linux/security/keys/request_key.c

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/* Request a key from userspace
*
* Copyright (C) 2004-2007 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
* Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
* 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
*
* See Documentation/security/keys-request-key.txt
*/
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/kmod.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 09:00:56 +04:00
#include <linux/keyctl.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include "internal.h"
#define key_negative_timeout 60 /* default timeout on a negative key's existence */
/**
* complete_request_key - Complete the construction of a key.
* @cons: The key construction record.
* @error: The success or failute of the construction.
*
* Complete the attempt to construct a key. The key will be negated
* if an error is indicated. The authorisation key will be revoked
* unconditionally.
*/
void complete_request_key(struct key_construction *cons, int error)
{
kenter("{%d,%d},%d", cons->key->serial, cons->authkey->serial, error);
if (error < 0)
key_negate_and_link(cons->key, key_negative_timeout, NULL,
cons->authkey);
else
key_revoke(cons->authkey);
key_put(cons->key);
key_put(cons->authkey);
kfree(cons);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(complete_request_key);
/*
* Initialise a usermode helper that is going to have a specific session
* keyring.
*
* This is called in context of freshly forked kthread before kernel_execve(),
* so we can simply install the desired session_keyring at this point.
*/
static int umh_keys_init(struct subprocess_info *info, struct cred *cred)
{
struct key *keyring = info->data;
return install_session_keyring_to_cred(cred, keyring);
}
/*
* Clean up a usermode helper with session keyring.
*/
static void umh_keys_cleanup(struct subprocess_info *info)
{
struct key *keyring = info->data;
key_put(keyring);
}
/*
* Call a usermode helper with a specific session keyring.
*/
static int call_usermodehelper_keys(const char *path, char **argv, char **envp,
struct key *session_keyring, int wait)
{
struct subprocess_info *info;
info = call_usermodehelper_setup(path, argv, envp, GFP_KERNEL,
umh_keys_init, umh_keys_cleanup,
session_keyring);
if (!info)
return -ENOMEM;
key_get(session_keyring);
return call_usermodehelper_exec(info, wait);
}
/*
* Request userspace finish the construction of a key
[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys Make it possible for a running process (such as gssapid) to be able to instantiate a key, as was requested by Trond Myklebust for NFS4. The patch makes the following changes: (1) A new, optional key type method has been added. This permits a key type to intercept requests at the point /sbin/request-key is about to be spawned and do something else with them - passing them over the rpc_pipefs files or netlink sockets for instance. The uninstantiated key, the authorisation key and the intended operation name are passed to the method. (2) The callout_info is no longer passed as an argument to /sbin/request-key to prevent unauthorised viewing of this data using ps or by looking in /proc/pid/cmdline. This means that the old /sbin/request-key program will not work with the patched kernel as it will expect to see an extra argument that is no longer there. A revised keyutils package will be made available tomorrow. (3) The callout_info is now attached to the authorisation key. Reading this key will retrieve the information. (4) A new field has been added to the task_struct. This holds the authorisation key currently active for a thread. Searches now look here for the caller's set of keys rather than looking for an auth key in the lowest level of the session keyring. This permits a thread to be servicing multiple requests at once and to switch between them. Note that this is per-thread, not per-process, and so is usable in multithreaded programs. The setting of this field is inherited across fork and exec. (5) A new keyctl function (KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY) has been added that permits a thread to assume the authority to deal with an uninstantiated key. Assumption is only permitted if the authorisation key associated with the uninstantiated key is somewhere in the thread's keyrings. This function can also clear the assumption. (6) A new magic key specifier has been added to refer to the currently assumed authorisation key (KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY). (7) Instantiation will only proceed if the appropriate authorisation key is assumed first. The assumed authorisation key is discarded if instantiation is successful. (8) key_validate() is moved from the file of request_key functions to the file of permissions functions. (9) The documentation is updated. From: <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> Build fix. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no> Cc: Alexander Zangerl <az@bond.edu.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-01-08 12:02:47 +03:00
* - execute "/sbin/request-key <op> <key> <uid> <gid> <keyring> <keyring> <keyring>"
*/
static int call_sbin_request_key(struct key_construction *cons,
const char *op,
void *aux)
{
static char const request_key[] = "/sbin/request-key";
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
key_serial_t prkey, sskey;
struct key *key = cons->key, *authkey = cons->authkey, *keyring,
*session;
[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys Make it possible for a running process (such as gssapid) to be able to instantiate a key, as was requested by Trond Myklebust for NFS4. The patch makes the following changes: (1) A new, optional key type method has been added. This permits a key type to intercept requests at the point /sbin/request-key is about to be spawned and do something else with them - passing them over the rpc_pipefs files or netlink sockets for instance. The uninstantiated key, the authorisation key and the intended operation name are passed to the method. (2) The callout_info is no longer passed as an argument to /sbin/request-key to prevent unauthorised viewing of this data using ps or by looking in /proc/pid/cmdline. This means that the old /sbin/request-key program will not work with the patched kernel as it will expect to see an extra argument that is no longer there. A revised keyutils package will be made available tomorrow. (3) The callout_info is now attached to the authorisation key. Reading this key will retrieve the information. (4) A new field has been added to the task_struct. This holds the authorisation key currently active for a thread. Searches now look here for the caller's set of keys rather than looking for an auth key in the lowest level of the session keyring. This permits a thread to be servicing multiple requests at once and to switch between them. Note that this is per-thread, not per-process, and so is usable in multithreaded programs. The setting of this field is inherited across fork and exec. (5) A new keyctl function (KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY) has been added that permits a thread to assume the authority to deal with an uninstantiated key. Assumption is only permitted if the authorisation key associated with the uninstantiated key is somewhere in the thread's keyrings. This function can also clear the assumption. (6) A new magic key specifier has been added to refer to the currently assumed authorisation key (KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY). (7) Instantiation will only proceed if the appropriate authorisation key is assumed first. The assumed authorisation key is discarded if instantiation is successful. (8) key_validate() is moved from the file of request_key functions to the file of permissions functions. (9) The documentation is updated. From: <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> Build fix. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no> Cc: Alexander Zangerl <az@bond.edu.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-01-08 12:02:47 +03:00
char *argv[9], *envp[3], uid_str[12], gid_str[12];
char key_str[12], keyring_str[3][12];
[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys Make it possible for a running process (such as gssapid) to be able to instantiate a key, as was requested by Trond Myklebust for NFS4. The patch makes the following changes: (1) A new, optional key type method has been added. This permits a key type to intercept requests at the point /sbin/request-key is about to be spawned and do something else with them - passing them over the rpc_pipefs files or netlink sockets for instance. The uninstantiated key, the authorisation key and the intended operation name are passed to the method. (2) The callout_info is no longer passed as an argument to /sbin/request-key to prevent unauthorised viewing of this data using ps or by looking in /proc/pid/cmdline. This means that the old /sbin/request-key program will not work with the patched kernel as it will expect to see an extra argument that is no longer there. A revised keyutils package will be made available tomorrow. (3) The callout_info is now attached to the authorisation key. Reading this key will retrieve the information. (4) A new field has been added to the task_struct. This holds the authorisation key currently active for a thread. Searches now look here for the caller's set of keys rather than looking for an auth key in the lowest level of the session keyring. This permits a thread to be servicing multiple requests at once and to switch between them. Note that this is per-thread, not per-process, and so is usable in multithreaded programs. The setting of this field is inherited across fork and exec. (5) A new keyctl function (KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY) has been added that permits a thread to assume the authority to deal with an uninstantiated key. Assumption is only permitted if the authorisation key associated with the uninstantiated key is somewhere in the thread's keyrings. This function can also clear the assumption. (6) A new magic key specifier has been added to refer to the currently assumed authorisation key (KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY). (7) Instantiation will only proceed if the appropriate authorisation key is assumed first. The assumed authorisation key is discarded if instantiation is successful. (8) key_validate() is moved from the file of request_key functions to the file of permissions functions. (9) The documentation is updated. From: <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> Build fix. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no> Cc: Alexander Zangerl <az@bond.edu.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-01-08 12:02:47 +03:00
char desc[20];
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 09:00:56 +04:00
int ret, i;
[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys Make it possible for a running process (such as gssapid) to be able to instantiate a key, as was requested by Trond Myklebust for NFS4. The patch makes the following changes: (1) A new, optional key type method has been added. This permits a key type to intercept requests at the point /sbin/request-key is about to be spawned and do something else with them - passing them over the rpc_pipefs files or netlink sockets for instance. The uninstantiated key, the authorisation key and the intended operation name are passed to the method. (2) The callout_info is no longer passed as an argument to /sbin/request-key to prevent unauthorised viewing of this data using ps or by looking in /proc/pid/cmdline. This means that the old /sbin/request-key program will not work with the patched kernel as it will expect to see an extra argument that is no longer there. A revised keyutils package will be made available tomorrow. (3) The callout_info is now attached to the authorisation key. Reading this key will retrieve the information. (4) A new field has been added to the task_struct. This holds the authorisation key currently active for a thread. Searches now look here for the caller's set of keys rather than looking for an auth key in the lowest level of the session keyring. This permits a thread to be servicing multiple requests at once and to switch between them. Note that this is per-thread, not per-process, and so is usable in multithreaded programs. The setting of this field is inherited across fork and exec. (5) A new keyctl function (KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY) has been added that permits a thread to assume the authority to deal with an uninstantiated key. Assumption is only permitted if the authorisation key associated with the uninstantiated key is somewhere in the thread's keyrings. This function can also clear the assumption. (6) A new magic key specifier has been added to refer to the currently assumed authorisation key (KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY). (7) Instantiation will only proceed if the appropriate authorisation key is assumed first. The assumed authorisation key is discarded if instantiation is successful. (8) key_validate() is moved from the file of request_key functions to the file of permissions functions. (9) The documentation is updated. From: <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> Build fix. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no> Cc: Alexander Zangerl <az@bond.edu.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-01-08 12:02:47 +03:00
kenter("{%d},{%d},%s", key->serial, authkey->serial, op);
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 09:00:56 +04:00
KEYS: Alter use of key instantiation link-to-keyring argument Alter the use of the key instantiation and negation functions' link-to-keyring arguments. Currently this specifies a keyring in the target process to link the key into, creating the keyring if it doesn't exist. This, however, can be a problem for copy-on-write credentials as it means that the instantiating process can alter the credentials of the requesting process. This patch alters the behaviour such that: (1) If keyctl_instantiate_key() or keyctl_negate_key() are given a specific keyring by ID (ringid >= 0), then that keyring will be used. (2) If keyctl_instantiate_key() or keyctl_negate_key() are given one of the special constants that refer to the requesting process's keyrings (KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING, all <= 0), then: (a) If sys_request_key() was given a keyring to use (destringid) then the key will be attached to that keyring. (b) If sys_request_key() was given a NULL keyring, then the key being instantiated will be attached to the default keyring as set by keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(). (3) No extra link will be made. Decision point (1) follows current behaviour, and allows those instantiators who've searched for a specifically named keyring in the requestor's keyring so as to partition the keys by type to still have their named keyrings. Decision point (2) allows the requestor to make sure that the key or keys that get produced by request_key() go where they want, whilst allowing the instantiator to request that the key is retained. This is mainly useful for situations where the instantiator makes a secondary request, the key for which should be retained by the initial requestor: +-----------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ | | | | | | | Requestor |------->| Instantiator |------->| Instantiator | | | | | | | +-----------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ request_key() request_key() This might be useful, for example, in Kerberos, where the requestor requests a ticket, and then the ticket instantiator requests the TGT, which someone else then has to go and fetch. The TGT, however, should be retained in the keyrings of the requestor, not the first instantiator. To make this explict an extra special keyring constant is also added. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 02:39:14 +03:00
ret = install_user_keyrings();
if (ret < 0)
goto error_alloc;
[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys Make it possible for a running process (such as gssapid) to be able to instantiate a key, as was requested by Trond Myklebust for NFS4. The patch makes the following changes: (1) A new, optional key type method has been added. This permits a key type to intercept requests at the point /sbin/request-key is about to be spawned and do something else with them - passing them over the rpc_pipefs files or netlink sockets for instance. The uninstantiated key, the authorisation key and the intended operation name are passed to the method. (2) The callout_info is no longer passed as an argument to /sbin/request-key to prevent unauthorised viewing of this data using ps or by looking in /proc/pid/cmdline. This means that the old /sbin/request-key program will not work with the patched kernel as it will expect to see an extra argument that is no longer there. A revised keyutils package will be made available tomorrow. (3) The callout_info is now attached to the authorisation key. Reading this key will retrieve the information. (4) A new field has been added to the task_struct. This holds the authorisation key currently active for a thread. Searches now look here for the caller's set of keys rather than looking for an auth key in the lowest level of the session keyring. This permits a thread to be servicing multiple requests at once and to switch between them. Note that this is per-thread, not per-process, and so is usable in multithreaded programs. The setting of this field is inherited across fork and exec. (5) A new keyctl function (KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY) has been added that permits a thread to assume the authority to deal with an uninstantiated key. Assumption is only permitted if the authorisation key associated with the uninstantiated key is somewhere in the thread's keyrings. This function can also clear the assumption. (6) A new magic key specifier has been added to refer to the currently assumed authorisation key (KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY). (7) Instantiation will only proceed if the appropriate authorisation key is assumed first. The assumed authorisation key is discarded if instantiation is successful. (8) key_validate() is moved from the file of request_key functions to the file of permissions functions. (9) The documentation is updated. From: <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> Build fix. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no> Cc: Alexander Zangerl <az@bond.edu.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-01-08 12:02:47 +03:00
/* allocate a new session keyring */
sprintf(desc, "_req.%u", key->serial);
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks. A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to access or modify its own credentials. A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to execve(). With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified and committed using something like the following sequence of events: struct cred *new = prepare_creds(); int ret = blah(new); if (ret < 0) { abort_creds(new); return ret; } return commit_creds(new); There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter the keys in a keyring in use by another task. To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be modified, except under special circumstances: (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented. (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced. The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be added by a later patch). This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the security code rather than altering the current creds directly. (2) Temporary credential overrides. do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex on the thread being dumped. This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering the task's objective credentials. (3) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check() (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set() Removed in favour of security_capset(). (*) security_capset(), ->capset() New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the new creds, are now const. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be killed if it's an error. (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security() Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds(). (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free() New. Free security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare() New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit() New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new security by commit_creds(). (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid() Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid(). (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid() Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid(). (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init() Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred directly to init's credentials. NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no longer records the sid of the thread that forked it. (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc() (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission() Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to refer to the security context. (4) sys_capset(). This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it calls have been merged. (5) reparent_to_kthreadd(). This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using commit_thread() to point that way. (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid() __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if successful. switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting __sigqueue_alloc(). (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups. The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying it. security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished. The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds(). Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into commit_creds(). The get functions all simply access the data directly. (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl(). security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly rather than through an argument. Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even if it doesn't end up using it. (9) Keyrings. A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code: (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly. They may want separating out again later. (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer rather than a task pointer to specify the security context. (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread keyring. (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them. (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for process or session keyrings (they're shared). (10) Usermode helper. The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process after it has been cloned. call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call. call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the supplied keyring as the new session keyring. (11) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the lock. (12) is_single_threaded(). This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now wants to use it too. The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD). (13) nfsd. The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches in this series have been applied. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 02:39:23 +03:00
