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# ifndef __ASMi386_ELF_H
# define __ASMi386_ELF_H
/*
* ELF register definitions . .
*/
# include <asm/ptrace.h>
# include <asm/user.h>
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# include <asm/auxvec.h>
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# include <linux/utsname.h>
# define R_386_NONE 0
# define R_386_32 1
# define R_386_PC32 2
# define R_386_GOT32 3
# define R_386_PLT32 4
# define R_386_COPY 5
# define R_386_GLOB_DAT 6
# define R_386_JMP_SLOT 7
# define R_386_RELATIVE 8
# define R_386_GOTOFF 9
# define R_386_GOTPC 10
# define R_386_NUM 11
typedef unsigned long elf_greg_t ;
# define ELF_NGREG (sizeof (struct user_regs_struct) / sizeof(elf_greg_t))
typedef elf_greg_t elf_gregset_t [ ELF_NGREG ] ;
typedef struct user_i387_struct elf_fpregset_t ;
typedef struct user_fxsr_struct elf_fpxregset_t ;
/*
* This is used to ensure we don ' t load something for the wrong architecture .
*/
# define elf_check_arch(x) \
( ( ( x ) - > e_machine = = EM_386 ) | | ( ( x ) - > e_machine = = EM_486 ) )
/*
* These are used to set parameters in the core dumps .
*/
# define ELF_CLASS ELFCLASS32
# define ELF_DATA ELFDATA2LSB
# define ELF_ARCH EM_386
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# ifdef __KERNEL__
# include <asm/processor.h>
# include <asm/system.h> /* for savesegment */
# include <asm/desc.h>
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/* SVR4/i386 ABI (pages 3-31, 3-32) says that when the program starts %edx
contains a pointer to a function which might be registered using ` atexit ' .
This provides a mean for the dynamic linker to call DT_FINI functions for
shared libraries that have been loaded before the code runs .
A value of 0 tells we have no such handler .
We might as well make sure everything else is cleared too ( except for % esp ) ,
just to make things more deterministic .
*/
# define ELF_PLAT_INIT(_r, load_addr) do { \
_r - > ebx = 0 ; _r - > ecx = 0 ; _r - > edx = 0 ; \
_r - > esi = 0 ; _r - > edi = 0 ; _r - > ebp = 0 ; \
_r - > eax = 0 ; \
} while ( 0 )
# define USE_ELF_CORE_DUMP
# define ELF_EXEC_PAGESIZE 4096
/* This is the location that an ET_DYN program is loaded if exec'ed. Typical
use of this is to invoke " ./ld.so someprog " to test out a new version of
the loader . We need to make sure that it is out of the way of the program
that it will " exec " , and that there is sufficient room for the brk . */
# define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (TASK_SIZE / 3 * 2)
/* regs is struct pt_regs, pr_reg is elf_gregset_t (which is
now struct_user_regs , they are different ) */
# define ELF_CORE_COPY_REGS(pr_reg, regs) \
pr_reg [ 0 ] = regs - > ebx ; \
pr_reg [ 1 ] = regs - > ecx ; \
pr_reg [ 2 ] = regs - > edx ; \
pr_reg [ 3 ] = regs - > esi ; \
pr_reg [ 4 ] = regs - > edi ; \
pr_reg [ 5 ] = regs - > ebp ; \
pr_reg [ 6 ] = regs - > eax ; \
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pr_reg [ 7 ] = regs - > xds & 0xffff ; \
pr_reg [ 8 ] = regs - > xes & 0xffff ; \
pr_reg [ 9 ] = regs - > xfs & 0xffff ; \
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savesegment ( gs , pr_reg [ 10 ] ) ; \
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pr_reg [ 11 ] = regs - > orig_eax ; \
pr_reg [ 12 ] = regs - > eip ; \
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pr_reg [ 13 ] = regs - > xcs & 0xffff ; \
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pr_reg [ 14 ] = regs - > eflags ; \
pr_reg [ 15 ] = regs - > esp ; \
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pr_reg [ 16 ] = regs - > xss & 0xffff ;
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/* This yields a mask that user programs can use to figure out what
instruction set this CPU supports . This could be done in user space ,
but it ' s not easy , and we ' ve already done it here . */
# define ELF_HWCAP (boot_cpu_data.x86_capability[0])
/* This yields a string that ld.so will use to load implementation
specific libraries for optimization . This is more specific in
intent than poking at uname or / proc / cpuinfo .
