linux/net/ipv4/route.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
/*
* INET An implementation of the TCP/IP protocol suite for the LINUX
* operating system. INET is implemented using the BSD Socket
* interface as the means of communication with the user level.
*
* ROUTE - implementation of the IP router.
*
* Authors: Ross Biro
* Fred N. van Kempen, <waltje@uWalt.NL.Mugnet.ORG>
* Alan Cox, <gw4pts@gw4pts.ampr.org>
* Linus Torvalds, <Linus.Torvalds@helsinki.fi>
* Alexey Kuznetsov, <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru>
*
* Fixes:
* Alan Cox : Verify area fixes.
* Alan Cox : cli() protects routing changes
* Rui Oliveira : ICMP routing table updates
* (rco@di.uminho.pt) Routing table insertion and update
* Linus Torvalds : Rewrote bits to be sensible
* Alan Cox : Added BSD route gw semantics
* Alan Cox : Super /proc >4K
* Alan Cox : MTU in route table
* Alan Cox : MSS actually. Also added the window
* clamper.
* Sam Lantinga : Fixed route matching in rt_del()
* Alan Cox : Routing cache support.
* Alan Cox : Removed compatibility cruft.
* Alan Cox : RTF_REJECT support.
* Alan Cox : TCP irtt support.
* Jonathan Naylor : Added Metric support.
* Miquel van Smoorenburg : BSD API fixes.
* Miquel van Smoorenburg : Metrics.
* Alan Cox : Use __u32 properly
* Alan Cox : Aligned routing errors more closely with BSD
* our system is still very different.
* Alan Cox : Faster /proc handling
* Alexey Kuznetsov : Massive rework to support tree based routing,
* routing caches and better behaviour.
*
* Olaf Erb : irtt wasn't being copied right.
* Bjorn Ekwall : Kerneld route support.
* Alan Cox : Multicast fixed (I hope)
* Pavel Krauz : Limited broadcast fixed
* Mike McLagan : Routing by source
* Alexey Kuznetsov : End of old history. Split to fib.c and
* route.c and rewritten from scratch.
* Andi Kleen : Load-limit warning messages.
* Vitaly E. Lavrov : Transparent proxy revived after year coma.
* Vitaly E. Lavrov : Race condition in ip_route_input_slow.
* Tobias Ringstrom : Uninitialized res.type in ip_route_output_slow.
* Vladimir V. Ivanov : IP rule info (flowid) is really useful.
* Marc Boucher : routing by fwmark
* Robert Olsson : Added rt_cache statistics
* Arnaldo C. Melo : Convert proc stuff to seq_file
* Eric Dumazet : hashed spinlocks and rt_check_expire() fixes.
* Ilia Sotnikov : Ignore TOS on PMTUD and Redirect
* Ilia Sotnikov : Removed TOS from hash calculations
*/
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "IPv4: " fmt
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/bitops.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/socket.h>
#include <linux/sockios.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/in.h>
#include <linux/inet.h>
#include <linux/netdevice.h>
#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
#include <linux/inetdevice.h>
#include <linux/igmp.h>
#include <linux/pkt_sched.h>
#include <linux/mroute.h>
#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
#include <linux/times.h>
include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies. percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is used as the basis of conversion. http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py The script does the followings. * Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used, gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h. * When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered - alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there doesn't seem to be any matching order. * If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the file. The conversion was done in the following steps. 1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400 files. 2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion, some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added inclusions to around 150 files. 3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits from #2 to make sure no file was left behind. 4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed. e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually. 5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as necessary. 6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h. 7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq). * x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config. * powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig * sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig * ia64 SMP allmodconfig * s390 SMP allmodconfig * alpha SMP allmodconfig * um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig 8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as a separate patch and serve as bisection point. Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step 6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch. If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of the specific arch. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
2010-03-24 11:04:11 +03:00
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/jhash.h>
#include <net/dst.h>
#include <net/dst_metadata.h>
#include <net/net_namespace.h>
#include <net/protocol.h>
#include <net/ip.h>
#include <net/route.h>
#include <net/inetpeer.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
#include <net/ip_fib.h>
#include <net/nexthop.h>
#include <net/arp.h>
#include <net/tcp.h>
#include <net/icmp.h>
#include <net/xfrm.h>
#include <net/lwtunnel.h>
#include <net/netevent.h>
#include <net/rtnetlink.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
#include <linux/sysctl.h>
#endif
#include <net/secure_seq.h>
#include <net/ip_tunnels.h>
#include <net/l3mdev.h>
#include "fib_lookup.h"
#define RT_FL_TOS(oldflp4) \
((oldflp4)->flowi4_tos & (IPTOS_RT_MASK | RTO_ONLINK))
#define RT_GC_TIMEOUT (300*HZ)
static int ip_rt_max_size;
static int ip_rt_redirect_number __read_mostly = 9;
static int ip_rt_redirect_load __read_mostly = HZ / 50;
static int ip_rt_redirect_silence __read_mostly = ((HZ / 50) << (9 + 1));
static int ip_rt_error_cost __read_mostly = HZ;
static int ip_rt_error_burst __read_mostly = 5 * HZ;
static int ip_rt_mtu_expires __read_mostly = 10 * 60 * HZ;
static u32 ip_rt_min_pmtu __read_mostly = 512 + 20 + 20;
static int ip_rt_min_advmss __read_mostly = 256;
static int ip_rt_gc_timeout __read_mostly = RT_GC_TIMEOUT;
/*
* Interface to generic destination cache.
*/
static struct dst_entry *ipv4_dst_check(struct dst_entry *dst, u32 cookie);
static unsigned int ipv4_default_advmss(const struct dst_entry *dst);
static unsigned int ipv4_mtu(const struct dst_entry *dst);
static struct dst_entry *ipv4_negative_advice(struct dst_entry *dst);
static void ipv4_link_failure(struct sk_buff *skb);
static void ip_rt_update_pmtu(struct dst_entry *dst, struct sock *sk,
net: add bool confirm_neigh parameter for dst_ops.update_pmtu The MTU update code is supposed to be invoked in response to real networking events that update the PMTU. In IPv6 PMTU update function __ip6_rt_update_pmtu() we called dst_confirm_neigh() to update neighbor confirmed time. But for tunnel code, it will call pmtu before xmit, like: - tnl_update_pmtu() - skb_dst_update_pmtu() - ip6_rt_update_pmtu() - __ip6_rt_update_pmtu() - dst_confirm_neigh() If the tunnel remote dst mac address changed and we still do the neigh confirm, we will not be able to update neigh cache and ping6 remote will failed. So for this ip_tunnel_xmit() case, _EVEN_ if the MTU is changed, we should not be invoking dst_confirm_neigh() as we have no evidence of successful two-way communication at this point. On the other hand it is also important to keep the neigh reachability fresh for TCP flows, so we cannot remove this dst_confirm_neigh() call. To fix the issue, we have to add a new bool parameter for dst_ops.update_pmtu to choose whether we should do neigh update or not. I will add the parameter in this patch and set all the callers to true to comply with the previous way, and fix the tunnel code one by one on later patches. v5: No change. v4: No change. v3: Do not remove dst_confirm_neigh, but add a new bool parameter in dst_ops.update_pmtu to control whether we should do neighbor confirm. Also split the big patch to small ones for each area. v2: Remove dst_confirm_neigh in __ip6_rt_update_pmtu. Suggested-by: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Reviewed-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com> Acked-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-12-22 05:51:09 +03:00
struct sk_buff *skb, u32 mtu,
bool confirm_neigh);
static void ip_do_redirect(struct dst_entry *dst, struct sock *sk,
struct sk_buff *skb);
static void ipv4_dst_destroy(struct dst_entry *dst);
net: Implement read-only protection and COW'ing of metrics. Routing metrics are now copy-on-write. Initially a route entry points it's metrics at a read-only location. If a routing table entry exists, it will point there. Else it will point at the all zero metric place-holder called 'dst_default_metrics'. The writeability state of the metrics is stored in the low bits of the metrics pointer, we have two bits left to spare if we want to store more states. For the initial implementation, COW is implemented simply via kmalloc. However future enhancements will change this to place the writable metrics somewhere else, in order to increase sharing. Very likely this "somewhere else" will be the inetpeer cache. Note also that this means that metrics updates may transiently fail if we cannot COW the metrics successfully. But even by itself, this patch should decrease memory usage and increase cache locality especially for routing workloads. In those cases the read-only metric copies stay in place and never get written to. TCP workloads where metrics get updated, and those rare cases where PMTU triggers occur, will take a very slight performance hit. But that hit will be alleviated when the long-term writable metrics move to a more sharable location. Since the metrics storage went from a u32 array of RTAX_MAX entries to what is essentially a pointer, some retooling of the dst_entry layout was necessary. Most importantly, we need to preserve the alignment of the reference count so that it doesn't share cache lines with the read-mostly state, as per Eric Dumazet's alignment assertion checks. The only non-trivial bit here is the move of the 'flags' member into the writeable cacheline. This is OK since we are always accessing the flags around the same moment when we made a modification to the reference count. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-01-27 07:51:05 +03:00
static u32 *ipv4_cow_metrics(struct dst_entry *dst, unsigned long old)
{
WARN_ON(1);
return NULL;
net: Implement read-only protection and COW'ing of metrics. Routing metrics are now copy-on-write. Initially a route entry points it's metrics at a read-only location. If a routing table entry exists, it will point there. Else it will point at the all zero metric place-holder called 'dst_default_metrics'. The writeability state of the metrics is stored in the low bits of the metrics pointer, we have two bits left to spare if we want to store more states. For the initial implementation, COW is implemented simply via kmalloc. However future enhancements will change this to place the writable metrics somewhere else, in order to increase sharing. Very likely this "somewhere else" will be the inetpeer cache. Note also that this means that metrics updates may transiently fail if we cannot COW the metrics successfully. But even by itself, this patch should decrease memory usage and increase cache locality especially for routing workloads. In those cases the read-only metric copies stay in place and never get written to. TCP workloads where metrics get updated, and those rare cases where PMTU triggers occur, will take a very slight performance hit. But that hit will be alleviated when the long-term writable metrics move to a more sharable location. Since the metrics storage went from a u32 array of RTAX_MAX entries to what is essentially a pointer, some retooling of the dst_entry layout was necessary. Most importantly, we need to preserve the alignment of the reference count so that it doesn't share cache lines with the read-mostly state, as per Eric Dumazet's alignment assertion checks. The only non-trivial bit here is the move of the 'flags' member into the writeable cacheline. This is OK since we are always accessing the flags around the same moment when we made a modification to the reference count. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-01-27 07:51:05 +03:00
}
static struct neighbour *ipv4_neigh_lookup(const struct dst_entry *dst,
struct sk_buff *skb,
const void *daddr);
static void ipv4_confirm_neigh(const struct dst_entry *dst, const void *daddr);
static struct dst_ops ipv4_dst_ops = {
.family = AF_INET,
.check = ipv4_dst_check,
.default_advmss = ipv4_default_advmss,
.mtu = ipv4_mtu,
net: Implement read-only protection and COW'ing of metrics. Routing metrics are now copy-on-write. Initially a route entry points it's metrics at a read-only location. If a routing table entry exists, it will point there. Else it will point at the all zero metric place-holder called 'dst_default_metrics'. The writeability state of the metrics is stored in the low bits of the metrics pointer, we have two bits left to spare if we want to store more states. For the initial implementation, COW is implemented simply via kmalloc. However future enhancements will change this to place the writable metrics somewhere else, in order to increase sharing. Very likely this "somewhere else" will be the inetpeer cache. Note also that this means that metrics updates may transiently fail if we cannot COW the metrics successfully. But even by itself, this patch should decrease memory usage and increase cache locality especially for routing workloads. In those cases the read-only metric copies stay in place and never get written to. TCP workloads where metrics get updated, and those rare cases where PMTU triggers occur, will take a very slight performance hit. But that hit will be alleviated when the long-term writable metrics move to a more sharable location. Since the metrics storage went from a u32 array of RTAX_MAX entries to what is essentially a pointer, some retooling of the dst_entry layout was necessary. Most importantly, we need to preserve the alignment of the reference count so that it doesn't share cache lines with the read-mostly state, as per Eric Dumazet's alignment assertion checks. The only non-trivial bit here is the move of the 'flags' member into the writeable cacheline. This is OK since we are always accessing the flags around the same moment when we made a modification to the reference count. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-01-27 07:51:05 +03:00
.cow_metrics = ipv4_cow_metrics,
.destroy = ipv4_dst_destroy,
.negative_advice = ipv4_negative_advice,
.link_failure = ipv4_link_failure,
.update_pmtu = ip_rt_update_pmtu,
.redirect = ip_do_redirect,
.local_out = __ip_local_out,
.neigh_lookup = ipv4_neigh_lookup,
.confirm_neigh = ipv4_confirm_neigh,
};
#define ECN_OR_COST(class) TC_PRIO_##class
const __u8 ip_tos2prio[16] = {
TC_PRIO_BESTEFFORT,
ECN_OR_COST(BESTEFFORT),
TC_PRIO_BESTEFFORT,
ECN_OR_COST(BESTEFFORT),
TC_PRIO_BULK,
ECN_OR_COST(BULK),
TC_PRIO_BULK,
ECN_OR_COST(BULK),
TC_PRIO_INTERACTIVE,
ECN_OR_COST(INTERACTIVE),
TC_PRIO_INTERACTIVE,
ECN_OR_COST(INTERACTIVE),
TC_PRIO_INTERACTIVE_BULK,
ECN_OR_COST(INTERACTIVE_BULK),
TC_PRIO_INTERACTIVE_BULK,
ECN_OR_COST(INTERACTIVE_BULK)
};
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ip_tos2prio);
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct rt_cache_stat, rt_cache_stat);
net: replace __this_cpu_inc in route.c with raw_cpu_inc The RT_CACHE_STAT_INC macro triggers the new preemption checks for __this_cpu ops. I do not see any other synchronization that would allow the use of a __this_cpu operation here however in commit dbd2915ce87e ("[IPV4]: RT_CACHE_STAT_INC() warning fix") Andrew justifies the use of raw_smp_processor_id() here because "we do not care" about races. In the past we agreed that the price of disabling interrupts here to get consistent counters would be too high. These counters may be inaccurate due to race conditions. The use of __this_cpu op improves the situation already from what commit dbd2915ce87e did since the single instruction emitted on x86 does not allow the race to occur anymore. However, non x86 platforms could still experience a race here. Trace: __this_cpu_add operation in preemptible [00000000] code: avahi-daemon/1193 caller is __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x38/0x60 CPU: 1 PID: 1193 Comm: avahi-daemon Tainted: GF 3.12.0-rc4+ #187 Call Trace: check_preemption_disabled+0xec/0x110 __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x38/0x60 __ip_route_output_key+0x575/0x8c0 ip_route_output_flow+0x27/0x70 udp_sendmsg+0x825/0xa20 inet_sendmsg+0x85/0xc0 sock_sendmsg+0x9c/0xd0 ___sys_sendmsg+0x37c/0x390 __sys_sendmsg+0x49/0x90 SyS_sendmsg+0x12/0x20 tracesys+0xe1/0xe6 Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-04-08 02:39:40 +04:00
#define RT_CACHE_STAT_INC(field) raw_cpu_inc(rt_cache_stat.field)
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
static void *rt_cache_seq_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *pos)
{
if (*pos)
return NULL;
return SEQ_START_TOKEN;
}
static void *rt_cache_seq_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *pos)
{
++*pos;
return NULL;
}
static void rt_cache_seq_stop(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
{
}
static int rt_cache_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
{
if (v == SEQ_START_TOKEN)
seq_printf(seq, "%-127s\n",
"Iface\tDestination\tGateway \tFlags\t\tRefCnt\tUse\t"
"Metric\tSource\t\tMTU\tWindow\tIRTT\tTOS\tHHRef\t"
"HHUptod\tSpecDst");
return 0;
}
static const struct seq_operations rt_cache_seq_ops = {
.start = rt_cache_seq_start,
.next = rt_cache_seq_next,
.stop = rt_cache_seq_stop,
.show = rt_cache_seq_show,
};
static int rt_cache_seq_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
return seq_open(file, &rt_cache_seq_ops);
}
static const struct proc_ops rt_cache_proc_ops = {
.proc_open = rt_cache_seq_open,
.proc_read = seq_read,
.proc_lseek = seq_lseek,
.proc_release = seq_release,
};
static void *rt_cpu_seq_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *pos)
{
int cpu;
if (*pos == 0)
return SEQ_START_TOKEN;
for (cpu = *pos-1; cpu < nr_cpu_ids; ++cpu) {
if (!cpu_possible(cpu))
continue;
*pos = cpu+1;
return &per_cpu(rt_cache_stat, cpu);
}
return NULL;
}
static void *rt_cpu_seq_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *pos)
{
int cpu;
for (cpu = *pos; cpu < nr_cpu_ids; ++cpu) {
if (!cpu_possible(cpu))
continue;
*pos = cpu+1;
return &per_cpu(rt_cache_stat, cpu);
}
(*pos)++;
return NULL;
}
static void rt_cpu_seq_stop(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
{
}
static int rt_cpu_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
{
struct rt_cache_stat *st = v;
if (v == SEQ_START_TOKEN) {
seq_printf(seq, "entries in_hit in_slow_tot in_slow_mc in_no_route in_brd in_martian_dst in_martian_src out_hit out_slow_tot out_slow_mc gc_total gc_ignored gc_goal_miss gc_dst_overflow in_hlist_search out_hlist_search\n");
return 0;
}
seq_printf(seq,"%08x %08x %08x %08x %08x %08x %08x %08x "
" %08x %08x %08x %08x %08x %08x %08x %08x %08x \n",
dst_entries_get_slow(&ipv4_dst_ops),
0, /* st->in_hit */
st->in_slow_tot,
st->in_slow_mc,
st->in_no_route,
st->in_brd,
st->in_martian_dst,
st->in_martian_src,
0, /* st->out_hit */
st->out_slow_tot,
st->out_slow_mc,
0, /* st->gc_total */
0, /* st->gc_ignored */
0, /* st->gc_goal_miss */
0, /* st->gc_dst_overflow */
0, /* st->in_hlist_search */
0 /* st->out_hlist_search */
);
return 0;
}
static const struct seq_operations rt_cpu_seq_ops = {
.start = rt_cpu_seq_start,
.next = rt_cpu_seq_next,
.stop = rt_cpu_seq_stop,
.show = rt_cpu_seq_show,
};
static int rt_cpu_seq_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
return seq_open(file, &rt_cpu_seq_ops);
}
static const struct proc_ops rt_cpu_proc_ops = {
.proc_open = rt_cpu_seq_open,
.proc_read = seq_read,
.proc_lseek = seq_lseek,
.proc_release = seq_release,
};
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_CLASSID
static int rt_acct_proc_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
{
struct ip_rt_acct *dst, *src;
unsigned int i, j;
dst = kcalloc(256, sizeof(struct ip_rt_acct), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dst)
return -ENOMEM;
for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
src = (struct ip_rt_acct *)per_cpu_ptr(ip_rt_acct, i);
for (j = 0; j < 256; j++) {
dst[j].o_bytes += src[j].o_bytes;
dst[j].o_packets += src[j].o_packets;
dst[j].i_bytes += src[j].i_bytes;
dst[j].i_packets += src[j].i_packets;
}
}
seq_write(m, dst, 256 * sizeof(struct ip_rt_acct));
kfree(dst);
return 0;
}
#endif
static int __net_init ip_rt_do_proc_init(struct net *net)
{
struct proc_dir_entry *pde;
pde = proc_create("rt_cache", 0444, net->proc_net,
&rt_cache_proc_ops);
if (!pde)
goto err1;
pde = proc_create("rt_cache", 0444,
net->proc_net_stat, &rt_cpu_proc_ops);
if (!pde)
goto err2;
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_CLASSID
pde = proc_create_single("rt_acct", 0, net->proc_net,
rt_acct_proc_show);
if (!pde)
goto err3;
#endif
return 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_CLASSID
err3:
remove_proc_entry("rt_cache", net->proc_net_stat);
#endif
err2:
remove_proc_entry("rt_cache", net->proc_net);
err1:
return -ENOMEM;
}
static void __net_exit ip_rt_do_proc_exit(struct net *net)
{
remove_proc_entry("rt_cache", net->proc_net_stat);
remove_proc_entry("rt_cache", net->proc_net);
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_CLASSID
remove_proc_entry("rt_acct", net->proc_net);
#endif
}
static struct pernet_operations ip_rt_proc_ops __net_initdata = {
.init = ip_rt_do_proc_init,
.exit = ip_rt_do_proc_exit,
};
static int __init ip_rt_proc_init(void)
{
return register_pernet_subsys(&ip_rt_proc_ops);
}
#else
static inline int ip_rt_proc_init(void)
{
return 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_PROC_FS */
static inline bool rt_is_expired(const struct rtable *rth)
{
return rth->rt_genid != rt_genid_ipv4(dev_net(rth->dst.dev));
}
void rt_cache_flush(struct net *net)
{
rt_genid_bump_ipv4(net);
net: fix route cache rebuilds We added an automatic route cache rebuilding in commit 1080d709fb9d8cd43 but had to correct few bugs. One of the assumption of original patch, was that entries where kept sorted in a given way. This assumption is known to be wrong (commit 1ddbcb005c395518 gave an explanation of this and corrected a leak) and expensive to respect. Paweł Staszewski reported to me one of his machine got its routing cache disabled after few messages like : [ 2677.850065] Route hash chain too long! [ 2677.850080] Adjust your secret_interval! [82839.662993] Route hash chain too long! [82839.662996] Adjust your secret_interval! [155843.731650] Route hash chain too long! [155843.731664] Adjust your secret_interval! [155843.811881] Route hash chain too long! [155843.811891] Adjust your secret_interval! [155843.858209] vlan0811: 5 rebuilds is over limit, route caching disabled [155843.858212] Route hash chain too long! [155843.858213] Adjust your secret_interval! This is because rt_intern_hash() might be fooled when computing a chain length, because multiple entries with same keys can differ because of TOS (or mark/oif) bits. In the rare case the fast algorithm see a too long chain, and before taking expensive path, we call a helper function in order to not count duplicates of same routes, that only differ with tos/mark/oif bits. This helper works with data already in cpu cache and is not be very expensive, despite its O(N^2) implementation. Paweł Staszewski sucessfully tested this patch on his loaded router. Reported-and-tested-by: Paweł Staszewski <pstaszewski@itcare.pl> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2010-03-08 06:20:00 +03:00
}
static struct neighbour *ipv4_neigh_lookup(const struct dst_entry *dst,
struct sk_buff *skb,
const void *daddr)
{
const struct rtable *rt = container_of(dst, struct rtable, dst);
struct net_device *dev = dst->dev;
struct neighbour *n;
ipv4: Add helpers for neigh lookup for nexthop A common theme in the output path is looking up a neigh entry for a nexthop, either the gateway in an rtable or a fallback to the daddr in the skb: nexthop = (__force u32)rt_nexthop(rt, ip_hdr(skb)->daddr); neigh = __ipv4_neigh_lookup_noref(dev, nexthop); if (unlikely(!neigh)) neigh = __neigh_create(&arp_tbl, &nexthop, dev, false); To allow the nexthop to be an IPv6 address we need to consider the family of the nexthop and then call __ipv{4,6}_neigh_lookup_noref based on it. To make this simpler, add a ip_neigh_gw4 helper similar to ip_neigh_gw6 added in an earlier patch which handles: neigh = __ipv4_neigh_lookup_noref(dev, nexthop); if (unlikely(!neigh)) neigh = __neigh_create(&arp_tbl, &nexthop, dev, false); And then add a second one, ip_neigh_for_gw, that calls either ip_neigh_gw4 or ip_neigh_gw6 based on the address family of the gateway. Update the output paths in the VRF driver and core v4 code to use ip_neigh_for_gw simplifying the family based lookup and making both ready for a v6 nexthop. ipv4_neigh_lookup has a different need - the potential to resolve a passed in address in addition to any gateway in the rtable or skb. Since this is a one-off, add ip_neigh_gw4 and ip_neigh_gw6 diectly. The difference between __neigh_create used by the helpers and neigh_create called by ipv4_neigh_lookup is taking a refcount, so add rcu_read_lock_bh and bump the refcnt on the neigh entry. Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-06 02:30:34 +03:00
rcu_read_lock_bh();
if (likely(rt->rt_gw_family == AF_INET)) {
n = ip_neigh_gw4(dev, rt->rt_gw4);
} else if (rt->rt_gw_family == AF_INET6) {
n = ip_neigh_gw6(dev, &rt->rt_gw6);
} else {
__be32 pkey;
pkey = skb ? ip_hdr(skb)->daddr : *((__be32 *) daddr);
n = ip_neigh_gw4(dev, pkey);
}
ipv4: Fix NULL pointer dereference in ipv4_neigh_lookup() Both ip_neigh_gw4() and ip_neigh_gw6() can return either a valid pointer or an error pointer, but the code currently checks that the pointer is not NULL. Fix this by checking that the pointer is not an error pointer, as this can result in a NULL pointer dereference [1]. Specifically, I believe that what happened is that ip_neigh_gw4() returned '-EINVAL' (0xffffffffffffffea) to which the offset of 'refcnt' (0x70) was added, which resulted in the address 0x000000000000005a. [1] BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in refcount_inc_not_zero_checked+0x6e/0x180 Read of size 4 at addr 000000000000005a by task swapper/2/0 CPU: 2 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/2 Not tainted 5.2.0-rc6-custom-reg-179657-gaa32d89 #396 Hardware name: Mellanox Technologies Ltd. MSN2010/SA002610, BIOS 5.6.5 08/24/2017 Call Trace: <IRQ> dump_stack+0x73/0xbb __kasan_report+0x188/0x1ea kasan_report+0xe/0x20 refcount_inc_not_zero_checked+0x6e/0x180 ipv4_neigh_lookup+0x365/0x12c0 __neigh_update+0x1467/0x22f0 arp_process.constprop.6+0x82e/0x1f00 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0xee/0x170 process_backlog+0xe3/0x640 net_rx_action+0x755/0xd90 __do_softirq+0x29b/0xae7 irq_exit+0x177/0x1c0 smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x164/0x5e0 apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20 </IRQ> Fixes: 5c9f7c1dfc2e ("ipv4: Add helpers for neigh lookup for nexthop") Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com> Reported-by: Shalom Toledo <shalomt@mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-07-04 19:26:38 +03:00
if (!IS_ERR(n) && !refcount_inc_not_zero(&n->refcnt))
ipv4: Add helpers for neigh lookup for nexthop A common theme in the output path is looking up a neigh entry for a nexthop, either the gateway in an rtable or a fallback to the daddr in the skb: nexthop = (__force u32)rt_nexthop(rt, ip_hdr(skb)->daddr); neigh = __ipv4_neigh_lookup_noref(dev, nexthop); if (unlikely(!neigh)) neigh = __neigh_create(&arp_tbl, &nexthop, dev, false); To allow the nexthop to be an IPv6 address we need to consider the family of the nexthop and then call __ipv{4,6}_neigh_lookup_noref based on it. To make this simpler, add a ip_neigh_gw4 helper similar to ip_neigh_gw6 added in an earlier patch which handles: neigh = __ipv4_neigh_lookup_noref(dev, nexthop); if (unlikely(!neigh)) neigh = __neigh_create(&arp_tbl, &nexthop, dev, false); And then add a second one, ip_neigh_for_gw, that calls either ip_neigh_gw4 or ip_neigh_gw6 based on the address family of the gateway. Update the output paths in the VRF driver and core v4 code to use ip_neigh_for_gw simplifying the family based lookup and making both ready for a v6 nexthop. ipv4_neigh_lookup has a different need - the potential to resolve a passed in address in addition to any gateway in the rtable or skb. Since this is a one-off, add ip_neigh_gw4 and ip_neigh_gw6 diectly. The difference between __neigh_create used by the helpers and neigh_create called by ipv4_neigh_lookup is taking a refcount, so add rcu_read_lock_bh and bump the refcnt on the neigh entry. Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-06 02:30:34 +03:00
n = NULL;
rcu_read_unlock_bh();
return n;
}
static void ipv4_confirm_neigh(const struct dst_entry *dst, const void *daddr)
{
const struct rtable *rt = container_of(dst, struct rtable, dst);
struct net_device *dev = dst->dev;
const __be32 *pkey = daddr;
if (rt->rt_gw_family == AF_INET) {
pkey = (const __be32 *)&rt->rt_gw4;
} else if (rt->rt_gw_family == AF_INET6) {
return __ipv6_confirm_neigh_stub(dev, &rt->rt_gw6);
} else if (!daddr ||
(rt->rt_flags &
(RTCF_MULTICAST | RTCF_BROADCAST | RTCF_LOCAL))) {
return;
}
__ipv4_confirm_neigh(dev, *(__force u32 *)pkey);
}
ip: make IP identifiers less predictable In "Counting Packets Sent Between Arbitrary Internet Hosts", Jeffrey and Jedidiah describe ways exploiting linux IP identifier generation to infer whether two machines are exchanging packets. With commit 73f156a6e8c1 ("inetpeer: get rid of ip_id_count"), we changed IP id generation, but this does not really prevent this side-channel technique. This patch adds a random amount of perturbation so that IP identifiers for a given destination [1] are no longer monotonically increasing after an idle period. Note that prandom_u32_max(1) returns 0, so if generator is used at most once per jiffy, this patch inserts no hole in the ID suite and do not increase collision probability. This is jiffies based, so in the worst case (HZ=1000), the id can rollover after ~65 seconds of idle time, which should be fine. We also change the hash used in __ip_select_ident() to not only hash on daddr, but also saddr and protocol, so that ICMP probes can not be used to infer information for other protocols. For IPv6, adds saddr into the hash as well, but not nexthdr. If I ping the patched target, we can see ID are now hard to predict. 21:57:11.008086 IP (...) A > target: ICMP echo request, seq 1, length 64 21:57:11.010752 IP (... id 2081 ...) target > A: ICMP echo reply, seq 1, length 64 21:57:12.013133 IP (...) A > target: ICMP echo request, seq 2, length 64 21:57:12.015737 IP (... id 3039 ...) target > A: ICMP echo reply, seq 2, length 64 21:57:13.016580 IP (...) A > target: ICMP echo request, seq 3, length 64 21:57:13.019251 IP (... id 3437 ...) target > A: ICMP echo reply, seq 3, length 64 [1] TCP sessions uses a per flow ID generator not changed by this patch. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Jeffrey Knockel <jeffk@cs.unm.edu> Reported-by: Jedidiah R. Crandall <crandall@cs.unm.edu> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-07-26 10:58:10 +04:00
#define IP_IDENTS_SZ 2048u
static atomic_t *ip_idents __read_mostly;
static u32 *ip_tstamps __read_mostly;
ip: make IP identifiers less predictable In "Counting Packets Sent Between Arbitrary Internet Hosts", Jeffrey and Jedidiah describe ways exploiting linux IP identifier generation to infer whether two machines are exchanging packets. With commit 73f156a6e8c1 ("inetpeer: get rid of ip_id_count"), we changed IP id generation, but this does not really prevent this side-channel technique. This patch adds a random amount of perturbation so that IP identifiers for a given destination [1] are no longer monotonically increasing after an idle period. Note that prandom_u32_max(1) returns 0, so if generator is used at most once per jiffy, this patch inserts no hole in the ID suite and do not increase collision probability. This is jiffies based, so in the worst case (HZ=1000), the id can rollover after ~65 seconds of idle time, which should be fine. We also change the hash used in __ip_select_ident() to not only hash on daddr, but also saddr and protocol, so that ICMP probes can not be used to infer information for other protocols. For IPv6, adds saddr into the hash as well, but not nexthdr. If I ping the patched target, we can see ID are now hard to predict. 21:57:11.008086 IP (...) A > target: ICMP echo request, seq 1, length 64 21:57:11.010752 IP (... id 2081 ...) target > A: ICMP echo reply, seq 1, length 64 21:57:12.013133 IP (...) A > target: ICMP echo request, seq 2, length 64 21:57:12.015737 IP (... id 3039 ...) target > A: ICMP echo reply, seq 2, length 64 21:57:13.016580 IP (...) A > target: ICMP echo request, seq 3, length 64 21:57:13.019251 IP (... id 3437 ...) target > A: ICMP echo reply, seq 3, length 64 [1] TCP sessions uses a per flow ID generator not changed by this patch. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Jeffrey Knockel <jeffk@cs.unm.edu> Reported-by: Jedidiah R. Crandall <crandall@cs.unm.edu> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-07-26 10:58:10 +04:00
/* In order to protect privacy, we add a perturbation to identifiers
* if one generator is seldom used. This makes hard for an attacker
* to infer how many packets were sent between two points in time.
*/
u32 ip_idents_reserve(u32 hash, int segs)
{
u32 *p_tstamp = ip_tstamps + hash % IP_IDENTS_SZ;
atomic_t *p_id = ip_idents + hash % IP_IDENTS_SZ;
locking/atomics: COCCINELLE/treewide: Convert trivial ACCESS_ONCE() patterns to READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() Please do not apply this to mainline directly, instead please re-run the coccinelle script shown below and apply its output. For several reasons, it is desirable to use {READ,WRITE}_ONCE() in preference to ACCESS_ONCE(), and new code is expected to use one of the former. So far, there's been no reason to change most existing uses of ACCESS_ONCE(), as these aren't harmful, and changing them results in churn. However, for some features, the read/write distinction is critical to correct operation. To distinguish these cases, separate read/write accessors must be used. This patch migrates (most) remaining ACCESS_ONCE() instances to {READ,WRITE}_ONCE(), using the following coccinelle script: ---- // Convert trivial ACCESS_ONCE() uses to equivalent READ_ONCE() and // WRITE_ONCE() // $ make coccicheck COCCI=/home/mark/once.cocci SPFLAGS="--include-headers" MODE=patch virtual patch @ depends on patch @ expression E1, E2; @@ - ACCESS_ONCE(E1) = E2 + WRITE_ONCE(E1, E2) @ depends on patch @ expression E; @@ - ACCESS_ONCE(E) + READ_ONCE(E) ---- Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: davem@davemloft.net Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: mpe@ellerman.id.au Cc: shuah@kernel.org Cc: snitzer@redhat.com Cc: thor.thayer@linux.intel.com Cc: tj@kernel.org Cc: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk Cc: will.deacon@arm.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1508792849-3115-19-git-send-email-paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-10-24 00:07:29 +03:00
u32 old = READ_ONCE(*p_tstamp);
ip: make IP identifiers less predictable In "Counting Packets Sent Between Arbitrary Internet Hosts", Jeffrey and Jedidiah describe ways exploiting linux IP identifier generation to infer whether two machines are exchanging packets. With commit 73f156a6e8c1 ("inetpeer: get rid of ip_id_count"), we changed IP id generation, but this does not really prevent this side-channel technique. This patch adds a random amount of perturbation so that IP identifiers for a given destination [1] are no longer monotonically increasing after an idle period. Note that prandom_u32_max(1) returns 0, so if generator is used at most once per jiffy, this patch inserts no hole in the ID suite and do not increase collision probability. This is jiffies based, so in the worst case (HZ=1000), the id can rollover after ~65 seconds of idle time, which should be fine. We also change the hash used in __ip_select_ident() to not only hash on daddr, but also saddr and protocol, so that ICMP probes can not be used to infer information for other protocols. For IPv6, adds saddr into the hash as well, but not nexthdr. If I ping the patched target, we can see ID are now hard to predict. 21:57:11.008086 IP (...) A > target: ICMP echo request, seq 1, length 64 21:57:11.010752 IP (... id 2081 ...) target > A: ICMP echo reply, seq 1, length 64 21:57:12.013133 IP (...) A > target: ICMP echo request, seq 2, length 64 21:57:12.015737 IP (... id 3039 ...) target > A: ICMP echo reply, seq 2, length 64 21:57:13.016580 IP (...) A > target: ICMP echo request, seq 3, length 64 21:57:13.019251 IP (... id 3437 ...) target > A: ICMP echo reply, seq 3, length 64 [1] TCP sessions uses a per flow ID generator not changed by this patch. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Jeffrey Knockel <jeffk@cs.unm.edu> Reported-by: Jedidiah R. Crandall <crandall@cs.unm.edu> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-07-26 10:58:10 +04:00
u32 now = (u32)jiffies;
u32 delta = 0;
ip: make IP identifiers less predictable In "Counting Packets Sent Between Arbitrary Internet Hosts", Jeffrey and Jedidiah describe ways exploiting linux IP identifier generation to infer whether two machines are exchanging packets. With commit 73f156a6e8c1 ("inetpeer: get rid of ip_id_count"), we changed IP id generation, but this does not really prevent this side-channel technique. This patch adds a random amount of perturbation so that IP identifiers for a given destination [1] are no longer monotonically increasing after an idle period. Note that prandom_u32_max(1) returns 0, so if generator is used at most once per jiffy, this patch inserts no hole in the ID suite and do not increase collision probability. This is jiffies based, so in the worst case (HZ=1000), the id can rollover after ~65 seconds of idle time, which should be fine. We also change the hash used in __ip_select_ident() to not only hash on daddr, but also saddr and protocol, so that ICMP probes can not be used to infer information for other protocols. For IPv6, adds saddr into the hash as well, but not nexthdr. If I ping the patched target, we can see ID are now hard to predict. 21:57:11.008086 IP (...) A > target: ICMP echo request, seq 1, length 64 21:57:11.010752 IP (... id 2081 ...) target > A: ICMP echo reply, seq 1, length 64 21:57:12.013133 IP (...) A > target: ICMP echo request, seq 2, length 64 21:57:12.015737 IP (... id 3039 ...) target > A: ICMP echo reply, seq 2, length 64 21:57:13.016580 IP (...) A > target: ICMP echo request, seq 3, length 64 21:57:13.019251 IP (... id 3437 ...) target > A: ICMP echo reply, seq 3, length 64 [1] TCP sessions uses a per flow ID generator not changed by this patch. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Jeffrey Knockel <jeffk@cs.unm.edu> Reported-by: Jedidiah R. Crandall <crandall@cs.unm.edu> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-07-26 10:58:10 +04:00
if (old != now && cmpxchg(p_tstamp, old, now) == old)
ip: make IP identifiers less predictable In "Counting Packets Sent Between Arbitrary Internet Hosts", Jeffrey and Jedidiah describe ways exploiting linux IP identifier generation to infer whether two machines are exchanging packets. With commit 73f156a6e8c1 ("inetpeer: get rid of ip_id_count"), we changed IP id generation, but this does not really prevent this side-channel technique. This patch adds a random amount of perturbation so that IP identifiers for a given destination [1] are no longer monotonically increasing after an idle period. Note that prandom_u32_max(1) returns 0, so if generator is used at most once per jiffy, this patch inserts no hole in the ID suite and do not increase collision probability. This is jiffies based, so in the worst case (HZ=1000), the id can rollover after ~65 seconds of idle time, which should be fine. We also change the hash used in __ip_select_ident() to not only hash on daddr, but also saddr and protocol, so that ICMP probes can not be used to infer information for other protocols. For IPv6, adds saddr into the hash as well, but not nexthdr. If I ping the patched target, we can see ID are now hard to predict. 21:57:11.008086 IP (...) A > target: ICMP echo request, seq 1, length 64 21:57:11.010752 IP (... id 2081 ...) target > A: ICMP echo reply, seq 1, length 64 21:57:12.013133 IP (...) A > target: ICMP echo request, seq 2, length 64 21:57:12.015737 IP (... id 3039 ...) target > A: ICMP echo reply, seq 2, length 64 21:57:13.016580 IP (...) A > target: ICMP echo request, seq 3, length 64 21:57:13.019251 IP (... id 3437 ...) target > A: ICMP echo reply, seq 3, length 64 [1] TCP sessions uses a per flow ID generator not changed by this patch. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Jeffrey Knockel <jeffk@cs.unm.edu> Reported-by: Jedidiah R. Crandall <crandall@cs.unm.edu> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-07-26 10:58:10 +04:00
delta = prandom_u32_max(now - old);
/* If UBSAN reports an error there, please make sure your compiler
* supports -fno-strict-overflow before reporting it that was a bug
* in UBSAN, and it has been fixed in GCC-8.
