2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
/*
* linux / net / sunrpc / auth_unix . c
*
* UNIX - style authentication ; no AUTH_SHORT support
*
* Copyright ( C ) 1996 , Olaf Kirch < okir @ monad . swb . de >
*/
include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h
percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being
included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which
in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files
universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies.
percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for
this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those
headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion
needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is
used as the basis of conversion.
http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py
The script does the followings.
* Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that
only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used,
gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h.
* When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include
blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms
to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains
core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered -
alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there
doesn't seem to be any matching order.
* If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly
because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out
an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the
file.
The conversion was done in the following steps.
1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly
over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h
and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400
files.
2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion,
some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or
embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added
inclusions to around 150 files.
3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits
from #2 to make sure no file was left behind.
4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed.
e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab
APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually.
5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically
editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h
files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h
inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually
wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each
slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as
necessary.
6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h.
7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures
were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my
distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few
more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things
build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq).
* x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config.
* powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig
* sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig
* ia64 SMP allmodconfig
* s390 SMP allmodconfig
* alpha SMP allmodconfig
* um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig
8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as
a separate patch and serve as bisection point.
Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step
6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch.
If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch
headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of
the specific arch.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
2010-03-24 11:04:11 +03:00
# include <linux/slab.h>
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
# include <linux/types.h>
# include <linux/sched.h>
# include <linux/module.h>
# include <linux/sunrpc/clnt.h>
# include <linux/sunrpc/auth.h>
2011-11-15 03:56:38 +04:00
# include <linux/user_namespace.h>
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
struct unx_cred {
struct rpc_cred uc_base ;
2013-02-02 04:31:17 +04:00
kgid_t uc_gid ;
2017-02-07 16:48:11 +03:00
kgid_t uc_gids [ UNX_NGROUPS ] ;
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
} ;
# define uc_uid uc_base.cr_uid
2014-11-18 00:58:04 +03:00
# if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SUNRPC_DEBUG)
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
# define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_AUTH
# endif
static struct rpc_auth unix_auth ;
2007-06-24 04:17:58 +04:00
static const struct rpc_credops unix_credops ;
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
static struct rpc_auth *
2013-08-27 03:23:04 +04:00
unx_create ( struct rpc_auth_create_args * args , struct rpc_clnt * clnt )
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
{
2007-01-31 20:14:08 +03:00
dprintk ( " RPC: creating UNIX authenticator for client %p \n " ,
clnt ) ;
2007-06-26 01:11:20 +04:00
atomic_inc ( & unix_auth . au_count ) ;
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
return & unix_auth ;
}
static void
unx_destroy ( struct rpc_auth * auth )
{
2007-01-31 20:14:08 +03:00
dprintk ( " RPC: destroying UNIX authenticator %p \n " , auth ) ;
2007-06-09 23:41:42 +04:00
rpcauth_clear_credcache ( auth - > au_credcache ) ;
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
}
2016-09-29 18:44:39 +03:00
static int
unx_hash_cred ( struct auth_cred * acred , unsigned int hashbits )
{
return hash_64 ( from_kgid ( & init_user_ns , acred - > gid ) |
( ( u64 ) from_kuid ( & init_user_ns , acred - > uid ) < <
( sizeof ( gid_t ) * 8 ) ) , hashbits ) ;
}
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
/*
* Lookup AUTH_UNIX creds for current process
*/
static struct rpc_cred *
unx_lookup_cred ( struct rpc_auth * auth , struct auth_cred * acred , int flags )
{
2016-04-22 03:51:54 +03:00
return rpcauth_lookup_credcache ( auth , acred , flags , GFP_NOFS ) ;
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
}
static struct rpc_cred *
2016-04-22 03:51:54 +03:00
unx_create_cred ( struct rpc_auth * auth , struct auth_cred * acred , int flags , gfp_t gfp )
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
{
struct unx_cred * cred ;
2008-03-12 19:12:16 +03:00
unsigned int groups = 0 ;
unsigned int i ;
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
2007-01-31 20:14:08 +03:00
dprintk ( " RPC: allocating UNIX cred for uid %d gid %d \n " ,
2013-02-02 05:10:52 +04:00
from_kuid ( & init_user_ns , acred - > uid ) ,
from_kgid ( & init_user_ns , acred - > gid ) ) ;
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
2016-04-22 03:51:54 +03:00
if ( ! ( cred = kmalloc ( sizeof ( * cred ) , gfp ) ) )
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
return ERR_PTR ( - ENOMEM ) ;
2007-06-24 03:55:31 +04:00
rpcauth_init_cred ( & cred - > uc_base , acred , auth , & unix_credops ) ;
2007-06-25 18:15:15 +04:00
cred - > uc_base . cr_flags = 1UL < < RPCAUTH_CRED_UPTODATE ;
2008-03-12 19:12:16 +03:00
if ( acred - > group_info ! = NULL )
groups = acred - > group_info - > ngroups ;
2017-02-07 16:48:11 +03:00
if ( groups > UNX_NGROUPS )
groups = UNX_NGROUPS ;
2008-03-12 19:12:16 +03:00
cred - > uc_gid = acred - > gid ;
2013-02-02 04:46:42 +04:00
for ( i = 0 ; i < groups ; i + + )
cred: simpler, 1D supplementary groups
Current supplementary groups code can massively overallocate memory and
is implemented in a way so that access to individual gid is done via 2D
array.
