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===================================
Documentation for /proc/sys/kernel/
===================================
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.. See scripts/check-sysctl-docs to keep this up to date
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Copyright (c) 1998, 1999, Rik van Riel <riel@nl.linux.org>
Copyright (c) 2009, Shen Feng<shen@cn.fujitsu.com>
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For general info and legal blurb, please look in
Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/index.rst.
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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This file contains documentation for the sysctl files in
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`` /proc/sys/kernel/ `` .
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The files in this directory can be used to tune and monitor
miscellaneous and general things in the operation of the Linux
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kernel. Since some of the files *can* be used to screw up your
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system, it is advisable to read both documentation and source
before actually making adjustments.
Currently, these files might (depending on your configuration)
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show up in `` /proc/sys/kernel `` :
.. contents :: :local:
acct
====
::
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highwater lowwater frequency
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If BSD-style process accounting is enabled these values control
its behaviour. If free space on filesystem where the log lives
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goes below `` lowwater ` ` \ % accounting suspends. If free space gets
above `` highwater ` ` \ % accounting resumes. ` ` frequency `` determines
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how often do we check the amount of free space (value is in
seconds). Default:
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::
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4 2 30
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That is, suspend accounting if free space drops below 2%; resume it
if it increases to at least 4%; consider information about amount of
free space valid for 30 seconds.
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acpi_video_flags
================
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See Documentation/power/video.rst. This allows the video resume mode to be set,
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in a similar fashion to the `` acpi_sleep `` kernel parameter, by
combining the following values:
= =======
1 s3_bios
2 s3_mode
4 s3_beep
= =======
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auto_msgmni
===========
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This variable has no effect and may be removed in future kernel
releases. Reading it always returns 0.
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Up to Linux 3.17, it enabled/disabled automatic recomputing of
`msgmni`_
upon memory add/remove or upon IPC namespace creation/removal.
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Echoing "1" into this file enabled msgmni automatic recomputing.
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Echoing "0" turned it off. The default value was 1.
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bootloader_type (x86 only)
==========================
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This gives the bootloader type number as indicated by the bootloader,
shifted left by 4, and OR'd with the low four bits of the bootloader
version. The reason for this encoding is that this used to match the
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`` type_of_loader `` field in the kernel header; the encoding is kept for
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backwards compatibility. That is, if the full bootloader type number
is 0x15 and the full version number is 0x234, this file will contain
the value 340 = 0x154.
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See the `` type_of_loader `` and `` ext_loader_type `` fields in
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Documentation/x86/boot.rst for additional information.
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bootloader_version (x86 only)
=============================
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The complete bootloader version number. In the example above, this
file will contain the value 564 = 0x234.
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See the `` type_of_loader `` and `` ext_loader_ver `` fields in
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Documentation/x86/boot.rst for additional information.
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bpf_stats_enabled
=================
Controls whether the kernel should collect statistics on BPF programs
(total time spent running, number of times run...). Enabling
statistics causes a slight reduction in performance on each program
run. The statistics can be seen using `` bpftool `` .
= ===================================
0 Don't collect statistics (default).
1 Collect statistics.
= ===================================
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cad_pid
=======
This is the pid which will be signalled on reboot (notably, by
Ctrl-Alt-Delete). Writing a value to this file which doesn't
correspond to a running process will result in `` -ESRCH `` .
See also `ctrl-alt-del`_ .
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cap_last_cap
============
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Highest valid capability of the running kernel. Exports
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`` CAP_LAST_CAP `` from the kernel.
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core_pattern
============
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`` core_pattern `` is used to specify a core dumpfile pattern name.
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* max length 127 characters; default value is "core"
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* `` core_pattern `` is used as a pattern template for the output
filename; certain string patterns (beginning with '%') are
substituted with their actual values.
* backward compatibility with `` core_uses_pid `` :
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If `` core_pattern `` does not include "%p" (default does not)
and `` core_uses_pid `` is set, then .PID will be appended to
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the filename.
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* corename format specifiers
======== ==========================================
%<NUL> '%' is dropped
%% output one '%'
%p pid
%P global pid (init PID namespace)
%i tid
%I global tid (init PID namespace)
%u uid (in initial user namespace)
%g gid (in initial user namespace)
%d dump mode, matches `` PR_SET_DUMPABLE `` and
`` /proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable ``
%s signal number
%t UNIX time of dump
%h hostname
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%e executable filename (may be shortened, could be changed by prctl etc)
%f executable filename
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%E executable path
%c maximum size of core file by resource limit RLIMIT_CORE
%<OTHER> both are dropped
======== ==========================================
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* If the first character of the pattern is a '|', the kernel will treat
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the rest of the pattern as a command to run. The core dump will be
written to the standard input of that program instead of to a file.
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core_pipe_limit
===============
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This sysctl is only applicable when `core_pattern`_ is configured to
pipe core files to a user space helper (when the first character of
`` core_pattern `` is a '|', see above).
When collecting cores via a pipe to an application, it is occasionally
useful for the collecting application to gather data about the
crashing process from its `` /proc/pid `` directory.
In order to do this safely, the kernel must wait for the collecting
process to exit, so as not to remove the crashing processes proc files
prematurely.
This in turn creates the possibility that a misbehaving userspace
collecting process can block the reaping of a crashed process simply
by never exiting.
This sysctl defends against that.
It defines how many concurrent crashing processes may be piped to user
space applications in parallel.
If this value is exceeded, then those crashing processes above that
value are noted via the kernel log and their cores are skipped.
0 is a special value, indicating that unlimited processes may be
captured in parallel, but that no waiting will take place (i.e. the
collecting process is not guaranteed access to `` /proc/<crashing
pid>/`` ).
This value defaults to 0.
core_uses_pid
=============
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The default coredump filename is "core". By setting
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`` core_uses_pid `` to 1, the coredump filename becomes core.PID.
If `core_pattern`_ does not include "%p" (default does not)
and `` core_uses_pid `` is set, then .PID will be appended to
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the filename.
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ctrl-alt-del
============
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When the value in this file is 0, ctrl-alt-del is trapped and
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sent to the `` init(1) `` program to handle a graceful restart.
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When, however, the value is > 0, Linux's reaction to a Vulcan
Nerve Pinch (tm) will be an immediate reboot, without even
syncing its dirty buffers.
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Note:
when a program (like dosemu) has the keyboard in 'raw'
mode, the ctrl-alt-del is intercepted by the program before it
ever reaches the kernel tty layer, and it's up to the program
to decide what to do with it.
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dmesg_restrict
==============
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This toggle indicates whether unprivileged users are prevented
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from using `` dmesg(8) `` to view messages from the kernel's log
buffer.
When `` dmesg_restrict `` is set to 0 there are no restrictions.
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When `` dmesg_restrict `` is set to 1, users must have
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`` CAP_SYSLOG `` to use `` dmesg(8) `` .
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The kernel config option `` CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT `` sets the
default value of `` dmesg_restrict `` .