*/
return atomic_add_return(segs + delta, p_id) - segs;
ip: make IP identifiers less predictable In "Counting Packets Sent Between Arbitrary Internet Hosts", Jeffrey and Jedidiah describe ways exploiting linux IP identifier generation to infer whether two machines are exchanging packets. With commit 73f156a6e8c1 ("inetpeer: get rid of ip_id_count"), we changed IP id generation, but this does not really prevent this side-channel technique. This patch adds a random amount of perturbation so that IP identifiers for a given destination [1] are no longer monotonically increasing after an idle period. Note that prandom_u32_max(1) returns 0, so if generator is used at most once per jiffy, this patch inserts no hole in the ID suite and do not increase collision probability. This is jiffies based, so in the worst case (HZ=1000), the id can rollover after ~65 seconds of idle time, which should be fine. We also change the hash used in __ip_select_ident() to not only hash on daddr, but also saddr and protocol, so that ICMP probes can not be used to infer information for other protocols. For IPv6, adds saddr into the hash as well, but not nexthdr. If I ping the patched target, we can see ID are now hard to predict. 21:57:11.008086 IP (...) A > target: ICMP echo request, seq 1, length 64 21:57:11.010752 IP (... id 2081 ...) target > A: ICMP echo reply, seq 1, length 64 21:57:12.013133 IP (...) A > target: ICMP echo request, seq 2, length 64 21:57:12.015737 IP (... id 3039 ...) target > A: ICMP echo reply, seq 2, length 64 21:57:13.016580 IP (...) A > target: ICMP echo request, seq 3, length 64 21:57:13.019251 IP (... id 3437 ...) target > A: ICMP echo reply, seq 3, length 64 [1] TCP sessions uses a per flow ID generator not changed by this patch. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Jeffrey Knockel <jeffk@cs.unm.edu> Reported-by: Jedidiah R. Crandall <crandall@cs.unm.edu> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-07-26 10:58:10 +04:00
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ip_idents_reserve);
void __ip_select_ident(struct net *net, struct iphdr *iph, int segs)
{
u32 hash, id;
/* Note the following code is not safe, but this is okay. */
if (unlikely(siphash_key_is_zero(&net->ipv4.ip_id_key)))
get_random_bytes(&net->ipv4.ip_id_key,
sizeof(net->ipv4.ip_id_key));
hash = siphash_3u32((__force u32)iph->daddr,
ip: make IP identifiers less predictable In "Counting Packets Sent Between Arbitrary Internet Hosts", Jeffrey and Jedidiah describe ways exploiting linux IP identifier generation to infer whether two machines are exchanging packets. With commit 73f156a6e8c1 ("inetpeer: get rid of ip_id_count"), we changed IP id generation, but this does not really prevent this side-channel technique. This patch adds a random amount of perturbation so that IP identifiers for a given destination [1] are no longer monotonically increasing after an idle period. Note that prandom_u32_max(1) returns 0, so if generator is used at most once per jiffy, this patch inserts no hole in the ID suite and do not increase collision probability. This is jiffies based, so in the worst case (HZ=1000), the id can rollover after ~65 seconds of idle time, which should be fine. We also change the hash used in __ip_select_ident() to not only hash on daddr, but also saddr and protocol, so that ICMP probes can not be used to infer information for other protocols. For IPv6, adds saddr into the hash as well, but not nexthdr. If I ping the patched target, we can see ID are now hard to predict. 21:57:11.008086 IP (...) A > target: ICMP echo request, seq 1, length 64 21:57:11.010752 IP (... id 2081 ...) target > A: ICMP echo reply, seq 1, length 64 21:57:12.013133 IP (...) A > target: ICMP echo request, seq 2, length 64 21:57:12.015737 IP (... id 3039 ...) target > A: ICMP echo reply, seq 2, length 64 21:57:13.016580 IP (...) A > target: ICMP echo request, seq 3, length 64 21:57:13.019251 IP (... id 3437 ...) target > A: ICMP echo reply, seq 3, length 64 [1] TCP sessions uses a per flow ID generator not changed by this patch. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Jeffrey Knockel <jeffk@cs.unm.edu> Reported-by: Jedidiah R. Crandall <crandall@cs.unm.edu> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-07-26 10:58:10 +04:00
(__force u32)iph->saddr,
iph->protocol,
&net->ipv4.ip_id_key);
id = ip_idents_reserve(hash, segs);
iph->id = htons(id);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ip_select_ident);
static void __build_flow_key(const struct net *net, struct flowi4 *fl4,
const struct sock *sk,
const struct iphdr *iph,
int oif, u8 tos,
u8 prot, u32 mark, int flow_flags)
{
if (sk) {
const struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
mark = sk->sk_mark;
tos = RT_CONN_FLAGS(sk);
prot = inet->hdrincl ? IPPROTO_RAW : sk->sk_protocol;
}
flowi4_init_output(fl4, oif, mark, tos,
RT_SCOPE_UNIVERSE, prot,
flow_flags,
iph->daddr, iph->saddr, 0, 0,
sock_net_uid(net, sk));
}
static void build_skb_flow_key(struct flowi4 *fl4, const struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct sock *sk)
{
const struct net *net = dev_net(skb->dev);
const struct iphdr *iph = ip_hdr(skb);
int oif = skb->dev->ifindex;
u8 tos = RT_TOS(iph->tos);
u8 prot = iph->protocol;
u32 mark = skb->mark;
__build_flow_key(net, fl4, sk, iph, oif, tos, prot, mark, 0);
}
static void build_sk_flow_key(struct flowi4 *fl4, const struct sock *sk)
{
const struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
const struct ip_options_rcu *inet_opt;
__be32 daddr = inet->inet_daddr;
rcu_read_lock();
inet_opt = rcu_dereference(inet->inet_opt);
if (inet_opt && inet_opt->opt.srr)
daddr = inet_opt->opt.faddr;
flowi4_init_output(fl4, sk->sk_bound_dev_if, sk->sk_mark,
RT_CONN_FLAGS(sk), RT_SCOPE_UNIVERSE,
inet->hdrincl ? IPPROTO_RAW : sk->sk_protocol,
inet_sk_flowi_flags(sk),
daddr, inet->inet_saddr, 0, 0, sk->sk_uid);
rcu_read_unlock();
}
static void ip_rt_build_flow_key(struct flowi4 *fl4, const struct sock *sk,
const struct sk_buff *skb)
{
if (skb)
build_skb_flow_key(fl4, skb, sk);
else
build_sk_flow_key(fl4, sk);
}
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(fnhe_lock);
static void fnhe_flush_routes(struct fib_nh_exception *fnhe)
{
struct rtable *rt;
rt = rcu_dereference(fnhe->fnhe_rth_input);
if (rt) {
RCU_INIT_POINTER(fnhe->fnhe_rth_input, NULL);
dst_dev_put(&rt->dst);
dst_release(&rt->dst);
}
rt = rcu_dereference(fnhe->fnhe_rth_output);
if (rt) {
RCU_INIT_POINTER(fnhe->fnhe_rth_output, NULL);
dst_dev_put(&rt->dst);
dst_release(&rt->dst);
}
}
static struct fib_nh_exception *fnhe_oldest(struct fnhe_hash_bucket *hash)
{
struct fib_nh_exception *fnhe, *oldest;
oldest = rcu_dereference(hash->chain);
for (fnhe = rcu_dereference(oldest->fnhe_next); fnhe;
fnhe = rcu_dereference(fnhe->fnhe_next)) {
if (time_before(fnhe->fnhe_stamp, oldest->fnhe_stamp))
oldest = fnhe;
}
fnhe_flush_routes(oldest);
return oldest;
}
static inline u32 fnhe_hashfun(__be32 daddr)
{
static u32 fnhe_hashrnd __read_mostly;
u32 hval;
net_get_random_once(&fnhe_hashrnd, sizeof(fnhe_hashrnd));
hval = jhash_1word((__force u32) daddr, fnhe_hashrnd);
return hash_32(hval, FNHE_HASH_SHIFT);
}
static void fill_route_from_fnhe(struct rtable *rt, struct fib_nh_exception *fnhe)
{
rt->rt_pmtu = fnhe->fnhe_pmtu;
rt->rt_mtu_locked = fnhe->fnhe_mtu_locked;
rt->dst.expires = fnhe->fnhe_expires;
if (fnhe->fnhe_gw) {
rt->rt_flags |= RTCF_REDIRECTED;
rt->rt_uses_gateway = 1;
rt->rt_gw_family = AF_INET;
rt->rt_gw4 = fnhe->fnhe_gw;
}
}
static void update_or_create_fnhe(struct fib_nh_common *nhc, __be32 daddr,
__be32 gw, u32 pmtu, bool lock,
unsigned long expires)
{
struct fnhe_hash_bucket *hash;
struct fib_nh_exception *fnhe;
struct rtable *rt;
u32 genid, hval;
unsigned int i;
int depth;
genid = fnhe_genid(dev_net(nhc->nhc_dev));
hval = fnhe_hashfun(daddr);
spin_lock_bh(&fnhe_lock);
hash = rcu_dereference(nhc->nhc_exceptions);
if (!hash) {
treewide: kzalloc() -> kcalloc() The kzalloc() function has a 2-factor argument form, kcalloc(). This patch replaces cases of: kzalloc(a * b, gfp) with: kcalloc(a * b, gfp) as well as handling cases of: kzalloc(a * b * c, gfp) with: kzalloc(array3_size(a, b, c), gfp) as it's slightly less ugly than: kzalloc_array(array_size(a, b), c, gfp) This does, however, attempt to ignore constant size factors like: kzalloc(4 * 1024, gfp) though any constants defined via macros get caught up in the conversion. Any factors with a sizeof() of "unsigned char", "char", and "u8" were dropped, since they're redundant. The Coccinelle script used for this was: // Fix redundant parens around sizeof(). @@ type TYPE; expression THING, E; @@ ( kzalloc( - (sizeof(TYPE)) * E + sizeof(TYPE) * E , ...) | kzalloc( - (sizeof(THING)) * E + sizeof(THING) * E , ...) ) // Drop single-byte sizes and redundant parens. @@ expression COUNT; typedef u8; typedef __u8; @@ ( kzalloc( - sizeof(u8) * (COUNT) + COUNT , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(__u8) * (COUNT) + COUNT , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(char) * (COUNT) + COUNT , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(unsigned char) * (COUNT) + COUNT , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(u8) * COUNT + COUNT , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(__u8) * COUNT + COUNT , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(char) * COUNT + COUNT , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(unsigned char) * COUNT + COUNT , ...) ) // 2-factor product with sizeof(type/expression) and identifier or constant. @@ type TYPE; expression THING; identifier COUNT_ID; constant COUNT_CONST; @@ ( - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_ID) + COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_ID + COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_CONST) + COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_CONST + COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_ID) + COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - sizeof(THING) * COUNT_ID + COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_CONST) + COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - sizeof(THING) * COUNT_CONST + COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING) , ...) ) // 2-factor product, only identifiers. @@ identifier SIZE, COUNT; @@ - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - SIZE * COUNT + COUNT, SIZE , ...) // 3-factor product with 1 sizeof(type) or sizeof(expression), with // redundant parens removed. @@ expression THING; identifier STRIDE, COUNT; type TYPE; @@ ( kzalloc( - sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE)) , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * STRIDE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE)) , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * (STRIDE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE)) , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * STRIDE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE)) , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING)) , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * STRIDE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING)) , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(THING) * COUNT * (STRIDE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING)) , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(THING) * COUNT * STRIDE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING)) , ...) ) // 3-factor product with 2 sizeof(variable), with redundant parens removed. @@ expression THING1, THING2; identifier COUNT; type TYPE1, TYPE2; @@ ( kzalloc( - sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(TYPE2) * COUNT + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2)) , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT) + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2)) , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2)) , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT) + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2)) , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2)) , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT) + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2)) , ...) ) // 3-factor product, only identifiers, with redundant parens removed. @@ identifier STRIDE, SIZE, COUNT; @@ ( kzalloc( - (COUNT) * STRIDE * SIZE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kzalloc( - COUNT * (STRIDE) * SIZE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kzalloc( - COUNT * STRIDE * (SIZE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kzalloc( - (COUNT) * (STRIDE) * SIZE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kzalloc( - COUNT * (STRIDE) * (SIZE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kzalloc( - (COUNT) * STRIDE * (SIZE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kzalloc( - (COUNT) * (STRIDE) * (SIZE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kzalloc( - COUNT * STRIDE * SIZE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) ) // Any remaining multi-factor products, first at least 3-factor products, // when they're not all constants... @@ expression E1, E2, E3; constant C1, C2, C3; @@ ( kzalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...) | kzalloc( - (E1) * E2 * E3 + array3_size(E1, E2, E3) , ...) | kzalloc( - (E1) * (E2) * E3 + array3_size(E1, E2, E3) , ...) | kzalloc( - (E1) * (E2) * (E3) + array3_size(E1, E2, E3) , ...) | kzalloc( - E1 * E2 * E3 + array3_size(E1, E2, E3) , ...) ) // And then all remaining 2 factors products when they're not all constants, // keeping sizeof() as the second factor argument. @@ expression THING, E1, E2; type TYPE; constant C1, C2, C3; @@ ( kzalloc(sizeof(THING) * C2, ...) | kzalloc(sizeof(TYPE) * C2, ...) | kzalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...) | kzalloc(C1 * C2, ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - sizeof(TYPE) * (E2) + E2, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - sizeof(TYPE) * E2 + E2, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - sizeof(THING) * (E2) + E2, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - sizeof(THING) * E2 + E2, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - (E1) * E2 + E1, E2 , ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - (E1) * (E2) + E1, E2 , ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - E1 * E2 + E1, E2 , ...) ) Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-06-13 00:03:40 +03:00
hash = kcalloc(FNHE_HASH_SIZE, sizeof(*hash), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!hash)
goto out_unlock;
rcu_assign_pointer(nhc->nhc_exceptions, hash);
}
hash += hval;
depth = 0;
for (fnhe = rcu_dereference(hash->chain); fnhe;
fnhe = rcu_dereference(fnhe->fnhe_next)) {
if (fnhe->fnhe_daddr == daddr)
break;
depth++;
}
if (fnhe) {
if (fnhe->fnhe_genid != genid)
fnhe->fnhe_genid = genid;
if (gw)
fnhe->fnhe_gw = gw;
if (pmtu) {
fnhe->fnhe_pmtu = pmtu;
fnhe->fnhe_mtu_locked = lock;
}
fnhe->fnhe_expires = max(1UL, expires);
/* Update all cached dsts too */
rt = rcu_dereference(fnhe->fnhe_rth_input);
if (rt)
fill_route_from_fnhe(rt, fnhe);
rt = rcu_dereference(fnhe->fnhe_rth_output);
if (rt)
fill_route_from_fnhe(rt, fnhe);
} else {
if (depth > FNHE_RECLAIM_DEPTH)
fnhe = fnhe_oldest(hash);
else {
fnhe = kzalloc(sizeof(*fnhe), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!fnhe)
goto out_unlock;
fnhe->fnhe_next = hash->chain;
rcu_assign_pointer(hash->chain, fnhe);
}
fnhe->fnhe_genid = genid;
fnhe->fnhe_daddr = daddr;
fnhe->fnhe_gw = gw;
fnhe->fnhe_pmtu = pmtu;
fnhe->fnhe_mtu_locked = lock;
ipv4: fix fnhe usage by non-cached routes Allow some non-cached routes to use non-expired fnhe: 1. ip_del_fnhe: moved above and now called by find_exception. The 4.5+ commit deed49df7390 expires fnhe only when caching routes. Change that to: 1.1. use fnhe for non-cached local output routes, with the help from (2) 1.2. allow __mkroute_input to detect expired fnhe (outdated fnhe_gw, for example) when do_cache is false, eg. when itag!=0 for unicast destinations. 2. __mkroute_output: keep fi to allow local routes with orig_oif != 0 to use fnhe info even when the new route will not be cached into fnhe. After commit 839da4d98960 ("net: ipv4: set orig_oif based on fib result for local traffic") it means all local routes will be affected because they are not cached. This change is used to solve a PMTU problem with IPVS (and probably Netfilter DNAT) setups that redirect local clients from target local IP (local route to Virtual IP) to new remote IP target, eg. IPVS TUN real server. Loopback has 64K MTU and we need to create fnhe on the local route that will keep the reduced PMTU for the Virtual IP. Without this change fnhe_pmtu is updated from ICMP but never exposed to non-cached local routes. This includes routes with flowi4_oif!=0 for 4.6+ and with flowi4_oif=any for 4.14+). 3. update_or_create_fnhe: make sure fnhe_expires is not 0 for new entries Fixes: 839da4d98960 ("net: ipv4: set orig_oif based on fib result for local traffic") Fixes: d6d5e999e5df ("route: do not cache fib route info on local routes with oif") Fixes: deed49df7390 ("route: check and remove route cache when we get route") Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Cc: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Acked-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-05-02 09:41:19 +03:00
fnhe->fnhe_expires = max(1UL, expires);
/* Exception created; mark the cached routes for the nexthop
* stale, so anyone caching it rechecks if this exception
* applies to them.
*/
rt = rcu_dereference(nhc->nhc_rth_input);
if (rt)
rt->dst.obsolete = DST_OBSOLETE_KILL;
for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
struct rtable __rcu **prt;
prt = per_cpu_ptr(nhc->nhc_pcpu_rth_output, i);
rt = rcu_dereference(*prt);
if (rt)
rt->dst.obsolete = DST_OBSOLETE_KILL;
}
}
fnhe->fnhe_stamp = jiffies;
out_unlock:
spin_unlock_bh(&fnhe_lock);
}
static void __ip_do_redirect(struct rtable *rt, struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi4 *fl4,
bool kill_route)
{
__be32 new_gw = icmp_hdr(skb)->un.gateway;
__be32 old_gw = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr;
struct net_device *dev = skb->dev;
struct in_device *in_dev;
struct fib_result res;
struct neighbour *n;
struct net *net;
switch (icmp_hdr(skb)->code & 7) {
case ICMP_REDIR_NET:
case ICMP_REDIR_NETTOS:
case ICMP_REDIR_HOST:
case ICMP_REDIR_HOSTTOS:
break;
default:
return;
}
if (rt->rt_gw_family != AF_INET || rt->rt_gw4 != old_gw)
return;
in_dev = __in_dev_get_rcu(dev);
if (!in_dev)
return;
net = dev_net(dev);
if (new_gw == old_gw || !IN_DEV_RX_REDIRECTS(in_dev) ||
ipv4_is_multicast(new_gw) || ipv4_is_lbcast(new_gw) ||
ipv4_is_zeronet(new_gw))
goto reject_redirect;
if (!IN_DEV_SHARED_MEDIA(in_dev)) {
if (!inet_addr_onlink(in_dev, new_gw, old_gw))
goto reject_redirect;
if (IN_DEV_SEC_REDIRECTS(in_dev) && ip_fib_check_default(new_gw, dev))
goto reject_redirect;
} else {
if (inet_addr_type(net, new_gw) != RTN_UNICAST)
goto reject_redirect;
}
n = __ipv4_neigh_lookup(rt->dst.dev, new_gw);
if (!n)
n = neigh_create(&arp_tbl, &new_gw, rt->dst.dev);
if (!IS_ERR(n)) {
if (!(n->nud_state & NUD_VALID)) {
neigh_event_send(n, NULL);
} else {
net: ipv4 sysctl option to ignore routes when nexthop link is down This feature is only enabled with the new per-interface or ipv4 global sysctls called 'ignore_routes_with_linkdown'. net.ipv4.conf.all.ignore_routes_with_linkdown = 0 net.ipv4.conf.default.ignore_routes_with_linkdown = 0 net.ipv4.conf.lo.ignore_routes_with_linkdown = 0 ... When the above sysctls are set, will report to userspace that a route is dead and will no longer resolve to this nexthop when performing a fib lookup. This will signal to userspace that the route will not be selected. The signalling of a RTNH_F_DEAD is only passed to userspace if the sysctl is enabled and link is down. This was done as without it the netlink listeners would have no idea whether or not a nexthop would be selected. The kernel only sets RTNH_F_DEAD internally if the interface has IFF_UP cleared. With the new sysctl set, the following behavior can be observed (interface p8p1 is link-down): default via 10.0.5.2 dev p9p1 10.0.5.0/24 dev p9p1 proto kernel scope link src 10.0.5.15 70.0.0.0/24 dev p7p1 proto kernel scope link src 70.0.0.1 80.0.0.0/24 dev p8p1 proto kernel scope link src 80.0.0.1 dead linkdown 90.0.0.0/24 via 80.0.0.2 dev p8p1 metric 1 dead linkdown 90.0.0.0/24 via 70.0.0.2 dev p7p1 metric 2 90.0.0.1 via 70.0.0.2 dev p7p1 src 70.0.0.1 cache local 80.0.0.1 dev lo src 80.0.0.1 cache <local> 80.0.0.2 via 10.0.5.2 dev p9p1 src 10.0.5.15 cache While the route does remain in the table (so it can be modified if needed rather than being wiped away as it would be if IFF_UP was cleared), the proper next-hop is chosen automatically when the link is down. Now interface p8p1 is linked-up: default via 10.0.5.2 dev p9p1 10.0.5.0/24 dev p9p1 proto kernel scope link src 10.0.5.15 70.0.0.0/24 dev p7p1 proto kernel scope link src 70.0.0.1 80.0.0.0/24 dev p8p1 proto kernel scope link src 80.0.0.1 90.0.0.0/24 via 80.0.0.2 dev p8p1 metric 1 90.0.0.0/24 via 70.0.0.2 dev p7p1 metric 2 192.168.56.0/24 dev p2p1 proto kernel scope link src 192.168.56.2 90.0.0.1 via 80.0.0.2 dev p8p1 src 80.0.0.1 cache local 80.0.0.1 dev lo src 80.0.0.1 cache <local> 80.0.0.2 dev p8p1 src 80.0.0.1 cache and the output changes to what one would expect. If the sysctl is not set, the following output would be expected when p8p1 is down: default via 10.0.5.2 dev p9p1 10.0.5.0/24 dev p9p1 proto kernel scope link src 10.0.5.15 70.0.0.0/24 dev p7p1 proto kernel scope link src 70.0.0.1 80.0.0.0/24 dev p8p1 proto kernel scope link src 80.0.0.1 linkdown 90.0.0.0/24 via 80.0.0.2 dev p8p1 metric 1 linkdown 90.0.0.0/24 via 70.0.0.2 dev p7p1 metric 2 Since the dead flag does not appear, there should be no expectation that the kernel would skip using this route due to link being down. v2: Split kernel changes into 2 patches, this actually makes a behavioral change if the sysctl is set. Also took suggestion from Alex to simplify code by only checking sysctl during fib lookup and suggestion from Scott to add a per-interface sysctl. v3: Code clean-ups to make it more readable and efficient as well as a reverse path check fix. v4: Drop binary sysctl v5: Whitespace fixups from Dave v6: Style changes from Dave and checkpatch suggestions v7: One more checkpatch fixup Signed-off-by: Andy Gospodarek <gospo@cumulusnetworks.com> Signed-off-by: Dinesh Dutt <ddutt@cumulusnetworks.com> Acked-by: Scott Feldman <sfeldma@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-06-23 20:45:37 +03:00
if (fib_lookup(net, fl4, &res, 0) == 0) {
ipv4: Update exception handling for multipath routes via same device Kfir reported that pmtu exceptions are not created properly for deployments where multipath routes use the same device. After some digging I see 2 compounding problems: 1. ip_route_output_key_hash_rcu is updating the flowi4_oif *after* the route lookup. This is the second use case where this has been a problem (the first is related to use of vti devices with VRF). I can not find any reason for the oif to be changed after the lookup; the code goes back to the start of git. It does not seem logical so remove it. 2. fib_lookups for exceptions do not call fib_select_path to handle multipath route selection based on the hash. The end result is that the fib_lookup used to add the exception always creates it based using the first leg of the route. An example topology showing the problem: | host1 +------+ | eth0 | .209 +------+ | +------+ switch | br0 | +------+ | +---------+---------+ | host2 | host3 +------+ +------+ | eth0 | .250 | eth0 | 192.168.252.252 +------+ +------+ +-----+ +-----+ | vti | .2 | vti | 192.168.247.3 +-----+ +-----+ \ / ================================= tunnels 192.168.247.1/24 for h in host1 host2 host3; do ip netns add ${h} ip -netns ${h} link set lo up ip netns exec ${h} sysctl -wq net.ipv4.ip_forward=1 done ip netns add switch ip -netns switch li set lo up ip -netns switch link add br0 type bridge stp 0 ip -netns switch link set br0 up for n in 1 2 3; do ip -netns switch link add eth-sw type veth peer name eth-h${n} ip -netns switch li set eth-h${n} master br0 up ip -netns switch li set eth-sw netns host${n} name eth0 done ip -netns host1 addr add 192.168.252.209/24 dev eth0 ip -netns host1 link set dev eth0 up ip -netns host1 route add 192.168.247.0/24 \ nexthop via 192.168.252.250 dev eth0 nexthop via 192.168.252.252 dev eth0 ip -netns host2 addr add 192.168.252.250/24 dev eth0 ip -netns host2 link set dev eth0 up ip -netns host2 addr add 192.168.252.252/24 dev eth0 ip -netns host3 link set dev eth0 up ip netns add tunnel ip -netns tunnel li set lo up ip -netns tunnel li add br0 type bridge ip -netns tunnel li set br0 up for n in $(seq 11 20); do ip -netns tunnel addr add dev br0 192.168.247.${n}/24 done for n in 2 3 do ip -netns tunnel link add vti${n} type veth peer name eth${n} ip -netns tunnel link set eth${n} mtu 1360 master br0 up ip -netns tunnel link set vti${n} netns host${n} mtu 1360 up ip -netns host${n} addr add dev vti${n} 192.168.247.${n}/24 done ip -netns tunnel ro add default nexthop via 192.168.247.2 nexthop via 192.168.247.3 ip netns exec host1 ping -M do -s 1400 -c3 -I 192.168.252.209 192.168.247.11 ip netns exec host1 ping -M do -s 1400 -c3 -I 192.168.252.209 192.168.247.15 ip -netns host1 ro ls cache Before this patch the cache always shows exceptions against the first leg in the multipath route; 192.168.252.250 per this example. Since the hash has an initial random seed, you may need to vary the final octet more than what is listed. In my tests, using addresses between 11 and 19 usually found 1 that used both legs. With this patch, the cache will have exceptions for both legs. Fixes: 4895c771c7f0 ("ipv4: Add FIB nexthop exceptions") Reported-by: Kfir Itzhak <mastertheknife@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-09-15 06:03:54 +03:00
struct fib_nh_common *nhc;
ipv4: Update exception handling for multipath routes via same device Kfir reported that pmtu exceptions are not created properly for deployments where multipath routes use the same device. After some digging I see 2 compounding problems: 1. ip_route_output_key_hash_rcu is updating the flowi4_oif *after* the route lookup. This is the second use case where this has been a problem (the first is related to use of vti devices with VRF). I can not find any reason for the oif to be changed after the lookup; the code goes back to the start of git. It does not seem logical so remove it. 2. fib_lookups for exceptions do not call fib_select_path to handle multipath route selection based on the hash. The end result is that the fib_lookup used to add the exception always creates it based using the first leg of the route. An example topology showing the problem: | host1 +------+ | eth0 | .209 +------+ | +------+ switch | br0 | +------+ | +---------+---------+ | host2 | host3 +------+ +------+ | eth0 | .250 | eth0 | 192.168.252.252 +------+ +------+ +-----+ +-----+ | vti | .2 | vti | 192.168.247.3 +-----+ +-----+ \ / ================================= tunnels 192.168.247.1/24 for h in host1 host2 host3; do ip netns add ${h} ip -netns ${h} link set lo up ip netns exec ${h} sysctl -wq net.ipv4.ip_forward=1 done ip netns add switch ip -netns switch li set lo up ip -netns switch link add br0 type bridge stp 0 ip -netns switch link set br0 up for n in 1 2 3; do ip -netns switch link add eth-sw type veth peer name eth-h${n} ip -netns switch li set eth-h${n} master br0 up ip -netns switch li set eth-sw netns host${n} name eth0 done ip -netns host1 addr add 192.168.252.209/24 dev eth0 ip -netns host1 link set dev eth0 up ip -netns host1 route add 192.168.247.0/24 \ nexthop via 192.168.252.250 dev eth0 nexthop via 192.168.252.252 dev eth0 ip -netns host2 addr add 192.168.252.250/24 dev eth0 ip -netns host2 link set dev eth0 up ip -netns host2 addr add 192.168.252.252/24 dev eth0 ip -netns host3 link set dev eth0 up ip netns add tunnel ip -netns tunnel li set lo up ip -netns tunnel li add br0 type bridge ip -netns tunnel li set br0 up for n in $(seq 11 20); do ip -netns tunnel addr add dev br0 192.168.247.${n}/24 done for n in 2 3 do ip -netns tunnel link add vti${n} type veth peer name eth${n} ip -netns tunnel link set eth${n} mtu 1360 master br0 up ip -netns tunnel link set vti${n} netns host${n} mtu 1360 up ip -netns host${n} addr add dev vti${n} 192.168.247.${n}/24 done ip -netns tunnel ro add default nexthop via 192.168.247.2 nexthop via 192.168.247.3 ip netns exec host1 ping -M do -s 1400 -c3 -I 192.168.252.209 192.168.247.11 ip netns exec host1 ping -M do -s 1400 -c3 -I 192.168.252.209 192.168.247.15 ip -netns host1 ro ls cache Before this patch the cache always shows exceptions against the first leg in the multipath route; 192.168.252.250 per this example. Since the hash has an initial random seed, you may need to vary the final octet more than what is listed. In my tests, using addresses between 11 and 19 usually found 1 that used both legs. With this patch, the cache will have exceptions for both legs. Fixes: 4895c771c7f0 ("ipv4: Add FIB nexthop exceptions") Reported-by: Kfir Itzhak <mastertheknife@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-09-15 06:03:54 +03:00
fib_select_path(net, &res, fl4, skb);
nhc = FIB_RES_NHC(res);
update_or_create_fnhe(nhc, fl4->daddr, new_gw,
0, false,
jiffies + ip_rt_gc_timeout);
}
if (kill_route)
rt->dst.obsolete = DST_OBSOLETE_KILL;
call_netevent_notifiers(NETEVENT_NEIGH_UPDATE, n);
}
neigh_release(n);
}
return;
reject_redirect:
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_VERBOSE
if (IN_DEV_LOG_MARTIANS(in_dev)) {
const struct iphdr *iph = (const struct iphdr *) skb->data;
__be32 daddr = iph->daddr;
__be32 saddr = iph->saddr;
net_info_ratelimited("Redirect from %pI4 on %s about %pI4 ignored\n"
" Advised path = %pI4 -> %pI4\n",
&old_gw, dev->name, &new_gw,
&saddr, &daddr);
}
#endif
;
}
static void ip_do_redirect(struct dst_entry *dst, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct rtable *rt;
struct flowi4 fl4;
const struct iphdr *iph = (const struct iphdr *) skb->data;
struct net *net = dev_net(skb->dev);
int oif = skb->dev->ifindex;
u8 tos = RT_TOS(iph->tos);
u8 prot = iph->protocol;
u32 mark = skb->mark;
rt = (struct rtable *) dst;
__build_flow_key(net, &fl4, sk, iph, oif, tos, prot, mark, 0);
__ip_do_redirect(rt, skb, &fl4, true);
}
static struct dst_entry *ipv4_negative_advice(struct dst_entry *dst)
{
struct rtable *rt = (struct rtable *)dst;
struct dst_entry *ret = dst;
if (rt) {
if (dst->obsolete > 0) {
ip_rt_put(rt);
ret = NULL;
} else if ((rt->rt_flags & RTCF_REDIRECTED) ||
rt->dst.expires) {
ip_rt_put(rt);
ret = NULL;
}
}
return ret;
}
/*
* Algorithm:
* 1. The first ip_rt_redirect_number redirects are sent
* with exponential backoff, then we stop sending them at all,
* assuming that the host ignores our redirects.
* 2. If we did not see packets requiring redirects
* during ip_rt_redirect_silence, we assume that the host
* forgot redirected route and start to send redirects again.
*
* This algorithm is much cheaper and more intelligent than dumb load limiting
* in icmp.c.
*
* NOTE. Do not forget to inhibit load limiting for redirects (redundant)
* and "frag. need" (breaks PMTU discovery) in icmp.c.
*/
void ip_rt_send_redirect(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct rtable *rt = skb_rtable(skb);
struct in_device *in_dev;
struct inet_peer *peer;
struct net *net;
int log_martians;
int vif;
rcu_read_lock();
in_dev = __in_dev_get_rcu(rt->dst.dev);
if (!in_dev || !IN_DEV_TX_REDIRECTS(in_dev)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
return;
}
log_martians = IN_DEV_LOG_MARTIANS(in_dev);
vif = l3mdev_master_ifindex_rcu(rt->dst.dev);
rcu_read_unlock();
net = dev_net(rt->dst.dev);
peer = inet_getpeer_v4(net->ipv4.peers, ip_hdr(skb)->saddr, vif, 1);
if (!peer) {
icmp_send(skb, ICMP_REDIRECT, ICMP_REDIR_HOST,
rt_nexthop(rt, ip_hdr(skb)->daddr));
return;
}
/* No redirected packets during ip_rt_redirect_silence;
* reset the algorithm.
*/
if (time_after(jiffies, peer->rate_last + ip_rt_redirect_silence)) {
peer->rate_tokens = 0;
peer->n_redirects = 0;
}
/* Too many ignored redirects; do not send anything
* set dst.rate_last to the last seen redirected packet.
*/
if (peer->n_redirects >= ip_rt_redirect_number) {
peer->rate_last = jiffies;
goto out_put_peer;
}
/* Check for load limit; set rate_last to the latest sent
* redirect.
*/
if (peer->n_redirects == 0 ||
time_after(jiffies,
(peer->rate_last +
(ip_rt_redirect_load << peer->n_redirects)))) {
__be32 gw = rt_nexthop(rt, ip_hdr(skb)->daddr);
icmp_send(skb, ICMP_REDIRECT, ICMP_REDIR_HOST, gw);
peer->rate_last = jiffies;
++peer->n_redirects;
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_VERBOSE
if (log_martians &&
peer->n_redirects == ip_rt_redirect_number)
net_warn_ratelimited("host %pI4/if%d ignores redirects for %pI4 to %pI4\n",
&ip_hdr(skb)->saddr, inet_iif(skb),
&ip_hdr(skb)->daddr, &gw);
#endif
}
out_put_peer:
inet_putpeer(peer);
}
static int ip_error(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct rtable *rt = skb_rtable(skb);
struct net_device *dev = skb->dev;
struct in_device *in_dev;
struct inet_peer *peer;
unsigned long now;
struct net *net;
bool send;
int code;
if (netif_is_l3_master(skb->dev)) {
dev = __dev_get_by_index(dev_net(skb->dev), IPCB(skb)->iif);
if (!dev)
goto out;
}
in_dev = __in_dev_get_rcu(dev);
/* IP on this device is disabled. */
if (!in_dev)
goto out;
net = dev_net(rt->dst.dev);
if (!IN_DEV_FORWARD(in_dev)) {
switch (rt->dst.error) {
case EHOSTUNREACH:
__IP_INC_STATS(net, IPSTATS_MIB_INADDRERRORS);
break;
case ENETUNREACH:
__IP_INC_STATS(net, IPSTATS_MIB_INNOROUTES);
break;
}
goto out;
}
switch (rt->dst.error) {
case EINVAL:
default:
goto out;
case EHOSTUNREACH:
code = ICMP_HOST_UNREACH;
break;
case ENETUNREACH:
code = ICMP_NET_UNREACH;
__IP_INC_STATS(net, IPSTATS_MIB_INNOROUTES);
break;
case EACCES:
code = ICMP_PKT_FILTERED;
break;
}
peer = inet_getpeer_v4(net->ipv4.peers, ip_hdr(skb)->saddr,
l3mdev_master_ifindex(skb->dev), 1);
send = true;
if (peer) {
now = jiffies;
peer->rate_tokens += now - peer->rate_last;
if (peer->rate_tokens > ip_rt_error_burst)
peer->rate_tokens = ip_rt_error_burst;
peer->rate_last = now;
if (peer->rate_tokens >= ip_rt_error_cost)
peer->rate_tokens -= ip_rt_error_cost;
else
send = false;
inet_putpeer(peer);
}
if (send)
icmp_send(skb, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, code, 0);
out: kfree_skb(skb);
return 0;
}
static void __ip_rt_update_pmtu(struct rtable *rt, struct flowi4 *fl4, u32 mtu)
{
struct dst_entry *dst = &rt->dst;
ipv4: Update exception handling for multipath routes via same device Kfir reported that pmtu exceptions are not created properly for deployments where multipath routes use the same device. After some digging I see 2 compounding problems: 1. ip_route_output_key_hash_rcu is updating the flowi4_oif *after* the route lookup. This is the second use case where this has been a problem (the first is related to use of vti devices with VRF). I can not find any reason for the oif to be changed after the lookup; the code goes back to the start of git. It does not seem logical so remove it. 2. fib_lookups for exceptions do not call fib_select_path to handle multipath route selection based on the hash. The end result is that the fib_lookup used to add the exception always creates it based using the first leg of the route. An example topology showing the problem: | host1 +------+ | eth0 | .209 +------+ | +------+ switch | br0 | +------+ | +---------+---------+ | host2 | host3 +------+ +------+ | eth0 | .250 | eth0 | 192.168.252.252 +------+ +------+ +-----+ +-----+ | vti | .2 | vti | 192.168.247.3 +-----+ +-----+ \ / ================================= tunnels 192.168.247.1/24 for h in host1 host2 host3; do ip netns add ${h} ip -netns ${h} link set lo up ip netns exec ${h} sysctl -wq net.ipv4.ip_forward=1 done ip netns add switch ip -netns switch li set lo up ip -netns switch link add br0 type bridge stp 0 ip -netns switch link set br0 up for n in 1 2 3; do ip -netns switch link add eth-sw type veth peer name eth-h${n} ip -netns switch li set eth-h${n} master br0 up ip -netns switch li set eth-sw netns host${n} name eth0 done ip -netns host1 addr add 192.168.252.209/24 dev eth0 ip -netns host1 link set dev eth0 up ip -netns host1 route add 192.168.247.0/24 \ nexthop via 192.168.252.250 dev eth0 nexthop via 192.168.252.252 dev eth0 ip -netns host2 addr add 192.168.252.250/24 dev eth0 ip -netns host2 link set dev eth0 up ip -netns host2 addr add 192.168.252.252/24 dev eth0 ip -netns host3 link set dev eth0 up ip netns add tunnel ip -netns tunnel li set lo up ip -netns tunnel li add br0 type bridge ip -netns tunnel li set br0 up for n in $(seq 11 20); do ip -netns tunnel addr add dev br0 192.168.247.${n}/24 done for n in 2 3 do ip -netns tunnel link add vti${n} type veth peer name eth${n} ip -netns tunnel link set eth${n} mtu 1360 master br0 up ip -netns tunnel link set vti${n} netns host${n} mtu 1360 up ip -netns host${n} addr add dev vti${n} 192.168.247.${n}/24 done ip -netns tunnel ro add default nexthop via 192.168.247.2 nexthop via 192.168.247.3 ip netns exec host1 ping -M do -s 1400 -c3 -I 192.168.252.209 192.168.247.11 ip netns exec host1 ping -M do -s 1400 -c3 -I 192.168.252.209 192.168.247.15 ip -netns host1 ro ls cache Before this patch the cache always shows exceptions against the first leg in the multipath route; 192.168.252.250 per this example. Since the hash has an initial random seed, you may need to vary the final octet more than what is listed. In my tests, using addresses between 11 and 19 usually found 1 that used both legs. With this patch, the cache will have exceptions for both legs. Fixes: 4895c771c7f0 ("ipv4: Add FIB nexthop exceptions") Reported-by: Kfir Itzhak <mastertheknife@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-09-15 06:03:54 +03:00
struct net *net = dev_net(dst->dev);
u32 old_mtu = ipv4_mtu(dst);
struct fib_result res;
bool lock = false;
if (ip_mtu_locked(dst))
return;
if (old_mtu < mtu)
return;
if (mtu < ip_rt_min_pmtu) {
lock = true;
mtu = min(old_mtu, ip_rt_min_pmtu);
}
if (rt->rt_pmtu == mtu && !lock &&
time_before(jiffies, dst->expires - ip_rt_mtu_expires / 2))
return;
ipv4: must use rcu protection while calling fib_lookup Following lockdep splat was reported by Pavel Roskin : [ 1570.586223] =============================== [ 1570.586225] [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ] [ 1570.586228] 3.6.0-rc3-wl-main #98 Not tainted [ 1570.586229] ------------------------------- [ 1570.586231] /home/proski/src/linux/net/ipv4/route.c:645 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! [ 1570.586233] [ 1570.586233] other info that might help us debug this: [ 1570.586233] [ 1570.586236] [ 1570.586236] rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0 [ 1570.586238] 2 locks held by Chrome_IOThread/4467: [ 1570.586240] #0: (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff814f2c0c>] release_sock+0x2c/0xa0 [ 1570.586253] #1: (fnhe_lock){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff815302fc>] update_or_create_fnhe+0x2c/0x270 [ 1570.586260] [ 1570.586260] stack backtrace: [ 1570.586263] Pid: 4467, comm: Chrome_IOThread Not tainted 3.6.0-rc3-wl-main #98 [ 1570.586265] Call Trace: [ 1570.586271] [<ffffffff810976ed>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xfd/0x130 [ 1570.586275] [<ffffffff8153042c>] update_or_create_fnhe+0x15c/0x270 [ 1570.586278] [<ffffffff815305b3>] __ip_rt_update_pmtu+0x73/0xb0 [ 1570.586282] [<ffffffff81530619>] ip_rt_update_pmtu+0x29/0x90 [ 1570.586285] [<ffffffff815411dc>] inet_csk_update_pmtu+0x2c/0x80 [ 1570.586290] [<ffffffff81558d1e>] tcp_v4_mtu_reduced+0x2e/0xc0 [ 1570.586293] [<ffffffff81553bc4>] tcp_release_cb+0xa4/0xb0 [ 1570.586296] [<ffffffff814f2c35>] release_sock+0x55/0xa0 [ 1570.586300] [<ffffffff815442ef>] tcp_sendmsg+0x4af/0xf50 [ 1570.586305] [<ffffffff8156fc60>] inet_sendmsg+0x120/0x230 [ 1570.586308] [<ffffffff8156fb40>] ? inet_sk_rebuild_header+0x40/0x40 [ 1570.586312] [<ffffffff814f4bdd>] ? sock_update_classid+0xbd/0x3b0 [ 1570.586315] [<ffffffff814f4c50>] ? sock_update_classid+0x130/0x3b0 [ 1570.586320] [<ffffffff814ec435>] do_sock_write+0xc5/0xe0 [ 1570.586323] [<ffffffff814ec4a3>] sock_aio_write+0x53/0x80 [ 1570.586328] [<ffffffff8114bc83>] do_sync_write+0xa3/0xe0 [ 1570.586332] [<ffffffff8114c5a5>] vfs_write+0x165/0x180 [ 1570.586335] [<ffffffff8114c805>] sys_write+0x45/0x90 [ 1570.586340] [<ffffffff815d2722>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Pavel Roskin <proski@gnu.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-08-28 16:33:07 +04:00
rcu_read_lock();
ipv4: Update exception handling for multipath routes via same device Kfir reported that pmtu exceptions are not created properly for deployments where multipath routes use the same device. After some digging I see 2 compounding problems: 1. ip_route_output_key_hash_rcu is updating the flowi4_oif *after* the route lookup. This is the second use case where this has been a problem (the first is related to use of vti devices with VRF). I can not find any reason for the oif to be changed after the lookup; the code goes back to the start of git. It does not seem logical so remove it. 2. fib_lookups for exceptions do not call fib_select_path to handle multipath route selection based on the hash. The end result is that the fib_lookup used to add the exception always creates it based using the first leg of the route. An example topology showing the problem: | host1 +------+ | eth0 | .209 +------+ | +------+ switch | br0 | +------+ | +---------+---------+ | host2 | host3 +------+ +------+ | eth0 | .250 | eth0 | 192.168.252.252 +------+ +------+ +-----+ +-----+ | vti | .2 | vti | 192.168.247.3 +-----+ +-----+ \ / ================================= tunnels 192.168.247.1/24 for h in host1 host2 host3; do ip netns add ${h} ip -netns ${h} link set lo up ip netns exec ${h} sysctl -wq net.ipv4.ip_forward=1 done ip netns add switch ip -netns switch li set lo up ip -netns switch link add br0 type bridge stp 0 ip -netns switch link set br0 up for n in 1 2 3; do ip -netns switch link add eth-sw type veth peer name eth-h${n} ip -netns switch li set eth-h${n} master br0 up ip -netns switch li set eth-sw netns host${n} name eth0 done ip -netns host1 addr add 192.168.252.209/24 dev eth0 ip -netns host1 link set dev eth0 up ip -netns host1 route add 192.168.247.0/24 \ nexthop via 192.168.252.250 dev eth0 nexthop via 192.168.252.252 dev eth0 ip -netns host2 addr add 192.168.252.250/24 dev eth0 ip -netns host2 link set dev eth0 up ip -netns host2 addr add 192.168.252.252/24 dev eth0 ip -netns host3 link set dev eth0 up ip netns add tunnel ip -netns tunnel li set lo up ip -netns tunnel li add br0 type bridge ip -netns tunnel li set br0 up for n in $(seq 11 20); do ip -netns tunnel addr add dev br0 192.168.247.${n}/24 done for n in 2 3 do ip -netns tunnel link add vti${n} type veth peer name eth${n} ip -netns tunnel link set eth${n} mtu 1360 master br0 up ip -netns tunnel link set vti${n} netns host${n} mtu 1360 up ip -netns host${n} addr add dev vti${n} 192.168.247.${n}/24 done ip -netns tunnel ro add default nexthop via 192.168.247.2 nexthop via 192.168.247.3 ip netns exec host1 ping -M do -s 1400 -c3 -I 192.168.252.209 192.168.247.11 ip netns exec host1 ping -M do -s 1400 -c3 -I 192.168.252.209 192.168.247.15 ip -netns host1 ro ls cache Before this patch the cache always shows exceptions against the first leg in the multipath route; 192.168.252.250 per this example. Since the hash has an initial random seed, you may need to vary the final octet more than what is listed. In my tests, using addresses between 11 and 19 usually found 1 that used both legs. With this patch, the cache will have exceptions for both legs. Fixes: 4895c771c7f0 ("ipv4: Add FIB nexthop exceptions") Reported-by: Kfir Itzhak <mastertheknife@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-09-15 06:03:54 +03:00
if (fib_lookup(net, fl4, &res, 0) == 0) {
struct fib_nh_common *nhc;
ipv4: Update exception handling for multipath routes via same device Kfir reported that pmtu exceptions are not created properly for deployments where multipath routes use the same device. After some digging I see 2 compounding problems: 1. ip_route_output_key_hash_rcu is updating the flowi4_oif *after* the route lookup. This is the second use case where this has been a problem (the first is related to use of vti devices with VRF). I can not find any reason for the oif to be changed after the lookup; the code goes back to the start of git. It does not seem logical so remove it. 2. fib_lookups for exceptions do not call fib_select_path to handle multipath route selection based on the hash. The end result is that the fib_lookup used to add the exception always creates it based using the first leg of the route. An example topology showing the problem: | host1 +------+ | eth0 | .209 +------+ | +------+ switch | br0 | +------+ | +---------+---------+ | host2 | host3 +------+ +------+ | eth0 | .250 | eth0 | 192.168.252.252 +------+ +------+ +-----+ +-----+ | vti | .2 | vti | 192.168.247.3 +-----+ +-----+ \ / ================================= tunnels 192.168.247.1/24 for h in host1 host2 host3; do ip netns add ${h} ip -netns ${h} link set lo up ip netns exec ${h} sysctl -wq net.ipv4.ip_forward=1 done ip netns add switch ip -netns switch li set lo up ip -netns switch link add br0 type bridge stp 0 ip -netns switch link set br0 up for n in 1 2 3; do ip -netns switch link add eth-sw type veth peer name eth-h${n} ip -netns switch li set eth-h${n} master br0 up ip -netns switch li set eth-sw netns host${n} name eth0 done ip -netns host1 addr add 192.168.252.209/24 dev eth0 ip -netns host1 link set dev eth0 up ip -netns host1 route add 192.168.247.0/24 \ nexthop via 192.168.252.250 dev eth0 nexthop via 192.168.252.252 dev eth0 ip -netns host2 addr add 192.168.252.250/24 dev eth0 ip -netns host2 link set dev eth0 up ip -netns host2 addr add 192.168.252.252/24 dev eth0 ip -netns host3 link set dev eth0 up ip netns add tunnel ip -netns tunnel li set lo up ip -netns tunnel li add br0 type bridge ip -netns tunnel li set br0 up for n in $(seq 11 20); do ip -netns tunnel addr add dev br0 192.168.247.${n}/24 done for n in 2 3 do ip -netns tunnel link add vti${n} type veth peer name eth${n} ip -netns tunnel link set eth${n} mtu 1360 master br0 up ip -netns tunnel link set vti${n} netns host${n} mtu 1360 up ip -netns host${n} addr add dev vti${n} 192.168.247.${n}/24 done ip -netns tunnel ro add default nexthop via 192.168.247.2 nexthop via 192.168.247.3 ip netns exec host1 ping -M do -s 1400 -c3 -I 192.168.252.209 192.168.247.11 ip netns exec host1 ping -M do -s 1400 -c3 -I 192.168.252.209 192.168.247.15 ip -netns host1 ro ls cache Before this patch the cache always shows exceptions against the first leg in the multipath route; 192.168.252.250 per this example. Since the hash has an initial random seed, you may need to vary the final octet more than what is listed. In my tests, using addresses between 11 and 19 usually found 1 that used both legs. With this patch, the cache will have exceptions for both legs. Fixes: 4895c771c7f0 ("ipv4: Add FIB nexthop exceptions") Reported-by: Kfir Itzhak <mastertheknife@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-09-15 06:03:54 +03:00
fib_select_path(net, &res, fl4, NULL);
nhc = FIB_RES_NHC(res);
update_or_create_fnhe(nhc, fl4->daddr, 0, mtu, lock,
jiffies + ip_rt_mtu_expires);
}
ipv4: must use rcu protection while calling fib_lookup Following lockdep splat was reported by Pavel Roskin : [ 1570.586223] =============================== [ 1570.586225] [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ] [ 1570.586228] 3.6.0-rc3-wl-main #98 Not tainted [ 1570.586229] ------------------------------- [ 1570.586231] /home/proski/src/linux/net/ipv4/route.c:645 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! [ 1570.586233] [ 1570.586233] other info that might help us debug this: [ 1570.586233] [ 1570.586236] [ 1570.586236] rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0 [ 1570.586238] 2 locks held by Chrome_IOThread/4467: [ 1570.586240] #0: (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff814f2c0c>] release_sock+0x2c/0xa0 [ 1570.586253] #1: (fnhe_lock){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff815302fc>] update_or_create_fnhe+0x2c/0x270 [ 1570.586260] [ 1570.586260] stack backtrace: [ 1570.586263] Pid: 4467, comm: Chrome_IOThread Not tainted 3.6.0-rc3-wl-main #98 [ 1570.586265] Call Trace: [ 1570.586271] [<ffffffff810976ed>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xfd/0x130 [ 1570.586275] [<ffffffff8153042c>] update_or_create_fnhe+0x15c/0x270 [ 1570.586278] [<ffffffff815305b3>] __ip_rt_update_pmtu+0x73/0xb0 [ 1570.586282] [<ffffffff81530619>] ip_rt_update_pmtu+0x29/0x90 [ 1570.586285] [<ffffffff815411dc>] inet_csk_update_pmtu+0x2c/0x80 [ 1570.586290] [<ffffffff81558d1e>] tcp_v4_mtu_reduced+0x2e/0xc0 [ 1570.586293] [<ffffffff81553bc4>] tcp_release_cb+0xa4/0xb0 [ 1570.586296] [<ffffffff814f2c35>] release_sock+0x55/0xa0 [ 1570.586300] [<ffffffff815442ef>] tcp_sendmsg+0x4af/0xf50 [ 1570.586305] [<ffffffff8156fc60>] inet_sendmsg+0x120/0x230 [ 1570.586308] [<ffffffff8156fb40>] ? inet_sk_rebuild_header+0x40/0x40 [ 1570.586312] [<ffffffff814f4bdd>] ? sock_update_classid+0xbd/0x3b0 [ 1570.586315] [<ffffffff814f4c50>] ? sock_update_classid+0x130/0x3b0 [ 1570.586320] [<ffffffff814ec435>] do_sock_write+0xc5/0xe0 [ 1570.586323] [<ffffffff814ec4a3>] sock_aio_write+0x53/0x80 [ 1570.586328] [<ffffffff8114bc83>] do_sync_write+0xa3/0xe0 [ 1570.586332] [<ffffffff8114c5a5>] vfs_write+0x165/0x180 [ 1570.586335] [<ffffffff8114c805>] sys_write+0x45/0x90 [ 1570.586340] [<ffffffff815d2722>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Pavel Roskin <proski@gnu.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-08-28 16:33:07 +04:00
rcu_read_unlock();
}
static void ip_rt_update_pmtu(struct dst_entry *dst, struct sock *sk,
net: add bool confirm_neigh parameter for dst_ops.update_pmtu The MTU update code is supposed to be invoked in response to real networking events that update the PMTU. In IPv6 PMTU update function __ip6_rt_update_pmtu() we called dst_confirm_neigh() to update neighbor confirmed time. But for tunnel code, it will call pmtu before xmit, like: - tnl_update_pmtu() - skb_dst_update_pmtu() - ip6_rt_update_pmtu() - __ip6_rt_update_pmtu() - dst_confirm_neigh() If the tunnel remote dst mac address changed and we still do the neigh confirm, we will not be able to update neigh cache and ping6 remote will failed. So for this ip_tunnel_xmit() case, _EVEN_ if the MTU is changed, we should not be invoking dst_confirm_neigh() as we have no evidence of successful two-way communication at this point. On the other hand it is also important to keep the neigh reachability fresh for TCP flows, so we cannot remove this dst_confirm_neigh() call. To fix the issue, we have to add a new bool parameter for dst_ops.update_pmtu to choose whether we should do neigh update or not. I will add the parameter in this patch and set all the callers to true to comply with the previous way, and fix the tunnel code one by one on later patches. v5: No change. v4: No change. v3: Do not remove dst_confirm_neigh, but add a new bool parameter in dst_ops.update_pmtu to control whether we should do neighbor confirm. Also split the big patch to small ones for each area. v2: Remove dst_confirm_neigh in __ip6_rt_update_pmtu. Suggested-by: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Reviewed-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com> Acked-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-12-22 05:51:09 +03:00
struct sk_buff *skb, u32 mtu,
bool confirm_neigh)
{
struct rtable *rt = (struct rtable *) dst;
struct flowi4 fl4;
ip_rt_build_flow_key(&fl4, sk, skb);
/* Don't make lookup fail for bridged encapsulations */
if (skb && netif_is_any_bridge_port(skb->dev))
fl4.flowi4_oif = 0;
__ip_rt_update_pmtu(rt, &fl4, mtu);
}
void ipv4_update_pmtu(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net *net, u32 mtu,
int oif, u8 protocol)
{
const struct iphdr *iph = (const struct iphdr *) skb->data;
struct flowi4 fl4;
struct rtable *rt;
u32 mark = IP4_REPLY_MARK(net, skb->mark);
__build_flow_key(net, &fl4, NULL, iph, oif,
RT_TOS(iph->tos), protocol, mark, 0);
rt = __ip_route_output_key(net, &fl4);
if (!IS_ERR(rt)) {
__ip_rt_update_pmtu(rt, &fl4, mtu);
ip_rt_put(rt);
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ipv4_update_pmtu);
static void __ipv4_sk_update_pmtu(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk, u32 mtu)
{
const struct iphdr *iph = (const struct iphdr *) skb->data;
struct flowi4 fl4;
struct rtable *rt;
__build_flow_key(sock_net(sk), &fl4, sk, iph, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
if (!fl4.flowi4_mark)
fl4.flowi4_mark = IP4_REPLY_MARK(sock_net(sk), skb->mark);
rt = __ip_route_output_key(sock_net(sk), &fl4);
if (!IS_ERR(rt)) {
__ip_rt_update_pmtu(rt, &fl4, mtu);
ip_rt_put(rt);
}
}
void ipv4_sk_update_pmtu(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk, u32 mtu)
{
const struct iphdr *iph = (const struct iphdr *) skb->data;
struct flowi4 fl4;
struct rtable *rt;
struct dst_entry *odst = NULL;
bool new = false;
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
bh_lock_sock(sk);
ipv4: introduce new IP_MTU_DISCOVER mode IP_PMTUDISC_INTERFACE Sockets marked with IP_PMTUDISC_INTERFACE won't do path mtu discovery, their sockets won't accept and install new path mtu information and they will always use the interface mtu for outgoing packets. It is guaranteed that the packet is not fragmented locally. But we won't set the DF-Flag on the outgoing frames. Florian Weimer had the idea to use this flag to ensure DNS servers are never generating outgoing fragments. They may well be fragmented on the path, but the server never stores or usees path mtu values, which could well be forged in an attack. (The root of the problem with path MTU discovery is that there is no reliable way to authenticate ICMP Fragmentation Needed But DF Set messages because they are sent from intermediate routers with their source addresses, and the IMCP payload will not always contain sufficient information to identify a flow.) Recent research in the DNS community showed that it is possible to implement an attack where DNS cache poisoning is feasible by spoofing fragments. This work was done by Amir Herzberg and Haya Shulman: <https://sites.google.com/site/hayashulman/files/fragmentation-poisoning.pdf> This issue was previously discussed among the DNS community, e.g. <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/dnsext/current/msg01204.html>, without leading to fixes. This patch depends on the patch "ipv4: fix DO and PROBE pmtu mode regarding local fragmentation with UFO/CORK" for the enforcement of the non-fragmentable checks. If other users than ip_append_page/data should use this semantic too, we have to add a new flag to IPCB(skb)->flags to suppress local fragmentation and check for this in ip_finish_output. Many thanks to Florian Weimer for the idea and feedback while implementing this patch. Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Suggested-by: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-11-05 05:24:17 +04:00
if (!ip_sk_accept_pmtu(sk))
goto out;
odst = sk_dst_get(sk);
if (sock_owned_by_user(sk) || !odst) {
__ipv4_sk_update_pmtu(skb, sk, mtu);
goto out;
}
__build_flow_key(net, &fl4, sk, iph, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
rt = (struct rtable *)odst;
if (odst->obsolete && !odst->ops->check(odst, 0)) {
rt = ip_route_output_flow(sock_net(sk), &fl4, sk);
if (IS_ERR(rt))
goto out;
new = true;
}
__ip_rt_update_pmtu((struct rtable *) xfrm_dst_path(&rt->dst), &fl4, mtu);
if (!dst_check(&rt->dst, 0)) {
if (new)
dst_release(&rt->dst);
rt = ip_route_output_flow(sock_net(sk), &fl4, sk);
if (IS_ERR(rt))
goto out;
new = true;
}
if (new)
sk_dst_set(sk, &rt->dst);
out:
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
dst_release(odst);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ipv4_sk_update_pmtu);
void ipv4_redirect(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net *net,
int oif, u8 protocol)
{
const struct iphdr *iph = (const struct iphdr *) skb->data;
struct flowi4 fl4;
struct rtable *rt;
__build_flow_key(net, &fl4, NULL, iph, oif,
RT_TOS(iph->tos), protocol, 0, 0);
rt = __ip_route_output_key(net, &fl4);
if (!IS_ERR(rt)) {
__ip_do_redirect(rt, skb, &fl4, false);
ip_rt_put(rt);
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ipv4_redirect);
void ipv4_sk_redirect(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk)
{
const struct iphdr *iph = (const struct iphdr *) skb->data;
struct flowi4 fl4;
struct rtable *rt;
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
__build_flow_key(net, &fl4, sk, iph, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
rt = __ip_route_output_key(net, &fl4);
if (!IS_ERR(rt)) {
__ip_do_redirect(rt, skb, &fl4, false);
ip_rt_put(rt);
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ipv4_sk_redirect);
static struct dst_entry *ipv4_dst_check(struct dst_entry *dst, u32 cookie)
{
struct rtable *rt = (struct rtable *) dst;
/* All IPV4 dsts are created with ->obsolete set to the value
* DST_OBSOLETE_FORCE_CHK which forces validation calls down
* into this function always.
