linux/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h

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License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 17:07:57 +03:00
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
/*
* fscrypt_private.h
*
* Copyright (C) 2015, Google, Inc.
*
* Originally written by Michael Halcrow, Ildar Muslukhov, and Uday Savagaonkar.
* Heavily modified since then.
*/
#ifndef _FSCRYPT_PRIVATE_H
#define _FSCRYPT_PRIVATE_H
#include <linux/fscrypt.h>
fscrypt: derive dirhash key for casefolded directories When we allow indexed directories to use both encryption and casefolding, for the dirhash we can't just hash the ciphertext filenames that are stored on-disk (as is done currently) because the dirhash must be case insensitive, but the stored names are case-preserving. Nor can we hash the plaintext names with an unkeyed hash (or a hash keyed with a value stored on-disk like ext4's s_hash_seed), since that would leak information about the names that encryption is meant to protect. Instead, if we can accept a dirhash that's only computable when the fscrypt key is available, we can hash the plaintext names with a keyed hash using a secret key derived from the directory's fscrypt master key. We'll use SipHash-2-4 for this purpose. Prepare for this by deriving a SipHash key for each casefolded encrypted directory. Make sure to handle deriving the key not only when setting up the directory's fscrypt_info, but also in the case where the casefold flag is enabled after the fscrypt_info was already set up. (We could just always derive the key regardless of casefolding, but that would introduce unnecessary overhead for people not using casefolding.) Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com> [EB: improved commit message, updated fscrypt.rst, squashed with change that avoids unnecessarily deriving the key, and many other cleanups] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200120223201.241390-3-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2020-01-21 01:31:57 +03:00
#include <linux/siphash.h>
#include <crypto/hash.h>
fscrypt: add inline encryption support Add support for inline encryption to fs/crypto/. With "inline encryption", the block layer handles the decryption/encryption as part of the bio, instead of the filesystem doing the crypto itself via Linux's crypto API. This model is needed in order to take advantage of the inline encryption hardware present on most modern mobile SoCs. To use inline encryption, the filesystem needs to be mounted with '-o inlinecrypt'. Blk-crypto will then be used instead of the traditional filesystem-layer crypto whenever possible to encrypt the contents of any encrypted files in that filesystem. Fscrypt still provides the key and IV to use, and the actual ciphertext on-disk is still the same; therefore it's testable using the existing fscrypt ciphertext verification tests. Note that since blk-crypto has a fallback to Linux's crypto API, and also supports all the encryption modes currently supported by fscrypt, this feature is usable and testable even without actual inline encryption hardware. Per-filesystem changes will be needed to set encryption contexts when submitting bios and to implement the 'inlinecrypt' mount option. This patch just adds the common code. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200702015607.1215430-3-satyat@google.com Co-developed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2020-07-02 04:56:05 +03:00
#include <linux/blk-crypto.h>
fscrypt: add FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl Add a new fscrypt ioctl, FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY. This ioctl adds an encryption key to the filesystem's fscrypt keyring ->s_master_keys, making any files encrypted with that key appear "unlocked". Why we need this ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The main problem is that the "locked/unlocked" (ciphertext/plaintext) status of encrypted files is global, but the fscrypt keys are not. fscrypt only looks for keys in the keyring(s) the process accessing the filesystem is subscribed to: the thread keyring, process keyring, and session keyring, where the session keyring may contain the user keyring. Therefore, userspace has to put fscrypt keys in the keyrings for individual users or sessions. But this means that when a process with a different keyring tries to access encrypted files, whether they appear "unlocked" or not is nondeterministic. This is because it depends on whether the files are currently present in the inode cache. Fixing this by consistently providing each process its own view of the filesystem depending on whether it has the key or not isn't feasible due to how the VFS caches work. Furthermore, while sometimes users expect this behavior, it is misguided for two reasons. First, it would be an OS-level access control mechanism largely redundant with existing access control mechanisms such as UNIX file permissions, ACLs, LSMs, etc. Encryption is actually for protecting the data at rest. Second, almost all users of fscrypt actually do need the keys to be global. The largest users of fscrypt, Android and Chromium OS, achieve this by having PID 1 create a "session keyring" that is inherited by every process. This works, but it isn't scalable because it prevents session keyrings from being used for any other purpose. On general-purpose Linux distros, the 'fscrypt' userspace tool [1] can't similarly abuse the session keyring, so to make 'sudo' work on all systems it has to link all the user keyrings into root's user keyring [2]. This is ugly and raises security concerns. Moreover it can't make the keys available to system services, such as sshd trying to access the user's '~/.ssh' directory (see [3], [4]) or NetworkManager trying to read certificates from the user's home directory (see [5]); or to Docker containers (see [6], [7]). By having an API to add a key to the *filesystem* we'll be able to fix the above bugs, remove userspace workarounds, and clearly express the intended semantics: the locked/unlocked status of an encrypted directory is global, and encryption is orthogonal to OS-level access control. Why not use the add_key() syscall ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ We use an ioctl for this API rather than the existing add_key() system call because the ioctl gives us the flexibility needed to implement fscrypt-specific semantics that will be introduced in later patches: - Supporting key removal with the semantics such that the secret is removed immediately and any unused inodes using the key are evicted; also, the eviction of any in-use inodes can be retried. - Calculating a key-dependent cryptographic identifier and returning it to userspace. - Allowing keys to be added and removed by non-root users, but only keys for v2 encryption policies; and to prevent denial-of-service attacks, users can only remove keys they themselves have added, and a key is only really removed after all users who added it have removed it. Trying to shoehorn these semantics into the keyrings syscalls would be very difficult, whereas the ioctls make things much easier. However, to reuse code the implementation still uses the keyrings service internally. Thus we get lockless RCU-mode key lookups without having to re-implement it, and the keys automatically show up in /proc/keys for debugging purposes. References: [1] https://github.com/google/fscrypt [2] https://goo.gl/55cCrI#heading=h.vf09isp98isb [3] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/111#issuecomment-444347939 [4] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/116 [5] https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/fscrypt/+bug/1770715 [6] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/128 [7] https://askubuntu.com/questions/1130306/cannot-run-docker-on-an-encrypted-filesystem Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-08-05 05:35:46 +03:00
#define CONST_STRLEN(str) (sizeof(str) - 1)
#define FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE 16
/*
* Minimum size of an fscrypt master key. Note: a longer key will be required
* if ciphers with a 256-bit security strength are used. This is just the
* absolute minimum, which applies when only 128-bit encryption is used.
*/
#define FSCRYPT_MIN_KEY_SIZE 16
fscrypt: add FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl Add a new fscrypt ioctl, FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY. This ioctl adds an encryption key to the filesystem's fscrypt keyring ->s_master_keys, making any files encrypted with that key appear "unlocked". Why we need this ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The main problem is that the "locked/unlocked" (ciphertext/plaintext) status of encrypted files is global, but the fscrypt keys are not. fscrypt only looks for keys in the keyring(s) the process accessing the filesystem is subscribed to: the thread keyring, process keyring, and session keyring, where the session keyring may contain the user keyring. Therefore, userspace has to put fscrypt keys in the keyrings for individual users or sessions. But this means that when a process with a different keyring tries to access encrypted files, whether they appear "unlocked" or not is nondeterministic. This is because it depends on whether the files are currently present in the inode cache. Fixing this by consistently providing each process its own view of the filesystem depending on whether it has the key or not isn't feasible due to how the VFS caches work. Furthermore, while sometimes users expect this behavior, it is misguided for two reasons. First, it would be an OS-level access control mechanism largely redundant with existing access control mechanisms such as UNIX file permissions, ACLs, LSMs, etc. Encryption is actually for protecting the data at rest. Second, almost all users of fscrypt actually do need the keys to be global. The largest users of fscrypt, Android and Chromium OS, achieve this by having PID 1 create a "session keyring" that is inherited by every process. This works, but it isn't scalable because it prevents session keyrings from being used for any other purpose. On general-purpose Linux distros, the 'fscrypt' userspace tool [1] can't similarly abuse the session keyring, so to make 'sudo' work on all systems it has to link all the user keyrings into root's user keyring [2]. This is ugly and raises security concerns. Moreover it can't make the keys available to system services, such as sshd trying to access the user's '~/.ssh' directory (see [3], [4]) or NetworkManager trying to read certificates from the user's home directory (see [5]); or to Docker containers (see [6], [7]). By having an API to add a key to the *filesystem* we'll be able to fix the above bugs, remove userspace workarounds, and clearly express the intended semantics: the locked/unlocked status of an encrypted directory is global, and encryption is orthogonal to OS-level access control. Why not use the add_key() syscall ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ We use an ioctl for this API rather than the existing add_key() system call because the ioctl gives us the flexibility needed to implement fscrypt-specific semantics that will be introduced in later patches: - Supporting key removal with the semantics such that the secret is removed immediately and any unused inodes using the key are evicted; also, the eviction of any in-use inodes can be retried. - Calculating a key-dependent cryptographic identifier and returning it to userspace. - Allowing keys to be added and removed by non-root users, but only keys for v2 encryption policies; and to prevent denial-of-service attacks, users can only remove keys they themselves have added, and a key is only really removed after all users who added it have removed it. Trying to shoehorn these semantics into the keyrings syscalls would be very difficult, whereas the ioctls make things much easier. However, to reuse code the implementation still uses the keyrings service internally. Thus we get lockless RCU-mode key lookups without having to re-implement it, and the keys automatically show up in /proc/keys for debugging purposes. References: [1] https://github.com/google/fscrypt [2] https://goo.gl/55cCrI#heading=h.vf09isp98isb [3] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/111#issuecomment-444347939 [4] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/116 [5] https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/fscrypt/+bug/1770715 [6] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/128 [7] https://askubuntu.com/questions/1130306/cannot-run-docker-on-an-encrypted-filesystem Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-08-05 05:35:46 +03:00
fscrypt: v2 encryption policy support Add a new fscrypt policy version, "v2". It has the following changes from the original policy version, which we call "v1" (*): - Master keys (the user-provided encryption keys) are only ever used as input to HKDF-SHA512. This is more flexible and less error-prone, and it avoids the quirks and limitations of the AES-128-ECB based KDF. Three classes of cryptographically isolated subkeys are defined: - Per-file keys, like used in v1 policies except for the new KDF. - Per-mode keys. These implement the semantics of the DIRECT_KEY flag, which for v1 policies made the master key be used directly. These are also planned to be used for inline encryption when support for it is added. - Key identifiers (see below). - Each master key is identified by a 16-byte master_key_identifier, which is derived from the key itself using HKDF-SHA512. This prevents users from associating the wrong key with an encrypted file or directory. This was easily possible with v1 policies, which identified the key by an arbitrary 8-byte master_key_descriptor. - The key must be provided in the filesystem-level keyring, not in a process-subscribed keyring. The following UAPI additions are made: - The existing ioctl FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY can now be passed a fscrypt_policy_v2 to set a v2 encryption policy. It's disambiguated from fscrypt_policy/fscrypt_policy_v1 by the version code prefix. - A new ioctl FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX is added. It allows getting the v1 or v2 encryption policy of an encrypted file or directory. The existing FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY ioctl could not be used because it did not have a way for userspace to indicate which policy structure is expected. The new ioctl includes a size field, so it is extensible to future fscrypt policy versions. - The ioctls FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY, and FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS now support managing keys for v2 encryption policies. Such keys are kept logically separate from keys for v1 encryption policies, and are identified by 'identifier' rather than by 'descriptor'. The 'identifier' need not be provided when adding a key, since the kernel will calculate it anyway. This patch temporarily keeps adding/removing v2 policy keys behind the same permission check done for adding/removing v1 policy keys: capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN). However, the next patch will carefully take advantage of the cryptographically secure master_key_identifier to allow non-root users to add/remove v2 policy keys, thus providing a full replacement for v1 policies. (*) Actually, in the API fscrypt_policy::version is 0 while on-disk fscrypt_context::format is 1. But I believe it makes the most sense to advance both to '2' to have them be in sync, and to consider the numbering to start at 1 except for the API quirk. Reviewed-by: Paul Crowley <paulcrowley@google.com> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-08-05 05:35:47 +03:00
#define FSCRYPT_CONTEXT_V1 1
#define FSCRYPT_CONTEXT_V2 2
fscrypt: remove kernel-internal constants from UAPI header There isn't really any valid reason to use __FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX or FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID in a userspace program. These constants are only meant to be used by the kernel internally, and they are defined in the UAPI header next to the mode numbers and flags only so that kernel developers don't forget to update them when adding new modes or flags. In https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201005074133.1958633-2-satyat@google.com there was an example of someone wanting to use __FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX in a user program, and it was wrong because the program would have broken if __FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX were ever increased. So having this definition available is harmful. FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID has the same problem. So, remove these definitions from the UAPI header. Replace FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID with just listing the valid flags explicitly in the one kernel function that needs it. Move __FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX to fscrypt_private.h, remove the double underscores (which were only present to discourage use by userspace), and add a BUILD_BUG_ON() and comments to (hopefully) ensure it is kept in sync. Keep the old name FS_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID, since it's been around for longer and there's a greater chance that removing it would break source compatibility with some program. Indeed, mtd-utils is using it in an #ifdef, and removing it would introduce compiler warnings (about FS_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_* being redefined) into the mtd-utils build. However, reduce its value to 0x07 so that it only includes the flags with old names (the ones present before Linux 5.4), and try to make it clear that it's now "frozen" and no new flags should be added to it. Fixes: 2336d0deb2d4 ("fscrypt: use FSCRYPT_ prefix for uapi constants") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.4+ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201024005132.495952-1-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2020-10-24 03:51:31 +03:00
/* Keep this in sync with include/uapi/linux/fscrypt.h */
#define FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX FSCRYPT_MODE_AES_256_HCTR2
fscrypt: remove kernel-internal constants from UAPI header There isn't really any valid reason to use __FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX or FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID in a userspace program. These constants are only meant to be used by the kernel internally, and they are defined in the UAPI header next to the mode numbers and flags only so that kernel developers don't forget to update them when adding new modes or flags. In https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201005074133.1958633-2-satyat@google.com there was an example of someone wanting to use __FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX in a user program, and it was wrong because the program would have broken if __FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX were ever increased. So having this definition available is harmful. FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID has the same problem. So, remove these definitions from the UAPI header. Replace FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID with just listing the valid flags explicitly in the one kernel function that needs it. Move __FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX to fscrypt_private.h, remove the double underscores (which were only present to discourage use by userspace), and add a BUILD_BUG_ON() and comments to (hopefully) ensure it is kept in sync. Keep the old name FS_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID, since it's been around for longer and there's a greater chance that removing it would break source compatibility with some program. Indeed, mtd-utils is using it in an #ifdef, and removing it would introduce compiler warnings (about FS_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_* being redefined) into the mtd-utils build. However, reduce its value to 0x07 so that it only includes the flags with old names (the ones present before Linux 5.4), and try to make it clear that it's now "frozen" and no new flags should be added to it. Fixes: 2336d0deb2d4 ("fscrypt: use FSCRYPT_ prefix for uapi constants") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.4+ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201024005132.495952-1-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2020-10-24 03:51:31 +03:00
fscrypt: v2 encryption policy support Add a new fscrypt policy version, "v2". It has the following changes from the original policy version, which we call "v1" (*): - Master keys (the user-provided encryption keys) are only ever used as input to HKDF-SHA512. This is more flexible and less error-prone, and it avoids the quirks and limitations of the AES-128-ECB based KDF. Three classes of cryptographically isolated subkeys are defined: - Per-file keys, like used in v1 policies except for the new KDF. - Per-mode keys. These implement the semantics of the DIRECT_KEY flag, which for v1 policies made the master key be used directly. These are also planned to be used for inline encryption when support for it is added. - Key identifiers (see below). - Each master key is identified by a 16-byte master_key_identifier, which is derived from the key itself using HKDF-SHA512. This prevents users from associating the wrong key with an encrypted file or directory. This was easily possible with v1 policies, which identified the key by an arbitrary 8-byte master_key_descriptor. - The key must be provided in the filesystem-level keyring, not in a process-subscribed keyring. The following UAPI additions are made: - The existing ioctl FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY can now be passed a fscrypt_policy_v2 to set a v2 encryption policy. It's disambiguated from fscrypt_policy/fscrypt_policy_v1 by the version code prefix. - A new ioctl FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX is added. It allows getting the v1 or v2 encryption policy of an encrypted file or directory. The existing FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY ioctl could not be used because it did not have a way for userspace to indicate which policy structure is expected. The new ioctl includes a size field, so it is extensible to future fscrypt policy versions. - The ioctls FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY, and FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS now support managing keys for v2 encryption policies. Such keys are kept logically separate from keys for v1 encryption policies, and are identified by 'identifier' rather than by 'descriptor'. The 'identifier' need not be provided when adding a key, since the kernel will calculate it anyway. This patch temporarily keeps adding/removing v2 policy keys behind the same permission check done for adding/removing v1 policy keys: capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN). However, the next patch will carefully take advantage of the cryptographically secure master_key_identifier to allow non-root users to add/remove v2 policy keys, thus providing a full replacement for v1 policies. (*) Actually, in the API fscrypt_policy::version is 0 while on-disk fscrypt_context::format is 1. But I believe it makes the most sense to advance both to '2' to have them be in sync, and to consider the numbering to start at 1 except for the API quirk. Reviewed-by: Paul Crowley <paulcrowley@google.com> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-08-05 05:35:47 +03:00
struct fscrypt_context_v1 {
u8 version; /* FSCRYPT_CONTEXT_V1 */
u8 contents_encryption_mode;
u8 filenames_encryption_mode;
u8 flags;
u8 master_key_descriptor[FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE];
u8 nonce[FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE];
fscrypt: v2 encryption policy support Add a new fscrypt policy version, "v2". It has the following changes from the original policy version, which we call "v1" (*): - Master keys (the user-provided encryption keys) are only ever used as input to HKDF-SHA512. This is more flexible and less error-prone, and it avoids the quirks and limitations of the AES-128-ECB based KDF. Three classes of cryptographically isolated subkeys are defined: - Per-file keys, like used in v1 policies except for the new KDF. - Per-mode keys. These implement the semantics of the DIRECT_KEY flag, which for v1 policies made the master key be used directly. These are also planned to be used for inline encryption when support for it is added. - Key identifiers (see below). - Each master key is identified by a 16-byte master_key_identifier, which is derived from the key itself using HKDF-SHA512. This prevents users from associating the wrong key with an encrypted file or directory. This was easily possible with v1 policies, which identified the key by an arbitrary 8-byte master_key_descriptor. - The key must be provided in the filesystem-level keyring, not in a process-subscribed keyring. The following UAPI additions are made: - The existing ioctl FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY can now be passed a fscrypt_policy_v2 to set a v2 encryption policy. It's disambiguated from fscrypt_policy/fscrypt_policy_v1 by the version code prefix. - A new ioctl FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX is added. It allows getting the v1 or v2 encryption policy of an encrypted file or directory. The existing FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY ioctl could not be used because it did not have a way for userspace to indicate which policy structure is expected. The new ioctl includes a size field, so it is extensible to future fscrypt policy versions. - The ioctls FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY, and FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS now support managing keys for v2 encryption policies. Such keys are kept logically separate from keys for v1 encryption policies, and are identified by 'identifier' rather than by 'descriptor'. The 'identifier' need not be provided when adding a key, since the kernel will calculate it anyway. This patch temporarily keeps adding/removing v2 policy keys behind the same permission check done for adding/removing v1 policy keys: capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN). However, the next patch will carefully take advantage of the cryptographically secure master_key_identifier to allow non-root users to add/remove v2 policy keys, thus providing a full replacement for v1 policies. (*) Actually, in the API fscrypt_policy::version is 0 while on-disk fscrypt_context::format is 1. But I believe it makes the most sense to advance both to '2' to have them be in sync, and to consider the numbering to start at 1 except for the API quirk. Reviewed-by: Paul Crowley <paulcrowley@google.com> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-08-05 05:35:47 +03:00
};
fscrypt: v2 encryption policy support Add a new fscrypt policy version, "v2". It has the following changes from the original policy version, which we call "v1" (*): - Master keys (the user-provided encryption keys) are only ever used as input to HKDF-SHA512. This is more flexible and less error-prone, and it avoids the quirks and limitations of the AES-128-ECB based KDF. Three classes of cryptographically isolated subkeys are defined: - Per-file keys, like used in v1 policies except for the new KDF. - Per-mode keys. These implement the semantics of the DIRECT_KEY flag, which for v1 policies made the master key be used directly. These are also planned to be used for inline encryption when support for it is added. - Key identifiers (see below). - Each master key is identified by a 16-byte master_key_identifier, which is derived from the key itself using HKDF-SHA512. This prevents users from associating the wrong key with an encrypted file or directory. This was easily possible with v1 policies, which identified the key by an arbitrary 8-byte master_key_descriptor. - The key must be provided in the filesystem-level keyring, not in a process-subscribed keyring. The following UAPI additions are made: - The existing ioctl FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY can now be passed a fscrypt_policy_v2 to set a v2 encryption policy. It's disambiguated from fscrypt_policy/fscrypt_policy_v1 by the version code prefix. - A new ioctl FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX is added. It allows getting the v1 or v2 encryption policy of an encrypted file or directory. The existing FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY ioctl could not be used because it did not have a way for userspace to indicate which policy structure is expected. The new ioctl includes a size field, so it is extensible to future fscrypt policy versions. - The ioctls FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY, and FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS now support managing keys for v2 encryption policies. Such keys are kept logically separate from keys for v1 encryption policies, and are identified by 'identifier' rather than by 'descriptor'. The 'identifier' need not be provided when adding a key, since the kernel will calculate it anyway. This patch temporarily keeps adding/removing v2 policy keys behind the same permission check done for adding/removing v1 policy keys: capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN). However, the next patch will carefully take advantage of the cryptographically secure master_key_identifier to allow non-root users to add/remove v2 policy keys, thus providing a full replacement for v1 policies. (*) Actually, in the API fscrypt_policy::version is 0 while on-disk fscrypt_context::format is 1. But I believe it makes the most sense to advance both to '2' to have them be in sync, and to consider the numbering to start at 1 except for the API quirk. Reviewed-by: Paul Crowley <paulcrowley@google.com> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-08-05 05:35:47 +03:00
struct fscrypt_context_v2 {
u8 version; /* FSCRYPT_CONTEXT_V2 */
u8 contents_encryption_mode;
u8 filenames_encryption_mode;
u8 flags;
fscrypt: support crypto data unit size less than filesystem block size Until now, fscrypt has always used the filesystem block size as the granularity of file contents encryption. Two scenarios have come up where a sub-block granularity of contents encryption would be useful: 1. Inline crypto hardware that only supports a crypto data unit size that is less than the filesystem block size. 2. Support for direct I/O at a granularity less than the filesystem block size, for example at the block device's logical block size in order to match the traditional direct I/O alignment requirement. (1) first came up with older eMMC inline crypto hardware that only supports a crypto data unit size of 512 bytes. That specific case ultimately went away because all systems with that hardware continued using out of tree code and never actually upgraded to the upstream inline crypto framework. But, now it's coming back in a new way: some current UFS controllers only support a data unit size of 4096 bytes, and there is a proposal to increase the filesystem block size to 16K. (2) was discussed as a "nice to have" feature, though not essential, when support for direct I/O on encrypted files was being upstreamed. Still, the fact that this feature has come up several times does suggest it would be wise to have available. Therefore, this patch implements it by using one of the reserved bytes in fscrypt_policy_v2 to allow users to select a sub-block data unit size. Supported data unit sizes are powers of 2 between 512 and the filesystem block size, inclusively. Support is implemented for both the FS-layer and inline crypto cases. This patch focuses on the basic support for sub-block data units. Some things are out of scope for this patch but may be addressed later: - Supporting sub-block data units in combination with FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_64, in most cases. Unfortunately this combination usually causes data unit indices to exceed 32 bits, and thus fscrypt_supported_policy() correctly disallows it. The users who potentially need this combination are using f2fs. To support it, f2fs would need to provide an option to slightly reduce its max file size. - Supporting sub-block data units in combination with FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_32. This has the same problem described above, but also it will need special code to make DUN wraparound still happen on a FS block boundary. - Supporting use case (2) mentioned above. The encrypted direct I/O code will need to stop requiring and assuming FS block alignment. This won't be hard, but it belongs in a separate patch. - Supporting this feature on filesystems other than ext4 and f2fs. (Filesystems declare support for it via their fscrypt_operations.) On UBIFS, sub-block data units don't make sense because UBIFS encrypts variable-length blocks as a result of compression. CephFS could support it, but a bit more work would be needed to make the fscrypt_*_block_inplace functions play nicely with sub-block data units. I don't think there's a use case for this on CephFS anyway. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230925055451.59499-6-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2023-09-25 08:54:51 +03:00
u8 log2_data_unit_size;
u8 __reserved[3];
fscrypt: v2 encryption policy support Add a new fscrypt policy version, "v2". It has the following changes from the original policy version, which we call "v1" (*): - Master keys (the user-provided encryption keys) are only ever used as input to HKDF-SHA512. This is more flexible and less error-prone, and it avoids the quirks and limitations of the AES-128-ECB based KDF. Three classes of cryptographically isolated subkeys are defined: - Per-file keys, like used in v1 policies except for the new KDF. - Per-mode keys. These implement the semantics of the DIRECT_KEY flag, which for v1 policies made the master key be used directly. These are also planned to be used for inline encryption when support for it is added. - Key identifiers (see below). - Each master key is identified by a 16-byte master_key_identifier, which is derived from the key itself using HKDF-SHA512. This prevents users from associating the wrong key with an encrypted file or directory. This was easily possible with v1 policies, which identified the key by an arbitrary 8-byte master_key_descriptor. - The key must be provided in the filesystem-level keyring, not in a process-subscribed keyring. The following UAPI additions are made: - The existing ioctl FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY can now be passed a fscrypt_policy_v2 to set a v2 encryption policy. It's disambiguated from fscrypt_policy/fscrypt_policy_v1 by the version code prefix. - A new ioctl FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX is added. It allows getting the v1 or v2 encryption policy of an encrypted file or directory. The existing FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY ioctl could not be used because it did not have a way for userspace to indicate which policy structure is expected. The new ioctl includes a size field, so it is extensible to future fscrypt policy versions. - The ioctls FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY, and FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS now support managing keys for v2 encryption policies. Such keys are kept logically separate from keys for v1 encryption policies, and are identified by 'identifier' rather than by 'descriptor'. The 'identifier' need not be provided when adding a key, since the kernel will calculate it anyway. This patch temporarily keeps adding/removing v2 policy keys behind the same permission check done for adding/removing v1 policy keys: capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN). However, the next patch will carefully take advantage of the cryptographically secure master_key_identifier to allow non-root users to add/remove v2 policy keys, thus providing a full replacement for v1 policies. (*) Actually, in the API fscrypt_policy::version is 0 while on-disk fscrypt_context::format is 1. But I believe it makes the most sense to advance both to '2' to have them be in sync, and to consider the numbering to start at 1 except for the API quirk. Reviewed-by: Paul Crowley <paulcrowley@google.com> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-08-05 05:35:47 +03:00
u8 master_key_identifier[FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE];
u8 nonce[FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE];
fscrypt: v2 encryption policy support Add a new fscrypt policy version, "v2". It has the following changes from the original policy version, which we call "v1" (*): - Master keys (the user-provided encryption keys) are only ever used as input to HKDF-SHA512. This is more flexible and less error-prone, and it avoids the quirks and limitations of the AES-128-ECB based KDF. Three classes of cryptographically isolated subkeys are defined: - Per-file keys, like used in v1 policies except for the new KDF. - Per-mode keys. These implement the semantics of the DIRECT_KEY flag, which for v1 policies made the master key be used directly. These are also planned to be used for inline encryption when support for it is added. - Key identifiers (see below). - Each master key is identified by a 16-byte master_key_identifier, which is derived from the key itself using HKDF-SHA512. This prevents users from associating the wrong key with an encrypted file or directory. This was easily possible with v1 policies, which identified the key by an arbitrary 8-byte master_key_descriptor. - The key must be provided in the filesystem-level keyring, not in a process-subscribed keyring. The following UAPI additions are made: - The existing ioctl FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY can now be passed a fscrypt_policy_v2 to set a v2 encryption policy. It's disambiguated from fscrypt_policy/fscrypt_policy_v1 by the version code prefix. - A new ioctl FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX is added. It allows getting the v1 or v2 encryption policy of an encrypted file or directory. The existing FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY ioctl could not be used because it did not have a way for userspace to indicate which policy structure is expected. The new ioctl includes a size field, so it is extensible to future fscrypt policy versions. - The ioctls FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY, and FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS now support managing keys for v2 encryption policies. Such keys are kept logically separate from keys for v1 encryption policies, and are identified by 'identifier' rather than by 'descriptor'. The 'identifier' need not be provided when adding a key, since the kernel will calculate it anyway. This patch temporarily keeps adding/removing v2 policy keys behind the same permission check done for adding/removing v1 policy keys: capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN). However, the next patch will carefully take advantage of the cryptographically secure master_key_identifier to allow non-root users to add/remove v2 policy keys, thus providing a full replacement for v1 policies. (*) Actually, in the API fscrypt_policy::version is 0 while on-disk fscrypt_context::format is 1. But I believe it makes the most sense to advance both to '2' to have them be in sync, and to consider the numbering to start at 1 except for the API quirk. Reviewed-by: Paul Crowley <paulcrowley@google.com> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-08-05 05:35:47 +03:00
};
/*
fscrypt: v2 encryption policy support Add a new fscrypt policy version, "v2". It has the following changes from the original policy version, which we call "v1" (*): - Master keys (the user-provided encryption keys) are only ever used as input to HKDF-SHA512. This is more flexible and less error-prone, and it avoids the quirks and limitations of the AES-128-ECB based KDF. Three classes of cryptographically isolated subkeys are defined: - Per-file keys, like used in v1 policies except for the new KDF. - Per-mode keys. These implement the semantics of the DIRECT_KEY flag, which for v1 policies made the master key be used directly. These are also planned to be used for inline encryption when support for it is added. - Key identifiers (see below). - Each master key is identified by a 16-byte master_key_identifier, which is derived from the key itself using HKDF-SHA512. This prevents users from associating the wrong key with an encrypted file or directory. This was easily possible with v1 policies, which identified the key by an arbitrary 8-byte master_key_descriptor. - The key must be provided in the filesystem-level keyring, not in a process-subscribed keyring. The following UAPI additions are made: - The existing ioctl FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY can now be passed a fscrypt_policy_v2 to set a v2 encryption policy. It's disambiguated from fscrypt_policy/fscrypt_policy_v1 by the version code prefix. - A new ioctl FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX is added. It allows getting the v1 or v2 encryption policy of an encrypted file or directory. The existing FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY ioctl could not be used because it did not have a way for userspace to indicate which policy structure is expected. The new ioctl includes a size field, so it is extensible to future fscrypt policy versions. - The ioctls FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY, and FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS now support managing keys for v2 encryption policies. Such keys are kept logically separate from keys for v1 encryption policies, and are identified by 'identifier' rather than by 'descriptor'. The 'identifier' need not be provided when adding a key, since the kernel will calculate it anyway. This patch temporarily keeps adding/removing v2 policy keys behind the same permission check done for adding/removing v1 policy keys: capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN). However, the next patch will carefully take advantage of the cryptographically secure master_key_identifier to allow non-root users to add/remove v2 policy keys, thus providing a full replacement for v1 policies. (*) Actually, in the API fscrypt_policy::version is 0 while on-disk fscrypt_context::format is 1. But I believe it makes the most sense to advance both to '2' to have them be in sync, and to consider the numbering to start at 1 except for the API quirk. Reviewed-by: Paul Crowley <paulcrowley@google.com> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-08-05 05:35:47 +03:00
* fscrypt_context - the encryption context of an inode
*
* This is the on-disk equivalent of an fscrypt_policy, stored alongside each
* encrypted file usually in a hidden extended attribute. It contains the
* fields from the fscrypt_policy, in order to identify the encryption algorithm
* and key with which the file is encrypted. It also contains a nonce that was
* randomly generated by fscrypt itself; this is used as KDF input or as a tweak
* to cause different files to be encrypted differently.
*/
union fscrypt_context {
u8 version;
struct fscrypt_context_v1 v1;
struct fscrypt_context_v2 v2;
};
/*
* Return the size expected for the given fscrypt_context based on its version
* number, or 0 if the context version is unrecognized.
*/
static inline int fscrypt_context_size(const union fscrypt_context *ctx)
{
switch (ctx->version) {
case FSCRYPT_CONTEXT_V1:
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(ctx->v1) != 28);
return sizeof(ctx->v1);
case FSCRYPT_CONTEXT_V2:
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(ctx->v2) != 40);
return sizeof(ctx->v2);
}
return 0;
}
/* Check whether an fscrypt_context has a recognized version number and size */
static inline bool fscrypt_context_is_valid(const union fscrypt_context *ctx,
int ctx_size)
{
return ctx_size >= 1 && ctx_size == fscrypt_context_size(ctx);
}
/* Retrieve the context's nonce, assuming the context was already validated */
static inline const u8 *fscrypt_context_nonce(const union fscrypt_context *ctx)
{
switch (ctx->version) {
case FSCRYPT_CONTEXT_V1:
return ctx->v1.nonce;
case FSCRYPT_CONTEXT_V2:
return ctx->v2.nonce;
}
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
return NULL;
}
fscrypt: v2 encryption policy support Add a new fscrypt policy version, "v2". It has the following changes from the original policy version, which we call "v1" (*): - Master keys (the user-provided encryption keys) are only ever used as input to HKDF-SHA512. This is more flexible and less error-prone, and it avoids the quirks and limitations of the AES-128-ECB based KDF. Three classes of cryptographically isolated subkeys are defined: - Per-file keys, like used in v1 policies except for the new KDF. - Per-mode keys. These implement the semantics of the DIRECT_KEY flag, which for v1 policies made the master key be used directly. These are also planned to be used for inline encryption when support for it is added. - Key identifiers (see below). - Each master key is identified by a 16-byte master_key_identifier, which is derived from the key itself using HKDF-SHA512. This prevents users from associating the wrong key with an encrypted file or directory. This was easily possible with v1 policies, which identified the key by an arbitrary 8-byte master_key_descriptor. - The key must be provided in the filesystem-level keyring, not in a process-subscribed keyring. The following UAPI additions are made: - The existing ioctl FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY can now be passed a fscrypt_policy_v2 to set a v2 encryption policy. It's disambiguated from fscrypt_policy/fscrypt_policy_v1 by the version code prefix. - A new ioctl FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX is added. It allows getting the v1 or v2 encryption policy of an encrypted file or directory. The existing FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY ioctl could not be used because it did not have a way for userspace to indicate which policy structure is expected. The new ioctl includes a size field, so it is extensible to future fscrypt policy versions. - The ioctls FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY, and FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS now support managing keys for v2 encryption policies. Such keys are kept logically separate from keys for v1 encryption policies, and are identified by 'identifier' rather than by 'descriptor'. The 'identifier' need not be provided when adding a key, since the kernel will calculate it anyway. This patch temporarily keeps adding/removing v2 policy keys behind the same permission check done for adding/removing v1 policy keys: capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN). However, the next patch will carefully take advantage of the cryptographically secure master_key_identifier to allow non-root users to add/remove v2 policy keys, thus providing a full replacement for v1 policies. (*) Actually, in the API fscrypt_policy::version is 0 while on-disk fscrypt_context::format is 1. But I believe it makes the most sense to advance both to '2' to have them be in sync, and to consider the numbering to start at 1 except for the API quirk. Reviewed-by: Paul Crowley <paulcrowley@google.com> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-08-05 05:35:47 +03:00
union fscrypt_policy {
u8 version;
struct fscrypt_policy_v1 v1;
struct fscrypt_policy_v2 v2;
};
/*
* Return the size expected for the given fscrypt_policy based on its version
* number, or 0 if the policy version is unrecognized.