cred = get_current_cred();
keyring = keyring_alloc(desc, cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred,
KEYS: Reduce initial permissions on keys Reduce the initial permissions on new keys to grant the possessor everything, view permission only to the user (so the keys can be seen in /proc/keys) and nothing else. This gives the creator a chance to adjust the permissions mask before other processes can access the new key or create a link to it. To aid with this, keyring_alloc() now takes a permission argument rather than setting the permissions itself. The following permissions are now set: (1) The user and user-session keyrings grant the user that owns them full permissions and grant a possessor everything bar SETATTR. (2) The process and thread keyrings grant the possessor full permissions but only grant the user VIEW. This permits the user to see them in /proc/keys, but not to do anything with them. (3) Anonymous session keyrings grant the possessor full permissions, but only grant the user VIEW and READ. This means that the user can see them in /proc/keys and can list them, but nothing else. Possibly READ shouldn't be provided either. (4) Named session keyrings grant everything an anonymous session keyring does, plus they grant the user LINK permission. The whole point of named session keyrings is that others can also subscribe to them. Possibly this should be a separate permission to LINK. (5) The temporary session keyring created by call_sbin_request_key() gets the same permissions as an anonymous session keyring. (6) Keys created by add_key() get VIEW, SEARCH, LINK and SETATTR for the possessor, plus READ and/or WRITE if the key type supports them. The used only gets VIEW now. (7) Keys created by request_key() now get the same as those created by add_key(). Reported-by: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net> Reported-by: Stef Walter <stefw@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2012-10-02 22:24:56 +04:00
KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ,
KEYS: Add a facility to restrict new links into a keyring Add a facility whereby proposed new links to be added to a keyring can be vetted, permitting them to be rejected if necessary. This can be used to block public keys from which the signature cannot be verified or for which the signature verification fails. It could also be used to provide blacklisting. This affects operations like add_key(), KEYCTL_LINK and KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE. To this end: (1) A function pointer is added to the key struct that, if set, points to the vetting function. This is called as: int (*restrict_link)(struct key *keyring, const struct key_type *key_type, unsigned long key_flags, const union key_payload *key_payload), where 'keyring' will be the keyring being added to, key_type and key_payload will describe the key being added and key_flags[*] can be AND'ed with KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED. [*] This parameter will be removed in a later patch when KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED is removed. The function should return 0 to allow the link to take place or an error (typically -ENOKEY, -ENOPKG or -EKEYREJECTED) to reject the link. The pointer should not be set directly, but rather should be set through keyring_alloc(). Note that if called during add_key(), preparse is called before this method, but a key isn't actually allocated until after this function is called. (2) KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION is added. This can be passed to key_create_or_update() or key_instantiate_and_link() to bypass the restriction check. (3) KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY is removed. The entire contents of a keyring with this restriction emplaced can be considered 'trustworthy' by virtue of being in the keyring when that keyring is consulted. (4) key_alloc() and keyring_alloc() take an extra argument that will be used to set restrict_link in the new key. This ensures that the pointer is set before the key is published, thus preventing a window of unrestrictedness. Normally this argument will be NULL. (5) As a temporary affair, keyring_restrict_trusted_only() is added. It should be passed to keyring_alloc() as the extra argument instead of setting KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY on a keyring. This will be replaced in a later patch with functions that look in the appropriate places for authoritative keys. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2016-04-06 18:14:24 +03:00
KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN, NULL, NULL);
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks. A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to access or modify its own credentials. A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to execve(). With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified and committed using something like the following sequence of events: struct cred *new = prepare_creds(); int ret = blah(new); if (ret < 0) { abort_creds(new); return ret; } return commit_creds(new); There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter the keys in a keyring in use by another task. To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be modified, except under special circumstances: (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented. (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced. The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be added by a later patch). This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the security code rather than altering the current creds directly. (2) Temporary credential overrides. do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex on the thread being dumped. This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering the task's objective credentials. (3) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check() (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set() Removed in favour of security_capset(). (*) security_capset(), ->capset() New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the new creds, are now const. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be killed if it's an error. (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security() Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds(). (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free() New. Free security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare() New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit() New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new security by commit_creds(). (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid() Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid(). (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid() Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid(). (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init() Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred directly to init's credentials. NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no longer records the sid of the thread that forked it. (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc() (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission() Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to refer to the security context. (4) sys_capset(). This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it calls have been merged. (5) reparent_to_kthreadd(). This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using commit_thread() to point that way. (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid() __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if successful. switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting __sigqueue_alloc(). (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups. The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying it. security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished. The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds(). Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into commit_creds(). The get functions all simply access the data directly. (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl(). security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly rather than through an argument. Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even if it doesn't end up using it. (9) Keyrings. A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code: (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly. They may want separating out again later. (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer rather than a task pointer to specify the security context. (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread keyring. (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them. (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for process or session keyrings (they're shared). (10) Usermode helper. The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process after it has been cloned. call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call. call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the supplied keyring as the new session keyring. (11) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the lock. (12) is_single_threaded(). This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now wants to use it too. The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD). (13) nfsd. The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches in this series have been applied. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 02:39:23 +03:00
put_cred(cred);
[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys Make it possible for a running process (such as gssapid) to be able to instantiate a key, as was requested by Trond Myklebust for NFS4. The patch makes the following changes: (1) A new, optional key type method has been added. This permits a key type to intercept requests at the point /sbin/request-key is about to be spawned and do something else with them - passing them over the rpc_pipefs files or netlink sockets for instance. The uninstantiated key, the authorisation key and the intended operation name are passed to the method. (2) The callout_info is no longer passed as an argument to /sbin/request-key to prevent unauthorised viewing of this data using ps or by looking in /proc/pid/cmdline. This means that the old /sbin/request-key program will not work with the patched kernel as it will expect to see an extra argument that is no longer there. A revised keyutils package will be made available tomorrow. (3) The callout_info is now attached to the authorisation key. Reading this key will retrieve the information. (4) A new field has been added to the task_struct. This holds the authorisation key currently active for a thread. Searches now look here for the caller's set of keys rather than looking for an auth key in the lowest level of the session keyring. This permits a thread to be servicing multiple requests at once and to switch between them. Note that this is per-thread, not per-process, and so is usable in multithreaded programs. The setting of this field is inherited across fork and exec. (5) A new keyctl function (KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY) has been added that permits a thread to assume the authority to deal with an uninstantiated key. Assumption is only permitted if the authorisation key associated with the uninstantiated key is somewhere in the thread's keyrings. This function can also clear the assumption. (6) A new magic key specifier has been added to refer to the currently assumed authorisation key (KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY). (7) Instantiation will only proceed if the appropriate authorisation key is assumed first. The assumed authorisation key is discarded if instantiation is successful. (8) key_validate() is moved from the file of request_key functions to the file of permissions functions. (9) The documentation is updated. From: <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> Build fix. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no> Cc: Alexander Zangerl <az@bond.edu.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-01-08 12:02:47 +03:00
if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
goto error_alloc;
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 09:00:56 +04:00
}
[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys Make it possible for a running process (such as gssapid) to be able to instantiate a key, as was requested by Trond Myklebust for NFS4. The patch makes the following changes: (1) A new, optional key type method has been added. This permits a key type to intercept requests at the point /sbin/request-key is about to be spawned and do something else with them - passing them over the rpc_pipefs files or netlink sockets for instance. The uninstantiated key, the authorisation key and the intended operation name are passed to the method. (2) The callout_info is no longer passed as an argument to /sbin/request-key to prevent unauthorised viewing of this data using ps or by looking in /proc/pid/cmdline. This means that the old /sbin/request-key program will not work with the patched kernel as it will expect to see an extra argument that is no longer there. A revised keyutils package will be made available tomorrow. (3) The callout_info is now attached to the authorisation key. Reading this key will retrieve the information. (4) A new field has been added to the task_struct. This holds the authorisation key currently active for a thread. Searches now look here for the caller's set of keys rather than looking for an auth key in the lowest level of the session keyring. This permits a thread to be servicing multiple requests at once and to switch between them. Note that this is per-thread, not per-process, and so is usable in multithreaded programs. The setting of this field is inherited across fork and exec. (5) A new keyctl function (KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY) has been added that permits a thread to assume the authority to deal with an uninstantiated key. Assumption is only permitted if the authorisation key associated with the uninstantiated key is somewhere in the thread's keyrings. This function can also clear the assumption. (6) A new magic key specifier has been added to refer to the currently assumed authorisation key (KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY). (7) Instantiation will only proceed if the appropriate authorisation key is assumed first. The assumed authorisation key is discarded if instantiation is successful. (8) key_validate() is moved from the file of request_key functions to the file of permissions functions. (9) The documentation is updated. From: <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> Build fix. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no> Cc: Alexander Zangerl <az@bond.edu.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-01-08 12:02:47 +03:00
/* attach the auth key to the session keyring */
KEYS: call_sbin_request_key() must write lock keyrings before modifying them call_sbin_request_key() creates a keyring and then attempts to insert a link to the authorisation key into that keyring, but does so without holding a write lock on the keyring semaphore. It will normally get away with this because it hasn't told anyone that the keyring exists yet. The new keyring, however, has had its serial number published, which means it can be accessed directly by that handle. This was found by a previous patch that adds RCU lockdep checks to the code that reads the keyring payload pointer, which includes a check that the keyring semaphore is actually locked. Without this patch, the following command: keyctl request2 user b a @s will provoke the following lockdep warning is displayed in dmesg: =================================================== [ INFO: suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage. ] --------------------------------------------------- security/keys/keyring.c:727 invoked rcu_dereference_check() without protection! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0 2 locks held by keyctl/2076: #0: (key_types_sem){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff811a5b29>] key_type_lookup+0x1c/0x71 #1: (keyring_serialise_link_sem){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff811a6d1e>] __key_link+0x4d/0x3c5 stack backtrace: Pid: 2076, comm: keyctl Not tainted 2.6.34-rc6-cachefs #54 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81051fdc>] lockdep_rcu_dereference+0xaa/0xb2 [<ffffffff811a6d1e>] ? __key_link+0x4d/0x3c5 [<ffffffff811a6e6f>] __key_link+0x19e/0x3c5 [<ffffffff811a5952>] ? __key_instantiate_and_link+0xb1/0xdc [<ffffffff811a59bf>] ? key_instantiate_and_link+0x42/0x5f [<ffffffff811aa0dc>] call_sbin_request_key+0xe7/0x33b [<ffffffff8139376a>] ? mutex_unlock+0x9/0xb [<ffffffff811a5952>] ? __key_instantiate_and_link+0xb1/0xdc [<ffffffff811a59bf>] ? key_instantiate_and_link+0x42/0x5f [<ffffffff811aa6fa>] ? request_key_auth_new+0x1c2/0x23c [<ffffffff810aaf15>] ? cache_alloc_debugcheck_after+0x108/0x173 [<ffffffff811a9d00>] ? request_key_and_link+0x146/0x300 [<ffffffff810ac568>] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0xe1/0x118 [<ffffffff811a9e45>] request_key_and_link+0x28b/0x300 [<ffffffff811a89ac>] sys_request_key+0xf7/0x14a [<ffffffff81052c0b>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x10c/0x130 [<ffffffff81394fb9>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f [<ffffffff81001eeb>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-04-30 17:32:23 +04:00
ret = key_link(keyring, authkey);
[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys Make it possible for a running process (such as gssapid) to be able to instantiate a key, as was requested by Trond Myklebust for NFS4. The patch makes the following changes: (1) A new, optional key type method has been added. This permits a key type to intercept requests at the point /sbin/request-key is about to be spawned and do something else with them - passing them over the rpc_pipefs files or netlink sockets for instance. The uninstantiated key, the authorisation key and the intended operation name are passed to the method. (2) The callout_info is no longer passed as an argument to /sbin/request-key to prevent unauthorised viewing of this data using ps or by looking in /proc/pid/cmdline. This means that the old /sbin/request-key program will not work with the patched kernel as it will expect to see an extra argument that is no longer there. A revised keyutils package will be made available tomorrow. (3) The callout_info is now attached to the authorisation key. Reading this key will retrieve the information. (4) A new field has been added to the task_struct. This holds the authorisation key currently active for a thread. Searches now look here for the caller's set of keys rather than looking for an auth key in the lowest level of the session keyring. This permits a thread to be servicing multiple requests at once and to switch between them. Note that this is per-thread, not per-process, and so is usable in multithreaded programs. The setting of this field is inherited across fork and exec. (5) A new keyctl function (KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY) has been added that permits a thread to assume the authority to deal with an uninstantiated key. Assumption is only permitted if the authorisation key associated with the uninstantiated key is somewhere in the thread's keyrings. This function can also clear the assumption. (6) A new magic key specifier has been added to refer to the currently assumed authorisation key (KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY). (7) Instantiation will only proceed if the appropriate authorisation key is assumed first. The assumed authorisation key is discarded if instantiation is successful. (8) key_validate() is moved from the file of request_key functions to the file of permissions functions. (9) The documentation is updated. From: <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> Build fix. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no> Cc: Alexander Zangerl <az@bond.edu.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-01-08 12:02:47 +03:00