*
* When a PMTU/redirect information update invalidates a route,
* this is indicated by setting obsolete to DST_OBSOLETE_KILL or
* DST_OBSOLETE_DEAD.
*/
if (dst->obsolete != DST_OBSOLETE_FORCE_CHK || rt_is_expired(rt))
return NULL;
return dst;
}
ipv4: add sanity checks in ipv4_link_failure() Before calling __ip_options_compile(), we need to ensure the network header is a an IPv4 one, and that it is already pulled in skb->head. RAW sockets going through a tunnel can end up calling ipv4_link_failure() with total garbage in the skb, or arbitrary lengthes. syzbot report : BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/string.h:355 [inline] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in __ip_options_echo+0x294/0x1120 net/ipv4/ip_options.c:123 Write of size 69 at addr ffff888096abf068 by task syz-executor.4/9204 CPU: 0 PID: 9204 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 5.1.0-rc5+ #77 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_address_description.cold+0x7c/0x20d mm/kasan/report.c:187 kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:317 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:185 [inline] check_memory_region+0x123/0x190 mm/kasan/generic.c:191 memcpy+0x38/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:133 memcpy include/linux/string.h:355 [inline] __ip_options_echo+0x294/0x1120 net/ipv4/ip_options.c:123 __icmp_send+0x725/0x1400 net/ipv4/icmp.c:695 ipv4_link_failure+0x29f/0x550 net/ipv4/route.c:1204 dst_link_failure include/net/dst.h:427 [inline] vti6_xmit net/ipv6/ip6_vti.c:514 [inline] vti6_tnl_xmit+0x10d4/0x1c0c net/ipv6/ip6_vti.c:553 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4414 [inline] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4423 [inline] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3292 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x1b2/0x980 net/core/dev.c:3308 __dev_queue_xmit+0x271d/0x3060 net/core/dev.c:3878 dev_queue_xmit+0x18/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3911 neigh_direct_output+0x16/0x20 net/core/neighbour.c:1527 neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:508 [inline] ip_finish_output2+0x949/0x1740 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:229 ip_finish_output+0x73c/0xd50 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:317 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:278 [inline] ip_output+0x21f/0x670 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:405 dst_output include/net/dst.h:444 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:289 [inline] raw_send_hdrinc net/ipv4/raw.c:432 [inline] raw_sendmsg+0x1d2b/0x2f20 net/ipv4/raw.c:663 inet_sendmsg+0x147/0x5d0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:798 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:651 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xdd/0x130 net/socket.c:661 sock_write_iter+0x27c/0x3e0 net/socket.c:988 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1866 [inline] new_sync_write+0x4c7/0x760 fs/read_write.c:474 __vfs_write+0xe4/0x110 fs/read_write.c:487 vfs_write+0x20c/0x580 fs/read_write.c:549 ksys_write+0x14f/0x2d0 fs/read_write.c:599 __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:611 [inline] __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:608 [inline] __x64_sys_write+0x73/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:608 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x458c29 Code: ad b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 7b b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007f293b44bc78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000458c29 RDX: 0000000000000014 RSI: 00000000200002c0 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 000000000073bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f293b44c6d4 R13: 00000000004c8623 R14: 00000000004ded68 R15: 00000000ffffffff The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea00025aafc0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 flags: 0x1fffc0000000000() raw: 01fffc0000000000 0000000000000000 ffffffff025a0101 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888096abef80: 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 ffff888096abf000: f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >ffff888096abf080: 00 00 f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ^ ffff888096abf100: 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 ffff888096abf180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Fixes: ed0de45a1008 ("ipv4: recompile ip options in ipv4_link_failure") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Stephen Suryaputra <ssuryaextr@gmail.com> Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-24 18:04:05 +03:00
static void ipv4_send_dest_unreach(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct ip_options opt;
ipv4: ensure rcu_read_lock() in ipv4_link_failure() fib_compute_spec_dst() needs to be called under rcu protection. syzbot reported : WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 5.1.0-rc4+ #165 Not tainted include/linux/inetdevice.h:220 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 1 lock held by swapper/0/0: #0: 0000000051b67925 ((&n->timer)){+.-.}, at: lockdep_copy_map include/linux/lockdep.h:170 [inline] #0: 0000000051b67925 ((&n->timer)){+.-.}, at: call_timer_fn+0xda/0x720 kernel/time/timer.c:1315 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.1.0-rc4+ #165 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x153/0x15d kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5162 __in_dev_get_rcu include/linux/inetdevice.h:220 [inline] fib_compute_spec_dst+0xbbd/0x1030 net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c:294 spec_dst_fill net/ipv4/ip_options.c:245 [inline] __ip_options_compile+0x15a7/0x1a10 net/ipv4/ip_options.c:343 ipv4_link_failure+0x172/0x400 net/ipv4/route.c:1195 dst_link_failure include/net/dst.h:427 [inline] arp_error_report+0xd1/0x1c0 net/ipv4/arp.c:297 neigh_invalidate+0x24b/0x570 net/core/neighbour.c:995 neigh_timer_handler+0xc35/0xf30 net/core/neighbour.c:1081 call_timer_fn+0x190/0x720 kernel/time/timer.c:1325 expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1362 [inline] __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1681 [inline] __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1649 [inline] run_timer_softirq+0x652/0x1700 kernel/time/timer.c:1694 __do_softirq+0x266/0x95a kernel/softirq.c:293 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:374 [inline] irq_exit+0x180/0x1d0 kernel/softirq.c:414 exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:536 [inline] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x14a/0x570 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1062 apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:807 Fixes: ed0de45a1008 ("ipv4: recompile ip options in ipv4_link_failure") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Stephen Suryaputra <ssuryaextr@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-14 03:32:21 +03:00
int res;
/* Recompile ip options since IPCB may not be valid anymore.
ipv4: add sanity checks in ipv4_link_failure() Before calling __ip_options_compile(), we need to ensure the network header is a an IPv4 one, and that it is already pulled in skb->head. RAW sockets going through a tunnel can end up calling ipv4_link_failure() with total garbage in the skb, or arbitrary lengthes. syzbot report : BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/string.h:355 [inline] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in __ip_options_echo+0x294/0x1120 net/ipv4/ip_options.c:123 Write of size 69 at addr ffff888096abf068 by task syz-executor.4/9204 CPU: 0 PID: 9204 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 5.1.0-rc5+ #77 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_address_description.cold+0x7c/0x20d mm/kasan/report.c:187 kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:317 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:185 [inline] check_memory_region+0x123/0x190 mm/kasan/generic.c:191 memcpy+0x38/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:133 memcpy include/linux/string.h:355 [inline] __ip_options_echo+0x294/0x1120 net/ipv4/ip_options.c:123 __icmp_send+0x725/0x1400 net/ipv4/icmp.c:695 ipv4_link_failure+0x29f/0x550 net/ipv4/route.c:1204 dst_link_failure include/net/dst.h:427 [inline] vti6_xmit net/ipv6/ip6_vti.c:514 [inline] vti6_tnl_xmit+0x10d4/0x1c0c net/ipv6/ip6_vti.c:553 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4414 [inline] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4423 [inline] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3292 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x1b2/0x980 net/core/dev.c:3308 __dev_queue_xmit+0x271d/0x3060 net/core/dev.c:3878 dev_queue_xmit+0x18/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3911 neigh_direct_output+0x16/0x20 net/core/neighbour.c:1527 neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:508 [inline] ip_finish_output2+0x949/0x1740 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:229 ip_finish_output+0x73c/0xd50 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:317 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:278 [inline] ip_output+0x21f/0x670 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:405 dst_output include/net/dst.h:444 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:289 [inline] raw_send_hdrinc net/ipv4/raw.c:432 [inline] raw_sendmsg+0x1d2b/0x2f20 net/ipv4/raw.c:663 inet_sendmsg+0x147/0x5d0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:798 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:651 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xdd/0x130 net/socket.c:661 sock_write_iter+0x27c/0x3e0 net/socket.c:988 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1866 [inline] new_sync_write+0x4c7/0x760 fs/read_write.c:474 __vfs_write+0xe4/0x110 fs/read_write.c:487 vfs_write+0x20c/0x580 fs/read_write.c:549 ksys_write+0x14f/0x2d0 fs/read_write.c:599 __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:611 [inline] __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:608 [inline] __x64_sys_write+0x73/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:608 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x458c29 Code: ad b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 7b b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007f293b44bc78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000458c29 RDX: 0000000000000014 RSI: 00000000200002c0 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 000000000073bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f293b44c6d4 R13: 00000000004c8623 R14: 00000000004ded68 R15: 00000000ffffffff The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea00025aafc0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 flags: 0x1fffc0000000000() raw: 01fffc0000000000 0000000000000000 ffffffff025a0101 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888096abef80: 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 ffff888096abf000: f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >ffff888096abf080: 00 00 f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ^ ffff888096abf100: 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 ffff888096abf180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Fixes: ed0de45a1008 ("ipv4: recompile ip options in ipv4_link_failure") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Stephen Suryaputra <ssuryaextr@gmail.com> Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-24 18:04:05 +03:00
* Also check we have a reasonable ipv4 header.
*/
ipv4: add sanity checks in ipv4_link_failure() Before calling __ip_options_compile(), we need to ensure the network header is a an IPv4 one, and that it is already pulled in skb->head. RAW sockets going through a tunnel can end up calling ipv4_link_failure() with total garbage in the skb, or arbitrary lengthes. syzbot report : BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/string.h:355 [inline] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in __ip_options_echo+0x294/0x1120 net/ipv4/ip_options.c:123 Write of size 69 at addr ffff888096abf068 by task syz-executor.4/9204 CPU: 0 PID: 9204 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 5.1.0-rc5+ #77 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_address_description.cold+0x7c/0x20d mm/kasan/report.c:187 kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:317 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:185 [inline] check_memory_region+0x123/0x190 mm/kasan/generic.c:191 memcpy+0x38/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:133 memcpy include/linux/string.h:355 [inline] __ip_options_echo+0x294/0x1120 net/ipv4/ip_options.c:123 __icmp_send+0x725/0x1400 net/ipv4/icmp.c:695 ipv4_link_failure+0x29f/0x550 net/ipv4/route.c:1204 dst_link_failure include/net/dst.h:427 [inline] vti6_xmit net/ipv6/ip6_vti.c:514 [inline] vti6_tnl_xmit+0x10d4/0x1c0c net/ipv6/ip6_vti.c:553 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4414 [inline] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4423 [inline] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3292 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x1b2/0x980 net/core/dev.c:3308 __dev_queue_xmit+0x271d/0x3060 net/core/dev.c:3878 dev_queue_xmit+0x18/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3911 neigh_direct_output+0x16/0x20 net/core/neighbour.c:1527 neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:508 [inline] ip_finish_output2+0x949/0x1740 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:229 ip_finish_output+0x73c/0xd50 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:317 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:278 [inline] ip_output+0x21f/0x670 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:405 dst_output include/net/dst.h:444 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:289 [inline] raw_send_hdrinc net/ipv4/raw.c:432 [inline] raw_sendmsg+0x1d2b/0x2f20 net/ipv4/raw.c:663 inet_sendmsg+0x147/0x5d0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:798 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:651 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xdd/0x130 net/socket.c:661 sock_write_iter+0x27c/0x3e0 net/socket.c:988 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1866 [inline] new_sync_write+0x4c7/0x760 fs/read_write.c:474 __vfs_write+0xe4/0x110 fs/read_write.c:487 vfs_write+0x20c/0x580 fs/read_write.c:549 ksys_write+0x14f/0x2d0 fs/read_write.c:599 __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:611 [inline] __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:608 [inline] __x64_sys_write+0x73/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:608 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x458c29 Code: ad b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 7b b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007f293b44bc78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000458c29 RDX: 0000000000000014 RSI: 00000000200002c0 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 000000000073bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f293b44c6d4 R13: 00000000004c8623 R14: 00000000004ded68 R15: 00000000ffffffff The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea00025aafc0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 flags: 0x1fffc0000000000() raw: 01fffc0000000000 0000000000000000 ffffffff025a0101 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888096abef80: 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 ffff888096abf000: f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >ffff888096abf080: 00 00 f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ^ ffff888096abf100: 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 ffff888096abf180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Fixes: ed0de45a1008 ("ipv4: recompile ip options in ipv4_link_failure") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Stephen Suryaputra <ssuryaextr@gmail.com> Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-24 18:04:05 +03:00
if (!pskb_network_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct iphdr)) ||
ip_hdr(skb)->version != 4 || ip_hdr(skb)->ihl < 5)
return;
ipv4: ensure rcu_read_lock() in ipv4_link_failure() fib_compute_spec_dst() needs to be called under rcu protection. syzbot reported : WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 5.1.0-rc4+ #165 Not tainted include/linux/inetdevice.h:220 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 1 lock held by swapper/0/0: #0: 0000000051b67925 ((&n->timer)){+.-.}, at: lockdep_copy_map include/linux/lockdep.h:170 [inline] #0: 0000000051b67925 ((&n->timer)){+.-.}, at: call_timer_fn+0xda/0x720 kernel/time/timer.c:1315 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.1.0-rc4+ #165 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x153/0x15d kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5162 __in_dev_get_rcu include/linux/inetdevice.h:220 [inline] fib_compute_spec_dst+0xbbd/0x1030 net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c:294 spec_dst_fill net/ipv4/ip_options.c:245 [inline] __ip_options_compile+0x15a7/0x1a10 net/ipv4/ip_options.c:343 ipv4_link_failure+0x172/0x400 net/ipv4/route.c:1195 dst_link_failure include/net/dst.h:427 [inline] arp_error_report+0xd1/0x1c0 net/ipv4/arp.c:297 neigh_invalidate+0x24b/0x570 net/core/neighbour.c:995 neigh_timer_handler+0xc35/0xf30 net/core/neighbour.c:1081 call_timer_fn+0x190/0x720 kernel/time/timer.c:1325 expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1362 [inline] __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1681 [inline] __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1649 [inline] run_timer_softirq+0x652/0x1700 kernel/time/timer.c:1694 __do_softirq+0x266/0x95a kernel/softirq.c:293 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:374 [inline] irq_exit+0x180/0x1d0 kernel/softirq.c:414 exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:536 [inline] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x14a/0x570 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1062 apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:807 Fixes: ed0de45a1008 ("ipv4: recompile ip options in ipv4_link_failure") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Stephen Suryaputra <ssuryaextr@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-14 03:32:21 +03:00
ipv4: add sanity checks in ipv4_link_failure() Before calling __ip_options_compile(), we need to ensure the network header is a an IPv4 one, and that it is already pulled in skb->head. RAW sockets going through a tunnel can end up calling ipv4_link_failure() with total garbage in the skb, or arbitrary lengthes. syzbot report : BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/string.h:355 [inline] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in __ip_options_echo+0x294/0x1120 net/ipv4/ip_options.c:123 Write of size 69 at addr ffff888096abf068 by task syz-executor.4/9204 CPU: 0 PID: 9204 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 5.1.0-rc5+ #77 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_address_description.cold+0x7c/0x20d mm/kasan/report.c:187 kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:317 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:185 [inline] check_memory_region+0x123/0x190 mm/kasan/generic.c:191 memcpy+0x38/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:133 memcpy include/linux/string.h:355 [inline] __ip_options_echo+0x294/0x1120 net/ipv4/ip_options.c:123 __icmp_send+0x725/0x1400 net/ipv4/icmp.c:695 ipv4_link_failure+0x29f/0x550 net/ipv4/route.c:1204 dst_link_failure include/net/dst.h:427 [inline] vti6_xmit net/ipv6/ip6_vti.c:514 [inline] vti6_tnl_xmit+0x10d4/0x1c0c net/ipv6/ip6_vti.c:553 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4414 [inline] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4423 [inline] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3292 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x1b2/0x980 net/core/dev.c:3308 __dev_queue_xmit+0x271d/0x3060 net/core/dev.c:3878 dev_queue_xmit+0x18/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3911 neigh_direct_output+0x16/0x20 net/core/neighbour.c:1527 neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:508 [inline] ip_finish_output2+0x949/0x1740 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:229 ip_finish_output+0x73c/0xd50 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:317 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:278 [inline] ip_output+0x21f/0x670 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:405 dst_output include/net/dst.h:444 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:289 [inline] raw_send_hdrinc net/ipv4/raw.c:432 [inline] raw_sendmsg+0x1d2b/0x2f20 net/ipv4/raw.c:663 inet_sendmsg+0x147/0x5d0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:798 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:651 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xdd/0x130 net/socket.c:661 sock_write_iter+0x27c/0x3e0 net/socket.c:988 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1866 [inline] new_sync_write+0x4c7/0x760 fs/read_write.c:474 __vfs_write+0xe4/0x110 fs/read_write.c:487 vfs_write+0x20c/0x580 fs/read_write.c:549 ksys_write+0x14f/0x2d0 fs/read_write.c:599 __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:611 [inline] __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:608 [inline] __x64_sys_write+0x73/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:608 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x458c29 Code: ad b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 7b b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007f293b44bc78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000458c29 RDX: 0000000000000014 RSI: 00000000200002c0 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 000000000073bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f293b44c6d4 R13: 00000000004c8623 R14: 00000000004ded68 R15: 00000000ffffffff The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea00025aafc0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 flags: 0x1fffc0000000000() raw: 01fffc0000000000 0000000000000000 ffffffff025a0101 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888096abef80: 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 ffff888096abf000: f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >ffff888096abf080: 00 00 f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ^ ffff888096abf100: 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 ffff888096abf180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Fixes: ed0de45a1008 ("ipv4: recompile ip options in ipv4_link_failure") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Stephen Suryaputra <ssuryaextr@gmail.com> Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-24 18:04:05 +03:00
memset(&opt, 0, sizeof(opt));
if (ip_hdr(skb)->ihl > 5) {
if (!pskb_network_may_pull(skb, ip_hdr(skb)->ihl * 4))
return;
opt.optlen = ip_hdr(skb)->ihl * 4 - sizeof(struct iphdr);
ipv4: ensure rcu_read_lock() in ipv4_link_failure() fib_compute_spec_dst() needs to be called under rcu protection. syzbot reported : WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 5.1.0-rc4+ #165 Not tainted include/linux/inetdevice.h:220 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 1 lock held by swapper/0/0: #0: 0000000051b67925 ((&n->timer)){+.-.}, at: lockdep_copy_map include/linux/lockdep.h:170 [inline] #0: 0000000051b67925 ((&n->timer)){+.-.}, at: call_timer_fn+0xda/0x720 kernel/time/timer.c:1315 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.1.0-rc4+ #165 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x153/0x15d kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5162 __in_dev_get_rcu include/linux/inetdevice.h:220 [inline] fib_compute_spec_dst+0xbbd/0x1030 net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c:294 spec_dst_fill net/ipv4/ip_options.c:245 [inline] __ip_options_compile+0x15a7/0x1a10 net/ipv4/ip_options.c:343 ipv4_link_failure+0x172/0x400 net/ipv4/route.c:1195 dst_link_failure include/net/dst.h:427 [inline] arp_error_report+0xd1/0x1c0 net/ipv4/arp.c:297 neigh_invalidate+0x24b/0x570 net/core/neighbour.c:995 neigh_timer_handler+0xc35/0xf30 net/core/neighbour.c:1081 call_timer_fn+0x190/0x720 kernel/time/timer.c:1325 expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1362 [inline] __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1681 [inline] __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1649 [inline] run_timer_softirq+0x652/0x1700 kernel/time/timer.c:1694 __do_softirq+0x266/0x95a kernel/softirq.c:293 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:374 [inline] irq_exit+0x180/0x1d0 kernel/softirq.c:414 exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:536 [inline] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x14a/0x570 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1062 apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:807 Fixes: ed0de45a1008 ("ipv4: recompile ip options in ipv4_link_failure") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Stephen Suryaputra <ssuryaextr@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-14 03:32:21 +03:00
ipv4: add sanity checks in ipv4_link_failure() Before calling __ip_options_compile(), we need to ensure the network header is a an IPv4 one, and that it is already pulled in skb->head. RAW sockets going through a tunnel can end up calling ipv4_link_failure() with total garbage in the skb, or arbitrary lengthes. syzbot report : BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/string.h:355 [inline] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in __ip_options_echo+0x294/0x1120 net/ipv4/ip_options.c:123 Write of size 69 at addr ffff888096abf068 by task syz-executor.4/9204 CPU: 0 PID: 9204 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 5.1.0-rc5+ #77 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_address_description.cold+0x7c/0x20d mm/kasan/report.c:187 kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:317 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:185 [inline] check_memory_region+0x123/0x190 mm/kasan/generic.c:191 memcpy+0x38/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:133 memcpy include/linux/string.h:355 [inline] __ip_options_echo+0x294/0x1120 net/ipv4/ip_options.c:123 __icmp_send+0x725/0x1400 net/ipv4/icmp.c:695 ipv4_link_failure+0x29f/0x550 net/ipv4/route.c:1204 dst_link_failure include/net/dst.h:427 [inline] vti6_xmit net/ipv6/ip6_vti.c:514 [inline] vti6_tnl_xmit+0x10d4/0x1c0c net/ipv6/ip6_vti.c:553 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4414 [inline] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4423 [inline] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3292 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x1b2/0x980 net/core/dev.c:3308 __dev_queue_xmit+0x271d/0x3060 net/core/dev.c:3878 dev_queue_xmit+0x18/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3911 neigh_direct_output+0x16/0x20 net/core/neighbour.c:1527 neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:508 [inline] ip_finish_output2+0x949/0x1740 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:229 ip_finish_output+0x73c/0xd50 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:317 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:278 [inline] ip_output+0x21f/0x670 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:405 dst_output include/net/dst.h:444 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:289 [inline] raw_send_hdrinc net/ipv4/raw.c:432 [inline] raw_sendmsg+0x1d2b/0x2f20 net/ipv4/raw.c:663 inet_sendmsg+0x147/0x5d0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:798 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:651 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xdd/0x130 net/socket.c:661 sock_write_iter+0x27c/0x3e0 net/socket.c:988 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1866 [inline] new_sync_write+0x4c7/0x760 fs/read_write.c:474 __vfs_write+0xe4/0x110 fs/read_write.c:487 vfs_write+0x20c/0x580 fs/read_write.c:549 ksys_write+0x14f/0x2d0 fs/read_write.c:599 __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:611 [inline] __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:608 [inline] __x64_sys_write+0x73/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:608 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x458c29 Code: ad b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 7b b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007f293b44bc78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000458c29 RDX: 0000000000000014 RSI: 00000000200002c0 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 000000000073bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f293b44c6d4 R13: 00000000004c8623 R14: 00000000004ded68 R15: 00000000ffffffff The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea00025aafc0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 flags: 0x1fffc0000000000() raw: 01fffc0000000000 0000000000000000 ffffffff025a0101 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888096abef80: 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 ffff888096abf000: f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >ffff888096abf080: 00 00 f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ^ ffff888096abf100: 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 ffff888096abf180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Fixes: ed0de45a1008 ("ipv4: recompile ip options in ipv4_link_failure") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Stephen Suryaputra <ssuryaextr@gmail.com> Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-24 18:04:05 +03:00
rcu_read_lock();
res = __ip_options_compile(dev_net(skb->dev), &opt, skb, NULL);
rcu_read_unlock();
ipv4: add sanity checks in ipv4_link_failure() Before calling __ip_options_compile(), we need to ensure the network header is a an IPv4 one, and that it is already pulled in skb->head. RAW sockets going through a tunnel can end up calling ipv4_link_failure() with total garbage in the skb, or arbitrary lengthes. syzbot report : BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/string.h:355 [inline] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in __ip_options_echo+0x294/0x1120 net/ipv4/ip_options.c:123 Write of size 69 at addr ffff888096abf068 by task syz-executor.4/9204 CPU: 0 PID: 9204 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 5.1.0-rc5+ #77 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_address_description.cold+0x7c/0x20d mm/kasan/report.c:187 kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:317 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:185 [inline] check_memory_region+0x123/0x190 mm/kasan/generic.c:191 memcpy+0x38/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:133 memcpy include/linux/string.h:355 [inline] __ip_options_echo+0x294/0x1120 net/ipv4/ip_options.c:123 __icmp_send+0x725/0x1400 net/ipv4/icmp.c:695 ipv4_link_failure+0x29f/0x550 net/ipv4/route.c:1204 dst_link_failure include/net/dst.h:427 [inline] vti6_xmit net/ipv6/ip6_vti.c:514 [inline] vti6_tnl_xmit+0x10d4/0x1c0c net/ipv6/ip6_vti.c:553 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4414 [inline] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4423 [inline] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3292 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x1b2/0x980 net/core/dev.c:3308 __dev_queue_xmit+0x271d/0x3060 net/core/dev.c:3878 dev_queue_xmit+0x18/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3911 neigh_direct_output+0x16/0x20 net/core/neighbour.c:1527 neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:508 [inline] ip_finish_output2+0x949/0x1740 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:229 ip_finish_output+0x73c/0xd50 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:317 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:278 [inline] ip_output+0x21f/0x670 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:405 dst_output include/net/dst.h:444 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:289 [inline] raw_send_hdrinc net/ipv4/raw.c:432 [inline] raw_sendmsg+0x1d2b/0x2f20 net/ipv4/raw.c:663 inet_sendmsg+0x147/0x5d0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:798 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:651 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xdd/0x130 net/socket.c:661 sock_write_iter+0x27c/0x3e0 net/socket.c:988 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1866 [inline] new_sync_write+0x4c7/0x760 fs/read_write.c:474 __vfs_write+0xe4/0x110 fs/read_write.c:487 vfs_write+0x20c/0x580 fs/read_write.c:549 ksys_write+0x14f/0x2d0 fs/read_write.c:599 __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:611 [inline] __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:608 [inline] __x64_sys_write+0x73/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:608 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x458c29 Code: ad b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 7b b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007f293b44bc78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000458c29 RDX: 0000000000000014 RSI: 00000000200002c0 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 000000000073bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f293b44c6d4 R13: 00000000004c8623 R14: 00000000004ded68 R15: 00000000ffffffff The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea00025aafc0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 flags: 0x1fffc0000000000() raw: 01fffc0000000000 0000000000000000 ffffffff025a0101 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888096abef80: 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 ffff888096abf000: f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >ffff888096abf080: 00 00 f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ^ ffff888096abf100: 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 ffff888096abf180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Fixes: ed0de45a1008 ("ipv4: recompile ip options in ipv4_link_failure") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Stephen Suryaputra <ssuryaextr@gmail.com> Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-24 18:04:05 +03:00
if (res)
return;
}
__icmp_send(skb, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, ICMP_HOST_UNREACH, 0, &opt);
ipv4: add sanity checks in ipv4_link_failure() Before calling __ip_options_compile(), we need to ensure the network header is a an IPv4 one, and that it is already pulled in skb->head. RAW sockets going through a tunnel can end up calling ipv4_link_failure() with total garbage in the skb, or arbitrary lengthes. syzbot report : BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/string.h:355 [inline] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in __ip_options_echo+0x294/0x1120 net/ipv4/ip_options.c:123 Write of size 69 at addr ffff888096abf068 by task syz-executor.4/9204 CPU: 0 PID: 9204 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 5.1.0-rc5+ #77 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_address_description.cold+0x7c/0x20d mm/kasan/report.c:187 kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:317 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:185 [inline] check_memory_region+0x123/0x190 mm/kasan/generic.c:191 memcpy+0x38/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:133 memcpy include/linux/string.h:355 [inline] __ip_options_echo+0x294/0x1120 net/ipv4/ip_options.c:123 __icmp_send+0x725/0x1400 net/ipv4/icmp.c:695 ipv4_link_failure+0x29f/0x550 net/ipv4/route.c:1204 dst_link_failure include/net/dst.h:427 [inline] vti6_xmit net/ipv6/ip6_vti.c:514 [inline] vti6_tnl_xmit+0x10d4/0x1c0c net/ipv6/ip6_vti.c:553 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4414 [inline] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4423 [inline] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3292 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x1b2/0x980 net/core/dev.c:3308 __dev_queue_xmit+0x271d/0x3060 net/core/dev.c:3878 dev_queue_xmit+0x18/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3911 neigh_direct_output+0x16/0x20 net/core/neighbour.c:1527 neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:508 [inline] ip_finish_output2+0x949/0x1740 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:229 ip_finish_output+0x73c/0xd50 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:317 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:278 [inline] ip_output+0x21f/0x670 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:405 dst_output include/net/dst.h:444 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:289 [inline] raw_send_hdrinc net/ipv4/raw.c:432 [inline] raw_sendmsg+0x1d2b/0x2f20 net/ipv4/raw.c:663 inet_sendmsg+0x147/0x5d0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:798 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:651 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xdd/0x130 net/socket.c:661 sock_write_iter+0x27c/0x3e0 net/socket.c:988 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1866 [inline] new_sync_write+0x4c7/0x760 fs/read_write.c:474 __vfs_write+0xe4/0x110 fs/read_write.c:487 vfs_write+0x20c/0x580 fs/read_write.c:549 ksys_write+0x14f/0x2d0 fs/read_write.c:599 __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:611 [inline] __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:608 [inline] __x64_sys_write+0x73/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:608 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x458c29 Code: ad b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 7b b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007f293b44bc78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000458c29 RDX: 0000000000000014 RSI: 00000000200002c0 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 000000000073bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f293b44c6d4 R13: 00000000004c8623 R14: 00000000004ded68 R15: 00000000ffffffff The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea00025aafc0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 flags: 0x1fffc0000000000() raw: 01fffc0000000000 0000000000000000 ffffffff025a0101 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888096abef80: 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 ffff888096abf000: f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >ffff888096abf080: 00 00 f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ^ ffff888096abf100: 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 ffff888096abf180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Fixes: ed0de45a1008 ("ipv4: recompile ip options in ipv4_link_failure") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Stephen Suryaputra <ssuryaextr@gmail.com> Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-24 18:04:05 +03:00
}
static void ipv4_link_failure(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct rtable *rt;
ipv4_send_dest_unreach(skb);
rt = skb_rtable(skb);
if (rt)
dst_set_expires(&rt->dst, 0);
}
static int ip_rt_bug(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
pr_debug("%s: %pI4 -> %pI4, %s\n",
__func__, &ip_hdr(skb)->saddr, &ip_hdr(skb)->daddr,
skb->dev ? skb->dev->name : "?");
kfree_skb(skb);
WARN_ON(1);
return 0;
}
/*
We do not cache source address of outgoing interface,
because it is used only by IP RR, TS and SRR options,
so that it out of fast path.
BTW remember: "addr" is allowed to be not aligned
in IP options!