For the moment , we have only optimizations for the Intel generations ,
but that could change . . . */
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# define ELF_PLATFORM (utsname()->machine)
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# define SET_PERSONALITY(ex, ibcs2) do { } while (0)
/*
* An executable for which elf_read_implies_exec ( ) returns TRUE will
* have the READ_IMPLIES_EXEC personality flag set automatically .
*/
# define elf_read_implies_exec(ex, executable_stack) (executable_stack != EXSTACK_DISABLE_X)
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struct task_struct ;
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extern int dump_task_regs ( struct task_struct * , elf_gregset_t * ) ;
extern int dump_task_fpu ( struct task_struct * , elf_fpregset_t * ) ;
extern int dump_task_extended_fpu ( struct task_struct * , struct user_fxsr_struct * ) ;
# define ELF_CORE_COPY_TASK_REGS(tsk, elf_regs) dump_task_regs(tsk, elf_regs)
# define ELF_CORE_COPY_FPREGS(tsk, elf_fpregs) dump_task_fpu(tsk, elf_fpregs)
# define ELF_CORE_COPY_XFPREGS(tsk, elf_xfpregs) dump_task_extended_fpu(tsk, elf_xfpregs)
[PATCH] vdso: randomize the i386 vDSO by moving it into a vma
Move the i386 VDSO down into a vma and thus randomize it.
Besides the security implications, this feature also helps debuggers, which
can COW a vma-backed VDSO just like a normal DSO and can thus do
single-stepping and other debugging features.
It's good for hypervisors (Xen, VMWare) too, which typically live in the same
high-mapped address space as the VDSO, hence whenever the VDSO is used, they
get lots of guest pagefaults and have to fix such guest accesses up - which
slows things down instead of speeding things up (the primary purpose of the
VDSO).
There's a new CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO (default=y) option, which provides support
for older glibcs that still rely on a prelinked high-mapped VDSO. Newer
distributions (using glibc 2.3.3 or later) can turn this option off. Turning
it off is also recommended for security reasons: attackers cannot use the
predictable high-mapped VDSO page as syscall trampoline anymore.
There is a new vdso=[0|1] boot option as well, and a runtime
/proc/sys/vm/vdso_enabled sysctl switch, that allows the VDSO to be turned
on/off.
(This version of the VDSO-randomization patch also has working ELF
coredumping, the previous patch crashed in the coredumping code.)
This code is a combined work of the exec-shield VDSO randomization
code and Gerd Hoffmann's hypervisor-centric VDSO patch. Rusty Russell
started this patch and i completed it.
[akpm@osdl.org: cleanups]
[akpm@osdl.org: compile fix]
[akpm@osdl.org: compile fix 2]
[akpm@osdl.org: compile fix 3]
[akpm@osdl.org: revernt MAXMEM change]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@suse.de>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Zachary Amsden <zach@vmware.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@muc.de>
Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-27 02:53:50 -07:00
# define VDSO_HIGH_BASE (__fix_to_virt(FIX_VDSO))
# define VDSO_BASE ((unsigned long)current->mm->context.vdso)
# ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO
# define VDSO_COMPAT_BASE VDSO_HIGH_BASE
# define VDSO_PRELINK VDSO_HIGH_BASE
# else
# define VDSO_COMPAT_BASE VDSO_BASE
# define VDSO_PRELINK 0
# endif
# define VDSO_SYM(x) \
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( VDSO_COMPAT_BASE + ( unsigned long ) ( x ) - VDSO_PRELINK )
[PATCH] vdso: randomize the i386 vDSO by moving it into a vma
Move the i386 VDSO down into a vma and thus randomize it.
Besides the security implications, this feature also helps debuggers, which
can COW a vma-backed VDSO just like a normal DSO and can thus do
single-stepping and other debugging features.
It's good for hypervisors (Xen, VMWare) too, which typically live in the same
high-mapped address space as the VDSO, hence whenever the VDSO is used, they
get lots of guest pagefaults and have to fix such guest accesses up - which
slows things down instead of speeding things up (the primary purpose of the
VDSO).
There's a new CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO (default=y) option, which provides support
for older glibcs that still rely on a prelinked high-mapped VDSO. Newer
distributions (using glibc 2.3.3 or later) can turn this option off. Turning
it off is also recommended for security reasons: attackers cannot use the
predictable high-mapped VDSO page as syscall trampoline anymore.