if (ret < 0)
goto error_link;
/* record the UID and GID */
sprintf(uid_str, "%d", from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsuid));
sprintf(gid_str, "%d", from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsgid));
/* we say which key is under construction */
sprintf(key_str, "%d", key->serial);
/* we specify the process's default keyrings */
sprintf(keyring_str[0], "%d",
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks. A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to access or modify its own credentials. A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to execve(). With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified and committed using something like the following sequence of events: struct cred *new = prepare_creds(); int ret = blah(new); if (ret < 0) { abort_creds(new); return ret; } return commit_creds(new); There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter the keys in a keyring in use by another task. To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be modified, except under special circumstances: (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented. (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced. The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be added by a later patch). This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the security code rather than altering the current creds directly. (2) Temporary credential overrides. do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex on the thread being dumped. This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering the task's objective credentials. (3) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check() (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set() Removed in favour of security_capset(). (*) security_capset(), ->capset() New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the new creds, are now const. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be killed if it's an error. (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security() Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds(). (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free() New. Free security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare() New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit() New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new security by commit_creds(). (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid() Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid(). (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid() Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid(). (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init() Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred directly to init's credentials. NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no longer records the sid of the thread that forked it. (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc() (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission() Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to refer to the security context. (4) sys_capset(). This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it calls have been merged. (5) reparent_to_kthreadd(). This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using commit_thread() to point that way. (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid() __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if successful. switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting __sigqueue_alloc(). (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups. The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying it. security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished. The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds(). Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into commit_creds(). The get functions all simply access the data directly. (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl(). security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly rather than through an argument. Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even if it doesn't end up using it. (9) Keyrings. A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code: (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly. They may want separating out again later. (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer rather than a task pointer to specify the security context. (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread keyring. (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them. (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for process or session keyrings (they're shared). (10) Usermode helper. The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process after it has been cloned. call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call. call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the supplied keyring as the new session keyring. (11) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the lock. (12) is_single_threaded(). This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now wants to use it too. The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD). (13) nfsd. The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches in this series have been applied. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 02:39:23 +03:00
cred->thread_keyring ? cred->thread_keyring->serial : 0);
prkey = 0;
KEYS: Make the session and process keyrings per-thread Make the session keyring per-thread rather than per-process, but still inherited from the parent thread to solve a problem with PAM and gdm. The problem is that join_session_keyring() will reject attempts to change the session keyring of a multithreaded program but gdm is now multithreaded before it gets to the point of starting PAM and running pam_keyinit to create the session keyring. See: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=49211 The reason that join_session_keyring() will only change the session keyring under a single-threaded environment is that it's hard to alter the other thread's credentials to effect the change in a multi-threaded program. The problems are such as: (1) How to prevent two threads both running join_session_keyring() from racing. (2) Another thread's credentials may not be modified directly by this process. (3) The number of threads is uncertain whilst we're not holding the appropriate spinlock, making preallocation slightly tricky. (4) We could use TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME and key_replace_session_keyring() to get another thread to replace its keyring, but that means preallocating for each thread. A reasonable way around this is to make the session keyring per-thread rather than per-process and just document that if you want a common session keyring, you must get it before you spawn any threads - which is the current situation anyway. Whilst we're at it, we can the process keyring behave in the same way. This means we can clean up some of the ickyness in the creds code. Basically, after this patch, the session, process and thread keyrings are about inheritance rules only and not about sharing changes of keyring. Reported-by: Mantas M. <grawity@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Ray Strode <rstrode@redhat.com>
2012-10-02 22:24:29 +04:00
if (cred->process_keyring)
prkey = cred->process_keyring->serial;
sprintf(keyring_str[1], "%d", prkey);
rcu_read_lock();
KEYS: Make the session and process keyrings per-thread Make the session keyring per-thread rather than per-process, but still inherited from the parent thread to solve a problem with PAM and gdm. The problem is that join_session_keyring() will reject attempts to change the session keyring of a multithreaded program but gdm is now multithreaded before it gets to the point of starting PAM and running pam_keyinit to create the session keyring. See: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=49211 The reason that join_session_keyring() will only change the session keyring under a single-threaded environment is that it's hard to alter the other thread's credentials to effect the change in a multi-threaded program. The problems are such as: (1) How to prevent two threads both running join_session_keyring() from racing. (2) Another thread's credentials may not be modified directly by this process. (3) The number of threads is uncertain whilst we're not holding the appropriate spinlock, making preallocation slightly tricky. (4) We could use TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME and key_replace_session_keyring() to get another thread to replace its keyring, but that means preallocating for each thread. A reasonable way around this is to make the session keyring per-thread rather than per-process and just document that if you want a common session keyring, you must get it before you spawn any threads - which is the current situation anyway. Whilst we're at it, we can the process keyring behave in the same way. This means we can clean up some of the ickyness in the creds code. Basically, after this patch, the session, process and thread keyrings are about inheritance rules only and not about sharing changes of keyring. Reported-by: Mantas M. <grawity@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Ray Strode <rstrode@redhat.com>
2012-10-02 22:24:29 +04:00
session = rcu_dereference(cred->session_keyring);
if (!session)
session = cred->user->session_keyring;
sskey = session->serial;
rcu_read_unlock();
sprintf(keyring_str[2], "%d", sskey);
/* set up a minimal environment */
i = 0;
envp[i++] = "HOME=/";
envp[i++] = "PATH=/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin";
envp[i] = NULL;
/* set up the argument list */
i = 0;
argv[i++] = (char *)request_key;
argv[i++] = (char *) op;
argv[i++] = key_str;
argv[i++] = uid_str;
argv[i++] = gid_str;
argv[i++] = keyring_str[0];
argv[i++] = keyring_str[1];
argv[i++] = keyring_str[2];
argv[i] = NULL;
/* do it */
ret = call_usermodehelper_keys(request_key, argv, envp, keyring,
UMH_WAIT_PROC);
kdebug("usermode -> 0x%x", ret);
if (ret >= 0) {
/* ret is the exit/wait code */
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags) ||
key_validate(key) < 0)
ret = -ENOKEY;
else
/* ignore any errors from userspace if the key was
* instantiated */
ret = 0;
}
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 09:00:56 +04:00
[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys Make it possible for a running process (such as gssapid) to be able to instantiate a key, as was requested by Trond Myklebust for NFS4. The patch makes the following changes: (1) A new, optional key type method has been added. This permits a key type to intercept requests at the point /sbin/request-key is about to be spawned and do something else with them - passing them over the rpc_pipefs files or netlink sockets for instance. The uninstantiated key, the authorisation key and the intended operation name are passed to the method. (2) The callout_info is no longer passed as an argument to /sbin/request-key to prevent unauthorised viewing of this data using ps or by looking in /proc/pid/cmdline. This means that the old /sbin/request-key program will not work with the patched kernel as it will expect to see an extra argument that is no longer there. A revised keyutils package will be made available tomorrow. (3) The callout_info is now attached to the authorisation key. Reading this key will retrieve the information. (4) A new field has been added to the task_struct. This holds the authorisation key currently active for a thread. Searches now look here for the caller's set of keys rather than looking for an auth key in the lowest level of the session keyring. This permits a thread to be servicing multiple requests at once and to switch between them. Note that this is per-thread, not per-process, and so is usable in multithreaded programs. The setting of this field is inherited across fork and exec. (5) A new keyctl function (KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY) has been added that permits a thread to assume the authority to deal with an uninstantiated key. Assumption is only permitted if the authorisation key associated with the uninstantiated key is somewhere in the thread's keyrings. This function can also clear the assumption. (6) A new magic key specifier has been added to refer to the currently assumed authorisation key (KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY). (7) Instantiation will only proceed if the appropriate authorisation key is assumed first. The assumed authorisation key is discarded if instantiation is successful. (8) key_validate() is moved from the file of request_key functions to the file of permissions functions. (9) The documentation is updated. From: <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> Build fix. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no> Cc: Alexander Zangerl <az@bond.edu.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-01-08 12:02:47 +03:00
error_link:
key_put(keyring);
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 09:00:56 +04:00
[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys Make it possible for a running process (such as gssapid) to be able to instantiate a key, as was requested by Trond Myklebust for NFS4. The patch makes the following changes: (1) A new, optional key type method has been added. This permits a key type to intercept requests at the point /sbin/request-key is about to be spawned and do something else with them - passing them over the rpc_pipefs files or netlink sockets for instance. The uninstantiated key, the authorisation key and the intended operation name are passed to the method. (2) The callout_info is no longer passed as an argument to /sbin/request-key to prevent unauthorised viewing of this data using ps or by looking in /proc/pid/cmdline. This means that the old /sbin/request-key program will not work with the patched kernel as it will expect to see an extra argument that is no longer there. A revised keyutils package will be made available tomorrow. (3) The callout_info is now attached to the authorisation key. Reading this key will retrieve the information. (4) A new field has been added to the task_struct. This holds the authorisation key currently active for a thread. Searches now look here for the caller's set of keys rather than looking for an auth key in the lowest level of the session keyring. This permits a thread to be servicing multiple requests at once and to switch between them. Note that this is per-thread, not per-process, and so is usable in multithreaded programs. The setting of this field is inherited across fork and exec. (5) A new keyctl function (KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY) has been added that permits a thread to assume the authority to deal with an uninstantiated key. Assumption is only permitted if the authorisation key associated with the uninstantiated key is somewhere in the thread's keyrings. This function can also clear the assumption. (6) A new magic key specifier has been added to refer to the currently assumed authorisation key (KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY). (7) Instantiation will only proceed if the appropriate authorisation key is assumed first. The assumed authorisation key is discarded if instantiation is successful. (8) key_validate() is moved from the file of request_key functions to the file of permissions functions. (9) The documentation is updated. From: <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> Build fix. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no> Cc: Alexander Zangerl <az@bond.edu.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-01-08 12:02:47 +03:00
error_alloc:
complete_request_key(cons, ret);
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks. A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to access or modify its own credentials. A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to execve(). With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified and committed using something like the following sequence of events: struct cred *new = prepare_creds(); int ret = blah(new); if (ret < 0) { abort_creds(new); return ret; } return commit_creds(new); There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter the keys in a keyring in use by another task. To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be modified, except under special circumstances: (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented. (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced. The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be added by a later patch). This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the security code rather than altering the current creds directly. (2) Temporary credential overrides. do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex on the thread being dumped. This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering the task's objective credentials. (3) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check() (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set() Removed in favour of security_capset(). (*) security_capset(), ->capset() New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the new creds, are now const. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be killed if it's an error. (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security() Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds(). (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free() New. Free security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare() New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit() New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new security by commit_creds(). (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid() Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid(). (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid() Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid(). (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init() Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred directly to init's credentials. NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no longer records the sid of the thread that forked it. (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc() (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission() Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to refer to the security context. (4) sys_capset(). This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it calls have been merged. (5) reparent_to_kthreadd(). This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using commit_thread() to point that way. (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid() __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if successful. switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting __sigqueue_alloc(). (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups. The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying it. security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished. The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds(). Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into commit_creds(). The get functions all simply access the data directly. (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl(). security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly rather than through an argument. Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even if it doesn't end up using it. (9) Keyrings. A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code: (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly. They may want separating out again later. (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer rather than a task pointer to specify the security context. (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread keyring. (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them. (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for process or session keyrings (they're shared). (10) Usermode helper. The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process after it has been cloned. call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call. call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the supplied keyring as the new session keyring. (11) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the lock. (12) is_single_threaded(). This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now wants to use it too. The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD). (13) nfsd. The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches in this series have been applied. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 02:39:23 +03:00
kleave(" = %d", ret);
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 09:00:56 +04:00
return ret;
}
/*
* Call out to userspace for key construction.
*
* Program failure is ignored in favour of key status.
*/
static int construct_key(struct key *key, const void *callout_info,