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domainname & hostname
=====================
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These files can be used to set the NIS/YP domainname and the
hostname of your box in exactly the same way as the commands
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domainname and hostname, i.e.::
# echo "darkstar" > /proc/sys/kernel/hostname
# echo "mydomain" > /proc/sys/kernel/domainname
has the same effect as::
# hostname "darkstar"
# domainname "mydomain"
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Note, however, that the classic darkstar.frop.org has the
hostname "darkstar" and DNS (Internet Domain Name Server)
domainname "frop.org", not to be confused with the NIS (Network
Information Service) or YP (Yellow Pages) domainname. These two
domain names are in general different. For a detailed discussion
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see the `` hostname(1) `` man page.
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firmware_config
===============
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See Documentation/driver-api/firmware/fallback-mechanisms.rst.
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The entries in this directory allow the firmware loader helper
fallback to be controlled:
* `` force_sysfs_fallback `` , when set to 1, forces the use of the
fallback;
* `` ignore_sysfs_fallback `` , when set to 1, ignores any fallback.
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ftrace_dump_on_oops
===================
Determines whether `` ftrace_dump() `` should be called on an oops (or
kernel panic). This will output the contents of the ftrace buffers to
the console. This is very useful for capturing traces that lead to
crashes and outputting them to a serial console.
= ===================================================
0 Disabled (default).
1 Dump buffers of all CPUs.
2 Dump the buffer of the CPU that triggered the oops.
= ===================================================
ftrace_enabled, stack_tracer_enabled
====================================
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See Documentation/trace/ftrace.rst.
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hardlockup_all_cpu_backtrace
============================
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This value controls the hard lockup detector behavior when a hard
lockup condition is detected as to whether or not to gather further
debug information. If enabled, arch-specific all-CPU stack dumping
will be initiated.
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= ============================================
0 Do nothing. This is the default behavior.
1 On detection capture more debug information.
= ============================================
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hardlockup_panic
================
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This parameter can be used to control whether the kernel panics
when a hard lockup is detected.
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= ===========================
0 Don't panic on hard lockup.
1 Panic on hard lockup.
= ===========================
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See Documentation/admin-guide/lockup-watchdogs.rst for more information.
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This can also be set using the nmi_watchdog kernel parameter.
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hotplug
=======
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Path for the hotplug policy agent.
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Default value is `` CONFIG_UEVENT_HELPER_PATH `` , which in turn defaults
to the empty string.
This file only exists when `` CONFIG_UEVENT_HELPER `` is enabled. Most
modern systems rely exclusively on the netlink-based uevent source and
don't need this.
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hung_task_all_cpu_backtrace
===========================
kernel/hung_task.c: introduce sysctl to print all traces when a hung task is detected
Commit 401c636a0eeb ("kernel/hung_task.c: show all hung tasks before
panic") introduced a change in that we started to show all CPUs
backtraces when a hung task is detected _and_ the sysctl/kernel
parameter "hung_task_panic" is set. The idea is good, because usually
when observing deadlocks (that may lead to hung tasks), the culprit is
another task holding a lock and not necessarily the task detected as
hung.
The problem with this approach is that dumping backtraces is a slightly
expensive task, specially printing that on console (and specially in
many CPU machines, as servers commonly found nowadays). So, users that
plan to collect a kdump to investigate the hung tasks and narrow down
the deadlock definitely don't need the CPUs backtrace on dmesg/console,
which will delay the panic and pollute the log (crash tool would easily
grab all CPUs traces with 'bt -a' command).
Also, there's the reciprocal scenario: some users may be interested in
seeing the CPUs backtraces but not have the system panic when a hung
task is detected. The current approach hence is almost as embedding a
policy in the kernel, by forcing the CPUs backtraces' dump (only) on
hung_task_panic.
This patch decouples the panic event on hung task from the CPUs
backtraces dump, by creating (and documenting) a new sysctl called
"hung_task_all_cpu_backtrace", analog to the approach taken on soft/hard
lockups, that have both a panic and an "all_cpu_backtrace" sysctl to
allow individual control. The new mechanism for dumping the CPUs
backtraces on hung task detection respects "hung_task_warnings" by not
dumping the traces in case there's no warnings left.
Signed-off-by: Guilherme G. Piccoli <gpiccoli@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200327223646.20779-1-gpiccoli@canonical.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-06-07 21:40:45 -07:00
If this option is set, the kernel will send an NMI to all CPUs to dump
their backtraces when a hung task is detected. This file shows up if
CONFIG_DETECT_HUNG_TASK and CONFIG_SMP are enabled.
0: Won't show all CPUs backtraces when a hung task is detected.
This is the default behavior.
1: Will non-maskably interrupt all CPUs and dump their backtraces when
a hung task is detected.
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hung_task_panic
===============
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Controls the kernel's behavior when a hung task is detected.
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This file shows up if `` CONFIG_DETECT_HUNG_TASK `` is enabled.
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= =================================================
0 Continue operation. This is the default behavior.
1 Panic immediately.
= =================================================
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hung_task_check_count
=====================
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The upper bound on the number of tasks that are checked.
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This file shows up if `` CONFIG_DETECT_HUNG_TASK `` is enabled.
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hung_task_timeout_secs
======================
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When a task in D state did not get scheduled
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for more than this value report a warning.
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This file shows up if `` CONFIG_DETECT_HUNG_TASK `` is enabled.
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0 means infinite timeout, no checking is done.
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Possible values to set are in range {0:`` LONG_MAX `` /`` HZ `` }.
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hung_task_check_interval_secs
=============================
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Hung task check interval. If hung task checking is enabled
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(see `hung_task_timeout_secs`_ ), the check is done every
`` hung_task_check_interval_secs `` seconds.
This file shows up if `` CONFIG_DETECT_HUNG_TASK `` is enabled.
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0 (default) means use `` hung_task_timeout_secs `` as checking
interval.
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Possible values to set are in range {0:`` LONG_MAX `` /`` HZ `` }.
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hung_task_warnings
==================
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The maximum number of warnings to report. During a check interval
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if a hung task is detected, this value is decreased by 1.
When this value reaches 0, no more warnings will be reported.
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This file shows up if `` CONFIG_DETECT_HUNG_TASK `` is enabled.
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-1: report an infinite number of warnings.
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hyperv_record_panic_msg
=======================
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Controls whether the panic kmsg data should be reported to Hyper-V.
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= =========================================================
0 Do not report panic kmsg data.
1 Report the panic kmsg data. This is the default behavior.
= =========================================================
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ignore-unaligned-usertrap
=========================
On architectures where unaligned accesses cause traps, and where this
feature is supported (`` CONFIG_SYSCTL_ARCH_UNALIGN_NO_WARN `` ;
currently, `` arc `` and `` ia64 `` ), controls whether all unaligned traps
are logged.
= =============================================================
0 Log all unaligned accesses.
1 Only warn the first time a process traps. This is the default
setting.
= =============================================================
See also `unaligned-trap`_ and `unaligned-dump-stack`_ . On `` ia64 `` ,
this allows system administrators to override the
`` IA64_THREAD_UAC_NOPRINT `` `` prctl `` and avoid logs being flooded.