If number of gids is <= 32, memory allocation is more or less tolerable
(140/148 bytes). But if it is not, code allocates full page (!)
regardless and, what's even more fun, doesn't reuse small 32-entry
array.
2D array means dependent shifts, loads and LEAs without possibility to
optimize them (gid is never known at compile time).
All of the above is unnecessary. Switch to the usual
trailing-zero-len-array scheme. Memory is allocated with
kmalloc/vmalloc() and only as much as needed. Accesses become simpler
(LEA 8(gi,idx,4) or even without displacement).
Maximum number of gids is 65536 which translates to 256KB+8 bytes. I
think kernel can handle such allocation.
On my usual desktop system with whole 9 (nine) aux groups, struct
group_info shrinks from 148 bytes to 44 bytes, yay!
Nice side effects:
- "gi->gid[i]" is shorter than "GROUP_AT(gi, i)", less typing,
- fix little mess in net/ipv4/ping.c
should have been using GROUP_AT macro but this point becomes moot,
- aux group allocation is persistent and should be accounted as such.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160817201927.GA2096@p183.telecom.by
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Vasily Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-10-08 03:03:12 +03:00
cred - > uc_gids [ i ] = acred - > group_info - > gid [ i ] ;
2017-02-07 16:48:11 +03:00
if ( i < UNX_NGROUPS )
2013-02-02 03:55:38 +04:00
cred - > uc_gids [ i ] = INVALID_GID ;
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
2007-06-25 17:48:25 +04:00
return & cred - > uc_base ;
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
}
static void
2007-06-24 23:55:26 +04:00
unx_free_cred ( struct unx_cred * unx_cred )
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
{
2007-06-24 23:55:26 +04:00
dprintk ( " RPC: unx_free_cred %p \n " , unx_cred ) ;
kfree ( unx_cred ) ;
}
2007-06-25 17:48:25 +04:00
2007-06-24 23:55:26 +04:00
static void
unx_free_cred_callback ( struct rcu_head * head )
{
struct unx_cred * unx_cred = container_of ( head , struct unx_cred , uc_base . cr_rcu ) ;
unx_free_cred ( unx_cred ) ;
}
static void
unx_destroy_cred ( struct rpc_cred * cred )
{
call_rcu ( & cred - > cr_rcu , unx_free_cred_callback ) ;
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
}
/*
* Match credentials against current process creds .
* The root_override argument takes care of cases where the caller may
* request root creds ( e . g . for NFS swapping ) .
*/
static int
2006-02-01 20:18:36 +03:00
unx_match ( struct auth_cred * acred , struct rpc_cred * rcred , int flags )
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
{
2007-06-25 17:48:25 +04:00
struct unx_cred * cred = container_of ( rcred , struct unx_cred , uc_base ) ;
2008-03-12 19:12:16 +03:00
unsigned int groups = 0 ;
unsigned int i ;
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
2013-02-02 04:39:32 +04:00
if ( ! uid_eq ( cred - > uc_uid , acred - > uid ) | | ! gid_eq ( cred - > uc_gid , acred - > gid ) )
2008-03-12 19:12:16 +03:00
return 0 ;
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
2008-03-12 19:12:16 +03:00
if ( acred - > group_info ! = NULL )
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
groups = acred - > group_info - > ngroups ;
2017-02-07 16:48:11 +03:00
if ( groups > UNX_NGROUPS )
groups = UNX_NGROUPS ;
2013-02-02 04:46:42 +04:00
for ( i = 0 ; i < groups ; i + + )
cred: simpler, 1D supplementary groups
Current supplementary groups code can massively overallocate memory and
is implemented in a way so that access to individual gid is done via 2D
array.