KEYS: Alter use of key instantiation link-to-keyring argument Alter the use of the key instantiation and negation functions' link-to-keyring arguments. Currently this specifies a keyring in the target process to link the key into, creating the keyring if it doesn't exist. This, however, can be a problem for copy-on-write credentials as it means that the instantiating process can alter the credentials of the requesting process. This patch alters the behaviour such that: (1) If keyctl_instantiate_key() or keyctl_negate_key() are given a specific keyring by ID (ringid >= 0), then that keyring will be used. (2) If keyctl_instantiate_key() or keyctl_negate_key() are given one of the special constants that refer to the requesting process's keyrings (KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING, all <= 0), then: (a) If sys_request_key() was given a keyring to use (destringid) then the key will be attached to that keyring. (b) If sys_request_key() was given a NULL keyring, then the key being instantiated will be attached to the default keyring as set by keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(). (3) No extra link will be made. Decision point (1) follows current behaviour, and allows those instantiators who've searched for a specifically named keyring in the requestor's keyring so as to partition the keys by type to still have their named keyrings. Decision point (2) allows the requestor to make sure that the key or keys that get produced by request_key() go where they want, whilst allowing the instantiator to request that the key is retained. This is mainly useful for situations where the instantiator makes a secondary request, the key for which should be retained by the initial requestor: +-----------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ | | | | | | | Requestor |------->| Instantiator |------->| Instantiator | | | | | | | +-----------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ request_key() request_key() This might be useful, for example, in Kerberos, where the requestor requests a ticket, and then the ticket instantiator requests the TGT, which someone else then has to go and fetch. The TGT, however, should be retained in the keyrings of the requestor, not the first instantiator. To make this explict an extra special keyring constant is also added. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 02:39:14 +03:00
size_t callout_len, void *aux,
struct key *dest_keyring)
{
struct key_construction *cons;
[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys Make it possible for a running process (such as gssapid) to be able to instantiate a key, as was requested by Trond Myklebust for NFS4. The patch makes the following changes: (1) A new, optional key type method has been added. This permits a key type to intercept requests at the point /sbin/request-key is about to be spawned and do something else with them - passing them over the rpc_pipefs files or netlink sockets for instance. The uninstantiated key, the authorisation key and the intended operation name are passed to the method. (2) The callout_info is no longer passed as an argument to /sbin/request-key to prevent unauthorised viewing of this data using ps or by looking in /proc/pid/cmdline. This means that the old /sbin/request-key program will not work with the patched kernel as it will expect to see an extra argument that is no longer there. A revised keyutils package will be made available tomorrow. (3) The callout_info is now attached to the authorisation key. Reading this key will retrieve the information. (4) A new field has been added to the task_struct. This holds the authorisation key currently active for a thread. Searches now look here for the caller's set of keys rather than looking for an auth key in the lowest level of the session keyring. This permits a thread to be servicing multiple requests at once and to switch between them. Note that this is per-thread, not per-process, and so is usable in multithreaded programs. The setting of this field is inherited across fork and exec. (5) A new keyctl function (KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY) has been added that permits a thread to assume the authority to deal with an uninstantiated key. Assumption is only permitted if the authorisation key associated with the uninstantiated key is somewhere in the thread's keyrings. This function can also clear the assumption. (6) A new magic key specifier has been added to refer to the currently assumed authorisation key (KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY). (7) Instantiation will only proceed if the appropriate authorisation key is assumed first. The assumed authorisation key is discarded if instantiation is successful. (8) key_validate() is moved from the file of request_key functions to the file of permissions functions. (9) The documentation is updated. From: <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> Build fix. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no> Cc: Alexander Zangerl <az@bond.edu.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-01-08 12:02:47 +03:00
request_key_actor_t actor;
struct key *authkey;
int ret;
kenter("%d,%p,%zu,%p", key->serial, callout_info, callout_len, aux);
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 09:00:56 +04:00
cons = kmalloc(sizeof(*cons), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!cons)
return -ENOMEM;
[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys Make it possible for a running process (such as gssapid) to be able to instantiate a key, as was requested by Trond Myklebust for NFS4. The patch makes the following changes: (1) A new, optional key type method has been added. This permits a key type to intercept requests at the point /sbin/request-key is about to be spawned and do something else with them - passing them over the rpc_pipefs files or netlink sockets for instance. The uninstantiated key, the authorisation key and the intended operation name are passed to the method. (2) The callout_info is no longer passed as an argument to /sbin/request-key to prevent unauthorised viewing of this data using ps or by looking in /proc/pid/cmdline. This means that the old /sbin/request-key program will not work with the patched kernel as it will expect to see an extra argument that is no longer there. A revised keyutils package will be made available tomorrow. (3) The callout_info is now attached to the authorisation key. Reading this key will retrieve the information. (4) A new field has been added to the task_struct. This holds the authorisation key currently active for a thread. Searches now look here for the caller's set of keys rather than looking for an auth key in the lowest level of the session keyring. This permits a thread to be servicing multiple requests at once and to switch between them. Note that this is per-thread, not per-process, and so is usable in multithreaded programs. The setting of this field is inherited across fork and exec. (5) A new keyctl function (KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY) has been added that permits a thread to assume the authority to deal with an uninstantiated key. Assumption is only permitted if the authorisation key associated with the uninstantiated key is somewhere in the thread's keyrings. This function can also clear the assumption. (6) A new magic key specifier has been added to refer to the currently assumed authorisation key (KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY). (7) Instantiation will only proceed if the appropriate authorisation key is assumed first. The assumed authorisation key is discarded if instantiation is successful. (8) key_validate() is moved from the file of request_key functions to the file of permissions functions. (9) The documentation is updated. From: <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> Build fix. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no> Cc: Alexander Zangerl <az@bond.edu.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-01-08 12:02:47 +03:00
/* allocate an authorisation key */
KEYS: Alter use of key instantiation link-to-keyring argument Alter the use of the key instantiation and negation functions' link-to-keyring arguments. Currently this specifies a keyring in the target process to link the key into, creating the keyring if it doesn't exist. This, however, can be a problem for copy-on-write credentials as it means that the instantiating process can alter the credentials of the requesting process. This patch alters the behaviour such that: (1) If keyctl_instantiate_key() or keyctl_negate_key() are given a specific keyring by ID (ringid >= 0), then that keyring will be used. (2) If keyctl_instantiate_key() or keyctl_negate_key() are given one of the special constants that refer to the requesting process's keyrings (KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING, all <= 0), then: (a) If sys_request_key() was given a keyring to use (destringid) then the key will be attached to that keyring. (b) If sys_request_key() was given a NULL keyring, then the key being instantiated will be attached to the default keyring as set by keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(). (3) No extra link will be made. Decision point (1) follows current behaviour, and allows those instantiators who've searched for a specifically named keyring in the requestor's keyring so as to partition the keys by type to still have their named keyrings. Decision point (2) allows the requestor to make sure that the key or keys that get produced by request_key() go where they want, whilst allowing the instantiator to request that the key is retained. This is mainly useful for situations where the instantiator makes a secondary request, the key for which should be retained by the initial requestor: +-----------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ | | | | | | | Requestor |------->| Instantiator |------->| Instantiator | | | | | | | +-----------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ request_key() request_key() This might be useful, for example, in Kerberos, where the requestor requests a ticket, and then the ticket instantiator requests the TGT, which someone else then has to go and fetch. The TGT, however, should be retained in the keyrings of the requestor, not the first instantiator. To make this explict an extra special keyring constant is also added. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 02:39:14 +03:00
authkey = request_key_auth_new(key, callout_info, callout_len,
dest_keyring);
[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys Make it possible for a running process (such as gssapid) to be able to instantiate a key, as was requested by Trond Myklebust for NFS4. The patch makes the following changes: (1) A new, optional key type method has been added. This permits a key type to intercept requests at the point /sbin/request-key is about to be spawned and do something else with them - passing them over the rpc_pipefs files or netlink sockets for instance. The uninstantiated key, the authorisation key and the intended operation name are passed to the method. (2) The callout_info is no longer passed as an argument to /sbin/request-key to prevent unauthorised viewing of this data using ps or by looking in /proc/pid/cmdline. This means that the old /sbin/request-key program will not work with the patched kernel as it will expect to see an extra argument that is no longer there. A revised keyutils package will be made available tomorrow. (3) The callout_info is now attached to the authorisation key. Reading this key will retrieve the information. (4) A new field has been added to the task_struct. This holds the authorisation key currently active for a thread. Searches now look here for the caller's set of keys rather than looking for an auth key in the lowest level of the session keyring. This permits a thread to be servicing multiple requests at once and to switch between them. Note that this is per-thread, not per-process, and so is usable in multithreaded programs. The setting of this field is inherited across fork and exec. (5) A new keyctl function (KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY) has been added that permits a thread to assume the authority to deal with an uninstantiated key. Assumption is only permitted if the authorisation key associated with the uninstantiated key is somewhere in the thread's keyrings. This function can also clear the assumption. (6) A new magic key specifier has been added to refer to the currently assumed authorisation key (KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY). (7) Instantiation will only proceed if the appropriate authorisation key is assumed first. The assumed authorisation key is discarded if instantiation is successful. (8) key_validate() is moved from the file of request_key functions to the file of permissions functions. (9) The documentation is updated. From: <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> Build fix. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no> Cc: Alexander Zangerl <az@bond.edu.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-01-08 12:02:47 +03:00
if (IS_ERR(authkey)) {
kfree(cons);
[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys Make it possible for a running process (such as gssapid) to be able to instantiate a key, as was requested by Trond Myklebust for NFS4. The patch makes the following changes: (1) A new, optional key type method has been added. This permits a key type to intercept requests at the point /sbin/request-key is about to be spawned and do something else with them - passing them over the rpc_pipefs files or netlink sockets for instance. The uninstantiated key, the authorisation key and the intended operation name are passed to the method. (2) The callout_info is no longer passed as an argument to /sbin/request-key to prevent unauthorised viewing of this data using ps or by looking in /proc/pid/cmdline. This means that the old /sbin/request-key program will not work with the patched kernel as it will expect to see an extra argument that is no longer there. A revised keyutils package will be made available tomorrow. (3) The callout_info is now attached to the authorisation key. Reading this key will retrieve the information. (4) A new field has been added to the task_struct. This holds the authorisation key currently active for a thread. Searches now look here for the caller's set of keys rather than looking for an auth key in the lowest level of the session keyring. This permits a thread to be servicing multiple requests at once and to switch between them. Note that this is per-thread, not per-process, and so is usable in multithreaded programs. The setting of this field is inherited across fork and exec. (5) A new keyctl function (KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY) has been added that permits a thread to assume the authority to deal with an uninstantiated key. Assumption is only permitted if the authorisation key associated with the uninstantiated key is somewhere in the thread's keyrings. This function can also clear the assumption. (6) A new magic key specifier has been added to refer to the currently assumed authorisation key (KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY). (7) Instantiation will only proceed if the appropriate authorisation key is assumed first. The assumed authorisation key is discarded if instantiation is successful. (8) key_validate() is moved from the file of request_key functions to the file of permissions functions. (9) The documentation is updated. From: <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> Build fix. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no> Cc: Alexander Zangerl <az@bond.edu.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-01-08 12:02:47 +03:00
ret = PTR_ERR(authkey);
authkey = NULL;
} else {
cons->authkey = key_get(authkey);
cons->key = key_get(key);
/* make the call */
actor = call_sbin_request_key;
if (key->type->request_key)
actor = key->type->request_key;
ret = actor(cons, "create", aux);
/* check that the actor called complete_request_key() prior to
* returning an error */
WARN_ON(ret < 0 &&
!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &authkey->flags));
key_put(authkey);
}
kleave(" = %d", ret);
return ret;
}
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 09:00:56 +04:00
/*
* Get the appropriate destination keyring for the request.
*
* The keyring selected is returned with an extra reference upon it which the
* caller must release.
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 09:00:56 +04:00
*/
KEYS: Alter use of key instantiation link-to-keyring argument Alter the use of the key instantiation and negation functions' link-to-keyring arguments. Currently this specifies a keyring in the target process to link the key into, creating the keyring if it doesn't exist. This, however, can be a problem for copy-on-write credentials as it means that the instantiating process can alter the credentials of the requesting process. This patch alters the behaviour such that: (1) If keyctl_instantiate_key() or keyctl_negate_key() are given a specific keyring by ID (ringid >= 0), then that keyring will be used. (2) If keyctl_instantiate_key() or keyctl_negate_key() are given one of the special constants that refer to the requesting process's keyrings (KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING, all <= 0), then: (a) If sys_request_key() was given a keyring to use (destringid) then the key will be attached to that keyring. (b) If sys_request_key() was given a NULL keyring, then the key being instantiated will be attached to the default keyring as set by keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(). (3) No extra link will be made. Decision point (1) follows current behaviour, and allows those instantiators who've searched for a specifically named keyring in the requestor's keyring so as to partition the keys by type to still have their named keyrings. Decision point (2) allows the requestor to make sure that the key or keys that get produced by request_key() go where they want, whilst allowing the instantiator to request that the key is retained. This is mainly useful for situations where the instantiator makes a secondary request, the key for which should be retained by the initial requestor: +-----------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ | | | | | | | Requestor |------->| Instantiator |------->| Instantiator | | | | | | | +-----------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ request_key() request_key() This might be useful, for example, in Kerberos, where the requestor requests a ticket, and then the ticket instantiator requests the TGT, which someone else then has to go and fetch. The TGT, however, should be retained in the keyrings of the requestor, not the first instantiator. To make this explict an extra special keyring constant is also added. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 02:39:14 +03:00
static void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring)
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 09:00:56 +04:00
{
KEYS: Alter use of key instantiation link-to-keyring argument Alter the use of the key instantiation and negation functions' link-to-keyring arguments. Currently this specifies a keyring in the target process to link the key into, creating the keyring if it doesn't exist. This, however, can be a problem for copy-on-write credentials as it means that the instantiating process can alter the credentials of the requesting process. This patch alters the behaviour such that: (1) If keyctl_instantiate_key() or keyctl_negate_key() are given a specific keyring by ID (ringid >= 0), then that keyring will be used. (2) If keyctl_instantiate_key() or keyctl_negate_key() are given one of the special constants that refer to the requesting process's keyrings (KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING, all <= 0), then: (a) If sys_request_key() was given a keyring to use (destringid) then the key will be attached to that keyring. (b) If sys_request_key() was given a NULL keyring, then the key being instantiated will be attached to the default keyring as set by keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(). (3) No extra link will be made. Decision point (1) follows current behaviour, and allows those instantiators who've searched for a specifically named keyring in the requestor's keyring so as to partition the keys by type to still have their named keyrings. Decision point (2) allows the requestor to make sure that the key or keys that get produced by request_key() go where they want, whilst allowing the instantiator to request that the key is retained. This is mainly useful for situations where the instantiator makes a secondary request, the key for which should be retained by the initial requestor: +-----------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ | | | | | | | Requestor |------->| Instantiator |------->| Instantiator | | | | | | | +-----------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ request_key() request_key() This might be useful, for example, in Kerberos, where the requestor requests a ticket, and then the ticket instantiator requests the TGT, which someone else then has to go and fetch. The TGT, however, should be retained in the keyrings of the requestor, not the first instantiator. To make this explict an extra special keyring constant is also added. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 02:39:14 +03:00
struct request_key_auth *rka;
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