*/
void ip_rt_get_source(u8 *addr, struct sk_buff *skb, struct rtable *rt)
{
__be32 src;
if (rt_is_output_route(rt))
src = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr;
fib: RCU conversion of fib_lookup() fib_lookup() converted to be called in RCU protected context, no reference taken and released on a contended cache line (fib_clntref) fib_table_lookup() and fib_semantic_match() get an additional parameter. struct fib_info gets an rcu_head field, and is freed after an rcu grace period. Stress test : (Sending 160.000.000 UDP frames on same neighbour, IP route cache disabled, dual E5540 @2.53GHz, 32bit kernel, FIB_HASH) (about same results for FIB_TRIE) Before patch : real 1m31.199s user 0m13.761s sys 23m24.780s After patch: real 1m5.375s user 0m14.997s sys 15m50.115s Before patch Profile : 13044.00 15.4% __ip_route_output_key vmlinux 8438.00 10.0% dst_destroy vmlinux 5983.00 7.1% fib_semantic_match vmlinux 5410.00 6.4% fib_rules_lookup vmlinux 4803.00 5.7% neigh_lookup vmlinux 4420.00 5.2% _raw_spin_lock vmlinux 3883.00 4.6% rt_set_nexthop vmlinux 3261.00 3.9% _raw_read_lock vmlinux 2794.00 3.3% fib_table_lookup vmlinux 2374.00 2.8% neigh_resolve_output vmlinux 2153.00 2.5% dst_alloc vmlinux 1502.00 1.8% _raw_read_lock_bh vmlinux 1484.00 1.8% kmem_cache_alloc vmlinux 1407.00 1.7% eth_header vmlinux 1406.00 1.7% ipv4_dst_destroy vmlinux 1298.00 1.5% __copy_from_user_ll vmlinux 1174.00 1.4% dev_queue_xmit vmlinux 1000.00 1.2% ip_output vmlinux After patch Profile : 13712.00 15.8% dst_destroy vmlinux 8548.00 9.9% __ip_route_output_key vmlinux 7017.00 8.1% neigh_lookup vmlinux 4554.00 5.3% fib_semantic_match vmlinux 4067.00 4.7% _raw_read_lock vmlinux 3491.00 4.0% dst_alloc vmlinux 3186.00 3.7% neigh_resolve_output vmlinux 3103.00 3.6% fib_table_lookup vmlinux 2098.00 2.4% _raw_read_lock_bh vmlinux 2081.00 2.4% kmem_cache_alloc vmlinux 2013.00 2.3% _raw_spin_lock vmlinux 1763.00 2.0% __copy_from_user_ll vmlinux 1763.00 2.0% ip_output vmlinux 1761.00 2.0% ipv4_dst_destroy vmlinux 1631.00 1.9% eth_header vmlinux 1440.00 1.7% _raw_read_unlock_bh vmlinux Reference results, if IP route cache is enabled : real 0m29.718s user 0m10.845s sys 7m37.341s 25213.00 29.5% __ip_route_output_key vmlinux 9011.00 10.5% dst_release vmlinux 4817.00 5.6% ip_push_pending_frames vmlinux 4232.00 5.0% ip_finish_output vmlinux 3940.00 4.6% udp_sendmsg vmlinux 3730.00 4.4% __copy_from_user_ll vmlinux 3716.00 4.4% ip_route_output_flow vmlinux 2451.00 2.9% __xfrm_lookup vmlinux 2221.00 2.6% ip_append_data vmlinux 1718.00 2.0% _raw_spin_lock_bh vmlinux 1655.00 1.9% __alloc_skb vmlinux 1572.00 1.8% sock_wfree vmlinux 1345.00 1.6% kfree vmlinux Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2010-10-05 14:41:36 +04:00
else {
struct fib_result res;
struct iphdr *iph = ip_hdr(skb);
struct flowi4 fl4 = {
.daddr = iph->daddr,
.saddr = iph->saddr,
.flowi4_tos = RT_TOS(iph->tos),
.flowi4_oif = rt->dst.dev->ifindex,
.flowi4_iif = skb->dev->ifindex,
.flowi4_mark = skb->mark,
};
fib: RCU conversion of fib_lookup() fib_lookup() converted to be called in RCU protected context, no reference taken and released on a contended cache line (fib_clntref) fib_table_lookup() and fib_semantic_match() get an additional parameter. struct fib_info gets an rcu_head field, and is freed after an rcu grace period. Stress test : (Sending 160.000.000 UDP frames on same neighbour, IP route cache disabled, dual E5540 @2.53GHz, 32bit kernel, FIB_HASH) (about same results for FIB_TRIE) Before patch : real 1m31.199s user 0m13.761s sys 23m24.780s After patch: real 1m5.375s user 0m14.997s sys 15m50.115s Before patch Profile : 13044.00 15.4% __ip_route_output_key vmlinux 8438.00 10.0% dst_destroy vmlinux 5983.00 7.1% fib_semantic_match vmlinux 5410.00 6.4% fib_rules_lookup vmlinux 4803.00 5.7% neigh_lookup vmlinux 4420.00 5.2% _raw_spin_lock vmlinux 3883.00 4.6% rt_set_nexthop vmlinux 3261.00 3.9% _raw_read_lock vmlinux 2794.00 3.3% fib_table_lookup vmlinux 2374.00 2.8% neigh_resolve_output vmlinux 2153.00 2.5% dst_alloc vmlinux 1502.00 1.8% _raw_read_lock_bh vmlinux 1484.00 1.8% kmem_cache_alloc vmlinux 1407.00 1.7% eth_header vmlinux 1406.00 1.7% ipv4_dst_destroy vmlinux 1298.00 1.5% __copy_from_user_ll vmlinux 1174.00 1.4% dev_queue_xmit vmlinux 1000.00 1.2% ip_output vmlinux After patch Profile : 13712.00 15.8% dst_destroy vmlinux 8548.00 9.9% __ip_route_output_key vmlinux 7017.00 8.1% neigh_lookup vmlinux 4554.00 5.3% fib_semantic_match vmlinux 4067.00 4.7% _raw_read_lock vmlinux 3491.00 4.0% dst_alloc vmlinux 3186.00 3.7% neigh_resolve_output vmlinux 3103.00 3.6% fib_table_lookup vmlinux 2098.00 2.4% _raw_read_lock_bh vmlinux 2081.00 2.4% kmem_cache_alloc vmlinux 2013.00 2.3% _raw_spin_lock vmlinux 1763.00 2.0% __copy_from_user_ll vmlinux 1763.00 2.0% ip_output vmlinux 1761.00 2.0% ipv4_dst_destroy vmlinux 1631.00 1.9% eth_header vmlinux 1440.00 1.7% _raw_read_unlock_bh vmlinux Reference results, if IP route cache is enabled : real 0m29.718s user 0m10.845s sys 7m37.341s 25213.00 29.5% __ip_route_output_key vmlinux 9011.00 10.5% dst_release vmlinux 4817.00 5.6% ip_push_pending_frames vmlinux 4232.00 5.0% ip_finish_output vmlinux 3940.00 4.6% udp_sendmsg vmlinux 3730.00 4.4% __copy_from_user_ll vmlinux 3716.00 4.4% ip_route_output_flow vmlinux 2451.00 2.9% __xfrm_lookup vmlinux 2221.00 2.6% ip_append_data vmlinux 1718.00 2.0% _raw_spin_lock_bh vmlinux 1655.00 1.9% __alloc_skb vmlinux 1572.00 1.8% sock_wfree vmlinux 1345.00 1.6% kfree vmlinux Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2010-10-05 14:41:36 +04:00
rcu_read_lock();
net: ipv4 sysctl option to ignore routes when nexthop link is down This feature is only enabled with the new per-interface or ipv4 global sysctls called 'ignore_routes_with_linkdown'. net.ipv4.conf.all.ignore_routes_with_linkdown = 0 net.ipv4.conf.default.ignore_routes_with_linkdown = 0 net.ipv4.conf.lo.ignore_routes_with_linkdown = 0 ... When the above sysctls are set, will report to userspace that a route is dead and will no longer resolve to this nexthop when performing a fib lookup. This will signal to userspace that the route will not be selected. The signalling of a RTNH_F_DEAD is only passed to userspace if the sysctl is enabled and link is down. This was done as without it the netlink listeners would have no idea whether or not a nexthop would be selected. The kernel only sets RTNH_F_DEAD internally if the interface has IFF_UP cleared. With the new sysctl set, the following behavior can be observed (interface p8p1 is link-down): default via 10.0.5.2 dev p9p1 10.0.5.0/24 dev p9p1 proto kernel scope link src 10.0.5.15 70.0.0.0/24 dev p7p1 proto kernel scope link src 70.0.0.1 80.0.0.0/24 dev p8p1 proto kernel scope link src 80.0.0.1 dead linkdown 90.0.0.0/24 via 80.0.0.2 dev p8p1 metric 1 dead linkdown 90.0.0.0/24 via 70.0.0.2 dev p7p1 metric 2 90.0.0.1 via 70.0.0.2 dev p7p1 src 70.0.0.1 cache local 80.0.0.1 dev lo src 80.0.0.1 cache <local> 80.0.0.2 via 10.0.5.2 dev p9p1 src 10.0.5.15 cache While the route does remain in the table (so it can be modified if needed rather than being wiped away as it would be if IFF_UP was cleared), the proper next-hop is chosen automatically when the link is down. Now interface p8p1 is linked-up: default via 10.0.5.2 dev p9p1 10.0.5.0/24 dev p9p1 proto kernel scope link src 10.0.5.15 70.0.0.0/24 dev p7p1 proto kernel scope link src 70.0.0.1 80.0.0.0/24 dev p8p1 proto kernel scope link src 80.0.0.1 90.0.0.0/24 via 80.0.0.2 dev p8p1 metric 1 90.0.0.0/24 via 70.0.0.2 dev p7p1 metric 2 192.168.56.0/24 dev p2p1 proto kernel scope link src 192.168.56.2 90.0.0.1 via 80.0.0.2 dev p8p1 src 80.0.0.1 cache local 80.0.0.1 dev lo src 80.0.0.1 cache <local> 80.0.0.2 dev p8p1 src 80.0.0.1 cache and the output changes to what one would expect. If the sysctl is not set, the following output would be expected when p8p1 is down: default via 10.0.5.2 dev p9p1 10.0.5.0/24 dev p9p1 proto kernel scope link src 10.0.5.15 70.0.0.0/24 dev p7p1 proto kernel scope link src 70.0.0.1 80.0.0.0/24 dev p8p1 proto kernel scope link src 80.0.0.1 linkdown 90.0.0.0/24 via 80.0.0.2 dev p8p1 metric 1 linkdown 90.0.0.0/24 via 70.0.0.2 dev p7p1 metric 2 Since the dead flag does not appear, there should be no expectation that the kernel would skip using this route due to link being down. v2: Split kernel changes into 2 patches, this actually makes a behavioral change if the sysctl is set. Also took suggestion from Alex to simplify code by only checking sysctl during fib lookup and suggestion from Scott to add a per-interface sysctl. v3: Code clean-ups to make it more readable and efficient as well as a reverse path check fix. v4: Drop binary sysctl v5: Whitespace fixups from Dave v6: Style changes from Dave and checkpatch suggestions v7: One more checkpatch fixup Signed-off-by: Andy Gospodarek <gospo@cumulusnetworks.com> Signed-off-by: Dinesh Dutt <ddutt@cumulusnetworks.com> Acked-by: Scott Feldman <sfeldma@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-06-23 20:45:37 +03:00
if (fib_lookup(dev_net(rt->dst.dev), &fl4, &res, 0) == 0)
src = fib_result_prefsrc(dev_net(rt->dst.dev), &res);
fib: RCU conversion of fib_lookup() fib_lookup() converted to be called in RCU protected context, no reference taken and released on a contended cache line (fib_clntref) fib_table_lookup() and fib_semantic_match() get an additional parameter. struct fib_info gets an rcu_head field, and is freed after an rcu grace period. Stress test : (Sending 160.000.000 UDP frames on same neighbour, IP route cache disabled, dual E5540 @2.53GHz, 32bit kernel, FIB_HASH) (about same results for FIB_TRIE) Before patch : real 1m31.199s user 0m13.761s sys 23m24.780s After patch: real 1m5.375s user 0m14.997s sys 15m50.115s Before patch Profile : 13044.00 15.4% __ip_route_output_key vmlinux 8438.00 10.0% dst_destroy vmlinux 5983.00 7.1% fib_semantic_match vmlinux 5410.00 6.4% fib_rules_lookup vmlinux 4803.00 5.7% neigh_lookup vmlinux 4420.00 5.2% _raw_spin_lock vmlinux 3883.00 4.6% rt_set_nexthop vmlinux 3261.00 3.9% _raw_read_lock vmlinux 2794.00 3.3% fib_table_lookup vmlinux 2374.00 2.8% neigh_resolve_output vmlinux 2153.00 2.5% dst_alloc vmlinux 1502.00 1.8% _raw_read_lock_bh vmlinux 1484.00 1.8% kmem_cache_alloc vmlinux 1407.00 1.7% eth_header vmlinux 1406.00 1.7% ipv4_dst_destroy vmlinux 1298.00 1.5% __copy_from_user_ll vmlinux 1174.00 1.4% dev_queue_xmit vmlinux 1000.00 1.2% ip_output vmlinux After patch Profile : 13712.00 15.8% dst_destroy vmlinux 8548.00 9.9% __ip_route_output_key vmlinux 7017.00 8.1% neigh_lookup vmlinux 4554.00 5.3% fib_semantic_match vmlinux 4067.00 4.7% _raw_read_lock vmlinux 3491.00 4.0% dst_alloc vmlinux 3186.00 3.7% neigh_resolve_output vmlinux 3103.00 3.6% fib_table_lookup vmlinux 2098.00 2.4% _raw_read_lock_bh vmlinux 2081.00 2.4% kmem_cache_alloc vmlinux 2013.00 2.3% _raw_spin_lock vmlinux 1763.00 2.0% __copy_from_user_ll vmlinux 1763.00 2.0% ip_output vmlinux 1761.00 2.0% ipv4_dst_destroy vmlinux 1631.00 1.9% eth_header vmlinux 1440.00 1.7% _raw_read_unlock_bh vmlinux Reference results, if IP route cache is enabled : real 0m29.718s user 0m10.845s sys 7m37.341s 25213.00 29.5% __ip_route_output_key vmlinux 9011.00 10.5% dst_release vmlinux 4817.00 5.6% ip_push_pending_frames vmlinux 4232.00 5.0% ip_finish_output vmlinux 3940.00 4.6% udp_sendmsg vmlinux 3730.00 4.4% __copy_from_user_ll vmlinux 3716.00 4.4% ip_route_output_flow vmlinux 2451.00 2.9% __xfrm_lookup vmlinux 2221.00 2.6% ip_append_data vmlinux 1718.00 2.0% _raw_spin_lock_bh vmlinux 1655.00 1.9% __alloc_skb vmlinux 1572.00 1.8% sock_wfree vmlinux 1345.00 1.6% kfree vmlinux Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2010-10-05 14:41:36 +04:00
else
src = inet_select_addr(rt->dst.dev,
rt_nexthop(rt, iph->daddr),
RT_SCOPE_UNIVERSE);
fib: RCU conversion of fib_lookup() fib_lookup() converted to be called in RCU protected context, no reference taken and released on a contended cache line (fib_clntref) fib_table_lookup() and fib_semantic_match() get an additional parameter. struct fib_info gets an rcu_head field, and is freed after an rcu grace period. Stress test : (Sending 160.000.000 UDP frames on same neighbour, IP route cache disabled, dual E5540 @2.53GHz, 32bit kernel, FIB_HASH) (about same results for FIB_TRIE) Before patch : real 1m31.199s user 0m13.761s sys 23m24.780s After patch: real 1m5.375s user 0m14.997s sys 15m50.115s Before patch Profile : 13044.00 15.4% __ip_route_output_key vmlinux 8438.00 10.0% dst_destroy vmlinux 5983.00 7.1% fib_semantic_match vmlinux 5410.00 6.4% fib_rules_lookup vmlinux 4803.00 5.7% neigh_lookup vmlinux 4420.00 5.2% _raw_spin_lock vmlinux 3883.00 4.6% rt_set_nexthop vmlinux 3261.00 3.9% _raw_read_lock vmlinux 2794.00 3.3% fib_table_lookup vmlinux 2374.00 2.8% neigh_resolve_output vmlinux 2153.00 2.5% dst_alloc vmlinux 1502.00 1.8% _raw_read_lock_bh vmlinux 1484.00 1.8% kmem_cache_alloc vmlinux 1407.00 1.7% eth_header vmlinux 1406.00 1.7% ipv4_dst_destroy vmlinux 1298.00 1.5% __copy_from_user_ll vmlinux 1174.00 1.4% dev_queue_xmit vmlinux 1000.00 1.2% ip_output vmlinux After patch Profile : 13712.00 15.8% dst_destroy vmlinux 8548.00 9.9% __ip_route_output_key vmlinux 7017.00 8.1% neigh_lookup vmlinux 4554.00 5.3% fib_semantic_match vmlinux 4067.00 4.7% _raw_read_lock vmlinux 3491.00 4.0% dst_alloc vmlinux 3186.00 3.7% neigh_resolve_output vmlinux 3103.00 3.6% fib_table_lookup vmlinux 2098.00 2.4% _raw_read_lock_bh vmlinux 2081.00 2.4% kmem_cache_alloc vmlinux 2013.00 2.3% _raw_spin_lock vmlinux 1763.00 2.0% __copy_from_user_ll vmlinux 1763.00 2.0% ip_output vmlinux 1761.00 2.0% ipv4_dst_destroy vmlinux 1631.00 1.9% eth_header vmlinux 1440.00 1.7% _raw_read_unlock_bh vmlinux Reference results, if IP route cache is enabled : real 0m29.718s user 0m10.845s sys 7m37.341s 25213.00 29.5% __ip_route_output_key vmlinux 9011.00 10.5% dst_release vmlinux 4817.00 5.6% ip_push_pending_frames vmlinux 4232.00 5.0% ip_finish_output vmlinux 3940.00 4.6% udp_sendmsg vmlinux 3730.00 4.4% __copy_from_user_ll vmlinux 3716.00 4.4% ip_route_output_flow vmlinux 2451.00 2.9% __xfrm_lookup vmlinux 2221.00 2.6% ip_append_data vmlinux 1718.00 2.0% _raw_spin_lock_bh vmlinux 1655.00 1.9% __alloc_skb vmlinux 1572.00 1.8% sock_wfree vmlinux 1345.00 1.6% kfree vmlinux Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2010-10-05 14:41:36 +04:00
rcu_read_unlock();
}
memcpy(addr, &src, 4);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_CLASSID
static void set_class_tag(struct rtable *rt, u32 tag)
{
if (!(rt->dst.tclassid & 0xFFFF))
rt->dst.tclassid |= tag & 0xFFFF;
if (!(rt->dst.tclassid & 0xFFFF0000))
rt->dst.tclassid |= tag & 0xFFFF0000;
}
#endif
static unsigned int ipv4_default_advmss(const struct dst_entry *dst)
{
unsigned int header_size = sizeof(struct tcphdr) + sizeof(struct iphdr);
unsigned int advmss = max_t(unsigned int, ipv4_mtu(dst) - header_size,
ip_rt_min_advmss);
return min(advmss, IPV4_MAX_PMTU - header_size);
}
static unsigned int ipv4_mtu(const struct dst_entry *dst)
{
const struct rtable *rt = (const struct rtable *) dst;
unsigned int mtu = rt->rt_pmtu;
if (!mtu || time_after_eq(jiffies, rt->dst.expires))
mtu = dst_metric_raw(dst, RTAX_MTU);
if (mtu)
return mtu;
mtu = READ_ONCE(dst->dev->mtu);
if (unlikely(ip_mtu_locked(dst))) {
if (rt->rt_uses_gateway && mtu > 576)
mtu = 576;
}
mtu = min_t(unsigned int, mtu, IP_MAX_MTU);
return mtu - lwtunnel_headroom(dst->lwtstate, mtu);
}
static void ip_del_fnhe(struct fib_nh_common *nhc, __be32 daddr)
ipv4: fix fnhe usage by non-cached routes Allow some non-cached routes to use non-expired fnhe: 1. ip_del_fnhe: moved above and now called by find_exception. The 4.5+ commit deed49df7390 expires fnhe only when caching routes. Change that to: 1.1. use fnhe for non-cached local output routes, with the help from (2) 1.2. allow __mkroute_input to detect expired fnhe (outdated fnhe_gw, for example) when do_cache is false, eg. when itag!=0 for unicast destinations. 2. __mkroute_output: keep fi to allow local routes with orig_oif != 0 to use fnhe info even when the new route will not be cached into fnhe. After commit 839da4d98960 ("net: ipv4: set orig_oif based on fib result for local traffic") it means all local routes will be affected because they are not cached. This change is used to solve a PMTU problem with IPVS (and probably Netfilter DNAT) setups that redirect local clients from target local IP (local route to Virtual IP) to new remote IP target, eg. IPVS TUN real server. Loopback has 64K MTU and we need to create fnhe on the local route that will keep the reduced PMTU for the Virtual IP. Without this change fnhe_pmtu is updated from ICMP but never exposed to non-cached local routes. This includes routes with flowi4_oif!=0 for 4.6+ and with flowi4_oif=any for 4.14+). 3. update_or_create_fnhe: make sure fnhe_expires is not 0 for new entries Fixes: 839da4d98960 ("net: ipv4: set orig_oif based on fib result for local traffic") Fixes: d6d5e999e5df ("route: do not cache fib route info on local routes with oif") Fixes: deed49df7390 ("route: check and remove route cache when we get route") Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Cc: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Acked-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-05-02 09:41:19 +03:00
{
struct fnhe_hash_bucket *hash;
struct fib_nh_exception *fnhe, __rcu **fnhe_p;
u32 hval = fnhe_hashfun(daddr);
spin_lock_bh(&fnhe_lock);
hash = rcu_dereference_protected(nhc->nhc_exceptions,
ipv4: fix fnhe usage by non-cached routes Allow some non-cached routes to use non-expired fnhe: 1. ip_del_fnhe: moved above and now called by find_exception. The 4.5+ commit deed49df7390 expires fnhe only when caching routes. Change that to: 1.1. use fnhe for non-cached local output routes, with the help from (2) 1.2. allow __mkroute_input to detect expired fnhe (outdated fnhe_gw, for example) when do_cache is false, eg. when itag!=0 for unicast destinations. 2. __mkroute_output: keep fi to allow local routes with orig_oif != 0 to use fnhe info even when the new route will not be cached into fnhe. After commit 839da4d98960 ("net: ipv4: set orig_oif based on fib result for local traffic") it means all local routes will be affected because they are not cached. This change is used to solve a PMTU problem with IPVS (and probably Netfilter DNAT) setups that redirect local clients from target local IP (local route to Virtual IP) to new remote IP target, eg. IPVS TUN real server. Loopback has 64K MTU and we need to create fnhe on the local route that will keep the reduced PMTU for the Virtual IP. Without this change fnhe_pmtu is updated from ICMP but never exposed to non-cached local routes. This includes routes with flowi4_oif!=0 for 4.6+ and with flowi4_oif=any for 4.14+). 3. update_or_create_fnhe: make sure fnhe_expires is not 0 for new entries Fixes: 839da4d98960 ("net: ipv4: set orig_oif based on fib result for local traffic") Fixes: d6d5e999e5df ("route: do not cache fib route info on local routes with oif") Fixes: deed49df7390 ("route: check and remove route cache when we get route") Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Cc: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Acked-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-05-02 09:41:19 +03:00
lockdep_is_held(&fnhe_lock));
hash += hval;
fnhe_p = &hash->chain;
fnhe = rcu_dereference_protected(*fnhe_p, lockdep_is_held(&fnhe_lock));
while (fnhe) {
if (fnhe->fnhe_daddr == daddr) {
rcu_assign_pointer(*fnhe_p, rcu_dereference_protected(
fnhe->fnhe_next, lockdep_is_held(&fnhe_lock)));
/* set fnhe_daddr to 0 to ensure it won't bind with
* new dsts in rt_bind_exception().
*/
fnhe->fnhe_daddr = 0;
ipv4: fix fnhe usage by non-cached routes Allow some non-cached routes to use non-expired fnhe: 1. ip_del_fnhe: moved above and now called by find_exception. The 4.5+ commit deed49df7390 expires fnhe only when caching routes. Change that to: 1.1. use fnhe for non-cached local output routes, with the help from (2) 1.2. allow __mkroute_input to detect expired fnhe (outdated fnhe_gw, for example) when do_cache is false, eg. when itag!=0 for unicast destinations. 2. __mkroute_output: keep fi to allow local routes with orig_oif != 0 to use fnhe info even when the new route will not be cached into fnhe. After commit 839da4d98960 ("net: ipv4: set orig_oif based on fib result for local traffic") it means all local routes will be affected because they are not cached. This change is used to solve a PMTU problem with IPVS (and probably Netfilter DNAT) setups that redirect local clients from target local IP (local route to Virtual IP) to new remote IP target, eg. IPVS TUN real server. Loopback has 64K MTU and we need to create fnhe on the local route that will keep the reduced PMTU for the Virtual IP. Without this change fnhe_pmtu is updated from ICMP but never exposed to non-cached local routes. This includes routes with flowi4_oif!=0 for 4.6+ and with flowi4_oif=any for 4.14+). 3. update_or_create_fnhe: make sure fnhe_expires is not 0 for new entries Fixes: 839da4d98960 ("net: ipv4: set orig_oif based on fib result for local traffic") Fixes: d6d5e999e5df ("route: do not cache fib route info on local routes with oif") Fixes: deed49df7390 ("route: check and remove route cache when we get route") Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Cc: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Acked-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-05-02 09:41:19 +03:00
fnhe_flush_routes(fnhe);
kfree_rcu(fnhe, rcu);
break;
}
fnhe_p = &fnhe->fnhe_next;
fnhe = rcu_dereference_protected(fnhe->fnhe_next,
lockdep_is_held(&fnhe_lock));
}
spin_unlock_bh(&fnhe_lock);
}
static struct fib_nh_exception *find_exception(struct fib_nh_common *nhc,
__be32 daddr)
{
struct fnhe_hash_bucket *hash = rcu_dereference(nhc->nhc_exceptions);
struct fib_nh_exception *fnhe;
u32 hval;
if (!hash)
return NULL;
hval = fnhe_hashfun(daddr);
for (fnhe = rcu_dereference(hash[hval].chain); fnhe;
fnhe = rcu_dereference(fnhe->fnhe_next)) {
ipv4: fix fnhe usage by non-cached routes Allow some non-cached routes to use non-expired fnhe: 1. ip_del_fnhe: moved above and now called by find_exception. The 4.5+ commit deed49df7390 expires fnhe only when caching routes. Change that to: 1.1. use fnhe for non-cached local output routes, with the help from (2) 1.2. allow __mkroute_input to detect expired fnhe (outdated fnhe_gw, for example) when do_cache is false, eg. when itag!=0 for unicast destinations. 2. __mkroute_output: keep fi to allow local routes with orig_oif != 0 to use fnhe info even when the new route will not be cached into fnhe. After commit 839da4d98960 ("net: ipv4: set orig_oif based on fib result for local traffic") it means all local routes will be affected because they are not cached. This change is used to solve a PMTU problem with IPVS (and probably Netfilter DNAT) setups that redirect local clients from target local IP (local route to Virtual IP) to new remote IP target, eg. IPVS TUN real server. Loopback has 64K MTU and we need to create fnhe on the local route that will keep the reduced PMTU for the Virtual IP. Without this change fnhe_pmtu is updated from ICMP but never exposed to non-cached local routes. This includes routes with flowi4_oif!=0 for 4.6+ and with flowi4_oif=any for 4.14+). 3. update_or_create_fnhe: make sure fnhe_expires is not 0 for new entries Fixes: 839da4d98960 ("net: ipv4: set orig_oif based on fib result for local traffic") Fixes: d6d5e999e5df ("route: do not cache fib route info on local routes with oif") Fixes: deed49df7390 ("route: check and remove route cache when we get route") Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Cc: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Acked-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-05-02 09:41:19 +03:00
if (fnhe->fnhe_daddr == daddr) {
if (fnhe->fnhe_expires &&
time_after(jiffies, fnhe->fnhe_expires)) {
ip_del_fnhe(nhc, daddr);
ipv4: fix fnhe usage by non-cached routes Allow some non-cached routes to use non-expired fnhe: 1. ip_del_fnhe: moved above and now called by find_exception. The 4.5+ commit deed49df7390 expires fnhe only when caching routes. Change that to: 1.1. use fnhe for non-cached local output routes, with the help from (2) 1.2. allow __mkroute_input to detect expired fnhe (outdated fnhe_gw, for example) when do_cache is false, eg. when itag!=0 for unicast destinations. 2. __mkroute_output: keep fi to allow local routes with orig_oif != 0 to use fnhe info even when the new route will not be cached into fnhe. After commit 839da4d98960 ("net: ipv4: set orig_oif based on fib result for local traffic") it means all local routes will be affected because they are not cached. This change is used to solve a PMTU problem with IPVS (and probably Netfilter DNAT) setups that redirect local clients from target local IP (local route to Virtual IP) to new remote IP target, eg. IPVS TUN real server. Loopback has 64K MTU and we need to create fnhe on the local route that will keep the reduced PMTU for the Virtual IP. Without this change fnhe_pmtu is updated from ICMP but never exposed to non-cached local routes. This includes routes with flowi4_oif!=0 for 4.6+ and with flowi4_oif=any for 4.14+). 3. update_or_create_fnhe: make sure fnhe_expires is not 0 for new entries Fixes: 839da4d98960 ("net: ipv4: set orig_oif based on fib result for local traffic") Fixes: d6d5e999e5df ("route: do not cache fib route info on local routes with oif") Fixes: deed49df7390 ("route: check and remove route cache when we get route") Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Cc: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Acked-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-05-02 09:41:19 +03:00
break;
}
return fnhe;
ipv4: fix fnhe usage by non-cached routes Allow some non-cached routes to use non-expired fnhe: 1. ip_del_fnhe: moved above and now called by find_exception. The 4.5+ commit deed49df7390 expires fnhe only when caching routes. Change that to: 1.1. use fnhe for non-cached local output routes, with the help from (2) 1.2. allow __mkroute_input to detect expired fnhe (outdated fnhe_gw, for example) when do_cache is false, eg. when itag!=0 for unicast destinations. 2. __mkroute_output: keep fi to allow local routes with orig_oif != 0 to use fnhe info even when the new route will not be cached into fnhe. After commit 839da4d98960 ("net: ipv4: set orig_oif based on fib result for local traffic") it means all local routes will be affected because they are not cached. This change is used to solve a PMTU problem with IPVS (and probably Netfilter DNAT) setups that redirect local clients from target local IP (local route to Virtual IP) to new remote IP target, eg. IPVS TUN real server. Loopback has 64K MTU and we need to create fnhe on the local route that will keep the reduced PMTU for the Virtual IP. Without this change fnhe_pmtu is updated from ICMP but never exposed to non-cached local routes. This includes routes with flowi4_oif!=0 for 4.6+ and with flowi4_oif=any for 4.14+). 3. update_or_create_fnhe: make sure fnhe_expires is not 0 for new entries Fixes: 839da4d98960 ("net: ipv4: set orig_oif based on fib result for local traffic") Fixes: d6d5e999e5df ("route: do not cache fib route info on local routes with oif") Fixes: deed49df7390 ("route: check and remove route cache when we get route") Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Cc: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Acked-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-05-02 09:41:19 +03:00
}
}
return NULL;
}
/* MTU selection:
* 1. mtu on route is locked - use it
* 2. mtu from nexthop exception
* 3. mtu from egress device
*/
u32 ip_mtu_from_fib_result(struct fib_result *res, __be32 daddr)
{
struct fib_nh_common *nhc = res->nhc;
struct net_device *dev = nhc->nhc_dev;
struct fib_info *fi = res->fi;
u32 mtu = 0;
if (dev_net(dev)->ipv4.sysctl_ip_fwd_use_pmtu ||
fi->fib_metrics->metrics[RTAX_LOCK - 1] & (1 << RTAX_MTU))
mtu = fi->fib_mtu;
if (likely(!mtu)) {
struct fib_nh_exception *fnhe;
fnhe = find_exception(nhc, daddr);
if (fnhe && !time_after_eq(jiffies, fnhe->fnhe_expires))
mtu = fnhe->fnhe_pmtu;
}
if (likely(!mtu))
mtu = min(READ_ONCE(dev->mtu), IP_MAX_MTU);
return mtu - lwtunnel_headroom(nhc->nhc_lwtstate, mtu);
}
static bool rt_bind_exception(struct rtable *rt, struct fib_nh_exception *fnhe,
__be32 daddr, const bool do_cache)
{
bool ret = false;
spin_lock_bh(&fnhe_lock);
if (daddr == fnhe->fnhe_daddr) {
struct rtable __rcu **porig;
struct rtable *orig;
int genid = fnhe_genid(dev_net(rt->dst.dev));
if (rt_is_input_route(rt))
porig = &fnhe->fnhe_rth_input;
else
porig = &fnhe->fnhe_rth_output;
orig = rcu_dereference(*porig);
if (fnhe->fnhe_genid != genid) {
fnhe->fnhe_genid = genid;
fnhe->fnhe_gw = 0;
fnhe->fnhe_pmtu = 0;
fnhe->fnhe_expires = 0;
fnhe->fnhe_mtu_locked = false;
fnhe_flush_routes(fnhe);
orig = NULL;
}
fill_route_from_fnhe(rt, fnhe);
if (!rt->rt_gw4) {
rt->rt_gw4 = daddr;
rt->rt_gw_family = AF_INET;
}
if (do_cache) {
dst_hold(&rt->dst);
rcu_assign_pointer(*porig, rt);
if (orig) {
dst_dev_put(&orig->dst);
dst_release(&orig->dst);
}
ret = true;
}
fnhe->fnhe_stamp = jiffies;
}
spin_unlock_bh(&fnhe_lock);
return ret;
}
static bool rt_cache_route(struct fib_nh_common *nhc, struct rtable *rt)
{
struct rtable *orig, *prev, **p;
bool ret = true;
if (rt_is_input_route(rt)) {
p = (struct rtable **)&nhc->nhc_rth_input;
} else {
p = (struct rtable **)raw_cpu_ptr(nhc->nhc_pcpu_rth_output);
}
orig = *p;
/* hold dst before doing cmpxchg() to avoid race condition
* on this dst
*/
dst_hold(&rt->dst);
prev = cmpxchg(p, orig, rt);
if (prev == orig) {
if (orig) {
ipv4: fix race condition between route lookup and invalidation Jesse and Ido reported the following race condition: <CPU A, t0> - Received packet A is forwarded and cached dst entry is taken from the nexthop ('nhc->nhc_rth_input'). Calls skb_dst_set() <t1> - Given Jesse has busy routers ("ingesting full BGP routing tables from multiple ISPs"), route is added / deleted and rt_cache_flush() is called <CPU B, t2> - Received packet B tries to use the same cached dst entry from t0, but rt_cache_valid() is no longer true and it is replaced in rt_cache_route() by the newer one. This calls dst_dev_put() on the original dst entry which assigns the blackhole netdev to 'dst->dev' <CPU A, t3> - dst_input(skb) is called on packet A and it is dropped due to 'dst->dev' being the blackhole netdev There are 2 issues in the v4 routing code: 1. A per-netns counter is used to do the validation of the route. That means whenever a route is changed in the netns, users of all routes in the netns needs to redo lookup. v6 has an implementation of only updating fn_sernum for routes that are affected. 2. When rt_cache_valid() returns false, rt_cache_route() is called to throw away the current cache, and create a new one. This seems unnecessary because as long as this route does not change, the route cache does not need to be recreated. To fully solve the above 2 issues, it probably needs quite some code changes and requires careful testing, and does not suite for net branch. So this patch only tries to add the deleted cached rt into the uncached list, so user could still be able to use it to receive packets until it's done. Fixes: 95c47f9cf5e0 ("ipv4: call dst_dev_put() properly") Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com> Reported-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@idosch.org> Reported-by: Jesse Hathaway <jesse@mbuki-mvuki.org> Tested-by: Jesse Hathaway <jesse@mbuki-mvuki.org> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-10-16 22:03:15 +03:00
rt_add_uncached_list(orig);
dst_release(&orig->dst);
}
} else {
dst_release(&rt->dst);
ret = false;
}
return ret;
}
struct uncached_list {
spinlock_t lock;
struct list_head head;
};
static DEFINE_PER_CPU_ALIGNED(struct uncached_list, rt_uncached_list);
xfrm: reuse uncached_list to track xdsts In early time, when freeing a xdst, it would be inserted into dst_garbage.list first. Then if it's refcnt was still held somewhere, later it would be put into dst_busy_list in dst_gc_task(). When one dev was being unregistered, the dev of these dsts in dst_busy_list would be set with loopback_dev and put this dev. So that this dev's removal wouldn't get blocked, and avoid the kmsg warning: kernel:unregister_netdevice: waiting for veth0 to become \ free. Usage count = 2 However after Commit 52df157f17e5 ("xfrm: take refcnt of dst when creating struct xfrm_dst bundle"), the xdst will not be freed with dst gc, and this warning happens. To fix it, we need to find these xdsts that are still held by others when removing the dev, and free xdst's dev and set it with loopback_dev. But unfortunately after flow_cache for xfrm was deleted, no list tracks them anymore. So we need to save these xdsts somewhere to release the xdst's dev later. To make this easier, this patch is to reuse uncached_list to track xdsts, so that the dev refcnt can be released in the event NETDEV_UNREGISTER process of fib_netdev_notifier. Thanks to Florian, we could move forward this fix quickly. Fixes: 52df157f17e5 ("xfrm: take refcnt of dst when creating struct xfrm_dst bundle") Reported-by: Jianlin Shi <jishi@redhat.com> Reported-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com> Tested-by: Eyal Birger <eyal.birger@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2018-02-14 14:06:02 +03:00
void rt_add_uncached_list(struct rtable *rt)
{
struct uncached_list *ul = raw_cpu_ptr(&rt_uncached_list);
rt->rt_uncached_list = ul;
spin_lock_bh(&ul->lock);
list_add_tail(&rt->rt_uncached, &ul->head);
spin_unlock_bh(&ul->lock);
}
xfrm: reuse uncached_list to track xdsts In early time, when freeing a xdst, it would be inserted into dst_garbage.list first. Then if it's refcnt was still held somewhere, later it would be put into dst_busy_list in dst_gc_task(). When one dev was being unregistered, the dev of these dsts in dst_busy_list would be set with loopback_dev and put this dev. So that this dev's removal wouldn't get blocked, and avoid the kmsg warning: kernel:unregister_netdevice: waiting for veth0 to become \ free. Usage count = 2 However after Commit 52df157f17e5 ("xfrm: take refcnt of dst when creating struct xfrm_dst bundle"), the xdst will not be freed with dst gc, and this warning happens. To fix it, we need to find these xdsts that are still held by others when removing the dev, and free xdst's dev and set it with loopback_dev. But unfortunately after flow_cache for xfrm was deleted, no list tracks them anymore. So we need to save these xdsts somewhere to release the xdst's dev later. To make this easier, this patch is to reuse uncached_list to track xdsts, so that the dev refcnt can be released in the event NETDEV_UNREGISTER process of fib_netdev_notifier. Thanks to Florian, we could move forward this fix quickly. Fixes: 52df157f17e5 ("xfrm: take refcnt of dst when creating struct xfrm_dst bundle") Reported-by: Jianlin Shi <jishi@redhat.com> Reported-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com> Tested-by: Eyal Birger <eyal.birger@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2018-02-14 14:06:02 +03:00
void rt_del_uncached_list(struct rtable *rt)
{
if (!list_empty(&rt->rt_uncached)) {
struct uncached_list *ul = rt->rt_uncached_list;
spin_lock_bh(&ul->lock);
list_del(&rt->rt_uncached);
spin_unlock_bh(&ul->lock);
}
}
xfrm: reuse uncached_list to track xdsts In early time, when freeing a xdst, it would be inserted into dst_garbage.list first. Then if it's refcnt was still held somewhere, later it would be put into dst_busy_list in dst_gc_task(). When one dev was being unregistered, the dev of these dsts in dst_busy_list would be set with loopback_dev and put this dev. So that this dev's removal wouldn't get blocked, and avoid the kmsg warning: kernel:unregister_netdevice: waiting for veth0 to become \ free. Usage count = 2 However after Commit 52df157f17e5 ("xfrm: take refcnt of dst when creating struct xfrm_dst bundle"), the xdst will not be freed with dst gc, and this warning happens. To fix it, we need to find these xdsts that are still held by others when removing the dev, and free xdst's dev and set it with loopback_dev. But unfortunately after flow_cache for xfrm was deleted, no list tracks them anymore. So we need to save these xdsts somewhere to release the xdst's dev later. To make this easier, this patch is to reuse uncached_list to track xdsts, so that the dev refcnt can be released in the event NETDEV_UNREGISTER process of fib_netdev_notifier. Thanks to Florian, we could move forward this fix quickly. Fixes: 52df157f17e5 ("xfrm: take refcnt of dst when creating struct xfrm_dst bundle") Reported-by: Jianlin Shi <jishi@redhat.com> Reported-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com> Tested-by: Eyal Birger <eyal.birger@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2018-02-14 14:06:02 +03:00
static void ipv4_dst_destroy(struct dst_entry *dst)
{
struct rtable *rt = (struct rtable *)dst;
ip_dst_metrics_put(dst);
xfrm: reuse uncached_list to track xdsts In early time, when freeing a xdst, it would be inserted into dst_garbage.list first. Then if it's refcnt was still held somewhere, later it would be put into dst_busy_list in dst_gc_task(). When one dev was being unregistered, the dev of these dsts in dst_busy_list would be set with loopback_dev and put this dev. So that this dev's removal wouldn't get blocked, and avoid the kmsg warning: kernel:unregister_netdevice: waiting for veth0 to become \ free. Usage count = 2 However after Commit 52df157f17e5 ("xfrm: take refcnt of dst when creating struct xfrm_dst bundle"), the xdst will not be freed with dst gc, and this warning happens. To fix it, we need to find these xdsts that are still held by others when removing the dev, and free xdst's dev and set it with loopback_dev. But unfortunately after flow_cache for xfrm was deleted, no list tracks them anymore. So we need to save these xdsts somewhere to release the xdst's dev later. To make this easier, this patch is to reuse uncached_list to track xdsts, so that the dev refcnt can be released in the event NETDEV_UNREGISTER process of fib_netdev_notifier. Thanks to Florian, we could move forward this fix quickly. Fixes: 52df157f17e5 ("xfrm: take refcnt of dst when creating struct xfrm_dst bundle") Reported-by: Jianlin Shi <jishi@redhat.com> Reported-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com> Tested-by: Eyal Birger <eyal.birger@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2018-02-14 14:06:02 +03:00
rt_del_uncached_list(rt);
}
void rt_flush_dev(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct rtable *rt;
int cpu;
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
struct uncached_list *ul = &per_cpu(rt_uncached_list, cpu);
spin_lock_bh(&ul->lock);
list_for_each_entry(rt, &ul->head, rt_uncached) {
if (rt->dst.dev != dev)
continue;
rt->dst.dev = blackhole_netdev;
dev_hold(rt->dst.dev);
dev_put(dev);
}
spin_unlock_bh(&ul->lock);
}
}
static bool rt_cache_valid(const struct rtable *rt)
{
return rt &&
rt->dst.obsolete == DST_OBSOLETE_FORCE_CHK &&
!rt_is_expired(rt);
}
static void rt_set_nexthop(struct rtable *rt, __be32 daddr,
const struct fib_result *res,
struct fib_nh_exception *fnhe,
struct fib_info *fi, u16 type, u32 itag,
const bool do_cache)
{
bool cached = false;
if (fi) {
struct fib_nh_common *nhc = FIB_RES_NHC(*res);
if (nhc->nhc_gw_family && nhc->nhc_scope == RT_SCOPE_LINK) {
rt->rt_uses_gateway = 1;
rt->rt_gw_family = nhc->nhc_gw_family;
/* only INET and INET6 are supported */
if (likely(nhc->nhc_gw_family == AF_INET))
rt->rt_gw4 = nhc->nhc_gw.ipv4;
else
rt->rt_gw6 = nhc->nhc_gw.ipv6;
}
ip_dst_init_metrics(&rt->dst, fi->fib_metrics);
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_CLASSID
if (nhc->nhc_family == AF_INET) {
struct fib_nh *nh;
nh = container_of(nhc, struct fib_nh, nh_common);
rt->dst.tclassid = nh->nh_tclassid;
}
#endif
rt->dst.lwtstate = lwtstate_get(nhc->nhc_lwtstate);
if (unlikely(fnhe))
cached = rt_bind_exception(rt, fnhe, daddr, do_cache);
else if (do_cache)
cached = rt_cache_route(nhc, rt);
if (unlikely(!cached)) {
/* Routes we intend to cache in nexthop exception or
* FIB nexthop have the DST_NOCACHE bit clear.
* However, if we are unsuccessful at storing this
* route into the cache we really need to set it.