There is a new vdso=[0|1] boot option as well, and a runtime
/proc/sys/vm/vdso_enabled sysctl switch, that allows the VDSO to be turned
on/off.
(This version of the VDSO-randomization patch also has working ELF
coredumping, the previous patch crashed in the coredumping code.)
This code is a combined work of the exec-shield VDSO randomization
code and Gerd Hoffmann's hypervisor-centric VDSO patch. Rusty Russell
started this patch and i completed it.
[akpm@osdl.org: cleanups]
[akpm@osdl.org: compile fix]
[akpm@osdl.org: compile fix 2]
[akpm@osdl.org: compile fix 3]
[akpm@osdl.org: revernt MAXMEM change]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@suse.de>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Zachary Amsden <zach@vmware.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@muc.de>
Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-27 02:53:50 -07:00
# define VDSO_HIGH_EHDR ((const struct elfhdr *) VDSO_HIGH_BASE)
# define VDSO_EHDR ((const struct elfhdr *) VDSO_COMPAT_BASE)
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extern void __kernel_vsyscall ;
[PATCH] vdso: randomize the i386 vDSO by moving it into a vma
Move the i386 VDSO down into a vma and thus randomize it.
Besides the security implications, this feature also helps debuggers, which
can COW a vma-backed VDSO just like a normal DSO and can thus do
single-stepping and other debugging features.
It's good for hypervisors (Xen, VMWare) too, which typically live in the same
high-mapped address space as the VDSO, hence whenever the VDSO is used, they
get lots of guest pagefaults and have to fix such guest accesses up - which
slows things down instead of speeding things up (the primary purpose of the
VDSO).
There's a new CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO (default=y) option, which provides support
for older glibcs that still rely on a prelinked high-mapped VDSO. Newer
distributions (using glibc 2.3.3 or later) can turn this option off. Turning
it off is also recommended for security reasons: attackers cannot use the
predictable high-mapped VDSO page as syscall trampoline anymore.
There is a new vdso=[0|1] boot option as well, and a runtime
/proc/sys/vm/vdso_enabled sysctl switch, that allows the VDSO to be turned
on/off.
(This version of the VDSO-randomization patch also has working ELF
coredumping, the previous patch crashed in the coredumping code.)
This code is a combined work of the exec-shield VDSO randomization
code and Gerd Hoffmann's hypervisor-centric VDSO patch. Rusty Russell
started this patch and i completed it.
[akpm@osdl.org: cleanups]
[akpm@osdl.org: compile fix]
[akpm@osdl.org: compile fix 2]
[akpm@osdl.org: compile fix 3]
[akpm@osdl.org: revernt MAXMEM change]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@suse.de>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Zachary Amsden <zach@vmware.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@muc.de>
Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-27 02:53:50 -07:00
# define VDSO_ENTRY VDSO_SYM(&__kernel_vsyscall)
2007-01-26 00:56:46 -08:00
# ifndef CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO
[PATCH] vdso: randomize the i386 vDSO by moving it into a vma
Move the i386 VDSO down into a vma and thus randomize it.
Besides the security implications, this feature also helps debuggers, which
can COW a vma-backed VDSO just like a normal DSO and can thus do
single-stepping and other debugging features.
It's good for hypervisors (Xen, VMWare) too, which typically live in the same
high-mapped address space as the VDSO, hence whenever the VDSO is used, they
get lots of guest pagefaults and have to fix such guest accesses up - which
slows things down instead of speeding things up (the primary purpose of the
VDSO).
There's a new CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO (default=y) option, which provides support
for older glibcs that still rely on a prelinked high-mapped VDSO. Newer
distributions (using glibc 2.3.3 or later) can turn this option off. Turning
it off is also recommended for security reasons: attackers cannot use the
predictable high-mapped VDSO page as syscall trampoline anymore.
There is a new vdso=[0|1] boot option as well, and a runtime
/proc/sys/vm/vdso_enabled sysctl switch, that allows the VDSO to be turned
on/off.
(This version of the VDSO-randomization patch also has working ELF
coredumping, the previous patch crashed in the coredumping code.)
This code is a combined work of the exec-shield VDSO randomization
code and Gerd Hoffmann's hypervisor-centric VDSO patch. Rusty Russell
started this patch and i completed it.