KEYS: Alter use of key instantiation link-to-keyring argument Alter the use of the key instantiation and negation functions' link-to-keyring arguments. Currently this specifies a keyring in the target process to link the key into, creating the keyring if it doesn't exist. This, however, can be a problem for copy-on-write credentials as it means that the instantiating process can alter the credentials of the requesting process. This patch alters the behaviour such that: (1) If keyctl_instantiate_key() or keyctl_negate_key() are given a specific keyring by ID (ringid >= 0), then that keyring will be used. (2) If keyctl_instantiate_key() or keyctl_negate_key() are given one of the special constants that refer to the requesting process's keyrings (KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING, all <= 0), then: (a) If sys_request_key() was given a keyring to use (destringid) then the key will be attached to that keyring. (b) If sys_request_key() was given a NULL keyring, then the key being instantiated will be attached to the default keyring as set by keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(). (3) No extra link will be made. Decision point (1) follows current behaviour, and allows those instantiators who've searched for a specifically named keyring in the requestor's keyring so as to partition the keys by type to still have their named keyrings. Decision point (2) allows the requestor to make sure that the key or keys that get produced by request_key() go where they want, whilst allowing the instantiator to request that the key is retained. This is mainly useful for situations where the instantiator makes a secondary request, the key for which should be retained by the initial requestor: +-----------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ | | | | | | | Requestor |------->| Instantiator |------->| Instantiator | | | | | | | +-----------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ request_key() request_key() This might be useful, for example, in Kerberos, where the requestor requests a ticket, and then the ticket instantiator requests the TGT, which someone else then has to go and fetch. The TGT, however, should be retained in the keyrings of the requestor, not the first instantiator. To make this explict an extra special keyring constant is also added. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 02:39:14 +03:00
struct key *dest_keyring = *_dest_keyring, *authkey;
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 09:00:56 +04:00
KEYS: Alter use of key instantiation link-to-keyring argument Alter the use of the key instantiation and negation functions' link-to-keyring arguments. Currently this specifies a keyring in the target process to link the key into, creating the keyring if it doesn't exist. This, however, can be a problem for copy-on-write credentials as it means that the instantiating process can alter the credentials of the requesting process. This patch alters the behaviour such that: (1) If keyctl_instantiate_key() or keyctl_negate_key() are given a specific keyring by ID (ringid >= 0), then that keyring will be used. (2) If keyctl_instantiate_key() or keyctl_negate_key() are given one of the special constants that refer to the requesting process's keyrings (KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING, all <= 0), then: (a) If sys_request_key() was given a keyring to use (destringid) then the key will be attached to that keyring. (b) If sys_request_key() was given a NULL keyring, then the key being instantiated will be attached to the default keyring as set by keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(). (3) No extra link will be made. Decision point (1) follows current behaviour, and allows those instantiators who've searched for a specifically named keyring in the requestor's keyring so as to partition the keys by type to still have their named keyrings. Decision point (2) allows the requestor to make sure that the key or keys that get produced by request_key() go where they want, whilst allowing the instantiator to request that the key is retained. This is mainly useful for situations where the instantiator makes a secondary request, the key for which should be retained by the initial requestor: +-----------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ | | | | | | | Requestor |------->| Instantiator |------->| Instantiator | | | | | | | +-----------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ request_key() request_key() This might be useful, for example, in Kerberos, where the requestor requests a ticket, and then the ticket instantiator requests the TGT, which someone else then has to go and fetch. The TGT, however, should be retained in the keyrings of the requestor, not the first instantiator. To make this explict an extra special keyring constant is also added. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 02:39:14 +03:00
kenter("%p", dest_keyring);
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 09:00:56 +04:00
/* find the appropriate keyring */
KEYS: Alter use of key instantiation link-to-keyring argument Alter the use of the key instantiation and negation functions' link-to-keyring arguments. Currently this specifies a keyring in the target process to link the key into, creating the keyring if it doesn't exist. This, however, can be a problem for copy-on-write credentials as it means that the instantiating process can alter the credentials of the requesting process. This patch alters the behaviour such that: (1) If keyctl_instantiate_key() or keyctl_negate_key() are given a specific keyring by ID (ringid >= 0), then that keyring will be used. (2) If keyctl_instantiate_key() or keyctl_negate_key() are given one of the special constants that refer to the requesting process's keyrings (KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING, all <= 0), then: (a) If sys_request_key() was given a keyring to use (destringid) then the key will be attached to that keyring. (b) If sys_request_key() was given a NULL keyring, then the key being instantiated will be attached to the default keyring as set by keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(). (3) No extra link will be made. Decision point (1) follows current behaviour, and allows those instantiators who've searched for a specifically named keyring in the requestor's keyring so as to partition the keys by type to still have their named keyrings. Decision point (2) allows the requestor to make sure that the key or keys that get produced by request_key() go where they want, whilst allowing the instantiator to request that the key is retained. This is mainly useful for situations where the instantiator makes a secondary request, the key for which should be retained by the initial requestor: +-----------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ | | | | | | | Requestor |------->| Instantiator |------->| Instantiator | | | | | | | +-----------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ request_key() request_key() This might be useful, for example, in Kerberos, where the requestor requests a ticket, and then the ticket instantiator requests the TGT, which someone else then has to go and fetch. The TGT, however, should be retained in the keyrings of the requestor, not the first instantiator. To make this explict an extra special keyring constant is also added. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 02:39:14 +03:00
if (dest_keyring) {
/* the caller supplied one */
key_get(dest_keyring);
} else {
/* use a default keyring; falling through the cases until we
* find one that we actually have */
switch (cred->jit_keyring) {
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 09:00:56 +04:00
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_DEFAULT:
KEYS: Alter use of key instantiation link-to-keyring argument Alter the use of the key instantiation and negation functions' link-to-keyring arguments. Currently this specifies a keyring in the target process to link the key into, creating the keyring if it doesn't exist. This, however, can be a problem for copy-on-write credentials as it means that the instantiating process can alter the credentials of the requesting process. This patch alters the behaviour such that: (1) If keyctl_instantiate_key() or keyctl_negate_key() are given a specific keyring by ID (ringid >= 0), then that keyring will be used. (2) If keyctl_instantiate_key() or keyctl_negate_key() are given one of the special constants that refer to the requesting process's keyrings (KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING, all <= 0), then: (a) If sys_request_key() was given a keyring to use (destringid) then the key will be attached to that keyring. (b) If sys_request_key() was given a NULL keyring, then the key being instantiated will be attached to the default keyring as set by keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(). (3) No extra link will be made. Decision point (1) follows current behaviour, and allows those instantiators who've searched for a specifically named keyring in the requestor's keyring so as to partition the keys by type to still have their named keyrings. Decision point (2) allows the requestor to make sure that the key or keys that get produced by request_key() go where they want, whilst allowing the instantiator to request that the key is retained. This is mainly useful for situations where the instantiator makes a secondary request, the key for which should be retained by the initial requestor: +-----------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ | | | | | | | Requestor |------->| Instantiator |------->| Instantiator | | | | | | | +-----------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ request_key() request_key() This might be useful, for example, in Kerberos, where the requestor requests a ticket, and then the ticket instantiator requests the TGT, which someone else then has to go and fetch. The TGT, however, should be retained in the keyrings of the requestor, not the first instantiator. To make this explict an extra special keyring constant is also added. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 02:39:14 +03:00
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_REQUESTOR_KEYRING:
if (cred->request_key_auth) {
authkey = cred->request_key_auth;
KEYS: Alter use of key instantiation link-to-keyring argument Alter the use of the key instantiation and negation functions' link-to-keyring arguments. Currently this specifies a keyring in the target process to link the key into, creating the keyring if it doesn't exist. This, however, can be a problem for copy-on-write credentials as it means that the instantiating process can alter the credentials of the requesting process. This patch alters the behaviour such that: (1) If keyctl_instantiate_key() or keyctl_negate_key() are given a specific keyring by ID (ringid >= 0), then that keyring will be used. (2) If keyctl_instantiate_key() or keyctl_negate_key() are given one of the special constants that refer to the requesting process's keyrings (KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING, all <= 0), then: (a) If sys_request_key() was given a keyring to use (destringid) then the key will be attached to that keyring. (b) If sys_request_key() was given a NULL keyring, then the key being instantiated will be attached to the default keyring as set by keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(). (3) No extra link will be made. Decision point (1) follows current behaviour, and allows those instantiators who've searched for a specifically named keyring in the requestor's keyring so as to partition the keys by type to still have their named keyrings. Decision point (2) allows the requestor to make sure that the key or keys that get produced by request_key() go where they want, whilst allowing the instantiator to request that the key is retained. This is mainly useful for situations where the instantiator makes a secondary request, the key for which should be retained by the initial requestor: +-----------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ | | | | | | | Requestor |------->| Instantiator |------->| Instantiator | | | | | | | +-----------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ request_key() request_key() This might be useful, for example, in Kerberos, where the requestor requests a ticket, and then the ticket instantiator requests the TGT, which someone else then has to go and fetch. The TGT, however, should be retained in the keyrings of the requestor, not the first instantiator. To make this explict an extra special keyring constant is also added. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 02:39:14 +03:00
down_read(&authkey->sem);
rka = authkey->payload.data[0];
KEYS: Alter use of key instantiation link-to-keyring argument Alter the use of the key instantiation and negation functions' link-to-keyring arguments. Currently this specifies a keyring in the target process to link the key into, creating the keyring if it doesn't exist. This, however, can be a problem for copy-on-write credentials as it means that the instantiating process can alter the credentials of the requesting process. This patch alters the behaviour such that: (1) If keyctl_instantiate_key() or keyctl_negate_key() are given a specific keyring by ID (ringid >= 0), then that keyring will be used. (2) If keyctl_instantiate_key() or keyctl_negate_key() are given one of the special constants that refer to the requesting process's keyrings (KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING, all <= 0), then: (a) If sys_request_key() was given a keyring to use (destringid) then the key will be attached to that keyring. (b) If sys_request_key() was given a NULL keyring, then the key being instantiated will be attached to the default keyring as set by keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(). (3) No extra link will be made. Decision point (1) follows current behaviour, and allows those instantiators who've searched for a specifically named keyring in the requestor's keyring so as to partition the keys by type to still have their named keyrings. Decision point (2) allows the requestor to make sure that the key or keys that get produced by request_key() go where they want, whilst allowing the instantiator to request that the key is retained. This is mainly useful for situations where the instantiator makes a secondary request, the key for which should be retained by the initial requestor: +-----------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ | | | | | | | Requestor |------->| Instantiator |------->| Instantiator | | | | | | | +-----------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ request_key() request_key() This might be useful, for example, in Kerberos, where the requestor requests a ticket, and then the ticket instantiator requests the TGT, which someone else then has to go and fetch. The TGT, however, should be retained in the keyrings of the requestor, not the first instantiator. To make this explict an extra special keyring constant is also added. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 02:39:14 +03:00
if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED,
&authkey->flags))
dest_keyring =
key_get(rka->dest_keyring);
up_read(&authkey->sem);
if (dest_keyring)
break;
}
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 09:00:56 +04:00
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING:
dest_keyring = key_get(cred->thread_keyring);
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 09:00:56 +04:00
if (dest_keyring)
break;
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_PROCESS_KEYRING:
KEYS: Make the session and process keyrings per-thread Make the session keyring per-thread rather than per-process, but still inherited from the parent thread to solve a problem with PAM and gdm. The problem is that join_session_keyring() will reject attempts to change the session keyring of a multithreaded program but gdm is now multithreaded before it gets to the point of starting PAM and running pam_keyinit to create the session keyring. See: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=49211 The reason that join_session_keyring() will only change the session keyring under a single-threaded environment is that it's hard to alter the other thread's credentials to effect the change in a multi-threaded program. The problems are such as: (1) How to prevent two threads both running join_session_keyring() from racing. (2) Another thread's credentials may not be modified directly by this process. (3) The number of threads is uncertain whilst we're not holding the appropriate spinlock, making preallocation slightly tricky. (4) We could use TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME and key_replace_session_keyring() to get another thread to replace its keyring, but that means preallocating for each thread. A reasonable way around this is to make the session keyring per-thread rather than per-process and just document that if you want a common session keyring, you must get it before you spawn any threads - which is the current situation anyway. Whilst we're at it, we can the process keyring behave in the same way. This means we can clean up some of the ickyness in the creds code. Basically, after this patch, the session, process and thread keyrings are about inheritance rules only and not about sharing changes of keyring. Reported-by: Mantas M. <grawity@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Ray Strode <rstrode@redhat.com>
2012-10-02 22:24:29 +04:00
dest_keyring = key_get(cred->process_keyring);
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 09:00:56 +04:00
if (dest_keyring)
break;
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_SESSION_KEYRING:
rcu_read_lock();
dest_keyring = key_get(
KEYS: Make the session and process keyrings per-thread Make the session keyring per-thread rather than per-process, but still inherited from the parent thread to solve a problem with PAM and gdm. The problem is that join_session_keyring() will reject attempts to change the session keyring of a multithreaded program but gdm is now multithreaded before it gets to the point of starting PAM and running pam_keyinit to create the session keyring. See: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=49211 The reason that join_session_keyring() will only change the session keyring under a single-threaded environment is that it's hard to alter the other thread's credentials to effect the change in a multi-threaded program. The problems are such as: (1) How to prevent two threads both running join_session_keyring() from racing. (2) Another thread's credentials may not be modified directly by this process. (3) The number of threads is uncertain whilst we're not holding the appropriate spinlock, making preallocation slightly tricky. (4) We could use TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME and key_replace_session_keyring() to get another thread to replace its keyring, but that means preallocating for each thread. A reasonable way around this is to make the session keyring per-thread rather than per-process and just document that if you want a common session keyring, you must get it before you spawn any threads - which is the current situation anyway. Whilst we're at it, we can the process keyring behave in the same way. This means we can clean up some of the ickyness in the creds code. Basically, after this patch, the session, process and thread keyrings are about inheritance rules only and not about sharing changes of keyring. Reported-by: Mantas M. <grawity@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Ray Strode <rstrode@redhat.com>
2012-10-02 22:24:29 +04:00
rcu_dereference(cred->session_keyring));
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 09:00:56 +04:00
rcu_read_unlock();
if (dest_keyring)
break;
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_SESSION_KEYRING:
dest_keyring =
key_get(cred->user->session_keyring);
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 09:00:56 +04:00
break;
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_KEYRING:
dest_keyring = key_get(cred->user->uid_keyring);
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 09:00:56 +04:00
break;
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_GROUP_KEYRING:
default:
BUG();
}
}
KEYS: Alter use of key instantiation link-to-keyring argument Alter the use of the key instantiation and negation functions' link-to-keyring arguments. Currently this specifies a keyring in the target process to link the key into, creating the keyring if it doesn't exist. This, however, can be a problem for copy-on-write credentials as it means that the instantiating process can alter the credentials of the requesting process. This patch alters the behaviour such that: (1) If keyctl_instantiate_key() or keyctl_negate_key() are given a specific keyring by ID (ringid >= 0), then that keyring will be used. (2) If keyctl_instantiate_key() or keyctl_negate_key() are given one of the special constants that refer to the requesting process's keyrings (KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING, all <= 0), then: (a) If sys_request_key() was given a keyring to use (destringid) then the key will be attached to that keyring. (b) If sys_request_key() was given a NULL keyring, then the key being instantiated will be attached to the default keyring as set by keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(). (3) No extra link will be made. Decision point (1) follows current behaviour, and allows those instantiators who've searched for a specifically named keyring in the requestor's keyring so as to partition the keys by type to still have their named keyrings. Decision point (2) allows the requestor to make sure that the key or keys that get produced by request_key() go where they want, whilst allowing the instantiator to request that the key is retained. This is mainly useful for situations where the instantiator makes a secondary request, the key for which should be retained by the initial requestor: +-----------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ | | | | | | | Requestor |------->| Instantiator |------->| Instantiator | | | | | | | +-----------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ request_key() request_key() This might be useful, for example, in Kerberos, where the requestor requests a ticket, and then the ticket instantiator requests the TGT, which someone else then has to go and fetch. The TGT, however, should be retained in the keyrings of the requestor, not the first instantiator. To make this explict an extra special keyring constant is also added. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 02:39:14 +03:00
*_dest_keyring = dest_keyring;
kleave(" [dk %d]", key_serial(dest_keyring));
return;
}
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 09:00:56 +04:00
/*
* Allocate a new key in under-construction state and attempt to link it in to
* the requested keyring.
*
* May return a key that's already under construction instead if there was a
* race between two thread calling request_key().