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kexec_load_disabled
===================
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A toggle indicating if the `` kexec_load `` syscall has been disabled.
This value defaults to 0 (false: `` kexec_load `` enabled), but can be
set to 1 (true: `` kexec_load `` disabled).
Once true, kexec can no longer be used, and the toggle cannot be set
back to false.
This allows a kexec image to be loaded before disabling the syscall,
allowing a system to set up (and later use) an image without it being
altered.
Generally used together with the `modules_disabled`_ sysctl.
kexec: add sysctl to disable kexec_load
For general-purpose (i.e. distro) kernel builds it makes sense to build
with CONFIG_KEXEC to allow end users to choose what kind of things they
want to do with kexec. However, in the face of trying to lock down a
system with such a kernel, there needs to be a way to disable kexec_load
(much like module loading can be disabled). Without this, it is too easy
for the root user to modify kernel memory even when CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM
and modules_disabled are set. With this change, it is still possible to
load an image for use later, then disable kexec_load so the image (or lack
of image) can't be altered.
The intention is for using this in environments where "perfect"
enforcement is hard. Without a verified boot, along with verified
modules, and along with verified kexec, this is trying to give a system a
better chance to defend itself (or at least grow the window of
discoverability) against attack in the face of a privilege escalation.
In my mind, I consider several boot scenarios:
1) Verified boot of read-only verified root fs loading fd-based
verification of kexec images.
2) Secure boot of writable root fs loading signed kexec images.
3) Regular boot loading kexec (e.g. kcrash) image early and locking it.
4) Regular boot with no control of kexec image at all.
1 and 2 don't exist yet, but will soon once the verified kexec series has
landed. 4 is the state of things now. The gap between 2 and 4 is too
large, so this change creates scenario 3, a middle-ground above 4 when 2
and 1 are not possible for a system.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-01-23 15:55:59 -08:00
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kptr_restrict
=============
kptr_restrict for hiding kernel pointers from unprivileged users
Add the %pK printk format specifier and the /proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict
sysctl.
The %pK format specifier is designed to hide exposed kernel pointers,
specifically via /proc interfaces. Exposing these pointers provides an
easy target for kernel write vulnerabilities, since they reveal the
locations of writable structures containing easily triggerable function
pointers. The behavior of %pK depends on the kptr_restrict sysctl.
If kptr_restrict is set to 0, no deviation from the standard %p behavior
occurs. If kptr_restrict is set to 1, the default, if the current user
(intended to be a reader via seq_printf(), etc.) does not have CAP_SYSLOG
(currently in the LSM tree), kernel pointers using %pK are printed as 0's.
If kptr_restrict is set to 2, kernel pointers using %pK are printed as
0's regardless of privileges. Replacing with 0's was chosen over the
default "(null)", which cannot be parsed by userland %p, which expects
"(nil)".
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: check for IRQ context when !kptr_restrict, save an indent level, s/WARN/WARN_ONCE/]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixup]
[randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix kernel/sysctl.c warning]
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Thomas Graf <tgraf@infradead.org>
Cc: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-01-12 16:59:41 -08:00
This toggle indicates whether restrictions are placed on
2020-02-18 13:59:16 +01:00
exposing kernel addresses via `` /proc `` and other interfaces.
When `` kptr_restrict `` is set to 0 (the default) the address is hashed
before printing.
(This is the equivalent to %p.)
When `` kptr_restrict `` is set to 1, kernel pointers printed using the
%pK format specifier will be replaced with 0s unless the user has
`` CAP_SYSLOG `` and effective user and group ids are equal to the real
ids.
This is because %pK checks are done at read() time rather than open()
time, so if permissions are elevated between the open() and the read()
(e.g via a setuid binary) then %pK will not leak kernel pointers to
unprivileged users.
Note, this is a temporary solution only.
The correct long-term solution is to do the permission checks at
open() time.
Consider removing world read permissions from files that use %pK, and
using `dmesg_restrict`_ to protect against uses of %pK in `` dmesg(8) ``
if leaking kernel pointer values to unprivileged users is a concern.
When `` kptr_restrict `` is set to 2, kernel pointers printed using
%pK will be replaced with 0s regardless of privileges.
modprobe
========
kptr_restrict for hiding kernel pointers from unprivileged users
Add the %pK printk format specifier and the /proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict
sysctl.
The %pK format specifier is designed to hide exposed kernel pointers,
specifically via /proc interfaces. Exposing these pointers provides an
easy target for kernel write vulnerabilities, since they reveal the
locations of writable structures containing easily triggerable function
pointers. The behavior of %pK depends on the kptr_restrict sysctl.
If kptr_restrict is set to 0, no deviation from the standard %p behavior
occurs. If kptr_restrict is set to 1, the default, if the current user
(intended to be a reader via seq_printf(), etc.) does not have CAP_SYSLOG
(currently in the LSM tree), kernel pointers using %pK are printed as 0's.
If kptr_restrict is set to 2, kernel pointers using %pK are printed as
0's regardless of privileges. Replacing with 0's was chosen over the
default "(null)", which cannot be parsed by userland %p, which expects
"(nil)".
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: check for IRQ context when !kptr_restrict, save an indent level, s/WARN/WARN_ONCE/]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixup]
[randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix kernel/sysctl.c warning]
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Thomas Graf <tgraf@infradead.org>
Cc: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-01-12 16:59:41 -08:00
2020-04-14 10:24:30 -07:00
The full path to the usermode helper for autoloading kernel modules,
2021-05-14 17:27:36 -07:00
by default `` CONFIG_MODPROBE_PATH `` , which in turn defaults to
"/sbin/modprobe". This binary is executed when the kernel requests a
module. For example, if userspace passes an unknown filesystem type
to mount(), then the kernel will automatically request the
corresponding filesystem module by executing this usermode helper.
2020-04-14 10:24:30 -07:00
This usermode helper should insert the needed module into the kernel.
This sysctl only affects module autoloading. It has no effect on the
ability to explicitly insert modules.
This sysctl can be used to debug module loading requests::
2020-02-18 13:59:17 +01:00
echo '#! /bin/sh' > /tmp/modprobe
echo 'echo "$@" >> /tmp/modprobe.log' >> /tmp/modprobe
echo 'exec /sbin/modprobe "$@"' >> /tmp/modprobe
chmod a+x /tmp/modprobe
echo /tmp/modprobe > /proc/sys/kernel/modprobe
2020-04-14 10:24:30 -07:00
Alternatively, if this sysctl is set to the empty string, then module
autoloading is completely disabled. The kernel will not try to
execute a usermode helper at all, nor will it call the
kernel_module_request LSM hook.
2011-07-23 10:39:29 -07:00
2020-04-14 10:24:30 -07:00
If CONFIG_STATIC_USERMODEHELPER=y is set in the kernel configuration,
then the configured static usermode helper overrides this sysctl,
except that the empty string is still accepted to completely disable
module autoloading as described above.