*/
static inline int fscrypt_policy_size(const union fscrypt_policy *policy)
{
switch (policy->version) {
case FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1:
return sizeof(policy->v1);
case FSCRYPT_POLICY_V2:
return sizeof(policy->v2);
}
return 0;
}
/* Return the contents encryption mode of a valid encryption policy */
static inline u8
fscrypt_policy_contents_mode(const union fscrypt_policy *policy)
{
switch (policy->version) {
case FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1:
return policy->v1.contents_encryption_mode;
case FSCRYPT_POLICY_V2:
return policy->v2.contents_encryption_mode;
}
BUG();
}
/* Return the filenames encryption mode of a valid encryption policy */
static inline u8
fscrypt_policy_fnames_mode(const union fscrypt_policy *policy)
{
switch (policy->version) {
case FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1:
return policy->v1.filenames_encryption_mode;
case FSCRYPT_POLICY_V2:
return policy->v2.filenames_encryption_mode;
}
BUG();
}
/* Return the flags (FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG*) of a valid encryption policy */
static inline u8
fscrypt_policy_flags(const union fscrypt_policy *policy)
{
switch (policy->version) {
case FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1:
return policy->v1.flags;
case FSCRYPT_POLICY_V2:
return policy->v2.flags;
}
BUG();
}
fscrypt: support crypto data unit size less than filesystem block size Until now, fscrypt has always used the filesystem block size as the granularity of file contents encryption. Two scenarios have come up where a sub-block granularity of contents encryption would be useful: 1. Inline crypto hardware that only supports a crypto data unit size that is less than the filesystem block size. 2. Support for direct I/O at a granularity less than the filesystem block size, for example at the block device's logical block size in order to match the traditional direct I/O alignment requirement. (1) first came up with older eMMC inline crypto hardware that only supports a crypto data unit size of 512 bytes. That specific case ultimately went away because all systems with that hardware continued using out of tree code and never actually upgraded to the upstream inline crypto framework. But, now it's coming back in a new way: some current UFS controllers only support a data unit size of 4096 bytes, and there is a proposal to increase the filesystem block size to 16K. (2) was discussed as a "nice to have" feature, though not essential, when support for direct I/O on encrypted files was being upstreamed. Still, the fact that this feature has come up several times does suggest it would be wise to have available. Therefore, this patch implements it by using one of the reserved bytes in fscrypt_policy_v2 to allow users to select a sub-block data unit size. Supported data unit sizes are powers of 2 between 512 and the filesystem block size, inclusively. Support is implemented for both the FS-layer and inline crypto cases. This patch focuses on the basic support for sub-block data units. Some things are out of scope for this patch but may be addressed later: - Supporting sub-block data units in combination with FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_64, in most cases. Unfortunately this combination usually causes data unit indices to exceed 32 bits, and thus fscrypt_supported_policy() correctly disallows it. The users who potentially need this combination are using f2fs. To support it, f2fs would need to provide an option to slightly reduce its max file size. - Supporting sub-block data units in combination with FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_32. This has the same problem described above, but also it will need special code to make DUN wraparound still happen on a FS block boundary. - Supporting use case (2) mentioned above. The encrypted direct I/O code will need to stop requiring and assuming FS block alignment. This won't be hard, but it belongs in a separate patch. - Supporting this feature on filesystems other than ext4 and f2fs. (Filesystems declare support for it via their fscrypt_operations.) On UBIFS, sub-block data units don't make sense because UBIFS encrypts variable-length blocks as a result of compression. CephFS could support it, but a bit more work would be needed to make the fscrypt_*_block_inplace functions play nicely with sub-block data units. I don't think there's a use case for this on CephFS anyway. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230925055451.59499-6-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2023-09-25 08:54:51 +03:00
static inline int
fscrypt_policy_v2_du_bits(const struct fscrypt_policy_v2 *policy,
const struct inode *inode)
{
return policy->log2_data_unit_size ?: inode->i_blkbits;
}
static inline int
fscrypt_policy_du_bits(const union fscrypt_policy *policy,
const struct inode *inode)
{
switch (policy->version) {
case FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1:
return inode->i_blkbits;
case FSCRYPT_POLICY_V2:
return fscrypt_policy_v2_du_bits(&policy->v2, inode);
}
BUG();
}
/*
* For encrypted symlinks, the ciphertext length is stored at the beginning
* of the string in little-endian format.
*/
struct fscrypt_symlink_data {
__le16 len;
char encrypted_path[];
} __packed;
fscrypt: add inline encryption support Add support for inline encryption to fs/crypto/. With "inline encryption", the block layer handles the decryption/encryption as part of the bio, instead of the filesystem doing the crypto itself via Linux's crypto API. This model is needed in order to take advantage of the inline encryption hardware present on most modern mobile SoCs. To use inline encryption, the filesystem needs to be mounted with '-o inlinecrypt'. Blk-crypto will then be used instead of the traditional filesystem-layer crypto whenever possible to encrypt the contents of any encrypted files in that filesystem. Fscrypt still provides the key and IV to use, and the actual ciphertext on-disk is still the same; therefore it's testable using the existing fscrypt ciphertext verification tests. Note that since blk-crypto has a fallback to Linux's crypto API, and also supports all the encryption modes currently supported by fscrypt, this feature is usable and testable even without actual inline encryption hardware. Per-filesystem changes will be needed to set encryption contexts when submitting bios and to implement the 'inlinecrypt' mount option. This patch just adds the common code. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200702015607.1215430-3-satyat@google.com Co-developed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2020-07-02 04:56:05 +03:00
/**
* struct fscrypt_prepared_key - a key prepared for actual encryption/decryption
* @tfm: crypto API transform object
* @blk_key: key for blk-crypto
*
* Normally only one of the fields will be non-NULL.
*/
struct fscrypt_prepared_key {
struct crypto_skcipher *tfm;
#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION_INLINE_CRYPT
struct blk_crypto_key *blk_key;
fscrypt: add inline encryption support Add support for inline encryption to fs/crypto/. With "inline encryption", the block layer handles the decryption/encryption as part of the bio, instead of the filesystem doing the crypto itself via Linux's crypto API. This model is needed in order to take advantage of the inline encryption hardware present on most modern mobile SoCs. To use inline encryption, the filesystem needs to be mounted with '-o inlinecrypt'. Blk-crypto will then be used instead of the traditional filesystem-layer crypto whenever possible to encrypt the contents of any encrypted files in that filesystem. Fscrypt still provides the key and IV to use, and the actual ciphertext on-disk is still the same; therefore it's testable using the existing fscrypt ciphertext verification tests. Note that since blk-crypto has a fallback to Linux's crypto API, and also supports all the encryption modes currently supported by fscrypt, this feature is usable and testable even without actual inline encryption hardware. Per-filesystem changes will be needed to set encryption contexts when submitting bios and to implement the 'inlinecrypt' mount option. This patch just adds the common code. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200702015607.1215430-3-satyat@google.com Co-developed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2020-07-02 04:56:05 +03:00
#endif
};
/*
* fscrypt_inode_info - the "encryption key" for an inode
fscrypt: add Adiantum support Add support for the Adiantum encryption mode to fscrypt. Adiantum is a tweakable, length-preserving encryption mode with security provably reducible to that of XChaCha12 and AES-256, subject to a security bound. It's also a true wide-block mode, unlike XTS. See the paper "Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for entry-level processors" (https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.pdf) for more details. Also see commit 059c2a4d8e16 ("crypto: adiantum - add Adiantum support"). On sufficiently long messages, Adiantum's bottlenecks are XChaCha12 and the NH hash function. These algorithms are fast even on processors without dedicated crypto instructions. Adiantum makes it feasible to enable storage encryption on low-end mobile devices that lack AES instructions; currently such devices are unencrypted. On ARM Cortex-A7, on 4096-byte messages Adiantum encryption is about 4 times faster than AES-256-XTS encryption; decryption is about 5 times faster. In fscrypt, Adiantum is suitable for encrypting both file contents and names. With filenames, it fixes a known weakness: when two filenames in a directory share a common prefix of >= 16 bytes, with CTS-CBC their encrypted filenames share a common prefix too, leaking information. Adiantum does not have this problem. Since Adiantum also accepts long tweaks (IVs), it's also safe to use the master key directly for Adiantum encryption rather than deriving per-file keys, provided that the per-file nonce is included in the IVs and the master key isn't used for any other encryption mode. This configuration saves memory and improves performance. A new fscrypt policy flag is added to allow users to opt-in to this configuration. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
2019-01-06 16:36:21 +03:00
*
* When an encrypted file's key is made available, an instance of this struct is
* allocated and stored in ->i_crypt_info. Once created, it remains until the
* inode is evicted.
*/
struct fscrypt_inode_info {
fscrypt: add Adiantum support Add support for the Adiantum encryption mode to fscrypt. Adiantum is a tweakable, length-preserving encryption mode with security provably reducible to that of XChaCha12 and AES-256, subject to a security bound. It's also a true wide-block mode, unlike XTS. See the paper "Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for entry-level processors" (https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.pdf) for more details. Also see commit 059c2a4d8e16 ("crypto: adiantum - add Adiantum support"). On sufficiently long messages, Adiantum's bottlenecks are XChaCha12 and the NH hash function. These algorithms are fast even on processors without dedicated crypto instructions. Adiantum makes it feasible to enable storage encryption on low-end mobile devices that lack AES instructions; currently such devices are unencrypted. On ARM Cortex-A7, on 4096-byte messages Adiantum encryption is about 4 times faster than AES-256-XTS encryption; decryption is about 5 times faster. In fscrypt, Adiantum is suitable for encrypting both file contents and names. With filenames, it fixes a known weakness: when two filenames in a directory share a common prefix of >= 16 bytes, with CTS-CBC their encrypted filenames share a common prefix too, leaking information. Adiantum does not have this problem. Since Adiantum also accepts long tweaks (IVs), it's also safe to use the master key directly for Adiantum encryption rather than deriving per-file keys, provided that the per-file nonce is included in the IVs and the master key isn't used for any other encryption mode. This configuration saves memory and improves performance. A new fscrypt policy flag is added to allow users to opt-in to this configuration. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
2019-01-06 16:36:21 +03:00
fscrypt: add inline encryption support Add support for inline encryption to fs/crypto/. With "inline encryption", the block layer handles the decryption/encryption as part of the bio, instead of the filesystem doing the crypto itself via Linux's crypto API. This model is needed in order to take advantage of the inline encryption hardware present on most modern mobile SoCs. To use inline encryption, the filesystem needs to be mounted with '-o inlinecrypt'. Blk-crypto will then be used instead of the traditional filesystem-layer crypto whenever possible to encrypt the contents of any encrypted files in that filesystem. Fscrypt still provides the key and IV to use, and the actual ciphertext on-disk is still the same; therefore it's testable using the existing fscrypt ciphertext verification tests. Note that since blk-crypto has a fallback to Linux's crypto API, and also supports all the encryption modes currently supported by fscrypt, this feature is usable and testable even without actual inline encryption hardware. Per-filesystem changes will be needed to set encryption contexts when submitting bios and to implement the 'inlinecrypt' mount option. This patch just adds the common code. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200702015607.1215430-3-satyat@google.com Co-developed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2020-07-02 04:56:05 +03:00
/* The key in a form prepared for actual encryption/decryption */
struct fscrypt_prepared_key ci_enc_key;
fscrypt: add Adiantum support Add support for the Adiantum encryption mode to fscrypt. Adiantum is a tweakable, length-preserving encryption mode with security provably reducible to that of XChaCha12 and AES-256, subject to a security bound. It's also a true wide-block mode, unlike XTS. See the paper "Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for entry-level processors" (https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.pdf) for more details. Also see commit 059c2a4d8e16 ("crypto: adiantum - add Adiantum support"). On sufficiently long messages, Adiantum's bottlenecks are XChaCha12 and the NH hash function. These algorithms are fast even on processors without dedicated crypto instructions. Adiantum makes it feasible to enable storage encryption on low-end mobile devices that lack AES instructions; currently such devices are unencrypted. On ARM Cortex-A7, on 4096-byte messages Adiantum encryption is about 4 times faster than AES-256-XTS encryption; decryption is about 5 times faster. In fscrypt, Adiantum is suitable for encrypting both file contents and names. With filenames, it fixes a known weakness: when two filenames in a directory share a common prefix of >= 16 bytes, with CTS-CBC their encrypted filenames share a common prefix too, leaking information. Adiantum does not have this problem. Since Adiantum also accepts long tweaks (IVs), it's also safe to use the master key directly for Adiantum encryption rather than deriving per-file keys, provided that the per-file nonce is included in the IVs and the master key isn't used for any other encryption mode. This configuration saves memory and improves performance. A new fscrypt policy flag is added to allow users to opt-in to this configuration. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
2019-01-06 16:36:21 +03:00
/* True if ci_enc_key should be freed when this struct is freed */
fscrypt: add support for IV_INO_LBLK_64 policies Inline encryption hardware compliant with the UFS v2.1 standard or with the upcoming version of the eMMC standard has the following properties: (1) Per I/O request, the encryption key is specified by a previously loaded keyslot. There might be only a small number of keyslots. (2) Per I/O request, the starting IV is specified by a 64-bit "data unit number" (DUN). IV bits 64-127 are assumed to be 0. The hardware automatically increments the DUN for each "data unit" of configurable size in the request, e.g. for each filesystem block. Property (1) makes it inefficient to use the traditional fscrypt per-file keys. Property (2) precludes the use of the existing DIRECT_KEY fscrypt policy flag, which needs at least 192 IV bits. Therefore, add a new fscrypt policy flag IV_INO_LBLK_64 which causes the encryption to modified as follows: - The encryption keys are derived from the master key, encryption mode number, and filesystem UUID. - The IVs are chosen as (inode_number << 32) | file_logical_block_num. For filenames encryption, file_logical_block_num is 0. Since the file nonces aren't used in the key derivation, many files may share the same encryption key. This is much more efficient on the target hardware. Including the inode number in the IVs and mixing the filesystem UUID into the keys ensures that data in different files is nevertheless still encrypted differently. Additionally, limiting the inode and block numbers to 32 bits and placing the block number in the low bits maintains compatibility with the 64-bit DUN convention (property (2) above). Since this scheme assumes that inode numbers are stable (which may preclude filesystem shrinking) and that inode and file logical block numbers are at most 32-bit, IV_INO_LBLK_64 will only be allowed on filesystems that meet these constraints. These are acceptable limitations for the cases where this format would actually be used. Note that IV_INO_LBLK_64 is an on-disk format, not an implementation. This patch just adds support for it using the existing filesystem layer encryption. A later patch will add support for inline encryption. Reviewed-by: Paul Crowley <paulcrowley@google.com> Co-developed-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-10-25 00:54:36 +03:00
bool ci_owns_key;
fscrypt: add inline encryption support Add support for inline encryption to fs/crypto/. With "inline encryption", the block layer handles the decryption/encryption as part of the bio, instead of the filesystem doing the crypto itself via Linux's crypto API. This model is needed in order to take advantage of the inline encryption hardware present on most modern mobile SoCs. To use inline encryption, the filesystem needs to be mounted with '-o inlinecrypt'. Blk-crypto will then be used instead of the traditional filesystem-layer crypto whenever possible to encrypt the contents of any encrypted files in that filesystem. Fscrypt still provides the key and IV to use, and the actual ciphertext on-disk is still the same; therefore it's testable using the existing fscrypt ciphertext verification tests. Note that since blk-crypto has a fallback to Linux's crypto API, and also supports all the encryption modes currently supported by fscrypt, this feature is usable and testable even without actual inline encryption hardware. Per-filesystem changes will be needed to set encryption contexts when submitting bios and to implement the 'inlinecrypt' mount option. This patch just adds the common code. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200702015607.1215430-3-satyat@google.com Co-developed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2020-07-02 04:56:05 +03:00
#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION_INLINE_CRYPT
/*
* True if this inode will use inline encryption (blk-crypto) instead of
* the traditional filesystem-layer encryption.
*/
bool ci_inlinecrypt;
#endif
fscrypt: support crypto data unit size less than filesystem block size Until now, fscrypt has always used the filesystem block size as the granularity of file contents encryption. Two scenarios have come up where a sub-block granularity of contents encryption would be useful: 1. Inline crypto hardware that only supports a crypto data unit size that is less than the filesystem block size. 2. Support for direct I/O at a granularity less than the filesystem block size, for example at the block device's logical block size in order to match the traditional direct I/O alignment requirement. (1) first came up with older eMMC inline crypto hardware that only supports a crypto data unit size of 512 bytes. That specific case ultimately went away because all systems with that hardware continued using out of tree code and never actually upgraded to the upstream inline crypto framework. But, now it's coming back in a new way: some current UFS controllers only support a data unit size of 4096 bytes, and there is a proposal to increase the filesystem block size to 16K. (2) was discussed as a "nice to have" feature, though not essential, when support for direct I/O on encrypted files was being upstreamed. Still, the fact that this feature has come up several times does suggest it would be wise to have available. Therefore, this patch implements it by using one of the reserved bytes in fscrypt_policy_v2 to allow users to select a sub-block data unit size. Supported data unit sizes are powers of 2 between 512 and the filesystem block size, inclusively. Support is implemented for both the FS-layer and inline crypto cases. This patch focuses on the basic support for sub-block data units. Some things are out of scope for this patch but may be addressed later: - Supporting sub-block data units in combination with FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_64, in most cases. Unfortunately this combination usually causes data unit indices to exceed 32 bits, and thus fscrypt_supported_policy() correctly disallows it. The users who potentially need this combination are using f2fs. To support it, f2fs would need to provide an option to slightly reduce its max file size. - Supporting sub-block data units in combination with FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_32. This has the same problem described above, but also it will need special code to make DUN wraparound still happen on a FS block boundary. - Supporting use case (2) mentioned above. The encrypted direct I/O code will need to stop requiring and assuming FS block alignment. This won't be hard, but it belongs in a separate patch. - Supporting this feature on filesystems other than ext4 and f2fs. (Filesystems declare support for it via their fscrypt_operations.) On UBIFS, sub-block data units don't make sense because UBIFS encrypts variable-length blocks as a result of compression. CephFS could support it, but a bit more work would be needed to make the fscrypt_*_block_inplace functions play nicely with sub-block data units. I don't think there's a use case for this on CephFS anyway. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230925055451.59499-6-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2023-09-25 08:54:51 +03:00
/*
* log2 of the data unit size (granularity of contents encryption) of
* this file. This is computable from ci_policy and ci_inode but is
* cached here for efficiency. Only used for regular files.
*/
u8 ci_data_unit_bits;
/* Cached value: log2 of number of data units per FS block */
u8 ci_data_units_per_block_bits;
fscrypt: add Adiantum support Add support for the Adiantum encryption mode to fscrypt. Adiantum is a tweakable, length-preserving encryption mode with security provably reducible to that of XChaCha12 and AES-256, subject to a security bound. It's also a true wide-block mode, unlike XTS. See the paper "Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for entry-level processors" (https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.pdf) for more details. Also see commit 059c2a4d8e16 ("crypto: adiantum - add Adiantum support"). On sufficiently long messages, Adiantum's bottlenecks are XChaCha12 and the NH hash function. These algorithms are fast even on processors without dedicated crypto instructions. Adiantum makes it feasible to enable storage encryption on low-end mobile devices that lack AES instructions; currently such devices are unencrypted. On ARM Cortex-A7, on 4096-byte messages Adiantum encryption is about 4 times faster than AES-256-XTS encryption; decryption is about 5 times faster. In fscrypt, Adiantum is suitable for encrypting both file contents and names. With filenames, it fixes a known weakness: when two filenames in a directory share a common prefix of >= 16 bytes, with CTS-CBC their encrypted filenames share a common prefix too, leaking information. Adiantum does not have this problem. Since Adiantum also accepts long tweaks (IVs), it's also safe to use the master key directly for Adiantum encryption rather than deriving per-file keys, provided that the per-file nonce is included in the IVs and the master key isn't used for any other encryption mode. This configuration saves memory and improves performance. A new fscrypt policy flag is added to allow users to opt-in to this configuration. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
2019-01-06 16:36:21 +03:00
/*
fscrypt: v2 encryption policy support Add a new fscrypt policy version, "v2". It has the following changes from the original policy version, which we call "v1" (*): - Master keys (the user-provided encryption keys) are only ever used as input to HKDF-SHA512. This is more flexible and less error-prone, and it avoids the quirks and limitations of the AES-128-ECB based KDF. Three classes of cryptographically isolated subkeys are defined: - Per-file keys, like used in v1 policies except for the new KDF. - Per-mode keys. These implement the semantics of the DIRECT_KEY flag, which for v1 policies made the master key be used directly. These are also planned to be used for inline encryption when support for it is added. - Key identifiers (see below). - Each master key is identified by a 16-byte master_key_identifier, which is derived from the key itself using HKDF-SHA512. This prevents users from associating the wrong key with an encrypted file or directory. This was easily possible with v1 policies, which identified the key by an arbitrary 8-byte master_key_descriptor. - The key must be provided in the filesystem-level keyring, not in a process-subscribed keyring. The following UAPI additions are made: - The existing ioctl FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY can now be passed a fscrypt_policy_v2 to set a v2 encryption policy. It's disambiguated from fscrypt_policy/fscrypt_policy_v1 by the version code prefix. - A new ioctl FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX is added. It allows getting the v1 or v2 encryption policy of an encrypted file or directory. The existing FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY ioctl could not be used because it did not have a way for userspace to indicate which policy structure is expected. The new ioctl includes a size field, so it is extensible to future fscrypt policy versions. - The ioctls FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY, and FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS now support managing keys for v2 encryption policies. Such keys are kept logically separate from keys for v1 encryption policies, and are identified by 'identifier' rather than by 'descriptor'. The 'identifier' need not be provided when adding a key, since the kernel will calculate it anyway. This patch temporarily keeps adding/removing v2 policy keys behind the same permission check done for adding/removing v1 policy keys: capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN). However, the next patch will carefully take advantage of the cryptographically secure master_key_identifier to allow non-root users to add/remove v2 policy keys, thus providing a full replacement for v1 policies. (*) Actually, in the API fscrypt_policy::version is 0 while on-disk fscrypt_context::format is 1. But I believe it makes the most sense to advance both to '2' to have them be in sync, and to consider the numbering to start at 1 except for the API quirk. Reviewed-by: Paul Crowley <paulcrowley@google.com> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-08-05 05:35:47 +03:00
* Encryption mode used for this inode. It corresponds to either the
* contents or filenames encryption mode, depending on the inode type.
fscrypt: add Adiantum support Add support for the Adiantum encryption mode to fscrypt. Adiantum is a tweakable, length-preserving encryption mode with security provably reducible to that of XChaCha12 and AES-256, subject to a security bound. It's also a true wide-block mode, unlike XTS. See the paper "Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for entry-level processors" (https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.pdf) for more details. Also see commit 059c2a4d8e16 ("crypto: adiantum - add Adiantum support"). On sufficiently long messages, Adiantum's bottlenecks are XChaCha12 and the NH hash function. These algorithms are fast even on processors without dedicated crypto instructions. Adiantum makes it feasible to enable storage encryption on low-end mobile devices that lack AES instructions; currently such devices are unencrypted. On ARM Cortex-A7, on 4096-byte messages Adiantum encryption is about 4 times faster than AES-256-XTS encryption; decryption is about 5 times faster. In fscrypt, Adiantum is suitable for encrypting both file contents and names. With filenames, it fixes a known weakness: when two filenames in a directory share a common prefix of >= 16 bytes, with CTS-CBC their encrypted filenames share a common prefix too, leaking information. Adiantum does not have this problem. Since Adiantum also accepts long tweaks (IVs), it's also safe to use the master key directly for Adiantum encryption rather than deriving per-file keys, provided that the per-file nonce is included in the IVs and the master key isn't used for any other encryption mode. This configuration saves memory and improves performance. A new fscrypt policy flag is added to allow users to opt-in to this configuration. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
2019-01-06 16:36:21 +03:00
*/
struct fscrypt_mode *ci_mode;
/* Back-pointer to the inode */
struct inode *ci_inode;
fscrypt: add FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl Add a new fscrypt ioctl, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY. This ioctl removes an encryption key that was added by FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY. It wipes the secret key itself, then "locks" the encrypted files and directories that had been unlocked using that key -- implemented by evicting the relevant dentries and inodes from the VFS caches. The problem this solves is that many fscrypt users want the ability to remove encryption keys, causing the corresponding encrypted directories to appear "locked" (presented in ciphertext form) again. Moreover, users want removing an encryption key to *really* remove it, in the sense that the removed keys cannot be recovered even if kernel memory is compromised, e.g. by the exploit of a kernel security vulnerability or by a physical attack. This is desirable after a user logs out of the system, for example. In many cases users even already assume this to be the case and are surprised to hear when it's not. It is not sufficient to simply unlink the master key from the keyring (or to revoke or invalidate it), since the actual encryption transform objects are still pinned in memory by their inodes. Therefore, to really remove a key we must also evict the relevant inodes. Currently one workaround is to run 'sync && echo 2 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches'. But, that evicts all unused inodes in the system rather than just the inodes associated with the key being removed, causing severe performance problems. Moreover, it requires root privileges, so regular users can't "lock" their encrypted files. Another workaround, used in Chromium OS kernels, is to add a new VFS-level ioctl FS_IOC_DROP_CACHE which is a more restricted version of drop_caches that operates on a single super_block. It does: shrink_dcache_sb(sb); invalidate_inodes(sb, false); But it's still a hack. Yet, the major users of filesystem encryption want this feature badly enough that they are actually using these hacks. To properly solve the problem, start maintaining a list of the inodes which have been "unlocked" using each master key. Originally this wasn't possible because the kernel didn't keep track of in-use master keys at all. But, with the ->s_master_keys keyring it is now possible. Then, add an ioctl FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY. It finds the specified master key in ->s_master_keys, then wipes the secret key itself, which prevents any additional inodes from being unlocked with the key. Then, it syncs the filesystem and evicts the inodes in the key's list. The normal inode eviction code will free and wipe the per-file keys (in ->i_crypt_info). Note that freeing ->i_crypt_info without evicting the inodes was also considered, but would have been racy. Some inodes may still be in use when a master key is removed, and we can't simply revoke random file descriptors, mmap's, etc. Thus, the ioctl simply skips in-use inodes, and returns -EBUSY to indicate that some inodes weren't evicted. The master key *secret* is still removed, but the fscrypt_master_key struct remains to keep track of the remaining inodes. Userspace can then retry the ioctl to evict the remaining inodes. Alternatively, if userspace adds the key again, the refreshed secret will be associated with the existing list of inodes so they remain correctly tracked for future key removals. The ioctl doesn't wipe pagecache pages. Thus, we tolerate that after a kernel compromise some portions of plaintext file contents may still be recoverable from memory. This can be solved by enabling page poisoning system-wide, which security conscious users may choose to do. But it's very difficult to solve otherwise, e.g. note that plaintext file contents may have been read in other places than pagecache pages. Like FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY is initially restricted to privileged users only. This is sufficient for some use cases, but not all. A later patch will relax this restriction, but it will require introducing key hashes, among other changes. Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-08-05 05:35:46 +03:00
/*
* The master key with which this inode was unlocked (decrypted). This
* will be NULL if the master key was found in a process-subscribed
* keyring rather than in the filesystem-level keyring.
*/
fscrypt: stop using keyrings subsystem for fscrypt_master_key The approach of fs/crypto/ internally managing the fscrypt_master_key structs as the payloads of "struct key" objects contained in a "struct key" keyring has outlived its usefulness. The original idea was to simplify the code by reusing code from the keyrings subsystem. However, several issues have arisen that can't easily be resolved: - When a master key struct is destroyed, blk_crypto_evict_key() must be called on any per-mode keys embedded in it. (This started being the case when inline encryption support was added.) Yet, the keyrings subsystem can arbitrarily delay the destruction of keys, even past the time the filesystem was unmounted. Therefore, currently there is no easy way to call blk_crypto_evict_key() when a master key is destroyed. Currently, this is worked around by holding an extra reference to the filesystem's request_queue(s). But it was overlooked that the request_queue reference is *not* guaranteed to pin the corresponding blk_crypto_profile too; for device-mapper devices that support inline crypto, it doesn't. This can cause a use-after-free. - When the last inode that was using an incompletely-removed master key is evicted, the master key removal is completed by removing the key struct from the keyring. Currently this is done via key_invalidate(). Yet, key_invalidate() takes the key semaphore. This can deadlock when called from the shrinker, since in fscrypt_ioctl_add_key(), memory is allocated with GFP_KERNEL under the same semaphore. - More generally, the fact that the keyrings subsystem can arbitrarily delay the destruction of keys (via garbage collection delay, or via random processes getting temporary key references) is undesirable, as it means we can't strictly guarantee that all secrets are ever wiped. - Doing the master key lookups via the keyrings subsystem results in the key_permission LSM hook being called. fscrypt doesn't want this, as all access control for encrypted files is designed to happen via the files themselves, like any other files. The workaround which SELinux users are using is to change their SELinux policy to grant key search access to all domains. This works, but it is an odd extra step that shouldn't really have to be done. The fix for all these issues is to change the implementation to what I should have done originally: don't use the keyrings subsystem to keep track of the filesystem's fscrypt_master_key structs. Instead, just store them in a regular kernel data structure, and rework the reference counting, locking, and lifetime accordingly. Retain support for RCU-mode key lookups by using a hash table. Replace fscrypt_sb_free() with fscrypt_sb_delete(), which releases the keys synchronously and runs a bit earlier during unmount, so that block devices are still available. A side effect of this patch is that neither the master keys themselves nor the filesystem keyrings will be listed in /proc/keys anymore. ("Master key users" and the master key users keyrings will still be listed.) However, this was mostly an implementation detail, and it was intended just for debugging purposes. I don't know of anyone using it. This patch does *not* change how "master key users" (->mk_users) works; that still uses the keyrings subsystem. That is still needed for key quotas, and changing that isn't necessary to solve the issues listed above. If we decide to change that too, it would be a separate patch. I've marked this as fixing the original commit that added the fscrypt keyring, but as noted above the most important issue that this patch fixes wasn't introduced until the addition of inline encryption support. Fixes: 22d94f493bfb ("fscrypt: add FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220901193208.138056-2-ebiggers@kernel.org
2022-09-01 22:32:06 +03:00
struct fscrypt_master_key *ci_master_key;
fscrypt: add FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl Add a new fscrypt ioctl, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY. This ioctl removes an encryption key that was added by FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY. It wipes the secret key itself, then "locks" the encrypted files and directories that had been unlocked using that key -- implemented by evicting the relevant dentries and inodes from the VFS caches. The problem this solves is that many fscrypt users want the ability to remove encryption keys, causing the corresponding encrypted directories to appear "locked" (presented in ciphertext form) again. Moreover, users want removing an encryption key to *really* remove it, in the sense that the removed keys cannot be recovered even if kernel memory is compromised, e.g. by the exploit of a kernel security vulnerability or by a physical attack. This is desirable after a user logs out of the system, for example. In many cases users even already assume this to be the case and are surprised to hear when it's not. It is not sufficient to simply unlink the master key from the keyring (or to revoke or invalidate it), since the actual encryption transform objects are still pinned in memory by their inodes. Therefore, to really remove a key we must also evict the relevant inodes. Currently one workaround is to run 'sync && echo 2 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches'. But, that evicts all unused inodes in the system rather than just the inodes associated with the key being removed, causing severe performance problems. Moreover, it requires root privileges, so regular users can't "lock" their encrypted files. Another workaround, used in Chromium OS kernels, is to add a new VFS-level ioctl FS_IOC_DROP_CACHE which is a more restricted version of drop_caches that operates on a single super_block. It does: shrink_dcache_sb(sb); invalidate_inodes(sb, false); But it's still a hack. Yet, the major users of filesystem encryption want this feature badly enough that they are actually using these hacks. To properly solve the problem, start maintaining a list of the inodes which have been "unlocked" using each master key. Originally this wasn't possible because the kernel didn't keep track of in-use master keys at all. But, with the ->s_master_keys keyring it is now possible. Then, add an ioctl FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY. It finds the specified master key in ->s_master_keys, then wipes the secret key itself, which prevents any additional inodes from being unlocked with the key. Then, it syncs the filesystem and evicts the inodes in the key's list. The normal inode eviction code will free and wipe the per-file keys (in ->i_crypt_info). Note that freeing ->i_crypt_info without evicting the inodes was also considered, but would have been racy. Some inodes may still be in use when a master key is removed, and we can't simply revoke random file descriptors, mmap's, etc. Thus, the ioctl simply skips in-use inodes, and returns -EBUSY to indicate that some inodes weren't evicted. The master key *secret* is still removed, but the fscrypt_master_key struct remains to keep track of the remaining inodes. Userspace can then retry the ioctl to evict the remaining inodes. Alternatively, if userspace adds the key again, the refreshed secret will be associated with the existing list of inodes so they remain correctly tracked for future key removals. The ioctl doesn't wipe pagecache pages. Thus, we tolerate that after a kernel compromise some portions of plaintext file contents may still be recoverable from memory. This can be solved by enabling page poisoning system-wide, which security conscious users may choose to do. But it's very difficult to solve otherwise, e.g. note that plaintext file contents may have been read in other places than pagecache pages. Like FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY is initially restricted to privileged users only. This is sufficient for some use cases, but not all. A later patch will relax this restriction, but it will require introducing key hashes, among other changes. Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-08-05 05:35:46 +03:00
/*
* Link in list of inodes that were unlocked with the master key.
* Only used when ->ci_master_key is set.