*/
static int construct_alloc_key(struct keyring_search_context *ctx,
struct key *dest_keyring,
unsigned long flags,
struct key_user *user,
struct key **_key)
{
struct assoc_array_edit *edit;
struct key *key;
KEYS: Reduce initial permissions on keys Reduce the initial permissions on new keys to grant the possessor everything, view permission only to the user (so the keys can be seen in /proc/keys) and nothing else. This gives the creator a chance to adjust the permissions mask before other processes can access the new key or create a link to it. To aid with this, keyring_alloc() now takes a permission argument rather than setting the permissions itself. The following permissions are now set: (1) The user and user-session keyrings grant the user that owns them full permissions and grant a possessor everything bar SETATTR. (2) The process and thread keyrings grant the possessor full permissions but only grant the user VIEW. This permits the user to see them in /proc/keys, but not to do anything with them. (3) Anonymous session keyrings grant the possessor full permissions, but only grant the user VIEW and READ. This means that the user can see them in /proc/keys and can list them, but nothing else. Possibly READ shouldn't be provided either. (4) Named session keyrings grant everything an anonymous session keyring does, plus they grant the user LINK permission. The whole point of named session keyrings is that others can also subscribe to them. Possibly this should be a separate permission to LINK. (5) The temporary session keyring created by call_sbin_request_key() gets the same permissions as an anonymous session keyring. (6) Keys created by add_key() get VIEW, SEARCH, LINK and SETATTR for the possessor, plus READ and/or WRITE if the key type supports them. The used only gets VIEW now. (7) Keys created by request_key() now get the same as those created by add_key(). Reported-by: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net> Reported-by: Stef Walter <stefw@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2012-10-02 22:24:56 +04:00
key_perm_t perm;
key_ref_t key_ref;
int ret;
kenter("%s,%s,,,",
ctx->index_key.type->name, ctx->index_key.description);
*_key = NULL;
mutex_lock(&user->cons_lock);
KEYS: Reduce initial permissions on keys Reduce the initial permissions on new keys to grant the possessor everything, view permission only to the user (so the keys can be seen in /proc/keys) and nothing else. This gives the creator a chance to adjust the permissions mask before other processes can access the new key or create a link to it. To aid with this, keyring_alloc() now takes a permission argument rather than setting the permissions itself. The following permissions are now set: (1) The user and user-session keyrings grant the user that owns them full permissions and grant a possessor everything bar SETATTR. (2) The process and thread keyrings grant the possessor full permissions but only grant the user VIEW. This permits the user to see them in /proc/keys, but not to do anything with them. (3) Anonymous session keyrings grant the possessor full permissions, but only grant the user VIEW and READ. This means that the user can see them in /proc/keys and can list them, but nothing else. Possibly READ shouldn't be provided either. (4) Named session keyrings grant everything an anonymous session keyring does, plus they grant the user LINK permission. The whole point of named session keyrings is that others can also subscribe to them. Possibly this should be a separate permission to LINK. (5) The temporary session keyring created by call_sbin_request_key() gets the same permissions as an anonymous session keyring. (6) Keys created by add_key() get VIEW, SEARCH, LINK and SETATTR for the possessor, plus READ and/or WRITE if the key type supports them. The used only gets VIEW now. (7) Keys created by request_key() now get the same as those created by add_key(). Reported-by: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net> Reported-by: Stef Walter <stefw@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2012-10-02 22:24:56 +04:00
perm = KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_SEARCH | KEY_POS_LINK | KEY_POS_SETATTR;
perm |= KEY_USR_VIEW;
if (ctx->index_key.type->read)
KEYS: Reduce initial permissions on keys Reduce the initial permissions on new keys to grant the possessor everything, view permission only to the user (so the keys can be seen in /proc/keys) and nothing else. This gives the creator a chance to adjust the permissions mask before other processes can access the new key or create a link to it. To aid with this, keyring_alloc() now takes a permission argument rather than setting the permissions itself. The following permissions are now set: (1) The user and user-session keyrings grant the user that owns them full permissions and grant a possessor everything bar SETATTR. (2) The process and thread keyrings grant the possessor full permissions but only grant the user VIEW. This permits the user to see them in /proc/keys, but not to do anything with them. (3) Anonymous session keyrings grant the possessor full permissions, but only grant the user VIEW and READ. This means that the user can see them in /proc/keys and can list them, but nothing else. Possibly READ shouldn't be provided either. (4) Named session keyrings grant everything an anonymous session keyring does, plus they grant the user LINK permission. The whole point of named session keyrings is that others can also subscribe to them. Possibly this should be a separate permission to LINK. (5) The temporary session keyring created by call_sbin_request_key() gets the same permissions as an anonymous session keyring. (6) Keys created by add_key() get VIEW, SEARCH, LINK and SETATTR for the possessor, plus READ and/or WRITE if the key type supports them. The used only gets VIEW now. (7) Keys created by request_key() now get the same as those created by add_key(). Reported-by: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net> Reported-by: Stef Walter <stefw@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2012-10-02 22:24:56 +04:00
perm |= KEY_POS_READ;
if (ctx->index_key.type == &key_type_keyring ||
ctx->index_key.type->update)
KEYS: Reduce initial permissions on keys Reduce the initial permissions on new keys to grant the possessor everything, view permission only to the user (so the keys can be seen in /proc/keys) and nothing else. This gives the creator a chance to adjust the permissions mask before other processes can access the new key or create a link to it. To aid with this, keyring_alloc() now takes a permission argument rather than setting the permissions itself. The following permissions are now set: (1) The user and user-session keyrings grant the user that owns them full permissions and grant a possessor everything bar SETATTR. (2) The process and thread keyrings grant the possessor full permissions but only grant the user VIEW. This permits the user to see them in /proc/keys, but not to do anything with them. (3) Anonymous session keyrings grant the possessor full permissions, but only grant the user VIEW and READ. This means that the user can see them in /proc/keys and can list them, but nothing else. Possibly READ shouldn't be provided either. (4) Named session keyrings grant everything an anonymous session keyring does, plus they grant the user LINK permission. The whole point of named session keyrings is that others can also subscribe to them. Possibly this should be a separate permission to LINK. (5) The temporary session keyring created by call_sbin_request_key() gets the same permissions as an anonymous session keyring. (6) Keys created by add_key() get VIEW, SEARCH, LINK and SETATTR for the possessor, plus READ and/or WRITE if the key type supports them. The used only gets VIEW now. (7) Keys created by request_key() now get the same as those created by add_key(). Reported-by: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net> Reported-by: Stef Walter <stefw@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2012-10-02 22:24:56 +04:00
perm |= KEY_POS_WRITE;
key = key_alloc(ctx->index_key.type, ctx->index_key.description,
ctx->cred->fsuid, ctx->cred->fsgid, ctx->cred,
KEYS: Add a facility to restrict new links into a keyring Add a facility whereby proposed new links to be added to a keyring can be vetted, permitting them to be rejected if necessary. This can be used to block public keys from which the signature cannot be verified or for which the signature verification fails. It could also be used to provide blacklisting. This affects operations like add_key(), KEYCTL_LINK and KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE. To this end: (1) A function pointer is added to the key struct that, if set, points to the vetting function. This is called as: int (*restrict_link)(struct key *keyring, const struct key_type *key_type, unsigned long key_flags, const union key_payload *key_payload), where 'keyring' will be the keyring being added to, key_type and key_payload will describe the key being added and key_flags[*] can be AND'ed with KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED. [*] This parameter will be removed in a later patch when KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED is removed. The function should return 0 to allow the link to take place or an error (typically -ENOKEY, -ENOPKG or -EKEYREJECTED) to reject the link. The pointer should not be set directly, but rather should be set through keyring_alloc(). Note that if called during add_key(), preparse is called before this method, but a key isn't actually allocated until after this function is called. (2) KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION is added. This can be passed to key_create_or_update() or key_instantiate_and_link() to bypass the restriction check. (3) KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY is removed. The entire contents of a keyring with this restriction emplaced can be considered 'trustworthy' by virtue of being in the keyring when that keyring is consulted. (4) key_alloc() and keyring_alloc() take an extra argument that will be used to set restrict_link in the new key. This ensures that the pointer is set before the key is published, thus preventing a window of unrestrictedness. Normally this argument will be NULL. (5) As a temporary affair, keyring_restrict_trusted_only() is added. It should be passed to keyring_alloc() as the extra argument instead of setting KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY on a keyring. This will be replaced in a later patch with functions that look in the appropriate places for authoritative keys. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2016-04-06 18:14:24 +03:00
perm, flags, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(key))
goto alloc_failed;
set_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags);
if (dest_keyring) {
ret = __key_link_begin(dest_keyring, &ctx->index_key, &edit);
if (ret < 0)
goto link_prealloc_failed;
}
/* attach the key to the destination keyring under lock, but we do need
* to do another check just in case someone beat us to it whilst we
* waited for locks */
mutex_lock(&key_construction_mutex);
key_ref = search_process_keyrings(ctx);
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
goto key_already_present;
if (dest_keyring)
__key_link(key, &edit);
mutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);
if (dest_keyring)
__key_link_end(dest_keyring, &ctx->index_key, edit);
mutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);
*_key = key;
kleave(" = 0 [%d]", key_serial(key));
return 0;
/* the key is now present - we tell the caller that we found it by
* returning -EINPROGRESS */
key_already_present:
key_put(key);
mutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);
key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
if (dest_keyring) {
ret = __key_link_check_live_key(dest_keyring, key);
if (ret == 0)
__key_link(key, &edit);
__key_link_end(dest_keyring, &ctx->index_key, edit);
if (ret < 0)
goto link_check_failed;
}
mutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);
*_key = key;
kleave(" = -EINPROGRESS [%d]", key_serial(key));
return -EINPROGRESS;
link_check_failed:
mutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);
key_put(key);
kleave(" = %d [linkcheck]", ret);
return ret;
link_prealloc_failed:
mutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);
key_put(key);
kleave(" = %d [prelink]", ret);
return ret;
alloc_failed:
mutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);
kleave(" = %ld", PTR_ERR(key));
return PTR_ERR(key);
}
/*
* Commence key construction.
*/
static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct keyring_search_context *ctx,
const char *callout_info,
size_t callout_len,
void *aux,
struct key *dest_keyring,
unsigned long flags)
{
struct key_user *user;
struct key *key;
int ret;
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks. A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to access or modify its own credentials. A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to execve(). With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified and committed using something like the following sequence of events: struct cred *new = prepare_creds(); int ret = blah(new); if (ret < 0) { abort_creds(new); return ret; } return commit_creds(new); There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter the keys in a keyring in use by another task. To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be modified, except under special circumstances: (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented. (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced. The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be added by a later patch). This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the security code rather than altering the current creds directly. (2) Temporary credential overrides. do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex on the thread being dumped. This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering the task's objective credentials. (3) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check() (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set() Removed in favour of security_capset(). (*) security_capset(), ->capset() New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the new creds, are now const. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be killed if it's an error. (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security() Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds(). (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free() New. Free security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare() New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit() New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new security by commit_creds(). (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid() Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid(). (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid() Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid(). (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init() Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred directly to init's credentials. NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no longer records the sid of the thread that forked it. (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc() (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission() Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to refer to the security context. (4) sys_capset(). This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it calls have been merged. (5) reparent_to_kthreadd(). This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using commit_thread() to point that way. (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid() __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if successful. switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting __sigqueue_alloc(). (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups. The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying it. security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished. The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds(). Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into commit_creds(). The get functions all simply access the data directly. (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl(). security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly rather than through an argument. Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even if it doesn't end up using it. (9) Keyrings. A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code: (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly. They may want separating out again later. (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer rather than a task pointer to specify the security context. (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread keyring. (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them. (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for process or session keyrings (they're shared). (10) Usermode helper. The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process after it has been cloned. call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call. call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the supplied keyring as the new session keyring. (11) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the lock. (12) is_single_threaded(). This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now wants to use it too. The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD). (13) nfsd. The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches in this series have been applied. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 02:39:23 +03:00
kenter("");
if (ctx->index_key.type == &key_type_keyring)
return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
user = key_user_lookup(current_fsuid());
if (!user)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
KEYS: Alter use of key instantiation link-to-keyring argument Alter the use of the key instantiation and negation functions' link-to-keyring arguments. Currently this specifies a keyring in the target process to link the key into, creating the keyring if it doesn't exist. This, however, can be a problem for copy-on-write credentials as it means that the instantiating process can alter the credentials of the requesting process. This patch alters the behaviour such that: (1) If keyctl_instantiate_key() or keyctl_negate_key() are given a specific keyring by ID (ringid >= 0), then that keyring will be used. (2) If keyctl_instantiate_key() or keyctl_negate_key() are given one of the special constants that refer to the requesting process's keyrings (KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING, all <= 0), then: (a) If sys_request_key() was given a keyring to use (destringid) then the key will be attached to that keyring. (b) If sys_request_key() was given a NULL keyring, then the key being instantiated will be attached to the default keyring as set by keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(). (3) No extra link will be made. Decision point (1) follows current behaviour, and allows those instantiators who've searched for a specifically named keyring in the requestor's keyring so as to partition the keys by type to still have their named keyrings. Decision point (2) allows the requestor to make sure that the key or keys that get produced by request_key() go where they want, whilst allowing the instantiator to request that the key is retained. This is mainly useful for situations where the instantiator makes a secondary request, the key for which should be retained by the initial requestor: +-----------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ | | | | | | | Requestor |------->| Instantiator |------->| Instantiator | | | | | | | +-----------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ request_key() request_key() This might be useful, for example, in Kerberos, where the requestor requests a ticket, and then the ticket instantiator requests the TGT, which someone else then has to go and fetch. The TGT, however, should be retained in the keyrings of the requestor, not the first instantiator. To make this explict an extra special keyring constant is also added. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 02:39:14 +03:00
construct_get_dest_keyring(&dest_keyring);
ret = construct_alloc_key(ctx, dest_keyring, flags, user, &key);
key_user_put(user);
if (ret == 0) {
KEYS: Alter use of key instantiation link-to-keyring argument Alter the use of the key instantiation and negation functions' link-to-keyring arguments. Currently this specifies a keyring in the target process to link the key into, creating the keyring if it doesn't exist. This, however, can be a problem for copy-on-write credentials as it means that the instantiating process can alter the credentials of the requesting process. This patch alters the behaviour such that: (1) If keyctl_instantiate_key() or keyctl_negate_key() are given a specific keyring by ID (ringid >= 0), then that keyring will be used. (2) If keyctl_instantiate_key() or keyctl_negate_key() are given one of the special constants that refer to the requesting process's keyrings (KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING, all <= 0), then: (a) If sys_request_key() was given a keyring to use (destringid) then the key will be attached to that keyring. (b) If sys_request_key() was given a NULL keyring, then the key being instantiated will be attached to the default keyring as set by keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(). (3) No extra link will be made. Decision point (1) follows current behaviour, and allows those instantiators who've searched for a specifically named keyring in the requestor's keyring so as to partition the keys by type to still have their named keyrings. Decision point (2) allows the requestor to make sure that the key or keys that get produced by request_key() go where they want, whilst allowing the instantiator to request that the key is retained. This is mainly useful for situations where the instantiator makes a secondary request, the key for which should be retained by the initial requestor: +-----------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ | | | | | | | Requestor |------->| Instantiator |------->| Instantiator | | | | | | | +-----------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ request_key() request_key() This might be useful, for example, in Kerberos, where the requestor requests a ticket, and then the ticket instantiator requests the TGT, which someone else then has to go and fetch. The TGT, however, should be retained in the keyrings of the requestor, not the first instantiator. To make this explict an extra special keyring constant is also added. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 02:39:14 +03:00
ret = construct_key(key, callout_info, callout_len, aux,
dest_keyring);
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks. A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to access or modify its own credentials. A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to execve(). With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified and committed using something like the following sequence of events: struct cred *new = prepare_creds(); int ret = blah(new); if (ret < 0) { abort_creds(new); return ret; } return commit_creds(new); There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter the keys in a keyring in use by another task. To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be modified, except under special circumstances: (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented. (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced. The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be added by a later patch). This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the security code rather than altering the current creds directly. (2) Temporary credential overrides. do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex on the thread being dumped. This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering the task's objective credentials. (3) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check() (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set() Removed in favour of security_capset(). (*) security_capset(), ->capset() New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the new creds, are now const. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be killed if it's an error. (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security() Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds(). (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free() New. Free security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare() New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit() New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new security by commit_creds(). (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid() Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid(). (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid() Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid(). (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init() Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred directly to init's credentials. NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no longer records the sid of the thread that forked it. (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc() (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission() Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to refer to the security context. (4) sys_capset(). This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it calls have been merged. (5) reparent_to_kthreadd(). This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using commit_thread() to point that way. (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid() __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if successful. switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting __sigqueue_alloc(). (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups. The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying it. security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished. The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds(). Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into commit_creds(). The get functions all simply access the data directly. (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl(). security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly rather than through an argument. Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even if it doesn't end up using it. (9) Keyrings. A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code: (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly. They may want separating out again later. (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer rather than a task pointer to specify the security context. (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread keyring. (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them. (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for process or session keyrings (they're shared). (10) Usermode helper. The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process after it has been cloned. call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call. call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the supplied keyring as the new session keyring. (11) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the lock. (12) is_single_threaded(). This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now wants to use it too. The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD). (13) nfsd. The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches in this series have been applied. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 02:39:23 +03:00
