linux/arch/x86/include/asm/i387.h

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/*
* Copyright (C) 1994 Linus Torvalds
*
* Pentium III FXSR, SSE support
* General FPU state handling cleanups
* Gareth Hughes <gareth@valinux.com>, May 2000
* x86-64 work by Andi Kleen 2002
*/
#ifndef _ASM_X86_I387_H
#define _ASM_X86_I387_H
#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
#include <linux/sched.h>
crypto: padlock - fix VIA PadLock instruction usage with irq_ts_save/restore() Wolfgang Walter reported this oops on his via C3 using padlock for AES-encryption: ################################################################## BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 000001f0 IP: [<c01028c5>] __switch_to+0x30/0x117 *pde = 00000000 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT Modules linked in: Pid: 2071, comm: sleep Not tainted (2.6.26 #11) EIP: 0060:[<c01028c5>] EFLAGS: 00010002 CPU: 0 EIP is at __switch_to+0x30/0x117 EAX: 00000000 EBX: c0493300 ECX: dc48dd00 EDX: c0493300 ESI: dc48dd00 EDI: c0493530 EBP: c04cff8c ESP: c04cff7c DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 0033 SS: 0068 Process sleep (pid: 2071, ti=c04ce000 task=dc48dd00 task.ti=d2fe6000) Stack: dc48df30 c0493300 00000000 00000000 d2fe7f44 c03b5b43 c04cffc8 00000046 c0131856 0000005a dc472d3c c0493300 c0493470 d983ae00 00002696 00000000 c0239f54 00000000 c04c4000 c04cffd8 c01025fe c04f3740 00049800 c04cffe0 Call Trace: [<c03b5b43>] ? schedule+0x285/0x2ff [<c0131856>] ? pm_qos_requirement+0x3c/0x53 [<c0239f54>] ? acpi_processor_idle+0x0/0x434 [<c01025fe>] ? cpu_idle+0x73/0x7f [<c03a4dcd>] ? rest_init+0x61/0x63 ======================= Wolfgang also found out that adding kernel_fpu_begin() and kernel_fpu_end() around the padlock instructions fix the oops. Suresh wrote: These padlock instructions though don't use/touch SSE registers, but it behaves similar to other SSE instructions. For example, it might cause DNA faults when cr0.ts is set. While this is a spurious DNA trap, it might cause oops with the recent fpu code changes. This is the code sequence that is probably causing this problem: a) new app is getting exec'd and it is somewhere in between start_thread() and flush_old_exec() in the load_xyz_binary() b) At pont "a", task's fpu state (like TS_USEDFPU, used_math() etc) is cleared. c) Now we get an interrupt/softirq which starts using these encrypt/decrypt routines in the network stack. This generates a math fault (as cr0.ts is '1') which sets TS_USEDFPU and restores the math that is in the task's xstate. d) Return to exec code path, which does start_thread() which does free_thread_xstate() and sets xstate pointer to NULL while the TS_USEDFPU is still set. e) At the next context switch from the new exec'd task to another task, we have a scenarios where TS_USEDFPU is set but xstate pointer is null. This can cause an oops during unlazy_fpu() in __switch_to() Now: 1) This should happen with or with out pre-emption. Viro also encountered similar problem with out CONFIG_PREEMPT. 2) kernel_fpu_begin() and kernel_fpu_end() will fix this problem, because kernel_fpu_begin() will manually do a clts() and won't run in to the situation of setting TS_USEDFPU in step "c" above. 3) This was working before the fpu changes, because its a spurious math fault which doesn't corrupt any fpu/sse registers and the task's math state was always in an allocated state. With out the recent lazy fpu allocation changes, while we don't see oops, there is a possible race still present in older kernels(for example, while kernel is using kernel_fpu_begin() in some optimized clear/copy page and an interrupt/softirq happens which uses these padlock instructions generating DNA fault). This is the failing scenario that existed even before the lazy fpu allocation changes: 0. CPU's TS flag is set 1. kernel using FPU in some optimized copy routine and while doing kernel_fpu_begin() takes an interrupt just before doing clts() 2. Takes an interrupt and ipsec uses padlock instruction. And we take a DNA fault as TS flag is still set. 3. We handle the DNA fault and set TS_USEDFPU and clear cr0.ts 4. We complete the padlock routine 5. Go back to step-1, which resumes clts() in kernel_fpu_begin(), finishes the optimized copy routine and does kernel_fpu_end(). At this point, we have cr0.ts again set to '1' but the task's TS_USEFPU is stilll set and not cleared. 