If number of gids is <= 32, memory allocation is more or less tolerable
(140/148 bytes). But if it is not, code allocates full page (!)
regardless and, what's even more fun, doesn't reuse small 32-entry
array.
2D array means dependent shifts, loads and LEAs without possibility to
optimize them (gid is never known at compile time).
All of the above is unnecessary. Switch to the usual
trailing-zero-len-array scheme. Memory is allocated with
kmalloc/vmalloc() and only as much as needed. Accesses become simpler
(LEA 8(gi,idx,4) or even without displacement).
Maximum number of gids is 65536 which translates to 256KB+8 bytes. I
think kernel can handle such allocation.
On my usual desktop system with whole 9 (nine) aux groups, struct
group_info shrinks from 148 bytes to 44 bytes, yay!
Nice side effects:
- "gi->gid[i]" is shorter than "GROUP_AT(gi, i)", less typing,
- fix little mess in net/ipv4/ping.c
should have been using GROUP_AT macro but this point becomes moot,
- aux group allocation is persistent and should be accounted as such.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160817201927.GA2096@p183.telecom.by
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Vasily Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-10-08 03:03:12 +03:00
if ( ! gid_eq ( cred - > uc_gids [ i ] , acred - > group_info - > gid [ i ] ) )
2008-03-12 19:12:16 +03:00
return 0 ;
2017-02-07 16:48:11 +03:00
if ( groups < UNX_NGROUPS & & gid_valid ( cred - > uc_gids [ groups ] ) )
2011-10-25 03:25:49 +04:00
return 0 ;
2008-03-12 19:12:16 +03:00
return 1 ;
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
}
/*
* Marshal credentials .
* Maybe we should keep a cached credential for performance reasons .
*/
2006-09-27 09:29:38 +04:00
static __be32 *
unx_marshal ( struct rpc_task * task , __be32 * p )
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
{
struct rpc_clnt * clnt = task - > tk_client ;
2010-07-31 22:29:08 +04:00
struct unx_cred * cred = container_of ( task - > tk_rqstp - > rq_cred , struct unx_cred , uc_base ) ;
2006-09-27 09:29:38 +04:00
__be32 * base , * hold ;
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
int i ;
* p + + = htonl ( RPC_AUTH_UNIX ) ;
base = p + + ;
* p + + = htonl ( jiffies / HZ ) ;
/*
* Copy the UTS nodename captured when the client was created .
*/
p = xdr_encode_array ( p , clnt - > cl_nodename , clnt - > cl_nodelen ) ;
2013-02-02 14:45:08 +04:00
* p + + = htonl ( ( u32 ) from_kuid ( & init_user_ns , cred - > uc_uid ) ) ;
* p + + = htonl ( ( u32 ) from_kgid ( & init_user_ns , cred - > uc_gid ) ) ;
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
hold = p + + ;
2017-02-07 16:48:11 +03:00
for ( i = 0 ; i < UNX_NGROUPS & & gid_valid ( cred - > uc_gids [ i ] ) ; i + + )
2013-02-02 14:45:08 +04:00
* p + + = htonl ( ( u32 ) from_kgid ( & init_user_ns , cred - > uc_gids [ i ] ) ) ;
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
* hold = htonl ( p - hold - 1 ) ; /* gid array length */
* base = htonl ( ( p - base - 1 ) < < 2 ) ; /* cred length */
* p + + = htonl ( RPC_AUTH_NULL ) ;
* p + + = htonl ( 0 ) ;
return p ;
}
/*
* Refresh credentials . This is a no - op for AUTH_UNIX
*/
static int
unx_refresh ( struct rpc_task * task )
{
2010-07-31 22:29:08 +04:00
set_bit ( RPCAUTH_CRED_UPTODATE , & task - > tk_rqstp - > rq_cred - > cr_flags ) ;
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
return 0 ;
}
2006-09-27 09:29:38 +04:00
static __be32 *
unx_validate ( struct rpc_task * task , __be32 * p )
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
{
rpc_authflavor_t flavor ;
u32 size ;
flavor = ntohl ( * p + + ) ;
if ( flavor ! = RPC_AUTH_NULL & &
flavor ! = RPC_AUTH_UNIX & &
flavor ! = RPC_AUTH_SHORT ) {
printk ( " RPC: bad verf flavor: %u \n " , flavor ) ;
2013-08-14 19:59:17 +04:00
return ERR_PTR ( - EIO ) ;
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
}
size = ntohl ( * p + + ) ;
if ( size > RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE ) {
printk ( " RPC: giant verf size: %u \n " , size ) ;
2013-08-14 19:59:17 +04:00
return ERR_PTR ( - EIO ) ;
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
}
2010-07-31 22:29:08 +04:00