if (ret < 0) {
kdebug("cons failed");
goto construction_failed;
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks. A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to access or modify its own credentials. A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to execve(). With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified and committed using something like the following sequence of events: struct cred *new = prepare_creds(); int ret = blah(new); if (ret < 0) { abort_creds(new); return ret; } return commit_creds(new); There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter the keys in a keyring in use by another task. To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be modified, except under special circumstances: (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented. (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced. The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be added by a later patch). This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the security code rather than altering the current creds directly. (2) Temporary credential overrides. do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex on the thread being dumped. This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering the task's objective credentials. (3) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check() (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set() Removed in favour of security_capset(). (*) security_capset(), ->capset() New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the new creds, are now const. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be killed if it's an error. (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security() Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds(). (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free() New. Free security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare() New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit() New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new security by commit_creds(). (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid() Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid(). (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid() Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid(). (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init() Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred directly to init's credentials. NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no longer records the sid of the thread that forked it. (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc() (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission() Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to refer to the security context. (4) sys_capset(). This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it calls have been merged. (5) reparent_to_kthreadd(). This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using commit_thread() to point that way. (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid() __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if successful. switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting __sigqueue_alloc(). (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups. The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying it. security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished. The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds(). Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into commit_creds(). The get functions all simply access the data directly. (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl(). security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly rather than through an argument. Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even if it doesn't end up using it. (9) Keyrings. A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code: (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly. They may want separating out again later. (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer rather than a task pointer to specify the security context. (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread keyring. (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them. (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for process or session keyrings (they're shared). (10) Usermode helper. The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process after it has been cloned. call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call. call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the supplied keyring as the new session keyring. (11) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the lock. (12) is_single_threaded(). This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now wants to use it too. The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD). (13) nfsd. The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches in this series have been applied. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 02:39:23 +03:00
}
} else if (ret == -EINPROGRESS) {
ret = 0;
} else {
goto couldnt_alloc_key;
}
KEYS: Alter use of key instantiation link-to-keyring argument Alter the use of the key instantiation and negation functions' link-to-keyring arguments. Currently this specifies a keyring in the target process to link the key into, creating the keyring if it doesn't exist. This, however, can be a problem for copy-on-write credentials as it means that the instantiating process can alter the credentials of the requesting process. This patch alters the behaviour such that: (1) If keyctl_instantiate_key() or keyctl_negate_key() are given a specific keyring by ID (ringid >= 0), then that keyring will be used. (2) If keyctl_instantiate_key() or keyctl_negate_key() are given one of the special constants that refer to the requesting process's keyrings (KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING, all <= 0), then: (a) If sys_request_key() was given a keyring to use (destringid) then the key will be attached to that keyring. (b) If sys_request_key() was given a NULL keyring, then the key being instantiated will be attached to the default keyring as set by keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(). (3) No extra link will be made. Decision point (1) follows current behaviour, and allows those instantiators who've searched for a specifically named keyring in the requestor's keyring so as to partition the keys by type to still have their named keyrings. Decision point (2) allows the requestor to make sure that the key or keys that get produced by request_key() go where they want, whilst allowing the instantiator to request that the key is retained. This is mainly useful for situations where the instantiator makes a secondary request, the key for which should be retained by the initial requestor: +-----------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ | | | | | | | Requestor |------->| Instantiator |------->| Instantiator | | | | | | | +-----------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ request_key() request_key() This might be useful, for example, in Kerberos, where the requestor requests a ticket, and then the ticket instantiator requests the TGT, which someone else then has to go and fetch. The TGT, however, should be retained in the keyrings of the requestor, not the first instantiator. To make this explict an extra special keyring constant is also added. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 02:39:14 +03:00
key_put(dest_keyring);
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks. A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to access or modify its own credentials. A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to execve(). With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified and committed using something like the following sequence of events: struct cred *new = prepare_creds(); int ret = blah(new); if (ret < 0) { abort_creds(new); return ret; } return commit_creds(new); There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter the keys in a keyring in use by another task. To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be modified, except under special circumstances: (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented. (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced. The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be added by a later patch). This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the security code rather than altering the current creds directly. (2) Temporary credential overrides. do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex on the thread being dumped. This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering the task's objective credentials. (3) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check() (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set() Removed in favour of security_capset(). (*) security_capset(), ->capset() New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the new creds, are now const. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be killed if it's an error. (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security() Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds(). (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free() New. Free security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare() New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit() New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new security by commit_creds(). (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid() Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid(). (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid() Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid(). (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init() Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred directly to init's credentials. NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no longer records the sid of the thread that forked it. (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc() (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission() Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to refer to the security context. (4) sys_capset(). This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it calls have been merged. (5) reparent_to_kthreadd(). This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using commit_thread() to point that way. (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid() __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if successful. switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting __sigqueue_alloc(). (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups. The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying it. security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished. The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds(). Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into commit_creds(). The get functions all simply access the data directly. (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl(). security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly rather than through an argument. Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even if it doesn't end up using it. (9) Keyrings. A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code: (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly. They may want separating out again later. (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer rather than a task pointer to specify the security context. (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread keyring. (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them. (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for process or session keyrings (they're shared). (10) Usermode helper. The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process after it has been cloned. call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call. call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the supplied keyring as the new session keyring. (11) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the lock. (12) is_single_threaded(). This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now wants to use it too. The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD). (13) nfsd. The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches in this series have been applied. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 02:39:23 +03:00
kleave(" = key %d", key_serial(key));
return key;
construction_failed:
key_negate_and_link(key, key_negative_timeout, NULL, NULL);
key_put(key);
couldnt_alloc_key:
KEYS: Alter use of key instantiation link-to-keyring argument Alter the use of the key instantiation and negation functions' link-to-keyring arguments. Currently this specifies a keyring in the target process to link the key into, creating the keyring if it doesn't exist. This, however, can be a problem for copy-on-write credentials as it means that the instantiating process can alter the credentials of the requesting process. This patch alters the behaviour such that: (1) If keyctl_instantiate_key() or keyctl_negate_key() are given a specific keyring by ID (ringid >= 0), then that keyring will be used. (2) If keyctl_instantiate_key() or keyctl_negate_key() are given one of the special constants that refer to the requesting process's keyrings (KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING, all <= 0), then: (a) If sys_request_key() was given a keyring to use (destringid) then the key will be attached to that keyring. (b) If sys_request_key() was given a NULL keyring, then the key being instantiated will be attached to the default keyring as set by keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(). (3) No extra link will be made. Decision point (1) follows current behaviour, and allows those instantiators who've searched for a specifically named keyring in the requestor's keyring so as to partition the keys by type to still have their named keyrings. Decision point (2) allows the requestor to make sure that the key or keys that get produced by request_key() go where they want, whilst allowing the instantiator to request that the key is retained. This is mainly useful for situations where the instantiator makes a secondary request, the key for which should be retained by the initial requestor: +-----------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ | | | | | | | Requestor |------->| Instantiator |------->| Instantiator | | | | | | | +-----------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ request_key() request_key() This might be useful, for example, in Kerberos, where the requestor requests a ticket, and then the ticket instantiator requests the TGT, which someone else then has to go and fetch. The TGT, however, should be retained in the keyrings of the requestor, not the first instantiator. To make this explict an extra special keyring constant is also added. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 02:39:14 +03:00
key_put(dest_keyring);
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks. A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to access or modify its own credentials. A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to execve(). With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified and committed using something like the following sequence of events: struct cred *new = prepare_creds(); int ret = blah(new); if (ret < 0) { abort_creds(new); return ret; } return commit_creds(new); There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter the keys in a keyring in use by another task. To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be modified, except under special circumstances: (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented. (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced. The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be added by a later patch). This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the security code rather than altering the current creds directly. (2) Temporary credential overrides. do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex on the thread being dumped. This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering the task's objective credentials. (3) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check() (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set() Removed in favour of security_capset(). (*) security_capset(), ->capset() New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the new creds, are now const. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be killed if it's an error. (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security() Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds(). (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free() New. Free security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare() New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit() New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new security by commit_creds(). (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid() Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid(). (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid() Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid(). (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init() Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred directly to init's credentials. NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no longer records the sid of the thread that forked it. (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc() (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission() Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to refer to the security context. (4) sys_capset(). This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it calls have been merged. (5) reparent_to_kthreadd(). This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using commit_thread() to point that way. (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid() __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if successful. switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting __sigqueue_alloc(). (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups. The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying it. security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished. The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds(). Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into commit_creds(). The get functions all simply access the data directly. (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl(). security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly rather than through an argument. Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even if it doesn't end up using it. (9) Keyrings. A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code: (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly. They may want separating out again later. (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer rather than a task pointer to specify the security context. (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread keyring. (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them. (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for process or session keyrings (they're shared). (10) Usermode helper. The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process after it has been cloned. call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call. call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the supplied keyring as the new session keyring. (11) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the lock. (12) is_single_threaded(). This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now wants to use it too. The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD). (13) nfsd. The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches in this series have been applied. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 02:39:23 +03:00
kleave(" = %d", ret);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 09:00:56 +04:00
/**
* request_key_and_link - Request a key and cache it in a keyring.
* @type: The type of key we want.
* @description: The searchable description of the key.
* @callout_info: The data to pass to the instantiation upcall (or NULL).
* @callout_len: The length of callout_info.
* @aux: Auxiliary data for the upcall.
* @dest_keyring: Where to cache the key.
* @flags: Flags to key_alloc().
*
* A key matching the specified criteria is searched for in the process's
* keyrings and returned with its usage count incremented if found. Otherwise,
* if callout_info is not NULL, a key will be allocated and some service
* (probably in userspace) will be asked to instantiate it.
*
* If successfully found or created, the key will be linked to the destination
* keyring if one is provided.
*
* Returns a pointer to the key if successful; -EACCES, -ENOKEY, -EKEYREVOKED
* or -EKEYEXPIRED if an inaccessible, negative, revoked or expired key was
* found; -ENOKEY if no key was found and no @callout_info was given; -EDQUOT
* if insufficient key quota was available to create a new key; or -ENOMEM if
* insufficient memory was available.
*
* If the returned key was created, then it may still be under construction,
* and wait_for_key_construction() should be used to wait for that to complete.
*/
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 09:00:56 +04:00
struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,
const char *description,
const void *callout_info,
size_t callout_len,
void *aux,
struct key *dest_keyring,
unsigned long flags)
{
struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
.index_key.type = type,
.index_key.description = description,
.cred = current_cred(),
.match_data.cmp = key_default_cmp,
.match_data.raw_data = description,
.match_data.lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
KEYS: request_key() should reget expired keys rather than give EKEYEXPIRED Since the keyring facility can be viewed as a cache (at least in some applications), the local expiration time on the key should probably be viewed as a 'needs updating after this time' property rather than an absolute 'anyone now wanting to use this object is out of luck' property. Since request_key() is the main interface for the usage of keys, this should update or replace an expired key rather than issuing EKEYEXPIRED if the local expiration has been reached (ie. it should refresh the cache). For absolute conditions where refreshing the cache probably doesn't help, the key can be negatively instantiated using KEYCTL_REJECT_KEY with EKEYEXPIRED given as the error to issue. This will still cause request_key() to return EKEYEXPIRED as that was explicitly set. In the future, if the key type has an update op available, we might want to upcall with the expired key and allow the upcall to update it. We would pass a different operation name (the first column in /etc/request-key.conf) to the request-key program. request_key() returning EKEYEXPIRED is causing an NFS problem which Chuck Lever describes thusly: After about 10 minutes, my NFSv4 functional tests fail because the ownership of the test files goes to "-2". Looking at /proc/keys shows that the id_resolv keys that map to my test user ID have expired. The ownership problem persists until the expired keys are purged from the keyring, and fresh keys are obtained. I bisected the problem to 3.13 commit b2a4df200d57 ("KEYS: Expand the capacity of a keyring"). This commit inadvertantly changes the API contract of the internal function keyring_search_aux(). The root cause appears to be that b2a4df200d57 made "no state check" the default behavior. "No state check" means the keyring search iterator function skips checking the key's expiry timeout, and returns expired keys. request_key_and_link() depends on getting an -EAGAIN result code to know when to perform an upcall to refresh an expired key. This patch can be tested directly by: keyctl request2 user debug:fred a @s keyctl timeout %user:debug:fred 3 sleep 4 keyctl request2 user debug:fred a @s Without the patch, the last command gives error EKEYEXPIRED, but with the command it gives a new key. Reported-by: Carl Hetherington <cth@carlh.net> Reported-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
2014-12-02 01:52:53 +03:00
.flags = (KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK |
KEYRING_SEARCH_SKIP_EXPIRED),
};
struct key *key;
key_ref_t key_ref;
int ret;
kenter("%s,%s,%p,%zu,%p,%p,%lx",
ctx.index_key.type->name, ctx.index_key.description,
callout_info, callout_len, aux, dest_keyring, flags);
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 09:00:56 +04:00
if (type->match_preparse) {
ret = type->match_preparse(&ctx.match_data);
if (ret < 0) {
key = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto error;
}
}
/* search all the process keyrings for a key */
key_ref = search_process_keyrings(&ctx);
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
if (dest_keyring) {
construct_get_dest_keyring(&dest_keyring);
ret = key_link(dest_keyring, key);
key_put(dest_keyring);
if (ret < 0) {
key_put(key);
key = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto error_free;
}
}
} else if (PTR_ERR(key_ref) != -EAGAIN) {
key = ERR_CAST(key_ref);
} else {
/* the search failed, but the keyrings were searchable, so we
* should consult userspace if we can */
key = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
if (!callout_info)
goto error_free;
key = construct_key_and_link(&ctx, callout_info, callout_len,
aux, dest_keyring, flags);
}
error_free:
if (type->match_free)
type->match_free(&ctx.match_data);
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 09:00:56 +04:00
error:
kleave(" = %p", key);
return key;
}
/**
* wait_for_key_construction - Wait for construction of a key to complete
* @key: The key being waited for.
* @intr: Whether to wait interruptibly.
*
* Wait for a key to finish being constructed.
*
* Returns 0 if successful; -ERESTARTSYS if the wait was interrupted; -ENOKEY
* if the key was negated; or -EKEYREVOKED or -EKEYEXPIRED if the key was
* revoked or expired.