2011-07-23 10:39:29 -07:00
2020-02-18 13:59:16 +01:00
modules_disabled
================
2009-04-02 15:49:29 -07:00
A toggle value indicating if modules are allowed to be loaded
in an otherwise modular kernel. This toggle defaults to off
(0), but can be set true (1). Once true, modules can be
neither loaded nor unloaded, and the toggle cannot be set back
2020-02-18 13:59:16 +01:00
to false. Generally used with the `kexec_load_disabled`_ toggle.
2009-04-02 15:49:29 -07:00
2020-02-18 13:59:16 +01:00
.. _msgmni:
2009-04-02 15:49:29 -07:00
2020-02-18 13:59:16 +01:00
msgmax, msgmnb, and msgmni
==========================
2020-02-18 13:59:19 +01:00
`` msgmax `` is the maximum size of an IPC message, in bytes. 8192 by
default (`` MSGMAX `` ).
`` msgmnb `` is the maximum size of an IPC queue, in bytes. 16384 by
default (`` MSGMNB `` ).
`` msgmni `` is the maximum number of IPC queues. 32000 by default
(`` MSGMNI `` ).
2020-02-18 13:59:16 +01:00
msg_next_id, sem_next_id, and shm_next_id (System V IPC)
========================================================
2013-01-04 15:34:50 -08:00
These three toggles allows to specify desired id for next allocated IPC
object: message, semaphore or shared memory respectively.
By default they are equal to -1, which means generic allocation logic.
2020-02-18 13:59:16 +01:00
Possible values to set are in range {0:`` INT_MAX `` }.
2013-01-04 15:34:50 -08:00
Notes:
2019-04-18 18:35:54 -03:00
1) kernel doesn't guarantee, that new object will have desired id. So,
it's up to userspace, how to handle an object with "wrong" id.
2) Toggle with non-default value will be set back to -1 by kernel after
successful IPC object allocation. If an IPC object allocation syscall
fails, it is undefined if the value remains unmodified or is reset to -1.
2013-01-04 15:34:50 -08:00
2020-05-18 16:58:36 +02:00
ngroups_max
===========
Maximum number of supplementary groups, _i.e._ the maximum size which
`` setgroups `` will accept. Exports `` NGROUPS_MAX `` from the kernel.
2020-02-18 13:59:16 +01:00
nmi_watchdog
============
2011-07-23 10:39:29 -07:00
2015-04-14 15:44:13 -07:00
This parameter can be used to control the NMI watchdog
(i.e. the hard lockup detector) on x86 systems.
2011-07-23 10:39:29 -07:00
2020-02-18 13:59:16 +01:00
= =================================
0 Disable the hard lockup detector.
1 Enable the hard lockup detector.
= =================================
2015-04-14 15:44:13 -07:00
The hard lockup detector monitors each CPU for its ability to respond to
timer interrupts. The mechanism utilizes CPU performance counter registers
that are programmed to generate Non-Maskable Interrupts (NMIs) periodically
while a CPU is busy. Hence, the alternative name 'NMI watchdog'.
The NMI watchdog is disabled by default if the kernel is running as a guest
2019-04-18 18:35:54 -03:00
in a KVM virtual machine. This default can be overridden by adding::
2015-04-14 15:44:13 -07:00
nmi_watchdog=1
2021-06-16 08:27:20 +02:00
to the guest kernel command line (see
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.rst).
2011-07-23 10:39:29 -07:00
2022-07-13 17:47:29 +02:00
nmi_wd_lpm_factor (PPC only)
============================
Factor to apply to the NMI watchdog timeout (only when `` nmi_watchdog `` is
set to 1). This factor represents the percentage added to
`` watchdog_thresh `` when calculating the NMI watchdog timeout during an
LPM. The soft lockup timeout is not impacted.
A value of 0 means no change. The default value is 200 meaning the NMI
watchdog is set to 30s (based on `` watchdog_thresh `` equal to 10).
2020-02-18 13:59:16 +01:00
numa_balancing
==============
2013-10-07 11:28:40 +01:00
NUMA balancing: optimize page placement for memory tiering system
With the advent of various new memory types, some machines will have
multiple types of memory, e.g. DRAM and PMEM (persistent memory). The
memory subsystem of these machines can be called memory tiering system,
because the performance of the different types of memory are usually
different.
In such system, because of the memory accessing pattern changing etc,
some pages in the slow memory may become hot globally. So in this
patch, the NUMA balancing mechanism is enhanced to optimize the page
placement among the different memory types according to hot/cold
dynamically.
In a typical memory tiering system, there are CPUs, fast memory and slow
memory in each physical NUMA node. The CPUs and the fast memory will be
put in one logical node (called fast memory node), while the slow memory
will be put in another (faked) logical node (called slow memory node).
That is, the fast memory is regarded as local while the slow memory is
regarded as remote. So it's possible for the recently accessed pages in
the slow memory node to be promoted to the fast memory node via the
existing NUMA balancing mechanism.
The original NUMA balancing mechanism will stop to migrate pages if the
free memory of the target node becomes below the high watermark. This
is a reasonable policy if there's only one memory type. But this makes
the original NUMA balancing mechanism almost do not work to optimize
page placement among different memory types. Details are as follows.
It's the common cases that the working-set size of the workload is
larger than the size of the fast memory nodes. Otherwise, it's
unnecessary to use the slow memory at all. So, there are almost always
no enough free pages in the fast memory nodes, so that the globally hot
pages in the slow memory node cannot be promoted to the fast memory
node. To solve the issue, we have 2 choices as follows,
a. Ignore the free pages watermark checking when promoting hot pages
from the slow memory node to the fast memory node. This will
create some memory pressure in the fast memory node, thus trigger
the memory reclaiming. So that, the cold pages in the fast memory
node will be demoted to the slow memory node.
b. Define a new watermark called wmark_promo which is higher than
wmark_high, and have kswapd reclaiming pages until free pages reach
such watermark. The scenario is as follows: when we want to promote
hot-pages from a slow memory to a fast memory, but fast memory's free
pages would go lower than high watermark with such promotion, we wake
up kswapd with wmark_promo watermark in order to demote cold pages and
free us up some space. So, next time we want to promote hot-pages we
might have a chance of doing so.
The choice "a" may create high memory pressure in the fast memory node.
If the memory pressure of the workload is high, the memory pressure
may become so high that the memory allocation latency of the workload
is influenced, e.g. the direct reclaiming may be triggered.
The choice "b" works much better at this aspect. If the memory
pressure of the workload is high, the hot pages promotion will stop
earlier because its allocation watermark is higher than that of the
normal memory allocation. So in this patch, choice "b" is implemented.
A new zone watermark (WMARK_PROMO) is added. Which is larger than the
high watermark and can be controlled via watermark_scale_factor.
In addition to the original page placement optimization among sockets,
the NUMA balancing mechanism is extended to be used to optimize page
placement according to hot/cold among different memory types. So the
sysctl user space interface (numa_balancing) is extended in a backward
compatible way as follow, so that the users can enable/disable these
functionality individually.