task - > tk_rqstp - > rq_cred - > cr_auth - > au_rslack = ( size > > 2 ) + 2 ;
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
p + = ( size > > 2 ) ;
return p ;
}
2010-07-31 22:29:07 +04:00
int __init rpc_init_authunix ( void )
2007-06-24 23:57:57 +04:00
{
2010-07-31 22:29:07 +04:00
return rpcauth_init_credcache ( & unix_auth ) ;
}
void rpc_destroy_authunix ( void )
{
rpcauth_destroy_credcache ( & unix_auth ) ;
2007-06-24 23:57:57 +04:00
}
2007-06-24 04:17:58 +04:00
const struct rpc_authops authunix_ops = {
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
. owner = THIS_MODULE ,
. au_flavor = RPC_AUTH_UNIX ,
. au_name = " UNIX " ,
. create = unx_create ,
. destroy = unx_destroy ,
2016-09-29 18:44:39 +03:00
. hash_cred = unx_hash_cred ,
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
. lookup_cred = unx_lookup_cred ,
. crcreate = unx_create_cred ,
} ;
static
struct rpc_auth unix_auth = {
2016-03-01 21:06:02 +03:00
. au_cslack = UNX_CALLSLACK ,
. au_rslack = NUL_REPLYSLACK ,
sunrpc: move NO_CRKEY_TIMEOUT to the auth->au_flags
A generic_cred can be used to look up a unx_cred or a gss_cred, so it's
not really safe to use the the generic_cred->acred->ac_flags to store
the NO_CRKEY_TIMEOUT flag. A lookup for a unx_cred triggered while the
KEY_EXPIRE_SOON flag is already set will cause both NO_CRKEY_TIMEOUT and
KEY_EXPIRE_SOON to be set in the ac_flags, leaving the user associated
with the auth_cred to be in a state where they're perpetually doing 4K
NFS_FILE_SYNC writes.
This can be reproduced as follows:
1. Mount two NFS filesystems, one with sec=krb5 and one with sec=sys.
They do not need to be the same export, nor do they even need to be from
the same NFS server. Also, v3 is fine.
$ sudo mount -o v3,sec=krb5 server1:/export /mnt/krb5
$ sudo mount -o v3,sec=sys server2:/export /mnt/sys
2. As the normal user, before accessing the kerberized mount, kinit with
a short lifetime (but not so short that renewing the ticket would leave
you within the 4-minute window again by the time the original ticket
expires), e.g.
$ kinit -l 10m -r 60m
3. Do some I/O to the kerberized mount and verify that the writes are
wsize, UNSTABLE:
$ dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/krb5/file bs=1M count=1
4. Wait until you're within 4 minutes of key expiry, then do some more
I/O to the kerberized mount to ensure that RPC_CRED_KEY_EXPIRE_SOON gets
set. Verify that the writes are 4K, FILE_SYNC:
$ dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/krb5/file bs=1M count=1
5. Now do some I/O to the sec=sys mount. This will cause
RPC_CRED_NO_CRKEY_TIMEOUT to be set:
$ dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/sys/file bs=1M count=1
6. Writes for that user will now be permanently 4K, FILE_SYNC for that
user, regardless of which mount is being written to, until you reboot
the client. Renewing the kerberos ticket (assuming it hasn't already
expired) will have no effect. Grabbing a new kerberos ticket at this
point will have no effect either.
Move the flag to the auth->au_flags field (which is currently unused)
and rename it slightly to reflect that it's no longer associated with
the auth_cred->ac_flags. Add the rpc_auth to the arg list of
rpcauth_cred_key_to_expire and check the au_flags there too. Finally,
add the inode to the arg list of nfs_ctx_key_to_expire so we can
determine the rpc_auth to pass to rpcauth_cred_key_to_expire.
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
2016-06-07 22:14:48 +03:00
. au_flags = RPCAUTH_AUTH_NO_CRKEY_TIMEOUT ,
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
. au_ops = & authunix_ops ,
2006-06-09 17:34:34 +04:00
. au_flavor = RPC_AUTH_UNIX ,
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
. au_count = ATOMIC_INIT ( 0 ) ,
} ;
static
2007-06-24 04:17:58 +04:00
const struct rpc_credops unix_credops = {
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
. cr_name = " AUTH_UNIX " ,
. crdestroy = unx_destroy_cred ,
2008-03-12 23:21:07 +03:00
. crbind = rpcauth_generic_bind_cred ,
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
. crmatch = unx_match ,
. crmarshal = unx_marshal ,
. crrefresh = unx_refresh ,
. crvalidate = unx_validate ,
} ;