*/
if (!rt->rt_gw4) {
rt->rt_gw_family = AF_INET;
rt->rt_gw4 = daddr;
}
rt_add_uncached_list(rt);
}
} else
rt_add_uncached_list(rt);
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_CLASSID
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_MULTIPLE_TABLES
set_class_tag(rt, res->tclassid);
#endif
set_class_tag(rt, itag);
#endif
}
struct rtable *rt_dst_alloc(struct net_device *dev,
unsigned int flags, u16 type,
bool nopolicy, bool noxfrm)
{
struct rtable *rt;
rt = dst_alloc(&ipv4_dst_ops, dev, 1, DST_OBSOLETE_FORCE_CHK,
(nopolicy ? DST_NOPOLICY : 0) |
(noxfrm ? DST_NOXFRM : 0));
if (rt) {
rt->rt_genid = rt_genid_ipv4(dev_net(dev));
rt->rt_flags = flags;
rt->rt_type = type;
rt->rt_is_input = 0;
rt->rt_iif = 0;
rt->rt_pmtu = 0;
rt->rt_mtu_locked = 0;
rt->rt_uses_gateway = 0;
rt->rt_gw_family = 0;
rt->rt_gw4 = 0;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&rt->rt_uncached);
rt->dst.output = ip_output;
if (flags & RTCF_LOCAL)
rt->dst.input = ip_local_deliver;
}
return rt;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(rt_dst_alloc);
struct rtable *rt_dst_clone(struct net_device *dev, struct rtable *rt)
{
struct rtable *new_rt;
new_rt = dst_alloc(&ipv4_dst_ops, dev, 1, DST_OBSOLETE_FORCE_CHK,
rt->dst.flags);
if (new_rt) {
new_rt->rt_genid = rt_genid_ipv4(dev_net(dev));
new_rt->rt_flags = rt->rt_flags;
new_rt->rt_type = rt->rt_type;
new_rt->rt_is_input = rt->rt_is_input;
new_rt->rt_iif = rt->rt_iif;
new_rt->rt_pmtu = rt->rt_pmtu;
new_rt->rt_mtu_locked = rt->rt_mtu_locked;
new_rt->rt_gw_family = rt->rt_gw_family;
if (rt->rt_gw_family == AF_INET)
new_rt->rt_gw4 = rt->rt_gw4;
else if (rt->rt_gw_family == AF_INET6)
new_rt->rt_gw6 = rt->rt_gw6;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new_rt->rt_uncached);
new_rt->dst.input = rt->dst.input;
new_rt->dst.output = rt->dst.output;
new_rt->dst.error = rt->dst.error;
new_rt->dst.lastuse = jiffies;
new_rt->dst.lwtstate = lwtstate_get(rt->dst.lwtstate);
}
return new_rt;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(rt_dst_clone);
/* called in rcu_read_lock() section */
int ip_mc_validate_source(struct sk_buff *skb, __be32 daddr, __be32 saddr,
u8 tos, struct net_device *dev,
struct in_device *in_dev, u32 *itag)
{
int err;
/* Primary sanity checks. */
if (!in_dev)
return -EINVAL;
if (ipv4_is_multicast(saddr) || ipv4_is_lbcast(saddr) ||
skb->protocol != htons(ETH_P_IP))
return -EINVAL;
if (ipv4_is_loopback(saddr) && !IN_DEV_ROUTE_LOCALNET(in_dev))
return -EINVAL;
if (ipv4_is_zeronet(saddr)) {
if (!ipv4_is_local_multicast(daddr) &&
ip_hdr(skb)->protocol != IPPROTO_IGMP)
return -EINVAL;
} else {
err = fib_validate_source(skb, saddr, 0, tos, 0, dev,
in_dev, itag);
if (err < 0)
return err;
}
return 0;
}
/* called in rcu_read_lock() section */
static int ip_route_input_mc(struct sk_buff *skb, __be32 daddr, __be32 saddr,
u8 tos, struct net_device *dev, int our)
{
struct in_device *in_dev = __in_dev_get_rcu(dev);
unsigned int flags = RTCF_MULTICAST;
struct rtable *rth;
u32 itag = 0;
int err;
err = ip_mc_validate_source(skb, daddr, saddr, tos, dev, in_dev, &itag);
if (err)
return err;
if (our)
flags |= RTCF_LOCAL;
rth = rt_dst_alloc(dev_net(dev)->loopback_dev, flags, RTN_MULTICAST,
IN_DEV_CONF_GET(in_dev, NOPOLICY), false);
if (!rth)
return -ENOBUFS;
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_CLASSID
rth->dst.tclassid = itag;
#endif
rth->dst.output = ip_rt_bug;
rth->rt_is_input= 1;
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_MROUTE
if (!ipv4_is_local_multicast(daddr) && IN_DEV_MFORWARD(in_dev))
rth->dst.input = ip_mr_input;
#endif
RT_CACHE_STAT_INC(in_slow_mc);
skb_dst_set(skb, &rth->dst);
return 0;
}
static void ip_handle_martian_source(struct net_device *dev,
struct in_device *in_dev,
struct sk_buff *skb,
__be32 daddr,
__be32 saddr)
{
RT_CACHE_STAT_INC(in_martian_src);
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_VERBOSE
if (IN_DEV_LOG_MARTIANS(in_dev) && net_ratelimit()) {
/*
* RFC1812 recommendation, if source is martian,
* the only hint is MAC header.
*/
pr_warn("martian source %pI4 from %pI4, on dev %s\n",
&daddr, &saddr, dev->name);
if (dev->hard_header_len && skb_mac_header_was_set(skb)) {
print_hex_dump(KERN_WARNING, "ll header: ",
DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 16, 1,
skb_mac_header(skb),
dev->hard_header_len, false);
}
}
#endif
}
/* called in rcu_read_lock() section */
static int __mkroute_input(struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct fib_result *res,
struct in_device *in_dev,
__be32 daddr, __be32 saddr, u32 tos)
{
struct fib_nh_common *nhc = FIB_RES_NHC(*res);
struct net_device *dev = nhc->nhc_dev;
struct fib_nh_exception *fnhe;
struct rtable *rth;
int err;
struct in_device *out_dev;
bool do_cache;
u32 itag = 0;
/* get a working reference to the output device */
out_dev = __in_dev_get_rcu(dev);
if (!out_dev) {
net_crit_ratelimited("Bug in ip_route_input_slow(). Please report.\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
err = fib_validate_source(skb, saddr, daddr, tos, FIB_RES_OIF(*res),
in_dev->dev, in_dev, &itag);
if (err < 0) {
ip_handle_martian_source(in_dev->dev, in_dev, skb, daddr,
saddr);
goto cleanup;
}
do_cache = res->fi && !itag;
if (out_dev == in_dev && err && IN_DEV_TX_REDIRECTS(out_dev) &&
skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) {
__be32 gw;
gw = nhc->nhc_gw_family == AF_INET ? nhc->nhc_gw.ipv4 : 0;
if (IN_DEV_SHARED_MEDIA(out_dev) ||
inet_addr_onlink(out_dev, saddr, gw))
IPCB(skb)->flags |= IPSKB_DOREDIRECT;
}
if (skb->protocol != htons(ETH_P_IP)) {
/* Not IP (i.e. ARP). Do not create route, if it is
* invalid for proxy arp. DNAT routes are always valid.
*
* Proxy arp feature have been extended to allow, ARP
* replies back to the same interface, to support
* Private VLAN switch technologies. See arp.c.
*/
if (out_dev == in_dev &&
IN_DEV_PROXY_ARP_PVLAN(in_dev) == 0) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto cleanup;
}
}
fnhe = find_exception(nhc, daddr);
if (do_cache) {
ipv4: fix fnhe usage by non-cached routes Allow some non-cached routes to use non-expired fnhe: 1. ip_del_fnhe: moved above and now called by find_exception. The 4.5+ commit deed49df7390 expires fnhe only when caching routes. Change that to: 1.1. use fnhe for non-cached local output routes, with the help from (2) 1.2. allow __mkroute_input to detect expired fnhe (outdated fnhe_gw, for example) when do_cache is false, eg. when itag!=0 for unicast destinations. 2. __mkroute_output: keep fi to allow local routes with orig_oif != 0 to use fnhe info even when the new route will not be cached into fnhe. After commit 839da4d98960 ("net: ipv4: set orig_oif based on fib result for local traffic") it means all local routes will be affected because they are not cached. This change is used to solve a PMTU problem with IPVS (and probably Netfilter DNAT) setups that redirect local clients from target local IP (local route to Virtual IP) to new remote IP target, eg. IPVS TUN real server. Loopback has 64K MTU and we need to create fnhe on the local route that will keep the reduced PMTU for the Virtual IP. Without this change fnhe_pmtu is updated from ICMP but never exposed to non-cached local routes. This includes routes with flowi4_oif!=0 for 4.6+ and with flowi4_oif=any for 4.14+). 3. update_or_create_fnhe: make sure fnhe_expires is not 0 for new entries Fixes: 839da4d98960 ("net: ipv4: set orig_oif based on fib result for local traffic") Fixes: d6d5e999e5df ("route: do not cache fib route info on local routes with oif") Fixes: deed49df7390 ("route: check and remove route cache when we get route") Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Cc: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Acked-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-05-02 09:41:19 +03:00
if (fnhe)
rth = rcu_dereference(fnhe->fnhe_rth_input);
ipv4: fix fnhe usage by non-cached routes Allow some non-cached routes to use non-expired fnhe: 1. ip_del_fnhe: moved above and now called by find_exception. The 4.5+ commit deed49df7390 expires fnhe only when caching routes. Change that to: 1.1. use fnhe for non-cached local output routes, with the help from (2) 1.2. allow __mkroute_input to detect expired fnhe (outdated fnhe_gw, for example) when do_cache is false, eg. when itag!=0 for unicast destinations. 2. __mkroute_output: keep fi to allow local routes with orig_oif != 0 to use fnhe info even when the new route will not be cached into fnhe. After commit 839da4d98960 ("net: ipv4: set orig_oif based on fib result for local traffic") it means all local routes will be affected because they are not cached. This change is used to solve a PMTU problem with IPVS (and probably Netfilter DNAT) setups that redirect local clients from target local IP (local route to Virtual IP) to new remote IP target, eg. IPVS TUN real server. Loopback has 64K MTU and we need to create fnhe on the local route that will keep the reduced PMTU for the Virtual IP. Without this change fnhe_pmtu is updated from ICMP but never exposed to non-cached local routes. This includes routes with flowi4_oif!=0 for 4.6+ and with flowi4_oif=any for 4.14+). 3. update_or_create_fnhe: make sure fnhe_expires is not 0 for new entries Fixes: 839da4d98960 ("net: ipv4: set orig_oif based on fib result for local traffic") Fixes: d6d5e999e5df ("route: do not cache fib route info on local routes with oif") Fixes: deed49df7390 ("route: check and remove route cache when we get route") Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Cc: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Acked-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-05-02 09:41:19 +03:00
else
rth = rcu_dereference(nhc->nhc_rth_input);
if (rt_cache_valid(rth)) {
skb_dst_set_noref(skb, &rth->dst);
goto out;
}
}
rth = rt_dst_alloc(out_dev->dev, 0, res->type,
IN_DEV_CONF_GET(in_dev, NOPOLICY),
IN_DEV_CONF_GET(out_dev, NOXFRM));
if (!rth) {
err = -ENOBUFS;
goto cleanup;
}
rth->rt_is_input = 1;
RT_CACHE_STAT_INC(in_slow_tot);
rth->dst.input = ip_forward;
rt_set_nexthop(rth, daddr, res, fnhe, res->fi, res->type, itag,
do_cache);
lwtunnel_set_redirect(&rth->dst);
skb_dst_set(skb, &rth->dst);
out:
err = 0;
cleanup:
return err;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_MULTIPATH
/* To make ICMP packets follow the right flow, the multipath hash is
* calculated from the inner IP addresses.
*/
static void ip_multipath_l3_keys(const struct sk_buff *skb,
struct flow_keys *hash_keys)
{
const struct iphdr *outer_iph = ip_hdr(skb);
const struct iphdr *key_iph = outer_iph;
const struct iphdr *inner_iph;
const struct icmphdr *icmph;
struct iphdr _inner_iph;
struct icmphdr _icmph;
if (likely(outer_iph->protocol != IPPROTO_ICMP))
goto out;
if (unlikely((outer_iph->frag_off & htons(IP_OFFSET)) != 0))
goto out;
icmph = skb_header_pointer(skb, outer_iph->ihl * 4, sizeof(_icmph),
&_icmph);
if (!icmph)
goto out;
if (!icmp_is_err(icmph->type))
goto out;
inner_iph = skb_header_pointer(skb,
outer_iph->ihl * 4 + sizeof(_icmph),
sizeof(_inner_iph), &_inner_iph);
if (!inner_iph)
goto out;
key_iph = inner_iph;
out:
hash_keys->addrs.v4addrs.src = key_iph->saddr;
hash_keys->addrs.v4addrs.dst = key_iph->daddr;
}
/* if skb is set it will be used and fl4 can be NULL */
int fib_multipath_hash(const struct net *net, const struct flowi4 *fl4,
const struct sk_buff *skb, struct flow_keys *flkeys)
{
u32 multipath_hash = fl4 ? fl4->flowi4_multipath_hash : 0;
struct flow_keys hash_keys;
u32 mhash;
switch (net->ipv4.sysctl_fib_multipath_hash_policy) {
case 0:
memset(&hash_keys, 0, sizeof(hash_keys));
hash_keys.control.addr_type = FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_IPV4_ADDRS;
if (skb) {
ip_multipath_l3_keys(skb, &hash_keys);
} else {
hash_keys.addrs.v4addrs.src = fl4->saddr;
hash_keys.addrs.v4addrs.dst = fl4->daddr;
}
break;
case 1:
/* skb is currently provided only when forwarding */
if (skb) {
unsigned int flag = FLOW_DISSECTOR_F_STOP_AT_ENCAP;
struct flow_keys keys;
/* short-circuit if we already have L4 hash present */
if (skb->l4_hash)
return skb_get_hash_raw(skb) >> 1;
memset(&hash_keys, 0, sizeof(hash_keys));
if (!flkeys) {
skb_flow_dissect_flow_keys(skb, &keys, flag);
flkeys = &keys;
}
hash_keys.control.addr_type = FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_IPV4_ADDRS;
hash_keys.addrs.v4addrs.src = flkeys->addrs.v4addrs.src;
hash_keys.addrs.v4addrs.dst = flkeys->addrs.v4addrs.dst;
hash_keys.ports.src = flkeys->ports.src;
hash_keys.ports.dst = flkeys->ports.dst;
hash_keys.basic.ip_proto = flkeys->basic.ip_proto;
} else {
memset(&hash_keys, 0, sizeof(hash_keys));
hash_keys.control.addr_type = FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_IPV4_ADDRS;
hash_keys.addrs.v4addrs.src = fl4->saddr;
hash_keys.addrs.v4addrs.dst = fl4->daddr;
hash_keys.ports.src = fl4->fl4_sport;
hash_keys.ports.dst = fl4->fl4_dport;
hash_keys.basic.ip_proto = fl4->flowi4_proto;
}
break;
case 2:
memset(&hash_keys, 0, sizeof(hash_keys));
/* skb is currently provided only when forwarding */
if (skb) {
struct flow_keys keys;
skb_flow_dissect_flow_keys(skb, &keys, 0);
/* Inner can be v4 or v6 */
if (keys.control.addr_type == FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_IPV4_ADDRS) {
hash_keys.control.addr_type = FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_IPV4_ADDRS;
hash_keys.addrs.v4addrs.src = keys.addrs.v4addrs.src;
hash_keys.addrs.v4addrs.dst = keys.addrs.v4addrs.dst;
} else if (keys.control.addr_type == FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_IPV6_ADDRS) {
hash_keys.control.addr_type = FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_IPV6_ADDRS;
hash_keys.addrs.v6addrs.src = keys.addrs.v6addrs.src;
hash_keys.addrs.v6addrs.dst = keys.addrs.v6addrs.dst;
hash_keys.tags.flow_label = keys.tags.flow_label;
hash_keys.basic.ip_proto = keys.basic.ip_proto;
} else {
/* Same as case 0 */
hash_keys.control.addr_type = FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_IPV4_ADDRS;
ip_multipath_l3_keys(skb, &hash_keys);
}
} else {
/* Same as case 0 */
hash_keys.control.addr_type = FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_IPV4_ADDRS;
hash_keys.addrs.v4addrs.src = fl4->saddr;
hash_keys.addrs.v4addrs.dst = fl4->daddr;
}
break;
}
mhash = flow_hash_from_keys(&hash_keys);
if (multipath_hash)
mhash = jhash_2words(mhash, multipath_hash, 0);
return mhash >> 1;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_MULTIPATH */
static int ip_mkroute_input(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct fib_result *res,
struct in_device *in_dev,
__be32 daddr, __be32 saddr, u32 tos,
struct flow_keys *hkeys)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_MULTIPATH
if (res->fi && fib_info_num_path(res->fi) > 1) {
int h = fib_multipath_hash(res->fi->fib_net, NULL, skb, hkeys);
fib_select_multipath(res, h);
}
#endif
/* create a routing cache entry */
return __mkroute_input(skb, res, in_dev, daddr, saddr, tos);
}
/* Implements all the saddr-related checks as ip_route_input_slow(),
* assuming daddr is valid and the destination is not a local broadcast one.
* Uses the provided hint instead of performing a route lookup.
*/
int ip_route_use_hint(struct sk_buff *skb, __be32 daddr, __be32 saddr,
u8 tos, struct net_device *dev,
const struct sk_buff *hint)
{
struct in_device *in_dev = __in_dev_get_rcu(dev);
struct rtable *rt = skb_rtable(hint);
struct net *net = dev_net(dev);
int err = -EINVAL;
u32 tag = 0;
if (ipv4_is_multicast(saddr) || ipv4_is_lbcast(saddr))
goto martian_source;
if (ipv4_is_zeronet(saddr))
goto martian_source;
if (ipv4_is_loopback(saddr) && !IN_DEV_NET_ROUTE_LOCALNET(in_dev, net))
goto martian_source;
if (rt->rt_type != RTN_LOCAL)
goto skip_validate_source;
tos &= IPTOS_RT_MASK;
err = fib_validate_source(skb, saddr, daddr, tos, 0, dev, in_dev, &tag);
if (err < 0)
goto martian_source;
skip_validate_source:
skb_dst_copy(skb, hint);
return 0;
martian_source:
ip_handle_martian_source(dev, in_dev, skb, daddr, saddr);
return err;
}
/*
* NOTE. We drop all the packets that has local source
* addresses, because every properly looped back packet
* must have correct destination already attached by output routine.
* Changes in the enforced policies must be applied also to
* ip_route_use_hint().
*
* Such approach solves two big problems:
* 1. Not simplex devices are handled properly.
* 2. IP spoofing attempts are filtered with 100% of guarantee.
fib: RCU conversion of fib_lookup() fib_lookup() converted to be called in RCU protected context, no reference taken and released on a contended cache line (fib_clntref) fib_table_lookup() and fib_semantic_match() get an additional parameter. struct fib_info gets an rcu_head field, and is freed after an rcu grace period. Stress test : (Sending 160.000.000 UDP frames on same neighbour, IP route cache disabled, dual E5540 @2.53GHz, 32bit kernel, FIB_HASH) (about same results for FIB_TRIE) Before patch : real 1m31.199s user 0m13.761s sys 23m24.780s After patch: real 1m5.375s user 0m14.997s sys 15m50.115s Before patch Profile : 13044.00 15.4% __ip_route_output_key vmlinux 8438.00 10.0% dst_destroy vmlinux 5983.00 7.1% fib_semantic_match vmlinux 5410.00 6.4% fib_rules_lookup vmlinux 4803.00 5.7% neigh_lookup vmlinux 4420.00 5.2% _raw_spin_lock vmlinux 3883.00 4.6% rt_set_nexthop vmlinux 3261.00 3.9% _raw_read_lock vmlinux 2794.00 3.3% fib_table_lookup vmlinux 2374.00 2.8% neigh_resolve_output vmlinux 2153.00 2.5% dst_alloc vmlinux 1502.00 1.8% _raw_read_lock_bh vmlinux 1484.00 1.8% kmem_cache_alloc vmlinux 1407.00 1.7% eth_header vmlinux 1406.00 1.7% ipv4_dst_destroy vmlinux 1298.00 1.5% __copy_from_user_ll vmlinux 1174.00 1.4% dev_queue_xmit vmlinux 1000.00 1.2% ip_output vmlinux After patch Profile : 13712.00 15.8% dst_destroy vmlinux 8548.00 9.9% __ip_route_output_key vmlinux 7017.00 8.1% neigh_lookup vmlinux 4554.00 5.3% fib_semantic_match vmlinux 4067.00 4.7% _raw_read_lock vmlinux 3491.00 4.0% dst_alloc vmlinux 3186.00 3.7% neigh_resolve_output vmlinux 3103.00 3.6% fib_table_lookup vmlinux 2098.00 2.4% _raw_read_lock_bh vmlinux 2081.00 2.4% kmem_cache_alloc vmlinux 2013.00 2.3% _raw_spin_lock vmlinux 1763.00 2.0% __copy_from_user_ll vmlinux 1763.00 2.0% ip_output vmlinux 1761.00 2.0% ipv4_dst_destroy vmlinux 1631.00 1.9% eth_header vmlinux 1440.00 1.7% _raw_read_unlock_bh vmlinux Reference results, if IP route cache is enabled : real 0m29.718s user 0m10.845s sys 7m37.341s 25213.00 29.5% __ip_route_output_key vmlinux 9011.00 10.5% dst_release vmlinux 4817.00 5.6% ip_push_pending_frames vmlinux 4232.00 5.0% ip_finish_output vmlinux 3940.00 4.6% udp_sendmsg vmlinux 3730.00 4.4% __copy_from_user_ll vmlinux 3716.00 4.4% ip_route_output_flow vmlinux 2451.00 2.9% __xfrm_lookup vmlinux 2221.00 2.6% ip_append_data vmlinux 1718.00 2.0% _raw_spin_lock_bh vmlinux 1655.00 1.9% __alloc_skb vmlinux 1572.00 1.8% sock_wfree vmlinux 1345.00 1.6% kfree vmlinux Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2010-10-05 14:41:36 +04:00
* called with rcu_read_lock()
*/
static int ip_route_input_slow(struct sk_buff *skb, __be32 daddr, __be32 saddr,
u8 tos, struct net_device *dev,
struct fib_result *res)
{
struct in_device *in_dev = __in_dev_get_rcu(dev);
struct flow_keys *flkeys = NULL, _flkeys;
struct net *net = dev_net(dev);
struct ip_tunnel_info *tun_info;
int err = -EINVAL;
unsigned int flags = 0;
u32 itag = 0;
struct rtable *rth;
struct flowi4 fl4;
bool do_cache = true;
/* IP on this device is disabled. */
if (!in_dev)
goto out;
/* Check for the most weird martians, which can be not detected
by fib_lookup.
*/
tun_info = skb_tunnel_info(skb);
if (tun_info && !(tun_info->mode & IP_TUNNEL_INFO_TX))
fl4.flowi4_tun_key.tun_id = tun_info->key.tun_id;
else
fl4.flowi4_tun_key.tun_id = 0;
skb_dst_drop(skb);
if (ipv4_is_multicast(saddr) || ipv4_is_lbcast(saddr))
goto martian_source;
res->fi = NULL;
res->table = NULL;
if (ipv4_is_lbcast(daddr) || (saddr == 0 && daddr == 0))
goto brd_input;
/* Accept zero addresses only to limited broadcast;
* I even do not know to fix it or not. Waiting for complains :-)
*/
if (ipv4_is_zeronet(saddr))
goto martian_source;
if (ipv4_is_zeronet(daddr))
goto martian_destination;
/* Following code try to avoid calling IN_DEV_NET_ROUTE_LOCALNET(),
* and call it once if daddr or/and saddr are loopback addresses
*/
if (ipv4_is_loopback(daddr)) {
if (!IN_DEV_NET_ROUTE_LOCALNET(in_dev, net))
goto martian_destination;
} else if (ipv4_is_loopback(saddr)) {
if (!IN_DEV_NET_ROUTE_LOCALNET(in_dev, net))
goto martian_source;
}
/*
* Now we are ready to route packet.
*/
fl4.flowi4_oif = 0;
fl4.flowi4_iif = dev->ifindex;
fl4.flowi4_mark = skb->mark;
fl4.flowi4_tos = tos;
fl4.flowi4_scope = RT_SCOPE_UNIVERSE;
fl4.flowi4_flags = 0;
fl4.daddr = daddr;
fl4.saddr = saddr;
fl4.flowi4_uid = sock_net_uid(net, NULL);
fl4.flowi4_multipath_hash = 0;
if (fib4_rules_early_flow_dissect(net, skb, &fl4, &_flkeys)) {
flkeys = &_flkeys;
} else {
fl4.flowi4_proto = 0;
fl4.fl4_sport = 0;
fl4.fl4_dport = 0;
}
err = fib_lookup(net, &fl4, res, 0);
if (err != 0) {
if (!IN_DEV_FORWARD(in_dev))
err = -EHOSTUNREACH;
goto no_route;
}
if (res->type == RTN_BROADCAST) {
if (IN_DEV_BFORWARD(in_dev))
goto make_route;
/* not do cache if bc_forwarding is enabled */
if (IPV4_DEVCONF_ALL(net, BC_FORWARDING))
do_cache = false;
goto brd_input;
}
if (res->type == RTN_LOCAL) {
err = fib_validate_source(skb, saddr, daddr, tos,
0, dev, in_dev, &itag);
if (err < 0)
goto martian_source;
goto local_input;
}
if (!IN_DEV_FORWARD(in_dev)) {
err = -EHOSTUNREACH;
goto no_route;
}
if (res->type != RTN_UNICAST)
goto martian_destination;
make_route:
err = ip_mkroute_input(skb, res, in_dev, daddr, saddr, tos, flkeys);
out: return err;
brd_input:
if (skb->protocol != htons(ETH_P_IP))
goto e_inval;
if (!ipv4_is_zeronet(saddr)) {
err = fib_validate_source(skb, saddr, 0, tos, 0, dev,
in_dev, &itag);
if (err < 0)
goto martian_source;
}
flags |= RTCF_BROADCAST;
res->type = RTN_BROADCAST;
RT_CACHE_STAT_INC(in_brd);
local_input:
do_cache &= res->fi && !itag;
if (do_cache) {
struct fib_nh_common *nhc = FIB_RES_NHC(*res);
rth = rcu_dereference(nhc->nhc_rth_input);
if (rt_cache_valid(rth)) {
skb_dst_set_noref(skb, &rth->dst);
err = 0;
goto out;
}
}
rth = rt_dst_alloc(l3mdev_master_dev_rcu(dev) ? : net->loopback_dev,
flags | RTCF_LOCAL, res->type,
IN_DEV_CONF_GET(in_dev, NOPOLICY), false);
if (!rth)
goto e_nobufs;
rth->dst.output= ip_rt_bug;
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_CLASSID
rth->dst.tclassid = itag;
#endif
rth->rt_is_input = 1;
RT_CACHE_STAT_INC(in_slow_tot);
if (res->type == RTN_UNREACHABLE) {
rth->dst.input= ip_error;
rth->dst.error= -err;
rth->rt_flags &= ~RTCF_LOCAL;
}
if (do_cache) {
struct fib_nh_common *nhc = FIB_RES_NHC(*res);
rth->dst.lwtstate = lwtstate_get(nhc->nhc_lwtstate);
if (lwtunnel_input_redirect(rth->dst.lwtstate)) {
WARN_ON(rth->dst.input == lwtunnel_input);
rth->dst.lwtstate->orig_input = rth->dst.input;
rth->dst.input = lwtunnel_input;
}
if (unlikely(!rt_cache_route(nhc, rth)))
rt_add_uncached_list(rth);
}
skb_dst_set(skb, &rth->dst);
err = 0;
fib: RCU conversion of fib_lookup() fib_lookup() converted to be called in RCU protected context, no reference taken and released on a contended cache line (fib_clntref) fib_table_lookup() and fib_semantic_match() get an additional parameter. struct fib_info gets an rcu_head field, and is freed after an rcu grace period. Stress test : (Sending 160.000.000 UDP frames on same neighbour, IP route cache disabled, dual E5540 @2.53GHz, 32bit kernel, FIB_HASH) (about same results for FIB_TRIE) Before patch : real 1m31.199s user 0m13.761s sys 23m24.780s After patch: real 1m5.375s user 0m14.997s sys 15m50.115s Before patch Profile : 13044.00 15.4% __ip_route_output_key vmlinux 8438.00 10.0% dst_destroy vmlinux 5983.00 7.1% fib_semantic_match vmlinux 5410.00 6.4% fib_rules_lookup vmlinux 4803.00 5.7% neigh_lookup vmlinux 4420.00 5.2% _raw_spin_lock vmlinux 3883.00 4.6% rt_set_nexthop vmlinux 3261.00 3.9% _raw_read_lock vmlinux 2794.00 3.3% fib_table_lookup vmlinux 2374.00 2.8% neigh_resolve_output vmlinux 2153.00 2.5% dst_alloc vmlinux 1502.00 1.8% _raw_read_lock_bh vmlinux 1484.00 1.8% kmem_cache_alloc vmlinux 1407.00 1.7% eth_header vmlinux 1406.00 1.7% ipv4_dst_destroy vmlinux 1298.00 1.5% __copy_from_user_ll vmlinux 1174.00 1.4% dev_queue_xmit vmlinux 1000.00 1.2% ip_output vmlinux After patch Profile : 13712.00 15.8% dst_destroy vmlinux 8548.00 9.9% __ip_route_output_key vmlinux 7017.00 8.1% neigh_lookup vmlinux 4554.00 5.3% fib_semantic_match vmlinux 4067.00 4.7% _raw_read_lock vmlinux 3491.00 4.0% dst_alloc vmlinux 3186.00 3.7% neigh_resolve_output vmlinux 3103.00 3.6% fib_table_lookup vmlinux 2098.00 2.4% _raw_read_lock_bh vmlinux 2081.00 2.4% kmem_cache_alloc vmlinux 2013.00 2.3% _raw_spin_lock vmlinux 1763.00 2.0% __copy_from_user_ll vmlinux 1763.00 2.0% ip_output vmlinux 1761.00 2.0% ipv4_dst_destroy vmlinux 1631.00 1.9% eth_header vmlinux 1440.00 1.7% _raw_read_unlock_bh vmlinux Reference results, if IP route cache is enabled : real 0m29.718s user 0m10.845s sys 7m37.341s 25213.00 29.5% __ip_route_output_key vmlinux 9011.00 10.5% dst_release vmlinux 4817.00 5.6% ip_push_pending_frames vmlinux 4232.00 5.0% ip_finish_output vmlinux 3940.00 4.6% udp_sendmsg vmlinux 3730.00 4.4% __copy_from_user_ll vmlinux 3716.00 4.4% ip_route_output_flow vmlinux 2451.00 2.9% __xfrm_lookup vmlinux 2221.00 2.6% ip_append_data vmlinux 1718.00 2.0% _raw_spin_lock_bh vmlinux 1655.00 1.9% __alloc_skb vmlinux 1572.00 1.8% sock_wfree vmlinux 1345.00 1.6% kfree vmlinux Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2010-10-05 14:41:36 +04:00
goto out;
no_route:
RT_CACHE_STAT_INC(in_no_route);
res->type = RTN_UNREACHABLE;
res->fi = NULL;
res->table = NULL;
goto local_input;
/*
* Do not cache martian addresses: they should be logged (RFC1812)
*/
martian_destination:
RT_CACHE_STAT_INC(in_martian_dst);
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_VERBOSE
if (IN_DEV_LOG_MARTIANS(in_dev))
net_warn_ratelimited("martian destination %pI4 from %pI4, dev %s\n",
&daddr, &saddr, dev->name);
#endif
e_inval:
err = -EINVAL;
fib: RCU conversion of fib_lookup() fib_lookup() converted to be called in RCU protected context, no reference taken and released on a contended cache line (fib_clntref) fib_table_lookup() and fib_semantic_match() get an additional parameter. struct fib_info gets an rcu_head field, and is freed after an rcu grace period. Stress test : (Sending 160.000.000 UDP frames on same neighbour, IP route cache disabled, dual E5540 @2.53GHz, 32bit kernel, FIB_HASH) (about same results for FIB_TRIE) Before patch : real 1m31.199s user 0m13.761s sys 23m24.780s After patch: real 1m5.375s user 0m14.997s sys 15m50.115s Before patch Profile : 13044.00 15.4% __ip_route_output_key vmlinux 8438.00 10.0% dst_destroy vmlinux 5983.00 7.1% fib_semantic_match vmlinux 5410.00 6.4% fib_rules_lookup vmlinux 4803.00 5.7% neigh_lookup vmlinux 4420.00 5.2% _raw_spin_lock vmlinux 3883.00 4.6% rt_set_nexthop vmlinux 3261.00 3.9% _raw_read_lock vmlinux 2794.00 3.3% fib_table_lookup vmlinux 2374.00 2.8% neigh_resolve_output vmlinux 2153.00 2.5% dst_alloc vmlinux 1502.00 1.8% _raw_read_lock_bh vmlinux 1484.00 1.8% kmem_cache_alloc vmlinux 1407.00 1.7% eth_header vmlinux 1406.00 1.7% ipv4_dst_destroy vmlinux 1298.00 1.5% __copy_from_user_ll vmlinux 1174.00 1.4% dev_queue_xmit vmlinux 1000.00 1.2% ip_output vmlinux After patch Profile : 13712.00 15.8% dst_destroy vmlinux 8548.00 9.9% __ip_route_output_key vmlinux 7017.00 8.1% neigh_lookup vmlinux 4554.00 5.3% fib_semantic_match vmlinux 4067.00 4.7% _raw_read_lock vmlinux 3491.00 4.0% dst_alloc vmlinux 3186.00 3.7% neigh_resolve_output vmlinux 3103.00 3.6% fib_table_lookup vmlinux 2098.00 2.4% _raw_read_lock_bh vmlinux 2081.00 2.4% kmem_cache_alloc vmlinux 2013.00 2.3% _raw_spin_lock vmlinux 1763.00 2.0% __copy_from_user_ll vmlinux 1763.00 2.0% ip_output vmlinux 1761.00 2.0% ipv4_dst_destroy vmlinux 1631.00 1.9% eth_header vmlinux 1440.00 1.7% _raw_read_unlock_bh vmlinux Reference results, if IP route cache is enabled : real 0m29.718s user 0m10.845s sys 7m37.341s 25213.00 29.5% __ip_route_output_key vmlinux 9011.00 10.5% dst_release vmlinux 4817.00 5.6% ip_push_pending_frames vmlinux 4232.00 5.0% ip_finish_output vmlinux 3940.00 4.6% udp_sendmsg vmlinux 3730.00 4.4% __copy_from_user_ll vmlinux 3716.00 4.4% ip_route_output_flow vmlinux 2451.00 2.9% __xfrm_lookup vmlinux 2221.00 2.6% ip_append_data vmlinux 1718.00 2.0% _raw_spin_lock_bh vmlinux 1655.00 1.9% __alloc_skb vmlinux 1572.00 1.8% sock_wfree vmlinux 1345.00 1.6% kfree vmlinux Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2010-10-05 14:41:36 +04:00
goto out;
e_nobufs:
err = -ENOBUFS;
fib: RCU conversion of fib_lookup() fib_lookup() converted to be called in RCU protected context, no reference taken and released on a contended cache line (fib_clntref) fib_table_lookup() and fib_semantic_match() get an additional parameter. struct fib_info gets an rcu_head field, and is freed after an rcu grace period. Stress test : (Sending 160.000.000 UDP frames on same neighbour, IP route cache disabled, dual E5540 @2.53GHz, 32bit kernel, FIB_HASH) (about same results for FIB_TRIE) Before patch : real 1m31.199s user 0m13.761s sys 23m24.780s After patch: real 1m5.375s user 0m14.997s sys 15m50.115s Before patch Profile : 13044.00 15.4% __ip_route_output_key vmlinux 8438.00 10.0% dst_destroy vmlinux 5983.00 7.1% fib_semantic_match vmlinux 5410.00 6.4% fib_rules_lookup vmlinux 4803.00 5.7% neigh_lookup vmlinux 4420.00 5.2% _raw_spin_lock vmlinux 3883.00 4.6% rt_set_nexthop vmlinux 3261.00 3.9% _raw_read_lock vmlinux 2794.00 3.3% fib_table_lookup vmlinux 2374.00 2.8% neigh_resolve_output vmlinux 2153.00 2.5% dst_alloc vmlinux 1502.00 1.8% _raw_read_lock_bh vmlinux 1484.00 1.8% kmem_cache_alloc vmlinux 1407.00 1.7% eth_header vmlinux 1406.00 1.7% ipv4_dst_destroy vmlinux 1298.00 1.5% __copy_from_user_ll vmlinux 1174.00 1.4% dev_queue_xmit vmlinux 1000.00 1.2% ip_output vmlinux After patch Profile : 13712.00 15.8% dst_destroy vmlinux 8548.00 9.9% __ip_route_output_key vmlinux 7017.00 8.1% neigh_lookup vmlinux 4554.00 5.3% fib_semantic_match vmlinux 4067.00 4.7% _raw_read_lock vmlinux 3491.00 4.0% dst_alloc vmlinux 3186.00 3.7% neigh_resolve_output vmlinux 3103.00 3.6% fib_table_lookup vmlinux 2098.00 2.4% _raw_read_lock_bh vmlinux 2081.00 2.4% kmem_cache_alloc vmlinux 2013.00 2.3% _raw_spin_lock vmlinux 1763.00 2.0% __copy_from_user_ll vmlinux 1763.00 2.0% ip_output vmlinux 1761.00 2.0% ipv4_dst_destroy vmlinux 1631.00 1.9% eth_header vmlinux 1440.00 1.7% _raw_read_unlock_bh vmlinux Reference results, if IP route cache is enabled : real 0m29.718s user 0m10.845s sys 7m37.341s 25213.00 29.5% __ip_route_output_key vmlinux 9011.00 10.5% dst_release vmlinux 4817.00 5.6% ip_push_pending_frames vmlinux 4232.00 5.0% ip_finish_output vmlinux 3940.00 4.6% udp_sendmsg vmlinux 3730.00 4.4% __copy_from_user_ll vmlinux 3716.00 4.4% ip_route_output_flow vmlinux 2451.00 2.9% __xfrm_lookup vmlinux 2221.00 2.6% ip_append_data vmlinux 1718.00 2.0% _raw_spin_lock_bh vmlinux 1655.00 1.9% __alloc_skb vmlinux 1572.00 1.8% sock_wfree vmlinux 1345.00 1.6% kfree vmlinux Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2010-10-05 14:41:36 +04:00
goto out;
martian_source:
ip_handle_martian_source(dev, in_dev, skb, daddr, saddr);
fib: RCU conversion of fib_lookup() fib_lookup() converted to be called in RCU protected context, no reference taken and released on a contended cache line (fib_clntref) fib_table_lookup() and fib_semantic_match() get an additional parameter. struct fib_info gets an rcu_head field, and is freed after an rcu grace period. Stress test : (Sending 160.000.000 UDP frames on same neighbour, IP route cache disabled, dual E5540 @2.53GHz, 32bit kernel, FIB_HASH) (about same results for FIB_TRIE) Before patch : real 1m31.199s user 0m13.761s sys 23m24.780s After patch: real 1m5.375s user 0m14.997s sys 15m50.115s Before patch Profile : 13044.00 15.4% __ip_route_output_key vmlinux 8438.00 10.0% dst_destroy vmlinux 5983.00 7.1% fib_semantic_match vmlinux 5410.00 6.4% fib_rules_lookup vmlinux 4803.00 5.7% neigh_lookup vmlinux 4420.00 5.2% _raw_spin_lock vmlinux 3883.00 4.6% rt_set_nexthop vmlinux 3261.00 3.9% _raw_read_lock vmlinux 2794.00 3.3% fib_table_lookup vmlinux 2374.00 2.8% neigh_resolve_output vmlinux 2153.00 2.5% dst_alloc vmlinux 1502.00 1.8% _raw_read_lock_bh vmlinux 1484.00 1.8% kmem_cache_alloc vmlinux 1407.00 1.7% eth_header vmlinux 1406.00 1.7% ipv4_dst_destroy vmlinux 1298.00 1.5% __copy_from_user_ll vmlinux 1174.00 1.4% dev_queue_xmit vmlinux 1000.00 1.2% ip_output vmlinux After patch Profile : 13712.00 15.8% dst_destroy vmlinux 8548.00 9.9% __ip_route_output_key vmlinux 7017.00 8.1% neigh_lookup vmlinux 4554.00 5.3% fib_semantic_match vmlinux 4067.00 4.7% _raw_read_lock vmlinux 3491.00 4.0% dst_alloc vmlinux 3186.00 3.7% neigh_resolve_output vmlinux 3103.00 3.6% fib_table_lookup vmlinux 2098.00 2.4% _raw_read_lock_bh vmlinux 2081.00 2.4% kmem_cache_alloc vmlinux 2013.00 2.3% _raw_spin_lock vmlinux 1763.00 2.0% __copy_from_user_ll vmlinux 1763.00 2.0% ip_output vmlinux 1761.00 2.0% ipv4_dst_destroy vmlinux 1631.00 1.9% eth_header vmlinux 1440.00 1.7% _raw_read_unlock_bh vmlinux Reference results, if IP route cache is enabled : real 0m29.718s user 0m10.845s sys 7m37.341s 25213.00 29.5% __ip_route_output_key vmlinux 9011.00 10.5% dst_release vmlinux 4817.00 5.6% ip_push_pending_frames vmlinux 4232.00 5.0% ip_finish_output vmlinux 3940.00 4.6% udp_sendmsg vmlinux 3730.00 4.4% __copy_from_user_ll vmlinux 3716.00 4.4% ip_route_output_flow vmlinux 2451.00 2.9% __xfrm_lookup vmlinux 2221.00 2.6% ip_append_data vmlinux 1718.00 2.0% _raw_spin_lock_bh vmlinux 1655.00 1.9% __alloc_skb vmlinux 1572.00 1.8% sock_wfree vmlinux 1345.00 1.6% kfree vmlinux Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2010-10-05 14:41:36 +04:00
goto out;
}
int ip_route_input_noref(struct sk_buff *skb, __be32 daddr, __be32 saddr,
u8 tos, struct net_device *dev)
{
struct fib_result res;
int err;
tos &= IPTOS_RT_MASK;
rcu_read_lock();
err = ip_route_input_rcu(skb, daddr, saddr, tos, dev, &res);
rcu_read_unlock();
return err;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ip_route_input_noref);
/* called with rcu_read_lock held */
int ip_route_input_rcu(struct sk_buff *skb, __be32 daddr, __be32 saddr,
u8 tos, struct net_device *dev, struct fib_result *res)
{
/* Multicast recognition logic is moved from route cache to here.
The problem was that too many Ethernet cards have broken/missing
hardware multicast filters :-( As result the host on multicasting
network acquires a lot of useless route cache entries, sort of
SDR messages from all the world. Now we try to get rid of them.
Really, provided software IP multicast filter is organized
reasonably (at least, hashed), it does not result in a slowdown
comparing with route cache reject entries.
Note, that multicast routers are not affected, because
route cache entry is created eventually.