The sysctl is converted from a Boolean value to a bits field. The
definition of the flags is,
- 0: NUMA_BALANCING_DISABLED
- 1: NUMA_BALANCING_NORMAL
- 2: NUMA_BALANCING_MEMORY_TIERING
We have tested the patch with the pmbench memory accessing benchmark
with the 80:20 read/write ratio and the Gauss access address
distribution on a 2 socket Intel server with Optane DC Persistent
Memory Model. The test results shows that the pmbench score can
improve up to 95.9%.
Thanks Andrew Morton to help fix the document format error.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220221084529.1052339-3-ying.huang@intel.com
Signed-off-by: "Huang, Ying" <ying.huang@intel.com>
Tested-by: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Zi Yan <ziy@nvidia.com>
Cc: Wei Xu <weixugc@google.com>
Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Cc: zhongjiang-ali <zhongjiang-ali@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-03-22 14:46:23 -07:00
Enables/disables and configures automatic page fault based NUMA memory
balancing. Memory is moved automatically to nodes that access it often.
The value to set can be the result of ORing the following:
2013-10-07 11:28:40 +01:00
NUMA balancing: optimize page placement for memory tiering system
With the advent of various new memory types, some machines will have
multiple types of memory, e.g. DRAM and PMEM (persistent memory). The
memory subsystem of these machines can be called memory tiering system,
because the performance of the different types of memory are usually
different.
In such system, because of the memory accessing pattern changing etc,
some pages in the slow memory may become hot globally. So in this
patch, the NUMA balancing mechanism is enhanced to optimize the page
placement among the different memory types according to hot/cold
dynamically.
In a typical memory tiering system, there are CPUs, fast memory and slow
memory in each physical NUMA node. The CPUs and the fast memory will be
put in one logical node (called fast memory node), while the slow memory
will be put in another (faked) logical node (called slow memory node).
That is, the fast memory is regarded as local while the slow memory is
regarded as remote. So it's possible for the recently accessed pages in
the slow memory node to be promoted to the fast memory node via the
existing NUMA balancing mechanism.
The original NUMA balancing mechanism will stop to migrate pages if the
free memory of the target node becomes below the high watermark. This
is a reasonable policy if there's only one memory type. But this makes
the original NUMA balancing mechanism almost do not work to optimize
page placement among different memory types. Details are as follows.
It's the common cases that the working-set size of the workload is
larger than the size of the fast memory nodes. Otherwise, it's
unnecessary to use the slow memory at all. So, there are almost always
no enough free pages in the fast memory nodes, so that the globally hot
pages in the slow memory node cannot be promoted to the fast memory
node. To solve the issue, we have 2 choices as follows,
a. Ignore the free pages watermark checking when promoting hot pages
from the slow memory node to the fast memory node. This will
create some memory pressure in the fast memory node, thus trigger
the memory reclaiming. So that, the cold pages in the fast memory
node will be demoted to the slow memory node.
b. Define a new watermark called wmark_promo which is higher than
wmark_high, and have kswapd reclaiming pages until free pages reach
such watermark. The scenario is as follows: when we want to promote
hot-pages from a slow memory to a fast memory, but fast memory's free
pages would go lower than high watermark with such promotion, we wake
up kswapd with wmark_promo watermark in order to demote cold pages and
free us up some space. So, next time we want to promote hot-pages we
might have a chance of doing so.
The choice "a" may create high memory pressure in the fast memory node.
If the memory pressure of the workload is high, the memory pressure
may become so high that the memory allocation latency of the workload
is influenced, e.g. the direct reclaiming may be triggered.
The choice "b" works much better at this aspect. If the memory
pressure of the workload is high, the hot pages promotion will stop
earlier because its allocation watermark is higher than that of the
normal memory allocation. So in this patch, choice "b" is implemented.
A new zone watermark (WMARK_PROMO) is added. Which is larger than the
high watermark and can be controlled via watermark_scale_factor.
In addition to the original page placement optimization among sockets,
the NUMA balancing mechanism is extended to be used to optimize page
placement according to hot/cold among different memory types. So the
sysctl user space interface (numa_balancing) is extended in a backward
compatible way as follow, so that the users can enable/disable these
functionality individually.
The sysctl is converted from a Boolean value to a bits field. The
definition of the flags is,
- 0: NUMA_BALANCING_DISABLED
- 1: NUMA_BALANCING_NORMAL
- 2: NUMA_BALANCING_MEMORY_TIERING
We have tested the patch with the pmbench memory accessing benchmark
with the 80:20 read/write ratio and the Gauss access address
distribution on a 2 socket Intel server with Optane DC Persistent
Memory Model. The test results shows that the pmbench score can
improve up to 95.9%.
Thanks Andrew Morton to help fix the document format error.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220221084529.1052339-3-ying.huang@intel.com
Signed-off-by: "Huang, Ying" <ying.huang@intel.com>
Tested-by: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Zi Yan <ziy@nvidia.com>
Cc: Wei Xu <weixugc@google.com>
Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Cc: zhongjiang-ali <zhongjiang-ali@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-03-22 14:46:23 -07:00
= =================================
0 NUMA_BALANCING_DISABLED
1 NUMA_BALANCING_NORMAL
2 NUMA_BALANCING_MEMORY_TIERING
= =================================
Or NUMA_BALANCING_NORMAL to optimize page placement among different
NUMA nodes to reduce remote accessing. On NUMA machines, there is a
performance penalty if remote memory is accessed by a CPU. When this
feature is enabled the kernel samples what task thread is accessing
memory by periodically unmapping pages and later trapping a page
fault. At the time of the page fault, it is determined if the data
being accessed should be migrated to a local memory node.
2013-10-07 11:28:40 +01:00
The unmapping of pages and trapping faults incur additional overhead that
ideally is offset by improved memory locality but there is no universal
guarantee. If the target workload is already bound to NUMA nodes then this
2022-02-10 13:25:14 +08:00
feature should be disabled.
2013-10-07 11:28:40 +01:00
NUMA balancing: optimize page placement for memory tiering system
With the advent of various new memory types, some machines will have
multiple types of memory, e.g. DRAM and PMEM (persistent memory). The
memory subsystem of these machines can be called memory tiering system,
because the performance of the different types of memory are usually
different.
In such system, because of the memory accessing pattern changing etc,
some pages in the slow memory may become hot globally. So in this
patch, the NUMA balancing mechanism is enhanced to optimize the page
placement among the different memory types according to hot/cold
dynamically.
In a typical memory tiering system, there are CPUs, fast memory and slow
memory in each physical NUMA node. The CPUs and the fast memory will be
put in one logical node (called fast memory node), while the slow memory
will be put in another (faked) logical node (called slow memory node).
That is, the fast memory is regarded as local while the slow memory is
regarded as remote. So it's possible for the recently accessed pages in
the slow memory node to be promoted to the fast memory node via the
existing NUMA balancing mechanism.
The original NUMA balancing mechanism will stop to migrate pages if the
free memory of the target node becomes below the high watermark. This
is a reasonable policy if there's only one memory type. But this makes
the original NUMA balancing mechanism almost do not work to optimize
page placement among different memory types. Details are as follows.