[akpm@osdl.org: cleanups]
[akpm@osdl.org: compile fix]
[akpm@osdl.org: compile fix 2]
[akpm@osdl.org: compile fix 3]
[akpm@osdl.org: revernt MAXMEM change]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@suse.de>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Zachary Amsden <zach@vmware.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@muc.de>
Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-27 02:53:50 -07:00
# define ARCH_HAS_SETUP_ADDITIONAL_PAGES
struct linux_binprm ;
extern int arch_setup_additional_pages ( struct linux_binprm * bprm ,
int executable_stack ) ;
2007-01-26 00:56:46 -08:00
# endif
[PATCH] vdso: randomize the i386 vDSO by moving it into a vma
Move the i386 VDSO down into a vma and thus randomize it.
Besides the security implications, this feature also helps debuggers, which
can COW a vma-backed VDSO just like a normal DSO and can thus do
single-stepping and other debugging features.
It's good for hypervisors (Xen, VMWare) too, which typically live in the same
high-mapped address space as the VDSO, hence whenever the VDSO is used, they
get lots of guest pagefaults and have to fix such guest accesses up - which
slows things down instead of speeding things up (the primary purpose of the
VDSO).
There's a new CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO (default=y) option, which provides support
for older glibcs that still rely on a prelinked high-mapped VDSO. Newer
distributions (using glibc 2.3.3 or later) can turn this option off. Turning
it off is also recommended for security reasons: attackers cannot use the
predictable high-mapped VDSO page as syscall trampoline anymore.
There is a new vdso=[0|1] boot option as well, and a runtime
/proc/sys/vm/vdso_enabled sysctl switch, that allows the VDSO to be turned
on/off.
(This version of the VDSO-randomization patch also has working ELF
coredumping, the previous patch crashed in the coredumping code.)
This code is a combined work of the exec-shield VDSO randomization
code and Gerd Hoffmann's hypervisor-centric VDSO patch. Rusty Russell
started this patch and i completed it.
[akpm@osdl.org: cleanups]
[akpm@osdl.org: compile fix]
[akpm@osdl.org: compile fix 2]
[akpm@osdl.org: compile fix 3]
[akpm@osdl.org: revernt MAXMEM change]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@suse.de>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Zachary Amsden <zach@vmware.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@muc.de>
Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-27 02:53:50 -07:00
extern unsigned int vdso_enabled ;
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
# define ARCH_DLINFO \
[PATCH] vdso: randomize the i386 vDSO by moving it into a vma
Move the i386 VDSO down into a vma and thus randomize it.
Besides the security implications, this feature also helps debuggers, which
can COW a vma-backed VDSO just like a normal DSO and can thus do
single-stepping and other debugging features.
It's good for hypervisors (Xen, VMWare) too, which typically live in the same
high-mapped address space as the VDSO, hence whenever the VDSO is used, they
get lots of guest pagefaults and have to fix such guest accesses up - which
slows things down instead of speeding things up (the primary purpose of the
VDSO).
There's a new CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO (default=y) option, which provides support
for older glibcs that still rely on a prelinked high-mapped VDSO. Newer
distributions (using glibc 2.3.3 or later) can turn this option off. Turning
it off is also recommended for security reasons: attackers cannot use the
predictable high-mapped VDSO page as syscall trampoline anymore.
There is a new vdso=[0|1] boot option as well, and a runtime
/proc/sys/vm/vdso_enabled sysctl switch, that allows the VDSO to be turned
on/off.
(This version of the VDSO-randomization patch also has working ELF
coredumping, the previous patch crashed in the coredumping code.)
This code is a combined work of the exec-shield VDSO randomization
code and Gerd Hoffmann's hypervisor-centric VDSO patch. Rusty Russell
started this patch and i completed it.
[akpm@osdl.org: cleanups]
[akpm@osdl.org: compile fix]
[akpm@osdl.org: compile fix 2]
[akpm@osdl.org: compile fix 3]
[akpm@osdl.org: revernt MAXMEM change]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@suse.de>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Zachary Amsden <zach@vmware.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@muc.de>
Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-27 02:53:50 -07:00
do if ( vdso_enabled ) { \
NEW_AUX_ENT ( AT_SYSINFO , VDSO_ENTRY ) ; \
NEW_AUX_ENT ( AT_SYSINFO_EHDR , VDSO_COMPAT_BASE ) ; \
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
} while ( 0 )
# endif
# endif