*/
if (ipv4_is_multicast(daddr)) {
struct in_device *in_dev = __in_dev_get_rcu(dev);
int our = 0;
int err = -EINVAL;
if (!in_dev)
return err;
our = ip_check_mc_rcu(in_dev, daddr, saddr,
ip_hdr(skb)->protocol);
/* check l3 master if no match yet */
if (!our && netif_is_l3_slave(dev)) {
struct in_device *l3_in_dev;
l3_in_dev = __in_dev_get_rcu(skb->dev);
if (l3_in_dev)
our = ip_check_mc_rcu(l3_in_dev, daddr, saddr,
ip_hdr(skb)->protocol);
}
if (our
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_MROUTE
||
(!ipv4_is_local_multicast(daddr) &&
IN_DEV_MFORWARD(in_dev))
#endif
) {
err = ip_route_input_mc(skb, daddr, saddr,
tos, dev, our);
}
return err;
}
return ip_route_input_slow(skb, daddr, saddr, tos, dev, res);
}
fib: RCU conversion of fib_lookup() fib_lookup() converted to be called in RCU protected context, no reference taken and released on a contended cache line (fib_clntref) fib_table_lookup() and fib_semantic_match() get an additional parameter. struct fib_info gets an rcu_head field, and is freed after an rcu grace period. Stress test : (Sending 160.000.000 UDP frames on same neighbour, IP route cache disabled, dual E5540 @2.53GHz, 32bit kernel, FIB_HASH) (about same results for FIB_TRIE) Before patch : real 1m31.199s user 0m13.761s sys 23m24.780s After patch: real 1m5.375s user 0m14.997s sys 15m50.115s Before patch Profile : 13044.00 15.4% __ip_route_output_key vmlinux 8438.00 10.0% dst_destroy vmlinux 5983.00 7.1% fib_semantic_match vmlinux 5410.00 6.4% fib_rules_lookup vmlinux 4803.00 5.7% neigh_lookup vmlinux 4420.00 5.2% _raw_spin_lock vmlinux 3883.00 4.6% rt_set_nexthop vmlinux 3261.00 3.9% _raw_read_lock vmlinux 2794.00 3.3% fib_table_lookup vmlinux 2374.00 2.8% neigh_resolve_output vmlinux 2153.00 2.5% dst_alloc vmlinux 1502.00 1.8% _raw_read_lock_bh vmlinux 1484.00 1.8% kmem_cache_alloc vmlinux 1407.00 1.7% eth_header vmlinux 1406.00 1.7% ipv4_dst_destroy vmlinux 1298.00 1.5% __copy_from_user_ll vmlinux 1174.00 1.4% dev_queue_xmit vmlinux 1000.00 1.2% ip_output vmlinux After patch Profile : 13712.00 15.8% dst_destroy vmlinux 8548.00 9.9% __ip_route_output_key vmlinux 7017.00 8.1% neigh_lookup vmlinux 4554.00 5.3% fib_semantic_match vmlinux 4067.00 4.7% _raw_read_lock vmlinux 3491.00 4.0% dst_alloc vmlinux 3186.00 3.7% neigh_resolve_output vmlinux 3103.00 3.6% fib_table_lookup vmlinux 2098.00 2.4% _raw_read_lock_bh vmlinux 2081.00 2.4% kmem_cache_alloc vmlinux 2013.00 2.3% _raw_spin_lock vmlinux 1763.00 2.0% __copy_from_user_ll vmlinux 1763.00 2.0% ip_output vmlinux 1761.00 2.0% ipv4_dst_destroy vmlinux 1631.00 1.9% eth_header vmlinux 1440.00 1.7% _raw_read_unlock_bh vmlinux Reference results, if IP route cache is enabled : real 0m29.718s user 0m10.845s sys 7m37.341s 25213.00 29.5% __ip_route_output_key vmlinux 9011.00 10.5% dst_release vmlinux 4817.00 5.6% ip_push_pending_frames vmlinux 4232.00 5.0% ip_finish_output vmlinux 3940.00 4.6% udp_sendmsg vmlinux 3730.00 4.4% __copy_from_user_ll vmlinux 3716.00 4.4% ip_route_output_flow vmlinux 2451.00 2.9% __xfrm_lookup vmlinux 2221.00 2.6% ip_append_data vmlinux 1718.00 2.0% _raw_spin_lock_bh vmlinux 1655.00 1.9% __alloc_skb vmlinux 1572.00 1.8% sock_wfree vmlinux 1345.00 1.6% kfree vmlinux Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2010-10-05 14:41:36 +04:00
/* called with rcu_read_lock() */
static struct rtable *__mkroute_output(const struct fib_result *res,
const struct flowi4 *fl4, int orig_oif,
struct net_device *dev_out,
unsigned int flags)
{
struct fib_info *fi = res->fi;
struct fib_nh_exception *fnhe;
struct in_device *in_dev;
u16 type = res->type;
struct rtable *rth;
bool do_cache;
in_dev = __in_dev_get_rcu(dev_out);
if (!in_dev)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
if (likely(!IN_DEV_ROUTE_LOCALNET(in_dev)))
if (ipv4_is_loopback(fl4->saddr) &&
!(dev_out->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK) &&
!netif_is_l3_master(dev_out))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
if (ipv4_is_lbcast(fl4->daddr))
type = RTN_BROADCAST;
else if (ipv4_is_multicast(fl4->daddr))
type = RTN_MULTICAST;
else if (ipv4_is_zeronet(fl4->daddr))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
if (dev_out->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK)
flags |= RTCF_LOCAL;
do_cache = true;
if (type == RTN_BROADCAST) {
flags |= RTCF_BROADCAST | RTCF_LOCAL;
fi = NULL;
} else if (type == RTN_MULTICAST) {
flags |= RTCF_MULTICAST | RTCF_LOCAL;
if (!ip_check_mc_rcu(in_dev, fl4->daddr, fl4->saddr,
fl4->flowi4_proto))
flags &= ~RTCF_LOCAL;
else
do_cache = false;
/* If multicast route do not exist use
* default one, but do not gateway in this case.
* Yes, it is hack.
*/
if (fi && res->prefixlen < 4)
fi = NULL;
} else if ((type == RTN_LOCAL) && (orig_oif != 0) &&
(orig_oif != dev_out->ifindex)) {
/* For local routes that require a particular output interface
* we do not want to cache the result. Caching the result
* causes incorrect behaviour when there are multiple source
* addresses on the interface, the end result being that if the
* intended recipient is waiting on that interface for the
* packet he won't receive it because it will be delivered on
* the loopback interface and the IP_PKTINFO ipi_ifindex will
* be set to the loopback interface as well.
*/
ipv4: fix fnhe usage by non-cached routes Allow some non-cached routes to use non-expired fnhe: 1. ip_del_fnhe: moved above and now called by find_exception. The 4.5+ commit deed49df7390 expires fnhe only when caching routes. Change that to: 1.1. use fnhe for non-cached local output routes, with the help from (2) 1.2. allow __mkroute_input to detect expired fnhe (outdated fnhe_gw, for example) when do_cache is false, eg. when itag!=0 for unicast destinations. 2. __mkroute_output: keep fi to allow local routes with orig_oif != 0 to use fnhe info even when the new route will not be cached into fnhe. After commit 839da4d98960 ("net: ipv4: set orig_oif based on fib result for local traffic") it means all local routes will be affected because they are not cached. This change is used to solve a PMTU problem with IPVS (and probably Netfilter DNAT) setups that redirect local clients from target local IP (local route to Virtual IP) to new remote IP target, eg. IPVS TUN real server. Loopback has 64K MTU and we need to create fnhe on the local route that will keep the reduced PMTU for the Virtual IP. Without this change fnhe_pmtu is updated from ICMP but never exposed to non-cached local routes. This includes routes with flowi4_oif!=0 for 4.6+ and with flowi4_oif=any for 4.14+). 3. update_or_create_fnhe: make sure fnhe_expires is not 0 for new entries Fixes: 839da4d98960 ("net: ipv4: set orig_oif based on fib result for local traffic") Fixes: d6d5e999e5df ("route: do not cache fib route info on local routes with oif") Fixes: deed49df7390 ("route: check and remove route cache when we get route") Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Cc: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Acked-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-05-02 09:41:19 +03:00
do_cache = false;
}
fnhe = NULL;
do_cache &= fi != NULL;
ipv4: fix fnhe usage by non-cached routes Allow some non-cached routes to use non-expired fnhe: 1. ip_del_fnhe: moved above and now called by find_exception. The 4.5+ commit deed49df7390 expires fnhe only when caching routes. Change that to: 1.1. use fnhe for non-cached local output routes, with the help from (2) 1.2. allow __mkroute_input to detect expired fnhe (outdated fnhe_gw, for example) when do_cache is false, eg. when itag!=0 for unicast destinations. 2. __mkroute_output: keep fi to allow local routes with orig_oif != 0 to use fnhe info even when the new route will not be cached into fnhe. After commit 839da4d98960 ("net: ipv4: set orig_oif based on fib result for local traffic") it means all local routes will be affected because they are not cached. This change is used to solve a PMTU problem with IPVS (and probably Netfilter DNAT) setups that redirect local clients from target local IP (local route to Virtual IP) to new remote IP target, eg. IPVS TUN real server. Loopback has 64K MTU and we need to create fnhe on the local route that will keep the reduced PMTU for the Virtual IP. Without this change fnhe_pmtu is updated from ICMP but never exposed to non-cached local routes. This includes routes with flowi4_oif!=0 for 4.6+ and with flowi4_oif=any for 4.14+). 3. update_or_create_fnhe: make sure fnhe_expires is not 0 for new entries Fixes: 839da4d98960 ("net: ipv4: set orig_oif based on fib result for local traffic") Fixes: d6d5e999e5df ("route: do not cache fib route info on local routes with oif") Fixes: deed49df7390 ("route: check and remove route cache when we get route") Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Cc: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Acked-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-05-02 09:41:19 +03:00
if (fi) {
struct fib_nh_common *nhc = FIB_RES_NHC(*res);
struct rtable __rcu **prth;
fnhe = find_exception(nhc, fl4->daddr);
ipv4: fix fnhe usage by non-cached routes Allow some non-cached routes to use non-expired fnhe: 1. ip_del_fnhe: moved above and now called by find_exception. The 4.5+ commit deed49df7390 expires fnhe only when caching routes. Change that to: 1.1. use fnhe for non-cached local output routes, with the help from (2) 1.2. allow __mkroute_input to detect expired fnhe (outdated fnhe_gw, for example) when do_cache is false, eg. when itag!=0 for unicast destinations. 2. __mkroute_output: keep fi to allow local routes with orig_oif != 0 to use fnhe info even when the new route will not be cached into fnhe. After commit 839da4d98960 ("net: ipv4: set orig_oif based on fib result for local traffic") it means all local routes will be affected because they are not cached. This change is used to solve a PMTU problem with IPVS (and probably Netfilter DNAT) setups that redirect local clients from target local IP (local route to Virtual IP) to new remote IP target, eg. IPVS TUN real server. Loopback has 64K MTU and we need to create fnhe on the local route that will keep the reduced PMTU for the Virtual IP. Without this change fnhe_pmtu is updated from ICMP but never exposed to non-cached local routes. This includes routes with flowi4_oif!=0 for 4.6+ and with flowi4_oif=any for 4.14+). 3. update_or_create_fnhe: make sure fnhe_expires is not 0 for new entries Fixes: 839da4d98960 ("net: ipv4: set orig_oif based on fib result for local traffic") Fixes: d6d5e999e5df ("route: do not cache fib route info on local routes with oif") Fixes: deed49df7390 ("route: check and remove route cache when we get route") Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Cc: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Acked-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-05-02 09:41:19 +03:00
if (!do_cache)
goto add;
if (fnhe) {
prth = &fnhe->fnhe_rth_output;
ipv4: fix fnhe usage by non-cached routes Allow some non-cached routes to use non-expired fnhe: 1. ip_del_fnhe: moved above and now called by find_exception. The 4.5+ commit deed49df7390 expires fnhe only when caching routes. Change that to: 1.1. use fnhe for non-cached local output routes, with the help from (2) 1.2. allow __mkroute_input to detect expired fnhe (outdated fnhe_gw, for example) when do_cache is false, eg. when itag!=0 for unicast destinations. 2. __mkroute_output: keep fi to allow local routes with orig_oif != 0 to use fnhe info even when the new route will not be cached into fnhe. After commit 839da4d98960 ("net: ipv4: set orig_oif based on fib result for local traffic") it means all local routes will be affected because they are not cached. This change is used to solve a PMTU problem with IPVS (and probably Netfilter DNAT) setups that redirect local clients from target local IP (local route to Virtual IP) to new remote IP target, eg. IPVS TUN real server. Loopback has 64K MTU and we need to create fnhe on the local route that will keep the reduced PMTU for the Virtual IP. Without this change fnhe_pmtu is updated from ICMP but never exposed to non-cached local routes. This includes routes with flowi4_oif!=0 for 4.6+ and with flowi4_oif=any for 4.14+). 3. update_or_create_fnhe: make sure fnhe_expires is not 0 for new entries Fixes: 839da4d98960 ("net: ipv4: set orig_oif based on fib result for local traffic") Fixes: d6d5e999e5df ("route: do not cache fib route info on local routes with oif") Fixes: deed49df7390 ("route: check and remove route cache when we get route") Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Cc: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Acked-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-05-02 09:41:19 +03:00
} else {
if (unlikely(fl4->flowi4_flags &
FLOWI_FLAG_KNOWN_NH &&
!(nhc->nhc_gw_family &&
nhc->nhc_scope == RT_SCOPE_LINK))) {
ipv4: fix fnhe usage by non-cached routes Allow some non-cached routes to use non-expired fnhe: 1. ip_del_fnhe: moved above and now called by find_exception. The 4.5+ commit deed49df7390 expires fnhe only when caching routes. Change that to: 1.1. use fnhe for non-cached local output routes, with the help from (2) 1.2. allow __mkroute_input to detect expired fnhe (outdated fnhe_gw, for example) when do_cache is false, eg. when itag!=0 for unicast destinations. 2. __mkroute_output: keep fi to allow local routes with orig_oif != 0 to use fnhe info even when the new route will not be cached into fnhe. After commit 839da4d98960 ("net: ipv4: set orig_oif based on fib result for local traffic") it means all local routes will be affected because they are not cached. This change is used to solve a PMTU problem with IPVS (and probably Netfilter DNAT) setups that redirect local clients from target local IP (local route to Virtual IP) to new remote IP target, eg. IPVS TUN real server. Loopback has 64K MTU and we need to create fnhe on the local route that will keep the reduced PMTU for the Virtual IP. Without this change fnhe_pmtu is updated from ICMP but never exposed to non-cached local routes. This includes routes with flowi4_oif!=0 for 4.6+ and with flowi4_oif=any for 4.14+). 3. update_or_create_fnhe: make sure fnhe_expires is not 0 for new entries Fixes: 839da4d98960 ("net: ipv4: set orig_oif based on fib result for local traffic") Fixes: d6d5e999e5df ("route: do not cache fib route info on local routes with oif") Fixes: deed49df7390 ("route: check and remove route cache when we get route") Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Cc: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Acked-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-05-02 09:41:19 +03:00
do_cache = false;
goto add;
}
prth = raw_cpu_ptr(nhc->nhc_pcpu_rth_output);
}
rth = rcu_dereference(*prth);
if (rt_cache_valid(rth) && dst_hold_safe(&rth->dst))
return rth;
}
add:
rth = rt_dst_alloc(dev_out, flags, type,
IN_DEV_CONF_GET(in_dev, NOPOLICY),
IN_DEV_CONF_GET(in_dev, NOXFRM));
if (!rth)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOBUFS);
rth->rt_iif = orig_oif;
RT_CACHE_STAT_INC(out_slow_tot);
if (flags & (RTCF_BROADCAST | RTCF_MULTICAST)) {
if (flags & RTCF_LOCAL &&
!(dev_out->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK)) {
rth->dst.output = ip_mc_output;
RT_CACHE_STAT_INC(out_slow_mc);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_MROUTE
if (type == RTN_MULTICAST) {
if (IN_DEV_MFORWARD(in_dev) &&
!ipv4_is_local_multicast(fl4->daddr)) {
rth->dst.input = ip_mr_input;
rth->dst.output = ip_mc_output;
}
}
#endif
}
rt_set_nexthop(rth, fl4->daddr, res, fnhe, fi, type, 0, do_cache);
lwtunnel_set_redirect(&rth->dst);
return rth;
}
/*
* Major route resolver routine.
*/
struct rtable *ip_route_output_key_hash(struct net *net, struct flowi4 *fl4,
const struct sk_buff *skb)
{
__u8 tos = RT_FL_TOS(fl4);
ipv4: fix uninit-value in ip_route_output_key_hash_rcu() syzbot complained that res.type could be used while not initialized. Using RTN_UNSPEC as initial value seems better than using garbage. BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __mkroute_output net/ipv4/route.c:2200 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ip_route_output_key_hash_rcu+0x31f0/0x3940 net/ipv4/route.c:2493 CPU: 1 PID: 12207 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.16.0+ #81 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:53 kmsan_report+0x142/0x240 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1067 __msan_warning_32+0x6c/0xb0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:676 __mkroute_output net/ipv4/route.c:2200 [inline] ip_route_output_key_hash_rcu+0x31f0/0x3940 net/ipv4/route.c:2493 ip_route_output_key_hash net/ipv4/route.c:2322 [inline] __ip_route_output_key include/net/route.h:126 [inline] ip_route_output_flow+0x1eb/0x3c0 net/ipv4/route.c:2577 raw_sendmsg+0x1861/0x3ed0 net/ipv4/raw.c:653 inet_sendmsg+0x48d/0x740 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:764 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:630 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:640 [inline] SYSC_sendto+0x6c3/0x7e0 net/socket.c:1747 SyS_sendto+0x8a/0xb0 net/socket.c:1715 do_syscall_64+0x309/0x430 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2 RIP: 0033:0x455259 RSP: 002b:00007fdc0625dc68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fdc0625e6d4 RCX: 0000000000455259 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000040 RDI: 0000000000000013 RBP: 000000000072bea0 R08: 0000000020000080 R09: 0000000000000010 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff R13: 00000000000004f7 R14: 00000000006fa7c8 R15: 0000000000000000 Local variable description: ----res.i.i@ip_route_output_flow Variable was created at: ip_route_output_flow+0x75/0x3c0 net/ipv4/route.c:2576 raw_sendmsg+0x1861/0x3ed0 net/ipv4/raw.c:653 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-04-07 23:42:42 +03:00
struct fib_result res = {
.type = RTN_UNSPEC,
.fi = NULL,
.table = NULL,
.tclassid = 0,
};
struct rtable *rth;
fl4->flowi4_iif = LOOPBACK_IFINDEX;
fl4->flowi4_tos = tos & IPTOS_RT_MASK;
fl4->flowi4_scope = ((tos & RTO_ONLINK) ?
RT_SCOPE_LINK : RT_SCOPE_UNIVERSE);
rcu_read_lock();
rth = ip_route_output_key_hash_rcu(net, fl4, &res, skb);
rcu_read_unlock();
return rth;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ip_route_output_key_hash);
struct rtable *ip_route_output_key_hash_rcu(struct net *net, struct flowi4 *fl4,
struct fib_result *res,
const struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct net_device *dev_out = NULL;
int orig_oif = fl4->flowi4_oif;
unsigned int flags = 0;
struct rtable *rth;
ipv4: Return -ENETUNREACH if we can't create route but saddr is valid ...instead of -EINVAL. An issue was found with older kernel versions while unplugging a NFS client with pending RPCs, and the wrong error code here prevented it from recovering once link is back up with a configured address. Incidentally, this is not an issue anymore since commit 4f8943f80883 ("SUNRPC: Replace direct task wakeups from softirq context"), included in 5.2-rc7, had the effect of decoupling the forwarding of this error by using SO_ERROR in xs_wake_error(), as pointed out by Benjamin Coddington. To the best of my knowledge, this isn't currently causing any further issue, but the error code doesn't look appropriate anyway, and we might hit this in other paths as well. In detail, as analysed by Gonzalo Siero, once the route is deleted because the interface is down, and can't be resolved and we return -EINVAL here, this ends up, courtesy of inet_sk_rebuild_header(), as the socket error seen by tcp_write_err(), called by tcp_retransmit_timer(). In turn, tcp_write_err() indirectly calls xs_error_report(), which wakes up the RPC pending tasks with a status of -EINVAL. This is then seen by call_status() in the SUN RPC implementation, which aborts the RPC call calling rpc_exit(), instead of handling this as a potentially temporary condition, i.e. as a timeout. Return -EINVAL only if the input parameters passed to ip_route_output_key_hash_rcu() are actually invalid (this is the case if the specified source address is multicast, limited broadcast or all zeroes), but return -ENETUNREACH in all cases where, at the given moment, the given source address doesn't allow resolving the route. While at it, drop the initialisation of err to -ENETUNREACH, which was added to __ip_route_output_key() back then by commit 0315e3827048 ("net: Fix behaviour of unreachable, blackhole and prohibit routes"), but actually had no effect, as it was, and is, overwritten by the fib_lookup() return code assignment, and anyway ignored in all other branches, including the if (fl4->saddr) one: I find this rather confusing, as it would look like -ENETUNREACH is the "default" error, while that statement has no effect. Also note that after commit fc75fc8339e7 ("ipv4: dont create routes on down devices"), we would get -ENETUNREACH if the device is down, but -EINVAL if the source address is specified and we can't resolve the route, and this appears to be rather inconsistent. Reported-by: Stefan Walter <walteste@inf.ethz.ch> Analysed-by: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com> Analysed-by: Gonzalo Siero <gsierohu@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-10-16 21:52:09 +03:00
int err;
if (fl4->saddr) {
if (ipv4_is_multicast(fl4->saddr) ||
ipv4_is_lbcast(fl4->saddr) ||
ipv4: Return -ENETUNREACH if we can't create route but saddr is valid ...instead of -EINVAL. An issue was found with older kernel versions while unplugging a NFS client with pending RPCs, and the wrong error code here prevented it from recovering once link is back up with a configured address. Incidentally, this is not an issue anymore since commit 4f8943f80883 ("SUNRPC: Replace direct task wakeups from softirq context"), included in 5.2-rc7, had the effect of decoupling the forwarding of this error by using SO_ERROR in xs_wake_error(), as pointed out by Benjamin Coddington. To the best of my knowledge, this isn't currently causing any further issue, but the error code doesn't look appropriate anyway, and we might hit this in other paths as well. In detail, as analysed by Gonzalo Siero, once the route is deleted because the interface is down, and can't be resolved and we return -EINVAL here, this ends up, courtesy of inet_sk_rebuild_header(), as the socket error seen by tcp_write_err(), called by tcp_retransmit_timer(). In turn, tcp_write_err() indirectly calls xs_error_report(), which wakes up the RPC pending tasks with a status of -EINVAL. This is then seen by call_status() in the SUN RPC implementation, which aborts the RPC call calling rpc_exit(), instead of handling this as a potentially temporary condition, i.e. as a timeout. Return -EINVAL only if the input parameters passed to ip_route_output_key_hash_rcu() are actually invalid (this is the case if the specified source address is multicast, limited broadcast or all zeroes), but return -ENETUNREACH in all cases where, at the given moment, the given source address doesn't allow resolving the route. While at it, drop the initialisation of err to -ENETUNREACH, which was added to __ip_route_output_key() back then by commit 0315e3827048 ("net: Fix behaviour of unreachable, blackhole and prohibit routes"), but actually had no effect, as it was, and is, overwritten by the fib_lookup() return code assignment, and anyway ignored in all other branches, including the if (fl4->saddr) one: I find this rather confusing, as it would look like -ENETUNREACH is the "default" error, while that statement has no effect. Also note that after commit fc75fc8339e7 ("ipv4: dont create routes on down devices"), we would get -ENETUNREACH if the device is down, but -EINVAL if the source address is specified and we can't resolve the route, and this appears to be rather inconsistent. Reported-by: Stefan Walter <walteste@inf.ethz.ch> Analysed-by: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com> Analysed-by: Gonzalo Siero <gsierohu@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-10-16 21:52:09 +03:00
ipv4_is_zeronet(fl4->saddr)) {
rth = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
goto out;
ipv4: Return -ENETUNREACH if we can't create route but saddr is valid ...instead of -EINVAL. An issue was found with older kernel versions while unplugging a NFS client with pending RPCs, and the wrong error code here prevented it from recovering once link is back up with a configured address. Incidentally, this is not an issue anymore since commit 4f8943f80883 ("SUNRPC: Replace direct task wakeups from softirq context"), included in 5.2-rc7, had the effect of decoupling the forwarding of this error by using SO_ERROR in xs_wake_error(), as pointed out by Benjamin Coddington. To the best of my knowledge, this isn't currently causing any further issue, but the error code doesn't look appropriate anyway, and we might hit this in other paths as well. In detail, as analysed by Gonzalo Siero, once the route is deleted because the interface is down, and can't be resolved and we return -EINVAL here, this ends up, courtesy of inet_sk_rebuild_header(), as the socket error seen by tcp_write_err(), called by tcp_retransmit_timer(). In turn, tcp_write_err() indirectly calls xs_error_report(), which wakes up the RPC pending tasks with a status of -EINVAL. This is then seen by call_status() in the SUN RPC implementation, which aborts the RPC call calling rpc_exit(), instead of handling this as a potentially temporary condition, i.e. as a timeout. Return -EINVAL only if the input parameters passed to ip_route_output_key_hash_rcu() are actually invalid (this is the case if the specified source address is multicast, limited broadcast or all zeroes), but return -ENETUNREACH in all cases where, at the given moment, the given source address doesn't allow resolving the route. While at it, drop the initialisation of err to -ENETUNREACH, which was added to __ip_route_output_key() back then by commit 0315e3827048 ("net: Fix behaviour of unreachable, blackhole and prohibit routes"), but actually had no effect, as it was, and is, overwritten by the fib_lookup() return code assignment, and anyway ignored in all other branches, including the if (fl4->saddr) one: I find this rather confusing, as it would look like -ENETUNREACH is the "default" error, while that statement has no effect. Also note that after commit fc75fc8339e7 ("ipv4: dont create routes on down devices"), we would get -ENETUNREACH if the device is down, but -EINVAL if the source address is specified and we can't resolve the route, and this appears to be rather inconsistent. Reported-by: Stefan Walter <walteste@inf.ethz.ch> Analysed-by: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com> Analysed-by: Gonzalo Siero <gsierohu@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-10-16 21:52:09 +03:00
}
rth = ERR_PTR(-ENETUNREACH);
/* I removed check for oif == dev_out->oif here.
It was wrong for two reasons:
1. ip_dev_find(net, saddr) can return wrong iface, if saddr
is assigned to multiple interfaces.
2. Moreover, we are allowed to send packets with saddr
of another iface. --ANK
*/
if (fl4->flowi4_oif == 0 &&
(ipv4_is_multicast(fl4->daddr) ||
ipv4_is_lbcast(fl4->daddr))) {
/* It is equivalent to inet_addr_type(saddr) == RTN_LOCAL */
dev_out = __ip_dev_find(net, fl4->saddr, false);
if (!dev_out)
goto out;
/* Special hack: user can direct multicasts
and limited broadcast via necessary interface
without fiddling with IP_MULTICAST_IF or IP_PKTINFO.
This hack is not just for fun, it allows
vic,vat and friends to work.
They bind socket to loopback, set ttl to zero
and expect that it will work.
From the viewpoint of routing cache they are broken,
because we are not allowed to build multicast path
with loopback source addr (look, routing cache
cannot know, that ttl is zero, so that packet
will not leave this host and route is valid).
Luckily, this hack is good workaround.
*/
fl4->flowi4_oif = dev_out->ifindex;
goto make_route;
}
if (!(fl4->flowi4_flags & FLOWI_FLAG_ANYSRC)) {
/* It is equivalent to inet_addr_type(saddr) == RTN_LOCAL */
if (!__ip_dev_find(net, fl4->saddr, false))
goto out;
}
}
if (fl4->flowi4_oif) {
dev_out = dev_get_by_index_rcu(net, fl4->flowi4_oif);
rth = ERR_PTR(-ENODEV);
if (!dev_out)
goto out;
/* RACE: Check return value of inet_select_addr instead. */
if (!(dev_out->flags & IFF_UP) || !__in_dev_get_rcu(dev_out)) {
rth = ERR_PTR(-ENETUNREACH);
goto out;
}
if (ipv4_is_local_multicast(fl4->daddr) ||
ipv4_is_lbcast(fl4->daddr) ||
fl4->flowi4_proto == IPPROTO_IGMP) {
if (!fl4->saddr)
fl4->saddr = inet_select_addr(dev_out, 0,
RT_SCOPE_LINK);
goto make_route;
}
if (!fl4->saddr) {
if (ipv4_is_multicast(fl4->daddr))
fl4->saddr = inet_select_addr(dev_out, 0,
fl4->flowi4_scope);
else if (!fl4->daddr)
fl4->saddr = inet_select_addr(dev_out, 0,
RT_SCOPE_HOST);
}
}
if (!fl4->daddr) {
fl4->daddr = fl4->saddr;
if (!fl4->daddr)
fl4->daddr = fl4->saddr = htonl(INADDR_LOOPBACK);
dev_out = net->loopback_dev;
fl4->flowi4_oif = LOOPBACK_IFINDEX;
res->type = RTN_LOCAL;
flags |= RTCF_LOCAL;
goto make_route;
}
err = fib_lookup(net, fl4, res, 0);
if (err) {
res->fi = NULL;
res->table = NULL;
if (fl4->flowi4_oif &&
(ipv4_is_multicast(fl4->daddr) ||
!netif_index_is_l3_master(net, fl4->flowi4_oif))) {
/* Apparently, routing tables are wrong. Assume,
that the destination is on link.
WHY? DW.
Because we are allowed to send to iface
even if it has NO routes and NO assigned
addresses. When oif is specified, routing
tables are looked up with only one purpose:
to catch if destination is gatewayed, rather than
direct. Moreover, if MSG_DONTROUTE is set,
we send packet, ignoring both routing tables
and ifaddr state. --ANK
We could make it even if oif is unknown,
likely IPv6, but we do not.
*/
if (fl4->saddr == 0)
fl4->saddr = inet_select_addr(dev_out, 0,
RT_SCOPE_LINK);
res->type = RTN_UNICAST;
goto make_route;
}
rth = ERR_PTR(err);
goto out;
}
if (res->type == RTN_LOCAL) {
if (!fl4->saddr) {
if (res->fi->fib_prefsrc)
fl4->saddr = res->fi->fib_prefsrc;
else
fl4->saddr = fl4->daddr;
}
/* L3 master device is the loopback for that domain */
dev_out = l3mdev_master_dev_rcu(FIB_RES_DEV(*res)) ? :
ipv4: Avoid caching l3mdev dst on mismatched local route David reported that doing the following: ip li add red type vrf table 10 ip link set dev eth1 vrf red ip addr add 127.0.0.1/8 dev red ip link set dev eth1 up ip li set red up ping -c1 -w1 -I red 127.0.0.1 ip li del red when either policy routing IP rules are present or the local table lookup ip rule is before the l3mdev lookup results in a hang with these messages: unregister_netdevice: waiting for red to become free. Usage count = 1 The problem is caused by caching the dst used for sending the packet out of the specified interface on a local route with a different nexthop interface. Thus the dst could stay around until the route in the table the lookup was done is deleted which may be never. Address the problem by not forcing output device to be the l3mdev in the flow's output interface if the lookup didn't use the l3mdev. This then results in the dst using the right device according to the route. Changes in v2: - make the dev_out passed in by __ip_route_output_key_hash correct instead of checking the nh dev if FLOWI_FLAG_SKIP_NH_OIF is set as suggested by David. Fixes: 5f02ce24c2696 ("net: l3mdev: Allow the l3mdev to be a loopback") Reported-by: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com> Suggested-by: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com> Signed-off-by: Robert Shearman <rshearma@brocade.com> Acked-by: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com> Tested-by: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-04-21 23:34:59 +03:00
net->loopback_dev;
net: ipv4: set orig_oif based on fib result for local traffic Attempts to connect to a local address with a socket bound to a device with the local address hangs if there is no listener: $ ip addr sh dev eth1 3: eth1: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc mq state UP group default qlen 1000 link/ether 02:e0:f9:1c:00:37 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff inet 10.100.1.4/24 scope global eth1 valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever inet6 2001:db8:1::4/120 scope global valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever inet6 fe80::e0:f9ff:fe1c:37/64 scope link valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever $ vrf-test -I eth1 -r 10.100.1.4 <hangs when there is no server> (don't let the command name fool you; vrf-test works without vrfs.) The problem is that the original intended device, eth1 in this case, is lost when the tcp reset is sent, so the socket lookup does not find a match for the reset and the connect attempt hangs. Fix by adjusting orig_oif for local traffic to the device from the fib lookup result. With this patch you get the more user friendly: $ vrf-test -I eth1 -r 10.100.1.4 connect failed: 111: Connection refused orig_oif is saved to the newly created rtable as rt_iif and when set it is used as the dif for socket lookups. It is set based on flowi4_oif passed in to ip_route_output_key_hash_rcu and will be set to either the loopback device, an l3mdev device, nothing (flowi4_oif = 0 which is the case in the example above) or a netdev index depending on the lookup path. In each case, resetting orig_oif to the device in the fib result for the RTN_LOCAL case allows the actual device to be preserved as the skb tx and rx is done over the loopback or VRF device. Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-10 23:49:10 +03:00
/* make sure orig_oif points to fib result device even
* though packet rx/tx happens over loopback or l3mdev
*/
orig_oif = FIB_RES_OIF(*res);
fl4->flowi4_oif = dev_out->ifindex;
flags |= RTCF_LOCAL;
goto make_route;
}
fib_select_path(net, res, fl4, skb);
dev_out = FIB_RES_DEV(*res);
make_route:
rth = __mkroute_output(res, fl4, orig_oif, dev_out, flags);
out:
return rth;
}
static struct dst_entry *ipv4_blackhole_dst_check(struct dst_entry *dst, u32 cookie)
{
return NULL;
}
static unsigned int ipv4_blackhole_mtu(const struct dst_entry *dst)
{
unsigned int mtu = dst_metric_raw(dst, RTAX_MTU);
return mtu ? : dst->dev->mtu;
}
static void ipv4_rt_blackhole_update_pmtu(struct dst_entry *dst, struct sock *sk,
net: add bool confirm_neigh parameter for dst_ops.update_pmtu The MTU update code is supposed to be invoked in response to real networking events that update the PMTU. In IPv6 PMTU update function __ip6_rt_update_pmtu() we called dst_confirm_neigh() to update neighbor confirmed time. But for tunnel code, it will call pmtu before xmit, like: - tnl_update_pmtu() - skb_dst_update_pmtu() - ip6_rt_update_pmtu() - __ip6_rt_update_pmtu() - dst_confirm_neigh() If the tunnel remote dst mac address changed and we still do the neigh confirm, we will not be able to update neigh cache and ping6 remote will failed. So for this ip_tunnel_xmit() case, _EVEN_ if the MTU is changed, we should not be invoking dst_confirm_neigh() as we have no evidence of successful two-way communication at this point. On the other hand it is also important to keep the neigh reachability fresh for TCP flows, so we cannot remove this dst_confirm_neigh() call. To fix the issue, we have to add a new bool parameter for dst_ops.update_pmtu to choose whether we should do neigh update or not. I will add the parameter in this patch and set all the callers to true to comply with the previous way, and fix the tunnel code one by one on later patches. v5: No change. v4: No change. v3: Do not remove dst_confirm_neigh, but add a new bool parameter in dst_ops.update_pmtu to control whether we should do neighbor confirm. Also split the big patch to small ones for each area. v2: Remove dst_confirm_neigh in __ip6_rt_update_pmtu. Suggested-by: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Reviewed-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com> Acked-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-12-22 05:51:09 +03:00
struct sk_buff *skb, u32 mtu,
bool confirm_neigh)
{
}
static void ipv4_rt_blackhole_redirect(struct dst_entry *dst, struct sock *sk,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
}
net: provide cow_metrics() methods to blackhole dst_ops Since commit 62fa8a846d7d (net: Implement read-only protection and COW'ing of metrics.) the kernel throws an oops. [ 101.620985] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) [ 101.621050] IP: [< (null)>] (null) [ 101.621084] PGD 6e53c067 PUD 3dd6a067 PMD 0 [ 101.621122] Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP [ 101.621153] last sysfs file: /sys/devices/virtual/ppp/ppp/uevent [ 101.621192] CPU 2 [ 101.621206] Modules linked in: l2tp_ppp pppox ppp_generic slhc l2tp_netlink l2tp_core deflate zlib_deflate twofish_x86_64 twofish_common des_generic cbc ecb sha1_generic hmac af_key iptable_filter snd_pcm_oss snd_mixer_oss snd_seq snd_seq_device loop snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_pcm snd_timer snd i2c_i801 iTCO_wdt psmouse soundcore snd_page_alloc evdev uhci_hcd ehci_hcd thermal [ 101.621552] [ 101.621567] Pid: 5129, comm: openl2tpd Not tainted 2.6.39-rc4-Quad #3 Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. G33-DS3R/G33-DS3R [ 101.621637] RIP: 0010:[<0000000000000000>] [< (null)>] (null) [ 101.621684] RSP: 0018:ffff88003ddeba60 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 101.621716] RAX: ffff88003ddb5600 RBX: ffff88003ddb5600 RCX: 0000000000000020 [ 101.621758] RDX: ffffffff81a69a00 RSI: ffffffff81b7ee61 RDI: ffff88003ddb5600 [ 101.621800] RBP: ffff8800537cd900 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88003ddb5600 [ 101.621840] R10: 0000000000000005 R11: 0000000000014b38 R12: ffff88003ddb5600 [ 101.621881] R13: ffffffff81b7e480 R14: ffffffff81b7e8b8 R15: ffff88003ddebad8 [ 101.621924] FS: 00007f06e4182700(0000) GS:ffff88007fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 101.621971] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 101.622005] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000045274000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 [ 101.622046] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 101.622087] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 101.622129] Process openl2tpd (pid: 5129, threadinfo ffff88003ddea000, task ffff88003de9a280) [ 101.622177] Stack: [ 101.622191] ffffffff81447efa ffff88007d3ded80 ffff88003de9a280 ffff88007d3ded80 [ 101.622245] 0000000000000001 ffff88003ddebbb8 ffffffff8148d5a7 0000000000000212 [ 101.622299] ffff88003dcea000 ffff88003dcea188 ffffffff00000001 ffffffff81b7e480 [ 101.622353] Call Trace: [ 101.622374] [<ffffffff81447efa>] ? ipv4_blackhole_route+0x1ba/0x210 [ 101.622415] [<ffffffff8148d5a7>] ? xfrm_lookup+0x417/0x510 [ 101.622450] [<ffffffff8127672a>] ? extract_buf+0x9a/0x140 [ 101.622485] [<ffffffff8144c6a0>] ? __ip_flush_pending_frames+0x70/0x70 [ 101.622526] [<ffffffff8146fbbf>] ? udp_sendmsg+0x62f/0x810 [ 101.622562] [<ffffffff813f98a6>] ? sock_sendmsg+0x116/0x130 [ 101.622599] [<ffffffff8109df58>] ? find_get_page+0x18/0x90 [ 101.622633] [<ffffffff8109fd6a>] ? filemap_fault+0x12a/0x4b0 [ 101.622668] [<ffffffff813fb5c4>] ? move_addr_to_kernel+0x64/0x90 [ 101.622706] [<ffffffff81405d5a>] ? verify_iovec+0x7a/0xf0 [ 101.622739] [<ffffffff813fc772>] ? sys_sendmsg+0x292/0x420 [ 101.622774] [<ffffffff810b994a>] ? handle_pte_fault+0x8a/0x7c0 [ 101.622810] [<ffffffff810b76fe>] ? __pte_alloc+0xae/0x130 [ 101.622844] [<ffffffff810ba2f8>] ? handle_mm_fault+0x138/0x380 [ 101.622880] [<ffffffff81024af9>] ? do_page_fault+0x189/0x410 [ 101.622915] [<ffffffff813fbe03>] ? sys_getsockname+0xf3/0x110 [ 101.622952] [<ffffffff81450c4d>] ? ip_setsockopt+0x4d/0xa0 [ 101.622986] [<ffffffff813f9932>] ? sockfd_lookup_light+0x22/0x90 [ 101.623024] [<ffffffff814b61fb>] ? system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [ 101.623060] Code: Bad RIP value. [ 101.623090] RIP [< (null)>] (null) [ 101.623125] RSP <ffff88003ddeba60> [ 101.623146] CR2: 0000000000000000 [ 101.650871] ---[ end trace ca3856a7d8e8dad4 ]--- [ 101.651011] __sk_free: optmem leakage (160 bytes) detected. The oops happens in dst_metrics_write_ptr() include/net/dst.h:124: return dst->ops->cow_metrics(dst, p); dst->ops->cow_metrics is NULL and causes the oops. Provide cow_metrics() methods, like we did in commit 214f45c91bb (net: provide default_advmss() methods to blackhole dst_ops) Signed-off-by: Held Bernhard <berny156@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-04-25 02:07:32 +04:00
static u32 *ipv4_rt_blackhole_cow_metrics(struct dst_entry *dst,
unsigned long old)
{
return NULL;
}
static struct dst_ops ipv4_dst_blackhole_ops = {
.family = AF_INET,
.check = ipv4_blackhole_dst_check,
.mtu = ipv4_blackhole_mtu,
.default_advmss = ipv4_default_advmss,
.update_pmtu = ipv4_rt_blackhole_update_pmtu,
.redirect = ipv4_rt_blackhole_redirect,
net: provide cow_metrics() methods to blackhole dst_ops Since commit 62fa8a846d7d (net: Implement read-only protection and COW'ing of metrics.) the kernel throws an oops. [ 101.620985] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) [ 101.621050] IP: [< (null)>] (null) [ 101.621084] PGD 6e53c067 PUD 3dd6a067 PMD 0 [ 101.621122] Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP [ 101.621153] last sysfs file: /sys/devices/virtual/ppp/ppp/uevent [ 101.621192] CPU 2 [ 101.621206] Modules linked in: l2tp_ppp pppox ppp_generic slhc l2tp_netlink l2tp_core deflate zlib_deflate twofish_x86_64 twofish_common des_generic cbc ecb sha1_generic hmac af_key iptable_filter snd_pcm_oss snd_mixer_oss snd_seq snd_seq_device loop snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_pcm snd_timer snd i2c_i801 iTCO_wdt psmouse soundcore snd_page_alloc evdev uhci_hcd ehci_hcd thermal [ 101.621552] [ 101.621567] Pid: 5129, comm: openl2tpd Not tainted 2.6.39-rc4-Quad #3 Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. G33-DS3R/G33-DS3R [ 101.621637] RIP: 0010:[<0000000000000000>] [< (null)>] (null) [ 101.621684] RSP: 0018:ffff88003ddeba60 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 101.621716] RAX: ffff88003ddb5600 RBX: ffff88003ddb5600 RCX: 0000000000000020 [ 101.621758] RDX: ffffffff81a69a00 RSI: ffffffff81b7ee61 RDI: ffff88003ddb5600 [ 101.621800] RBP: ffff8800537cd900 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88003ddb5600 [ 101.621840] R10: 0000000000000005 R11: 0000000000014b38 R12: ffff88003ddb5600 [ 101.621881] R13: ffffffff81b7e480 R14: ffffffff81b7e8b8 R15: ffff88003ddebad8 [ 101.621924] FS: 00007f06e4182700(0000) GS:ffff88007fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 101.621971] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 101.622005] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000045274000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 [ 101.622046] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 101.622087] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 101.622129] Process openl2tpd (pid: 5129, threadinfo ffff88003ddea000, task ffff88003de9a280) [ 101.622177] Stack: [ 101.622191] ffffffff81447efa ffff88007d3ded80 ffff88003de9a280 ffff88007d3ded80 [ 101.622245] 0000000000000001 ffff88003ddebbb8 ffffffff8148d5a7 0000000000000212 [ 101.622299] ffff88003dcea000 ffff88003dcea188 ffffffff00000001 ffffffff81b7e480 [ 101.622353] Call Trace: [ 101.622374] [<ffffffff81447efa>] ? ipv4_blackhole_route+0x1ba/0x210 [ 101.622415] [<ffffffff8148d5a7>] ? xfrm_lookup+0x417/0x510 [ 101.622450] [<ffffffff8127672a>] ? extract_buf+0x9a/0x140 [ 101.622485] [<ffffffff8144c6a0>] ? __ip_flush_pending_frames+0x70/0x70 [ 101.622526] [<ffffffff8146fbbf>] ? udp_sendmsg+0x62f/0x810 [ 101.622562] [<ffffffff813f98a6>] ? sock_sendmsg+0x116/0x130 [ 101.622599] [<ffffffff8109df58>] ? find_get_page+0x18/0x90 [ 101.622633] [<ffffffff8109fd6a>] ? filemap_fault+0x12a/0x4b0 [ 101.622668] [<ffffffff813fb5c4>] ? move_addr_to_kernel+0x64/0x90 [ 101.622706] [<ffffffff81405d5a>] ? verify_iovec+0x7a/0xf0 [ 101.622739] [<ffffffff813fc772>] ? sys_sendmsg+0x292/0x420 [ 101.622774] [<ffffffff810b994a>] ? handle_pte_fault+0x8a/0x7c0 [ 101.622810] [<ffffffff810b76fe>] ? __pte_alloc+0xae/0x130 [ 101.622844] [<ffffffff810ba2f8>] ? handle_mm_fault+0x138/0x380 [ 101.622880] [<ffffffff81024af9>] ? do_page_fault+0x189/0x410 [ 101.622915] [<ffffffff813fbe03>] ? sys_getsockname+0xf3/0x110 [ 101.622952] [<ffffffff81450c4d>] ? ip_setsockopt+0x4d/0xa0 [ 101.622986] [<ffffffff813f9932>] ? sockfd_lookup_light+0x22/0x90 [ 101.623024] [<ffffffff814b61fb>] ? system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [ 101.623060] Code: Bad RIP value. [ 101.623090] RIP [< (null)>] (null) [ 101.623125] RSP <ffff88003ddeba60> [ 101.623146] CR2: 0000000000000000 [ 101.650871] ---[ end trace ca3856a7d8e8dad4 ]--- [ 101.651011] __sk_free: optmem leakage (160 bytes) detected. The oops happens in dst_metrics_write_ptr() include/net/dst.h:124: return dst->ops->cow_metrics(dst, p); dst->ops->cow_metrics is NULL and causes the oops. Provide cow_metrics() methods, like we did in commit 214f45c91bb (net: provide default_advmss() methods to blackhole dst_ops) Signed-off-by: Held Bernhard <berny156@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-04-25 02:07:32 +04:00
.cow_metrics = ipv4_rt_blackhole_cow_metrics,
.neigh_lookup = ipv4_neigh_lookup,
};
struct dst_entry *ipv4_blackhole_route(struct net *net, struct dst_entry *dst_orig)
{
struct rtable *ort = (struct rtable *) dst_orig;
struct rtable *rt;
rt = dst_alloc(&ipv4_dst_blackhole_ops, NULL, 1, DST_OBSOLETE_DEAD, 0);
if (rt) {
struct dst_entry *new = &rt->dst;
new->__use = 1;
new->input = dst_discard;
new->output = dst_discard_out;
new->dev = net->loopback_dev;
if (new->dev)
dev_hold(new->dev);
rt->rt_is_input = ort->rt_is_input;
rt->rt_iif = ort->rt_iif;
rt->rt_pmtu = ort->rt_pmtu;
rt->rt_mtu_locked = ort->rt_mtu_locked;
rt->rt_genid = rt_genid_ipv4(net);
rt->rt_flags = ort->rt_flags;
rt->rt_type = ort->rt_type;
rt->rt_uses_gateway = ort->rt_uses_gateway;
rt->rt_gw_family = ort->rt_gw_family;
if (rt->rt_gw_family == AF_INET)
rt->rt_gw4 = ort->rt_gw4;
else if (rt->rt_gw_family == AF_INET6)
rt->rt_gw6 = ort->rt_gw6;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&rt->rt_uncached);
}
dst_release(dst_orig);
return rt ? &rt->dst : ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
struct rtable *ip_route_output_flow(struct net *net, struct flowi4 *flp4,
const struct sock *sk)
{
struct rtable *rt = __ip_route_output_key(net, flp4);
if (IS_ERR(rt))
return rt;
if (flp4->flowi4_proto) {
flp4->flowi4_oif = rt->dst.dev->ifindex;
rt = (struct rtable *)xfrm_lookup_route(net, &rt->dst,
flowi4_to_flowi(flp4),
sk, 0);
}
return rt;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ip_route_output_flow);
struct rtable *ip_route_output_tunnel(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct net_device *dev,
struct net *net, __be32 *saddr,
const struct ip_tunnel_info *info,
u8 protocol, bool use_cache)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_DST_CACHE
struct dst_cache *dst_cache;
#endif
struct rtable *rt = NULL;
struct flowi4 fl4;
__u8 tos;
#ifdef CONFIG_DST_CACHE
dst_cache = (struct dst_cache *)&info->dst_cache;
if (use_cache) {
rt = dst_cache_get_ip4(dst_cache, saddr);
if (rt)
return rt;
}
#endif
memset(&fl4, 0, sizeof(fl4));
fl4.flowi4_mark = skb->mark;
fl4.flowi4_proto = protocol;
fl4.daddr = info->key.u.ipv4.dst;
fl4.saddr = info->key.u.ipv4.src;
tos = info->key.tos;
fl4.flowi4_tos = RT_TOS(tos);
rt = ip_route_output_key(net, &fl4);
if (IS_ERR(rt)) {
netdev_dbg(dev, "no route to %pI4\n", &fl4.daddr);
return ERR_PTR(-ENETUNREACH);
}
if (rt->dst.dev == dev) { /* is this necessary? */
netdev_dbg(dev, "circular route to %pI4\n", &fl4.daddr);
ip_rt_put(rt);