6. Now kernel resumes its user operation. And at the next context switch, kernel sees it has do a FP save as TS_USEDFPU is still set and then will do a unlazy_fpu() in __switch_to(). unlazy_fpu() will take a DNA fault, as cr0.ts is '1' and now, because we are in __switch_to(), math_state_restore() will get confused and will restore the next task's FP state and will save it in prev tasks's FP state. Remember, in __switch_to() we are already on the stack of the next task but take a DNA fault for the prev task. This causes the fpu leakage. Fix the padlock instruction usage by calling them inside the context of new routines irq_ts_save/restore(), which clear/restore cr0.ts manually in the interrupt context. This will not generate spurious DNA in the context of the interrupt which will fix the oops encountered and the possible FPU leakage issue. Reported-and-bisected-by: Wolfgang Walter <wolfgang.walter@stwm.de> Signed-off-by: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2008-08-13 16:02:26 +04:00
#include <linux/hardirq.h>
struct pt_regs;
struct user_i387_struct;
extern int init_fpu(struct task_struct *child);
extern int dump_fpu(struct pt_regs *, struct user_i387_struct *);
extern void math_state_restore(void);
extern bool irq_fpu_usable(void);
extern void kernel_fpu_begin(void);
extern void kernel_fpu_end(void);
crypto: padlock - fix VIA PadLock instruction usage with irq_ts_save/restore() Wolfgang Walter reported this oops on his via C3 using padlock for AES-encryption: ################################################################## BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 000001f0 IP: [<c01028c5>] __switch_to+0x30/0x117 *pde = 00000000 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT Modules linked in: Pid: 2071, comm: sleep Not tainted (2.6.26 #11) EIP: 0060:[<c01028c5>] EFLAGS: 00010002 CPU: 0 EIP is at __switch_to+0x30/0x117 EAX: 00000000 EBX: c0493300 ECX: dc48dd00 EDX: c0493300 ESI: dc48dd00 EDI: c0493530 EBP: c04cff8c ESP: c04cff7c DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 0033 SS: 0068 Process sleep (pid: 2071, ti=c04ce000 task=dc48dd00 task.ti=d2fe6000) Stack: dc48df30 c0493300 00000000 00000000 d2fe7f44 c03b5b43 c04cffc8 00000046 c0131856 0000005a dc472d3c c0493300 c0493470 d983ae00 00002696 00000000 c0239f54 00000000 c04c4000 c04cffd8 c01025fe c04f3740 00049800 c04cffe0 Call Trace: [<c03b5b43>] ? schedule+0x285/0x2ff [<c0131856>] ? pm_qos_requirement+0x3c/0x53 [<c0239f54>] ? acpi_processor_idle+0x0/0x434 [<c01025fe>] ? cpu_idle+0x73/0x7f [<c03a4dcd>] ? rest_init+0x61/0x63 ======================= Wolfgang also found out that adding kernel_fpu_begin() and kernel_fpu_end() around the padlock instructions fix the oops. Suresh wrote: These padlock instructions though don't use/touch SSE registers, but it behaves similar to other SSE instructions. For example, it might cause DNA faults when cr0.ts is set. While this is a spurious DNA trap, it might cause oops with the recent fpu code changes. This is the code sequence that is probably causing this problem: a) new app is getting exec'd and it is somewhere in between start_thread() and flush_old_exec() in the load_xyz_binary() b) At pont "a", task's fpu state (like TS_USEDFPU, used_math() etc) is cleared. c) Now we get an interrupt/softirq which starts using these encrypt/decrypt routines in the network stack. This generates a math fault (as cr0.ts is '1') which sets TS_USEDFPU and restores the math that is in the task's xstate. d) Return to exec code path, which does start_thread() which does free_thread_xstate() and sets xstate pointer to NULL while the TS_USEDFPU is still set. e) At the next context switch from the new exec'd task to another task, we have a scenarios where TS_USEDFPU is set but xstate pointer is null. This can cause an oops during unlazy_fpu() in __switch_to() Now: 1) This should happen with or with out pre-emption. Viro also encountered similar problem with out CONFIG_PREEMPT. 2) kernel_fpu_begin() and kernel_fpu_end() will fix this problem, because kernel_fpu_begin() will manually do a clts() and won't run in to the situation of setting TS_USEDFPU in step "c" above. 