*/
struct list_head ci_master_key_link;
fscrypt: add Adiantum support Add support for the Adiantum encryption mode to fscrypt. Adiantum is a tweakable, length-preserving encryption mode with security provably reducible to that of XChaCha12 and AES-256, subject to a security bound. It's also a true wide-block mode, unlike XTS. See the paper "Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for entry-level processors" (https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.pdf) for more details. Also see commit 059c2a4d8e16 ("crypto: adiantum - add Adiantum support"). On sufficiently long messages, Adiantum's bottlenecks are XChaCha12 and the NH hash function. These algorithms are fast even on processors without dedicated crypto instructions. Adiantum makes it feasible to enable storage encryption on low-end mobile devices that lack AES instructions; currently such devices are unencrypted. On ARM Cortex-A7, on 4096-byte messages Adiantum encryption is about 4 times faster than AES-256-XTS encryption; decryption is about 5 times faster. In fscrypt, Adiantum is suitable for encrypting both file contents and names. With filenames, it fixes a known weakness: when two filenames in a directory share a common prefix of >= 16 bytes, with CTS-CBC their encrypted filenames share a common prefix too, leaking information. Adiantum does not have this problem. Since Adiantum also accepts long tweaks (IVs), it's also safe to use the master key directly for Adiantum encryption rather than deriving per-file keys, provided that the per-file nonce is included in the IVs and the master key isn't used for any other encryption mode. This configuration saves memory and improves performance. A new fscrypt policy flag is added to allow users to opt-in to this configuration. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
2019-01-06 16:36:21 +03:00
/*
* If non-NULL, then encryption is done using the master key directly
fscrypt: add inline encryption support Add support for inline encryption to fs/crypto/. With "inline encryption", the block layer handles the decryption/encryption as part of the bio, instead of the filesystem doing the crypto itself via Linux's crypto API. This model is needed in order to take advantage of the inline encryption hardware present on most modern mobile SoCs. To use inline encryption, the filesystem needs to be mounted with '-o inlinecrypt'. Blk-crypto will then be used instead of the traditional filesystem-layer crypto whenever possible to encrypt the contents of any encrypted files in that filesystem. Fscrypt still provides the key and IV to use, and the actual ciphertext on-disk is still the same; therefore it's testable using the existing fscrypt ciphertext verification tests. Note that since blk-crypto has a fallback to Linux's crypto API, and also supports all the encryption modes currently supported by fscrypt, this feature is usable and testable even without actual inline encryption hardware. Per-filesystem changes will be needed to set encryption contexts when submitting bios and to implement the 'inlinecrypt' mount option. This patch just adds the common code. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200702015607.1215430-3-satyat@google.com Co-developed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2020-07-02 04:56:05 +03:00
* and ci_enc_key will equal ci_direct_key->dk_key.
fscrypt: add Adiantum support Add support for the Adiantum encryption mode to fscrypt. Adiantum is a tweakable, length-preserving encryption mode with security provably reducible to that of XChaCha12 and AES-256, subject to a security bound. It's also a true wide-block mode, unlike XTS. See the paper "Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for entry-level processors" (https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.pdf) for more details. Also see commit 059c2a4d8e16 ("crypto: adiantum - add Adiantum support"). On sufficiently long messages, Adiantum's bottlenecks are XChaCha12 and the NH hash function. These algorithms are fast even on processors without dedicated crypto instructions. Adiantum makes it feasible to enable storage encryption on low-end mobile devices that lack AES instructions; currently such devices are unencrypted. On ARM Cortex-A7, on 4096-byte messages Adiantum encryption is about 4 times faster than AES-256-XTS encryption; decryption is about 5 times faster. In fscrypt, Adiantum is suitable for encrypting both file contents and names. With filenames, it fixes a known weakness: when two filenames in a directory share a common prefix of >= 16 bytes, with CTS-CBC their encrypted filenames share a common prefix too, leaking information. Adiantum does not have this problem. Since Adiantum also accepts long tweaks (IVs), it's also safe to use the master key directly for Adiantum encryption rather than deriving per-file keys, provided that the per-file nonce is included in the IVs and the master key isn't used for any other encryption mode. This configuration saves memory and improves performance. A new fscrypt policy flag is added to allow users to opt-in to this configuration. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
2019-01-06 16:36:21 +03:00
*/
struct fscrypt_direct_key *ci_direct_key;
fscrypt: add Adiantum support Add support for the Adiantum encryption mode to fscrypt. Adiantum is a tweakable, length-preserving encryption mode with security provably reducible to that of XChaCha12 and AES-256, subject to a security bound. It's also a true wide-block mode, unlike XTS. See the paper "Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for entry-level processors" (https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.pdf) for more details. Also see commit 059c2a4d8e16 ("crypto: adiantum - add Adiantum support"). On sufficiently long messages, Adiantum's bottlenecks are XChaCha12 and the NH hash function. These algorithms are fast even on processors without dedicated crypto instructions. Adiantum makes it feasible to enable storage encryption on low-end mobile devices that lack AES instructions; currently such devices are unencrypted. On ARM Cortex-A7, on 4096-byte messages Adiantum encryption is about 4 times faster than AES-256-XTS encryption; decryption is about 5 times faster. In fscrypt, Adiantum is suitable for encrypting both file contents and names. With filenames, it fixes a known weakness: when two filenames in a directory share a common prefix of >= 16 bytes, with CTS-CBC their encrypted filenames share a common prefix too, leaking information. Adiantum does not have this problem. Since Adiantum also accepts long tweaks (IVs), it's also safe to use the master key directly for Adiantum encryption rather than deriving per-file keys, provided that the per-file nonce is included in the IVs and the master key isn't used for any other encryption mode. This configuration saves memory and improves performance. A new fscrypt policy flag is added to allow users to opt-in to this configuration. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
2019-01-06 16:36:21 +03:00
fscrypt: derive dirhash key for casefolded directories When we allow indexed directories to use both encryption and casefolding, for the dirhash we can't just hash the ciphertext filenames that are stored on-disk (as is done currently) because the dirhash must be case insensitive, but the stored names are case-preserving. Nor can we hash the plaintext names with an unkeyed hash (or a hash keyed with a value stored on-disk like ext4's s_hash_seed), since that would leak information about the names that encryption is meant to protect. Instead, if we can accept a dirhash that's only computable when the fscrypt key is available, we can hash the plaintext names with a keyed hash using a secret key derived from the directory's fscrypt master key. We'll use SipHash-2-4 for this purpose. Prepare for this by deriving a SipHash key for each casefolded encrypted directory. Make sure to handle deriving the key not only when setting up the directory's fscrypt_info, but also in the case where the casefold flag is enabled after the fscrypt_info was already set up. (We could just always derive the key regardless of casefolding, but that would introduce unnecessary overhead for people not using casefolding.) Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com> [EB: improved commit message, updated fscrypt.rst, squashed with change that avoids unnecessarily deriving the key, and many other cleanups] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200120223201.241390-3-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2020-01-21 01:31:57 +03:00
/*
* This inode's hash key for filenames. This is a 128-bit SipHash-2-4
* key. This is only set for directories that use a keyed dirhash over
* the plaintext filenames -- currently just casefolded directories.
*/
siphash_key_t ci_dirhash_key;
bool ci_dirhash_key_initialized;
fscrypt: v2 encryption policy support Add a new fscrypt policy version, "v2". It has the following changes from the original policy version, which we call "v1" (*): - Master keys (the user-provided encryption keys) are only ever used as input to HKDF-SHA512. This is more flexible and less error-prone, and it avoids the quirks and limitations of the AES-128-ECB based KDF. Three classes of cryptographically isolated subkeys are defined: - Per-file keys, like used in v1 policies except for the new KDF. - Per-mode keys. These implement the semantics of the DIRECT_KEY flag, which for v1 policies made the master key be used directly. These are also planned to be used for inline encryption when support for it is added. - Key identifiers (see below). - Each master key is identified by a 16-byte master_key_identifier, which is derived from the key itself using HKDF-SHA512. This prevents users from associating the wrong key with an encrypted file or directory. This was easily possible with v1 policies, which identified the key by an arbitrary 8-byte master_key_descriptor. - The key must be provided in the filesystem-level keyring, not in a process-subscribed keyring. The following UAPI additions are made: - The existing ioctl FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY can now be passed a fscrypt_policy_v2 to set a v2 encryption policy. It's disambiguated from fscrypt_policy/fscrypt_policy_v1 by the version code prefix. - A new ioctl FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX is added. It allows getting the v1 or v2 encryption policy of an encrypted file or directory. The existing FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY ioctl could not be used because it did not have a way for userspace to indicate which policy structure is expected. The new ioctl includes a size field, so it is extensible to future fscrypt policy versions. - The ioctls FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY, and FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS now support managing keys for v2 encryption policies. Such keys are kept logically separate from keys for v1 encryption policies, and are identified by 'identifier' rather than by 'descriptor'. The 'identifier' need not be provided when adding a key, since the kernel will calculate it anyway. This patch temporarily keeps adding/removing v2 policy keys behind the same permission check done for adding/removing v1 policy keys: capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN). However, the next patch will carefully take advantage of the cryptographically secure master_key_identifier to allow non-root users to add/remove v2 policy keys, thus providing a full replacement for v1 policies. (*) Actually, in the API fscrypt_policy::version is 0 while on-disk fscrypt_context::format is 1. But I believe it makes the most sense to advance both to '2' to have them be in sync, and to consider the numbering to start at 1 except for the API quirk. Reviewed-by: Paul Crowley <paulcrowley@google.com> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-08-05 05:35:47 +03:00
/* The encryption policy used by this inode */
union fscrypt_policy ci_policy;
/* This inode's nonce, copied from the fscrypt_context */
u8 ci_nonce[FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE];
fscrypt: add support for IV_INO_LBLK_32 policies The eMMC inline crypto standard will only specify 32 DUN bits (a.k.a. IV bits), unlike UFS's 64. IV_INO_LBLK_64 is therefore not applicable, but an encryption format which uses one key per policy and permits the moving of encrypted file contents (as f2fs's garbage collector requires) is still desirable. To support such hardware, add a new encryption format IV_INO_LBLK_32 that makes the best use of the 32 bits: the IV is set to 'SipHash-2-4(inode_number) + file_logical_block_number mod 2^32', where the SipHash key is derived from the fscrypt master key. We hash only the inode number and not also the block number, because we need to maintain contiguity of DUNs to merge bios. Unlike with IV_INO_LBLK_64, with this format IV reuse is possible; this is unavoidable given the size of the DUN. This means this format should only be used where the requirements of the first paragraph apply. However, the hash spreads out the IVs in the whole usable range, and the use of a keyed hash makes it difficult for an attacker to determine which files use which IVs. Besides the above differences, this flag works like IV_INO_LBLK_64 in that on ext4 it is only allowed if the stable_inodes feature has been enabled to prevent inode numbers and the filesystem UUID from changing. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200515204141.251098-1-ebiggers@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Paul Crowley <paulcrowley@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2020-05-15 23:41:41 +03:00
/* Hashed inode number. Only set for IV_INO_LBLK_32 */
u32 ci_hashed_ino;
};
typedef enum {
FS_DECRYPT = 0,
FS_ENCRYPT,
} fscrypt_direction_t;
/* crypto.c */
extern struct kmem_cache *fscrypt_inode_info_cachep;
int fscrypt_initialize(struct super_block *sb);
int fscrypt_crypt_data_unit(const struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci,
fscrypt: support crypto data unit size less than filesystem block size Until now, fscrypt has always used the filesystem block size as the granularity of file contents encryption. Two scenarios have come up where a sub-block granularity of contents encryption would be useful: 1. Inline crypto hardware that only supports a crypto data unit size that is less than the filesystem block size. 2. Support for direct I/O at a granularity less than the filesystem block size, for example at the block device's logical block size in order to match the traditional direct I/O alignment requirement. (1) first came up with older eMMC inline crypto hardware that only supports a crypto data unit size of 512 bytes. That specific case ultimately went away because all systems with that hardware continued using out of tree code and never actually upgraded to the upstream inline crypto framework. But, now it's coming back in a new way: some current UFS controllers only support a data unit size of 4096 bytes, and there is a proposal to increase the filesystem block size to 16K. (2) was discussed as a "nice to have" feature, though not essential, when support for direct I/O on encrypted files was being upstreamed. Still, the fact that this feature has come up several times does suggest it would be wise to have available. Therefore, this patch implements it by using one of the reserved bytes in fscrypt_policy_v2 to allow users to select a sub-block data unit size. Supported data unit sizes are powers of 2 between 512 and the filesystem block size, inclusively. Support is implemented for both the FS-layer and inline crypto cases. This patch focuses on the basic support for sub-block data units. Some things are out of scope for this patch but may be addressed later: - Supporting sub-block data units in combination with FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_64, in most cases. Unfortunately this combination usually causes data unit indices to exceed 32 bits, and thus fscrypt_supported_policy() correctly disallows it. The users who potentially need this combination are using f2fs. To support it, f2fs would need to provide an option to slightly reduce its max file size. - Supporting sub-block data units in combination with FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_32. This has the same problem described above, but also it will need special code to make DUN wraparound still happen on a FS block boundary. - Supporting use case (2) mentioned above. The encrypted direct I/O code will need to stop requiring and assuming FS block alignment. This won't be hard, but it belongs in a separate patch. - Supporting this feature on filesystems other than ext4 and f2fs. (Filesystems declare support for it via their fscrypt_operations.) On UBIFS, sub-block data units don't make sense because UBIFS encrypts variable-length blocks as a result of compression. CephFS could support it, but a bit more work would be needed to make the fscrypt_*_block_inplace functions play nicely with sub-block data units. I don't think there's a use case for this on CephFS anyway. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230925055451.59499-6-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2023-09-25 08:54:51 +03:00
fscrypt_direction_t rw, u64 index,
struct page *src_page, struct page *dest_page,
unsigned int len, unsigned int offs,
gfp_t gfp_flags);
struct page *fscrypt_alloc_bounce_page(gfp_t gfp_flags);
void __printf(3, 4) __cold
fscrypt_msg(const struct inode *inode, const char *level, const char *fmt, ...);
#define fscrypt_warn(inode, fmt, ...) \
fscrypt_msg((inode), KERN_WARNING, fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__)
#define fscrypt_err(inode, fmt, ...) \
fscrypt_msg((inode), KERN_ERR, fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__)
fscrypt: add Adiantum support Add support for the Adiantum encryption mode to fscrypt. Adiantum is a tweakable, length-preserving encryption mode with security provably reducible to that of XChaCha12 and AES-256, subject to a security bound. It's also a true wide-block mode, unlike XTS. See the paper "Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for entry-level processors" (https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.pdf) for more details. Also see commit 059c2a4d8e16 ("crypto: adiantum - add Adiantum support"). On sufficiently long messages, Adiantum's bottlenecks are XChaCha12 and the NH hash function. These algorithms are fast even on processors without dedicated crypto instructions. Adiantum makes it feasible to enable storage encryption on low-end mobile devices that lack AES instructions; currently such devices are unencrypted. On ARM Cortex-A7, on 4096-byte messages Adiantum encryption is about 4 times faster than AES-256-XTS encryption; decryption is about 5 times faster. In fscrypt, Adiantum is suitable for encrypting both file contents and names. With filenames, it fixes a known weakness: when two filenames in a directory share a common prefix of >= 16 bytes, with CTS-CBC their encrypted filenames share a common prefix too, leaking information. Adiantum does not have this problem. Since Adiantum also accepts long tweaks (IVs), it's also safe to use the master key directly for Adiantum encryption rather than deriving per-file keys, provided that the per-file nonce is included in the IVs and the master key isn't used for any other encryption mode. This configuration saves memory and improves performance. A new fscrypt policy flag is added to allow users to opt-in to this configuration. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
2019-01-06 16:36:21 +03:00
#define FSCRYPT_MAX_IV_SIZE 32
union fscrypt_iv {
struct {
fscrypt: support crypto data unit size less than filesystem block size Until now, fscrypt has always used the filesystem block size as the granularity of file contents encryption. Two scenarios have come up where a sub-block granularity of contents encryption would be useful: 1. Inline crypto hardware that only supports a crypto data unit size that is less than the filesystem block size. 2. Support for direct I/O at a granularity less than the filesystem block size, for example at the block device's logical block size in order to match the traditional direct I/O alignment requirement. (1) first came up with older eMMC inline crypto hardware that only supports a crypto data unit size of 512 bytes. That specific case ultimately went away because all systems with that hardware continued using out of tree code and never actually upgraded to the upstream inline crypto framework. But, now it's coming back in a new way: some current UFS controllers only support a data unit size of 4096 bytes, and there is a proposal to increase the filesystem block size to 16K. (2) was discussed as a "nice to have" feature, though not essential, when support for direct I/O on encrypted files was being upstreamed. Still, the fact that this feature has come up several times does suggest it would be wise to have available. Therefore, this patch implements it by using one of the reserved bytes in fscrypt_policy_v2 to allow users to select a sub-block data unit size. Supported data unit sizes are powers of 2 between 512 and the filesystem block size, inclusively. Support is implemented for both the FS-layer and inline crypto cases. This patch focuses on the basic support for sub-block data units. Some things are out of scope for this patch but may be addressed later: - Supporting sub-block data units in combination with FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_64, in most cases. Unfortunately this combination usually causes data unit indices to exceed 32 bits, and thus fscrypt_supported_policy() correctly disallows it. The users who potentially need this combination are using f2fs. To support it, f2fs would need to provide an option to slightly reduce its max file size. - Supporting sub-block data units in combination with FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_32. This has the same problem described above, but also it will need special code to make DUN wraparound still happen on a FS block boundary. - Supporting use case (2) mentioned above. The encrypted direct I/O code will need to stop requiring and assuming FS block alignment. This won't be hard, but it belongs in a separate patch. - Supporting this feature on filesystems other than ext4 and f2fs. (Filesystems declare support for it via their fscrypt_operations.) On UBIFS, sub-block data units don't make sense because UBIFS encrypts variable-length blocks as a result of compression. CephFS could support it, but a bit more work would be needed to make the fscrypt_*_block_inplace functions play nicely with sub-block data units. I don't think there's a use case for this on CephFS anyway. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230925055451.59499-6-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2023-09-25 08:54:51 +03:00
/* zero-based index of data unit within the file */
__le64 index;
fscrypt: add Adiantum support Add support for the Adiantum encryption mode to fscrypt. Adiantum is a tweakable, length-preserving encryption mode with security provably reducible to that of XChaCha12 and AES-256, subject to a security bound. It's also a true wide-block mode, unlike XTS. See the paper "Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for entry-level processors" (https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.pdf) for more details. Also see commit 059c2a4d8e16 ("crypto: adiantum - add Adiantum support"). On sufficiently long messages, Adiantum's bottlenecks are XChaCha12 and the NH hash function. These algorithms are fast even on processors without dedicated crypto instructions. Adiantum makes it feasible to enable storage encryption on low-end mobile devices that lack AES instructions; currently such devices are unencrypted. On ARM Cortex-A7, on 4096-byte messages Adiantum encryption is about 4 times faster than AES-256-XTS encryption; decryption is about 5 times faster. In fscrypt, Adiantum is suitable for encrypting both file contents and names. With filenames, it fixes a known weakness: when two filenames in a directory share a common prefix of >= 16 bytes, with CTS-CBC their encrypted filenames share a common prefix too, leaking information. Adiantum does not have this problem. Since Adiantum also accepts long tweaks (IVs), it's also safe to use the master key directly for Adiantum encryption rather than deriving per-file keys, provided that the per-file nonce is included in the IVs and the master key isn't used for any other encryption mode. This configuration saves memory and improves performance. A new fscrypt policy flag is added to allow users to opt-in to this configuration. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
2019-01-06 16:36:21 +03:00
/* per-file nonce; only set in DIRECT_KEY mode */
u8 nonce[FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE];
fscrypt: add Adiantum support Add support for the Adiantum encryption mode to fscrypt. Adiantum is a tweakable, length-preserving encryption mode with security provably reducible to that of XChaCha12 and AES-256, subject to a security bound. It's also a true wide-block mode, unlike XTS. See the paper "Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for entry-level processors" (https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.pdf) for more details. Also see commit 059c2a4d8e16 ("crypto: adiantum - add Adiantum support"). On sufficiently long messages, Adiantum's bottlenecks are XChaCha12 and the NH hash function. These algorithms are fast even on processors without dedicated crypto instructions. Adiantum makes it feasible to enable storage encryption on low-end mobile devices that lack AES instructions; currently such devices are unencrypted. On ARM Cortex-A7, on 4096-byte messages Adiantum encryption is about 4 times faster than AES-256-XTS encryption; decryption is about 5 times faster. In fscrypt, Adiantum is suitable for encrypting both file contents and names. With filenames, it fixes a known weakness: when two filenames in a directory share a common prefix of >= 16 bytes, with CTS-CBC their encrypted filenames share a common prefix too, leaking information. Adiantum does not have this problem. Since Adiantum also accepts long tweaks (IVs), it's also safe to use the master key directly for Adiantum encryption rather than deriving per-file keys, provided that the per-file nonce is included in the IVs and the master key isn't used for any other encryption mode. This configuration saves memory and improves performance. A new fscrypt policy flag is added to allow users to opt-in to this configuration. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
2019-01-06 16:36:21 +03:00
};
u8 raw[FSCRYPT_MAX_IV_SIZE];
fscrypt: add inline encryption support Add support for inline encryption to fs/crypto/. With "inline encryption", the block layer handles the decryption/encryption as part of the bio, instead of the filesystem doing the crypto itself via Linux's crypto API. This model is needed in order to take advantage of the inline encryption hardware present on most modern mobile SoCs. To use inline encryption, the filesystem needs to be mounted with '-o inlinecrypt'. Blk-crypto will then be used instead of the traditional filesystem-layer crypto whenever possible to encrypt the contents of any encrypted files in that filesystem. Fscrypt still provides the key and IV to use, and the actual ciphertext on-disk is still the same; therefore it's testable using the existing fscrypt ciphertext verification tests. Note that since blk-crypto has a fallback to Linux's crypto API, and also supports all the encryption modes currently supported by fscrypt, this feature is usable and testable even without actual inline encryption hardware. Per-filesystem changes will be needed to set encryption contexts when submitting bios and to implement the 'inlinecrypt' mount option. This patch just adds the common code. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200702015607.1215430-3-satyat@google.com Co-developed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2020-07-02 04:56:05 +03:00
__le64 dun[FSCRYPT_MAX_IV_SIZE / sizeof(__le64)];
fscrypt: add Adiantum support Add support for the Adiantum encryption mode to fscrypt. Adiantum is a tweakable, length-preserving encryption mode with security provably reducible to that of XChaCha12 and AES-256, subject to a security bound. It's also a true wide-block mode, unlike XTS. See the paper "Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for entry-level processors" (https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.pdf) for more details. Also see commit 059c2a4d8e16 ("crypto: adiantum - add Adiantum support"). On sufficiently long messages, Adiantum's bottlenecks are XChaCha12 and the NH hash function. These algorithms are fast even on processors without dedicated crypto instructions. Adiantum makes it feasible to enable storage encryption on low-end mobile devices that lack AES instructions; currently such devices are unencrypted. On ARM Cortex-A7, on 4096-byte messages Adiantum encryption is about 4 times faster than AES-256-XTS encryption; decryption is about 5 times faster. In fscrypt, Adiantum is suitable for encrypting both file contents and names. With filenames, it fixes a known weakness: when two filenames in a directory share a common prefix of >= 16 bytes, with CTS-CBC their encrypted filenames share a common prefix too, leaking information. Adiantum does not have this problem. Since Adiantum also accepts long tweaks (IVs), it's also safe to use the master key directly for Adiantum encryption rather than deriving per-file keys, provided that the per-file nonce is included in the IVs and the master key isn't used for any other encryption mode. This configuration saves memory and improves performance. A new fscrypt policy flag is added to allow users to opt-in to this configuration. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
2019-01-06 16:36:21 +03:00
};
fscrypt: support crypto data unit size less than filesystem block size Until now, fscrypt has always used the filesystem block size as the granularity of file contents encryption. Two scenarios have come up where a sub-block granularity of contents encryption would be useful: 1. Inline crypto hardware that only supports a crypto data unit size that is less than the filesystem block size. 2. Support for direct I/O at a granularity less than the filesystem block size, for example at the block device's logical block size in order to match the traditional direct I/O alignment requirement. (1) first came up with older eMMC inline crypto hardware that only supports a crypto data unit size of 512 bytes. That specific case ultimately went away because all systems with that hardware continued using out of tree code and never actually upgraded to the upstream inline crypto framework. But, now it's coming back in a new way: some current UFS controllers only support a data unit size of 4096 bytes, and there is a proposal to increase the filesystem block size to 16K. (2) was discussed as a "nice to have" feature, though not essential, when support for direct I/O on encrypted files was being upstreamed. Still, the fact that this feature has come up several times does suggest it would be wise to have available. Therefore, this patch implements it by using one of the reserved bytes in fscrypt_policy_v2 to allow users to select a sub-block data unit size. Supported data unit sizes are powers of 2 between 512 and the filesystem block size, inclusively. Support is implemented for both the FS-layer and inline crypto cases. This patch focuses on the basic support for sub-block data units. Some things are out of scope for this patch but may be addressed later: - Supporting sub-block data units in combination with FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_64, in most cases. Unfortunately this combination usually causes data unit indices to exceed 32 bits, and thus fscrypt_supported_policy() correctly disallows it. The users who potentially need this combination are using f2fs. To support it, f2fs would need to provide an option to slightly reduce its max file size. - Supporting sub-block data units in combination with FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_32. This has the same problem described above, but also it will need special code to make DUN wraparound still happen on a FS block boundary. - Supporting use case (2) mentioned above. The encrypted direct I/O code will need to stop requiring and assuming FS block alignment. This won't be hard, but it belongs in a separate patch. - Supporting this feature on filesystems other than ext4 and f2fs. (Filesystems declare support for it via their fscrypt_operations.) On UBIFS, sub-block data units don't make sense because UBIFS encrypts variable-length blocks as a result of compression. CephFS could support it, but a bit more work would be needed to make the fscrypt_*_block_inplace functions play nicely with sub-block data units. I don't think there's a use case for this on CephFS anyway. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230925055451.59499-6-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2023-09-25 08:54:51 +03:00
void fscrypt_generate_iv(union fscrypt_iv *iv, u64 index,
const struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci);
fscrypt: add Adiantum support Add support for the Adiantum encryption mode to fscrypt. Adiantum is a tweakable, length-preserving encryption mode with security provably reducible to that of XChaCha12 and AES-256, subject to a security bound. It's also a true wide-block mode, unlike XTS. See the paper "Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for entry-level processors" (https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.pdf) for more details. Also see commit 059c2a4d8e16 ("crypto: adiantum - add Adiantum support"). On sufficiently long messages, Adiantum's bottlenecks are XChaCha12 and the NH hash function. These algorithms are fast even on processors without dedicated crypto instructions. Adiantum makes it feasible to enable storage encryption on low-end mobile devices that lack AES instructions; currently such devices are unencrypted. On ARM Cortex-A7, on 4096-byte messages Adiantum encryption is about 4 times faster than AES-256-XTS encryption; decryption is about 5 times faster. In fscrypt, Adiantum is suitable for encrypting both file contents and names. With filenames, it fixes a known weakness: when two filenames in a directory share a common prefix of >= 16 bytes, with CTS-CBC their encrypted filenames share a common prefix too, leaking information. Adiantum does not have this problem. Since Adiantum also accepts long tweaks (IVs), it's also safe to use the master key directly for Adiantum encryption rather than deriving per-file keys, provided that the per-file nonce is included in the IVs and the master key isn't used for any other encryption mode. This configuration saves memory and improves performance. A new fscrypt policy flag is added to allow users to opt-in to this configuration. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
2019-01-06 16:36:21 +03:00
/*
fscrypt: support crypto data unit size less than filesystem block size Until now, fscrypt has always used the filesystem block size as the granularity of file contents encryption. Two scenarios have come up where a sub-block granularity of contents encryption would be useful: 1. Inline crypto hardware that only supports a crypto data unit size that is less than the filesystem block size. 2. Support for direct I/O at a granularity less than the filesystem block size, for example at the block device's logical block size in order to match the traditional direct I/O alignment requirement. (1) first came up with older eMMC inline crypto hardware that only supports a crypto data unit size of 512 bytes. That specific case ultimately went away because all systems with that hardware continued using out of tree code and never actually upgraded to the upstream inline crypto framework. But, now it's coming back in a new way: some current UFS controllers only support a data unit size of 4096 bytes, and there is a proposal to increase the filesystem block size to 16K. (2) was discussed as a "nice to have" feature, though not essential, when support for direct I/O on encrypted files was being upstreamed. Still, the fact that this feature has come up several times does suggest it would be wise to have available. Therefore, this patch implements it by using one of the reserved bytes in fscrypt_policy_v2 to allow users to select a sub-block data unit size. Supported data unit sizes are powers of 2 between 512 and the filesystem block size, inclusively. Support is implemented for both the FS-layer and inline crypto cases. This patch focuses on the basic support for sub-block data units. Some things are out of scope for this patch but may be addressed later: - Supporting sub-block data units in combination with FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_64, in most cases. Unfortunately this combination usually causes data unit indices to exceed 32 bits, and thus fscrypt_supported_policy() correctly disallows it. The users who potentially need this combination are using f2fs. To support it, f2fs would need to provide an option to slightly reduce its max file size. - Supporting sub-block data units in combination with FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_32. This has the same problem described above, but also it will need special code to make DUN wraparound still happen on a FS block boundary. - Supporting use case (2) mentioned above. The encrypted direct I/O code will need to stop requiring and assuming FS block alignment. This won't be hard, but it belongs in a separate patch. - Supporting this feature on filesystems other than ext4 and f2fs. (Filesystems declare support for it via their fscrypt_operations.) On UBIFS, sub-block data units don't make sense because UBIFS encrypts variable-length blocks as a result of compression. CephFS could support it, but a bit more work would be needed to make the fscrypt_*_block_inplace functions play nicely with sub-block data units. I don't think there's a use case for this on CephFS anyway. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230925055451.59499-6-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2023-09-25 08:54:51 +03:00
* Return the number of bits used by the maximum file data unit index that is
* possible on the given filesystem, using the given log2 data unit size.
