIRECT flag
Files are measured or appraised based on the IMA policy. When a
file, in policy, is opened with the O_DIRECT flag, a deadlock
occurs.
The first attempt at resolving this lockdep temporarily removed the
O_DIRECT flag and restored it, after calculating the hash. The
second attempt introduced the O_DIRECT_HAVELOCK flag. Based on this
flag, do_blockdev_direct_IO() would skip taking the i_mutex a second
time. The third attempt, by Dmitry Kasatkin, resolves the i_mutex
locking issue, by re-introducing the IMA mutex, but uncovered
another problem. Reading a file with O_DIRECT flag set, writes
directly to userspace pages. A second patch allocates a user-space
like memory. This works for all IMA hooks, except ima_file_free(),
which is called on __fput() to recalculate the file hash.
Until this last issue is addressed, do not 'collect' the
measurement for measuring, appraising, or auditing files opened
with the O_DIRECT flag set. Based on policy, permit or deny file
access. This patch defines a new IMA policy rule option named
'permit_directio'. Policy rules could be defined, based on LSM
or other criteria, to permit specific applications to open files
with the O_DIRECT flag set.
Changelog v1:
- permit or deny file access based IMA policy rules
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
2014-05-12 17:28:11 +04:00
# define IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO 0x04000000
2014-06-27 19:04:27 +04:00
# define IMA_NEW_FILE 0x08000000
2012-09-12 21:51:32 +04:00
2012-12-04 02:08:11 +04:00
# define IMA_DO_MASK (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_AUDIT | \
IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK )
# define IMA_DONE_MASK (IMA_MEASURED | IMA_APPRAISED | IMA_AUDITED | \
IMA_COLLECTED | IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK )
/* iint subaction appraise cache flags */
# define IMA_FILE_APPRAISE 0x00000100
# define IMA_FILE_APPRAISED 0x00000200
# define IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE 0x00000400
# define IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED 0x00000800
# define IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE 0x00001000
# define IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED 0x00002000
# define IMA_MODULE_APPRAISE 0x00004000
# define IMA_MODULE_APPRAISED 0x00008000
2014-07-22 18:39:48 +04:00
# define IMA_FIRMWARE_APPRAISE 0x00010000
# define IMA_FIRMWARE_APPRAISED 0x00020000
2012-12-04 02:08:11 +04:00
# define IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK (IMA_FILE_APPRAISE | IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE | \
2014-07-22 18:39:48 +04:00
IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE | IMA_MODULE_APPRAISE | \
IMA_FIRMWARE_APPRAISE )
2012-12-04 02:08:11 +04:00
# define IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK (IMA_FILE_APPRAISED | IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED | \
2014-07-22 18:39:48 +04:00
IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED | IMA_MODULE_APPRAISED | \
IMA_FIRMWARE_APPRAISED )
2011-03-09 22:13:22 +03:00
2011-03-09 22:28:20 +03:00
enum evm_ima_xattr_type {
IMA_XATTR_DIGEST = 0x01 ,
EVM_XATTR_HMAC ,
EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG ,
2013-08-12 12:22:51 +04:00
IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG ,
2011-03-09 22:28:20 +03:00
} ;
struct evm_ima_xattr_data {
u8 type ;
u8 digest [ SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE ] ;
2013-04-25 11:43:56 +04:00
} __packed ;
# define IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE 64
struct ima_digest_data {
u8 algo ;
u8 length ;
2013-08-12 12:22:51 +04:00
union {
struct {
u8 unused ;
u8 type ;
} sha1 ;
struct {
u8 type ;
u8 algo ;
} ng ;
u8 data [ 2 ] ;
} xattr ;
2013-04-25 11:44:04 +04:00
u8 digest [ 0 ] ;
2013-04-25 11:43:56 +04:00
} __packed ;
2011-03-09 22:28:20 +03:00
2013-04-25 11:44:04 +04:00
/*
* signature format v2 - for using with asymmetric keys
*/
struct signature_v2_hdr {
2013-10-10 11:12:03 +04:00
uint8_t type ; /* xattr type */
2013-04-25 11:44:04 +04:00
uint8_t version ; /* signature format version */
uint8_t hash_algo ; /* Digest algorithm [enum pkey_hash_algo] */
uint32_t keyid ; /* IMA key identifier - not X509/PGP specific */
uint16_t sig_size ; /* signature size */
uint8_t sig [ 0 ] ; /* signature payload */
} __packed ;
2011-03-09 22:13:22 +03:00
/* integrity data associated with an inode */
struct integrity_iint_cache {
2013-04-25 11:43:56 +04:00
struct rb_node rb_node ; /* rooted in integrity_iint_tree */
2011-03-09 22:13:22 +03:00
struct inode * inode ; /* back pointer to inode in question */
u64 version ; /* track inode changes */
2012-12-05 18:29:09 +04:00
unsigned long flags ;
2012-12-04 02:08:11 +04:00
enum integrity_status ima_file_status : 4 ;
enum integrity_status ima_mmap_status : 4 ;
enum integrity_status ima_bprm_status : 4 ;
enum integrity_status ima_module_status : 4 ;
2014-07-22 18:39:48 +04:00
enum integrity_status ima_firmware_status : 4 ;
2012-09-21 18:00:43 +04:00
enum integrity_status evm_status : 4 ;
2013-04-25 11:44:04 +04:00
struct ima_digest_data * ima_hash ;
2011-03-09 22:13:22 +03:00
} ;
/* rbtree tree calls to lookup, insert, delete
* integrity data associated with an inode .
*/
struct integrity_iint_cache * integrity_iint_find ( struct inode * inode ) ;
2011-08-17 04:34:33 +04:00
2011-10-05 12:54:46 +04:00
# define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM 0
# define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MODULE 1
# define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA 2
# define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX 3
2012-01-17 19:12:07 +04:00
# ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE
2011-10-05 12:54:46 +04:00
int integrity_digsig_verify ( const unsigned int id , const char * sig , int siglen ,
2013-10-10 10:56:13 +04:00
const char * digest , int digestlen ) ;
2011-10-05 12:54:46 +04:00
2013-08-13 16:47:43 +04:00
int integrity_init_keyring ( const unsigned int id ) ;
2011-10-05 12:54:46 +04:00
# else
static inline int integrity_digsig_verify ( const unsigned int id ,
const char * sig , int siglen ,
const char * digest , int digestlen )
{
return - EOPNOTSUPP ;
}
2013-08-13 16:47:43 +04:00
static inline int integrity_init_keyring ( const unsigned int id )
{
return 0 ;
}
2012-01-17 19:12:07 +04:00
# endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE */
2011-10-05 12:54:46 +04:00
2013-02-07 02:12:08 +04:00
# ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
int asymmetric_verify ( struct key * keyring , const char * sig ,
int siglen , const char * data , int datalen ) ;
# else
static inline int asymmetric_verify ( struct key * keyring , const char * sig ,
int siglen , const char * data , int datalen )
{
return - EOPNOTSUPP ;
}
# endif
2013-03-18 22:48:02 +04:00
# ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_AUDIT
/* declarations */
void integrity_audit_msg ( int audit_msgno , struct inode * inode ,
const unsigned char * fname , const char * op ,
const char * cause , int result , int info ) ;
# else
static inline void integrity_audit_msg ( int audit_msgno , struct inode * inode ,
const unsigned char * fname ,
const char * op , const char * cause ,
int result , int info )
{
}
# endif
2011-08-17 04:34:33 +04:00
/* set during initialization */
extern int iint_initialized ;