3) This was working before the fpu changes, because its a spurious math fault which doesn't corrupt any fpu/sse registers and the task's math state was always in an allocated state. With out the recent lazy fpu allocation changes, while we don't see oops, there is a possible race still present in older kernels(for example, while kernel is using kernel_fpu_begin() in some optimized clear/copy page and an interrupt/softirq happens which uses these padlock instructions generating DNA fault). This is the failing scenario that existed even before the lazy fpu allocation changes: 0. CPU's TS flag is set 1. kernel using FPU in some optimized copy routine and while doing kernel_fpu_begin() takes an interrupt just before doing clts() 2. Takes an interrupt and ipsec uses padlock instruction. And we take a DNA fault as TS flag is still set. 3. We handle the DNA fault and set TS_USEDFPU and clear cr0.ts 4. We complete the padlock routine 5. Go back to step-1, which resumes clts() in kernel_fpu_begin(), finishes the optimized copy routine and does kernel_fpu_end(). At this point, we have cr0.ts again set to '1' but the task's TS_USEFPU is stilll set and not cleared. 6. Now kernel resumes its user operation. And at the next context switch, kernel sees it has do a FP save as TS_USEDFPU is still set and then will do a unlazy_fpu() in __switch_to(). unlazy_fpu() will take a DNA fault, as cr0.ts is '1' and now, because we are in __switch_to(), math_state_restore() will get confused and will restore the next task's FP state and will save it in prev tasks's FP state. Remember, in __switch_to() we are already on the stack of the next task but take a DNA fault for the prev task. This causes the fpu leakage. Fix the padlock instruction usage by calling them inside the context of new routines irq_ts_save/restore(), which clear/restore cr0.ts manually in the interrupt context. This will not generate spurious DNA in the context of the interrupt which will fix the oops encountered and the possible FPU leakage issue. Reported-and-bisected-by: Wolfgang Walter <wolfgang.walter@stwm.de> Signed-off-by: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2008-08-13 16:02:26 +04:00
/*
* Some instructions like VIA's padlock instructions generate a spurious
* DNA fault but don't modify SSE registers. And these instructions
x86: Clear TS in irq_ts_save() when in an atomic section The dynamic FPU context allocation changes caused the padlock driver to generate the below warning. Fix it by masking TS when doing padlock encryption operations in an atomic section. This solves: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/slub.c:1602 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 82, name: cryptomgr_test Pid: 82, comm: cryptomgr_test Not tainted 2.6.29.4-168.test7.fc11.x86_64 #1 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8103ff16>] __might_sleep+0x10b/0x110 [<ffffffff810cd3b2>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x37/0xf1 [<ffffffff81018505>] init_fpu+0x49/0x8a [<ffffffff81012a83>] math_state_restore+0x3e/0xbc [<ffffffff813ac6d0>] do_device_not_available+0x9/0xb [<ffffffff810123ab>] device_not_available+0x1b/0x20 [<ffffffffa001c066>] ? aes_crypt+0x66/0x74 [padlock_aes] [<ffffffff8119a51a>] ? blkcipher_walk_next+0x257/0x2e0 [<ffffffff8119a731>] ? blkcipher_walk_first+0x18e/0x19d [<ffffffffa001c1fe>] aes_encrypt+0x9d/0xe5 [padlock_aes] [<ffffffffa0027253>] crypt+0x6b/0x114 [xts] [<ffffffffa001c161>] ? aes_encrypt+0x0/0xe5 [padlock_aes] [<ffffffffa001c161>] ? aes_encrypt+0x0/0xe5 [padlock_aes] [<ffffffffa0027390>] encrypt+0x49/0x4b [xts] [<ffffffff81199acc>] async_encrypt+0x3c/0x3e [<ffffffff8119dafc>] test_skcipher+0x1da/0x658 [<ffffffff811979c3>] ? crypto_spawn_tfm+0x8e/0xb1 [<ffffffff8119672d>] ? __crypto_alloc_tfm+0x11b/0x15f [<ffffffff811979c3>] ? crypto_spawn_tfm+0x8e/0xb1 [<ffffffff81199dbe>] ? skcipher_geniv_init+0x2b/0x47 [<ffffffff8119a905>] ? async_chainiv_init+0x5c/0x61 [<ffffffff8119dfdd>] alg_test_skcipher+0x63/0x9b [<ffffffff8119e1bc>] alg_test+0x12d/0x175 [<ffffffff8119c488>] cryptomgr_test+0x38/0x54 [<ffffffff8119c450>] ? cryptomgr_test+0x0/0x54 [<ffffffff8105c6c9>] kthread+0x4d/0x78 [<ffffffff8101264a>] child_rip+0xa/0x20 [<ffffffff81011f67>] ? restore_args+0x0/0x30 [<ffffffff8105c67c>] ? kthread+0x0/0x78 [<ffffffff81012640>] ? child_rip+0x0/0x20 Signed-off-by: Chuck Ebbert <cebbert@redhat.com> Cc: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com> LKML-Reference: <20090609104050.50158cfe@dhcp-100-2-144.bos.redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-06-09 18:40:50 +04:00
* get used from interrupt context as well. To prevent these kernel instructions
* in interrupt context interacting wrongly with other user/kernel fpu usage, we