return ERR_PTR(-ELOOP);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_DST_CACHE
if (use_cache)
dst_cache_set_ip4(dst_cache, &rt->dst, fl4.saddr);
#endif
*saddr = fl4.saddr;
return rt;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ip_route_output_tunnel);
/* called with rcu_read_lock held */
static int rt_fill_info(struct net *net, __be32 dst, __be32 src,
struct rtable *rt, u32 table_id, struct flowi4 *fl4,
net: route dump netlink NLM_F_MULTI flag missing An excerpt from netlink(7) man page, In multipart messages (multiple nlmsghdr headers with associated payload in one byte stream) the first and all following headers have the NLM_F_MULTI flag set, except for the last header which has the type NLMSG_DONE. but, after (ee28906) there is a missing NLM_F_MULTI flag in the middle of a FIB dump. The result is user space applications following above man page excerpt may get confused and may stop parsing msg believing something went wrong. In the golang netlink lib [0] the library logic stops parsing believing the message is not a multipart message. Found this running Cilium[1] against net-next while adding a feature to auto-detect routes. I noticed with multiple route tables we no longer could detect the default routes on net tree kernels because the library logic was not returning them. Fix this by handling the fib_dump_info_fnhe() case the same way the fib_dump_info() handles it by passing the flags argument through the call chain and adding a flags argument to rt_fill_info(). Tested with Cilium stack and auto-detection of routes works again. Also annotated libs to dump netlink msgs and inspected NLM_F_MULTI and NLMSG_DONE flags look correct after this. Note: In inet_rtm_getroute() pass rt_fill_info() '0' for flags the same as is done for fib_dump_info() so this looks correct to me. [0] https://github.com/vishvananda/netlink/ [1] https://github.com/cilium/ Fixes: ee28906fd7a14 ("ipv4: Dump route exceptions if requested") Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-08-24 03:11:38 +03:00
struct sk_buff *skb, u32 portid, u32 seq,
unsigned int flags)
{
struct rtmsg *r;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
unsigned long expires = 0;
u32 error;
u32 metrics[RTAX_MAX];
net: route dump netlink NLM_F_MULTI flag missing An excerpt from netlink(7) man page, In multipart messages (multiple nlmsghdr headers with associated payload in one byte stream) the first and all following headers have the NLM_F_MULTI flag set, except for the last header which has the type NLMSG_DONE. but, after (ee28906) there is a missing NLM_F_MULTI flag in the middle of a FIB dump. The result is user space applications following above man page excerpt may get confused and may stop parsing msg believing something went wrong. In the golang netlink lib [0] the library logic stops parsing believing the message is not a multipart message. Found this running Cilium[1] against net-next while adding a feature to auto-detect routes. I noticed with multiple route tables we no longer could detect the default routes on net tree kernels because the library logic was not returning them. Fix this by handling the fib_dump_info_fnhe() case the same way the fib_dump_info() handles it by passing the flags argument through the call chain and adding a flags argument to rt_fill_info(). Tested with Cilium stack and auto-detection of routes works again. Also annotated libs to dump netlink msgs and inspected NLM_F_MULTI and NLMSG_DONE flags look correct after this. Note: In inet_rtm_getroute() pass rt_fill_info() '0' for flags the same as is done for fib_dump_info() so this looks correct to me. [0] https://github.com/vishvananda/netlink/ [1] https://github.com/cilium/ Fixes: ee28906fd7a14 ("ipv4: Dump route exceptions if requested") Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-08-24 03:11:38 +03:00
nlh = nlmsg_put(skb, portid, seq, RTM_NEWROUTE, sizeof(*r), flags);
if (!nlh)
return -EMSGSIZE;
r = nlmsg_data(nlh);
r->rtm_family = AF_INET;
r->rtm_dst_len = 32;
r->rtm_src_len = 0;
r->rtm_tos = fl4 ? fl4->flowi4_tos : 0;
r->rtm_table = table_id < 256 ? table_id : RT_TABLE_COMPAT;
if (nla_put_u32(skb, RTA_TABLE, table_id))
goto nla_put_failure;
r->rtm_type = rt->rt_type;
r->rtm_scope = RT_SCOPE_UNIVERSE;
r->rtm_protocol = RTPROT_UNSPEC;
r->rtm_flags = (rt->rt_flags & ~0xFFFF) | RTM_F_CLONED;
if (rt->rt_flags & RTCF_NOTIFY)
r->rtm_flags |= RTM_F_NOTIFY;
if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_DOREDIRECT)
r->rtm_flags |= RTCF_DOREDIRECT;
if (nla_put_in_addr(skb, RTA_DST, dst))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (src) {
r->rtm_src_len = 32;
if (nla_put_in_addr(skb, RTA_SRC, src))
goto nla_put_failure;
}
if (rt->dst.dev &&
nla_put_u32(skb, RTA_OIF, rt->dst.dev->ifindex))
goto nla_put_failure;
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_CLASSID
if (rt->dst.tclassid &&
nla_put_u32(skb, RTA_FLOW, rt->dst.tclassid))
goto nla_put_failure;
#endif
if (fl4 && !rt_is_input_route(rt) &&
fl4->saddr != src) {
if (nla_put_in_addr(skb, RTA_PREFSRC, fl4->saddr))
goto nla_put_failure;
}
if (rt->rt_uses_gateway) {
if (rt->rt_gw_family == AF_INET &&
nla_put_in_addr(skb, RTA_GATEWAY, rt->rt_gw4)) {
goto nla_put_failure;
} else if (rt->rt_gw_family == AF_INET6) {
int alen = sizeof(struct in6_addr);
struct nlattr *nla;
struct rtvia *via;
nla = nla_reserve(skb, RTA_VIA, alen + 2);
if (!nla)
goto nla_put_failure;
via = nla_data(nla);
via->rtvia_family = AF_INET6;
memcpy(via->rtvia_addr, &rt->rt_gw6, alen);
}
}
expires = rt->dst.expires;
if (expires) {
unsigned long now = jiffies;
if (time_before(now, expires))
expires -= now;
else
expires = 0;
}
memcpy(metrics, dst_metrics_ptr(&rt->dst), sizeof(metrics));
if (rt->rt_pmtu && expires)
metrics[RTAX_MTU - 1] = rt->rt_pmtu;
if (rt->rt_mtu_locked && expires)
metrics[RTAX_LOCK - 1] |= BIT(RTAX_MTU);
if (rtnetlink_put_metrics(skb, metrics) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
if (fl4) {
if (fl4->flowi4_mark &&
nla_put_u32(skb, RTA_MARK, fl4->flowi4_mark))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (!uid_eq(fl4->flowi4_uid, INVALID_UID) &&
nla_put_u32(skb, RTA_UID,
from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(),
fl4->flowi4_uid)))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (rt_is_input_route(rt)) {
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_MROUTE
if (ipv4_is_multicast(dst) &&
!ipv4_is_local_multicast(dst) &&
IPV4_DEVCONF_ALL(net, MC_FORWARDING)) {
int err = ipmr_get_route(net, skb,
fl4->saddr, fl4->daddr,
r, portid);
if (err <= 0) {
if (err == 0)
return 0;
goto nla_put_failure;
}
} else
#endif
if (nla_put_u32(skb, RTA_IIF, fl4->flowi4_iif))
goto nla_put_failure;
}
}
error = rt->dst.error;
if (rtnl_put_cacheinfo(skb, &rt->dst, 0, expires, error) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
netlink: make nlmsg_end() and genlmsg_end() void Contrary to common expectations for an "int" return, these functions return only a positive value -- if used correctly they cannot even return 0 because the message header will necessarily be in the skb. This makes the very common pattern of if (genlmsg_end(...) < 0) { ... } be a whole bunch of dead code. Many places also simply do return nlmsg_end(...); and the caller is expected to deal with it. This also commonly (at least for me) causes errors, because it is very common to write if (my_function(...)) /* error condition */ and if my_function() does "return nlmsg_end()" this is of course wrong. Additionally, there's not a single place in the kernel that actually needs the message length returned, and if anyone needs it later then it'll be very easy to just use skb->len there. Remove this, and make the functions void. This removes a bunch of dead code as described above. The patch adds lines because I did - return nlmsg_end(...); + nlmsg_end(...); + return 0; I could have preserved all the function's return values by returning skb->len, but instead I've audited all the places calling the affected functions and found that none cared. A few places actually compared the return value with <= 0 in dump functionality, but that could just be changed to < 0 with no change in behaviour, so I opted for the more efficient version. One instance of the error I've made numerous times now is also present in net/phonet/pn_netlink.c in the route_dumpit() function - it didn't check for <0 or <=0 and thus broke out of the loop every single time. I've preserved this since it will (I think) have caused the messages to userspace to be formatted differently with just a single message for every SKB returned to userspace. It's possible that this isn't needed for the tools that actually use this, but I don't even know what they are so couldn't test that changing this behaviour would be acceptable. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-01-17 00:09:00 +03:00
nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
nlmsg_cancel(skb, nlh);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
ipv4: Dump route exceptions if requested Since commit 4895c771c7f0 ("ipv4: Add FIB nexthop exceptions."), cached exception routes are stored as a separate entity, so they are not dumped on a FIB dump, even if the RTM_F_CLONED flag is passed. This implies that the command 'ip route list cache' doesn't return any result anymore. If the RTM_F_CLONED is passed, and strict checking requested, retrieve nexthop exception routes and dump them. If no strict checking is requested, filtering can't be performed consistently: dump everything in that case. With this, we need to add an argument to the netlink callback in order to track how many entries were already dumped for the last leaf included in a partial netlink dump. A single additional argument is sufficient, even if we traverse logically nested structures (nexthop objects, hash table buckets, bucket chains): it doesn't matter if we stop in the middle of any of those, because they are always traversed the same way. As an example, s_i values in [], s_fa values in (): node (fa) #1 [1] nexthop #1 bucket #1 -> #0 in chain (1) bucket #2 -> #0 in chain (2) -> #1 in chain (3) -> #2 in chain (4) bucket #3 -> #0 in chain (5) -> #1 in chain (6) nexthop #2 bucket #1 -> #0 in chain (7) -> #1 in chain (8) bucket #2 -> #0 in chain (9) -- node (fa) #2 [2] nexthop #1 bucket #1 -> #0 in chain (1) -> #1 in chain (2) bucket #2 -> #0 in chain (3) it doesn't matter if we stop at (3), (4), (7) for "node #1", or at (2) for "node #2": walking flattens all that. It would even be possible to drop the distinction between the in-tree (s_i) and in-node (s_fa) counter, but a further improvement might advise against this. This is only as accurate as the existing tracking mechanism for leaves: if a partial dump is restarted after exceptions are removed or expired, we might skip some non-dumped entries. To improve this, we could attach a 'sernum' attribute (similar to the one used for IPv6) to nexthop entities, and bump this counter whenever exceptions change: having a distinction between the two counters would make this more convenient. Listing of exception routes (modified routes pre-3.5) was tested against these versions of kernel and iproute2: iproute2 kernel 4.14.0 4.15.0 4.19.0 5.0.0 5.1.0 3.5-rc4 + + + + + 4.4 4.9 4.14 4.15 4.19 5.0 5.1 fixed + + + + + v7: - Move loop over nexthop objects to route.c, and pass struct fib_info and table ID to it, not a struct fib_alias (suggested by David Ahern) - While at it, note that the NULL check on fa->fa_info is redundant, and the check on RTNH_F_DEAD is also not consistent with what's done with regular route listing: just keep it for nhc_flags - Rename entry point function for dumping exceptions to fib_dump_info_fnhe(), and rearrange arguments for consistency with fib_dump_info() - Rename fnhe_dump_buckets() to fnhe_dump_bucket() and make it handle one bucket at a time - Expand commit message to describe why we can have a single "skip" counter for all exceptions stored in bucket chains in nexthop objects (suggested by David Ahern) v6: - Rebased onto net-next - Loop over nexthop paths too. Move loop over fnhe buckets to route.c, avoids need to export rt_fill_info() and to touch exceptions from fib_trie.c. Pass NULL as flow to rt_fill_info(), it now allows that (suggested by David Ahern) Fixes: 4895c771c7f0 ("ipv4: Add FIB nexthop exceptions.") Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-06-21 18:45:23 +03:00
static int fnhe_dump_bucket(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct netlink_callback *cb, u32 table_id,
struct fnhe_hash_bucket *bucket, int genid,
net: route dump netlink NLM_F_MULTI flag missing An excerpt from netlink(7) man page, In multipart messages (multiple nlmsghdr headers with associated payload in one byte stream) the first and all following headers have the NLM_F_MULTI flag set, except for the last header which has the type NLMSG_DONE. but, after (ee28906) there is a missing NLM_F_MULTI flag in the middle of a FIB dump. The result is user space applications following above man page excerpt may get confused and may stop parsing msg believing something went wrong. In the golang netlink lib [0] the library logic stops parsing believing the message is not a multipart message. Found this running Cilium[1] against net-next while adding a feature to auto-detect routes. I noticed with multiple route tables we no longer could detect the default routes on net tree kernels because the library logic was not returning them. Fix this by handling the fib_dump_info_fnhe() case the same way the fib_dump_info() handles it by passing the flags argument through the call chain and adding a flags argument to rt_fill_info(). Tested with Cilium stack and auto-detection of routes works again. Also annotated libs to dump netlink msgs and inspected NLM_F_MULTI and NLMSG_DONE flags look correct after this. Note: In inet_rtm_getroute() pass rt_fill_info() '0' for flags the same as is done for fib_dump_info() so this looks correct to me. [0] https://github.com/vishvananda/netlink/ [1] https://github.com/cilium/ Fixes: ee28906fd7a14 ("ipv4: Dump route exceptions if requested") Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-08-24 03:11:38 +03:00
int *fa_index, int fa_start, unsigned int flags)
ipv4: Dump route exceptions if requested Since commit 4895c771c7f0 ("ipv4: Add FIB nexthop exceptions."), cached exception routes are stored as a separate entity, so they are not dumped on a FIB dump, even if the RTM_F_CLONED flag is passed. This implies that the command 'ip route list cache' doesn't return any result anymore. If the RTM_F_CLONED is passed, and strict checking requested, retrieve nexthop exception routes and dump them. If no strict checking is requested, filtering can't be performed consistently: dump everything in that case. With this, we need to add an argument to the netlink callback in order to track how many entries were already dumped for the last leaf included in a partial netlink dump. A single additional argument is sufficient, even if we traverse logically nested structures (nexthop objects, hash table buckets, bucket chains): it doesn't matter if we stop in the middle of any of those, because they are always traversed the same way. As an example, s_i values in [], s_fa values in (): node (fa) #1 [1] nexthop #1 bucket #1 -> #0 in chain (1) bucket #2 -> #0 in chain (2) -> #1 in chain (3) -> #2 in chain (4) bucket #3 -> #0 in chain (5) -> #1 in chain (6) nexthop #2 bucket #1 -> #0 in chain (7) -> #1 in chain (8) bucket #2 -> #0 in chain (9) -- node (fa) #2 [2] nexthop #1 bucket #1 -> #0 in chain (1) -> #1 in chain (2) bucket #2 -> #0 in chain (3) it doesn't matter if we stop at (3), (4), (7) for "node #1", or at (2) for "node #2": walking flattens all that. It would even be possible to drop the distinction between the in-tree (s_i) and in-node (s_fa) counter, but a further improvement might advise against this. This is only as accurate as the existing tracking mechanism for leaves: if a partial dump is restarted after exceptions are removed or expired, we might skip some non-dumped entries. To improve this, we could attach a 'sernum' attribute (similar to the one used for IPv6) to nexthop entities, and bump this counter whenever exceptions change: having a distinction between the two counters would make this more convenient. Listing of exception routes (modified routes pre-3.5) was tested against these versions of kernel and iproute2: iproute2 kernel 4.14.0 4.15.0 4.19.0 5.0.0 5.1.0 3.5-rc4 + + + + + 4.4 4.9 4.14 4.15 4.19 5.0 5.1 fixed + + + + + v7: - Move loop over nexthop objects to route.c, and pass struct fib_info and table ID to it, not a struct fib_alias (suggested by David Ahern) - While at it, note that the NULL check on fa->fa_info is redundant, and the check on RTNH_F_DEAD is also not consistent with what's done with regular route listing: just keep it for nhc_flags - Rename entry point function for dumping exceptions to fib_dump_info_fnhe(), and rearrange arguments for consistency with fib_dump_info() - Rename fnhe_dump_buckets() to fnhe_dump_bucket() and make it handle one bucket at a time - Expand commit message to describe why we can have a single "skip" counter for all exceptions stored in bucket chains in nexthop objects (suggested by David Ahern) v6: - Rebased onto net-next - Loop over nexthop paths too. Move loop over fnhe buckets to route.c, avoids need to export rt_fill_info() and to touch exceptions from fib_trie.c. Pass NULL as flow to rt_fill_info(), it now allows that (suggested by David Ahern) Fixes: 4895c771c7f0 ("ipv4: Add FIB nexthop exceptions.") Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-06-21 18:45:23 +03:00
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < FNHE_HASH_SIZE; i++) {
struct fib_nh_exception *fnhe;
for (fnhe = rcu_dereference(bucket[i].chain); fnhe;
fnhe = rcu_dereference(fnhe->fnhe_next)) {
struct rtable *rt;
int err;
if (*fa_index < fa_start)
goto next;
if (fnhe->fnhe_genid != genid)
goto next;
if (fnhe->fnhe_expires &&
time_after(jiffies, fnhe->fnhe_expires))
goto next;
rt = rcu_dereference(fnhe->fnhe_rth_input);
if (!rt)
rt = rcu_dereference(fnhe->fnhe_rth_output);
if (!rt)
goto next;
err = rt_fill_info(net, fnhe->fnhe_daddr, 0, rt,
table_id, NULL, skb,
NETLINK_CB(cb->skb).portid,
net: route dump netlink NLM_F_MULTI flag missing An excerpt from netlink(7) man page, In multipart messages (multiple nlmsghdr headers with associated payload in one byte stream) the first and all following headers have the NLM_F_MULTI flag set, except for the last header which has the type NLMSG_DONE. but, after (ee28906) there is a missing NLM_F_MULTI flag in the middle of a FIB dump. The result is user space applications following above man page excerpt may get confused and may stop parsing msg believing something went wrong. In the golang netlink lib [0] the library logic stops parsing believing the message is not a multipart message. Found this running Cilium[1] against net-next while adding a feature to auto-detect routes. I noticed with multiple route tables we no longer could detect the default routes on net tree kernels because the library logic was not returning them. Fix this by handling the fib_dump_info_fnhe() case the same way the fib_dump_info() handles it by passing the flags argument through the call chain and adding a flags argument to rt_fill_info(). Tested with Cilium stack and auto-detection of routes works again. Also annotated libs to dump netlink msgs and inspected NLM_F_MULTI and NLMSG_DONE flags look correct after this. Note: In inet_rtm_getroute() pass rt_fill_info() '0' for flags the same as is done for fib_dump_info() so this looks correct to me. [0] https://github.com/vishvananda/netlink/ [1] https://github.com/cilium/ Fixes: ee28906fd7a14 ("ipv4: Dump route exceptions if requested") Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-08-24 03:11:38 +03:00
cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq, flags);
ipv4: Dump route exceptions if requested Since commit 4895c771c7f0 ("ipv4: Add FIB nexthop exceptions."), cached exception routes are stored as a separate entity, so they are not dumped on a FIB dump, even if the RTM_F_CLONED flag is passed. This implies that the command 'ip route list cache' doesn't return any result anymore. If the RTM_F_CLONED is passed, and strict checking requested, retrieve nexthop exception routes and dump them. If no strict checking is requested, filtering can't be performed consistently: dump everything in that case. With this, we need to add an argument to the netlink callback in order to track how many entries were already dumped for the last leaf included in a partial netlink dump. A single additional argument is sufficient, even if we traverse logically nested structures (nexthop objects, hash table buckets, bucket chains): it doesn't matter if we stop in the middle of any of those, because they are always traversed the same way. As an example, s_i values in [], s_fa values in (): node (fa) #1 [1] nexthop #1 bucket #1 -> #0 in chain (1) bucket #2 -> #0 in chain (2) -> #1 in chain (3) -> #2 in chain (4) bucket #3 -> #0 in chain (5) -> #1 in chain (6) nexthop #2 bucket #1 -> #0 in chain (7) -> #1 in chain (8) bucket #2 -> #0 in chain (9) -- node (fa) #2 [2] nexthop #1 bucket #1 -> #0 in chain (1) -> #1 in chain (2) bucket #2 -> #0 in chain (3) it doesn't matter if we stop at (3), (4), (7) for "node #1", or at (2) for "node #2": walking flattens all that. It would even be possible to drop the distinction between the in-tree (s_i) and in-node (s_fa) counter, but a further improvement might advise against this. This is only as accurate as the existing tracking mechanism for leaves: if a partial dump is restarted after exceptions are removed or expired, we might skip some non-dumped entries. To improve this, we could attach a 'sernum' attribute (similar to the one used for IPv6) to nexthop entities, and bump this counter whenever exceptions change: having a distinction between the two counters would make this more convenient. Listing of exception routes (modified routes pre-3.5) was tested against these versions of kernel and iproute2: iproute2 kernel 4.14.0 4.15.0 4.19.0 5.0.0 5.1.0 3.5-rc4 + + + + + 4.4 4.9 4.14 4.15 4.19 5.0 5.1 fixed + + + + + v7: - Move loop over nexthop objects to route.c, and pass struct fib_info and table ID to it, not a struct fib_alias (suggested by David Ahern) - While at it, note that the NULL check on fa->fa_info is redundant, and the check on RTNH_F_DEAD is also not consistent with what's done with regular route listing: just keep it for nhc_flags - Rename entry point function for dumping exceptions to fib_dump_info_fnhe(), and rearrange arguments for consistency with fib_dump_info() - Rename fnhe_dump_buckets() to fnhe_dump_bucket() and make it handle one bucket at a time - Expand commit message to describe why we can have a single "skip" counter for all exceptions stored in bucket chains in nexthop objects (suggested by David Ahern) v6: - Rebased onto net-next - Loop over nexthop paths too. Move loop over fnhe buckets to route.c, avoids need to export rt_fill_info() and to touch exceptions from fib_trie.c. Pass NULL as flow to rt_fill_info(), it now allows that (suggested by David Ahern) Fixes: 4895c771c7f0 ("ipv4: Add FIB nexthop exceptions.") Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-06-21 18:45:23 +03:00
if (err)
return err;
next:
(*fa_index)++;
}
}
return 0;
}
int fib_dump_info_fnhe(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb,
u32 table_id, struct fib_info *fi,
net: route dump netlink NLM_F_MULTI flag missing An excerpt from netlink(7) man page, In multipart messages (multiple nlmsghdr headers with associated payload in one byte stream) the first and all following headers have the NLM_F_MULTI flag set, except for the last header which has the type NLMSG_DONE. but, after (ee28906) there is a missing NLM_F_MULTI flag in the middle of a FIB dump. The result is user space applications following above man page excerpt may get confused and may stop parsing msg believing something went wrong. In the golang netlink lib [0] the library logic stops parsing believing the message is not a multipart message. Found this running Cilium[1] against net-next while adding a feature to auto-detect routes. I noticed with multiple route tables we no longer could detect the default routes on net tree kernels because the library logic was not returning them. Fix this by handling the fib_dump_info_fnhe() case the same way the fib_dump_info() handles it by passing the flags argument through the call chain and adding a flags argument to rt_fill_info(). Tested with Cilium stack and auto-detection of routes works again. Also annotated libs to dump netlink msgs and inspected NLM_F_MULTI and NLMSG_DONE flags look correct after this. Note: In inet_rtm_getroute() pass rt_fill_info() '0' for flags the same as is done for fib_dump_info() so this looks correct to me. [0] https://github.com/vishvananda/netlink/ [1] https://github.com/cilium/ Fixes: ee28906fd7a14 ("ipv4: Dump route exceptions if requested") Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-08-24 03:11:38 +03:00
int *fa_index, int fa_start, unsigned int flags)
ipv4: Dump route exceptions if requested Since commit 4895c771c7f0 ("ipv4: Add FIB nexthop exceptions."), cached exception routes are stored as a separate entity, so they are not dumped on a FIB dump, even if the RTM_F_CLONED flag is passed. This implies that the command 'ip route list cache' doesn't return any result anymore. If the RTM_F_CLONED is passed, and strict checking requested, retrieve nexthop exception routes and dump them. If no strict checking is requested, filtering can't be performed consistently: dump everything in that case. With this, we need to add an argument to the netlink callback in order to track how many entries were already dumped for the last leaf included in a partial netlink dump. A single additional argument is sufficient, even if we traverse logically nested structures (nexthop objects, hash table buckets, bucket chains): it doesn't matter if we stop in the middle of any of those, because they are always traversed the same way. As an example, s_i values in [], s_fa values in (): node (fa) #1 [1] nexthop #1 bucket #1 -> #0 in chain (1) bucket #2 -> #0 in chain (2) -> #1 in chain (3) -> #2 in chain (4) bucket #3 -> #0 in chain (5) -> #1 in chain (6) nexthop #2 bucket #1 -> #0 in chain (7) -> #1 in chain (8) bucket #2 -> #0 in chain (9) -- node (fa) #2 [2] nexthop #1 bucket #1 -> #0 in chain (1) -> #1 in chain (2) bucket #2 -> #0 in chain (3) it doesn't matter if we stop at (3), (4), (7) for "node #1", or at (2) for "node #2": walking flattens all that. It would even be possible to drop the distinction between the in-tree (s_i) and in-node (s_fa) counter, but a further improvement might advise against this. This is only as accurate as the existing tracking mechanism for leaves: if a partial dump is restarted after exceptions are removed or expired, we might skip some non-dumped entries. To improve this, we could attach a 'sernum' attribute (similar to the one used for IPv6) to nexthop entities, and bump this counter whenever exceptions change: having a distinction between the two counters would make this more convenient. Listing of exception routes (modified routes pre-3.5) was tested against these versions of kernel and iproute2: iproute2 kernel 4.14.0 4.15.0 4.19.0 5.0.0 5.1.0 3.5-rc4 + + + + + 4.4 4.9 4.14 4.15 4.19 5.0 5.1 fixed + + + + + v7: - Move loop over nexthop objects to route.c, and pass struct fib_info and table ID to it, not a struct fib_alias (suggested by David Ahern) - While at it, note that the NULL check on fa->fa_info is redundant, and the check on RTNH_F_DEAD is also not consistent with what's done with regular route listing: just keep it for nhc_flags - Rename entry point function for dumping exceptions to fib_dump_info_fnhe(), and rearrange arguments for consistency with fib_dump_info() - Rename fnhe_dump_buckets() to fnhe_dump_bucket() and make it handle one bucket at a time - Expand commit message to describe why we can have a single "skip" counter for all exceptions stored in bucket chains in nexthop objects (suggested by David Ahern) v6: - Rebased onto net-next - Loop over nexthop paths too. Move loop over fnhe buckets to route.c, avoids need to export rt_fill_info() and to touch exceptions from fib_trie.c. Pass NULL as flow to rt_fill_info(), it now allows that (suggested by David Ahern) Fixes: 4895c771c7f0 ("ipv4: Add FIB nexthop exceptions.") Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-06-21 18:45:23 +03:00
{
struct net *net = sock_net(cb->skb->sk);
int nhsel, genid = fnhe_genid(net);
for (nhsel = 0; nhsel < fib_info_num_path(fi); nhsel++) {
struct fib_nh_common *nhc = fib_info_nhc(fi, nhsel);
struct fnhe_hash_bucket *bucket;
int err;
if (nhc->nhc_flags & RTNH_F_DEAD)
continue;
ipv4: fix suspicious RCU usage in fib_dump_info_fnhe() sysbot reported that we lack appropriate rcu_read_lock() protection in fib_dump_info_fnhe() net/ipv4/route.c:2875 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 1 lock held by syz-executor609/8966: #0: 00000000b7dbe288 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: netlink_dump+0xe7/0xfb0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2199 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 8966 Comm: syz-executor609 Not tainted 5.2.0-rc5+ #43 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x153/0x15d kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5250 fib_dump_info_fnhe+0x9d9/0x1080 net/ipv4/route.c:2875 fn_trie_dump_leaf net/ipv4/fib_trie.c:2141 [inline] fib_table_dump+0x64a/0xd00 net/ipv4/fib_trie.c:2175 inet_dump_fib+0x83c/0xa90 net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c:1004 rtnl_dump_all+0x295/0x490 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3445 netlink_dump+0x558/0xfb0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2244 __netlink_dump_start+0x5b1/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2352 netlink_dump_start include/linux/netlink.h:226 [inline] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x73d/0xb00 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5182 netlink_rcv_skb+0x177/0x450 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477 rtnetlink_rcv+0x1d/0x30 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5237 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1302 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x531/0x710 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1328 netlink_sendmsg+0x8ae/0xd70 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:646 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd7/0x130 net/socket.c:665 sock_write_iter+0x27c/0x3e0 net/socket.c:994 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1872 [inline] new_sync_write+0x4d3/0x770 fs/read_write.c:483 __vfs_write+0xe1/0x110 fs/read_write.c:496 vfs_write+0x20c/0x580 fs/read_write.c:558 ksys_write+0x14f/0x290 fs/read_write.c:611 __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:623 [inline] __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:620 [inline] __x64_sys_write+0x73/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:620 do_syscall_64+0xfd/0x680 arch/x86/entry/common.c:301 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x4401b9 Code: 18 89 d0 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 fb 13 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007ffc8e134978 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004002c8 RCX: 00000000004401b9 RDX: 000000000000001c RSI: 0000000020000000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00000000006ca018 R08: 00000000004002c8 R09: 00000000004002c8 R10: 0000000000000010 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000401a40 R13: 0000000000401ad0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Fixes: ee28906fd7a1 ("ipv4: Dump route exceptions if requested") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com> Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Reviewed-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-06-26 13:04:50 +03:00
rcu_read_lock();
ipv4: Dump route exceptions if requested Since commit 4895c771c7f0 ("ipv4: Add FIB nexthop exceptions."), cached exception routes are stored as a separate entity, so they are not dumped on a FIB dump, even if the RTM_F_CLONED flag is passed. This implies that the command 'ip route list cache' doesn't return any result anymore. If the RTM_F_CLONED is passed, and strict checking requested, retrieve nexthop exception routes and dump them. If no strict checking is requested, filtering can't be performed consistently: dump everything in that case. With this, we need to add an argument to the netlink callback in order to track how many entries were already dumped for the last leaf included in a partial netlink dump. A single additional argument is sufficient, even if we traverse logically nested structures (nexthop objects, hash table buckets, bucket chains): it doesn't matter if we stop in the middle of any of those, because they are always traversed the same way. As an example, s_i values in [], s_fa values in (): node (fa) #1 [1] nexthop #1 bucket #1 -> #0 in chain (1) bucket #2 -> #0 in chain (2) -> #1 in chain (3) -> #2 in chain (4) bucket #3 -> #0 in chain (5) -> #1 in chain (6) nexthop #2 bucket #1 -> #0 in chain (7) -> #1 in chain (8) bucket #2 -> #0 in chain (9) -- node (fa) #2 [2] nexthop #1 bucket #1 -> #0 in chain (1) -> #1 in chain (2) bucket #2 -> #0 in chain (3) it doesn't matter if we stop at (3), (4), (7) for "node #1", or at (2) for "node #2": walking flattens all that. It would even be possible to drop the distinction between the in-tree (s_i) and in-node (s_fa) counter, but a further improvement might advise against this. This is only as accurate as the existing tracking mechanism for leaves: if a partial dump is restarted after exceptions are removed or expired, we might skip some non-dumped entries. To improve this, we could attach a 'sernum' attribute (similar to the one used for IPv6) to nexthop entities, and bump this counter whenever exceptions change: having a distinction between the two counters would make this more convenient. Listing of exception routes (modified routes pre-3.5) was tested against these versions of kernel and iproute2: iproute2 kernel 4.14.0 4.15.0 4.19.0 5.0.0 5.1.0 3.5-rc4 + + + + + 4.4 4.9 4.14 4.15 4.19 5.0 5.1 fixed + + + + + v7: - Move loop over nexthop objects to route.c, and pass struct fib_info and table ID to it, not a struct fib_alias (suggested by David Ahern) - While at it, note that the NULL check on fa->fa_info is redundant, and the check on RTNH_F_DEAD is also not consistent with what's done with regular route listing: just keep it for nhc_flags - Rename entry point function for dumping exceptions to fib_dump_info_fnhe(), and rearrange arguments for consistency with fib_dump_info() - Rename fnhe_dump_buckets() to fnhe_dump_bucket() and make it handle one bucket at a time - Expand commit message to describe why we can have a single "skip" counter for all exceptions stored in bucket chains in nexthop objects (suggested by David Ahern) v6: - Rebased onto net-next - Loop over nexthop paths too. Move loop over fnhe buckets to route.c, avoids need to export rt_fill_info() and to touch exceptions from fib_trie.c. Pass NULL as flow to rt_fill_info(), it now allows that (suggested by David Ahern) Fixes: 4895c771c7f0 ("ipv4: Add FIB nexthop exceptions.") Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-06-21 18:45:23 +03:00
bucket = rcu_dereference(nhc->nhc_exceptions);
ipv4: fix suspicious RCU usage in fib_dump_info_fnhe() sysbot reported that we lack appropriate rcu_read_lock() protection in fib_dump_info_fnhe() net/ipv4/route.c:2875 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 1 lock held by syz-executor609/8966: #0: 00000000b7dbe288 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: netlink_dump+0xe7/0xfb0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2199 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 8966 Comm: syz-executor609 Not tainted 5.2.0-rc5+ #43 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x153/0x15d kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5250 fib_dump_info_fnhe+0x9d9/0x1080 net/ipv4/route.c:2875 fn_trie_dump_leaf net/ipv4/fib_trie.c:2141 [inline] fib_table_dump+0x64a/0xd00 net/ipv4/fib_trie.c:2175 inet_dump_fib+0x83c/0xa90 net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c:1004 rtnl_dump_all+0x295/0x490 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3445 netlink_dump+0x558/0xfb0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2244 __netlink_dump_start+0x5b1/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2352 netlink_dump_start include/linux/netlink.h:226 [inline] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x73d/0xb00 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5182 netlink_rcv_skb+0x177/0x450 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477 rtnetlink_rcv+0x1d/0x30 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5237 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1302 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x531/0x710 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1328 netlink_sendmsg+0x8ae/0xd70 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:646 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd7/0x130 net/socket.c:665 sock_write_iter+0x27c/0x3e0 net/socket.c:994 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1872 [inline] new_sync_write+0x4d3/0x770 fs/read_write.c:483 __vfs_write+0xe1/0x110 fs/read_write.c:496 vfs_write+0x20c/0x580 fs/read_write.c:558 ksys_write+0x14f/0x290 fs/read_write.c:611 __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:623 [inline] __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:620 [inline] __x64_sys_write+0x73/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:620 do_syscall_64+0xfd/0x680 arch/x86/entry/common.c:301 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x4401b9 Code: 18 89 d0 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 fb 13 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007ffc8e134978 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004002c8 RCX: 00000000004401b9 RDX: 000000000000001c RSI: 0000000020000000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00000000006ca018 R08: 00000000004002c8 R09: 00000000004002c8 R10: 0000000000000010 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000401a40 R13: 0000000000401ad0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Fixes: ee28906fd7a1 ("ipv4: Dump route exceptions if requested") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com> Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Reviewed-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-06-26 13:04:50 +03:00
err = 0;
if (bucket)
err = fnhe_dump_bucket(net, skb, cb, table_id, bucket,
net: route dump netlink NLM_F_MULTI flag missing An excerpt from netlink(7) man page, In multipart messages (multiple nlmsghdr headers with associated payload in one byte stream) the first and all following headers have the NLM_F_MULTI flag set, except for the last header which has the type NLMSG_DONE. but, after (ee28906) there is a missing NLM_F_MULTI flag in the middle of a FIB dump. The result is user space applications following above man page excerpt may get confused and may stop parsing msg believing something went wrong. In the golang netlink lib [0] the library logic stops parsing believing the message is not a multipart message. Found this running Cilium[1] against net-next while adding a feature to auto-detect routes. I noticed with multiple route tables we no longer could detect the default routes on net tree kernels because the library logic was not returning them. Fix this by handling the fib_dump_info_fnhe() case the same way the fib_dump_info() handles it by passing the flags argument through the call chain and adding a flags argument to rt_fill_info(). Tested with Cilium stack and auto-detection of routes works again. Also annotated libs to dump netlink msgs and inspected NLM_F_MULTI and NLMSG_DONE flags look correct after this. Note: In inet_rtm_getroute() pass rt_fill_info() '0' for flags the same as is done for fib_dump_info() so this looks correct to me. [0] https://github.com/vishvananda/netlink/ [1] https://github.com/cilium/ Fixes: ee28906fd7a14 ("ipv4: Dump route exceptions if requested") Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-08-24 03:11:38 +03:00
genid, fa_index, fa_start,
flags);
ipv4: fix suspicious RCU usage in fib_dump_info_fnhe() sysbot reported that we lack appropriate rcu_read_lock() protection in fib_dump_info_fnhe() net/ipv4/route.c:2875 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 1 lock held by syz-executor609/8966: #0: 00000000b7dbe288 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: netlink_dump+0xe7/0xfb0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2199 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 8966 Comm: syz-executor609 Not tainted 5.2.0-rc5+ #43 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x153/0x15d kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5250 fib_dump_info_fnhe+0x9d9/0x1080 net/ipv4/route.c:2875 fn_trie_dump_leaf net/ipv4/fib_trie.c:2141 [inline] fib_table_dump+0x64a/0xd00 net/ipv4/fib_trie.c:2175 inet_dump_fib+0x83c/0xa90 net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c:1004 rtnl_dump_all+0x295/0x490 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3445 netlink_dump+0x558/0xfb0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2244 __netlink_dump_start+0x5b1/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2352 netlink_dump_start include/linux/netlink.h:226 [inline] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x73d/0xb00 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5182 netlink_rcv_skb+0x177/0x450 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477 rtnetlink_rcv+0x1d/0x30 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5237 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1302 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x531/0x710 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1328 netlink_sendmsg+0x8ae/0xd70 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:646 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd7/0x130 net/socket.c:665 sock_write_iter+0x27c/0x3e0 net/socket.c:994 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1872 [inline] new_sync_write+0x4d3/0x770 fs/read_write.c:483 __vfs_write+0xe1/0x110 fs/read_write.c:496 vfs_write+0x20c/0x580 fs/read_write.c:558 ksys_write+0x14f/0x290 fs/read_write.c:611 __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:623 [inline] __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:620 [inline] __x64_sys_write+0x73/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:620 do_syscall_64+0xfd/0x680 arch/x86/entry/common.c:301 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x4401b9 Code: 18 89 d0 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 fb 13 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007ffc8e134978 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004002c8 RCX: 00000000004401b9 RDX: 000000000000001c RSI: 0000000020000000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00000000006ca018 R08: 00000000004002c8 R09: 00000000004002c8 R10: 0000000000000010 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000401a40 R13: 0000000000401ad0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Fixes: ee28906fd7a1 ("ipv4: Dump route exceptions if requested") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com> Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Reviewed-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-06-26 13:04:50 +03:00
rcu_read_unlock();
ipv4: Dump route exceptions if requested Since commit 4895c771c7f0 ("ipv4: Add FIB nexthop exceptions."), cached exception routes are stored as a separate entity, so they are not dumped on a FIB dump, even if the RTM_F_CLONED flag is passed. This implies that the command 'ip route list cache' doesn't return any result anymore. If the RTM_F_CLONED is passed, and strict checking requested, retrieve nexthop exception routes and dump them. If no strict checking is requested, filtering can't be performed consistently: dump everything in that case. With this, we need to add an argument to the netlink callback in order to track how many entries were already dumped for the last leaf included in a partial netlink dump. A single additional argument is sufficient, even if we traverse logically nested structures (nexthop objects, hash table buckets, bucket chains): it doesn't matter if we stop in the middle of any of those, because they are always traversed the same way. As an example, s_i values in [], s_fa values in (): node (fa) #1 [1] nexthop #1 bucket #1 -> #0 in chain (1) bucket #2 -> #0 in chain (2) -> #1 in chain (3) -> #2 in chain (4) bucket #3 -> #0 in chain (5) -> #1 in chain (6) nexthop #2 bucket #1 -> #0 in chain (7) -> #1 in chain (8) bucket #2 -> #0 in chain (9) -- node (fa) #2 [2] nexthop #1 bucket #1 -> #0 in chain (1) -> #1 in chain (2) bucket #2 -> #0 in chain (3) it doesn't matter if we stop at (3), (4), (7) for "node #1", or at (2) for "node #2": walking flattens all that. It would even be possible to drop the distinction between the in-tree (s_i) and in-node (s_fa) counter, but a further improvement might advise against this. This is only as accurate as the existing tracking mechanism for leaves: if a partial dump is restarted after exceptions are removed or expired, we might skip some non-dumped entries. To improve this, we could attach a 'sernum' attribute (similar to the one used for IPv6) to nexthop entities, and bump this counter whenever exceptions change: having a distinction between the two counters would make this more convenient. Listing of exception routes (modified routes pre-3.5) was tested against these versions of kernel and iproute2: iproute2 kernel 4.14.0 4.15.0 4.19.0 5.0.0 5.1.0 3.5-rc4 + + + + + 4.4 4.9 4.14 4.15 4.19 5.0 5.1 fixed + + + + + v7: - Move loop over nexthop objects to route.c, and pass struct fib_info and table ID to it, not a struct fib_alias (suggested by David Ahern) - While at it, note that the NULL check on fa->fa_info is redundant, and the check on RTNH_F_DEAD is also not consistent with what's done with regular route listing: just keep it for nhc_flags - Rename entry point function for dumping exceptions to fib_dump_info_fnhe(), and rearrange arguments for consistency with fib_dump_info() - Rename fnhe_dump_buckets() to fnhe_dump_bucket() and make it handle one bucket at a time - Expand commit message to describe why we can have a single "skip" counter for all exceptions stored in bucket chains in nexthop objects (suggested by David Ahern) v6: - Rebased onto net-next - Loop over nexthop paths too. Move loop over fnhe buckets to route.c, avoids need to export rt_fill_info() and to touch exceptions from fib_trie.c. Pass NULL as flow to rt_fill_info(), it now allows that (suggested by David Ahern) Fixes: 4895c771c7f0 ("ipv4: Add FIB nexthop exceptions.") Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-06-21 18:45:23 +03:00
if (err)
return err;
}
return 0;
}
static struct sk_buff *inet_rtm_getroute_build_skb(__be32 src, __be32 dst,
u8 ip_proto, __be16 sport,
__be16 dport)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct iphdr *iph;
skb = alloc_skb(NLMSG_GOODSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!skb)
return NULL;
/* Reserve room for dummy headers, this skb can pass
* through good chunk of routing engine.