It's the common cases that the working-set size of the workload is
larger than the size of the fast memory nodes. Otherwise, it's
unnecessary to use the slow memory at all. So, there are almost always
no enough free pages in the fast memory nodes, so that the globally hot
pages in the slow memory node cannot be promoted to the fast memory
node. To solve the issue, we have 2 choices as follows,
a. Ignore the free pages watermark checking when promoting hot pages
from the slow memory node to the fast memory node. This will
create some memory pressure in the fast memory node, thus trigger
the memory reclaiming. So that, the cold pages in the fast memory
node will be demoted to the slow memory node.
b. Define a new watermark called wmark_promo which is higher than
wmark_high, and have kswapd reclaiming pages until free pages reach
such watermark. The scenario is as follows: when we want to promote
hot-pages from a slow memory to a fast memory, but fast memory's free
pages would go lower than high watermark with such promotion, we wake
up kswapd with wmark_promo watermark in order to demote cold pages and
free us up some space. So, next time we want to promote hot-pages we
might have a chance of doing so.
The choice "a" may create high memory pressure in the fast memory node.
If the memory pressure of the workload is high, the memory pressure
may become so high that the memory allocation latency of the workload
is influenced, e.g. the direct reclaiming may be triggered.
The choice "b" works much better at this aspect. If the memory
pressure of the workload is high, the hot pages promotion will stop
earlier because its allocation watermark is higher than that of the
normal memory allocation. So in this patch, choice "b" is implemented.
A new zone watermark (WMARK_PROMO) is added. Which is larger than the
high watermark and can be controlled via watermark_scale_factor.
In addition to the original page placement optimization among sockets,
the NUMA balancing mechanism is extended to be used to optimize page
placement according to hot/cold among different memory types. So the
sysctl user space interface (numa_balancing) is extended in a backward
compatible way as follow, so that the users can enable/disable these
functionality individually.
The sysctl is converted from a Boolean value to a bits field. The
definition of the flags is,
- 0: NUMA_BALANCING_DISABLED
- 1: NUMA_BALANCING_NORMAL
- 2: NUMA_BALANCING_MEMORY_TIERING
We have tested the patch with the pmbench memory accessing benchmark
with the 80:20 read/write ratio and the Gauss access address
distribution on a 2 socket Intel server with Optane DC Persistent
Memory Model. The test results shows that the pmbench score can
improve up to 95.9%.
Thanks Andrew Morton to help fix the document format error.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220221084529.1052339-3-ying.huang@intel.com
Signed-off-by: "Huang, Ying" <ying.huang@intel.com>
Tested-by: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Zi Yan <ziy@nvidia.com>
Cc: Wei Xu <weixugc@google.com>
Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Cc: zhongjiang-ali <zhongjiang-ali@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-03-22 14:46:23 -07:00
Or NUMA_BALANCING_MEMORY_TIERING to optimize page placement among
different types of memory (represented as different NUMA nodes) to
place the hot pages in the fast memory. This is implemented based on
unmapping and page fault too.
2013-10-07 11:28:40 +01:00
2020-06-14 21:11:00 -07:00
oops_all_cpu_backtrace
======================
2020-06-07 21:40:48 -07:00
If this option is set, the kernel will send an NMI to all CPUs to dump
their backtraces when an oops event occurs. It should be used as a last
resort in case a panic cannot be triggered (to protect VMs running, for
example) or kdump can't be collected. This file shows up if CONFIG_SMP
is enabled.
0: Won't show all CPUs backtraces when an oops is detected.
This is the default behavior.
1: Will non-maskably interrupt all CPUs and dump their backtraces when
an oops event is detected.
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osrelease, ostype & version
===========================
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::
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# cat osrelease
2.1.88
# cat ostype
Linux
# cat version
#5 Wed Feb 25 21:49:24 MET 1998
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The files `` osrelease `` and `` ostype `` should be clear enough.
`` version ``
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needs a little more clarification however. The '#5' means that
this is the fifth kernel built from this source base and the
date behind it indicates the time the kernel was built.
The only way to tune these values is to rebuild the kernel :-)
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overflowgid & overflowuid
=========================
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if your architecture did not always support 32-bit UIDs (i.e. arm,
i386, m68k, sh, and sparc32), a fixed UID and GID will be returned to
applications that use the old 16-bit UID/GID system calls, if the
actual UID or GID would exceed 65535.
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These sysctls allow you to change the value of the fixed UID and GID.
The default is 65534.
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panic
=====
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The value in this file determines the behaviour of the kernel on a
panic:
* if zero, the kernel will loop forever;
* if negative, the kernel will reboot immediately;
* if positive, the kernel will reboot after the corresponding number
of seconds.
When you use the software watchdog, the recommended setting is 60.
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2015-12-14 11:19:14 +01:00
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panic_on_io_nmi
===============
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Controls the kernel's behavior when a CPU receives an NMI caused by
an IO error.
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= ==================================================================
0 Try to continue operation (default).
1 Panic immediately. The IO error triggered an NMI. This indicates a
serious system condition which could result in IO data corruption.
Rather than continuing, panicking might be a better choice. Some
servers issue this sort of NMI when the dump button is pushed,
and you can use this option to take a crash dump.
= ==================================================================
2015-12-14 11:19:14 +01:00
2011-07-23 10:39:29 -07:00
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panic_on_oops
=============
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Controls the kernel's behaviour when an oops or BUG is encountered.
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= ===================================================================
0 Try to continue operation.
1 Panic immediately. If the `panic` sysctl is also non-zero then the
machine will be rebooted.
= ===================================================================
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panic_on_stackoverflow
======================
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Controls the kernel's behavior when detecting the overflows of
kernel, IRQ and exception stacks except a user stack.
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This file shows up if `` CONFIG_DEBUG_STACKOVERFLOW `` is enabled.
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= ==========================
0 Try to continue operation.
1 Panic immediately.
= ==========================
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panic_on_unrecovered_nmi
========================
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The default Linux behaviour on an NMI of either memory or unknown is
to continue operation. For many environments such as scientific
computing it is preferable that the box is taken out and the error
dealt with than an uncorrected parity/ECC error get propagated.
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A small number of systems do generate NMIs for bizarre random reasons
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such as power management so the default is off. That sysctl works like
the existing panic controls already in that directory.
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panic_on_warn
=============
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Calls panic() in the WARN() path when set to 1. This is useful to avoid
a kernel rebuild when attempting to kdump at the location of a WARN().
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= ================================================
0 Only WARN(), default behaviour.
1 Call panic() after printing out WARN() location.
= ================================================
2014-12-10 15:45:50 -08:00
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panic_print
===========
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Bitmask for printing system info when panic happens. User can chose
combination of the following bits:
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===== ============================================
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bit 0 print all tasks info
bit 1 print system memory info
bit 2 print timer info
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bit 3 print locks info if `` CONFIG_LOCKDEP `` is on
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bit 4 print ftrace buffer
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bit 5 print all printk messages in buffer
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bit 6 print all CPUs backtrace (if available in the arch)
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===== ============================================
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So for example to print tasks and memory info on panic, user can::
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echo 3 > /proc/sys/kernel/panic_print
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panic_on_rcu_stall
==================
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When set to 1, calls panic() after RCU stall detection messages. This
is useful to define the root cause of RCU stalls using a vmcore.