*/
static inline int
fscrypt: support crypto data unit size less than filesystem block size Until now, fscrypt has always used the filesystem block size as the granularity of file contents encryption. Two scenarios have come up where a sub-block granularity of contents encryption would be useful: 1. Inline crypto hardware that only supports a crypto data unit size that is less than the filesystem block size. 2. Support for direct I/O at a granularity less than the filesystem block size, for example at the block device's logical block size in order to match the traditional direct I/O alignment requirement. (1) first came up with older eMMC inline crypto hardware that only supports a crypto data unit size of 512 bytes. That specific case ultimately went away because all systems with that hardware continued using out of tree code and never actually upgraded to the upstream inline crypto framework. But, now it's coming back in a new way: some current UFS controllers only support a data unit size of 4096 bytes, and there is a proposal to increase the filesystem block size to 16K. (2) was discussed as a "nice to have" feature, though not essential, when support for direct I/O on encrypted files was being upstreamed. Still, the fact that this feature has come up several times does suggest it would be wise to have available. Therefore, this patch implements it by using one of the reserved bytes in fscrypt_policy_v2 to allow users to select a sub-block data unit size. Supported data unit sizes are powers of 2 between 512 and the filesystem block size, inclusively. Support is implemented for both the FS-layer and inline crypto cases. This patch focuses on the basic support for sub-block data units. Some things are out of scope for this patch but may be addressed later: - Supporting sub-block data units in combination with FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_64, in most cases. Unfortunately this combination usually causes data unit indices to exceed 32 bits, and thus fscrypt_supported_policy() correctly disallows it. The users who potentially need this combination are using f2fs. To support it, f2fs would need to provide an option to slightly reduce its max file size. - Supporting sub-block data units in combination with FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_32. This has the same problem described above, but also it will need special code to make DUN wraparound still happen on a FS block boundary. - Supporting use case (2) mentioned above. The encrypted direct I/O code will need to stop requiring and assuming FS block alignment. This won't be hard, but it belongs in a separate patch. - Supporting this feature on filesystems other than ext4 and f2fs. (Filesystems declare support for it via their fscrypt_operations.) On UBIFS, sub-block data units don't make sense because UBIFS encrypts variable-length blocks as a result of compression. CephFS could support it, but a bit more work would be needed to make the fscrypt_*_block_inplace functions play nicely with sub-block data units. I don't think there's a use case for this on CephFS anyway. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230925055451.59499-6-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2023-09-25 08:54:51 +03:00
fscrypt_max_file_dun_bits(const struct super_block *sb, int du_bits)
{
fscrypt: support crypto data unit size less than filesystem block size Until now, fscrypt has always used the filesystem block size as the granularity of file contents encryption. Two scenarios have come up where a sub-block granularity of contents encryption would be useful: 1. Inline crypto hardware that only supports a crypto data unit size that is less than the filesystem block size. 2. Support for direct I/O at a granularity less than the filesystem block size, for example at the block device's logical block size in order to match the traditional direct I/O alignment requirement. (1) first came up with older eMMC inline crypto hardware that only supports a crypto data unit size of 512 bytes. That specific case ultimately went away because all systems with that hardware continued using out of tree code and never actually upgraded to the upstream inline crypto framework. But, now it's coming back in a new way: some current UFS controllers only support a data unit size of 4096 bytes, and there is a proposal to increase the filesystem block size to 16K. (2) was discussed as a "nice to have" feature, though not essential, when support for direct I/O on encrypted files was being upstreamed. Still, the fact that this feature has come up several times does suggest it would be wise to have available. Therefore, this patch implements it by using one of the reserved bytes in fscrypt_policy_v2 to allow users to select a sub-block data unit size. Supported data unit sizes are powers of 2 between 512 and the filesystem block size, inclusively. Support is implemented for both the FS-layer and inline crypto cases. This patch focuses on the basic support for sub-block data units. Some things are out of scope for this patch but may be addressed later: - Supporting sub-block data units in combination with FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_64, in most cases. Unfortunately this combination usually causes data unit indices to exceed 32 bits, and thus fscrypt_supported_policy() correctly disallows it. The users who potentially need this combination are using f2fs. To support it, f2fs would need to provide an option to slightly reduce its max file size. - Supporting sub-block data units in combination with FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_32. This has the same problem described above, but also it will need special code to make DUN wraparound still happen on a FS block boundary. - Supporting use case (2) mentioned above. The encrypted direct I/O code will need to stop requiring and assuming FS block alignment. This won't be hard, but it belongs in a separate patch. - Supporting this feature on filesystems other than ext4 and f2fs. (Filesystems declare support for it via their fscrypt_operations.) On UBIFS, sub-block data units don't make sense because UBIFS encrypts variable-length blocks as a result of compression. CephFS could support it, but a bit more work would be needed to make the fscrypt_*_block_inplace functions play nicely with sub-block data units. I don't think there's a use case for this on CephFS anyway. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230925055451.59499-6-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2023-09-25 08:54:51 +03:00
return fls64(sb->s_maxbytes - 1) - du_bits;
}
fscrypt: new helper functions for ->symlink() Currently, filesystems supporting fscrypt need to implement some tricky logic when creating encrypted symlinks, including handling a peculiar on-disk format (struct fscrypt_symlink_data) and correctly calculating the size of the encrypted symlink. Introduce helper functions to make things a bit easier: - fscrypt_prepare_symlink() computes and validates the size the symlink target will require on-disk. - fscrypt_encrypt_symlink() creates the encrypted target if needed. The new helpers actually fix some subtle bugs. First, when checking whether the symlink target was too long, filesystems didn't account for the fact that the NUL padding is meant to be truncated if it would cause the maximum length to be exceeded, as is done for filenames in directories. Consequently users would receive ENAMETOOLONG when creating symlinks close to what is supposed to be the maximum length. For example, with EXT4 with a 4K block size, the maximum symlink target length in an encrypted directory is supposed to be 4093 bytes (in comparison to 4095 in an unencrypted directory), but in FS_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_32-mode only up to 4064 bytes were accepted. Second, symlink targets of "." and ".." were not being encrypted, even though they should be, as these names are special in *directory entries* but not in symlink targets. Fortunately, we can fix this simply by starting to encrypt them, as old kernels already accept them in encrypted form. Third, the output string length the filesystems were providing when doing the actual encryption was incorrect, as it was forgotten to exclude 'sizeof(struct fscrypt_symlink_data)'. Fortunately though, this bug didn't make a difference. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
2018-01-05 21:45:01 +03:00
/* fname.c */
bool __fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size(const union fscrypt_policy *policy,
u32 orig_len, u32 max_len,
u32 *encrypted_len_ret);
fscrypt: new helper functions for ->symlink() Currently, filesystems supporting fscrypt need to implement some tricky logic when creating encrypted symlinks, including handling a peculiar on-disk format (struct fscrypt_symlink_data) and correctly calculating the size of the encrypted symlink. Introduce helper functions to make things a bit easier: - fscrypt_prepare_symlink() computes and validates the size the symlink target will require on-disk. - fscrypt_encrypt_symlink() creates the encrypted target if needed. The new helpers actually fix some subtle bugs. First, when checking whether the symlink target was too long, filesystems didn't account for the fact that the NUL padding is meant to be truncated if it would cause the maximum length to be exceeded, as is done for filenames in directories. Consequently users would receive ENAMETOOLONG when creating symlinks close to what is supposed to be the maximum length. For example, with EXT4 with a 4K block size, the maximum symlink target length in an encrypted directory is supposed to be 4093 bytes (in comparison to 4095 in an unencrypted directory), but in FS_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_32-mode only up to 4064 bytes were accepted. Second, symlink targets of "." and ".." were not being encrypted, even though they should be, as these names are special in *directory entries* but not in symlink targets. Fortunately, we can fix this simply by starting to encrypt them, as old kernels already accept them in encrypted form. Third, the output string length the filesystems were providing when doing the actual encryption was incorrect, as it was forgotten to exclude 'sizeof(struct fscrypt_symlink_data)'. Fortunately though, this bug didn't make a difference. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
2018-01-05 21:45:01 +03:00
fscrypt: add an HKDF-SHA512 implementation Add an implementation of HKDF (RFC 5869) to fscrypt, for the purpose of deriving additional key material from the fscrypt master keys for v2 encryption policies. HKDF is a key derivation function built on top of HMAC. We choose SHA-512 for the underlying unkeyed hash, and use an "hmac(sha512)" transform allocated from the crypto API. We'll be using this to replace the AES-ECB based KDF currently used to derive the per-file encryption keys. While the AES-ECB based KDF is believed to meet the original security requirements, it is nonstandard and has problems that don't exist in modern KDFs such as HKDF: 1. It's reversible. Given a derived key and nonce, an attacker can easily compute the master key. This is okay if the master key and derived keys are equally hard to compromise, but now we'd like to be more robust against threats such as a derived key being compromised through a timing attack, or a derived key for an in-use file being compromised after the master key has already been removed. 2. It doesn't evenly distribute the entropy from the master key; each 16 input bytes only affects the corresponding 16 output bytes. 3. It isn't easily extensible to deriving other values or keys, such as a public hash for securely identifying the key, or per-mode keys. Per-mode keys will be immediately useful for Adiantum encryption, for which fscrypt currently uses the master key directly, introducing unnecessary usage constraints. Per-mode keys will also be useful for hardware inline encryption, which is currently being worked on. HKDF solves all the above problems. Reviewed-by: Paul Crowley <paulcrowley@google.com> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-08-05 05:35:47 +03:00
/* hkdf.c */
struct fscrypt_hkdf {
struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm;
};
int fscrypt_init_hkdf(struct fscrypt_hkdf *hkdf, const u8 *master_key,
unsigned int master_key_size);
fscrypt: add an HKDF-SHA512 implementation Add an implementation of HKDF (RFC 5869) to fscrypt, for the purpose of deriving additional key material from the fscrypt master keys for v2 encryption policies. HKDF is a key derivation function built on top of HMAC. We choose SHA-512 for the underlying unkeyed hash, and use an "hmac(sha512)" transform allocated from the crypto API. We'll be using this to replace the AES-ECB based KDF currently used to derive the per-file encryption keys. While the AES-ECB based KDF is believed to meet the original security requirements, it is nonstandard and has problems that don't exist in modern KDFs such as HKDF: 1. It's reversible. Given a derived key and nonce, an attacker can easily compute the master key. This is okay if the master key and derived keys are equally hard to compromise, but now we'd like to be more robust against threats such as a derived key being compromised through a timing attack, or a derived key for an in-use file being compromised after the master key has already been removed. 2. It doesn't evenly distribute the entropy from the master key; each 16 input bytes only affects the corresponding 16 output bytes. 3. It isn't easily extensible to deriving other values or keys, such as a public hash for securely identifying the key, or per-mode keys. Per-mode keys will be immediately useful for Adiantum encryption, for which fscrypt currently uses the master key directly, introducing unnecessary usage constraints. Per-mode keys will also be useful for hardware inline encryption, which is currently being worked on. HKDF solves all the above problems. Reviewed-by: Paul Crowley <paulcrowley@google.com> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-08-05 05:35:47 +03:00
fscrypt: v2 encryption policy support Add a new fscrypt policy version, "v2". It has the following changes from the original policy version, which we call "v1" (*): - Master keys (the user-provided encryption keys) are only ever used as input to HKDF-SHA512. This is more flexible and less error-prone, and it avoids the quirks and limitations of the AES-128-ECB based KDF. Three classes of cryptographically isolated subkeys are defined: - Per-file keys, like used in v1 policies except for the new KDF. - Per-mode keys. These implement the semantics of the DIRECT_KEY flag, which for v1 policies made the master key be used directly. These are also planned to be used for inline encryption when support for it is added. - Key identifiers (see below). - Each master key is identified by a 16-byte master_key_identifier, which is derived from the key itself using HKDF-SHA512. This prevents users from associating the wrong key with an encrypted file or directory. This was easily possible with v1 policies, which identified the key by an arbitrary 8-byte master_key_descriptor. - The key must be provided in the filesystem-level keyring, not in a process-subscribed keyring. The following UAPI additions are made: - The existing ioctl FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY can now be passed a fscrypt_policy_v2 to set a v2 encryption policy. It's disambiguated from fscrypt_policy/fscrypt_policy_v1 by the version code prefix. - A new ioctl FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX is added. It allows getting the v1 or v2 encryption policy of an encrypted file or directory. The existing FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY ioctl could not be used because it did not have a way for userspace to indicate which policy structure is expected. The new ioctl includes a size field, so it is extensible to future fscrypt policy versions. - The ioctls FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY, and FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS now support managing keys for v2 encryption policies. Such keys are kept logically separate from keys for v1 encryption policies, and are identified by 'identifier' rather than by 'descriptor'. The 'identifier' need not be provided when adding a key, since the kernel will calculate it anyway. This patch temporarily keeps adding/removing v2 policy keys behind the same permission check done for adding/removing v1 policy keys: capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN). However, the next patch will carefully take advantage of the cryptographically secure master_key_identifier to allow non-root users to add/remove v2 policy keys, thus providing a full replacement for v1 policies. (*) Actually, in the API fscrypt_policy::version is 0 while on-disk fscrypt_context::format is 1. But I believe it makes the most sense to advance both to '2' to have them be in sync, and to consider the numbering to start at 1 except for the API quirk. Reviewed-by: Paul Crowley <paulcrowley@google.com> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-08-05 05:35:47 +03:00
/*
* The list of contexts in which fscrypt uses HKDF. These values are used as
* the first byte of the HKDF application-specific info string to guarantee that
* info strings are never repeated between contexts. This ensures that all HKDF
* outputs are unique and cryptographically isolated, i.e. knowledge of one
* output doesn't reveal another.
*/
#define HKDF_CONTEXT_KEY_IDENTIFIER 1 /* info=<empty> */
#define HKDF_CONTEXT_PER_FILE_ENC_KEY 2 /* info=file_nonce */
#define HKDF_CONTEXT_DIRECT_KEY 3 /* info=mode_num */
#define HKDF_CONTEXT_IV_INO_LBLK_64_KEY 4 /* info=mode_num||fs_uuid */
#define HKDF_CONTEXT_DIRHASH_KEY 5 /* info=file_nonce */
#define HKDF_CONTEXT_IV_INO_LBLK_32_KEY 6 /* info=mode_num||fs_uuid */
#define HKDF_CONTEXT_INODE_HASH_KEY 7 /* info=<empty> */
fscrypt: v2 encryption policy support Add a new fscrypt policy version, "v2". It has the following changes from the original policy version, which we call "v1" (*): - Master keys (the user-provided encryption keys) are only ever used as input to HKDF-SHA512. This is more flexible and less error-prone, and it avoids the quirks and limitations of the AES-128-ECB based KDF. Three classes of cryptographically isolated subkeys are defined: - Per-file keys, like used in v1 policies except for the new KDF. - Per-mode keys. These implement the semantics of the DIRECT_KEY flag, which for v1 policies made the master key be used directly. These are also planned to be used for inline encryption when support for it is added. - Key identifiers (see below). - Each master key is identified by a 16-byte master_key_identifier, which is derived from the key itself using HKDF-SHA512. This prevents users from associating the wrong key with an encrypted file or directory. This was easily possible with v1 policies, which identified the key by an arbitrary 8-byte master_key_descriptor. - The key must be provided in the filesystem-level keyring, not in a process-subscribed keyring. The following UAPI additions are made: - The existing ioctl FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY can now be passed a fscrypt_policy_v2 to set a v2 encryption policy. It's disambiguated from fscrypt_policy/fscrypt_policy_v1 by the version code prefix. - A new ioctl FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX is added. It allows getting the v1 or v2 encryption policy of an encrypted file or directory. The existing FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY ioctl could not be used because it did not have a way for userspace to indicate which policy structure is expected. The new ioctl includes a size field, so it is extensible to future fscrypt policy versions. - The ioctls FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY, and FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS now support managing keys for v2 encryption policies. Such keys are kept logically separate from keys for v1 encryption policies, and are identified by 'identifier' rather than by 'descriptor'. The 'identifier' need not be provided when adding a key, since the kernel will calculate it anyway. This patch temporarily keeps adding/removing v2 policy keys behind the same permission check done for adding/removing v1 policy keys: capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN). However, the next patch will carefully take advantage of the cryptographically secure master_key_identifier to allow non-root users to add/remove v2 policy keys, thus providing a full replacement for v1 policies. (*) Actually, in the API fscrypt_policy::version is 0 while on-disk fscrypt_context::format is 1. But I believe it makes the most sense to advance both to '2' to have them be in sync, and to consider the numbering to start at 1 except for the API quirk. Reviewed-by: Paul Crowley <paulcrowley@google.com> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-08-05 05:35:47 +03:00
int fscrypt_hkdf_expand(const struct fscrypt_hkdf *hkdf, u8 context,
const u8 *info, unsigned int infolen,
u8 *okm, unsigned int okmlen);
fscrypt: add an HKDF-SHA512 implementation Add an implementation of HKDF (RFC 5869) to fscrypt, for the purpose of deriving additional key material from the fscrypt master keys for v2 encryption policies. HKDF is a key derivation function built on top of HMAC. We choose SHA-512 for the underlying unkeyed hash, and use an "hmac(sha512)" transform allocated from the crypto API. We'll be using this to replace the AES-ECB based KDF currently used to derive the per-file encryption keys. While the AES-ECB based KDF is believed to meet the original security requirements, it is nonstandard and has problems that don't exist in modern KDFs such as HKDF: 1. It's reversible. Given a derived key and nonce, an attacker can easily compute the master key. This is okay if the master key and derived keys are equally hard to compromise, but now we'd like to be more robust against threats such as a derived key being compromised through a timing attack, or a derived key for an in-use file being compromised after the master key has already been removed. 2. It doesn't evenly distribute the entropy from the master key; each 16 input bytes only affects the corresponding 16 output bytes. 3. It isn't easily extensible to deriving other values or keys, such as a public hash for securely identifying the key, or per-mode keys. Per-mode keys will be immediately useful for Adiantum encryption, for which fscrypt currently uses the master key directly, introducing unnecessary usage constraints. Per-mode keys will also be useful for hardware inline encryption, which is currently being worked on. HKDF solves all the above problems. Reviewed-by: Paul Crowley <paulcrowley@google.com> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-08-05 05:35:47 +03:00
void fscrypt_destroy_hkdf(struct fscrypt_hkdf *hkdf);
fscrypt: add an HKDF-SHA512 implementation Add an implementation of HKDF (RFC 5869) to fscrypt, for the purpose of deriving additional key material from the fscrypt master keys for v2 encryption policies. HKDF is a key derivation function built on top of HMAC. We choose SHA-512 for the underlying unkeyed hash, and use an "hmac(sha512)" transform allocated from the crypto API. We'll be using this to replace the AES-ECB based KDF currently used to derive the per-file encryption keys. While the AES-ECB based KDF is believed to meet the original security requirements, it is nonstandard and has problems that don't exist in modern KDFs such as HKDF: 1. It's reversible. Given a derived key and nonce, an attacker can easily compute the master key. This is okay if the master key and derived keys are equally hard to compromise, but now we'd like to be more robust against threats such as a derived key being compromised through a timing attack, or a derived key for an in-use file being compromised after the master key has already been removed. 2. It doesn't evenly distribute the entropy from the master key; each 16 input bytes only affects the corresponding 16 output bytes. 3. It isn't easily extensible to deriving other values or keys, such as a public hash for securely identifying the key, or per-mode keys. Per-mode keys will be immediately useful for Adiantum encryption, for which fscrypt currently uses the master key directly, introducing unnecessary usage constraints. Per-mode keys will also be useful for hardware inline encryption, which is currently being worked on. HKDF solves all the above problems. Reviewed-by: Paul Crowley <paulcrowley@google.com> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-08-05 05:35:47 +03:00
fscrypt: add inline encryption support Add support for inline encryption to fs/crypto/. With "inline encryption", the block layer handles the decryption/encryption as part of the bio, instead of the filesystem doing the crypto itself via Linux's crypto API. This model is needed in order to take advantage of the inline encryption hardware present on most modern mobile SoCs. To use inline encryption, the filesystem needs to be mounted with '-o inlinecrypt'. Blk-crypto will then be used instead of the traditional filesystem-layer crypto whenever possible to encrypt the contents of any encrypted files in that filesystem. Fscrypt still provides the key and IV to use, and the actual ciphertext on-disk is still the same; therefore it's testable using the existing fscrypt ciphertext verification tests. Note that since blk-crypto has a fallback to Linux's crypto API, and also supports all the encryption modes currently supported by fscrypt, this feature is usable and testable even without actual inline encryption hardware. Per-filesystem changes will be needed to set encryption contexts when submitting bios and to implement the 'inlinecrypt' mount option. This patch just adds the common code. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200702015607.1215430-3-satyat@google.com Co-developed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2020-07-02 04:56:05 +03:00
/* inline_crypt.c */
#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION_INLINE_CRYPT
int fscrypt_select_encryption_impl(struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci);
fscrypt: add inline encryption support Add support for inline encryption to fs/crypto/. With "inline encryption", the block layer handles the decryption/encryption as part of the bio, instead of the filesystem doing the crypto itself via Linux's crypto API. This model is needed in order to take advantage of the inline encryption hardware present on most modern mobile SoCs. To use inline encryption, the filesystem needs to be mounted with '-o inlinecrypt'. Blk-crypto will then be used instead of the traditional filesystem-layer crypto whenever possible to encrypt the contents of any encrypted files in that filesystem. Fscrypt still provides the key and IV to use, and the actual ciphertext on-disk is still the same; therefore it's testable using the existing fscrypt ciphertext verification tests. Note that since blk-crypto has a fallback to Linux's crypto API, and also supports all the encryption modes currently supported by fscrypt, this feature is usable and testable even without actual inline encryption hardware. Per-filesystem changes will be needed to set encryption contexts when submitting bios and to implement the 'inlinecrypt' mount option. This patch just adds the common code. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200702015607.1215430-3-satyat@google.com Co-developed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2020-07-02 04:56:05 +03:00
static inline bool
fscrypt_using_inline_encryption(const struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci)
fscrypt: add inline encryption support Add support for inline encryption to fs/crypto/. With "inline encryption", the block layer handles the decryption/encryption as part of the bio, instead of the filesystem doing the crypto itself via Linux's crypto API. This model is needed in order to take advantage of the inline encryption hardware present on most modern mobile SoCs. To use inline encryption, the filesystem needs to be mounted with '-o inlinecrypt'. Blk-crypto will then be used instead of the traditional filesystem-layer crypto whenever possible to encrypt the contents of any encrypted files in that filesystem. Fscrypt still provides the key and IV to use, and the actual ciphertext on-disk is still the same; therefore it's testable using the existing fscrypt ciphertext verification tests. Note that since blk-crypto has a fallback to Linux's crypto API, and also supports all the encryption modes currently supported by fscrypt, this feature is usable and testable even without actual inline encryption hardware. Per-filesystem changes will be needed to set encryption contexts when submitting bios and to implement the 'inlinecrypt' mount option. This patch just adds the common code. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200702015607.1215430-3-satyat@google.com Co-developed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2020-07-02 04:56:05 +03:00
{
return ci->ci_inlinecrypt;
}
int fscrypt_prepare_inline_crypt_key(struct fscrypt_prepared_key *prep_key,
const u8 *raw_key,
const struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci);
fscrypt: add inline encryption support Add support for inline encryption to fs/crypto/. With "inline encryption", the block layer handles the decryption/encryption as part of the bio, instead of the filesystem doing the crypto itself via Linux's crypto API. This model is needed in order to take advantage of the inline encryption hardware present on most modern mobile SoCs. To use inline encryption, the filesystem needs to be mounted with '-o inlinecrypt'. Blk-crypto will then be used instead of the traditional filesystem-layer crypto whenever possible to encrypt the contents of any encrypted files in that filesystem. Fscrypt still provides the key and IV to use, and the actual ciphertext on-disk is still the same; therefore it's testable using the existing fscrypt ciphertext verification tests. Note that since blk-crypto has a fallback to Linux's crypto API, and also supports all the encryption modes currently supported by fscrypt, this feature is usable and testable even without actual inline encryption hardware. Per-filesystem changes will be needed to set encryption contexts when submitting bios and to implement the 'inlinecrypt' mount option. This patch just adds the common code. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200702015607.1215430-3-satyat@google.com Co-developed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2020-07-02 04:56:05 +03:00
void fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key(struct super_block *sb,
struct fscrypt_prepared_key *prep_key);
fscrypt: add inline encryption support Add support for inline encryption to fs/crypto/. With "inline encryption", the block layer handles the decryption/encryption as part of the bio, instead of the filesystem doing the crypto itself via Linux's crypto API. This model is needed in order to take advantage of the inline encryption hardware present on most modern mobile SoCs. To use inline encryption, the filesystem needs to be mounted with '-o inlinecrypt'. Blk-crypto will then be used instead of the traditional filesystem-layer crypto whenever possible to encrypt the contents of any encrypted files in that filesystem. Fscrypt still provides the key and IV to use, and the actual ciphertext on-disk is still the same; therefore it's testable using the existing fscrypt ciphertext verification tests. Note that since blk-crypto has a fallback to Linux's crypto API, and also supports all the encryption modes currently supported by fscrypt, this feature is usable and testable even without actual inline encryption hardware. Per-filesystem changes will be needed to set encryption contexts when submitting bios and to implement the 'inlinecrypt' mount option. This patch just adds the common code. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200702015607.1215430-3-satyat@google.com Co-developed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2020-07-02 04:56:05 +03:00
/*
* Check whether the crypto transform or blk-crypto key has been allocated in
* @prep_key, depending on which encryption implementation the file will use.
*/
static inline bool
fscrypt_is_key_prepared(struct fscrypt_prepared_key *prep_key,
const struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci)
fscrypt: add inline encryption support Add support for inline encryption to fs/crypto/. With "inline encryption", the block layer handles the decryption/encryption as part of the bio, instead of the filesystem doing the crypto itself via Linux's crypto API. This model is needed in order to take advantage of the inline encryption hardware present on most modern mobile SoCs. To use inline encryption, the filesystem needs to be mounted with '-o inlinecrypt'. Blk-crypto will then be used instead of the traditional filesystem-layer crypto whenever possible to encrypt the contents of any encrypted files in that filesystem. Fscrypt still provides the key and IV to use, and the actual ciphertext on-disk is still the same; therefore it's testable using the existing fscrypt ciphertext verification tests. Note that since blk-crypto has a fallback to Linux's crypto API, and also supports all the encryption modes currently supported by fscrypt, this feature is usable and testable even without actual inline encryption hardware. Per-filesystem changes will be needed to set encryption contexts when submitting bios and to implement the 'inlinecrypt' mount option. This patch just adds the common code. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200702015607.1215430-3-satyat@google.com Co-developed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2020-07-02 04:56:05 +03:00
{
/*
* The two smp_load_acquire()'s here pair with the smp_store_release()'s
* in fscrypt_prepare_inline_crypt_key() and fscrypt_prepare_key().
* I.e., in some cases (namely, if this prep_key is a per-mode
* encryption key) another task can publish blk_key or tfm concurrently,
* executing a RELEASE barrier. We need to use smp_load_acquire() here
* to safely ACQUIRE the memory the other task published.
fscrypt: add inline encryption support Add support for inline encryption to fs/crypto/. With "inline encryption", the block layer handles the decryption/encryption as part of the bio, instead of the filesystem doing the crypto itself via Linux's crypto API. This model is needed in order to take advantage of the inline encryption hardware present on most modern mobile SoCs. To use inline encryption, the filesystem needs to be mounted with '-o inlinecrypt'. Blk-crypto will then be used instead of the traditional filesystem-layer crypto whenever possible to encrypt the contents of any encrypted files in that filesystem. Fscrypt still provides the key and IV to use, and the actual ciphertext on-disk is still the same; therefore it's testable using the existing fscrypt ciphertext verification tests. Note that since blk-crypto has a fallback to Linux's crypto API, and also supports all the encryption modes currently supported by fscrypt, this feature is usable and testable even without actual inline encryption hardware. Per-filesystem changes will be needed to set encryption contexts when submitting bios and to implement the 'inlinecrypt' mount option. This patch just adds the common code. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200702015607.1215430-3-satyat@google.com Co-developed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2020-07-02 04:56:05 +03:00
*/
if (fscrypt_using_inline_encryption(ci))
return smp_load_acquire(&prep_key->blk_key) != NULL;
return smp_load_acquire(&prep_key->tfm) != NULL;
fscrypt: add inline encryption support Add support for inline encryption to fs/crypto/. With "inline encryption", the block layer handles the decryption/encryption as part of the bio, instead of the filesystem doing the crypto itself via Linux's crypto API. This model is needed in order to take advantage of the inline encryption hardware present on most modern mobile SoCs. To use inline encryption, the filesystem needs to be mounted with '-o inlinecrypt'. Blk-crypto will then be used instead of the traditional filesystem-layer crypto whenever possible to encrypt the contents of any encrypted files in that filesystem. Fscrypt still provides the key and IV to use, and the actual ciphertext on-disk is still the same; therefore it's testable using the existing fscrypt ciphertext verification tests. Note that since blk-crypto has a fallback to Linux's crypto API, and also supports all the encryption modes currently supported by fscrypt, this feature is usable and testable even without actual inline encryption hardware. Per-filesystem changes will be needed to set encryption contexts when submitting bios and to implement the 'inlinecrypt' mount option. This patch just adds the common code. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200702015607.1215430-3-satyat@google.com Co-developed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2020-07-02 04:56:05 +03:00
}
#else /* CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION_INLINE_CRYPT */
static inline int fscrypt_select_encryption_impl(struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci)
fscrypt: add inline encryption support Add support for inline encryption to fs/crypto/. With "inline encryption", the block layer handles the decryption/encryption as part of the bio, instead of the filesystem doing the crypto itself via Linux's crypto API. This model is needed in order to take advantage of the inline encryption hardware present on most modern mobile SoCs. To use inline encryption, the filesystem needs to be mounted with '-o inlinecrypt'. Blk-crypto will then be used instead of the traditional filesystem-layer crypto whenever possible to encrypt the contents of any encrypted files in that filesystem. Fscrypt still provides the key and IV to use, and the actual ciphertext on-disk is still the same; therefore it's testable using the existing fscrypt ciphertext verification tests. Note that since blk-crypto has a fallback to Linux's crypto API, and also supports all the encryption modes currently supported by fscrypt, this feature is usable and testable even without actual inline encryption hardware. Per-filesystem changes will be needed to set encryption contexts when submitting bios and to implement the 'inlinecrypt' mount option. This patch just adds the common code. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200702015607.1215430-3-satyat@google.com Co-developed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2020-07-02 04:56:05 +03:00
{
return 0;
}
static inline bool
fscrypt_using_inline_encryption(const struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci)
fscrypt: add inline encryption support Add support for inline encryption to fs/crypto/. With "inline encryption", the block layer handles the decryption/encryption as part of the bio, instead of the filesystem doing the crypto itself via Linux's crypto API. This model is needed in order to take advantage of the inline encryption hardware present on most modern mobile SoCs. To use inline encryption, the filesystem needs to be mounted with '-o inlinecrypt'. Blk-crypto will then be used instead of the traditional filesystem-layer crypto whenever possible to encrypt the contents of any encrypted files in that filesystem. Fscrypt still provides the key and IV to use, and the actual ciphertext on-disk is still the same; therefore it's testable using the existing fscrypt ciphertext verification tests. Note that since blk-crypto has a fallback to Linux's crypto API, and also supports all the encryption modes currently supported by fscrypt, this feature is usable and testable even without actual inline encryption hardware. Per-filesystem changes will be needed to set encryption contexts when submitting bios and to implement the 'inlinecrypt' mount option. This patch just adds the common code. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200702015607.1215430-3-satyat@google.com Co-developed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2020-07-02 04:56:05 +03:00
{
return false;
}
static inline int
fscrypt_prepare_inline_crypt_key(struct fscrypt_prepared_key *prep_key,
const u8 *raw_key,
const struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci)
fscrypt: add inline encryption support Add support for inline encryption to fs/crypto/. With "inline encryption", the block layer handles the decryption/encryption as part of the bio, instead of the filesystem doing the crypto itself via Linux's crypto API. This model is needed in order to take advantage of the inline encryption hardware present on most modern mobile SoCs. To use inline encryption, the filesystem needs to be mounted with '-o inlinecrypt'. Blk-crypto will then be used instead of the traditional filesystem-layer crypto whenever possible to encrypt the contents of any encrypted files in that filesystem. Fscrypt still provides the key and IV to use, and the actual ciphertext on-disk is still the same; therefore it's testable using the existing fscrypt ciphertext verification tests. Note that since blk-crypto has a fallback to Linux's crypto API, and also supports all the encryption modes currently supported by fscrypt, this feature is usable and testable even without actual inline encryption hardware. Per-filesystem changes will be needed to set encryption contexts when submitting bios and to implement the 'inlinecrypt' mount option. This patch just adds the common code. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200702015607.1215430-3-satyat@google.com Co-developed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2020-07-02 04:56:05 +03:00
{
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
fscrypt: add inline encryption support Add support for inline encryption to fs/crypto/. With "inline encryption", the block layer handles the decryption/encryption as part of the bio, instead of the filesystem doing the crypto itself via Linux's crypto API. This model is needed in order to take advantage of the inline encryption hardware present on most modern mobile SoCs. To use inline encryption, the filesystem needs to be mounted with '-o inlinecrypt'. Blk-crypto will then be used instead of the traditional filesystem-layer crypto whenever possible to encrypt the contents of any encrypted files in that filesystem. Fscrypt still provides the key and IV to use, and the actual ciphertext on-disk is still the same; therefore it's testable using the existing fscrypt ciphertext verification tests. Note that since blk-crypto has a fallback to Linux's crypto API, and also supports all the encryption modes currently supported by fscrypt, this feature is usable and testable even without actual inline encryption hardware. Per-filesystem changes will be needed to set encryption contexts when submitting bios and to implement the 'inlinecrypt' mount option. This patch just adds the common code. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200702015607.1215430-3-satyat@google.com Co-developed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2020-07-02 04:56:05 +03:00
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
static inline void
fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key(struct super_block *sb,
struct fscrypt_prepared_key *prep_key)
fscrypt: add inline encryption support Add support for inline encryption to fs/crypto/. With "inline encryption", the block layer handles the decryption/encryption as part of the bio, instead of the filesystem doing the crypto itself via Linux's crypto API. This model is needed in order to take advantage of the inline encryption hardware present on most modern mobile SoCs. To use inline encryption, the filesystem needs to be mounted with '-o inlinecrypt'. Blk-crypto will then be used instead of the traditional filesystem-layer crypto whenever possible to encrypt the contents of any encrypted files in that filesystem. Fscrypt still provides the key and IV to use, and the actual ciphertext on-disk is still the same; therefore it's testable using the existing fscrypt ciphertext verification tests. Note that since blk-crypto has a fallback to Linux's crypto API, and also supports all the encryption modes currently supported by fscrypt, this feature is usable and testable even without actual inline encryption hardware. Per-filesystem changes will be needed to set encryption contexts when submitting bios and to implement the 'inlinecrypt' mount option. This patch just adds the common code. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200702015607.1215430-3-satyat@google.com Co-developed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2020-07-02 04:56:05 +03:00
{
}
static inline bool
fscrypt_is_key_prepared(struct fscrypt_prepared_key *prep_key,
const struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci)
fscrypt: add inline encryption support Add support for inline encryption to fs/crypto/. With "inline encryption", the block layer handles the decryption/encryption as part of the bio, instead of the filesystem doing the crypto itself via Linux's crypto API. This model is needed in order to take advantage of the inline encryption hardware present on most modern mobile SoCs. To use inline encryption, the filesystem needs to be mounted with '-o inlinecrypt'. Blk-crypto will then be used instead of the traditional filesystem-layer crypto whenever possible to encrypt the contents of any encrypted files in that filesystem. Fscrypt still provides the key and IV to use, and the actual ciphertext on-disk is still the same; therefore it's testable using the existing fscrypt ciphertext verification tests. Note that since blk-crypto has a fallback to Linux's crypto API, and also supports all the encryption modes currently supported by fscrypt, this feature is usable and testable even without actual inline encryption hardware. Per-filesystem changes will be needed to set encryption contexts when submitting bios and to implement the 'inlinecrypt' mount option. This patch just adds the common code. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200702015607.1215430-3-satyat@google.com Co-developed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2020-07-02 04:56:05 +03:00
{
return smp_load_acquire(&prep_key->tfm) != NULL;
fscrypt: add inline encryption support Add support for inline encryption to fs/crypto/. With "inline encryption", the block layer handles the decryption/encryption as part of the bio, instead of the filesystem doing the crypto itself via Linux's crypto API. This model is needed in order to take advantage of the inline encryption hardware present on most modern mobile SoCs. To use inline encryption, the filesystem needs to be mounted with '-o inlinecrypt'. Blk-crypto will then be used instead of the traditional filesystem-layer crypto whenever possible to encrypt the contents of any encrypted files in that filesystem. Fscrypt still provides the key and IV to use, and the actual ciphertext on-disk is still the same; therefore it's testable using the existing fscrypt ciphertext verification tests. Note that since blk-crypto has a fallback to Linux's crypto API, and also supports all the encryption modes currently supported by fscrypt, this feature is usable and testable even without actual inline encryption hardware. Per-filesystem changes will be needed to set encryption contexts when submitting bios and to implement the 'inlinecrypt' mount option. This patch just adds the common code. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200702015607.1215430-3-satyat@google.com Co-developed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2020-07-02 04:56:05 +03:00
}
#endif /* !CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION_INLINE_CRYPT */
fscrypt: add FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl Add a new fscrypt ioctl, FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY. This ioctl adds an encryption key to the filesystem's fscrypt keyring ->s_master_keys, making any files encrypted with that key appear "unlocked". Why we need this ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The main problem is that the "locked/unlocked" (ciphertext/plaintext) status of encrypted files is global, but the fscrypt keys are not. fscrypt only looks for keys in the keyring(s) the process accessing the filesystem is subscribed to: the thread keyring, process keyring, and session keyring, where the session keyring may contain the user keyring. Therefore, userspace has to put fscrypt keys in the keyrings for individual users or sessions. But this means that when a process with a different keyring tries to access encrypted files, whether they appear "unlocked" or not is nondeterministic. This is because it depends on whether the files are currently present in the inode cache. Fixing this by consistently providing each process its own view of the filesystem depending on whether it has the key or not isn't feasible due to how the VFS caches work. Furthermore, while sometimes users expect this behavior, it is misguided for two reasons. First, it would be an OS-level access control mechanism largely redundant with existing access control mechanisms such as UNIX file permissions, ACLs, LSMs, etc. Encryption is actually for protecting the data at rest. Second, almost all users of fscrypt actually do need the keys to be global. The largest users of fscrypt, Android and Chromium OS, achieve this by having PID 1 create a "session keyring" that is inherited by every process. This works, but it isn't scalable because it prevents session keyrings from being used for any other purpose. On general-purpose Linux distros, the 'fscrypt' userspace tool [1] can't similarly abuse the session keyring, so to make 'sudo' work on all systems it has to link all the user keyrings into root's user keyring [2]. This is ugly and raises security concerns. Moreover it can't make the keys available to system services, such as sshd trying to access the user's '~/.ssh' directory (see [3], [4]) or NetworkManager trying to read certificates from the user's home directory (see [5]); or to Docker containers (see [6], [7]). By having an API to add a key to the *filesystem* we'll be able to fix the above bugs, remove userspace workarounds, and clearly express the intended semantics: the locked/unlocked status of an encrypted directory is global, and encryption is orthogonal to OS-level access control. Why not use the add_key() syscall ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ We use an ioctl for this API rather than the existing add_key() system call because the ioctl gives us the flexibility needed to implement fscrypt-specific semantics that will be introduced in later patches: - Supporting key removal with the semantics such that the secret is removed immediately and any unused inodes using the key are evicted; also, the eviction of any in-use inodes can be retried. - Calculating a key-dependent cryptographic identifier and returning it to userspace. - Allowing keys to be added and removed by non-root users, but only keys for v2 encryption policies; and to prevent denial-of-service attacks, users can only remove keys they themselves have added, and a key is only really removed after all users who added it have removed it. Trying to shoehorn these semantics into the keyrings syscalls would be very difficult, whereas the ioctls make things much easier. However, to reuse code the implementation still uses the keyrings service internally. Thus we get lockless RCU-mode key lookups without having to re-implement it, and the keys automatically show up in /proc/keys for debugging purposes. References: [1] https://github.com/google/fscrypt [2] https://goo.gl/55cCrI#heading=h.vf09isp98isb [3] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/111#issuecomment-444347939 [4] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/116 [5] https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/fscrypt/+bug/1770715 [6] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/128 [7] https://askubuntu.com/questions/1130306/cannot-run-docker-on-an-encrypted-filesystem Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-08-05 05:35:46 +03:00
/* keyring.c */
/*
* fscrypt_master_key_secret - secret key material of an in-use master key
*/
struct fscrypt_master_key_secret {
fscrypt: v2 encryption policy support Add a new fscrypt policy version, "v2". It has the following changes from the original policy version, which we call "v1" (*): - Master keys (the user-provided encryption keys) are only ever used as input to HKDF-SHA512. This is more flexible and less error-prone, and it avoids the quirks and limitations of the AES-128-ECB based KDF. Three classes of cryptographically isolated subkeys are defined: - Per-file keys, like used in v1 policies except for the new KDF. - Per-mode keys. These implement the semantics of the DIRECT_KEY flag, which for v1 policies made the master key be used directly. These are also planned to be used for inline encryption when support for it is added. - Key identifiers (see below). - Each master key is identified by a 16-byte master_key_identifier, which is derived from the key itself using HKDF-SHA512. This prevents users from associating the wrong key with an encrypted file or directory. This was easily possible with v1 policies, which identified the key by an arbitrary 8-byte master_key_descriptor. - The key must be provided in the filesystem-level keyring, not in a process-subscribed keyring. The following UAPI additions are made: - The existing ioctl FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY can now be passed a fscrypt_policy_v2 to set a v2 encryption policy. It's disambiguated from fscrypt_policy/fscrypt_policy_v1 by the version code prefix. - A new ioctl FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX is added. It allows getting the v1 or v2 encryption policy of an encrypted file or directory. The existing FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY ioctl could not be used because it did not have a way for userspace to indicate which policy structure is expected. The new ioctl includes a size field, so it is extensible to future fscrypt policy versions. - The ioctls FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY, and FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS now support managing keys for v2 encryption policies. Such keys are kept logically separate from keys for v1 encryption policies, and are identified by 'identifier' rather than by 'descriptor'. The 'identifier' need not be provided when adding a key, since the kernel will calculate it anyway. This patch temporarily keeps adding/removing v2 policy keys behind the same permission check done for adding/removing v1 policy keys: capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN). However, the next patch will carefully take advantage of the cryptographically secure master_key_identifier to allow non-root users to add/remove v2 policy keys, thus providing a full replacement for v1 policies. (*) Actually, in the API fscrypt_policy::version is 0 while on-disk fscrypt_context::format is 1. But I believe it makes the most sense to advance both to '2' to have them be in sync, and to consider the numbering to start at 1 except for the API quirk. Reviewed-by: Paul Crowley <paulcrowley@google.com> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-08-05 05:35:47 +03:00
/*
* For v2 policy keys: HKDF context keyed by this master key.