*/
int wait_for_key_construction(struct key *key, bool intr)
{
int ret;
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 09:00:56 +04:00
ret = wait_on_bit(&key->flags, KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT,
intr ? TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE : TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
sched: Remove proliferation of wait_on_bit() action functions The current "wait_on_bit" interface requires an 'action' function to be provided which does the actual waiting. There are over 20 such functions, many of them identical. Most cases can be satisfied by one of just two functions, one which uses io_schedule() and one which just uses schedule(). So: Rename wait_on_bit and wait_on_bit_lock to wait_on_bit_action and wait_on_bit_lock_action to make it explicit that they need an action function. Introduce new wait_on_bit{,_lock} and wait_on_bit{,_lock}_io which are *not* given an action function but implicitly use a standard one. The decision to error-out if a signal is pending is now made based on the 'mode' argument rather than being encoded in the action function. All instances of the old wait_on_bit and wait_on_bit_lock which can use the new version have been changed accordingly and their action functions have been discarded. wait_on_bit{_lock} does not return any specific error code in the event of a signal so the caller must check for non-zero and interpolate their own error code as appropriate. The wait_on_bit() call in __fscache_wait_on_invalidate() was ambiguous as it specified TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE but used fscache_wait_bit_interruptible as an action function. David Howells confirms this should be uniformly "uninterruptible" The main remaining user of wait_on_bit{,_lock}_action is NFS which needs to use a freezer-aware schedule() call. A comment in fs/gfs2/glock.c notes that having multiple 'action' functions is useful as they display differently in the 'wchan' field of 'ps'. (and /proc/$PID/wchan). As the new bit_wait{,_io} functions are tagged "__sched", they will not show up at all, but something higher in the stack. So the distinction will still be visible, only with different function names (gds2_glock_wait versus gfs2_glock_dq_wait in the gfs2/glock.c case). Since first version of this patch (against 3.15) two new action functions appeared, on in NFS and one in CIFS. CIFS also now uses an action function that makes the same freezer aware schedule call as NFS. Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> (fscache, keys) Acked-by: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com> (gfs2) Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Steve French <sfrench@samba.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140707051603.28027.72349.stgit@notabene.brown Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2014-07-07 09:16:04 +04:00
if (ret)
return -ERESTARTSYS;
KEYS: Fix a race between negating a key and reading the error set key_reject_and_link() marking a key as negative and setting the error with which it was negated races with keyring searches and other things that read that error. The fix is to switch the order in which the assignments are done in key_reject_and_link() and to use memory barriers. Kudos to Dave Wysochanski <dwysocha@redhat.com> and Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com> for tracking this down. This may be the cause of: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000070 IP: [<ffffffff81219011>] wait_for_key_construction+0x31/0x80 PGD c6b2c3067 PUD c59879067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP last sysfs file: /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu3/cache/index2/shared_cpu_map CPU 0 Modules linked in: ... Pid: 13359, comm: amqzxma0 Not tainted 2.6.32-358.20.1.el6.x86_64 #1 IBM System x3650 M3 -[7945PSJ]-/00J6159 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81219011>] wait_for_key_construction+0x31/0x80 RSP: 0018:ffff880c6ab33758 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: ffffffff81219080 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000002 RDX: ffffffff81219060 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff880c6ab33768 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff880adfcbce40 R13: ffffffffa03afb84 R14: ffff880adfcbce40 R15: ffff880adfcbce43 FS: 00007f29b8042700(0000) GS:ffff880028200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000070 CR3: 0000000c613dc000 CR4: 00000000000007f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Process amqzxma0 (pid: 13359, threadinfo ffff880c6ab32000, task ffff880c610deae0) Stack: ffff880adfcbce40 0000000000000000 ffff880c6ab337b8 ffffffff81219695 <d> 0000000000000000 ffff880a000000d0 ffff880c6ab337a8 000000000000000f <d> ffffffffa03afb93 000000000000000f ffff88186c7882c0 0000000000000014 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81219695>] request_key+0x65/0xa0 [<ffffffffa03a0885>] nfs_idmap_request_key+0xc5/0x170 [nfs] [<ffffffffa03a0eb4>] nfs_idmap_lookup_id+0x34/0x80 [nfs] [<ffffffffa03a1255>] nfs_map_group_to_gid+0x75/0xa0 [nfs] [<ffffffffa039a9ad>] decode_getfattr_attrs+0xbdd/0xfb0 [nfs] [<ffffffff81057310>] ? __dequeue_entity+0x30/0x50 [<ffffffff8100988e>] ? __switch_to+0x26e/0x320 [<ffffffffa039ae03>] decode_getfattr+0x83/0xe0 [nfs] [<ffffffffa039b610>] ? nfs4_xdr_dec_getattr+0x0/0xa0 [nfs] [<ffffffffa039b69f>] nfs4_xdr_dec_getattr+0x8f/0xa0 [nfs] [<ffffffffa02dada4>] rpcauth_unwrap_resp+0x84/0xb0 [sunrpc] [<ffffffffa039b610>] ? nfs4_xdr_dec_getattr+0x0/0xa0 [nfs] [<ffffffffa02cf923>] call_decode+0x1b3/0x800 [sunrpc] [<ffffffff81096de0>] ? wake_bit_function+0x0/0x50 [<ffffffffa02cf770>] ? call_decode+0x0/0x800 [sunrpc] [<ffffffffa02d99a7>] __rpc_execute+0x77/0x350 [sunrpc] [<ffffffff81096c67>] ? bit_waitqueue+0x17/0xd0 [<ffffffffa02d9ce1>] rpc_execute+0x61/0xa0 [sunrpc] [<ffffffffa02d03a5>] rpc_run_task+0x75/0x90 [sunrpc] [<ffffffffa02d04c2>] rpc_call_sync+0x42/0x70 [sunrpc] [<ffffffffa038ff80>] _nfs4_call_sync+0x30/0x40 [nfs] [<ffffffffa038836c>] _nfs4_proc_getattr+0xac/0xc0 [nfs] [<ffffffff810aac87>] ? futex_wait+0x227/0x380 [<ffffffffa038b856>] nfs4_proc_getattr+0x56/0x80 [nfs] [<ffffffffa0371403>] __nfs_revalidate_inode+0xe3/0x220 [nfs] [<ffffffffa037158e>] nfs_revalidate_mapping+0x4e/0x170 [nfs] [<ffffffffa036f147>] nfs_file_read+0x77/0x130 [nfs] [<ffffffff811811aa>] do_sync_read+0xfa/0x140 [<ffffffff81096da0>] ? autoremove_wake_function+0x0/0x40 [<ffffffff8100bb8e>] ? apic_timer_interrupt+0xe/0x20 [<ffffffff8100b9ce>] ? common_interrupt+0xe/0x13 [<ffffffff81228ffb>] ? selinux_file_permission+0xfb/0x150 [<ffffffff8121bed6>] ? security_file_permission+0x16/0x20 [<ffffffff81181a95>] vfs_read+0xb5/0x1a0 [<ffffffff81181bd1>] sys_read+0x51/0x90 [<ffffffff810dc685>] ? __audit_syscall_exit+0x265/0x290 [<ffffffff8100b072>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Dave Wysochanski <dwysocha@redhat.com> cc: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
2013-10-30 15:15:24 +04:00
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags)) {
smp_rmb();
return key->reject_error;
KEYS: Fix a race between negating a key and reading the error set key_reject_and_link() marking a key as negative and setting the error with which it was negated races with keyring searches and other things that read that error. The fix is to switch the order in which the assignments are done in key_reject_and_link() and to use memory barriers. Kudos to Dave Wysochanski <dwysocha@redhat.com> and Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com> for tracking this down. This may be the cause of: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000070 IP: [<ffffffff81219011>] wait_for_key_construction+0x31/0x80 PGD c6b2c3067 PUD c59879067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP last sysfs file: /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu3/cache/index2/shared_cpu_map CPU 0 Modules linked in: ... Pid: 13359, comm: amqzxma0 Not tainted 2.6.32-358.20.1.el6.x86_64 #1 IBM System x3650 M3 -[7945PSJ]-/00J6159 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81219011>] wait_for_key_construction+0x31/0x80 RSP: 0018:ffff880c6ab33758 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: ffffffff81219080 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000002 RDX: ffffffff81219060 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff880c6ab33768 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff880adfcbce40 R13: ffffffffa03afb84 R14: ffff880adfcbce40 R15: ffff880adfcbce43 FS: 00007f29b8042700(0000) GS:ffff880028200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000070 CR3: 0000000c613dc000 CR4: 00000000000007f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Process amqzxma0 (pid: 13359, threadinfo ffff880c6ab32000, task ffff880c610deae0) Stack: ffff880adfcbce40 0000000000000000 ffff880c6ab337b8 ffffffff81219695 <d> 0000000000000000 ffff880a000000d0 ffff880c6ab337a8 000000000000000f <d> ffffffffa03afb93 000000000000000f ffff88186c7882c0 0000000000000014 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81219695>] request_key+0x65/0xa0 [<ffffffffa03a0885>] nfs_idmap_request_key+0xc5/0x170 [nfs] [<ffffffffa03a0eb4>] nfs_idmap_lookup_id+0x34/0x80 [nfs] [<ffffffffa03a1255>] nfs_map_group_to_gid+0x75/0xa0 [nfs] [<ffffffffa039a9ad>] decode_getfattr_attrs+0xbdd/0xfb0 [nfs] [<ffffffff81057310>] ? __dequeue_entity+0x30/0x50 [<ffffffff8100988e>] ? __switch_to+0x26e/0x320 [<ffffffffa039ae03>] decode_getfattr+0x83/0xe0 [nfs] [<ffffffffa039b610>] ? nfs4_xdr_dec_getattr+0x0/0xa0 [nfs] [<ffffffffa039b69f>] nfs4_xdr_dec_getattr+0x8f/0xa0 [nfs] [<ffffffffa02dada4>] rpcauth_unwrap_resp+0x84/0xb0 [sunrpc] [<ffffffffa039b610>] ? nfs4_xdr_dec_getattr+0x0/0xa0 [nfs] [<ffffffffa02cf923>] call_decode+0x1b3/0x800 [sunrpc] [<ffffffff81096de0>] ? wake_bit_function+0x0/0x50 [<ffffffffa02cf770>] ? call_decode+0x0/0x800 [sunrpc] [<ffffffffa02d99a7>] __rpc_execute+0x77/0x350 [sunrpc] [<ffffffff81096c67>] ? bit_waitqueue+0x17/0xd0 [<ffffffffa02d9ce1>] rpc_execute+0x61/0xa0 [sunrpc] [<ffffffffa02d03a5>] rpc_run_task+0x75/0x90 [sunrpc] [<ffffffffa02d04c2>] rpc_call_sync+0x42/0x70 [sunrpc] [<ffffffffa038ff80>] _nfs4_call_sync+0x30/0x40 [nfs] [<ffffffffa038836c>] _nfs4_proc_getattr+0xac/0xc0 [nfs] [<ffffffff810aac87>] ? futex_wait+0x227/0x380 [<ffffffffa038b856>] nfs4_proc_getattr+0x56/0x80 [nfs] [<ffffffffa0371403>] __nfs_revalidate_inode+0xe3/0x220 [nfs] [<ffffffffa037158e>] nfs_revalidate_mapping+0x4e/0x170 [nfs] [<ffffffffa036f147>] nfs_file_read+0x77/0x130 [nfs] [<ffffffff811811aa>] do_sync_read+0xfa/0x140 [<ffffffff81096da0>] ? autoremove_wake_function+0x0/0x40 [<ffffffff8100bb8e>] ? apic_timer_interrupt+0xe/0x20 [<ffffffff8100b9ce>] ? common_interrupt+0xe/0x13 [<ffffffff81228ffb>] ? selinux_file_permission+0xfb/0x150 [<ffffffff8121bed6>] ? security_file_permission+0x16/0x20 [<ffffffff81181a95>] vfs_read+0xb5/0x1a0 [<ffffffff81181bd1>] sys_read+0x51/0x90 [<ffffffff810dc685>] ? __audit_syscall_exit+0x265/0x290 [<ffffffff8100b072>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Dave Wysochanski <dwysocha@redhat.com> cc: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
2013-10-30 15:15:24 +04:00
}
return key_validate(key);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_key_construction);
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 09:00:56 +04:00
/**
* request_key - Request a key and wait for construction
* @type: Type of key.
* @description: The searchable description of the key.
* @callout_info: The data to pass to the instantiation upcall (or NULL).
*
* As for request_key_and_link() except that it does not add the returned key
* to a keyring if found, new keys are always allocated in the user's quota,
* the callout_info must be a NUL-terminated string and no auxiliary data can
* be passed.
*
* Furthermore, it then works as wait_for_key_construction() to wait for the
* completion of keys undergoing construction with a non-interruptible wait.
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 09:00:56 +04:00
*/
struct key *request_key(struct key_type *type,
const char *description,
const char *callout_info)
{
struct key *key;
size_t callout_len = 0;
int ret;
if (callout_info)
callout_len = strlen(callout_info);
key = request_key_and_link(type, description, callout_info, callout_len,
NULL, NULL, KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA);
if (!IS_ERR(key)) {
ret = wait_for_key_construction(key, false);
if (ret < 0) {
key_put(key);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
}
return key;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(request_key);
/**
* request_key_with_auxdata - Request a key with auxiliary data for the upcaller
* @type: The type of key we want.
* @description: The searchable description of the key.
* @callout_info: The data to pass to the instantiation upcall (or NULL).
* @callout_len: The length of callout_info.
* @aux: Auxiliary data for the upcall.
*
* As for request_key_and_link() except that it does not add the returned key
* to a keyring if found and new keys are always allocated in the user's quota.
*
* Furthermore, it then works as wait_for_key_construction() to wait for the
* completion of keys undergoing construction with a non-interruptible wait.
*/
struct key *request_key_with_auxdata(struct key_type *type,
const char *description,
const void *callout_info,
size_t callout_len,
void *aux)
{
struct key *key;
int ret;
key = request_key_and_link(type, description, callout_info, callout_len,
aux, NULL, KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA);
if (!IS_ERR(key)) {
ret = wait_for_key_construction(key, false);
if (ret < 0) {
key_put(key);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
}
return key;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(request_key_with_auxdata);
/*
* request_key_async - Request a key (allow async construction)
* @type: Type of key.
* @description: The searchable description of the key.
* @callout_info: The data to pass to the instantiation upcall (or NULL).
* @callout_len: The length of callout_info.
*
* As for request_key_and_link() except that it does not add the returned key
* to a keyring if found, new keys are always allocated in the user's quota and
* no auxiliary data can be passed.
*
* The caller should call wait_for_key_construction() to wait for the
* completion of the returned key if it is still undergoing construction.
*/
struct key *request_key_async(struct key_type *type,
const char *description,
const void *callout_info,
size_t callout_len)
{
return request_key_and_link(type, description, callout_info,
callout_len, NULL, NULL,
KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(request_key_async);
/*
* request a key with auxiliary data for the upcaller (allow async construction)
* @type: Type of key.
* @description: The searchable description of the key.
* @callout_info: The data to pass to the instantiation upcall (or NULL).
* @callout_len: The length of callout_info.
* @aux: Auxiliary data for the upcall.
*
* As for request_key_and_link() except that it does not add the returned key
* to a keyring if found and new keys are always allocated in the user's quota.
*
* The caller should call wait_for_key_construction() to wait for the
* completion of the returned key if it is still undergoing construction.
*/
struct key *request_key_async_with_auxdata(struct key_type *type,
const char *description,
const void *callout_info,
size_t callout_len,
void *aux)
{
return request_key_and_link(type, description, callout_info,
callout_len, aux, NULL, KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(request_key_async_with_auxdata);