crypto: padlock - fix VIA PadLock instruction usage with irq_ts_save/restore() Wolfgang Walter reported this oops on his via C3 using padlock for AES-encryption: ################################################################## BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 000001f0 IP: [<c01028c5>] __switch_to+0x30/0x117 *pde = 00000000 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT Modules linked in: Pid: 2071, comm: sleep Not tainted (2.6.26 #11) EIP: 0060:[<c01028c5>] EFLAGS: 00010002 CPU: 0 EIP is at __switch_to+0x30/0x117 EAX: 00000000 EBX: c0493300 ECX: dc48dd00 EDX: c0493300 ESI: dc48dd00 EDI: c0493530 EBP: c04cff8c ESP: c04cff7c DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 0033 SS: 0068 Process sleep (pid: 2071, ti=c04ce000 task=dc48dd00 task.ti=d2fe6000) Stack: dc48df30 c0493300 00000000 00000000 d2fe7f44 c03b5b43 c04cffc8 00000046 c0131856 0000005a dc472d3c c0493300 c0493470 d983ae00 00002696 00000000 c0239f54 00000000 c04c4000 c04cffd8 c01025fe c04f3740 00049800 c04cffe0 Call Trace: [<c03b5b43>] ? schedule+0x285/0x2ff [<c0131856>] ? pm_qos_requirement+0x3c/0x53 [<c0239f54>] ? acpi_processor_idle+0x0/0x434 [<c01025fe>] ? cpu_idle+0x73/0x7f [<c03a4dcd>] ? rest_init+0x61/0x63 ======================= Wolfgang also found out that adding kernel_fpu_begin() and kernel_fpu_end() around the padlock instructions fix the oops. Suresh wrote: These padlock instructions though don't use/touch SSE registers, but it behaves similar to other SSE instructions. For example, it might cause DNA faults when cr0.ts is set. While this is a spurious DNA trap, it might cause oops with the recent fpu code changes. This is the code sequence that is probably causing this problem: a) new app is getting exec'd and it is somewhere in between start_thread() and flush_old_exec() in the load_xyz_binary() b) At pont "a", task's fpu state (like TS_USEDFPU, used_math() etc) is cleared. c) Now we get an interrupt/softirq which starts using these encrypt/decrypt routines in the network stack. This generates a math fault (as cr0.ts is '1') which sets TS_USEDFPU and restores the math that is in the task's xstate. d) Return to exec code path, which does start_thread() which does free_thread_xstate() and sets xstate pointer to NULL while the TS_USEDFPU is still set. e) At the next context switch from the new exec'd task to another task, we have a scenarios where TS_USEDFPU is set but xstate pointer is null. This can cause an oops during unlazy_fpu() in __switch_to() Now: 1) This should happen with or with out pre-emption. Viro also encountered similar problem with out CONFIG_PREEMPT. 2) kernel_fpu_begin() and kernel_fpu_end() will fix this problem, because kernel_fpu_begin() will manually do a clts() and won't run in to the situation of setting TS_USEDFPU in step "c" above. 3) This was working before the fpu changes, because its a spurious math fault which doesn't corrupt any fpu/sse registers and the task's math state was always in an allocated state. With out the recent lazy fpu allocation changes, while we don't see oops, there is a possible race still present in older kernels(for example, while kernel is using kernel_fpu_begin() in some optimized clear/copy page and an interrupt/softirq happens which uses these padlock instructions generating DNA fault). This is the failing scenario that existed even before the lazy fpu allocation changes: 0. CPU's TS flag is set 1. kernel using FPU in some optimized copy routine and while doing kernel_fpu_begin() takes an interrupt just before doing clts() 2. Takes an interrupt and ipsec uses padlock instruction. And we take a DNA fault as TS flag is still set. 3. We handle the DNA fault and set TS_USEDFPU and clear cr0.ts 4. We complete the padlock routine 5. Go back to step-1, which resumes clts() in kernel_fpu_begin(), finishes the optimized copy routine and does kernel_fpu_end(). At this point, we have cr0.ts again set to '1' but the task's TS_USEFPU is stilll set and not cleared. 6. Now kernel resumes its user operation. And at the next context switch, kernel sees it has do a FP save as TS_USEDFPU is still set and then will do a unlazy_fpu() in __switch_to(). unlazy_fpu() will take a DNA fault, as cr0.ts is '1' and now, because we are in __switch_to(), math_state_restore() will get confused and will restore the next task's FP state and will save it in prev tasks's FP state. Remember, in __switch_to() we are already on the stack of the next task but take a DNA fault for the prev task. This causes the fpu leakage. Fix the padlock instruction usage by calling them inside the context of new routines irq_ts_save/restore(), which clear/restore cr0.ts manually in the interrupt context. This will not generate spurious DNA in the context of the interrupt which will fix the oops encountered and the possible FPU leakage issue. Reported-and-bisected-by: Wolfgang Walter <wolfgang.walter@stwm.de> Signed-off-by: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2008-08-13 16:02:26 +04:00