* For v1 policy keys: not set (hkdf.hmac_tfm == NULL).
*/
struct fscrypt_hkdf hkdf;
/*
* Size of the raw key in bytes. This remains set even if ->raw was
* zeroized due to no longer being needed. I.e. we still remember the
* size of the key even if we don't need to remember the key itself.
*/
fscrypt: add FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl Add a new fscrypt ioctl, FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY. This ioctl adds an encryption key to the filesystem's fscrypt keyring ->s_master_keys, making any files encrypted with that key appear "unlocked". Why we need this ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The main problem is that the "locked/unlocked" (ciphertext/plaintext) status of encrypted files is global, but the fscrypt keys are not. fscrypt only looks for keys in the keyring(s) the process accessing the filesystem is subscribed to: the thread keyring, process keyring, and session keyring, where the session keyring may contain the user keyring. Therefore, userspace has to put fscrypt keys in the keyrings for individual users or sessions. But this means that when a process with a different keyring tries to access encrypted files, whether they appear "unlocked" or not is nondeterministic. This is because it depends on whether the files are currently present in the inode cache. Fixing this by consistently providing each process its own view of the filesystem depending on whether it has the key or not isn't feasible due to how the VFS caches work. Furthermore, while sometimes users expect this behavior, it is misguided for two reasons. First, it would be an OS-level access control mechanism largely redundant with existing access control mechanisms such as UNIX file permissions, ACLs, LSMs, etc. Encryption is actually for protecting the data at rest. Second, almost all users of fscrypt actually do need the keys to be global. The largest users of fscrypt, Android and Chromium OS, achieve this by having PID 1 create a "session keyring" that is inherited by every process. This works, but it isn't scalable because it prevents session keyrings from being used for any other purpose. On general-purpose Linux distros, the 'fscrypt' userspace tool [1] can't similarly abuse the session keyring, so to make 'sudo' work on all systems it has to link all the user keyrings into root's user keyring [2]. This is ugly and raises security concerns. Moreover it can't make the keys available to system services, such as sshd trying to access the user's '~/.ssh' directory (see [3], [4]) or NetworkManager trying to read certificates from the user's home directory (see [5]); or to Docker containers (see [6], [7]). By having an API to add a key to the *filesystem* we'll be able to fix the above bugs, remove userspace workarounds, and clearly express the intended semantics: the locked/unlocked status of an encrypted directory is global, and encryption is orthogonal to OS-level access control. Why not use the add_key() syscall ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ We use an ioctl for this API rather than the existing add_key() system call because the ioctl gives us the flexibility needed to implement fscrypt-specific semantics that will be introduced in later patches: - Supporting key removal with the semantics such that the secret is removed immediately and any unused inodes using the key are evicted; also, the eviction of any in-use inodes can be retried. - Calculating a key-dependent cryptographic identifier and returning it to userspace. - Allowing keys to be added and removed by non-root users, but only keys for v2 encryption policies; and to prevent denial-of-service attacks, users can only remove keys they themselves have added, and a key is only really removed after all users who added it have removed it. Trying to shoehorn these semantics into the keyrings syscalls would be very difficult, whereas the ioctls make things much easier. However, to reuse code the implementation still uses the keyrings service internally. Thus we get lockless RCU-mode key lookups without having to re-implement it, and the keys automatically show up in /proc/keys for debugging purposes. References: [1] https://github.com/google/fscrypt [2] https://goo.gl/55cCrI#heading=h.vf09isp98isb [3] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/111#issuecomment-444347939 [4] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/116 [5] https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/fscrypt/+bug/1770715 [6] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/128 [7] https://askubuntu.com/questions/1130306/cannot-run-docker-on-an-encrypted-filesystem Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-08-05 05:35:46 +03:00
u32 size;
fscrypt: v2 encryption policy support Add a new fscrypt policy version, "v2". It has the following changes from the original policy version, which we call "v1" (*): - Master keys (the user-provided encryption keys) are only ever used as input to HKDF-SHA512. This is more flexible and less error-prone, and it avoids the quirks and limitations of the AES-128-ECB based KDF. Three classes of cryptographically isolated subkeys are defined: - Per-file keys, like used in v1 policies except for the new KDF. - Per-mode keys. These implement the semantics of the DIRECT_KEY flag, which for v1 policies made the master key be used directly. These are also planned to be used for inline encryption when support for it is added. - Key identifiers (see below). - Each master key is identified by a 16-byte master_key_identifier, which is derived from the key itself using HKDF-SHA512. This prevents users from associating the wrong key with an encrypted file or directory. This was easily possible with v1 policies, which identified the key by an arbitrary 8-byte master_key_descriptor. - The key must be provided in the filesystem-level keyring, not in a process-subscribed keyring. The following UAPI additions are made: - The existing ioctl FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY can now be passed a fscrypt_policy_v2 to set a v2 encryption policy. It's disambiguated from fscrypt_policy/fscrypt_policy_v1 by the version code prefix. - A new ioctl FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX is added. It allows getting the v1 or v2 encryption policy of an encrypted file or directory. The existing FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY ioctl could not be used because it did not have a way for userspace to indicate which policy structure is expected. The new ioctl includes a size field, so it is extensible to future fscrypt policy versions. - The ioctls FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY, and FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS now support managing keys for v2 encryption policies. Such keys are kept logically separate from keys for v1 encryption policies, and are identified by 'identifier' rather than by 'descriptor'. The 'identifier' need not be provided when adding a key, since the kernel will calculate it anyway. This patch temporarily keeps adding/removing v2 policy keys behind the same permission check done for adding/removing v1 policy keys: capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN). However, the next patch will carefully take advantage of the cryptographically secure master_key_identifier to allow non-root users to add/remove v2 policy keys, thus providing a full replacement for v1 policies. (*) Actually, in the API fscrypt_policy::version is 0 while on-disk fscrypt_context::format is 1. But I believe it makes the most sense to advance both to '2' to have them be in sync, and to consider the numbering to start at 1 except for the API quirk. Reviewed-by: Paul Crowley <paulcrowley@google.com> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-08-05 05:35:47 +03:00
/* For v1 policy keys: the raw key. Wiped for v2 policy keys. */
fscrypt: add FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl Add a new fscrypt ioctl, FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY. This ioctl adds an encryption key to the filesystem's fscrypt keyring ->s_master_keys, making any files encrypted with that key appear "unlocked". Why we need this ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The main problem is that the "locked/unlocked" (ciphertext/plaintext) status of encrypted files is global, but the fscrypt keys are not. fscrypt only looks for keys in the keyring(s) the process accessing the filesystem is subscribed to: the thread keyring, process keyring, and session keyring, where the session keyring may contain the user keyring. Therefore, userspace has to put fscrypt keys in the keyrings for individual users or sessions. But this means that when a process with a different keyring tries to access encrypted files, whether they appear "unlocked" or not is nondeterministic. This is because it depends on whether the files are currently present in the inode cache. Fixing this by consistently providing each process its own view of the filesystem depending on whether it has the key or not isn't feasible due to how the VFS caches work. Furthermore, while sometimes users expect this behavior, it is misguided for two reasons. First, it would be an OS-level access control mechanism largely redundant with existing access control mechanisms such as UNIX file permissions, ACLs, LSMs, etc. Encryption is actually for protecting the data at rest. Second, almost all users of fscrypt actually do need the keys to be global. The largest users of fscrypt, Android and Chromium OS, achieve this by having PID 1 create a "session keyring" that is inherited by every process. This works, but it isn't scalable because it prevents session keyrings from being used for any other purpose. On general-purpose Linux distros, the 'fscrypt' userspace tool [1] can't similarly abuse the session keyring, so to make 'sudo' work on all systems it has to link all the user keyrings into root's user keyring [2]. This is ugly and raises security concerns. Moreover it can't make the keys available to system services, such as sshd trying to access the user's '~/.ssh' directory (see [3], [4]) or NetworkManager trying to read certificates from the user's home directory (see [5]); or to Docker containers (see [6], [7]). By having an API to add a key to the *filesystem* we'll be able to fix the above bugs, remove userspace workarounds, and clearly express the intended semantics: the locked/unlocked status of an encrypted directory is global, and encryption is orthogonal to OS-level access control. Why not use the add_key() syscall ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ We use an ioctl for this API rather than the existing add_key() system call because the ioctl gives us the flexibility needed to implement fscrypt-specific semantics that will be introduced in later patches: - Supporting key removal with the semantics such that the secret is removed immediately and any unused inodes using the key are evicted; also, the eviction of any in-use inodes can be retried. - Calculating a key-dependent cryptographic identifier and returning it to userspace. - Allowing keys to be added and removed by non-root users, but only keys for v2 encryption policies; and to prevent denial-of-service attacks, users can only remove keys they themselves have added, and a key is only really removed after all users who added it have removed it. Trying to shoehorn these semantics into the keyrings syscalls would be very difficult, whereas the ioctls make things much easier. However, to reuse code the implementation still uses the keyrings service internally. Thus we get lockless RCU-mode key lookups without having to re-implement it, and the keys automatically show up in /proc/keys for debugging purposes. References: [1] https://github.com/google/fscrypt [2] https://goo.gl/55cCrI#heading=h.vf09isp98isb [3] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/111#issuecomment-444347939 [4] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/116 [5] https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/fscrypt/+bug/1770715 [6] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/128 [7] https://askubuntu.com/questions/1130306/cannot-run-docker-on-an-encrypted-filesystem Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-08-05 05:35:46 +03:00
u8 raw[FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE];
} __randomize_layout;
/*
* fscrypt_master_key - an in-use master key
*
* This represents a master encryption key which has been added to the
fscrypt: track master key presence separately from secret Master keys can be in one of three states: present, incompletely removed, and absent (as per FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_* used in the UAPI). Currently, the way that "present" is distinguished from "incompletely removed" internally is by whether ->mk_secret exists or not. With extent-based encryption, it will be necessary to allow per-extent keys to be derived while the master key is incompletely removed, so that I/O on open files will reliably continue working after removal of the key has been initiated. (We could allow I/O to sometimes fail in that case, but that seems problematic for reasons such as writes getting silently thrown away and diverging from the existing fscrypt semantics.) Therefore, when the filesystem is using extent-based encryption, ->mk_secret can't be wiped when the key becomes incompletely removed. As a prerequisite for doing that, this patch makes the "present" state be tracked using a new field, ->mk_present. No behavior is changed yet. The basic idea here is borrowed from Josef Bacik's patch "fscrypt: use a flag to indicate that the master key is being evicted" (https://lore.kernel.org/r/e86c16dddc049ff065f877d793ad773e4c6bfad9.1696970227.git.josef@toxicpanda.com). I reimplemented it using a "present" bool instead of an "evicted" flag, fixed a couple bugs, and tried to update everything to be consistent. Note: I considered adding a ->mk_status field instead, holding one of FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_*. At first that seemed nice, but it ended up being more complex (despite simplifying FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS), since it would have introduced redundancy and had weird locking rules. Reviewed-by: Neal Gompa <neal@gompa.dev> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231015061055.62673-1-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2023-10-15 09:10:55 +03:00
* filesystem. There are three high-level states that a key can be in:
*
* FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_PRESENT
* Key is fully usable; it can be used to unlock inodes that are encrypted
* with it (this includes being able to create new inodes). ->mk_present
* indicates whether the key is in this state. ->mk_secret exists, the key
* is in the keyring, and ->mk_active_refs > 0 due to ->mk_present.
*
* FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_INCOMPLETELY_REMOVED
* Removal of this key has been initiated, but some inodes that were
* unlocked with it are still in-use. Like ABSENT, ->mk_secret is wiped,
* and the key can no longer be used to unlock inodes. Unlike ABSENT, the
* key is still in the keyring; ->mk_decrypted_inodes is nonempty; and
* ->mk_active_refs > 0, being equal to the size of ->mk_decrypted_inodes.
*
* This state transitions to ABSENT if ->mk_decrypted_inodes becomes empty,
* or to PRESENT if FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY is called again for this key.
*
* FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_ABSENT
* Key is fully removed. The key is no longer in the keyring,
* ->mk_decrypted_inodes is empty, ->mk_active_refs == 0, ->mk_secret is
* wiped, and the key can no longer be used to unlock inodes.
fscrypt: add FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl Add a new fscrypt ioctl, FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY. This ioctl adds an encryption key to the filesystem's fscrypt keyring ->s_master_keys, making any files encrypted with that key appear "unlocked". Why we need this ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The main problem is that the "locked/unlocked" (ciphertext/plaintext) status of encrypted files is global, but the fscrypt keys are not. fscrypt only looks for keys in the keyring(s) the process accessing the filesystem is subscribed to: the thread keyring, process keyring, and session keyring, where the session keyring may contain the user keyring. Therefore, userspace has to put fscrypt keys in the keyrings for individual users or sessions. But this means that when a process with a different keyring tries to access encrypted files, whether they appear "unlocked" or not is nondeterministic. This is because it depends on whether the files are currently present in the inode cache. Fixing this by consistently providing each process its own view of the filesystem depending on whether it has the key or not isn't feasible due to how the VFS caches work. Furthermore, while sometimes users expect this behavior, it is misguided for two reasons. First, it would be an OS-level access control mechanism largely redundant with existing access control mechanisms such as UNIX file permissions, ACLs, LSMs, etc. Encryption is actually for protecting the data at rest. Second, almost all users of fscrypt actually do need the keys to be global. The largest users of fscrypt, Android and Chromium OS, achieve this by having PID 1 create a "session keyring" that is inherited by every process. This works, but it isn't scalable because it prevents session keyrings from being used for any other purpose. On general-purpose Linux distros, the 'fscrypt' userspace tool [1] can't similarly abuse the session keyring, so to make 'sudo' work on all systems it has to link all the user keyrings into root's user keyring [2]. This is ugly and raises security concerns. Moreover it can't make the keys available to system services, such as sshd trying to access the user's '~/.ssh' directory (see [3], [4]) or NetworkManager trying to read certificates from the user's home directory (see [5]); or to Docker containers (see [6], [7]). By having an API to add a key to the *filesystem* we'll be able to fix the above bugs, remove userspace workarounds, and clearly express the intended semantics: the locked/unlocked status of an encrypted directory is global, and encryption is orthogonal to OS-level access control. Why not use the add_key() syscall ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ We use an ioctl for this API rather than the existing add_key() system call because the ioctl gives us the flexibility needed to implement fscrypt-specific semantics that will be introduced in later patches: - Supporting key removal with the semantics such that the secret is removed immediately and any unused inodes using the key are evicted; also, the eviction of any in-use inodes can be retried. - Calculating a key-dependent cryptographic identifier and returning it to userspace. - Allowing keys to be added and removed by non-root users, but only keys for v2 encryption policies; and to prevent denial-of-service attacks, users can only remove keys they themselves have added, and a key is only really removed after all users who added it have removed it. Trying to shoehorn these semantics into the keyrings syscalls would be very difficult, whereas the ioctls make things much easier. However, to reuse code the implementation still uses the keyrings service internally. Thus we get lockless RCU-mode key lookups without having to re-implement it, and the keys automatically show up in /proc/keys for debugging purposes. References: [1] https://github.com/google/fscrypt [2] https://goo.gl/55cCrI#heading=h.vf09isp98isb [3] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/111#issuecomment-444347939 [4] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/116 [5] https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/fscrypt/+bug/1770715 [6] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/128 [7] https://askubuntu.com/questions/1130306/cannot-run-docker-on-an-encrypted-filesystem Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-08-05 05:35:46 +03:00
*/
struct fscrypt_master_key {
fscrypt: stop using keyrings subsystem for fscrypt_master_key The approach of fs/crypto/ internally managing the fscrypt_master_key structs as the payloads of "struct key" objects contained in a "struct key" keyring has outlived its usefulness. The original idea was to simplify the code by reusing code from the keyrings subsystem. However, several issues have arisen that can't easily be resolved: - When a master key struct is destroyed, blk_crypto_evict_key() must be called on any per-mode keys embedded in it. (This started being the case when inline encryption support was added.) Yet, the keyrings subsystem can arbitrarily delay the destruction of keys, even past the time the filesystem was unmounted. Therefore, currently there is no easy way to call blk_crypto_evict_key() when a master key is destroyed. Currently, this is worked around by holding an extra reference to the filesystem's request_queue(s). But it was overlooked that the request_queue reference is *not* guaranteed to pin the corresponding blk_crypto_profile too; for device-mapper devices that support inline crypto, it doesn't. This can cause a use-after-free. - When the last inode that was using an incompletely-removed master key is evicted, the master key removal is completed by removing the key struct from the keyring. Currently this is done via key_invalidate(). Yet, key_invalidate() takes the key semaphore. This can deadlock when called from the shrinker, since in fscrypt_ioctl_add_key(), memory is allocated with GFP_KERNEL under the same semaphore. - More generally, the fact that the keyrings subsystem can arbitrarily delay the destruction of keys (via garbage collection delay, or via random processes getting temporary key references) is undesirable, as it means we can't strictly guarantee that all secrets are ever wiped. - Doing the master key lookups via the keyrings subsystem results in the key_permission LSM hook being called. fscrypt doesn't want this, as all access control for encrypted files is designed to happen via the files themselves, like any other files. The workaround which SELinux users are using is to change their SELinux policy to grant key search access to all domains. This works, but it is an odd extra step that shouldn't really have to be done. The fix for all these issues is to change the implementation to what I should have done originally: don't use the keyrings subsystem to keep track of the filesystem's fscrypt_master_key structs. Instead, just store them in a regular kernel data structure, and rework the reference counting, locking, and lifetime accordingly. Retain support for RCU-mode key lookups by using a hash table. Replace fscrypt_sb_free() with fscrypt_sb_delete(), which releases the keys synchronously and runs a bit earlier during unmount, so that block devices are still available. A side effect of this patch is that neither the master keys themselves nor the filesystem keyrings will be listed in /proc/keys anymore. ("Master key users" and the master key users keyrings will still be listed.) However, this was mostly an implementation detail, and it was intended just for debugging purposes. I don't know of anyone using it. This patch does *not* change how "master key users" (->mk_users) works; that still uses the keyrings subsystem. That is still needed for key quotas, and changing that isn't necessary to solve the issues listed above. If we decide to change that too, it would be a separate patch. I've marked this as fixing the original commit that added the fscrypt keyring, but as noted above the most important issue that this patch fixes wasn't introduced until the addition of inline encryption support. Fixes: 22d94f493bfb ("fscrypt: add FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220901193208.138056-2-ebiggers@kernel.org
2022-09-01 22:32:06 +03:00
/*
* Link in ->s_master_keys->key_hashtable.
fscrypt: stop using keyrings subsystem for fscrypt_master_key The approach of fs/crypto/ internally managing the fscrypt_master_key structs as the payloads of "struct key" objects contained in a "struct key" keyring has outlived its usefulness. The original idea was to simplify the code by reusing code from the keyrings subsystem. However, several issues have arisen that can't easily be resolved: - When a master key struct is destroyed, blk_crypto_evict_key() must be called on any per-mode keys embedded in it. (This started being the case when inline encryption support was added.) Yet, the keyrings subsystem can arbitrarily delay the destruction of keys, even past the time the filesystem was unmounted. Therefore, currently there is no easy way to call blk_crypto_evict_key() when a master key is destroyed. Currently, this is worked around by holding an extra reference to the filesystem's request_queue(s). But it was overlooked that the request_queue reference is *not* guaranteed to pin the corresponding blk_crypto_profile too; for device-mapper devices that support inline crypto, it doesn't. This can cause a use-after-free. - When the last inode that was using an incompletely-removed master key is evicted, the master key removal is completed by removing the key struct from the keyring. Currently this is done via key_invalidate(). Yet, key_invalidate() takes the key semaphore. This can deadlock when called from the shrinker, since in fscrypt_ioctl_add_key(), memory is allocated with GFP_KERNEL under the same semaphore. - More generally, the fact that the keyrings subsystem can arbitrarily delay the destruction of keys (via garbage collection delay, or via random processes getting temporary key references) is undesirable, as it means we can't strictly guarantee that all secrets are ever wiped. - Doing the master key lookups via the keyrings subsystem results in the key_permission LSM hook being called. fscrypt doesn't want this, as all access control for encrypted files is designed to happen via the files themselves, like any other files. The workaround which SELinux users are using is to change their SELinux policy to grant key search access to all domains. This works, but it is an odd extra step that shouldn't really have to be done. The fix for all these issues is to change the implementation to what I should have done originally: don't use the keyrings subsystem to keep track of the filesystem's fscrypt_master_key structs. Instead, just store them in a regular kernel data structure, and rework the reference counting, locking, and lifetime accordingly. Retain support for RCU-mode key lookups by using a hash table. Replace fscrypt_sb_free() with fscrypt_sb_delete(), which releases the keys synchronously and runs a bit earlier during unmount, so that block devices are still available. A side effect of this patch is that neither the master keys themselves nor the filesystem keyrings will be listed in /proc/keys anymore. ("Master key users" and the master key users keyrings will still be listed.) However, this was mostly an implementation detail, and it was intended just for debugging purposes. I don't know of anyone using it. This patch does *not* change how "master key users" (->mk_users) works; that still uses the keyrings subsystem. That is still needed for key quotas, and changing that isn't necessary to solve the issues listed above. If we decide to change that too, it would be a separate patch. I've marked this as fixing the original commit that added the fscrypt keyring, but as noted above the most important issue that this patch fixes wasn't introduced until the addition of inline encryption support. Fixes: 22d94f493bfb ("fscrypt: add FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220901193208.138056-2-ebiggers@kernel.org
2022-09-01 22:32:06 +03:00
* Only valid if ->mk_active_refs > 0.
*/
struct hlist_node mk_node;
fscrypt: track master key presence separately from secret Master keys can be in one of three states: present, incompletely removed, and absent (as per FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_* used in the UAPI). Currently, the way that "present" is distinguished from "incompletely removed" internally is by whether ->mk_secret exists or not. With extent-based encryption, it will be necessary to allow per-extent keys to be derived while the master key is incompletely removed, so that I/O on open files will reliably continue working after removal of the key has been initiated. (We could allow I/O to sometimes fail in that case, but that seems problematic for reasons such as writes getting silently thrown away and diverging from the existing fscrypt semantics.) Therefore, when the filesystem is using extent-based encryption, ->mk_secret can't be wiped when the key becomes incompletely removed. As a prerequisite for doing that, this patch makes the "present" state be tracked using a new field, ->mk_present. No behavior is changed yet. The basic idea here is borrowed from Josef Bacik's patch "fscrypt: use a flag to indicate that the master key is being evicted" (https://lore.kernel.org/r/e86c16dddc049ff065f877d793ad773e4c6bfad9.1696970227.git.josef@toxicpanda.com). I reimplemented it using a "present" bool instead of an "evicted" flag, fixed a couple bugs, and tried to update everything to be consistent. Note: I considered adding a ->mk_status field instead, holding one of FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_*. At first that seemed nice, but it ended up being more complex (despite simplifying FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS), since it would have introduced redundancy and had weird locking rules. Reviewed-by: Neal Gompa <neal@gompa.dev> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231015061055.62673-1-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2023-10-15 09:10:55 +03:00
/* Semaphore that protects ->mk_secret, ->mk_users, and ->mk_present */
fscrypt: stop using keyrings subsystem for fscrypt_master_key The approach of fs/crypto/ internally managing the fscrypt_master_key structs as the payloads of "struct key" objects contained in a "struct key" keyring has outlived its usefulness. The original idea was to simplify the code by reusing code from the keyrings subsystem. However, several issues have arisen that can't easily be resolved: - When a master key struct is destroyed, blk_crypto_evict_key() must be called on any per-mode keys embedded in it. (This started being the case when inline encryption support was added.) Yet, the keyrings subsystem can arbitrarily delay the destruction of keys, even past the time the filesystem was unmounted. Therefore, currently there is no easy way to call blk_crypto_evict_key() when a master key is destroyed. Currently, this is worked around by holding an extra reference to the filesystem's request_queue(s). But it was overlooked that the request_queue reference is *not* guaranteed to pin the corresponding blk_crypto_profile too; for device-mapper devices that support inline crypto, it doesn't. This can cause a use-after-free. - When the last inode that was using an incompletely-removed master key is evicted, the master key removal is completed by removing the key struct from the keyring. Currently this is done via key_invalidate(). Yet, key_invalidate() takes the key semaphore. This can deadlock when called from the shrinker, since in fscrypt_ioctl_add_key(), memory is allocated with GFP_KERNEL under the same semaphore. - More generally, the fact that the keyrings subsystem can arbitrarily delay the destruction of keys (via garbage collection delay, or via random processes getting temporary key references) is undesirable, as it means we can't strictly guarantee that all secrets are ever wiped. - Doing the master key lookups via the keyrings subsystem results in the key_permission LSM hook being called. fscrypt doesn't want this, as all access control for encrypted files is designed to happen via the files themselves, like any other files. The workaround which SELinux users are using is to change their SELinux policy to grant key search access to all domains. This works, but it is an odd extra step that shouldn't really have to be done. The fix for all these issues is to change the implementation to what I should have done originally: don't use the keyrings subsystem to keep track of the filesystem's fscrypt_master_key structs. Instead, just store them in a regular kernel data structure, and rework the reference counting, locking, and lifetime accordingly. Retain support for RCU-mode key lookups by using a hash table. Replace fscrypt_sb_free() with fscrypt_sb_delete(), which releases the keys synchronously and runs a bit earlier during unmount, so that block devices are still available. A side effect of this patch is that neither the master keys themselves nor the filesystem keyrings will be listed in /proc/keys anymore. ("Master key users" and the master key users keyrings will still be listed.) However, this was mostly an implementation detail, and it was intended just for debugging purposes. I don't know of anyone using it. This patch does *not* change how "master key users" (->mk_users) works; that still uses the keyrings subsystem. That is still needed for key quotas, and changing that isn't necessary to solve the issues listed above. If we decide to change that too, it would be a separate patch. I've marked this as fixing the original commit that added the fscrypt keyring, but as noted above the most important issue that this patch fixes wasn't introduced until the addition of inline encryption support. Fixes: 22d94f493bfb ("fscrypt: add FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220901193208.138056-2-ebiggers@kernel.org
2022-09-01 22:32:06 +03:00
struct rw_semaphore mk_sem;
/*
* Active and structural reference counts. An active ref guarantees
* that the struct continues to exist, continues to be in the keyring
* ->s_master_keys, and that any embedded subkeys (e.g.
fscrypt: stop using keyrings subsystem for fscrypt_master_key The approach of fs/crypto/ internally managing the fscrypt_master_key structs as the payloads of "struct key" objects contained in a "struct key" keyring has outlived its usefulness. The original idea was to simplify the code by reusing code from the keyrings subsystem. However, several issues have arisen that can't easily be resolved: - When a master key struct is destroyed, blk_crypto_evict_key() must be called on any per-mode keys embedded in it. (This started being the case when inline encryption support was added.) Yet, the keyrings subsystem can arbitrarily delay the destruction of keys, even past the time the filesystem was unmounted. Therefore, currently there is no easy way to call blk_crypto_evict_key() when a master key is destroyed. Currently, this is worked around by holding an extra reference to the filesystem's request_queue(s). But it was overlooked that the request_queue reference is *not* guaranteed to pin the corresponding blk_crypto_profile too; for device-mapper devices that support inline crypto, it doesn't. This can cause a use-after-free. - When the last inode that was using an incompletely-removed master key is evicted, the master key removal is completed by removing the key struct from the keyring. Currently this is done via key_invalidate(). Yet, key_invalidate() takes the key semaphore. This can deadlock when called from the shrinker, since in fscrypt_ioctl_add_key(), memory is allocated with GFP_KERNEL under the same semaphore. - More generally, the fact that the keyrings subsystem can arbitrarily delay the destruction of keys (via garbage collection delay, or via random processes getting temporary key references) is undesirable, as it means we can't strictly guarantee that all secrets are ever wiped. - Doing the master key lookups via the keyrings subsystem results in the key_permission LSM hook being called. fscrypt doesn't want this, as all access control for encrypted files is designed to happen via the files themselves, like any other files. The workaround which SELinux users are using is to change their SELinux policy to grant key search access to all domains. This works, but it is an odd extra step that shouldn't really have to be done. The fix for all these issues is to change the implementation to what I should have done originally: don't use the keyrings subsystem to keep track of the filesystem's fscrypt_master_key structs. Instead, just store them in a regular kernel data structure, and rework the reference counting, locking, and lifetime accordingly. Retain support for RCU-mode key lookups by using a hash table. Replace fscrypt_sb_free() with fscrypt_sb_delete(), which releases the keys synchronously and runs a bit earlier during unmount, so that block devices are still available. A side effect of this patch is that neither the master keys themselves nor the filesystem keyrings will be listed in /proc/keys anymore. ("Master key users" and the master key users keyrings will still be listed.) However, this was mostly an implementation detail, and it was intended just for debugging purposes. I don't know of anyone using it. This patch does *not* change how "master key users" (->mk_users) works; that still uses the keyrings subsystem. That is still needed for key quotas, and changing that isn't necessary to solve the issues listed above. If we decide to change that too, it would be a separate patch. I've marked this as fixing the original commit that added the fscrypt keyring, but as noted above the most important issue that this patch fixes wasn't introduced until the addition of inline encryption support. Fixes: 22d94f493bfb ("fscrypt: add FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220901193208.138056-2-ebiggers@kernel.org
2022-09-01 22:32:06 +03:00
* ->mk_direct_keys) that have been prepared continue to exist.
* A structural ref only guarantees that the struct continues to exist.
*
fscrypt: track master key presence separately from secret Master keys can be in one of three states: present, incompletely removed, and absent (as per FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_* used in the UAPI). Currently, the way that "present" is distinguished from "incompletely removed" internally is by whether ->mk_secret exists or not. With extent-based encryption, it will be necessary to allow per-extent keys to be derived while the master key is incompletely removed, so that I/O on open files will reliably continue working after removal of the key has been initiated. (We could allow I/O to sometimes fail in that case, but that seems problematic for reasons such as writes getting silently thrown away and diverging from the existing fscrypt semantics.) Therefore, when the filesystem is using extent-based encryption, ->mk_secret can't be wiped when the key becomes incompletely removed. As a prerequisite for doing that, this patch makes the "present" state be tracked using a new field, ->mk_present. No behavior is changed yet. The basic idea here is borrowed from Josef Bacik's patch "fscrypt: use a flag to indicate that the master key is being evicted" (https://lore.kernel.org/r/e86c16dddc049ff065f877d793ad773e4c6bfad9.1696970227.git.josef@toxicpanda.com). I reimplemented it using a "present" bool instead of an "evicted" flag, fixed a couple bugs, and tried to update everything to be consistent. Note: I considered adding a ->mk_status field instead, holding one of FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_*. At first that seemed nice, but it ended up being more complex (despite simplifying FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS), since it would have introduced redundancy and had weird locking rules. Reviewed-by: Neal Gompa <neal@gompa.dev> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231015061055.62673-1-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2023-10-15 09:10:55 +03:00
* There is one active ref associated with ->mk_present being true, and
* one active ref for each inode in ->mk_decrypted_inodes.
fscrypt: stop using keyrings subsystem for fscrypt_master_key The approach of fs/crypto/ internally managing the fscrypt_master_key structs as the payloads of "struct key" objects contained in a "struct key" keyring has outlived its usefulness. The original idea was to simplify the code by reusing code from the keyrings subsystem. However, several issues have arisen that can't easily be resolved: - When a master key struct is destroyed, blk_crypto_evict_key() must be called on any per-mode keys embedded in it. (This started being the case when inline encryption support was added.) Yet, the keyrings subsystem can arbitrarily delay the destruction of keys, even past the time the filesystem was unmounted. Therefore, currently there is no easy way to call blk_crypto_evict_key() when a master key is destroyed. Currently, this is worked around by holding an extra reference to the filesystem's request_queue(s). But it was overlooked that the request_queue reference is *not* guaranteed to pin the corresponding blk_crypto_profile too; for device-mapper devices that support inline crypto, it doesn't. This can cause a use-after-free. - When the last inode that was using an incompletely-removed master key is evicted, the master key removal is completed by removing the key struct from the keyring. Currently this is done via key_invalidate(). Yet, key_invalidate() takes the key semaphore. This can deadlock when called from the shrinker, since in fscrypt_ioctl_add_key(), memory is allocated with GFP_KERNEL under the same semaphore. - More generally, the fact that the keyrings subsystem can arbitrarily delay the destruction of keys (via garbage collection delay, or via random processes getting temporary key references) is undesirable, as it means we can't strictly guarantee that all secrets are ever wiped. - Doing the master key lookups via the keyrings subsystem results in the key_permission LSM hook being called. fscrypt doesn't want this, as all access control for encrypted files is designed to happen via the files themselves, like any other files. The workaround which SELinux users are using is to change their SELinux policy to grant key search access to all domains. This works, but it is an odd extra step that shouldn't really have to be done. The fix for all these issues is to change the implementation to what I should have done originally: don't use the keyrings subsystem to keep track of the filesystem's fscrypt_master_key structs. Instead, just store them in a regular kernel data structure, and rework the reference counting, locking, and lifetime accordingly. Retain support for RCU-mode key lookups by using a hash table. Replace fscrypt_sb_free() with fscrypt_sb_delete(), which releases the keys synchronously and runs a bit earlier during unmount, so that block devices are still available. A side effect of this patch is that neither the master keys themselves nor the filesystem keyrings will be listed in /proc/keys anymore. ("Master key users" and the master key users keyrings will still be listed.) However, this was mostly an implementation detail, and it was intended just for debugging purposes. I don't know of anyone using it. This patch does *not* change how "master key users" (->mk_users) works; that still uses the keyrings subsystem. That is still needed for key quotas, and changing that isn't necessary to solve the issues listed above. If we decide to change that too, it would be a separate patch. I've marked this as fixing the original commit that added the fscrypt keyring, but as noted above the most important issue that this patch fixes wasn't introduced until the addition of inline encryption support. Fixes: 22d94f493bfb ("fscrypt: add FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220901193208.138056-2-ebiggers@kernel.org
2022-09-01 22:32:06 +03:00
*
* There is one structural ref associated with the active refcount being
* nonzero. Finding a key in the keyring also takes a structural ref,
* which is then held temporarily while the key is operated on.