*/
skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IP);
iph = skb_put(skb, sizeof(struct iphdr));
iph->protocol = ip_proto;
iph->saddr = src;
iph->daddr = dst;
iph->version = 0x4;
iph->frag_off = 0;
iph->ihl = 0x5;
skb_set_transport_header(skb, skb->len);
switch (iph->protocol) {
case IPPROTO_UDP: {
struct udphdr *udph;
udph = skb_put_zero(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr));
udph->source = sport;
udph->dest = dport;
udph->len = sizeof(struct udphdr);
udph->check = 0;
break;
}
case IPPROTO_TCP: {
struct tcphdr *tcph;
tcph = skb_put_zero(skb, sizeof(struct tcphdr));
tcph->source = sport;
tcph->dest = dport;
tcph->doff = sizeof(struct tcphdr) / 4;
tcph->rst = 1;
tcph->check = ~tcp_v4_check(sizeof(struct tcphdr),
src, dst, 0);
break;
}
case IPPROTO_ICMP: {
struct icmphdr *icmph;
icmph = skb_put_zero(skb, sizeof(struct icmphdr));
icmph->type = ICMP_ECHO;
icmph->code = 0;
}
}
return skb;
}
static int inet_rtm_valid_getroute_req(struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
struct nlattr **tb,
struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
{
struct rtmsg *rtm;
int i, err;
if (nlh->nlmsg_len < nlmsg_msg_size(sizeof(*rtm))) {
NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack,
"ipv4: Invalid header for route get request");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!netlink_strict_get_check(skb))
netlink: make validation more configurable for future strictness We currently have two levels of strict validation: 1) liberal (default) - undefined (type >= max) & NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted - garbage at end of message accepted 2) strict (opt-in) - NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted Split out parsing strictness into four different options: * TRAILING - check that there's no trailing data after parsing attributes (in message or nested) * MAXTYPE - reject attrs > max known type * UNSPEC - reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC policy entries * STRICT_ATTRS - strictly validate attribute size The default for future things should be *everything*. The current *_strict() is a combination of TRAILING and MAXTYPE, and is renamed to _deprecated_strict(). The current regular parsing has none of this, and is renamed to *_parse_deprecated(). Additionally it allows us to selectively set one of the new flags even on old policies. Notably, the UNSPEC flag could be useful in this case, since it can be arranged (by filling in the policy) to not be an incompatible userspace ABI change, but would then going forward prevent forgetting attribute entries. Similar can apply to the POLICY flag. We end up with the following renames: * nla_parse -> nla_parse_deprecated * nla_parse_strict -> nla_parse_deprecated_strict * nlmsg_parse -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated * nlmsg_parse_strict -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict * nla_parse_nested -> nla_parse_nested_deprecated * nla_validate_nested -> nla_validate_nested_deprecated Using spatch, of course: @@ expression TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_deprecated(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse_nested(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_nested_deprecated(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) @@ expression START, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_validate_nested(START, MAX, POL, EXT) +nla_validate_nested_deprecated(START, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_validate(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_validate_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) For this patch, don't actually add the strict, non-renamed versions yet so that it breaks compile if I get it wrong. Also, while at it, make nla_validate and nla_parse go down to a common __nla_validate_parse() function to avoid code duplication. Ultimately, this allows us to have very strict validation for every new caller of nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc as re-introduced in the next patch, while existing things will continue to work as is. In effect then, this adds fully strict validation for any new command. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-26 15:07:28 +03:00
return nlmsg_parse_deprecated(nlh, sizeof(*rtm), tb, RTA_MAX,
rtm_ipv4_policy, extack);
rtm = nlmsg_data(nlh);
if ((rtm->rtm_src_len && rtm->rtm_src_len != 32) ||
(rtm->rtm_dst_len && rtm->rtm_dst_len != 32) ||
rtm->rtm_table || rtm->rtm_protocol ||
rtm->rtm_scope || rtm->rtm_type) {
NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "ipv4: Invalid values in header for route get request");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (rtm->rtm_flags & ~(RTM_F_NOTIFY |
RTM_F_LOOKUP_TABLE |
RTM_F_FIB_MATCH)) {
NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "ipv4: Unsupported rtm_flags for route get request");
return -EINVAL;
}
netlink: make validation more configurable for future strictness We currently have two levels of strict validation: 1) liberal (default) - undefined (type >= max) & NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted - garbage at end of message accepted 2) strict (opt-in) - NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted Split out parsing strictness into four different options: * TRAILING - check that there's no trailing data after parsing attributes (in message or nested) * MAXTYPE - reject attrs > max known type * UNSPEC - reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC policy entries * STRICT_ATTRS - strictly validate attribute size The default for future things should be *everything*. The current *_strict() is a combination of TRAILING and MAXTYPE, and is renamed to _deprecated_strict(). The current regular parsing has none of this, and is renamed to *_parse_deprecated(). Additionally it allows us to selectively set one of the new flags even on old policies. Notably, the UNSPEC flag could be useful in this case, since it can be arranged (by filling in the policy) to not be an incompatible userspace ABI change, but would then going forward prevent forgetting attribute entries. Similar can apply to the POLICY flag. We end up with the following renames: * nla_parse -> nla_parse_deprecated * nla_parse_strict -> nla_parse_deprecated_strict * nlmsg_parse -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated * nlmsg_parse_strict -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict * nla_parse_nested -> nla_parse_nested_deprecated * nla_validate_nested -> nla_validate_nested_deprecated Using spatch, of course: @@ expression TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_deprecated(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse_nested(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_nested_deprecated(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) @@ expression START, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_validate_nested(START, MAX, POL, EXT) +nla_validate_nested_deprecated(START, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_validate(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_validate_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) For this patch, don't actually add the strict, non-renamed versions yet so that it breaks compile if I get it wrong. Also, while at it, make nla_validate and nla_parse go down to a common __nla_validate_parse() function to avoid code duplication. Ultimately, this allows us to have very strict validation for every new caller of nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc as re-introduced in the next patch, while existing things will continue to work as is. In effect then, this adds fully strict validation for any new command. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-26 15:07:28 +03:00
err = nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(nlh, sizeof(*rtm), tb, RTA_MAX,
rtm_ipv4_policy, extack);
if (err)
return err;
if ((tb[RTA_SRC] && !rtm->rtm_src_len) ||
(tb[RTA_DST] && !rtm->rtm_dst_len)) {
NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "ipv4: rtm_src_len and rtm_dst_len must be 32 for IPv4");
return -EINVAL;
}
for (i = 0; i <= RTA_MAX; i++) {
if (!tb[i])
continue;
switch (i) {
case RTA_IIF:
case RTA_OIF:
case RTA_SRC:
case RTA_DST:
case RTA_IP_PROTO:
case RTA_SPORT:
case RTA_DPORT:
case RTA_MARK:
case RTA_UID:
break;
default:
NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "ipv4: Unsupported attribute in route get request");
return -EINVAL;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int inet_rtm_getroute(struct sk_buff *in_skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(in_skb->sk);
struct nlattr *tb[RTA_MAX+1];
u32 table_id = RT_TABLE_MAIN;
__be16 sport = 0, dport = 0;
struct fib_result res = {};
u8 ip_proto = IPPROTO_UDP;
struct rtable *rt = NULL;
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct rtmsg *rtm;
struct flowi4 fl4 = {};
__be32 dst = 0;
__be32 src = 0;
kuid_t uid;
u32 iif;
int err;
int mark;
err = inet_rtm_valid_getroute_req(in_skb, nlh, tb, extack);
if (err < 0)
return err;
rtm = nlmsg_data(nlh);
src = tb[RTA_SRC] ? nla_get_in_addr(tb[RTA_SRC]) : 0;
dst = tb[RTA_DST] ? nla_get_in_addr(tb[RTA_DST]) : 0;
iif = tb[RTA_IIF] ? nla_get_u32(tb[RTA_IIF]) : 0;
mark = tb[RTA_MARK] ? nla_get_u32(tb[RTA_MARK]) : 0;
if (tb[RTA_UID])
uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), nla_get_u32(tb[RTA_UID]));
else
uid = (iif ? INVALID_UID : current_uid());
if (tb[RTA_IP_PROTO]) {
err = rtm_getroute_parse_ip_proto(tb[RTA_IP_PROTO],
&ip_proto, AF_INET, extack);
if (err)
return err;
}
if (tb[RTA_SPORT])
sport = nla_get_be16(tb[RTA_SPORT]);
if (tb[RTA_DPORT])
dport = nla_get_be16(tb[RTA_DPORT]);
skb = inet_rtm_getroute_build_skb(src, dst, ip_proto, sport, dport);
if (!skb)
return -ENOBUFS;
fl4.daddr = dst;
fl4.saddr = src;
fl4.flowi4_tos = rtm->rtm_tos;
fl4.flowi4_oif = tb[RTA_OIF] ? nla_get_u32(tb[RTA_OIF]) : 0;
fl4.flowi4_mark = mark;
fl4.flowi4_uid = uid;
if (sport)
fl4.fl4_sport = sport;
if (dport)
fl4.fl4_dport = dport;
fl4.flowi4_proto = ip_proto;
rcu_read_lock();
if (iif) {
struct net_device *dev;
dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(net, iif);
if (!dev) {
err = -ENODEV;
goto errout_rcu;
}
fl4.flowi4_iif = iif; /* for rt_fill_info */
skb->dev = dev;
skb->mark = mark;
err = ip_route_input_rcu(skb, dst, src, rtm->rtm_tos,
dev, &res);
rt = skb_rtable(skb);
if (err == 0 && rt->dst.error)
err = -rt->dst.error;
} else {
fl4.flowi4_iif = LOOPBACK_IFINDEX;
net: ipv4: Set skb->dev for output route resolution When user requests to resolve an output route, the kernel synthesizes an skb where the relevant parameters (e.g., source address) are set. The skb is then passed to ip_route_output_key_hash_rcu() which might call into the flow dissector in case a multipath route was hit and a nexthop needs to be selected based on the multipath hash. Since both 'skb->dev' and 'skb->sk' are not set, a warning is triggered in the flow dissector [1]. The warning is there to prevent codepaths from silently falling back to the standard flow dissector instead of the BPF one. Therefore, instead of removing the warning, set 'skb->dev' to the loopback device, as its not used for anything but resolving the correct namespace. [1] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 24819 at net/core/flow_dissector.c:764 __skb_flow_dissect+0x314/0x16b0 ... RSP: 0018:ffffa0df41fdf650 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8bcded232000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffffa0df41fdf7e0 RSI: ffffffff98e415a0 RDI: ffff8bcded232000 RBP: ffffa0df41fdf760 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffffa0df41fdf7e8 R11: ffff8bcdf27a3000 R12: ffffffff98e415a0 R13: ffffa0df41fdf7e0 R14: ffffffff98dd2980 R15: ffffa0df41fdf7e0 FS: 00007f46f6897680(0000) GS:ffff8bcdf7a80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000055933e95f9a0 CR3: 000000021e636000 CR4: 00000000001006e0 Call Trace: fib_multipath_hash+0x28c/0x2d0 ? fib_multipath_hash+0x28c/0x2d0 fib_select_path+0x241/0x32f ? __fib_lookup+0x6a/0xb0 ip_route_output_key_hash_rcu+0x650/0xa30 ? __alloc_skb+0x9b/0x1d0 inet_rtm_getroute+0x3f7/0xb80 ? __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x11c/0x2c0 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x1d9/0x2f0 ? rtnl_calcit.isra.24+0x120/0x120 netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x130 rtnetlink_rcv+0x15/0x20 netlink_unicast+0x20a/0x2c0 netlink_sendmsg+0x2d1/0x3d0 sock_sendmsg+0x39/0x50 ___sys_sendmsg+0x2a0/0x2f0 ? filemap_map_pages+0x16b/0x360 ? __handle_mm_fault+0x108e/0x13d0 __sys_sendmsg+0x63/0xa0 ? __sys_sendmsg+0x63/0xa0 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x1f/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x5a/0x120 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Fixes: d0e13a1488ad ("flow_dissector: lookup netns by skb->sk if skb->dev is NULL") Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-12-20 20:03:27 +03:00
skb->dev = net->loopback_dev;
rt = ip_route_output_key_hash_rcu(net, &fl4, &res, skb);
err = 0;
if (IS_ERR(rt))
err = PTR_ERR(rt);
else
skb_dst_set(skb, &rt->dst);
}
if (err)
goto errout_rcu;
if (rtm->rtm_flags & RTM_F_NOTIFY)
rt->rt_flags |= RTCF_NOTIFY;
if (rtm->rtm_flags & RTM_F_LOOKUP_TABLE)
table_id = res.table ? res.table->tb_id : 0;
/* reset skb for netlink reply msg */
skb_trim(skb, 0);
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
net: check and errout if res->fi is NULL when RTM_F_FIB_MATCH is set Syzkaller hit 'general protection fault in fib_dump_info' bug on commit 4.13-rc5.. Guilty file: net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 2808 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.13.0-rc5 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 task: ffff880078562700 task.stack: ffff880078110000 RIP: 0010:fib_dump_info+0x388/0x1170 net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c:1314 RSP: 0018:ffff880078117010 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 00000000000000fe RCX: 0000000000000002 RDX: 0000000000000006 RSI: ffff880078117084 RDI: 0000000000000030 RBP: ffff880078117268 R08: 000000000000000c R09: ffff8800780d80c8 R10: 0000000058d629b4 R11: 0000000067fce681 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff8800784bd540 R14: ffff8800780d80b5 R15: ffff8800780d80a4 FS: 00000000022fa940(0000) GS:ffff88007fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000004387d0 CR3: 0000000079135000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: inet_rtm_getroute+0xc89/0x1f50 net/ipv4/route.c:2766 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x288/0x680 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4217 netlink_rcv_skb+0x340/0x470 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2397 rtnetlink_rcv+0x28/0x30 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4223 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1265 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x4c4/0x6e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1291 netlink_sendmsg+0x8c4/0xca0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1854 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:633 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:643 ___sys_sendmsg+0x779/0x8d0 net/socket.c:2035 __sys_sendmsg+0xd1/0x170 net/socket.c:2069 SYSC_sendmsg net/socket.c:2080 [inline] SyS_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50 net/socket.c:2076 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa5 RIP: 0033:0x4512e9 RSP: 002b:00007ffc75584cc8 EFLAGS: 00000216 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 00000000004512e9 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020f2cfc8 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 000000000000000e R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000216 R12: fffffffffffffffe R13: 0000000000718000 R14: 0000000020c44ff0 R15: 0000000000000000 Code: 00 0f b6 8d ec fd ff ff 48 8b 85 f0 fd ff ff 88 48 17 48 8b 45 28 48 8d 78 30 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e cb 0c 00 00 48 8b 45 28 44 RIP: fib_dump_info+0x388/0x1170 net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c:1314 RSP: ffff880078117010 ---[ end trace 254a7af28348f88b ]--- This patch adds a res->fi NULL check. example run: $ip route get 0.0.0.0 iif virt1-0 broadcast 0.0.0.0 dev lo cache <local,brd> iif virt1-0 $ip route get 0.0.0.0 iif virt1-0 fibmatch RTNETLINK answers: No route to host Reported-by: idaifish <idaifish@gmail.com> Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Fixes: b61798130f1b ("net: ipv4: RTM_GETROUTE: return matched fib result when requested") Signed-off-by: Roopa Prabhu <roopa@cumulusnetworks.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 22:38:52 +03:00
if (rtm->rtm_flags & RTM_F_FIB_MATCH) {
struct fib_rt_info fri;
net: check and errout if res->fi is NULL when RTM_F_FIB_MATCH is set Syzkaller hit 'general protection fault in fib_dump_info' bug on commit 4.13-rc5.. Guilty file: net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 2808 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.13.0-rc5 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 task: ffff880078562700 task.stack: ffff880078110000 RIP: 0010:fib_dump_info+0x388/0x1170 net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c:1314 RSP: 0018:ffff880078117010 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 00000000000000fe RCX: 0000000000000002 RDX: 0000000000000006 RSI: ffff880078117084 RDI: 0000000000000030 RBP: ffff880078117268 R08: 000000000000000c R09: ffff8800780d80c8 R10: 0000000058d629b4 R11: 0000000067fce681 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff8800784bd540 R14: ffff8800780d80b5 R15: ffff8800780d80a4 FS: 00000000022fa940(0000) GS:ffff88007fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000004387d0 CR3: 0000000079135000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: inet_rtm_getroute+0xc89/0x1f50 net/ipv4/route.c:2766 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x288/0x680 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4217 netlink_rcv_skb+0x340/0x470 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2397 rtnetlink_rcv+0x28/0x30 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4223 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1265 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x4c4/0x6e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1291 netlink_sendmsg+0x8c4/0xca0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1854 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:633 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:643 ___sys_sendmsg+0x779/0x8d0 net/socket.c:2035 __sys_sendmsg+0xd1/0x170 net/socket.c:2069 SYSC_sendmsg net/socket.c:2080 [inline] SyS_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50 net/socket.c:2076 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa5 RIP: 0033:0x4512e9 RSP: 002b:00007ffc75584cc8 EFLAGS: 00000216 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 00000000004512e9 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020f2cfc8 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 000000000000000e R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000216 R12: fffffffffffffffe R13: 0000000000718000 R14: 0000000020c44ff0 R15: 0000000000000000 Code: 00 0f b6 8d ec fd ff ff 48 8b 85 f0 fd ff ff 88 48 17 48 8b 45 28 48 8d 78 30 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e cb 0c 00 00 48 8b 45 28 44 RIP: fib_dump_info+0x388/0x1170 net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c:1314 RSP: ffff880078117010 ---[ end trace 254a7af28348f88b ]--- This patch adds a res->fi NULL check. example run: $ip route get 0.0.0.0 iif virt1-0 broadcast 0.0.0.0 dev lo cache <local,brd> iif virt1-0 $ip route get 0.0.0.0 iif virt1-0 fibmatch RTNETLINK answers: No route to host Reported-by: idaifish <idaifish@gmail.com> Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Fixes: b61798130f1b ("net: ipv4: RTM_GETROUTE: return matched fib result when requested") Signed-off-by: Roopa Prabhu <roopa@cumulusnetworks.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 22:38:52 +03:00
if (!res.fi) {
err = fib_props[res.type].error;
if (!err)
err = -EHOSTUNREACH;
goto errout_rcu;
net: check and errout if res->fi is NULL when RTM_F_FIB_MATCH is set Syzkaller hit 'general protection fault in fib_dump_info' bug on commit 4.13-rc5.. Guilty file: net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 2808 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.13.0-rc5 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 task: ffff880078562700 task.stack: ffff880078110000 RIP: 0010:fib_dump_info+0x388/0x1170 net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c:1314 RSP: 0018:ffff880078117010 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 00000000000000fe RCX: 0000000000000002 RDX: 0000000000000006 RSI: ffff880078117084 RDI: 0000000000000030 RBP: ffff880078117268 R08: 000000000000000c R09: ffff8800780d80c8 R10: 0000000058d629b4 R11: 0000000067fce681 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff8800784bd540 R14: ffff8800780d80b5 R15: ffff8800780d80a4 FS: 00000000022fa940(0000) GS:ffff88007fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000004387d0 CR3: 0000000079135000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: inet_rtm_getroute+0xc89/0x1f50 net/ipv4/route.c:2766 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x288/0x680 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4217 netlink_rcv_skb+0x340/0x470 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2397 rtnetlink_rcv+0x28/0x30 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4223 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1265 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x4c4/0x6e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1291 netlink_sendmsg+0x8c4/0xca0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1854 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:633 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:643 ___sys_sendmsg+0x779/0x8d0 net/socket.c:2035 __sys_sendmsg+0xd1/0x170 net/socket.c:2069 SYSC_sendmsg net/socket.c:2080 [inline] SyS_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50 net/socket.c:2076 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa5 RIP: 0033:0x4512e9 RSP: 002b:00007ffc75584cc8 EFLAGS: 00000216 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 00000000004512e9 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020f2cfc8 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 000000000000000e R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000216 R12: fffffffffffffffe R13: 0000000000718000 R14: 0000000020c44ff0 R15: 0000000000000000 Code: 00 0f b6 8d ec fd ff ff 48 8b 85 f0 fd ff ff 88 48 17 48 8b 45 28 48 8d 78 30 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e cb 0c 00 00 48 8b 45 28 44 RIP: fib_dump_info+0x388/0x1170 net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c:1314 RSP: ffff880078117010 ---[ end trace 254a7af28348f88b ]--- This patch adds a res->fi NULL check. example run: $ip route get 0.0.0.0 iif virt1-0 broadcast 0.0.0.0 dev lo cache <local,brd> iif virt1-0 $ip route get 0.0.0.0 iif virt1-0 fibmatch RTNETLINK answers: No route to host Reported-by: idaifish <idaifish@gmail.com> Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Fixes: b61798130f1b ("net: ipv4: RTM_GETROUTE: return matched fib result when requested") Signed-off-by: Roopa Prabhu <roopa@cumulusnetworks.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 22:38:52 +03:00
}
fri.fi = res.fi;
fri.tb_id = table_id;
fri.dst = res.prefix;
fri.dst_len = res.prefixlen;
fri.tos = fl4.flowi4_tos;
fri.type = rt->rt_type;
ipv4: Add "offload" and "trap" indications to routes When performing L3 offload, routes and nexthops are usually programmed into two different tables in the underlying device. Therefore, the fact that a nexthop resides in hardware does not necessarily mean that all the associated routes also reside in hardware and vice-versa. While the kernel can signal to user space the presence of a nexthop in hardware (via 'RTNH_F_OFFLOAD'), it does not have a corresponding flag for routes. In addition, the fact that a route resides in hardware does not necessarily mean that the traffic is offloaded. For example, unreachable routes (i.e., 'RTN_UNREACHABLE') are programmed to trap packets to the CPU so that the kernel will be able to generate the appropriate ICMP error packet. This patch adds an "offload" and "trap" indications to IPv4 routes, so that users will have better visibility into the offload process. 'struct fib_alias' is extended with two new fields that indicate if the route resides in hardware or not and if it is offloading traffic from the kernel or trapping packets to it. Note that the new fields are added in the 6 bytes hole and therefore the struct still fits in a single cache line [1]. Capable drivers are expected to invoke fib_alias_hw_flags_set() with the route's key in order to set the flags. The indications are dumped to user space via a new flags (i.e., 'RTM_F_OFFLOAD' and 'RTM_F_TRAP') in the 'rtm_flags' field in the ancillary header. v2: * Make use of 'struct fib_rt_info' in fib_alias_hw_flags_set() [1] struct fib_alias { struct hlist_node fa_list; /* 0 16 */ struct fib_info * fa_info; /* 16 8 */ u8 fa_tos; /* 24 1 */ u8 fa_type; /* 25 1 */ u8 fa_state; /* 26 1 */ u8 fa_slen; /* 27 1 */ u32 tb_id; /* 28 4 */ s16 fa_default; /* 32 2 */ u8 offload:1; /* 34: 0 1 */ u8 trap:1; /* 34: 1 1 */ u8 unused:6; /* 34: 2 1 */ /* XXX 5 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct callback_head rcu __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 40 16 */ /* size: 56, cachelines: 1, members: 12 */ /* sum members: 50, holes: 1, sum holes: 5 */ /* sum bitfield members: 8 bits (1 bytes) */ /* forced alignments: 1, forced holes: 1, sum forced holes: 5 */ /* last cacheline: 56 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-01-14 14:23:11 +03:00
fri.offload = 0;
fri.trap = 0;
if (res.fa_head) {
struct fib_alias *fa;
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(fa, res.fa_head, fa_list) {
u8 slen = 32 - fri.dst_len;
if (fa->fa_slen == slen &&
fa->tb_id == fri.tb_id &&
fa->fa_tos == fri.tos &&
fa->fa_info == res.fi &&
fa->fa_type == fri.type) {
fri.offload = fa->offload;
fri.trap = fa->trap;
break;
}
}
}
err = fib_dump_info(skb, NETLINK_CB(in_skb).portid,
nlh->nlmsg_seq, RTM_NEWROUTE, &fri, 0);
net: check and errout if res->fi is NULL when RTM_F_FIB_MATCH is set Syzkaller hit 'general protection fault in fib_dump_info' bug on commit 4.13-rc5.. Guilty file: net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 2808 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.13.0-rc5 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 task: ffff880078562700 task.stack: ffff880078110000 RIP: 0010:fib_dump_info+0x388/0x1170 net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c:1314 RSP: 0018:ffff880078117010 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 00000000000000fe RCX: 0000000000000002 RDX: 0000000000000006 RSI: ffff880078117084 RDI: 0000000000000030 RBP: ffff880078117268 R08: 000000000000000c R09: ffff8800780d80c8 R10: 0000000058d629b4 R11: 0000000067fce681 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff8800784bd540 R14: ffff8800780d80b5 R15: ffff8800780d80a4 FS: 00000000022fa940(0000) GS:ffff88007fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000004387d0 CR3: 0000000079135000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: inet_rtm_getroute+0xc89/0x1f50 net/ipv4/route.c:2766 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x288/0x680 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4217 netlink_rcv_skb+0x340/0x470 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2397 rtnetlink_rcv+0x28/0x30 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4223 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1265 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x4c4/0x6e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1291 netlink_sendmsg+0x8c4/0xca0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1854 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:633 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:643 ___sys_sendmsg+0x779/0x8d0 net/socket.c:2035 __sys_sendmsg+0xd1/0x170 net/socket.c:2069 SYSC_sendmsg net/socket.c:2080 [inline] SyS_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50 net/socket.c:2076 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa5 RIP: 0033:0x4512e9 RSP: 002b:00007ffc75584cc8 EFLAGS: 00000216 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 00000000004512e9 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020f2cfc8 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 000000000000000e R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000216 R12: fffffffffffffffe R13: 0000000000718000 R14: 0000000020c44ff0 R15: 0000000000000000 Code: 00 0f b6 8d ec fd ff ff 48 8b 85 f0 fd ff ff 88 48 17 48 8b 45 28 48 8d 78 30 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e cb 0c 00 00 48 8b 45 28 44 RIP: fib_dump_info+0x388/0x1170 net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c:1314 RSP: ffff880078117010 ---[ end trace 254a7af28348f88b ]--- This patch adds a res->fi NULL check. example run: $ip route get 0.0.0.0 iif virt1-0 broadcast 0.0.0.0 dev lo cache <local,brd> iif virt1-0 $ip route get 0.0.0.0 iif virt1-0 fibmatch RTNETLINK answers: No route to host Reported-by: idaifish <idaifish@gmail.com> Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Fixes: b61798130f1b ("net: ipv4: RTM_GETROUTE: return matched fib result when requested") Signed-off-by: Roopa Prabhu <roopa@cumulusnetworks.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 22:38:52 +03:00
} else {
err = rt_fill_info(net, dst, src, rt, table_id, &fl4, skb,
net: route dump netlink NLM_F_MULTI flag missing An excerpt from netlink(7) man page, In multipart messages (multiple nlmsghdr headers with associated payload in one byte stream) the first and all following headers have the NLM_F_MULTI flag set, except for the last header which has the type NLMSG_DONE. but, after (ee28906) there is a missing NLM_F_MULTI flag in the middle of a FIB dump. The result is user space applications following above man page excerpt may get confused and may stop parsing msg believing something went wrong. In the golang netlink lib [0] the library logic stops parsing believing the message is not a multipart message. Found this running Cilium[1] against net-next while adding a feature to auto-detect routes. I noticed with multiple route tables we no longer could detect the default routes on net tree kernels because the library logic was not returning them. Fix this by handling the fib_dump_info_fnhe() case the same way the fib_dump_info() handles it by passing the flags argument through the call chain and adding a flags argument to rt_fill_info(). Tested with Cilium stack and auto-detection of routes works again. Also annotated libs to dump netlink msgs and inspected NLM_F_MULTI and NLMSG_DONE flags look correct after this. Note: In inet_rtm_getroute() pass rt_fill_info() '0' for flags the same as is done for fib_dump_info() so this looks correct to me. [0] https://github.com/vishvananda/netlink/ [1] https://github.com/cilium/ Fixes: ee28906fd7a14 ("ipv4: Dump route exceptions if requested") Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-08-24 03:11:38 +03:00
NETLINK_CB(in_skb).portid,
nlh->nlmsg_seq, 0);
net: check and errout if res->fi is NULL when RTM_F_FIB_MATCH is set Syzkaller hit 'general protection fault in fib_dump_info' bug on commit 4.13-rc5.. Guilty file: net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 2808 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.13.0-rc5 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 task: ffff880078562700 task.stack: ffff880078110000 RIP: 0010:fib_dump_info+0x388/0x1170 net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c:1314 RSP: 0018:ffff880078117010 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 00000000000000fe RCX: 0000000000000002 RDX: 0000000000000006 RSI: ffff880078117084 RDI: 0000000000000030 RBP: ffff880078117268 R08: 000000000000000c R09: ffff8800780d80c8 R10: 0000000058d629b4 R11: 0000000067fce681 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff8800784bd540 R14: ffff8800780d80b5 R15: ffff8800780d80a4 FS: 00000000022fa940(0000) GS:ffff88007fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000004387d0 CR3: 0000000079135000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: inet_rtm_getroute+0xc89/0x1f50 net/ipv4/route.c:2766 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x288/0x680 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4217 netlink_rcv_skb+0x340/0x470 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2397 rtnetlink_rcv+0x28/0x30 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4223 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1265 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x4c4/0x6e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1291 netlink_sendmsg+0x8c4/0xca0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1854 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:633 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:643 ___sys_sendmsg+0x779/0x8d0 net/socket.c:2035 __sys_sendmsg+0xd1/0x170 net/socket.c:2069 SYSC_sendmsg net/socket.c:2080 [inline] SyS_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50 net/socket.c:2076 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa5 RIP: 0033:0x4512e9 RSP: 002b:00007ffc75584cc8 EFLAGS: 00000216 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 00000000004512e9 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020f2cfc8 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 000000000000000e R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000216 R12: fffffffffffffffe R13: 0000000000718000 R14: 0000000020c44ff0 R15: 0000000000000000 Code: 00 0f b6 8d ec fd ff ff 48 8b 85 f0 fd ff ff 88 48 17 48 8b 45 28 48 8d 78 30 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e cb 0c 00 00 48 8b 45 28 44 RIP: fib_dump_info+0x388/0x1170 net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c:1314 RSP: ffff880078117010 ---[ end trace 254a7af28348f88b ]--- This patch adds a res->fi NULL check. example run: $ip route get 0.0.0.0 iif virt1-0 broadcast 0.0.0.0 dev lo cache <local,brd> iif virt1-0 $ip route get 0.0.0.0 iif virt1-0 fibmatch RTNETLINK answers: No route to host Reported-by: idaifish <idaifish@gmail.com> Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Fixes: b61798130f1b ("net: ipv4: RTM_GETROUTE: return matched fib result when requested") Signed-off-by: Roopa Prabhu <roopa@cumulusnetworks.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 22:38:52 +03:00
}
if (err < 0)
goto errout_rcu;
rcu_read_unlock();
err = rtnl_unicast(skb, net, NETLINK_CB(in_skb).portid);
errout_free:
return err;
errout_rcu:
rcu_read_unlock();
kfree_skb(skb);
goto errout_free;
}
void ip_rt_multicast_event(struct in_device *in_dev)
{
rt_cache_flush(dev_net(in_dev->dev));
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
static int ip_rt_gc_interval __read_mostly = 60 * HZ;
static int ip_rt_gc_min_interval __read_mostly = HZ / 2;
static int ip_rt_gc_elasticity __read_mostly = 8;
static int ip_min_valid_pmtu __read_mostly = IPV4_MIN_MTU;
static int ipv4_sysctl_rtcache_flush(struct ctl_table *__ctl, int write,
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct net *net = (struct net *)__ctl->extra1;
if (write) {
rt_cache_flush(net);
fnhe_genid_bump(net);
return 0;
}
return -EINVAL;
}
static struct ctl_table ipv4_route_table[] = {
{
.procname = "gc_thresh",
.data = &ipv4_dst_ops.gc_thresh,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
},
{
.procname = "max_size",
.data = &ip_rt_max_size,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
},
{
/* Deprecated. Use gc_min_interval_ms */
.procname = "gc_min_interval",
.data = &ip_rt_gc_min_interval,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_jiffies,
},
{
.procname = "gc_min_interval_ms",
.data = &ip_rt_gc_min_interval,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_ms_jiffies,
},
{
.procname = "gc_timeout",
.data = &ip_rt_gc_timeout,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_jiffies,
},
{
.procname = "gc_interval",
.data = &ip_rt_gc_interval,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_jiffies,
},
{
.procname = "redirect_load",
.data = &ip_rt_redirect_load,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
},
{
.procname = "redirect_number",
.data = &ip_rt_redirect_number,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
},
{
.procname = "redirect_silence",
.data = &ip_rt_redirect_silence,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
},
{
.procname = "error_cost",
.data = &ip_rt_error_cost,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
},
{
.procname = "error_burst",
.data = &ip_rt_error_burst,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
},
{
.procname = "gc_elasticity",
.data = &ip_rt_gc_elasticity,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
},
{
.procname = "mtu_expires",
.data = &ip_rt_mtu_expires,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_jiffies,
},
{
.procname = "min_pmtu",
.data = &ip_rt_min_pmtu,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
.extra1 = &ip_min_valid_pmtu,
},
{
.procname = "min_adv_mss",
.data = &ip_rt_min_advmss,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
},
{ }
};
static const char ipv4_route_flush_procname[] = "flush";
static struct ctl_table ipv4_route_flush_table[] = {
{
.procname = ipv4_route_flush_procname,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0200,
.proc_handler = ipv4_sysctl_rtcache_flush,
},
{ },
};
static __net_init int sysctl_route_net_init(struct net *net)
{
struct ctl_table *tbl;
tbl = ipv4_route_flush_table;
if (!net_eq(net, &init_net)) {
tbl = kmemdup(tbl, sizeof(ipv4_route_flush_table), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tbl)
goto err_dup;
/* Don't export non-whitelisted sysctls to unprivileged users */
if (net->user_ns != &init_user_ns) {
if (tbl[0].procname != ipv4_route_flush_procname)
tbl[0].procname = NULL;
}
}
tbl[0].extra1 = net;
net->ipv4.route_hdr = register_net_sysctl(net, "net/ipv4/route", tbl);
if (!net->ipv4.route_hdr)
goto err_reg;
return 0;
err_reg:
if (tbl != ipv4_route_flush_table)
kfree(tbl);
err_dup:
return -ENOMEM;
}
static __net_exit void sysctl_route_net_exit(struct net *net)
{
struct ctl_table *tbl;
tbl = net->ipv4.route_hdr->ctl_table_arg;
unregister_net_sysctl_table(net->ipv4.route_hdr);
BUG_ON(tbl == ipv4_route_flush_table);
kfree(tbl);
}
static __net_initdata struct pernet_operations sysctl_route_ops = {
.init = sysctl_route_net_init,
.exit = sysctl_route_net_exit,
};
#endif
static __net_init int rt_genid_init(struct net *net)
{
atomic_set(&net->ipv4.rt_genid, 0);
atomic_set(&net->fnhe_genid, 0);
atomic_set(&net->ipv4.dev_addr_genid, get_random_int());
return 0;
}
static __net_initdata struct pernet_operations rt_genid_ops = {
.init = rt_genid_init,
};
static int __net_init ipv4_inetpeer_init(struct net *net)
{
struct inet_peer_base *bp = kmalloc(sizeof(*bp), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!bp)
return -ENOMEM;
inet_peer_base_init(bp);
net->ipv4.peers = bp;
return 0;
}
static void __net_exit ipv4_inetpeer_exit(struct net *net)
{
struct inet_peer_base *bp = net->ipv4.peers;
net->ipv4.peers = NULL;
inetpeer_invalidate_tree(bp);
kfree(bp);
}
static __net_initdata struct pernet_operations ipv4_inetpeer_ops = {
.init = ipv4_inetpeer_init,
.exit = ipv4_inetpeer_exit,
};
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_CLASSID
struct ip_rt_acct __percpu *ip_rt_acct __read_mostly;
#endif /* CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_CLASSID */
int __init ip_rt_init(void)
{
int cpu;
treewide: kmalloc() -> kmalloc_array() The kmalloc() function has a 2-factor argument form, kmalloc_array(). This patch replaces cases of: kmalloc(a * b, gfp) with: kmalloc_array(a * b, gfp) as well as handling cases of: kmalloc(a * b * c, gfp) with: kmalloc(array3_size(a, b, c), gfp) as it's slightly less ugly than: kmalloc_array(array_size(a, b), c, gfp) This does, however, attempt to ignore constant size factors like: kmalloc(4 * 1024, gfp) though any constants defined via macros get caught up in the conversion. Any factors with a sizeof() of "unsigned char", "char", and "u8" were dropped, since they're redundant. The tools/ directory was manually excluded, since it has its own implementation of kmalloc(). The Coccinelle script used for this was: // Fix redundant parens around sizeof(). @@ type TYPE; expression THING, E; @@ ( kmalloc( - (sizeof(TYPE)) * E + sizeof(TYPE) * E , ...) | kmalloc( - (sizeof(THING)) * E + sizeof(THING) * E , ...) ) // Drop single-byte sizes and redundant parens. @@ expression COUNT; typedef u8; typedef __u8; @@ ( kmalloc( - sizeof(u8) * (COUNT) + COUNT , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(__u8) * (COUNT) + COUNT , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(char) * (COUNT) + COUNT , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(unsigned char) * (COUNT) + COUNT , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(u8) * COUNT + COUNT , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(__u8) * COUNT + COUNT , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(char) * COUNT + COUNT , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(unsigned char) * COUNT + COUNT , ...) ) // 2-factor product with sizeof(type/expression) and identifier or constant. @@ type TYPE; expression THING; identifier COUNT_ID; constant COUNT_CONST; @@ ( - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_ID) + COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_ID + COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_CONST) + COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_CONST + COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_ID) + COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(THING) * COUNT_ID + COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_CONST) + COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(THING) * COUNT_CONST + COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING) , ...) ) // 2-factor product, only identifiers. @@ identifier SIZE, COUNT; @@ - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - SIZE * COUNT + COUNT, SIZE , ...) // 3-factor product with 1 sizeof(type) or sizeof(expression), with // redundant parens removed. @@ expression THING; identifier STRIDE, COUNT; type TYPE; @@ ( kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * STRIDE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * (STRIDE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * STRIDE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * STRIDE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(THING) * COUNT * (STRIDE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(THING) * COUNT * STRIDE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING)) , ...) ) // 3-factor product with 2 sizeof(variable), with redundant parens removed. @@ expression THING1, THING2; identifier COUNT; type TYPE1, TYPE2; @@ ( kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(TYPE2) * COUNT + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT) + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT) + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT) + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2)) , ...) ) // 3-factor product, only identifiers, with redundant parens removed. @@ identifier STRIDE, SIZE, COUNT; @@ ( kmalloc( - (COUNT) * STRIDE * SIZE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kmalloc( - COUNT * (STRIDE) * SIZE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kmalloc( - COUNT * STRIDE * (SIZE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kmalloc( - (COUNT) * (STRIDE) * SIZE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kmalloc( - COUNT * (STRIDE) * (SIZE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kmalloc( - (COUNT) * STRIDE * (SIZE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kmalloc( - (COUNT) * (STRIDE) * (SIZE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kmalloc( - COUNT * STRIDE * SIZE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) ) // Any remaining multi-factor products, first at least 3-factor products, // when they're not all constants... @@ expression E1, E2, E3; constant C1, C2, C3; @@ ( kmalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...) | kmalloc( - (E1) * E2 * E3 + array3_size(E1, E2, E3) , ...) | kmalloc( - (E1) * (E2) * E3 + array3_size(E1, E2, E3) , ...) | kmalloc( - (E1) * (E2) * (E3) + array3_size(E1, E2, E3) , ...) | kmalloc( - E1 * E2 * E3 + array3_size(E1, E2, E3) , ...) ) // And then all remaining 2 factors products when they're not all constants, // keeping sizeof() as the second factor argument. @@ expression THING, E1, E2; type TYPE; constant C1, C2, C3; @@ ( kmalloc(sizeof(THING) * C2, ...) | kmalloc(sizeof(TYPE) * C2, ...) | kmalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...) | kmalloc(C1 * C2, ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(TYPE) * (E2) + E2, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(TYPE) * E2 + E2, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(THING) * (E2) + E2, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(THING) * E2 + E2, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - (E1) * E2 + E1, E2 , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - (E1) * (E2) + E1, E2 , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - E1 * E2 + E1, E2 , ...) ) Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-06-12 23:55:00 +03:00
ip_idents = kmalloc_array(IP_IDENTS_SZ, sizeof(*ip_idents),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ip_idents)
panic("IP: failed to allocate ip_idents\n");
prandom_bytes(ip_idents, IP_IDENTS_SZ * sizeof(*ip_idents));
ip_tstamps = kcalloc(IP_IDENTS_SZ, sizeof(*ip_tstamps), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ip_tstamps)
panic("IP: failed to allocate ip_tstamps\n");
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
struct uncached_list *ul = &per_cpu(rt_uncached_list, cpu);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ul->head);
spin_lock_init(&ul->lock);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_CLASSID
ip_rt_acct = __alloc_percpu(256 * sizeof(struct ip_rt_acct), __alignof__(struct ip_rt_acct));
if (!ip_rt_acct)
panic("IP: failed to allocate ip_rt_acct\n");
#endif
ipv4_dst_ops.kmem_cachep =
kmem_cache_create("ip_dst_cache", sizeof(struct rtable), 0,
SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
ipv4_dst_blackhole_ops.kmem_cachep = ipv4_dst_ops.kmem_cachep;
if (dst_entries_init(&ipv4_dst_ops) < 0)
panic("IP: failed to allocate ipv4_dst_ops counter\n");
if (dst_entries_init(&ipv4_dst_blackhole_ops) < 0)
panic("IP: failed to allocate ipv4_dst_blackhole_ops counter\n");
ipv4_dst_ops.gc_thresh = ~0;
ip_rt_max_size = INT_MAX;
devinet_init();
ip_fib_init();
if (ip_rt_proc_init())
pr_err("Unable to create route proc files\n");
#ifdef CONFIG_XFRM
xfrm_init();
xfrm4_init();
#endif
rtnl_register(PF_INET, RTM_GETROUTE, inet_rtm_getroute, NULL,
RTNL_FLAG_DOIT_UNLOCKED);
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
register_pernet_subsys(&sysctl_route_ops);
#endif
register_pernet_subsys(&rt_genid_ops);
register_pernet_subsys(&ipv4_inetpeer_ops);
return 0;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
/*
* We really need to sanitize the damn ipv4 init order, then all
* this nonsense will go away.
*/
void __init ip_static_sysctl_init(void)
{
register_net_sysctl(&init_net, "net/ipv4/route", ipv4_route_table);
}
#endif