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= ============================================================
0 Do not panic() when RCU stall takes place, default behavior.
1 panic() after printing RCU stall messages.
= ============================================================
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max_rcu_stall_to_panic
======================
When `` panic_on_rcu_stall `` is set to 1, this value determines the
number of times that RCU can stall before panic() is called.
When `` panic_on_rcu_stall `` is set to 0, this value is has no effect.
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perf_cpu_time_max_percent
=========================
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Hints to the kernel how much CPU time it should be allowed to
use to handle perf sampling events. If the perf subsystem
is informed that its samples are exceeding this limit, it
will drop its sampling frequency to attempt to reduce its CPU
usage.
Some perf sampling happens in NMIs. If these samples
unexpectedly take too long to execute, the NMIs can become
stacked up next to each other so much that nothing else is
allowed to execute.
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===== ========================================================
0 Disable the mechanism. Do not monitor or correct perf's
sampling rate no matter how CPU time it takes.
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1-100 Attempt to throttle perf's sample rate to this
percentage of CPU. Note: the kernel calculates an
"expected" length of each sample event. 100 here means
100% of that expected length. Even if this is set to
100, you may still see sample throttling if this
length is exceeded. Set to 0 if you truly do not care
how much CPU is consumed.
===== ========================================================
2013-06-21 08:51:36 -07:00
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perf_event_paranoid
===================
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Controls use of the performance events system by unprivileged
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users (without CAP_PERFMON). The default value is 2.
For backward compatibility reasons access to system performance
monitoring and observability remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN
privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure system
performance monitoring and observability operations is discouraged
with respect to CAP_PERFMON use cases.
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=== ==================================================================
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-1 Allow use of (almost) all events by all users.
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Ignore mlock limit after perf_event_mlock_kb without
`` CAP_IPC_LOCK `` .
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>=0 Disallow ftrace function tracepoint by users without
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`` CAP_PERFMON `` .
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Disallow raw tracepoint access by users without `` CAP_PERFMON `` .
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>=1 Disallow CPU event access by users without `` CAP_PERFMON `` .
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>=2 Disallow kernel profiling by users without `` CAP_PERFMON `` .
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=== ==================================================================
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perf_event_max_stack
====================
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Controls maximum number of stack frames to copy for (`` attr.sample_type &
PERF_SAMPLE_CALLCHAIN`` ) configured events, for instance, when using
'`` perf record -g `` ' or '`` perf trace --call-graph fp `` '.
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This can only be done when no events are in use that have callchains
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enabled, otherwise writing to this file will return `` -EBUSY `` .
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The default value is 127.
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perf_event_mlock_kb
===================
2017-08-20 14:39:20 +03:00
Documentation: fix multiple typos found in the admin-guide subdirectory
Fix thirty five typos in dm-integrity.rst, dm-raid.rst, dm-zoned.rst,
verity.rst, writecache.rst, tsx_async_abort.rst, md.rst, bttv.rst,
dvb_references.rst, frontend-cardlist.rst, gspca-cardlist.rst, ipu3.rst,
remote-controller.rst, mm/index.rst, numaperf.rst, userfaultfd.rst,
module-signing.rst, imx-ddr.rst, intel-speed-select.rst,
intel_pstate.rst, ramoops.rst, abi.rst, kernel.rst, vm.rst
Signed-off-by: Andrew Klychkov <andrew.a.klychkov@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201204072848.GA49895@spblnx124.lan
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
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Control size of per-cpu ring buffer not counted against mlock limit.
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The default value is 512 + 1 page
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perf_event_max_contexts_per_stack
=================================
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Controls maximum number of stack frame context entries for
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(`` attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_CALLCHAIN `` ) configured events, for
instance, when using '`` perf record -g `` ' or '`` perf trace --call-graph fp `` '.
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This can only be done when no events are in use that have callchains
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enabled, otherwise writing to this file will return `` -EBUSY `` .
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The default value is 8.
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perf_user_access (arm64 only)
=================================
Controls user space access for reading perf event counters. When set to 1,
user space can read performance monitor counter registers directly.
The default value is 0 (access disabled).
See Documentation/arm64/perf.rst for more information.
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pid_max
=======
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PID allocation wrap value. When the kernel's next PID value
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reaches this value, it wraps back to a minimum PID value.
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PIDs of value `` pid_max `` or larger are not allocated.
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ns_last_pid
===========
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The last pid allocated in the current (the one task using this sysctl
lives in) pid namespace. When selecting a pid for a next task on fork
kernel tries to allocate a number starting from this one.
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powersave-nap (PPC only)
========================
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If set, Linux-PPC will use the 'nap' mode of powersaving,
otherwise the 'doze' mode will be used.
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
==============================================================
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printk
======
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The four values in printk denote: `` console_loglevel `` ,
`` default_message_loglevel `` , `` minimum_console_loglevel `` and
`` default_console_loglevel `` respectively.
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These values influence printk() behavior when printing or
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logging error messages. See '`` man 2 syslog `` ' for more info on
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the different loglevels.
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======================== =====================================
console_loglevel messages with a higher priority than
this will be printed to the console
default_message_loglevel messages without an explicit priority
will be printed with this priority
minimum_console_loglevel minimum (highest) value to which
console_loglevel can be set
default_console_loglevel default value for console_loglevel
======================== =====================================
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printk_delay
============
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Delay each printk message in `` printk_delay `` milliseconds
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Value from 0 - 10000 is allowed.
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printk_ratelimit
================
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Some warning messages are rate limited. `` printk_ratelimit `` specifies
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the minimum length of time between these messages (in seconds).
The default value is 5 seconds.
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A value of 0 will disable rate limiting.
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printk_ratelimit_burst
======================
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While long term we enforce one message per `printk_ratelimit`_
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seconds, we do allow a burst of messages to pass through.
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`` printk_ratelimit_burst `` specifies the number of messages we can
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send before ratelimiting kicks in.
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The default value is 10 messages.
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printk_devkmsg
==============
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Control the logging to `` /dev/kmsg `` from userspace:
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========= =============================================
ratelimit default, ratelimited
on unlimited logging to /dev/kmsg from userspace
off logging to /dev/kmsg disabled
========= =============================================
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The kernel command line parameter `` printk.devkmsg= `` overrides this and is
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a one-time setting until next reboot: once set, it cannot be changed by
this sysctl interface anymore.
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==============================================================
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pty
===
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See Documentation/filesystems/devpts.rst.