*/
refcount_t mk_active_refs;
refcount_t mk_struct_refs;
struct rcu_head mk_rcu_head;
fscrypt: add FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl Add a new fscrypt ioctl, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY. This ioctl removes an encryption key that was added by FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY. It wipes the secret key itself, then "locks" the encrypted files and directories that had been unlocked using that key -- implemented by evicting the relevant dentries and inodes from the VFS caches. The problem this solves is that many fscrypt users want the ability to remove encryption keys, causing the corresponding encrypted directories to appear "locked" (presented in ciphertext form) again. Moreover, users want removing an encryption key to *really* remove it, in the sense that the removed keys cannot be recovered even if kernel memory is compromised, e.g. by the exploit of a kernel security vulnerability or by a physical attack. This is desirable after a user logs out of the system, for example. In many cases users even already assume this to be the case and are surprised to hear when it's not. It is not sufficient to simply unlink the master key from the keyring (or to revoke or invalidate it), since the actual encryption transform objects are still pinned in memory by their inodes. Therefore, to really remove a key we must also evict the relevant inodes. Currently one workaround is to run 'sync && echo 2 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches'. But, that evicts all unused inodes in the system rather than just the inodes associated with the key being removed, causing severe performance problems. Moreover, it requires root privileges, so regular users can't "lock" their encrypted files. Another workaround, used in Chromium OS kernels, is to add a new VFS-level ioctl FS_IOC_DROP_CACHE which is a more restricted version of drop_caches that operates on a single super_block. It does: shrink_dcache_sb(sb); invalidate_inodes(sb, false); But it's still a hack. Yet, the major users of filesystem encryption want this feature badly enough that they are actually using these hacks. To properly solve the problem, start maintaining a list of the inodes which have been "unlocked" using each master key. Originally this wasn't possible because the kernel didn't keep track of in-use master keys at all. But, with the ->s_master_keys keyring it is now possible. Then, add an ioctl FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY. It finds the specified master key in ->s_master_keys, then wipes the secret key itself, which prevents any additional inodes from being unlocked with the key. Then, it syncs the filesystem and evicts the inodes in the key's list. The normal inode eviction code will free and wipe the per-file keys (in ->i_crypt_info). Note that freeing ->i_crypt_info without evicting the inodes was also considered, but would have been racy. Some inodes may still be in use when a master key is removed, and we can't simply revoke random file descriptors, mmap's, etc. Thus, the ioctl simply skips in-use inodes, and returns -EBUSY to indicate that some inodes weren't evicted. The master key *secret* is still removed, but the fscrypt_master_key struct remains to keep track of the remaining inodes. Userspace can then retry the ioctl to evict the remaining inodes. Alternatively, if userspace adds the key again, the refreshed secret will be associated with the existing list of inodes so they remain correctly tracked for future key removals. The ioctl doesn't wipe pagecache pages. Thus, we tolerate that after a kernel compromise some portions of plaintext file contents may still be recoverable from memory. This can be solved by enabling page poisoning system-wide, which security conscious users may choose to do. But it's very difficult to solve otherwise, e.g. note that plaintext file contents may have been read in other places than pagecache pages. Like FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY is initially restricted to privileged users only. This is sufficient for some use cases, but not all. A later patch will relax this restriction, but it will require introducing key hashes, among other changes. Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-08-05 05:35:46 +03:00
/*
fscrypt: track master key presence separately from secret Master keys can be in one of three states: present, incompletely removed, and absent (as per FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_* used in the UAPI). Currently, the way that "present" is distinguished from "incompletely removed" internally is by whether ->mk_secret exists or not. With extent-based encryption, it will be necessary to allow per-extent keys to be derived while the master key is incompletely removed, so that I/O on open files will reliably continue working after removal of the key has been initiated. (We could allow I/O to sometimes fail in that case, but that seems problematic for reasons such as writes getting silently thrown away and diverging from the existing fscrypt semantics.) Therefore, when the filesystem is using extent-based encryption, ->mk_secret can't be wiped when the key becomes incompletely removed. As a prerequisite for doing that, this patch makes the "present" state be tracked using a new field, ->mk_present. No behavior is changed yet. The basic idea here is borrowed from Josef Bacik's patch "fscrypt: use a flag to indicate that the master key is being evicted" (https://lore.kernel.org/r/e86c16dddc049ff065f877d793ad773e4c6bfad9.1696970227.git.josef@toxicpanda.com). I reimplemented it using a "present" bool instead of an "evicted" flag, fixed a couple bugs, and tried to update everything to be consistent. Note: I considered adding a ->mk_status field instead, holding one of FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_*. At first that seemed nice, but it ended up being more complex (despite simplifying FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS), since it would have introduced redundancy and had weird locking rules. Reviewed-by: Neal Gompa <neal@gompa.dev> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231015061055.62673-1-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2023-10-15 09:10:55 +03:00
* The secret key material. Wiped as soon as it is no longer needed;
* for details, see the fscrypt_master_key struct comment.
fscrypt: add FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl Add a new fscrypt ioctl, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY. This ioctl removes an encryption key that was added by FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY. It wipes the secret key itself, then "locks" the encrypted files and directories that had been unlocked using that key -- implemented by evicting the relevant dentries and inodes from the VFS caches. The problem this solves is that many fscrypt users want the ability to remove encryption keys, causing the corresponding encrypted directories to appear "locked" (presented in ciphertext form) again. Moreover, users want removing an encryption key to *really* remove it, in the sense that the removed keys cannot be recovered even if kernel memory is compromised, e.g. by the exploit of a kernel security vulnerability or by a physical attack. This is desirable after a user logs out of the system, for example. In many cases users even already assume this to be the case and are surprised to hear when it's not. It is not sufficient to simply unlink the master key from the keyring (or to revoke or invalidate it), since the actual encryption transform objects are still pinned in memory by their inodes. Therefore, to really remove a key we must also evict the relevant inodes. Currently one workaround is to run 'sync && echo 2 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches'. But, that evicts all unused inodes in the system rather than just the inodes associated with the key being removed, causing severe performance problems. Moreover, it requires root privileges, so regular users can't "lock" their encrypted files. Another workaround, used in Chromium OS kernels, is to add a new VFS-level ioctl FS_IOC_DROP_CACHE which is a more restricted version of drop_caches that operates on a single super_block. It does: shrink_dcache_sb(sb); invalidate_inodes(sb, false); But it's still a hack. Yet, the major users of filesystem encryption want this feature badly enough that they are actually using these hacks. To properly solve the problem, start maintaining a list of the inodes which have been "unlocked" using each master key. Originally this wasn't possible because the kernel didn't keep track of in-use master keys at all. But, with the ->s_master_keys keyring it is now possible. Then, add an ioctl FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY. It finds the specified master key in ->s_master_keys, then wipes the secret key itself, which prevents any additional inodes from being unlocked with the key. Then, it syncs the filesystem and evicts the inodes in the key's list. The normal inode eviction code will free and wipe the per-file keys (in ->i_crypt_info). Note that freeing ->i_crypt_info without evicting the inodes was also considered, but would have been racy. Some inodes may still be in use when a master key is removed, and we can't simply revoke random file descriptors, mmap's, etc. Thus, the ioctl simply skips in-use inodes, and returns -EBUSY to indicate that some inodes weren't evicted. The master key *secret* is still removed, but the fscrypt_master_key struct remains to keep track of the remaining inodes. Userspace can then retry the ioctl to evict the remaining inodes. Alternatively, if userspace adds the key again, the refreshed secret will be associated with the existing list of inodes so they remain correctly tracked for future key removals. The ioctl doesn't wipe pagecache pages. Thus, we tolerate that after a kernel compromise some portions of plaintext file contents may still be recoverable from memory. This can be solved by enabling page poisoning system-wide, which security conscious users may choose to do. But it's very difficult to solve otherwise, e.g. note that plaintext file contents may have been read in other places than pagecache pages. Like FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY is initially restricted to privileged users only. This is sufficient for some use cases, but not all. A later patch will relax this restriction, but it will require introducing key hashes, among other changes. Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-08-05 05:35:46 +03:00
*
fscrypt: track master key presence separately from secret Master keys can be in one of three states: present, incompletely removed, and absent (as per FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_* used in the UAPI). Currently, the way that "present" is distinguished from "incompletely removed" internally is by whether ->mk_secret exists or not. With extent-based encryption, it will be necessary to allow per-extent keys to be derived while the master key is incompletely removed, so that I/O on open files will reliably continue working after removal of the key has been initiated. (We could allow I/O to sometimes fail in that case, but that seems problematic for reasons such as writes getting silently thrown away and diverging from the existing fscrypt semantics.) Therefore, when the filesystem is using extent-based encryption, ->mk_secret can't be wiped when the key becomes incompletely removed. As a prerequisite for doing that, this patch makes the "present" state be tracked using a new field, ->mk_present. No behavior is changed yet. The basic idea here is borrowed from Josef Bacik's patch "fscrypt: use a flag to indicate that the master key is being evicted" (https://lore.kernel.org/r/e86c16dddc049ff065f877d793ad773e4c6bfad9.1696970227.git.josef@toxicpanda.com). I reimplemented it using a "present" bool instead of an "evicted" flag, fixed a couple bugs, and tried to update everything to be consistent. Note: I considered adding a ->mk_status field instead, holding one of FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_*. At first that seemed nice, but it ended up being more complex (despite simplifying FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS), since it would have introduced redundancy and had weird locking rules. Reviewed-by: Neal Gompa <neal@gompa.dev> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231015061055.62673-1-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2023-10-15 09:10:55 +03:00
* Locking: protected by ->mk_sem.
fscrypt: add FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl Add a new fscrypt ioctl, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY. This ioctl removes an encryption key that was added by FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY. It wipes the secret key itself, then "locks" the encrypted files and directories that had been unlocked using that key -- implemented by evicting the relevant dentries and inodes from the VFS caches. The problem this solves is that many fscrypt users want the ability to remove encryption keys, causing the corresponding encrypted directories to appear "locked" (presented in ciphertext form) again. Moreover, users want removing an encryption key to *really* remove it, in the sense that the removed keys cannot be recovered even if kernel memory is compromised, e.g. by the exploit of a kernel security vulnerability or by a physical attack. This is desirable after a user logs out of the system, for example. In many cases users even already assume this to be the case and are surprised to hear when it's not. It is not sufficient to simply unlink the master key from the keyring (or to revoke or invalidate it), since the actual encryption transform objects are still pinned in memory by their inodes. Therefore, to really remove a key we must also evict the relevant inodes. Currently one workaround is to run 'sync && echo 2 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches'. But, that evicts all unused inodes in the system rather than just the inodes associated with the key being removed, causing severe performance problems. Moreover, it requires root privileges, so regular users can't "lock" their encrypted files. Another workaround, used in Chromium OS kernels, is to add a new VFS-level ioctl FS_IOC_DROP_CACHE which is a more restricted version of drop_caches that operates on a single super_block. It does: shrink_dcache_sb(sb); invalidate_inodes(sb, false); But it's still a hack. Yet, the major users of filesystem encryption want this feature badly enough that they are actually using these hacks. To properly solve the problem, start maintaining a list of the inodes which have been "unlocked" using each master key. Originally this wasn't possible because the kernel didn't keep track of in-use master keys at all. But, with the ->s_master_keys keyring it is now possible. Then, add an ioctl FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY. It finds the specified master key in ->s_master_keys, then wipes the secret key itself, which prevents any additional inodes from being unlocked with the key. Then, it syncs the filesystem and evicts the inodes in the key's list. The normal inode eviction code will free and wipe the per-file keys (in ->i_crypt_info). Note that freeing ->i_crypt_info without evicting the inodes was also considered, but would have been racy. Some inodes may still be in use when a master key is removed, and we can't simply revoke random file descriptors, mmap's, etc. Thus, the ioctl simply skips in-use inodes, and returns -EBUSY to indicate that some inodes weren't evicted. The master key *secret* is still removed, but the fscrypt_master_key struct remains to keep track of the remaining inodes. Userspace can then retry the ioctl to evict the remaining inodes. Alternatively, if userspace adds the key again, the refreshed secret will be associated with the existing list of inodes so they remain correctly tracked for future key removals. The ioctl doesn't wipe pagecache pages. Thus, we tolerate that after a kernel compromise some portions of plaintext file contents may still be recoverable from memory. This can be solved by enabling page poisoning system-wide, which security conscious users may choose to do. But it's very difficult to solve otherwise, e.g. note that plaintext file contents may have been read in other places than pagecache pages. Like FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY is initially restricted to privileged users only. This is sufficient for some use cases, but not all. A later patch will relax this restriction, but it will require introducing key hashes, among other changes. Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-08-05 05:35:46 +03:00
*/
fscrypt: add FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl Add a new fscrypt ioctl, FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY. This ioctl adds an encryption key to the filesystem's fscrypt keyring ->s_master_keys, making any files encrypted with that key appear "unlocked". Why we need this ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The main problem is that the "locked/unlocked" (ciphertext/plaintext) status of encrypted files is global, but the fscrypt keys are not. fscrypt only looks for keys in the keyring(s) the process accessing the filesystem is subscribed to: the thread keyring, process keyring, and session keyring, where the session keyring may contain the user keyring. Therefore, userspace has to put fscrypt keys in the keyrings for individual users or sessions. But this means that when a process with a different keyring tries to access encrypted files, whether they appear "unlocked" or not is nondeterministic. This is because it depends on whether the files are currently present in the inode cache. Fixing this by consistently providing each process its own view of the filesystem depending on whether it has the key or not isn't feasible due to how the VFS caches work. Furthermore, while sometimes users expect this behavior, it is misguided for two reasons. First, it would be an OS-level access control mechanism largely redundant with existing access control mechanisms such as UNIX file permissions, ACLs, LSMs, etc. Encryption is actually for protecting the data at rest. Second, almost all users of fscrypt actually do need the keys to be global. The largest users of fscrypt, Android and Chromium OS, achieve this by having PID 1 create a "session keyring" that is inherited by every process. This works, but it isn't scalable because it prevents session keyrings from being used for any other purpose. On general-purpose Linux distros, the 'fscrypt' userspace tool [1] can't similarly abuse the session keyring, so to make 'sudo' work on all systems it has to link all the user keyrings into root's user keyring [2]. This is ugly and raises security concerns. Moreover it can't make the keys available to system services, such as sshd trying to access the user's '~/.ssh' directory (see [3], [4]) or NetworkManager trying to read certificates from the user's home directory (see [5]); or to Docker containers (see [6], [7]). By having an API to add a key to the *filesystem* we'll be able to fix the above bugs, remove userspace workarounds, and clearly express the intended semantics: the locked/unlocked status of an encrypted directory is global, and encryption is orthogonal to OS-level access control. Why not use the add_key() syscall ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ We use an ioctl for this API rather than the existing add_key() system call because the ioctl gives us the flexibility needed to implement fscrypt-specific semantics that will be introduced in later patches: - Supporting key removal with the semantics such that the secret is removed immediately and any unused inodes using the key are evicted; also, the eviction of any in-use inodes can be retried. - Calculating a key-dependent cryptographic identifier and returning it to userspace. - Allowing keys to be added and removed by non-root users, but only keys for v2 encryption policies; and to prevent denial-of-service attacks, users can only remove keys they themselves have added, and a key is only really removed after all users who added it have removed it. Trying to shoehorn these semantics into the keyrings syscalls would be very difficult, whereas the ioctls make things much easier. However, to reuse code the implementation still uses the keyrings service internally. Thus we get lockless RCU-mode key lookups without having to re-implement it, and the keys automatically show up in /proc/keys for debugging purposes. References: [1] https://github.com/google/fscrypt [2] https://goo.gl/55cCrI#heading=h.vf09isp98isb [3] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/111#issuecomment-444347939 [4] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/116 [5] https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/fscrypt/+bug/1770715 [6] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/128 [7] https://askubuntu.com/questions/1130306/cannot-run-docker-on-an-encrypted-filesystem Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-08-05 05:35:46 +03:00
struct fscrypt_master_key_secret mk_secret;
fscrypt: v2 encryption policy support Add a new fscrypt policy version, "v2". It has the following changes from the original policy version, which we call "v1" (*): - Master keys (the user-provided encryption keys) are only ever used as input to HKDF-SHA512. This is more flexible and less error-prone, and it avoids the quirks and limitations of the AES-128-ECB based KDF. Three classes of cryptographically isolated subkeys are defined: - Per-file keys, like used in v1 policies except for the new KDF. - Per-mode keys. These implement the semantics of the DIRECT_KEY flag, which for v1 policies made the master key be used directly. These are also planned to be used for inline encryption when support for it is added. - Key identifiers (see below). - Each master key is identified by a 16-byte master_key_identifier, which is derived from the key itself using HKDF-SHA512. This prevents users from associating the wrong key with an encrypted file or directory. This was easily possible with v1 policies, which identified the key by an arbitrary 8-byte master_key_descriptor. - The key must be provided in the filesystem-level keyring, not in a process-subscribed keyring. The following UAPI additions are made: - The existing ioctl FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY can now be passed a fscrypt_policy_v2 to set a v2 encryption policy. It's disambiguated from fscrypt_policy/fscrypt_policy_v1 by the version code prefix. - A new ioctl FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX is added. It allows getting the v1 or v2 encryption policy of an encrypted file or directory. The existing FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY ioctl could not be used because it did not have a way for userspace to indicate which policy structure is expected. The new ioctl includes a size field, so it is extensible to future fscrypt policy versions. - The ioctls FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY, and FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS now support managing keys for v2 encryption policies. Such keys are kept logically separate from keys for v1 encryption policies, and are identified by 'identifier' rather than by 'descriptor'. The 'identifier' need not be provided when adding a key, since the kernel will calculate it anyway. This patch temporarily keeps adding/removing v2 policy keys behind the same permission check done for adding/removing v1 policy keys: capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN). However, the next patch will carefully take advantage of the cryptographically secure master_key_identifier to allow non-root users to add/remove v2 policy keys, thus providing a full replacement for v1 policies. (*) Actually, in the API fscrypt_policy::version is 0 while on-disk fscrypt_context::format is 1. But I believe it makes the most sense to advance both to '2' to have them be in sync, and to consider the numbering to start at 1 except for the API quirk. Reviewed-by: Paul Crowley <paulcrowley@google.com> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-08-05 05:35:47 +03:00
/*
* For v1 policy keys: an arbitrary key descriptor which was assigned by
* userspace (->descriptor).
*
* For v2 policy keys: a cryptographic hash of this key (->identifier).
*/
fscrypt: add FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl Add a new fscrypt ioctl, FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY. This ioctl adds an encryption key to the filesystem's fscrypt keyring ->s_master_keys, making any files encrypted with that key appear "unlocked". Why we need this ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The main problem is that the "locked/unlocked" (ciphertext/plaintext) status of encrypted files is global, but the fscrypt keys are not. fscrypt only looks for keys in the keyring(s) the process accessing the filesystem is subscribed to: the thread keyring, process keyring, and session keyring, where the session keyring may contain the user keyring. Therefore, userspace has to put fscrypt keys in the keyrings for individual users or sessions. But this means that when a process with a different keyring tries to access encrypted files, whether they appear "unlocked" or not is nondeterministic. This is because it depends on whether the files are currently present in the inode cache. Fixing this by consistently providing each process its own view of the filesystem depending on whether it has the key or not isn't feasible due to how the VFS caches work. Furthermore, while sometimes users expect this behavior, it is misguided for two reasons. First, it would be an OS-level access control mechanism largely redundant with existing access control mechanisms such as UNIX file permissions, ACLs, LSMs, etc. Encryption is actually for protecting the data at rest. Second, almost all users of fscrypt actually do need the keys to be global. The largest users of fscrypt, Android and Chromium OS, achieve this by having PID 1 create a "session keyring" that is inherited by every process. This works, but it isn't scalable because it prevents session keyrings from being used for any other purpose. On general-purpose Linux distros, the 'fscrypt' userspace tool [1] can't similarly abuse the session keyring, so to make 'sudo' work on all systems it has to link all the user keyrings into root's user keyring [2]. This is ugly and raises security concerns. Moreover it can't make the keys available to system services, such as sshd trying to access the user's '~/.ssh' directory (see [3], [4]) or NetworkManager trying to read certificates from the user's home directory (see [5]); or to Docker containers (see [6], [7]). By having an API to add a key to the *filesystem* we'll be able to fix the above bugs, remove userspace workarounds, and clearly express the intended semantics: the locked/unlocked status of an encrypted directory is global, and encryption is orthogonal to OS-level access control. Why not use the add_key() syscall ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ We use an ioctl for this API rather than the existing add_key() system call because the ioctl gives us the flexibility needed to implement fscrypt-specific semantics that will be introduced in later patches: - Supporting key removal with the semantics such that the secret is removed immediately and any unused inodes using the key are evicted; also, the eviction of any in-use inodes can be retried. - Calculating a key-dependent cryptographic identifier and returning it to userspace. - Allowing keys to be added and removed by non-root users, but only keys for v2 encryption policies; and to prevent denial-of-service attacks, users can only remove keys they themselves have added, and a key is only really removed after all users who added it have removed it. Trying to shoehorn these semantics into the keyrings syscalls would be very difficult, whereas the ioctls make things much easier. However, to reuse code the implementation still uses the keyrings service internally. Thus we get lockless RCU-mode key lookups without having to re-implement it, and the keys automatically show up in /proc/keys for debugging purposes. References: [1] https://github.com/google/fscrypt [2] https://goo.gl/55cCrI#heading=h.vf09isp98isb [3] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/111#issuecomment-444347939 [4] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/116 [5] https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/fscrypt/+bug/1770715 [6] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/128 [7] https://askubuntu.com/questions/1130306/cannot-run-docker-on-an-encrypted-filesystem Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-08-05 05:35:46 +03:00
struct fscrypt_key_specifier mk_spec;
fscrypt: allow unprivileged users to add/remove keys for v2 policies Allow the FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY and FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctls to be used by non-root users to add and remove encryption keys from the filesystem-level crypto keyrings, subject to limitations. Motivation: while privileged fscrypt key management is sufficient for some users (e.g. Android and Chromium OS, where a privileged process manages all keys), the old API by design also allows non-root users to set up and use encrypted directories, and we don't want to regress on that. Especially, we don't want to force users to continue using the old API, running into the visibility mismatch between files and keyrings and being unable to "lock" encrypted directories. Intuitively, the ioctls have to be privileged since they manipulate filesystem-level state. However, it's actually safe to make them unprivileged if we very carefully enforce some specific limitations. First, each key must be identified by a cryptographic hash so that a user can't add the wrong key for another user's files. For v2 encryption policies, we use the key_identifier for this. v1 policies don't have this, so managing keys for them remains privileged. Second, each key a user adds is charged to their quota for the keyrings service. Thus, a user can't exhaust memory by adding a huge number of keys. By default each non-root user is allowed up to 200 keys; this can be changed using the existing sysctl 'kernel.keys.maxkeys'. Third, if multiple users add the same key, we keep track of those users of the key (of which there remains a single copy), and won't really remove the key, i.e. "lock" the encrypted files, until all those users have removed it. This prevents denial of service attacks that would be possible under simpler schemes, such allowing the first user who added a key to remove it -- since that could be a malicious user who has compromised the key. Of course, encryption keys should be kept secret, but the idea is that using encryption should never be *less* secure than not using encryption, even if your key was compromised. We tolerate that a user will be unable to really remove a key, i.e. unable to "lock" their encrypted files, if another user has added the same key. But in a sense, this is actually a good thing because it will avoid providing a false notion of security where a key appears to have been removed when actually it's still in memory, available to any attacker who compromises the operating system kernel. Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-08-05 05:35:47 +03:00
/*
* Keyring which contains a key of type 'key_type_fscrypt_user' for each
* user who has added this key. Normally each key will be added by just
* one user, but it's possible that multiple users share a key, and in
* that case we need to keep track of those users so that one user can't
* remove the key before the others want it removed too.
*
* This is NULL for v1 policy keys; those can only be added by root.
*
fscrypt: stop using keyrings subsystem for fscrypt_master_key The approach of fs/crypto/ internally managing the fscrypt_master_key structs as the payloads of "struct key" objects contained in a "struct key" keyring has outlived its usefulness. The original idea was to simplify the code by reusing code from the keyrings subsystem. However, several issues have arisen that can't easily be resolved: - When a master key struct is destroyed, blk_crypto_evict_key() must be called on any per-mode keys embedded in it. (This started being the case when inline encryption support was added.) Yet, the keyrings subsystem can arbitrarily delay the destruction of keys, even past the time the filesystem was unmounted. Therefore, currently there is no easy way to call blk_crypto_evict_key() when a master key is destroyed. Currently, this is worked around by holding an extra reference to the filesystem's request_queue(s). But it was overlooked that the request_queue reference is *not* guaranteed to pin the corresponding blk_crypto_profile too; for device-mapper devices that support inline crypto, it doesn't. This can cause a use-after-free. - When the last inode that was using an incompletely-removed master key is evicted, the master key removal is completed by removing the key struct from the keyring. Currently this is done via key_invalidate(). Yet, key_invalidate() takes the key semaphore. This can deadlock when called from the shrinker, since in fscrypt_ioctl_add_key(), memory is allocated with GFP_KERNEL under the same semaphore. - More generally, the fact that the keyrings subsystem can arbitrarily delay the destruction of keys (via garbage collection delay, or via random processes getting temporary key references) is undesirable, as it means we can't strictly guarantee that all secrets are ever wiped. - Doing the master key lookups via the keyrings subsystem results in the key_permission LSM hook being called. fscrypt doesn't want this, as all access control for encrypted files is designed to happen via the files themselves, like any other files. The workaround which SELinux users are using is to change their SELinux policy to grant key search access to all domains. This works, but it is an odd extra step that shouldn't really have to be done. The fix for all these issues is to change the implementation to what I should have done originally: don't use the keyrings subsystem to keep track of the filesystem's fscrypt_master_key structs. Instead, just store them in a regular kernel data structure, and rework the reference counting, locking, and lifetime accordingly. Retain support for RCU-mode key lookups by using a hash table. Replace fscrypt_sb_free() with fscrypt_sb_delete(), which releases the keys synchronously and runs a bit earlier during unmount, so that block devices are still available. A side effect of this patch is that neither the master keys themselves nor the filesystem keyrings will be listed in /proc/keys anymore. ("Master key users" and the master key users keyrings will still be listed.) However, this was mostly an implementation detail, and it was intended just for debugging purposes. I don't know of anyone using it. This patch does *not* change how "master key users" (->mk_users) works; that still uses the keyrings subsystem. That is still needed for key quotas, and changing that isn't necessary to solve the issues listed above. If we decide to change that too, it would be a separate patch. I've marked this as fixing the original commit that added the fscrypt keyring, but as noted above the most important issue that this patch fixes wasn't introduced until the addition of inline encryption support. Fixes: 22d94f493bfb ("fscrypt: add FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220901193208.138056-2-ebiggers@kernel.org
2022-09-01 22:32:06 +03:00
* Locking: protected by ->mk_sem. (We don't just rely on the keyrings
* subsystem semaphore ->mk_users->sem, as we need support for atomic
fscrypt: track master key presence separately from secret Master keys can be in one of three states: present, incompletely removed, and absent (as per FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_* used in the UAPI). Currently, the way that "present" is distinguished from "incompletely removed" internally is by whether ->mk_secret exists or not. With extent-based encryption, it will be necessary to allow per-extent keys to be derived while the master key is incompletely removed, so that I/O on open files will reliably continue working after removal of the key has been initiated. (We could allow I/O to sometimes fail in that case, but that seems problematic for reasons such as writes getting silently thrown away and diverging from the existing fscrypt semantics.) Therefore, when the filesystem is using extent-based encryption, ->mk_secret can't be wiped when the key becomes incompletely removed. As a prerequisite for doing that, this patch makes the "present" state be tracked using a new field, ->mk_present. No behavior is changed yet. The basic idea here is borrowed from Josef Bacik's patch "fscrypt: use a flag to indicate that the master key is being evicted" (https://lore.kernel.org/r/e86c16dddc049ff065f877d793ad773e4c6bfad9.1696970227.git.josef@toxicpanda.com). I reimplemented it using a "present" bool instead of an "evicted" flag, fixed a couple bugs, and tried to update everything to be consistent. Note: I considered adding a ->mk_status field instead, holding one of FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_*. At first that seemed nice, but it ended up being more complex (despite simplifying FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS), since it would have introduced redundancy and had weird locking rules. Reviewed-by: Neal Gompa <neal@gompa.dev> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231015061055.62673-1-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2023-10-15 09:10:55 +03:00
* search+insert along with proper synchronization with other fields.)
fscrypt: allow unprivileged users to add/remove keys for v2 policies Allow the FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY and FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctls to be used by non-root users to add and remove encryption keys from the filesystem-level crypto keyrings, subject to limitations. Motivation: while privileged fscrypt key management is sufficient for some users (e.g. Android and Chromium OS, where a privileged process manages all keys), the old API by design also allows non-root users to set up and use encrypted directories, and we don't want to regress on that. Especially, we don't want to force users to continue using the old API, running into the visibility mismatch between files and keyrings and being unable to "lock" encrypted directories. Intuitively, the ioctls have to be privileged since they manipulate filesystem-level state. However, it's actually safe to make them unprivileged if we very carefully enforce some specific limitations. First, each key must be identified by a cryptographic hash so that a user can't add the wrong key for another user's files. For v2 encryption policies, we use the key_identifier for this. v1 policies don't have this, so managing keys for them remains privileged. Second, each key a user adds is charged to their quota for the keyrings service. Thus, a user can't exhaust memory by adding a huge number of keys. By default each non-root user is allowed up to 200 keys; this can be changed using the existing sysctl 'kernel.keys.maxkeys'. Third, if multiple users add the same key, we keep track of those users of the key (of which there remains a single copy), and won't really remove the key, i.e. "lock" the encrypted files, until all those users have removed it. This prevents denial of service attacks that would be possible under simpler schemes, such allowing the first user who added a key to remove it -- since that could be a malicious user who has compromised the key. Of course, encryption keys should be kept secret, but the idea is that using encryption should never be *less* secure than not using encryption, even if your key was compromised. We tolerate that a user will be unable to really remove a key, i.e. unable to "lock" their encrypted files, if another user has added the same key. But in a sense, this is actually a good thing because it will avoid providing a false notion of security where a key appears to have been removed when actually it's still in memory, available to any attacker who compromises the operating system kernel. Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-08-05 05:35:47 +03:00
*/
struct key *mk_users;
fscrypt: add FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl Add a new fscrypt ioctl, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY. This ioctl removes an encryption key that was added by FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY. It wipes the secret key itself, then "locks" the encrypted files and directories that had been unlocked using that key -- implemented by evicting the relevant dentries and inodes from the VFS caches. The problem this solves is that many fscrypt users want the ability to remove encryption keys, causing the corresponding encrypted directories to appear "locked" (presented in ciphertext form) again. Moreover, users want removing an encryption key to *really* remove it, in the sense that the removed keys cannot be recovered even if kernel memory is compromised, e.g. by the exploit of a kernel security vulnerability or by a physical attack. This is desirable after a user logs out of the system, for example. In many cases users even already assume this to be the case and are surprised to hear when it's not. It is not sufficient to simply unlink the master key from the keyring (or to revoke or invalidate it), since the actual encryption transform objects are still pinned in memory by their inodes. Therefore, to really remove a key we must also evict the relevant inodes. Currently one workaround is to run 'sync && echo 2 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches'. But, that evicts all unused inodes in the system rather than just the inodes associated with the key being removed, causing severe performance problems. Moreover, it requires root privileges, so regular users can't "lock" their encrypted files. Another workaround, used in Chromium OS kernels, is to add a new VFS-level ioctl FS_IOC_DROP_CACHE which is a more restricted version of drop_caches that operates on a single super_block. It does: shrink_dcache_sb(sb); invalidate_inodes(sb, false); But it's still a hack. Yet, the major users of filesystem encryption want this feature badly enough that they are actually using these hacks. To properly solve the problem, start maintaining a list of the inodes which have been "unlocked" using each master key. Originally this wasn't possible because the kernel didn't keep track of in-use master keys at all. But, with the ->s_master_keys keyring it is now possible. Then, add an ioctl FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY. It finds the specified master key in ->s_master_keys, then wipes the secret key itself, which prevents any additional inodes from being unlocked with the key. Then, it syncs the filesystem and evicts the inodes in the key's list. The normal inode eviction code will free and wipe the per-file keys (in ->i_crypt_info). Note that freeing ->i_crypt_info without evicting the inodes was also considered, but would have been racy. Some inodes may still be in use when a master key is removed, and we can't simply revoke random file descriptors, mmap's, etc. Thus, the ioctl simply skips in-use inodes, and returns -EBUSY to indicate that some inodes weren't evicted. The master key *secret* is still removed, but the fscrypt_master_key struct remains to keep track of the remaining inodes. Userspace can then retry the ioctl to evict the remaining inodes. Alternatively, if userspace adds the key again, the refreshed secret will be associated with the existing list of inodes so they remain correctly tracked for future key removals. The ioctl doesn't wipe pagecache pages. Thus, we tolerate that after a kernel compromise some portions of plaintext file contents may still be recoverable from memory. This can be solved by enabling page poisoning system-wide, which security conscious users may choose to do. But it's very difficult to solve otherwise, e.g. note that plaintext file contents may have been read in other places than pagecache pages. Like FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY is initially restricted to privileged users only. This is sufficient for some use cases, but not all. A later patch will relax this restriction, but it will require introducing key hashes, among other changes. Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-08-05 05:35:46 +03:00
/*
* List of inodes that were unlocked using this key. This allows the
* inodes to be evicted efficiently if the key is removed.