* should use them only in the context of irq_ts_save/restore()
*/
static inline int irq_ts_save(void)
{
/*
x86: Clear TS in irq_ts_save() when in an atomic section The dynamic FPU context allocation changes caused the padlock driver to generate the below warning. Fix it by masking TS when doing padlock encryption operations in an atomic section. This solves: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/slub.c:1602 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 82, name: cryptomgr_test Pid: 82, comm: cryptomgr_test Not tainted 2.6.29.4-168.test7.fc11.x86_64 #1 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8103ff16>] __might_sleep+0x10b/0x110 [<ffffffff810cd3b2>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x37/0xf1 [<ffffffff81018505>] init_fpu+0x49/0x8a [<ffffffff81012a83>] math_state_restore+0x3e/0xbc [<ffffffff813ac6d0>] do_device_not_available+0x9/0xb [<ffffffff810123ab>] device_not_available+0x1b/0x20 [<ffffffffa001c066>] ? aes_crypt+0x66/0x74 [padlock_aes] [<ffffffff8119a51a>] ? blkcipher_walk_next+0x257/0x2e0 [<ffffffff8119a731>] ? blkcipher_walk_first+0x18e/0x19d [<ffffffffa001c1fe>] aes_encrypt+0x9d/0xe5 [padlock_aes] [<ffffffffa0027253>] crypt+0x6b/0x114 [xts] [<ffffffffa001c161>] ? aes_encrypt+0x0/0xe5 [padlock_aes] [<ffffffffa001c161>] ? aes_encrypt+0x0/0xe5 [padlock_aes] [<ffffffffa0027390>] encrypt+0x49/0x4b [xts] [<ffffffff81199acc>] async_encrypt+0x3c/0x3e [<ffffffff8119dafc>] test_skcipher+0x1da/0x658 [<ffffffff811979c3>] ? crypto_spawn_tfm+0x8e/0xb1 [<ffffffff8119672d>] ? __crypto_alloc_tfm+0x11b/0x15f [<ffffffff811979c3>] ? crypto_spawn_tfm+0x8e/0xb1 [<ffffffff81199dbe>] ? skcipher_geniv_init+0x2b/0x47 [<ffffffff8119a905>] ? async_chainiv_init+0x5c/0x61 [<ffffffff8119dfdd>] alg_test_skcipher+0x63/0x9b [<ffffffff8119e1bc>] alg_test+0x12d/0x175 [<ffffffff8119c488>] cryptomgr_test+0x38/0x54 [<ffffffff8119c450>] ? cryptomgr_test+0x0/0x54 [<ffffffff8105c6c9>] kthread+0x4d/0x78 [<ffffffff8101264a>] child_rip+0xa/0x20 [<ffffffff81011f67>] ? restore_args+0x0/0x30 [<ffffffff8105c67c>] ? kthread+0x0/0x78 [<ffffffff81012640>] ? child_rip+0x0/0x20 Signed-off-by: Chuck Ebbert <cebbert@redhat.com> Cc: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com> LKML-Reference: <20090609104050.50158cfe@dhcp-100-2-144.bos.redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-06-09 18:40:50 +04:00
* If in process context and not atomic, we can take a spurious DNA fault.
* Otherwise, doing clts() in process context requires disabling preemption
* or some heavy lifting like kernel_fpu_begin()
crypto: padlock - fix VIA PadLock instruction usage with irq_ts_save/restore() Wolfgang Walter reported this oops on his via C3 using padlock for AES-encryption: ################################################################## BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 000001f0 IP: [<c01028c5>] __switch_to+0x30/0x117 *pde = 00000000 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT Modules linked in: Pid: 2071, comm: sleep Not tainted (2.6.26 #11) EIP: 0060:[<c01028c5>] EFLAGS: 00010002 CPU: 0 EIP is at __switch_to+0x30/0x117 EAX: 00000000 EBX: c0493300 ECX: dc48dd00 EDX: c0493300 ESI: dc48dd00 EDI: c0493530 EBP: c04cff8c ESP: c04cff7c DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 0033 SS: 0068 Process sleep (pid: 2071, ti=c04ce000 task=dc48dd00 task.ti=d2fe6000) Stack: dc48df30 c0493300 00000000 00000000 d2fe7f44 c03b5b43 c04cffc8 00000046 c0131856 0000005a dc472d3c c0493300 c0493470 d983ae00 00002696 00000000 c0239f54 00000000 c04c4000 c04cffd8 c01025fe c04f3740 00049800 c04cffe0 Call Trace: [<c03b5b43>] ? schedule+0x285/0x2ff [<c0131856>] ? pm_qos_requirement+0x3c/0x53 [<c0239f54>] ? acpi_processor_idle+0x0/0x434 [<c01025fe>] ? cpu_idle+0x73/0x7f [<c03a4dcd>] ? rest_init+0x61/0x63 ======================= Wolfgang also found out that adding kernel_fpu_begin() and kernel_fpu_end() around the padlock instructions fix the oops. Suresh wrote: These padlock instructions though don't use/touch SSE registers, but it behaves similar to other SSE instructions. For example, it might cause DNA faults when cr0.ts is set. While this is a spurious DNA trap, it might cause oops with the recent fpu code changes. This is the code sequence that is probably causing this problem: a) new app is getting exec'd and it is somewhere in between start_thread() and