*/
struct list_head mk_decrypted_inodes;
spinlock_t mk_decrypted_inodes_lock;
fscrypt: add support for IV_INO_LBLK_64 policies Inline encryption hardware compliant with the UFS v2.1 standard or with the upcoming version of the eMMC standard has the following properties: (1) Per I/O request, the encryption key is specified by a previously loaded keyslot. There might be only a small number of keyslots. (2) Per I/O request, the starting IV is specified by a 64-bit "data unit number" (DUN). IV bits 64-127 are assumed to be 0. The hardware automatically increments the DUN for each "data unit" of configurable size in the request, e.g. for each filesystem block. Property (1) makes it inefficient to use the traditional fscrypt per-file keys. Property (2) precludes the use of the existing DIRECT_KEY fscrypt policy flag, which needs at least 192 IV bits. Therefore, add a new fscrypt policy flag IV_INO_LBLK_64 which causes the encryption to modified as follows: - The encryption keys are derived from the master key, encryption mode number, and filesystem UUID. - The IVs are chosen as (inode_number << 32) | file_logical_block_num. For filenames encryption, file_logical_block_num is 0. Since the file nonces aren't used in the key derivation, many files may share the same encryption key. This is much more efficient on the target hardware. Including the inode number in the IVs and mixing the filesystem UUID into the keys ensures that data in different files is nevertheless still encrypted differently. Additionally, limiting the inode and block numbers to 32 bits and placing the block number in the low bits maintains compatibility with the 64-bit DUN convention (property (2) above). Since this scheme assumes that inode numbers are stable (which may preclude filesystem shrinking) and that inode and file logical block numbers are at most 32-bit, IV_INO_LBLK_64 will only be allowed on filesystems that meet these constraints. These are acceptable limitations for the cases where this format would actually be used. Note that IV_INO_LBLK_64 is an on-disk format, not an implementation. This patch just adds support for it using the existing filesystem layer encryption. A later patch will add support for inline encryption. Reviewed-by: Paul Crowley <paulcrowley@google.com> Co-developed-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-10-25 00:54:36 +03:00
/*
fscrypt: add support for IV_INO_LBLK_32 policies The eMMC inline crypto standard will only specify 32 DUN bits (a.k.a. IV bits), unlike UFS's 64. IV_INO_LBLK_64 is therefore not applicable, but an encryption format which uses one key per policy and permits the moving of encrypted file contents (as f2fs's garbage collector requires) is still desirable. To support such hardware, add a new encryption format IV_INO_LBLK_32 that makes the best use of the 32 bits: the IV is set to 'SipHash-2-4(inode_number) + file_logical_block_number mod 2^32', where the SipHash key is derived from the fscrypt master key. We hash only the inode number and not also the block number, because we need to maintain contiguity of DUNs to merge bios. Unlike with IV_INO_LBLK_64, with this format IV reuse is possible; this is unavoidable given the size of the DUN. This means this format should only be used where the requirements of the first paragraph apply. However, the hash spreads out the IVs in the whole usable range, and the use of a keyed hash makes it difficult for an attacker to determine which files use which IVs. Besides the above differences, this flag works like IV_INO_LBLK_64 in that on ext4 it is only allowed if the stable_inodes feature has been enabled to prevent inode numbers and the filesystem UUID from changing. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200515204141.251098-1-ebiggers@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Paul Crowley <paulcrowley@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2020-05-15 23:41:41 +03:00
* Per-mode encryption keys for the various types of encryption policies
* that use them. Allocated and derived on-demand.
fscrypt: add support for IV_INO_LBLK_64 policies Inline encryption hardware compliant with the UFS v2.1 standard or with the upcoming version of the eMMC standard has the following properties: (1) Per I/O request, the encryption key is specified by a previously loaded keyslot. There might be only a small number of keyslots. (2) Per I/O request, the starting IV is specified by a 64-bit "data unit number" (DUN). IV bits 64-127 are assumed to be 0. The hardware automatically increments the DUN for each "data unit" of configurable size in the request, e.g. for each filesystem block. Property (1) makes it inefficient to use the traditional fscrypt per-file keys. Property (2) precludes the use of the existing DIRECT_KEY fscrypt policy flag, which needs at least 192 IV bits. Therefore, add a new fscrypt policy flag IV_INO_LBLK_64 which causes the encryption to modified as follows: - The encryption keys are derived from the master key, encryption mode number, and filesystem UUID. - The IVs are chosen as (inode_number << 32) | file_logical_block_num. For filenames encryption, file_logical_block_num is 0. Since the file nonces aren't used in the key derivation, many files may share the same encryption key. This is much more efficient on the target hardware. Including the inode number in the IVs and mixing the filesystem UUID into the keys ensures that data in different files is nevertheless still encrypted differently. Additionally, limiting the inode and block numbers to 32 bits and placing the block number in the low bits maintains compatibility with the 64-bit DUN convention (property (2) above). Since this scheme assumes that inode numbers are stable (which may preclude filesystem shrinking) and that inode and file logical block numbers are at most 32-bit, IV_INO_LBLK_64 will only be allowed on filesystems that meet these constraints. These are acceptable limitations for the cases where this format would actually be used. Note that IV_INO_LBLK_64 is an on-disk format, not an implementation. This patch just adds support for it using the existing filesystem layer encryption. A later patch will add support for inline encryption. Reviewed-by: Paul Crowley <paulcrowley@google.com> Co-developed-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-10-25 00:54:36 +03:00
*/
fscrypt: remove kernel-internal constants from UAPI header There isn't really any valid reason to use __FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX or FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID in a userspace program. These constants are only meant to be used by the kernel internally, and they are defined in the UAPI header next to the mode numbers and flags only so that kernel developers don't forget to update them when adding new modes or flags. In https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201005074133.1958633-2-satyat@google.com there was an example of someone wanting to use __FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX in a user program, and it was wrong because the program would have broken if __FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX were ever increased. So having this definition available is harmful. FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID has the same problem. So, remove these definitions from the UAPI header. Replace FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID with just listing the valid flags explicitly in the one kernel function that needs it. Move __FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX to fscrypt_private.h, remove the double underscores (which were only present to discourage use by userspace), and add a BUILD_BUG_ON() and comments to (hopefully) ensure it is kept in sync. Keep the old name FS_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID, since it's been around for longer and there's a greater chance that removing it would break source compatibility with some program. Indeed, mtd-utils is using it in an #ifdef, and removing it would introduce compiler warnings (about FS_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_* being redefined) into the mtd-utils build. However, reduce its value to 0x07 so that it only includes the flags with old names (the ones present before Linux 5.4), and try to make it clear that it's now "frozen" and no new flags should be added to it. Fixes: 2336d0deb2d4 ("fscrypt: use FSCRYPT_ prefix for uapi constants") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.4+ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201024005132.495952-1-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2020-10-24 03:51:31 +03:00
struct fscrypt_prepared_key mk_direct_keys[FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX + 1];
struct fscrypt_prepared_key mk_iv_ino_lblk_64_keys[FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX + 1];
struct fscrypt_prepared_key mk_iv_ino_lblk_32_keys[FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX + 1];
fscrypt: add support for IV_INO_LBLK_32 policies The eMMC inline crypto standard will only specify 32 DUN bits (a.k.a. IV bits), unlike UFS's 64. IV_INO_LBLK_64 is therefore not applicable, but an encryption format which uses one key per policy and permits the moving of encrypted file contents (as f2fs's garbage collector requires) is still desirable. To support such hardware, add a new encryption format IV_INO_LBLK_32 that makes the best use of the 32 bits: the IV is set to 'SipHash-2-4(inode_number) + file_logical_block_number mod 2^32', where the SipHash key is derived from the fscrypt master key. We hash only the inode number and not also the block number, because we need to maintain contiguity of DUNs to merge bios. Unlike with IV_INO_LBLK_64, with this format IV reuse is possible; this is unavoidable given the size of the DUN. This means this format should only be used where the requirements of the first paragraph apply. However, the hash spreads out the IVs in the whole usable range, and the use of a keyed hash makes it difficult for an attacker to determine which files use which IVs. Besides the above differences, this flag works like IV_INO_LBLK_64 in that on ext4 it is only allowed if the stable_inodes feature has been enabled to prevent inode numbers and the filesystem UUID from changing. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200515204141.251098-1-ebiggers@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Paul Crowley <paulcrowley@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2020-05-15 23:41:41 +03:00
/* Hash key for inode numbers. Initialized only when needed. */
siphash_key_t mk_ino_hash_key;
bool mk_ino_hash_key_initialized;
fscrypt: v2 encryption policy support Add a new fscrypt policy version, "v2". It has the following changes from the original policy version, which we call "v1" (*): - Master keys (the user-provided encryption keys) are only ever used as input to HKDF-SHA512. This is more flexible and less error-prone, and it avoids the quirks and limitations of the AES-128-ECB based KDF. Three classes of cryptographically isolated subkeys are defined: - Per-file keys, like used in v1 policies except for the new KDF. - Per-mode keys. These implement the semantics of the DIRECT_KEY flag, which for v1 policies made the master key be used directly. These are also planned to be used for inline encryption when support for it is added. - Key identifiers (see below). - Each master key is identified by a 16-byte master_key_identifier, which is derived from the key itself using HKDF-SHA512. This prevents users from associating the wrong key with an encrypted file or directory. This was easily possible with v1 policies, which identified the key by an arbitrary 8-byte master_key_descriptor. - The key must be provided in the filesystem-level keyring, not in a process-subscribed keyring. The following UAPI additions are made: - The existing ioctl FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY can now be passed a fscrypt_policy_v2 to set a v2 encryption policy. It's disambiguated from fscrypt_policy/fscrypt_policy_v1 by the version code prefix. - A new ioctl FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX is added. It allows getting the v1 or v2 encryption policy of an encrypted file or directory. The existing FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY ioctl could not be used because it did not have a way for userspace to indicate which policy structure is expected. The new ioctl includes a size field, so it is extensible to future fscrypt policy versions. - The ioctls FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY, and FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS now support managing keys for v2 encryption policies. Such keys are kept logically separate from keys for v1 encryption policies, and are identified by 'identifier' rather than by 'descriptor'. The 'identifier' need not be provided when adding a key, since the kernel will calculate it anyway. This patch temporarily keeps adding/removing v2 policy keys behind the same permission check done for adding/removing v1 policy keys: capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN). However, the next patch will carefully take advantage of the cryptographically secure master_key_identifier to allow non-root users to add/remove v2 policy keys, thus providing a full replacement for v1 policies. (*) Actually, in the API fscrypt_policy::version is 0 while on-disk fscrypt_context::format is 1. But I believe it makes the most sense to advance both to '2' to have them be in sync, and to consider the numbering to start at 1 except for the API quirk. Reviewed-by: Paul Crowley <paulcrowley@google.com> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-08-05 05:35:47 +03:00
fscrypt: add FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl Add a new fscrypt ioctl, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY. This ioctl removes an encryption key that was added by FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY. It wipes the secret key itself, then "locks" the encrypted files and directories that had been unlocked using that key -- implemented by evicting the relevant dentries and inodes from the VFS caches. The problem this solves is that many fscrypt users want the ability to remove encryption keys, causing the corresponding encrypted directories to appear "locked" (presented in ciphertext form) again. Moreover, users want removing an encryption key to *really* remove it, in the sense that the removed keys cannot be recovered even if kernel memory is compromised, e.g. by the exploit of a kernel security vulnerability or by a physical attack. This is desirable after a user logs out of the system, for example. In many cases users even already assume this to be the case and are surprised to hear when it's not. It is not sufficient to simply unlink the master key from the keyring (or to revoke or invalidate it), since the actual encryption transform objects are still pinned in memory by their inodes. Therefore, to really remove a key we must also evict the relevant inodes. Currently one workaround is to run 'sync && echo 2 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches'. But, that evicts all unused inodes in the system rather than just the inodes associated with the key being removed, causing severe performance problems. Moreover, it requires root privileges, so regular users can't "lock" their encrypted files. Another workaround, used in Chromium OS kernels, is to add a new VFS-level ioctl FS_IOC_DROP_CACHE which is a more restricted version of drop_caches that operates on a single super_block. It does: shrink_dcache_sb(sb); invalidate_inodes(sb, false); But it's still a hack. Yet, the major users of filesystem encryption want this feature badly enough that they are actually using these hacks. To properly solve the problem, start maintaining a list of the inodes which have been "unlocked" using each master key. Originally this wasn't possible because the kernel didn't keep track of in-use master keys at all. But, with the ->s_master_keys keyring it is now possible. Then, add an ioctl FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY. It finds the specified master key in ->s_master_keys, then wipes the secret key itself, which prevents any additional inodes from being unlocked with the key. Then, it syncs the filesystem and evicts the inodes in the key's list. The normal inode eviction code will free and wipe the per-file keys (in ->i_crypt_info). Note that freeing ->i_crypt_info without evicting the inodes was also considered, but would have been racy. Some inodes may still be in use when a master key is removed, and we can't simply revoke random file descriptors, mmap's, etc. Thus, the ioctl simply skips in-use inodes, and returns -EBUSY to indicate that some inodes weren't evicted. The master key *secret* is still removed, but the fscrypt_master_key struct remains to keep track of the remaining inodes. Userspace can then retry the ioctl to evict the remaining inodes. Alternatively, if userspace adds the key again, the refreshed secret will be associated with the existing list of inodes so they remain correctly tracked for future key removals. The ioctl doesn't wipe pagecache pages. Thus, we tolerate that after a kernel compromise some portions of plaintext file contents may still be recoverable from memory. This can be solved by enabling page poisoning system-wide, which security conscious users may choose to do. But it's very difficult to solve otherwise, e.g. note that plaintext file contents may have been read in other places than pagecache pages. Like FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY is initially restricted to privileged users only. This is sufficient for some use cases, but not all. A later patch will relax this restriction, but it will require introducing key hashes, among other changes. Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-08-05 05:35:46 +03:00
/*
fscrypt: track master key presence separately from secret Master keys can be in one of three states: present, incompletely removed, and absent (as per FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_* used in the UAPI). Currently, the way that "present" is distinguished from "incompletely removed" internally is by whether ->mk_secret exists or not. With extent-based encryption, it will be necessary to allow per-extent keys to be derived while the master key is incompletely removed, so that I/O on open files will reliably continue working after removal of the key has been initiated. (We could allow I/O to sometimes fail in that case, but that seems problematic for reasons such as writes getting silently thrown away and diverging from the existing fscrypt semantics.) Therefore, when the filesystem is using extent-based encryption, ->mk_secret can't be wiped when the key becomes incompletely removed. As a prerequisite for doing that, this patch makes the "present" state be tracked using a new field, ->mk_present. No behavior is changed yet. The basic idea here is borrowed from Josef Bacik's patch "fscrypt: use a flag to indicate that the master key is being evicted" (https://lore.kernel.org/r/e86c16dddc049ff065f877d793ad773e4c6bfad9.1696970227.git.josef@toxicpanda.com). I reimplemented it using a "present" bool instead of an "evicted" flag, fixed a couple bugs, and tried to update everything to be consistent. Note: I considered adding a ->mk_status field instead, holding one of FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_*. At first that seemed nice, but it ended up being more complex (despite simplifying FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS), since it would have introduced redundancy and had weird locking rules. Reviewed-by: Neal Gompa <neal@gompa.dev> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231015061055.62673-1-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2023-10-15 09:10:55 +03:00
* Whether this key is in the "present" state, i.e. fully usable. For
* details, see the fscrypt_master_key struct comment.
*
* Locking: protected by ->mk_sem, but can be read locklessly using
* READ_ONCE(). Writers must use WRITE_ONCE() when concurrent readers
* are possible.
fscrypt: add FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl Add a new fscrypt ioctl, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY. This ioctl removes an encryption key that was added by FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY. It wipes the secret key itself, then "locks" the encrypted files and directories that had been unlocked using that key -- implemented by evicting the relevant dentries and inodes from the VFS caches. The problem this solves is that many fscrypt users want the ability to remove encryption keys, causing the corresponding encrypted directories to appear "locked" (presented in ciphertext form) again. Moreover, users want removing an encryption key to *really* remove it, in the sense that the removed keys cannot be recovered even if kernel memory is compromised, e.g. by the exploit of a kernel security vulnerability or by a physical attack. This is desirable after a user logs out of the system, for example. In many cases users even already assume this to be the case and are surprised to hear when it's not. It is not sufficient to simply unlink the master key from the keyring (or to revoke or invalidate it), since the actual encryption transform objects are still pinned in memory by their inodes. Therefore, to really remove a key we must also evict the relevant inodes. Currently one workaround is to run 'sync && echo 2 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches'. But, that evicts all unused inodes in the system rather than just the inodes associated with the key being removed, causing severe performance problems. Moreover, it requires root privileges, so regular users can't "lock" their encrypted files. Another workaround, used in Chromium OS kernels, is to add a new VFS-level ioctl FS_IOC_DROP_CACHE which is a more restricted version of drop_caches that operates on a single super_block. It does: shrink_dcache_sb(sb); invalidate_inodes(sb, false); But it's still a hack. Yet, the major users of filesystem encryption want this feature badly enough that they are actually using these hacks. To properly solve the problem, start maintaining a list of the inodes which have been "unlocked" using each master key. Originally this wasn't possible because the kernel didn't keep track of in-use master keys at all. But, with the ->s_master_keys keyring it is now possible. Then, add an ioctl FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY. It finds the specified master key in ->s_master_keys, then wipes the secret key itself, which prevents any additional inodes from being unlocked with the key. Then, it syncs the filesystem and evicts the inodes in the key's list. The normal inode eviction code will free and wipe the per-file keys (in ->i_crypt_info). Note that freeing ->i_crypt_info without evicting the inodes was also considered, but would have been racy. Some inodes may still be in use when a master key is removed, and we can't simply revoke random file descriptors, mmap's, etc. Thus, the ioctl simply skips in-use inodes, and returns -EBUSY to indicate that some inodes weren't evicted. The master key *secret* is still removed, but the fscrypt_master_key struct remains to keep track of the remaining inodes. Userspace can then retry the ioctl to evict the remaining inodes. Alternatively, if userspace adds the key again, the refreshed secret will be associated with the existing list of inodes so they remain correctly tracked for future key removals. The ioctl doesn't wipe pagecache pages. Thus, we tolerate that after a kernel compromise some portions of plaintext file contents may still be recoverable from memory. This can be solved by enabling page poisoning system-wide, which security conscious users may choose to do. But it's very difficult to solve otherwise, e.g. note that plaintext file contents may have been read in other places than pagecache pages. Like FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY is initially restricted to privileged users only. This is sufficient for some use cases, but not all. A later patch will relax this restriction, but it will require introducing key hashes, among other changes. Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-08-05 05:35:46 +03:00
*/
fscrypt: track master key presence separately from secret Master keys can be in one of three states: present, incompletely removed, and absent (as per FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_* used in the UAPI). Currently, the way that "present" is distinguished from "incompletely removed" internally is by whether ->mk_secret exists or not. With extent-based encryption, it will be necessary to allow per-extent keys to be derived while the master key is incompletely removed, so that I/O on open files will reliably continue working after removal of the key has been initiated. (We could allow I/O to sometimes fail in that case, but that seems problematic for reasons such as writes getting silently thrown away and diverging from the existing fscrypt semantics.) Therefore, when the filesystem is using extent-based encryption, ->mk_secret can't be wiped when the key becomes incompletely removed. As a prerequisite for doing that, this patch makes the "present" state be tracked using a new field, ->mk_present. No behavior is changed yet. The basic idea here is borrowed from Josef Bacik's patch "fscrypt: use a flag to indicate that the master key is being evicted" (https://lore.kernel.org/r/e86c16dddc049ff065f877d793ad773e4c6bfad9.1696970227.git.josef@toxicpanda.com). I reimplemented it using a "present" bool instead of an "evicted" flag, fixed a couple bugs, and tried to update everything to be consistent. Note: I considered adding a ->mk_status field instead, holding one of FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_*. At first that seemed nice, but it ended up being more complex (despite simplifying FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS), since it would have introduced redundancy and had weird locking rules. Reviewed-by: Neal Gompa <neal@gompa.dev> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231015061055.62673-1-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2023-10-15 09:10:55 +03:00
bool mk_present;
} __randomize_layout;
fscrypt: add FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl Add a new fscrypt ioctl, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY. This ioctl removes an encryption key that was added by FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY. It wipes the secret key itself, then "locks" the encrypted files and directories that had been unlocked using that key -- implemented by evicting the relevant dentries and inodes from the VFS caches. The problem this solves is that many fscrypt users want the ability to remove encryption keys, causing the corresponding encrypted directories to appear "locked" (presented in ciphertext form) again. Moreover, users want removing an encryption key to *really* remove it, in the sense that the removed keys cannot be recovered even if kernel memory is compromised, e.g. by the exploit of a kernel security vulnerability or by a physical attack. This is desirable after a user logs out of the system, for example. In many cases users even already assume this to be the case and are surprised to hear when it's not. It is not sufficient to simply unlink the master key from the keyring (or to revoke or invalidate it), since the actual encryption transform objects are still pinned in memory by their inodes. Therefore, to really remove a key we must also evict the relevant inodes. Currently one workaround is to run 'sync && echo 2 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches'. But, that evicts all unused inodes in the system rather than just the inodes associated with the key being removed, causing severe performance problems. Moreover, it requires root privileges, so regular users can't "lock" their encrypted files. Another workaround, used in Chromium OS kernels, is to add a new VFS-level ioctl FS_IOC_DROP_CACHE which is a more restricted version of drop_caches that operates on a single super_block. It does: shrink_dcache_sb(sb); invalidate_inodes(sb, false); But it's still a hack. Yet, the major users of filesystem encryption want this feature badly enough that they are actually using these hacks. To properly solve the problem, start maintaining a list of the inodes which have been "unlocked" using each master key. Originally this wasn't possible because the kernel didn't keep track of in-use master keys at all. But, with the ->s_master_keys keyring it is now possible. Then, add an ioctl FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY. It finds the specified master key in ->s_master_keys, then wipes the secret key itself, which prevents any additional inodes from being unlocked with the key. Then, it syncs the filesystem and evicts the inodes in the key's list. The normal inode eviction code will free and wipe the per-file keys (in ->i_crypt_info). Note that freeing ->i_crypt_info without evicting the inodes was also considered, but would have been racy. Some inodes may still be in use when a master key is removed, and we can't simply revoke random file descriptors, mmap's, etc. Thus, the ioctl simply skips in-use inodes, and returns -EBUSY to indicate that some inodes weren't evicted. The master key *secret* is still removed, but the fscrypt_master_key struct remains to keep track of the remaining inodes. Userspace can then retry the ioctl to evict the remaining inodes. Alternatively, if userspace adds the key again, the refreshed secret will be associated with the existing list of inodes so they remain correctly tracked for future key removals. The ioctl doesn't wipe pagecache pages. Thus, we tolerate that after a kernel compromise some portions of plaintext file contents may still be recoverable from memory. This can be solved by enabling page poisoning system-wide, which security conscious users may choose to do. But it's very difficult to solve otherwise, e.g. note that plaintext file contents may have been read in other places than pagecache pages. Like FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY is initially restricted to privileged users only. This is sufficient for some use cases, but not all. A later patch will relax this restriction, but it will require introducing key hashes, among other changes. Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-08-05 05:35:46 +03:00
fscrypt: add FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl Add a new fscrypt ioctl, FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY. This ioctl adds an encryption key to the filesystem's fscrypt keyring ->s_master_keys, making any files encrypted with that key appear "unlocked". Why we need this ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The main problem is that the "locked/unlocked" (ciphertext/plaintext) status of encrypted files is global, but the fscrypt keys are not. fscrypt only looks for keys in the keyring(s) the process accessing the filesystem is subscribed to: the thread keyring, process keyring, and session keyring, where the session keyring may contain the user keyring. Therefore, userspace has to put fscrypt keys in the keyrings for individual users or sessions. But this means that when a process with a different keyring tries to access encrypted files, whether they appear "unlocked" or not is nondeterministic. This is because it depends on whether the files are currently present in the inode cache. Fixing this by consistently providing each process its own view of the filesystem depending on whether it has the key or not isn't feasible due to how the VFS caches work. Furthermore, while sometimes users expect this behavior, it is misguided for two reasons. First, it would be an OS-level access control mechanism largely redundant with existing access control mechanisms such as UNIX file permissions, ACLs, LSMs, etc. Encryption is actually for protecting the data at rest. Second, almost all users of fscrypt actually do need the keys to be global. The largest users of fscrypt, Android and Chromium OS, achieve this by having PID 1 create a "session keyring" that is inherited by every process. This works, but it isn't scalable because it prevents session keyrings from being used for any other purpose. On general-purpose Linux distros, the 'fscrypt' userspace tool [1] can't similarly abuse the session keyring, so to make 'sudo' work on all systems it has to link all the user keyrings into root's user keyring [2]. This is ugly and raises security concerns. Moreover it can't make the keys available to system services, such as sshd trying to access the user's '~/.ssh' directory (see [3], [4]) or NetworkManager trying to read certificates from the user's home directory (see [5]); or to Docker containers (see [6], [7]). By having an API to add a key to the *filesystem* we'll be able to fix the above bugs, remove userspace workarounds, and clearly express the intended semantics: the locked/unlocked status of an encrypted directory is global, and encryption is orthogonal to OS-level access control. Why not use the add_key() syscall ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ We use an ioctl for this API rather than the existing add_key() system call because the ioctl gives us the flexibility needed to implement fscrypt-specific semantics that will be introduced in later patches: - Supporting key removal with the semantics such that the secret is removed immediately and any unused inodes using the key are evicted; also, the eviction of any in-use inodes can be retried. - Calculating a key-dependent cryptographic identifier and returning it to userspace. - Allowing keys to be added and removed by non-root users, but only keys for v2 encryption policies; and to prevent denial-of-service attacks, users can only remove keys they themselves have added, and a key is only really removed after all users who added it have removed it. Trying to shoehorn these semantics into the keyrings syscalls would be very difficult, whereas the ioctls make things much easier. However, to reuse code the implementation still uses the keyrings service internally. Thus we get lockless RCU-mode key lookups without having to re-implement it, and the keys automatically show up in /proc/keys for debugging purposes. References: [1] https://github.com/google/fscrypt [2] https://goo.gl/55cCrI#heading=h.vf09isp98isb [3] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/111#issuecomment-444347939 [4] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/116 [5] https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/fscrypt/+bug/1770715 [6] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/128 [7] https://askubuntu.com/questions/1130306/cannot-run-docker-on-an-encrypted-filesystem Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-08-05 05:35:46 +03:00
static inline const char *master_key_spec_type(
const struct fscrypt_key_specifier *spec)
{
switch (spec->type) {
case FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR:
return "descriptor";
fscrypt: v2 encryption policy support Add a new fscrypt policy version, "v2". It has the following changes from the original policy version, which we call "v1" (*): - Master keys (the user-provided encryption keys) are only ever used as input to HKDF-SHA512. This is more flexible and less error-prone, and it avoids the quirks and limitations of the AES-128-ECB based KDF. Three classes of cryptographically isolated subkeys are defined: - Per-file keys, like used in v1 policies except for the new KDF. - Per-mode keys. These implement the semantics of the DIRECT_KEY flag, which for v1 policies made the master key be used directly. These are also planned to be used for inline encryption when support for it is added. - Key identifiers (see below). - Each master key is identified by a 16-byte master_key_identifier, which is derived from the key itself using HKDF-SHA512. This prevents users from associating the wrong key with an encrypted file or directory. This was easily possible with v1 policies, which identified the key by an arbitrary 8-byte master_key_descriptor. - The key must be provided in the filesystem-level keyring, not in a process-subscribed keyring. The following UAPI additions are made: - The existing ioctl FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY can now be passed a fscrypt_policy_v2 to set a v2 encryption policy. It's disambiguated from fscrypt_policy/fscrypt_policy_v1 by the version code prefix. - A new ioctl FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX is added. It allows getting the v1 or v2 encryption policy of an encrypted file or directory. The existing FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY ioctl could not be used because it did not have a way for userspace to indicate which policy structure is expected. The new ioctl includes a size field, so it is extensible to future fscrypt policy versions. - The ioctls FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY, and FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS now support managing keys for v2 encryption policies. Such keys are kept logically separate from keys for v1 encryption policies, and are identified by 'identifier' rather than by 'descriptor'. The 'identifier' need not be provided when adding a key, since the kernel will calculate it anyway. This patch temporarily keeps adding/removing v2 policy keys behind the same permission check done for adding/removing v1 policy keys: capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN). However, the next patch will carefully take advantage of the cryptographically secure master_key_identifier to allow non-root users to add/remove v2 policy keys, thus providing a full replacement for v1 policies. (*) Actually, in the API fscrypt_policy::version is 0 while on-disk fscrypt_context::format is 1. But I believe it makes the most sense to advance both to '2' to have them be in sync, and to consider the numbering to start at 1 except for the API quirk. Reviewed-by: Paul Crowley <paulcrowley@google.com> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-08-05 05:35:47 +03:00
case FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_IDENTIFIER:
return "identifier";
fscrypt: add FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl Add a new fscrypt ioctl, FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY. This ioctl adds an encryption key to the filesystem's fscrypt keyring ->s_master_keys, making any files encrypted with that key appear "unlocked". Why we need this ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The main problem is that the "locked/unlocked" (ciphertext/plaintext) status of encrypted files is global, but the fscrypt keys are not. fscrypt only looks for keys in the keyring(s) the process accessing the filesystem is subscribed to: the thread keyring, process keyring, and session keyring, where the session keyring may contain the user keyring. Therefore, userspace has to put fscrypt keys in the keyrings for individual users or sessions. But this means that when a process with a different keyring tries to access encrypted files, whether they appear "unlocked" or not is nondeterministic. This is because it depends on whether the files are currently present in the inode cache. Fixing this by consistently providing each process its own view of the filesystem depending on whether it has the key or not isn't feasible due to how the VFS caches work. Furthermore, while sometimes users expect this behavior, it is misguided for two reasons. First, it would be an OS-level access control mechanism largely redundant with existing access control mechanisms such as UNIX file permissions, ACLs, LSMs, etc. Encryption is actually for protecting the data at rest. Second, almost all users of fscrypt actually do need the keys to be global. The largest users of fscrypt, Android and Chromium OS, achieve this by having PID 1 create a "session keyring" that is inherited by every process. This works, but it isn't scalable because it prevents session keyrings from being used for any other purpose. On general-purpose Linux distros, the 'fscrypt' userspace tool [1] can't similarly abuse the session keyring, so to make 'sudo' work on all systems it has to link all the user keyrings into root's user keyring [2]. This is ugly and raises security concerns. Moreover it can't make the keys available to system services, such as sshd trying to access the user's '~/.ssh' directory (see [3], [4]) or NetworkManager trying to read certificates from the user's home directory (see [5]); or to Docker containers (see [6], [7]). By having an API to add a key to the *filesystem* we'll be able to fix the above bugs, remove userspace workarounds, and clearly express the intended semantics: the locked/unlocked status of an encrypted directory is global, and encryption is orthogonal to OS-level access control. Why not use the add_key() syscall ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ We use an ioctl for this API rather than the existing add_key() system call because the ioctl gives us the flexibility needed to implement fscrypt-specific semantics that will be introduced in later patches: - Supporting key removal with the semantics such that the secret is removed immediately and any unused inodes using the key are evicted; also, the eviction of any in-use inodes can be retried. - Calculating a key-dependent cryptographic identifier and returning it to userspace. - Allowing keys to be added and removed by non-root users, but only keys for v2 encryption policies; and to prevent denial-of-service attacks, users can only remove keys they themselves have added, and a key is only really removed after all users who added it have removed it. Trying to shoehorn these semantics into the keyrings syscalls would be very difficult, whereas the ioctls make things much easier. However, to reuse code the implementation still uses the keyrings service internally. Thus we get lockless RCU-mode key lookups without having to re-implement it, and the keys automatically show up in /proc/keys for debugging purposes. References: [1] https://github.com/google/fscrypt [2] https://goo.gl/55cCrI#heading=h.vf09isp98isb [3] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/111#issuecomment-444347939 [4] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/116 [5] https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/fscrypt/+bug/1770715 [6] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/128 [7] https://askubuntu.com/questions/1130306/cannot-run-docker-on-an-encrypted-filesystem Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-08-05 05:35:46 +03:00
}
return "[unknown]";
}
static inline int master_key_spec_len(const struct fscrypt_key_specifier *spec)
{
switch (spec->type) {
case FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR:
return FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE;
fscrypt: v2 encryption policy support Add a new fscrypt policy version, "v2". It has the following changes from the original policy version, which we call "v1" (*): - Master keys (the user-provided encryption keys) are only ever used as input to HKDF-SHA512. This is more flexible and less error-prone, and it avoids the quirks and limitations of the AES-128-ECB based KDF. Three classes of cryptographically isolated subkeys are defined: - Per-file keys, like used in v1 policies except for the new KDF. - Per-mode keys. These implement the semantics of the DIRECT_KEY flag, which for v1 policies made the master key be used directly. These are also planned to be used for inline encryption when support for it is added. - Key identifiers (see below). - Each master key is identified by a 16-byte master_key_identifier, which is derived from the key itself using HKDF-SHA512. This prevents users from associating the wrong key with an encrypted file or directory. This was easily possible with v1 policies, which identified the key by an arbitrary 8-byte master_key_descriptor. - The key must be provided in the filesystem-level keyring, not in a process-subscribed keyring. The following UAPI additions are made: - The existing ioctl FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY can now be passed a fscrypt_policy_v2 to set a v2 encryption policy. It's disambiguated from fscrypt_policy/fscrypt_policy_v1 by the version code prefix. - A new ioctl FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX is added. It allows getting the v1 or v2 encryption policy of an encrypted file or directory. The existing FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY ioctl could not be used because it did not have a way for userspace to indicate which policy structure is expected. The new ioctl includes a size field, so it is extensible to future fscrypt policy versions. - The ioctls FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY, and FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS now support managing keys for v2 encryption policies. Such keys are kept logically separate from keys for v1 encryption policies, and are identified by 'identifier' rather than by 'descriptor'. The 'identifier' need not be provided when adding a key, since the kernel will calculate it anyway. This patch temporarily keeps adding/removing v2 policy keys behind the same permission check done for adding/removing v1 policy keys: capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN). However, the next patch will carefully take advantage of the cryptographically secure master_key_identifier to allow non-root users to add/remove v2 policy keys, thus providing a full replacement for v1 policies. (*) Actually, in the API fscrypt_policy::version is 0 while on-disk fscrypt_context::format is 1. But I believe it makes the most sense to advance both to '2' to have them be in sync, and to consider the numbering to start at 1 except for the API quirk. Reviewed-by: Paul Crowley <paulcrowley@google.com> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-08-05 05:35:47 +03:00
case FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_IDENTIFIER:
return FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE;
fscrypt: add FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl Add a new fscrypt ioctl, FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY. This ioctl adds an encryption key to the filesystem's fscrypt keyring ->s_master_keys, making any files encrypted with that key appear "unlocked". Why we need this ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The main problem is that the "locked/unlocked" (ciphertext/plaintext) status of encrypted files is global, but the fscrypt keys are not. fscrypt only looks for keys in the keyring(s) the process accessing the filesystem is subscribed to: the thread keyring, process keyring, and session keyring, where the session keyring may contain the user keyring. Therefore, userspace has to put fscrypt keys in the keyrings for individual users or sessions. But this means that when a process with a different keyring tries to access encrypted files, whether they appear "unlocked" or not is nondeterministic. This is because it depends on whether the files are currently present in the inode cache. Fixing this by consistently providing each process its own view of the filesystem depending on whether it has the key or not isn't feasible due to how the VFS caches work. Furthermore, while sometimes users expect this behavior, it is misguided for two reasons. First, it would be an OS-level access control mechanism largely redundant with existing access control mechanisms such as UNIX file permissions, ACLs, LSMs, etc. Encryption is actually for protecting the data at rest. Second, almost all users of fscrypt actually do need the keys to be global. The largest users of fscrypt, Android and Chromium OS, achieve this by having PID 1 create a "session keyring" that is inherited by every process. This works, but it isn't scalable because it prevents session keyrings from being used for any other purpose. On general-purpose Linux distros, the 'fscrypt' userspace tool [1] can't similarly abuse the session keyring, so to make 'sudo' work on all systems it has to link all the user keyrings into root's user keyring [2]. This is ugly and raises security concerns. Moreover it can't make the keys available to system services, such as sshd trying to access the user's '~/.ssh' directory (see [3], [4]) or NetworkManager trying to read certificates from the user's home directory (see [5]); or to Docker containers (see [6], [7]). By having an API to add a key to the *filesystem* we'll be able to fix the above bugs, remove userspace workarounds, and clearly express the intended semantics: the locked/unlocked status of an encrypted directory is global, and encryption is orthogonal to OS-level access control. Why not use the add_key() syscall ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ We use an ioctl for this API rather than the existing add_key() system call because the ioctl gives us the flexibility needed to implement fscrypt-specific semantics that will be introduced in later patches: - Supporting key removal with the semantics such that the secret is removed immediately and any unused inodes using the key are evicted; also, the eviction of any in-use inodes can be retried. - Calculating a key-dependent cryptographic identifier and returning it to userspace. - Allowing keys to be added and removed by non-root users, but only keys for v2 encryption policies; and to prevent denial-of-service attacks, users can only remove keys they themselves have added, and a key is only really removed after all users who added it have removed it. Trying to shoehorn these semantics into the keyrings syscalls would be very difficult, whereas the ioctls make things much easier. However, to reuse code the implementation still uses the keyrings service internally. Thus we get lockless RCU-mode key lookups without having to re-implement it, and the keys automatically show up in /proc/keys for debugging purposes. References: [1] https://github.com/google/fscrypt [2] https://goo.gl/55cCrI#heading=h.vf09isp98isb [3] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/111#issuecomment-444347939 [4] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/116 [5] https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/fscrypt/+bug/1770715 [6] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/128 [7] https://askubuntu.com/questions/1130306/cannot-run-docker-on-an-encrypted-filesystem Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-08-05 05:35:46 +03:00
}
return 0;
}
fscrypt: stop using keyrings subsystem for fscrypt_master_key The approach of fs/crypto/ internally managing the fscrypt_master_key structs as the payloads of "struct key" objects contained in a "struct key" keyring has outlived its usefulness. The original idea was to simplify the code by reusing code from the keyrings subsystem. However, several issues have arisen that can't easily be resolved: - When a master key struct is destroyed, blk_crypto_evict_key() must be called on any per-mode keys embedded in it. (This started being the case when inline encryption support was added.) Yet, the keyrings subsystem can arbitrarily delay the destruction of keys, even past the time the filesystem was unmounted. Therefore, currently there is no easy way to call blk_crypto_evict_key() when a master key is destroyed. Currently, this is worked around by holding an extra reference to the filesystem's request_queue(s). But it was overlooked that the request_queue reference is *not* guaranteed to pin the corresponding blk_crypto_profile too; for device-mapper devices that support inline crypto, it doesn't. This can cause a use-after-free. - When the last inode that was using an incompletely-removed master key is evicted, the master key removal is completed by removing the key struct from the keyring. Currently this is done via key_invalidate(). Yet, key_invalidate() takes the key semaphore. This can deadlock when called from the shrinker, since in fscrypt_ioctl_add_key(), memory is allocated with GFP_KERNEL under the same semaphore. - More generally, the fact that the keyrings subsystem can arbitrarily delay the destruction of keys (via garbage collection delay, or via random processes getting temporary key references) is undesirable, as it means we can't strictly guarantee that all secrets are ever wiped. - Doing the master key lookups via the keyrings subsystem results in the key_permission LSM hook being called. fscrypt doesn't want this, as all access control for encrypted files is designed to happen via the files themselves, like any other files. The workaround which SELinux users are using is to change their SELinux policy to grant key search access to all domains. This works, but it is an odd extra step that shouldn't really have to be done. The fix for all these issues is to change the implementation to what I should have done originally: don't use the keyrings subsystem to keep track of the filesystem's fscrypt_master_key structs. Instead, just store them in a regular kernel data structure, and rework the reference counting, locking, and lifetime accordingly. Retain support for RCU-mode key lookups by using a hash table. Replace fscrypt_sb_free() with fscrypt_sb_delete(), which releases the keys synchronously and runs a bit earlier during unmount, so that block devices are still available. A side effect of this patch is that neither the master keys themselves nor the filesystem keyrings will be listed in /proc/keys anymore. ("Master key users" and the master key users keyrings will still be listed.) However, this was mostly an implementation detail, and it was intended just for debugging purposes. I don't know of anyone using it. This patch does *not* change how "master key users" (->mk_users) works; that still uses the keyrings subsystem. That is still needed for key quotas, and changing that isn't necessary to solve the issues listed above. If we decide to change that too, it would be a separate patch. I've marked this as fixing the original commit that added the fscrypt keyring, but as noted above the most important issue that this patch fixes wasn't introduced until the addition of inline encryption support. Fixes: 22d94f493bfb ("fscrypt: add FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220901193208.138056-2-ebiggers@kernel.org
2022-09-01 22:32:06 +03:00
void fscrypt_put_master_key(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk);
void fscrypt_put_master_key_activeref(struct super_block *sb,
struct fscrypt_master_key *mk);
fscrypt: stop using keyrings subsystem for fscrypt_master_key The approach of fs/crypto/ internally managing the fscrypt_master_key structs as the payloads of "struct key" objects contained in a "struct key" keyring has outlived its usefulness. The original idea was to simplify the code by reusing code from the keyrings subsystem. However, several issues have arisen that can't easily be resolved: - When a master key struct is destroyed, blk_crypto_evict_key() must be called on any per-mode keys embedded in it. (This started being the case when inline encryption support was added.) Yet, the keyrings subsystem can arbitrarily delay the destruction of keys, even past the time the filesystem was unmounted. Therefore, currently there is no easy way to call blk_crypto_evict_key() when a master key is destroyed. Currently, this is worked around by holding an extra reference to the filesystem's request_queue(s). But it was overlooked that the request_queue reference is *not* guaranteed to pin the corresponding blk_crypto_profile too; for device-mapper devices that support inline crypto, it doesn't. This can cause a use-after-free. - When the last inode that was using an incompletely-removed master key is evicted, the master key removal is completed by removing the key struct from the keyring. Currently this is done via key_invalidate(). Yet, key_invalidate() takes the key semaphore. This can deadlock when called from the shrinker, since in fscrypt_ioctl_add_key(), memory is allocated with GFP_KERNEL under the same semaphore. - More generally, the fact that the keyrings subsystem can arbitrarily delay the destruction of keys (via garbage collection delay, or via random processes getting temporary key references) is undesirable, as it means we can't strictly guarantee that all secrets are ever wiped. - Doing the master key lookups via the keyrings subsystem results in the key_permission LSM hook being called. fscrypt doesn't want this, as all access control for encrypted files is designed to happen via the files themselves, like any other files. The workaround which SELinux users are using is to change their SELinux policy to grant key search access to all domains. This works, but it is an odd extra step that shouldn't really have to be done. The fix for all these issues is to change the implementation to what I should have done originally: don't use the keyrings subsystem to keep track of the filesystem's fscrypt_master_key structs. Instead, just store them in a regular kernel data structure, and rework the reference counting, locking, and lifetime accordingly. Retain support for RCU-mode key lookups by using a hash table. Replace fscrypt_sb_free() with fscrypt_sb_delete(), which releases the keys synchronously and runs a bit earlier during unmount, so that block devices are still available. A side effect of this patch is that neither the master keys themselves nor the filesystem keyrings will be listed in /proc/keys anymore. ("Master key users" and the master key users keyrings will still be listed.) However, this was mostly an implementation detail, and it was intended just for debugging purposes. I don't know of anyone using it. This patch does *not* change how "master key users" (->mk_users) works; that still uses the keyrings subsystem. That is still needed for key quotas, and changing that isn't necessary to solve the issues listed above. If we decide to change that too, it would be a separate patch. I've marked this as fixing the original commit that added the fscrypt keyring, but as noted above the most important issue that this patch fixes wasn't introduced until the addition of inline encryption support. Fixes: 22d94f493bfb ("fscrypt: add FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220901193208.138056-2-ebiggers@kernel.org
2022-09-01 22:32:06 +03:00
struct fscrypt_master_key *
fscrypt: add FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl Add a new fscrypt ioctl, FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY. This ioctl adds an encryption key to the filesystem's fscrypt keyring ->s_master_keys, making any files encrypted with that key appear "unlocked". Why we need this ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The main problem is that the "locked/unlocked" (ciphertext/plaintext) status of encrypted files is global, but the fscrypt keys are not. fscrypt only looks for keys in the keyring(s) the process accessing the filesystem is subscribed to: the thread keyring, process keyring, and session keyring, where the session keyring may contain the user keyring. Therefore, userspace has to put fscrypt keys in the keyrings for individual users or sessions. But this means that when a process with a different keyring tries to access encrypted files, whether they appear "unlocked" or not is nondeterministic. This is because it depends on whether the files are currently present in the inode cache. Fixing this by consistently providing each process its own view of the filesystem depending on whether it has the key or not isn't feasible due to how the VFS caches work. Furthermore, while sometimes users expect this behavior, it is misguided for two reasons. First, it would be an OS-level access control mechanism largely redundant with existing access control mechanisms such as UNIX file permissions, ACLs, LSMs, etc. Encryption is actually for protecting the data at rest. Second, almost all users of fscrypt actually do need the keys to be global. The largest users of fscrypt, Android and Chromium OS, achieve this by having PID 1 create a "session keyring" that is inherited by every process. This works, but it isn't scalable because it prevents session keyrings from being used for any other purpose. On general-purpose Linux distros, the 'fscrypt' userspace tool [1] can't similarly abuse the session keyring, so to make 'sudo' work on all systems it has to link all the user keyrings into root's user keyring [2]. This is ugly and raises security concerns. Moreover it can't make the keys available to system services, such as sshd trying to access the user's '~/.ssh' directory (see [3], [4]) or NetworkManager trying to read certificates from the user's home directory (see [5]); or to Docker containers (see [6], [7]). By having an API to add a key to the *filesystem* we'll be able to fix the above bugs, remove userspace workarounds, and clearly express the intended semantics: the locked/unlocked status of an encrypted directory is global, and encryption is orthogonal to OS-level access control. Why not use the add_key() syscall ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ We use an ioctl for this API rather than the existing add_key() system call because the ioctl gives us the flexibility needed to implement fscrypt-specific semantics that will be introduced in later patches: - Supporting key removal with the semantics such that the secret is removed immediately and any unused inodes using the key are evicted; also, the eviction of any in-use inodes can be retried. - Calculating a key-dependent cryptographic identifier and returning it to userspace. - Allowing keys to be added and removed by non-root users, but only keys for v2 encryption policies; and to prevent denial-of-service attacks, users can only remove keys they themselves have added, and a key is only really removed after all users who added it have removed it. Trying to shoehorn these semantics into the keyrings syscalls would be very difficult, whereas the ioctls make things much easier. However, to reuse code the implementation still uses the keyrings service internally. Thus we get lockless RCU-mode key lookups without having to re-implement it, and the keys automatically show up in /proc/keys for debugging purposes. References: [1] https://github.com/google/fscrypt [2] https://goo.gl/55cCrI#heading=h.vf09isp98isb [3] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/111#issuecomment-444347939 [4] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/116 [5] https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/fscrypt/+bug/1770715 [6] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/128 [7] https://askubuntu.com/questions/1130306/cannot-run-docker-on-an-encrypted-filesystem Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-08-05 05:35:46 +03:00
fscrypt_find_master_key(struct super_block *sb,
const struct fscrypt_key_specifier *mk_spec);
int fscrypt_get_test_dummy_key_identifier(
u8 key_identifier[FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE]);
int fscrypt_add_test_dummy_key(struct super_block *sb,
struct fscrypt_key_specifier *key_spec);
int fscrypt_verify_key_added(struct super_block *sb,
const u8 identifier[FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE]);
int __init fscrypt_init_keyring(void);
fscrypt: add FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl Add a new fscrypt ioctl, FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY. This ioctl adds an encryption key to the filesystem's fscrypt keyring ->s_master_keys, making any files encrypted with that key appear "unlocked". Why we need this ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The main problem is that the "locked/unlocked" (ciphertext/plaintext) status of encrypted files is global, but the fscrypt keys are not. fscrypt only looks for keys in the keyring(s) the process accessing the filesystem is subscribed to: the thread keyring, process keyring, and session keyring, where the session keyring may contain the user keyring. Therefore, userspace has to put fscrypt keys in the keyrings for individual users or sessions. But this means that when a process with a different keyring tries to access encrypted files, whether they appear "unlocked" or not is nondeterministic. This is because it depends on whether the files are currently present in the inode cache. Fixing this by consistently providing each process its own view of the filesystem depending on whether it has the key or not isn't feasible due to how the VFS caches work. Furthermore, while sometimes users expect this behavior, it is misguided for two reasons. First, it would be an OS-level access control mechanism largely redundant with existing access control mechanisms such as UNIX file permissions, ACLs, LSMs, etc. Encryption is actually for protecting the data at rest. Second, almost all users of fscrypt actually do need the keys to be global. The largest users of fscrypt, Android and Chromium OS, achieve this by having PID 1 create a "session keyring" that is inherited by every process. This works, but it isn't scalable because it prevents session keyrings from being used for any other purpose. On general-purpose Linux distros, the 'fscrypt' userspace tool [1] can't similarly abuse the session keyring, so to make 'sudo' work on all systems it has to link all the user keyrings into root's user keyring [2]. This is ugly and raises security concerns. Moreover it can't make the keys available to system services, such as sshd trying to access the user's '~/.ssh' directory (see [3], [4]) or NetworkManager trying to read certificates from the user's home directory (see [5]); or to Docker containers (see [6], [7]). By having an API to add a key to the *filesystem* we'll be able to fix the above bugs, remove userspace workarounds, and clearly express the intended semantics: the locked/unlocked status of an encrypted directory is global, and encryption is orthogonal to OS-level access control. Why not use the add_key() syscall ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ We use an ioctl for this API rather than the existing add_key() system call because the ioctl gives us the flexibility needed to implement fscrypt-specific semantics that will be introduced in later patches: - Supporting key removal with the semantics such that the secret is removed immediately and any unused inodes using the key are evicted; also, the eviction of any in-use inodes can be retried. - Calculating a key-dependent cryptographic identifier and returning it to userspace. - Allowing keys to be added and removed by non-root users, but only keys for v2 encryption policies; and to prevent denial-of-service attacks, users can only remove keys they themselves have added, and a key is only really removed after all users who added it have removed it. Trying to shoehorn these semantics into the keyrings syscalls would be very difficult, whereas the ioctls make things much easier. However, to reuse code the implementation still uses the keyrings service internally. Thus we get lockless RCU-mode key lookups without having to re-implement it, and the keys automatically show up in /proc/keys for debugging purposes. References: [1] https://github.com/google/fscrypt [2] https://goo.gl/55cCrI#heading=h.vf09isp98isb [3] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/111#issuecomment-444347939 [4] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/116 [5] https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/fscrypt/+bug/1770715 [6] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/128 [7] https://askubuntu.com/questions/1130306/cannot-run-docker-on-an-encrypted-filesystem Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-08-05 05:35:46 +03:00
/* keysetup.c */
fscrypt: add Adiantum support Add support for the Adiantum encryption mode to fscrypt. Adiantum is a tweakable, length-preserving encryption mode with security provably reducible to that of XChaCha12 and AES-256, subject to a security bound. It's also a true wide-block mode, unlike XTS. See the paper "Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for entry-level processors" (https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.pdf) for more details. Also see commit 059c2a4d8e16 ("crypto: adiantum - add Adiantum support"). On sufficiently long messages, Adiantum's bottlenecks are XChaCha12 and the NH hash function. These algorithms are fast even on processors without dedicated crypto instructions. Adiantum makes it feasible to enable storage encryption on low-end mobile devices that lack AES instructions; currently such devices are unencrypted. On ARM Cortex-A7, on 4096-byte messages Adiantum encryption is about 4 times faster than AES-256-XTS encryption; decryption is about 5 times faster. In fscrypt, Adiantum is suitable for encrypting both file contents and names. With filenames, it fixes a known weakness: when two filenames in a directory share a common prefix of >= 16 bytes, with CTS-CBC their encrypted filenames share a common prefix too, leaking information. Adiantum does not have this problem. Since Adiantum also accepts long tweaks (IVs), it's also safe to use the master key directly for Adiantum encryption rather than deriving per-file keys, provided that the per-file nonce is included in the IVs and the master key isn't used for any other encryption mode. This configuration saves memory and improves performance. A new fscrypt policy flag is added to allow users to opt-in to this configuration. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
2019-01-06 16:36:21 +03:00
struct fscrypt_mode {
const char *friendly_name;
const char *cipher_str;
fscrypt: allow 256-bit master keys with AES-256-XTS fscrypt currently requires a 512-bit master key when AES-256-XTS is used, since AES-256-XTS keys are 512-bit and fscrypt requires that the master key be at least as long any key that will be derived from it. However, this is overly strict because AES-256-XTS doesn't actually have a 512-bit security strength, but rather 256-bit. The fact that XTS takes twice the expected key size is a quirk of the XTS mode. It is sufficient to use 256 bits of entropy for AES-256-XTS, provided that it is first properly expanded into a 512-bit key, which HKDF-SHA512 does. Therefore, relax the check of the master key size to use the security strength of the derived key rather than the size of the derived key (except for v1 encryption policies, which don't use HKDF). Besides making things more flexible for userspace, this is needed in order for the use of a KDF which only takes a 256-bit key to be introduced into the fscrypt key hierarchy. This will happen with hardware-wrapped keys support, as all known hardware which supports that feature uses an SP800-108 KDF using AES-256-CMAC, so the wrapped keys are wrapped 256-bit AES keys. Moreover, there is interest in fscrypt supporting the same type of AES-256-CMAC based KDF in software as an alternative to HKDF-SHA512. There is no security problem with such features, so fix the key length check to work properly with them. Reviewed-by: Paul Crowley <paulcrowley@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210921030303.5598-1-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2021-09-21 06:03:03 +03:00
int keysize; /* key size in bytes */
int security_strength; /* security strength in bytes */
int ivsize; /* IV size in bytes */
int logged_cryptoapi_impl;
int logged_blk_crypto_native;
int logged_blk_crypto_fallback;
fscrypt: add inline encryption support Add support for inline encryption to fs/crypto/. With "inline encryption", the block layer handles the decryption/encryption as part of the bio, instead of the filesystem doing the crypto itself via Linux's crypto API. This model is needed in order to take advantage of the inline encryption hardware present on most modern mobile SoCs. To use inline encryption, the filesystem needs to be mounted with '-o inlinecrypt'. Blk-crypto will then be used instead of the traditional filesystem-layer crypto whenever possible to encrypt the contents of any encrypted files in that filesystem. Fscrypt still provides the key and IV to use, and the actual ciphertext on-disk is still the same; therefore it's testable using the existing fscrypt ciphertext verification tests. Note that since blk-crypto has a fallback to Linux's crypto API, and also supports all the encryption modes currently supported by fscrypt, this feature is usable and testable even without actual inline encryption hardware. Per-filesystem changes will be needed to set encryption contexts when submitting bios and to implement the 'inlinecrypt' mount option. This patch just adds the common code. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200702015607.1215430-3-satyat@google.com Co-developed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2020-07-02 04:56:05 +03:00
enum blk_crypto_mode_num blk_crypto_mode;
fscrypt: add Adiantum support Add support for the Adiantum encryption mode to fscrypt. Adiantum is a tweakable, length-preserving encryption mode with security provably reducible to that of XChaCha12 and AES-256, subject to a security bound. It's also a true wide-block mode, unlike XTS. See the paper "Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for entry-level processors" (https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.pdf) for more details. Also see commit 059c2a4d8e16 ("crypto: adiantum - add Adiantum support"). On sufficiently long messages, Adiantum's bottlenecks are XChaCha12 and the NH hash function. These algorithms are fast even on processors without dedicated crypto instructions. Adiantum makes it feasible to enable storage encryption on low-end mobile devices that lack AES instructions; currently such devices are unencrypted. On ARM Cortex-A7, on 4096-byte messages Adiantum encryption is about 4 times faster than AES-256-XTS encryption; decryption is about 5 times faster. In fscrypt, Adiantum is suitable for encrypting both file contents and names. With filenames, it fixes a known weakness: when two filenames in a directory share a common prefix of >= 16 bytes, with CTS-CBC their encrypted filenames share a common prefix too, leaking information. Adiantum does not have this problem. Since Adiantum also accepts long tweaks (IVs), it's also safe to use the master key directly for Adiantum encryption rather than deriving per-file keys, provided that the per-file nonce is included in the IVs and the master key isn't used for any other encryption mode. This configuration saves memory and improves performance. A new fscrypt policy flag is added to allow users to opt-in to this configuration. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
2019-01-06 16:36:21 +03:00
};
extern struct fscrypt_mode fscrypt_modes[];
fscrypt: add inline encryption support Add support for inline encryption to fs/crypto/. With "inline encryption", the block layer handles the decryption/encryption as part of the bio, instead of the filesystem doing the crypto itself via Linux's crypto API. This model is needed in order to take advantage of the inline encryption hardware present on most modern mobile SoCs. To use inline encryption, the filesystem needs to be mounted with '-o inlinecrypt'. Blk-crypto will then be used instead of the traditional filesystem-layer crypto whenever possible to encrypt the contents of any encrypted files in that filesystem. Fscrypt still provides the key and IV to use, and the actual ciphertext on-disk is still the same; therefore it's testable using the existing fscrypt ciphertext verification tests. Note that since blk-crypto has a fallback to Linux's crypto API, and also supports all the encryption modes currently supported by fscrypt, this feature is usable and testable even without actual inline encryption hardware. Per-filesystem changes will be needed to set encryption contexts when submitting bios and to implement the 'inlinecrypt' mount option. This patch just adds the common code. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200702015607.1215430-3-satyat@google.com Co-developed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2020-07-02 04:56:05 +03:00
int fscrypt_prepare_key(struct fscrypt_prepared_key *prep_key,
const u8 *raw_key, const struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci);
fscrypt: add inline encryption support Add support for inline encryption to fs/crypto/. With "inline encryption", the block layer handles the decryption/encryption as part of the bio, instead of the filesystem doing the crypto itself via Linux's crypto API. This model is needed in order to take advantage of the inline encryption hardware present on most modern mobile SoCs. To use inline encryption, the filesystem needs to be mounted with '-o inlinecrypt'. Blk-crypto will then be used instead of the traditional filesystem-layer crypto whenever possible to encrypt the contents of any encrypted files in that filesystem. Fscrypt still provides the key and IV to use, and the actual ciphertext on-disk is still the same; therefore it's testable using the existing fscrypt ciphertext verification tests. Note that since blk-crypto has a fallback to Linux's crypto API, and also supports all the encryption modes currently supported by fscrypt, this feature is usable and testable even without actual inline encryption hardware. Per-filesystem changes will be needed to set encryption contexts when submitting bios and to implement the 'inlinecrypt' mount option. This patch just adds the common code. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200702015607.1215430-3-satyat@google.com Co-developed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2020-07-02 04:56:05 +03:00
void fscrypt_destroy_prepared_key(struct super_block *sb,
struct fscrypt_prepared_key *prep_key);
int fscrypt_set_per_file_enc_key(struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci,
const u8 *raw_key);
int fscrypt_derive_dirhash_key(struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci,
const struct fscrypt_master_key *mk);
fscrypt: derive dirhash key for casefolded directories When we allow indexed directories to use both encryption and casefolding, for the dirhash we can't just hash the ciphertext filenames that are stored on-disk (as is done currently) because the dirhash must be case insensitive, but the stored names are case-preserving. Nor can we hash the plaintext names with an unkeyed hash (or a hash keyed with a value stored on-disk like ext4's s_hash_seed), since that would leak information about the names that encryption is meant to protect. Instead, if we can accept a dirhash that's only computable when the fscrypt key is available, we can hash the plaintext names with a keyed hash using a secret key derived from the directory's fscrypt master key. We'll use SipHash-2-4 for this purpose. Prepare for this by deriving a SipHash key for each casefolded encrypted directory. Make sure to handle deriving the key not only when setting up the directory's fscrypt_info, but also in the case where the casefold flag is enabled after the fscrypt_info was already set up. (We could just always derive the key regardless of casefolding, but that would introduce unnecessary overhead for people not using casefolding.) Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com> [EB: improved commit message, updated fscrypt.rst, squashed with change that avoids unnecessarily deriving the key, and many other cleanups] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200120223201.241390-3-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2020-01-21 01:31:57 +03:00
void fscrypt_hash_inode_number(struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci,
fscrypt: add fscrypt_prepare_new_inode() and fscrypt_set_context() fscrypt_get_encryption_info() is intended to be GFP_NOFS-safe. But actually it isn't, since it uses functions like crypto_alloc_skcipher() which aren't GFP_NOFS-safe, even when called under memalloc_nofs_save(). Therefore it can deadlock when called from a context that needs GFP_NOFS, e.g. during an ext4 transaction or between f2fs_lock_op() and f2fs_unlock_op(). This happens when creating a new encrypted file. We can't fix this by just not setting up the key for new inodes right away, since new symlinks need their key to encrypt the symlink target. So we need to set up the new inode's key before starting the transaction. But just calling fscrypt_get_encryption_info() earlier doesn't work, since it assumes the encryption context is already set, and the encryption context can't be set until the transaction. The recently proposed fscrypt support for the ceph filesystem (https://lkml.kernel.org/linux-fscrypt/20200821182813.52570-1-jlayton@kernel.org/T/#u) will have this same ordering problem too, since ceph will need to encrypt new symlinks before setting their encryption context. Finally, f2fs can deadlock when the filesystem is mounted with '-o test_dummy_encryption' and a new file is created in an existing unencrypted directory. Similarly, this is caused by holding too many locks when calling fscrypt_get_encryption_info(). To solve all these problems, add new helper functions: - fscrypt_prepare_new_inode() sets up a new inode's encryption key (fscrypt_info), using the parent directory's encryption policy and a new random nonce. It neither reads nor writes the encryption context. - fscrypt_set_context() persists the encryption context of a new inode, using the information from the fscrypt_info already in memory. This replaces fscrypt_inherit_context(). Temporarily keep fscrypt_inherit_context() around until all filesystems have been converted to use fscrypt_set_context(). Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200917041136.178600-2-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2020-09-17 07:11:24 +03:00
const struct fscrypt_master_key *mk);
fscrypt: allow deleting files with unsupported encryption policy Currently it's impossible to delete files that use an unsupported encryption policy, as the kernel will just return an error when performing any operation on the top-level encrypted directory, even just a path lookup into the directory or opening the directory for readdir. More specifically, this occurs in any of the following cases: - The encryption context has an unrecognized version number. Current kernels know about v1 and v2, but there could be more versions in the future. - The encryption context has unrecognized encryption modes (FSCRYPT_MODE_*) or flags (FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_*), an unrecognized combination of modes, or reserved bits set. - The encryption key has been added and the encryption modes are recognized but aren't available in the crypto API -- for example, a directory is encrypted with FSCRYPT_MODE_ADIANTUM but the kernel doesn't have CONFIG_CRYPTO_ADIANTUM enabled. It's desirable to return errors for most operations on files that use an unsupported encryption policy, but the current behavior is too strict. We need to allow enough to delete files, so that people can't be stuck with undeletable files when downgrading kernel versions. That includes allowing directories to be listed and allowing dentries to be looked up. Fix this by modifying the key setup logic to treat an unsupported encryption policy in the same way as "key unavailable" in the cases that are required for a recursive delete to work: preparing for a readdir or a dentry lookup, revalidating a dentry, or checking whether an inode has the same encryption policy as its parent directory. Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201203022041.230976-10-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2020-12-03 05:20:41 +03:00
int fscrypt_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode, bool allow_unsupported);
/**
* fscrypt_require_key() - require an inode's encryption key
* @inode: the inode we need the key for
*
* If the inode is encrypted, set up its encryption key if not already done.
* Then require that the key be present and return -ENOKEY otherwise.
*
* No locks are needed, and the key will live as long as the struct inode --- so
* it won't go away from under you.
*
* Return: 0 on success, -ENOKEY if the key is missing, or another -errno code
* if a problem occurred while setting up the encryption key.
*/
static inline int fscrypt_require_key(struct inode *inode)
{
if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode)) {
fscrypt: allow deleting files with unsupported encryption policy Currently it's impossible to delete files that use an unsupported encryption policy, as the kernel will just return an error when performing any operation on the top-level encrypted directory, even just a path lookup into the directory or opening the directory for readdir. More specifically, this occurs in any of the following cases: - The encryption context has an unrecognized version number. Current kernels know about v1 and v2, but there could be more versions in the future. - The encryption context has unrecognized encryption modes (FSCRYPT_MODE_*) or flags (FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_*), an unrecognized combination of modes, or reserved bits set. - The encryption key has been added and the encryption modes are recognized but aren't available in the crypto API -- for example, a directory is encrypted with FSCRYPT_MODE_ADIANTUM but the kernel doesn't have CONFIG_CRYPTO_ADIANTUM enabled. It's desirable to return errors for most operations on files that use an unsupported encryption policy, but the current behavior is too strict. We need to allow enough to delete files, so that people can't be stuck with undeletable files when downgrading kernel versions. That includes allowing directories to be listed and allowing dentries to be looked up. Fix this by modifying the key setup logic to treat an unsupported encryption policy in the same way as "key unavailable" in the cases that are required for a recursive delete to work: preparing for a readdir or a dentry lookup, revalidating a dentry, or checking whether an inode has the same encryption policy as its parent directory. Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201203022041.230976-10-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2020-12-03 05:20:41 +03:00
int err = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(inode, false);
if (err)
return err;
if (!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(inode))
return -ENOKEY;
}
return 0;
}
/* keysetup_v1.c */
void fscrypt_put_direct_key(struct fscrypt_direct_key *dk);
int fscrypt_setup_v1_file_key(struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci,
const u8 *raw_master_key);
int fscrypt_setup_v1_file_key_via_subscribed_keyrings(
struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci);
fscrypt: v2 encryption policy support Add a new fscrypt policy version, "v2". It has the following changes from the original policy version, which we call "v1" (*): - Master keys (the user-provided encryption keys) are only ever used as input to HKDF-SHA512. This is more flexible and less error-prone, and it avoids the quirks and limitations of the AES-128-ECB based KDF. Three classes of cryptographically isolated subkeys are defined: - Per-file keys, like used in v1 policies except for the new KDF. - Per-mode keys. These implement the semantics of the DIRECT_KEY flag, which for v1 policies made the master key be used directly. These are also planned to be used for inline encryption when support for it is added. - Key identifiers (see below). - Each master key is identified by a 16-byte master_key_identifier, which is derived from the key itself using HKDF-SHA512. This prevents users from associating the wrong key with an encrypted file or directory. This was easily possible with v1 policies, which identified the key by an arbitrary 8-byte master_key_descriptor. - The key must be provided in the filesystem-level keyring, not in a process-subscribed keyring. The following UAPI additions are made: - The existing ioctl FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY can now be passed a fscrypt_policy_v2 to set a v2 encryption policy. It's disambiguated from fscrypt_policy/fscrypt_policy_v1 by the version code prefix. - A new ioctl FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX is added. It allows getting the v1 or v2 encryption policy of an encrypted file or directory. The existing FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY ioctl could not be used because it did not have a way for userspace to indicate which policy structure is expected. The new ioctl includes a size field, so it is extensible to future fscrypt policy versions. - The ioctls FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY, and FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS now support managing keys for v2 encryption policies. Such keys are kept logically separate from keys for v1 encryption policies, and are identified by 'identifier' rather than by 'descriptor'. The 'identifier' need not be provided when adding a key, since the kernel will calculate it anyway. This patch temporarily keeps adding/removing v2 policy keys behind the same permission check done for adding/removing v1 policy keys: capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN). However, the next patch will carefully take advantage of the cryptographically secure master_key_identifier to allow non-root users to add/remove v2 policy keys, thus providing a full replacement for v1 policies. (*) Actually, in the API fscrypt_policy::version is 0 while on-disk fscrypt_context::format is 1. But I believe it makes the most sense to advance both to '2' to have them be in sync, and to consider the numbering to start at 1 except for the API quirk. Reviewed-by: Paul Crowley <paulcrowley@google.com> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-08-05 05:35:47 +03:00
/* policy.c */
bool fscrypt_policies_equal(const union fscrypt_policy *policy1,
const union fscrypt_policy *policy2);
int fscrypt_policy_to_key_spec(const union fscrypt_policy *policy,
struct fscrypt_key_specifier *key_spec);
const union fscrypt_policy *fscrypt_get_dummy_policy(struct super_block *sb);
bool fscrypt_supported_policy(const union fscrypt_policy *policy_u,
const struct inode *inode);
int fscrypt_policy_from_context(union fscrypt_policy *policy_u,
const union fscrypt_context *ctx_u,
int ctx_size);
fscrypt: handle test_dummy_encryption in more logical way The behavior of the test_dummy_encryption mount option is that when a new file (or directory or symlink) is created in an unencrypted directory, it's automatically encrypted using a dummy encryption policy. That's it; in particular, the encryption (or lack thereof) of existing files (or directories or symlinks) doesn't change. Unfortunately the implementation of test_dummy_encryption is a bit weird and confusing. When test_dummy_encryption is enabled and a file is being created in an unencrypted directory, we set up an encryption key (->i_crypt_info) for the directory. This isn't actually used to do any encryption, however, since the directory is still unencrypted! Instead, ->i_crypt_info is only used for inheriting the encryption policy. One consequence of this is that the filesystem ends up providing a "dummy context" (policy + nonce) instead of a "dummy policy". In commit ed318a6cc0b6 ("fscrypt: support test_dummy_encryption=v2"), I mistakenly thought this was required. However, actually the nonce only ends up being used to derive a key that is never used. Another consequence of this implementation is that it allows for 'inode->i_crypt_info != NULL && !IS_ENCRYPTED(inode)', which is an edge case that can be forgotten about. For example, currently FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY on an unencrypted directory may return the dummy encryption policy when the filesystem is mounted with test_dummy_encryption. That seems like the wrong thing to do, since again, the directory itself is not actually encrypted. Therefore, switch to a more logical and maintainable implementation where the dummy encryption policy inheritance is done without setting up keys for unencrypted directories. This involves: - Adding a function fscrypt_policy_to_inherit() which returns the encryption policy to inherit from a directory. This can be a real policy, a dummy policy, or no policy. - Replacing struct fscrypt_dummy_context, ->get_dummy_context(), etc. with struct fscrypt_dummy_policy, ->get_dummy_policy(), etc. - Making fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size() take an fscrypt_policy instead of an inode. Acked-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200917041136.178600-13-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2020-09-17 07:11:35 +03:00
const union fscrypt_policy *fscrypt_policy_to_inherit(struct inode *dir);
#endif /* _FSCRYPT_PRIVATE_H */