flush_old_exec() in the load_xyz_binary() b) At pont "a", task's fpu state (like TS_USEDFPU, used_math() etc) is cleared. c) Now we get an interrupt/softirq which starts using these encrypt/decrypt routines in the network stack. This generates a math fault (as cr0.ts is '1') which sets TS_USEDFPU and restores the math that is in the task's xstate. d) Return to exec code path, which does start_thread() which does free_thread_xstate() and sets xstate pointer to NULL while the TS_USEDFPU is still set. e) At the next context switch from the new exec'd task to another task, we have a scenarios where TS_USEDFPU is set but xstate pointer is null. This can cause an oops during unlazy_fpu() in __switch_to() Now: 1) This should happen with or with out pre-emption. Viro also encountered similar problem with out CONFIG_PREEMPT. 2) kernel_fpu_begin() and kernel_fpu_end() will fix this problem, because kernel_fpu_begin() will manually do a clts() and won't run in to the situation of setting TS_USEDFPU in step "c" above. 3) This was working before the fpu changes, because its a spurious math fault which doesn't corrupt any fpu/sse registers and the task's math state was always in an allocated state. With out the recent lazy fpu allocation changes, while we don't see oops, there is a possible race still present in older kernels(for example, while kernel is using kernel_fpu_begin() in some optimized clear/copy page and an interrupt/softirq happens which uses these padlock instructions generating DNA fault). This is the failing scenario that existed even before the lazy fpu allocation changes: 0. CPU's TS flag is set 1. kernel using FPU in some optimized copy routine and while doing kernel_fpu_begin() takes an interrupt just before doing clts() 2. Takes an interrupt and ipsec uses padlock instruction. And we take a DNA fault as TS flag is still set. 3. We handle the DNA fault and set TS_USEDFPU and clear cr0.ts 4. We complete the padlock routine 5. Go back to step-1, which resumes clts() in kernel_fpu_begin(), finishes the optimized copy routine and does kernel_fpu_end(). At this point, we have cr0.ts again set to '1' but the task's TS_USEFPU is stilll set and not cleared. 6. Now kernel resumes its user operation. And at the next context switch, kernel sees it has do a FP save as TS_USEDFPU is still set and then will do a unlazy_fpu() in __switch_to(). unlazy_fpu() will take a DNA fault, as cr0.ts is '1' and now, because we are in __switch_to(), math_state_restore() will get confused and will restore the next task's FP state and will save it in prev tasks's FP state. Remember, in __switch_to() we are already on the stack of the next task but take a DNA fault for the prev task. This causes the fpu leakage. Fix the padlock instruction usage by calling them inside the context of new routines irq_ts_save/restore(), which clear/restore cr0.ts manually in the interrupt context. This will not generate spurious DNA in the context of the interrupt which will fix the oops encountered and the possible FPU leakage issue. Reported-and-bisected-by: Wolfgang Walter <wolfgang.walter@stwm.de> Signed-off-by: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2008-08-13 16:02:26 +04:00
*/
x86: Clear TS in irq_ts_save() when in an atomic section The dynamic FPU context allocation changes caused the padlock driver to generate the below warning. Fix it by masking TS when doing padlock encryption operations in an atomic section. This solves: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/slub.c:1602 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 82, name: cryptomgr_test Pid: 82, comm: cryptomgr_test Not tainted 2.6.29.4-168.test7.fc11.x86_64 #1 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8103ff16>] __might_sleep+0x10b/0x110 [<ffffffff810cd3b2>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x37/0xf1 [<ffffffff81018505>] init_fpu+0x49/0x8a [<ffffffff81012a83>] math_state_restore+0x3e/0xbc [<ffffffff813ac6d0>] do_device_not_available+0x9/0xb [<ffffffff810123ab>] device_not_available+0x1b/0x20 [<ffffffffa001c066>] ? aes_crypt+0x66/0x74 [padlock_aes] [<ffffffff8119a51a>] ? blkcipher_walk_next+0x257/0x2e0 [<ffffffff8119a731>] ? blkcipher_walk_first+0x18e/0x19d [<ffffffffa001c1fe>] aes_encrypt+0x9d/0xe5 [padlock_aes] [<ffffffffa0027253>] crypt+0x6b/0x114 [xts] [<ffffffffa001c161>] ? aes_encrypt+0x0/0xe5 [padlock_aes] [<ffffffffa001c161>] ? aes_encrypt+0x0/0xe5 [padlock_aes] [<ffffffffa0027390>] encrypt+0x49/0x4b [xts] [<ffffffff81199acc>] async_encrypt+0x3c/0x3e [<ffffffff8119dafc>] test_skcipher+0x1da/0x658 [<ffffffff811979c3>] ? crypto_spawn_tfm+0x8e/0xb1 [<ffffffff8119672d>] ? __crypto_alloc_tfm+0x11b/0x15f [<ffffffff811979c3>] ? crypto_spawn_tfm+0x8e/0xb1 [<ffffffff81199dbe>] ? skcipher_geniv_init+0x2b/0x47 [<ffffffff8119a905>] ? async_chainiv_init+0x5c/0x61 [<ffffffff8119dfdd>] alg_test_skcipher+0x63/0x9b [<ffffffff8119e1bc>] alg_test+0x12d/0x175 [<ffffffff8119c488>] cryptomgr_test+0x38/0x54 [<ffffffff8119c450>] ? cryptomgr_test+0x0/0x54 [<ffffffff8105c6c9>] kthread+0x4d/0x78 [<ffffffff8101264a>] child_rip+0xa/0x20 [<ffffffff81011f67>] ? restore_args+0x0/0x30 [<ffffffff8105c67c>] ? kthread+0x0/0x78 [<ffffffff81012640>] ? child_rip+0x0/0x20 Signed-off-by: Chuck Ebbert <cebbert@redhat.com> Cc: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com> LKML-Reference: <20090609104050.50158cfe@dhcp-100-2-144.bos.redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-06-09 18:40:50 +04:00
if (!in_atomic())
crypto: padlock - fix VIA PadLock instruction usage with irq_ts_save/restore() Wolfgang Walter reported this oops on his via C3 using padlock for AES-encryption: ################################################################## BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 000001f0 IP: [<c01028c5>] __switch_to+0x30/0x117 *pde = 00000000 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT Modules linked in: Pid: 2071, comm: sleep Not tainted (2.6.26 #11) EIP: 0060:[<c01028c5>] EFLAGS: 00010002 CPU: 0 EIP is at __switch_to+0x30/0x117 EAX: 00000000 EBX: c0493300 ECX: dc48dd00 EDX: c0493300 ESI: dc48dd00 EDI: c0493530 EBP: c04cff8c ESP: c04cff7c DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 0033 SS: 0068 Process sleep (pid: 2071, ti=c04ce000 task=dc48dd00 task.ti=d2fe6000) Stack: dc48df30 c0493300 00000000 00000000 d2fe7f44 c03b5b43 c04cffc8 00000046 c0131856 0000005a dc472d3c c0493300 c0493470 d983ae00 00002696 00000000 c0239f54 00000000 c04c4000 c04cffd8 c01025fe c04f3740 00049800 c04cffe0 Call Trace: [<c03b5b43>] ? schedule+0x285/0x2ff [<c0131856>] ? pm_qos_requirement+0x3c/0x53 [<c0239f54>] ? acpi_processor_idle+0x0/0x434 [<c01025fe>] ? cpu_idle+0x73/0x7f [<c03a4dcd>] ? rest_init+0x61/0x63 ======================= Wolfgang also found out that adding kernel_fpu_begin() and kernel_fpu_end() around the padlock instructions fix the oops. Suresh wrote: These padlock instructions though don't use/touch SSE registers, but it behaves similar to other SSE instructions. For example, it might cause DNA faults when cr0.ts is set. While this is a spurious DNA trap, it might cause oops with the recent fpu code changes. This is the code sequence that is probably causing this problem: a) new app is getting exec'd and it is somewhere in between start_thread() and flush_old_exec() in the load_xyz_binary() b) At pont "a", task's fpu state (like TS_USEDFPU, used_math() etc) is cleared. c) Now we get an interrupt/softirq which starts using these encrypt/decrypt routines in the network stack. This generates a math fault (as cr0.ts is '1') which sets TS_USEDFPU and restores the math that is in the task's xstate. d) Return to exec code path, which does start_thread() which does free_thread_xstate() and sets xstate pointer to NULL while the TS_USEDFPU is still set. e) At the next context switch from the new exec'd task to another task, we have a scenarios where TS_USEDFPU is set but xstate pointer is null. This can cause an oops during unlazy_fpu() in __switch_to() Now: 1) This should happen with or with out pre-emption. Viro also encountered similar problem with out CONFIG_PREEMPT. 2) kernel_fpu_begin() and kernel_fpu_end() will fix this problem, because kernel_fpu_begin() will manually do a clts() and won't run in to the situation of setting TS_USEDFPU in step "c" above. 3) This was working before the fpu changes, because its a spurious math fault which doesn't corrupt any fpu/sse registers and the task's math state was always in an allocated state. With out the recent lazy fpu allocation changes, while we don't see oops, there is a possible race still present in older kernels(for example, while kernel is using kernel_fpu_begin() in some optimized clear/copy page and an interrupt/softirq happens which uses these padlock instructions generating DNA fault). This is the failing scenario that existed even before the lazy fpu allocation changes: 0. CPU's TS flag is set 1. kernel using FPU in some optimized copy routine and while doing kernel_fpu_begin() takes an interrupt just before doing clts() 2. Takes an interrupt and ipsec uses padlock instruction. And we take a DNA fault as TS flag is still set. 3. We handle the DNA fault and set TS_USEDFPU and clear cr0.ts 4. We complete the padlock routine 5. Go back to step-1, which resumes clts() in kernel_fpu_begin(), finishes the optimized copy routine and does kernel_fpu_end(). At this point, we have cr0.ts again set to '1' but the task's TS_USEFPU is stilll set and not cleared. 6. Now kernel resumes its user operation. And at the next context switch, kernel sees it has do a FP save as TS_USEDFPU is still set and then will do a unlazy_fpu() in __switch_to(). unlazy_fpu() will take a DNA fault, as cr0.ts is '1' and now, because we are in __switch_to(), math_state_restore() will get confused and will restore the next task's FP state and will save it in prev tasks's FP state. Remember, in __switch_to() we are already on the stack of the next task but take a DNA fault for the prev task. This causes the fpu leakage. Fix the padlock instruction usage by calling them inside the context of new routines irq_ts_save/restore(), which clear/restore cr0.ts manually in the interrupt context. This will not generate spurious DNA in the context of the interrupt which will fix the oops encountered and the possible FPU leakage issue. Reported-and-bisected-by: Wolfgang Walter <wolfgang.walter@stwm.de> Signed-off-by: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2008-08-13 16:02:26 +04:00
return 0;
if (read_cr0() & X86_CR0_TS) {
clts();
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
static inline void irq_ts_restore(int TS_state)
{
if (TS_state)
stts();
}
i387: fix x86-64 preemption-unsafe user stack save/restore Commit 5b1cbac37798 ("i387: make irq_fpu_usable() tests more robust") added a sanity check to the #NM handler to verify that we never cause the "Device Not Available" exception in kernel mode. However, that check actually pinpointed a (fundamental) race where we do cause that exception as part of the signal stack FPU state save/restore code. Because we use the floating point instructions themselves to save and restore state directly from user mode, we cannot do that atomically with testing the TS_USEDFPU bit: the user mode access itself may cause a page fault, which causes a task switch, which saves and restores the FP/MMX state from the kernel buffers. This kind of "recursive" FP state save is fine per se, but it means that when the signal stack save/restore gets restarted, it will now take the '#NM' exception we originally tried to avoid. With preemption this can happen even without the page fault - but because of the user access, we cannot just disable preemption around the save/restore instruction. There are various ways to solve this, including using the "enable/disable_page_fault()" helpers to not allow page faults at all during the sequence, and fall back to copying things by hand without the use of the native FP state save/restore instructions. However, the simplest thing to do is to just allow the #NM from kernel space, but fix the race in setting and clearing CR0.TS that this all exposed: the TS bit changes and the TS_USEDFPU bit absolutely have to be atomic wrt scheduling, so while the actual state save/restore can be interrupted and restarted, the act of actually clearing/setting CR0.TS and the TS_USEDFPU bit together must not. Instead of just adding random "preempt_disable/enable()" calls to what is already excessively ugly code, this introduces some helper functions that mostly mirror the "kernel_fpu_begin/end()" functionality, just for the user state instead. Those helper functions should probably eventually replace the other ad-hoc CR0.TS and TS_USEDFPU tests too, but I'll need to think about it some more: the task switching functionality in particular needs to expose the difference between the 'prev' and 'next' threads, while the new helper functions intentionally were written to only work with 'current'. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-02-16 21:15:04 +04:00
/*
* The question "does this thread have fpu access?"
* is slightly racy, since preemption could come in
* and revoke it immediately after the test.
*
* However, even in that very unlikely scenario,
* we can just assume we have FPU access - typically
* to save the FP state - we'll just take a #NM
* fault and get the FPU access back.
*/
static inline int user_has_fpu(void)
{
return current->thread.fpu.has_fpu;
}
extern void unlazy_fpu(struct task_struct *tsk);
#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
#endif /* _ASM_X86_I387_H */