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random
======
This is a directory, with the following entries:
* `` boot_id `` : a UUID generated the first time this is retrieved, and
unvarying after that;
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* `` uuid `` : a UUID generated every time this is retrieved (this can
thus be used to generate UUIDs at will);
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* `` entropy_avail `` : the pool's entropy count, in bits;
* `` poolsize `` : the entropy pool size, in bits;
* `` urandom_min_reseed_secs `` : obsolete (used to determine the minimum
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number of seconds between urandom pool reseeding). This file is
writable for compatibility purposes, but writing to it has no effect
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on any RNG behavior;
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* `` write_wakeup_threshold `` : when the entropy count drops below this
(as a number of bits), processes waiting to write to `` /dev/random ``
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are woken up. This file is writable for compatibility purposes, but
writing to it has no effect on any RNG behavior.
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randomize_va_space
==================
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This option can be used to select the type of process address
space randomization that is used in the system, for architectures
that support this feature.
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== ===========================================================================
0 Turn the process address space randomization off. This is the
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default for architectures that do not support this feature anyways,
and kernels that are booted with the "norandmaps" parameter.
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1 Make the addresses of mmap base, stack and VDSO page randomized.
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This, among other things, implies that shared libraries will be
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loaded to random addresses. Also for PIE-linked binaries, the
location of code start is randomized. This is the default if the
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`` CONFIG_COMPAT_BRK `` option is enabled.
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2 Additionally enable heap randomization. This is the default if
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`` CONFIG_COMPAT_BRK `` is disabled.
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There are a few legacy applications out there (such as some ancient
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versions of libc.so.5 from 1996) that assume that brk area starts
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just after the end of the code+bss. These applications break when
start of the brk area is randomized. There are however no known
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non-legacy applications that would be broken this way, so for most
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systems it is safe to choose full randomization.
Systems with ancient and/or broken binaries should be configured
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with `` CONFIG_COMPAT_BRK `` enabled, which excludes the heap from process
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address space randomization.
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== ===========================================================================
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real-root-dev
=============
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See Documentation/admin-guide/initrd.rst.
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reboot-cmd (SPARC only)
=======================
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??? This seems to be a way to give an argument to the Sparc
ROM/Flash boot loader. Maybe to tell it what to do after
rebooting. ???
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sched_energy_aware
==================
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Enables/disables Energy Aware Scheduling (EAS). EAS starts
automatically on platforms where it can run (that is,
platforms with asymmetric CPU topologies and having an Energy
Model available). If your platform happens to meet the
requirements for EAS but you do not want to use it, change
this value to 0.
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task_delayacct
===============
Enables/disables task delay accounting (see
2021-11-16 12:11:21 +00:00
Documentation/accounting/delay-accounting.rst. Enabling this feature incurs
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a small amount of overhead in the scheduler but is useful for debugging
and performance tuning. It is required by some tools such as iotop.
2018-12-03 09:56:23 +00:00
2020-02-18 13:59:16 +01:00
sched_schedstats
================
2016-02-05 09:08:36 +00:00
Enables/disables scheduler statistics. Enabling this feature
incurs a small amount of overhead in the scheduler but is
useful for debugging and performance tuning.
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sched_util_clamp_min
====================
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Max allowed *minimum* utilization.
Default value is 1024, which is the maximum possible value.
It means that any requested uclamp.min value cannot be greater than
sched_util_clamp_min, i.e., it is restricted to the range
[0:sched_util_clamp_min].
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sched_util_clamp_max
====================
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Max allowed *maximum* utilization.
Default value is 1024, which is the maximum possible value.
It means that any requested uclamp.max value cannot be greater than
sched_util_clamp_max, i.e., it is restricted to the range
[0:sched_util_clamp_max].
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sched_util_clamp_min_rt_default
===============================
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By default Linux is tuned for performance. Which means that RT tasks always run
at the highest frequency and most capable (highest capacity) CPU (in
heterogeneous systems).
Uclamp achieves this by setting the requested uclamp.min of all RT tasks to
1024 by default, which effectively boosts the tasks to run at the highest
frequency and biases them to run on the biggest CPU.
This knob allows admins to change the default behavior when uclamp is being
used. In battery powered devices particularly, running at the maximum
capacity and frequency will increase energy consumption and shorten the battery
life.
This knob is only effective for RT tasks which the user hasn't modified their
requested uclamp.min value via sched_setattr() syscall.
This knob will not escape the range constraint imposed by sched_util_clamp_min
defined above.
For example if
sched_util_clamp_min_rt_default = 800
sched_util_clamp_min = 600
Then the boost will be clamped to 600 because 800 is outside of the permissible
range of [0:600]. This could happen for instance if a powersave mode will
restrict all boosts temporarily by modifying sched_util_clamp_min. As soon as
this restriction is lifted, the requested sched_util_clamp_min_rt_default
will take effect.
2016-02-05 09:08:36 +00:00
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seccomp
=======
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See Documentation/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.rst.
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sg-big-buff
===========
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This file shows the size of the generic SCSI (sg) buffer.
You can't tune it just yet, but you could change it on
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compile time by editing `` include/scsi/sg.h `` and changing
the value of `` SG_BIG_BUFF `` .
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There shouldn't be any reason to change this value. If
you can come up with one, you probably know what you
are doing anyway :)
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shmall
======
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This parameter sets the total amount of shared memory pages that
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can be used system wide. Hence, `` shmall `` should always be at least
`` ceil(shmmax/PAGE_SIZE) `` .
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If you are not sure what the default `` PAGE_SIZE `` is on your Linux
system, you can run the following command::
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# getconf PAGE_SIZE
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shmmax
======
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This value can be used to query and set the run time limit
on the maximum shared memory segment size that can be created.
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Shared memory segments up to 1Gb are now supported in the
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kernel. This value defaults to `` SHMMAX `` .
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shmmni
======
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This value determines the maximum number of shared memory segments.
4096 by default (`` SHMMNI `` ).
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shm_rmid_forced
===============
2011-07-26 16:08:48 -07:00
Linux lets you set resource limits, including how much memory one
2020-02-18 13:59:16 +01:00
process can consume, via `` setrlimit(2) `` . Unfortunately, shared memory
2011-07-26 16:08:48 -07:00
segments are allowed to exist without association with any process, and
thus might not be counted against any resource limits. If enabled,
shared memory segments are automatically destroyed when their attach
count becomes zero after a detach or a process termination. It will
also destroy segments that were created, but never attached to, on exit
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from the process. The only use left for `` IPC_RMID `` is to immediately
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destroy an unattached segment. Of course, this breaks the way things are
defined, so some applications might stop working. Note that this
feature will do you no good unless you also configure your resource
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limits (in particular, `` RLIMIT_AS `` and `` RLIMIT_NPROC `` ). Most systems don't
2011-07-26 16:08:48 -07:00
need this.
Note that if you change this from 0 to 1, already created segments
without users and with a dead originative process will be destroyed.
2020-02-18 13:59:16 +01:00
sysctl_writes_strict
====================
sysctl: allow for strict write position handling
When writing to a sysctl string, each write, regardless of VFS position,
begins writing the string from the start. This means the contents of
the last write to the sysctl controls the string contents instead of the
first:
open("/proc/sys/kernel/modprobe", O_WRONLY) = 1
write(1, "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"..., 4096) = 4096
write(1, "/bin/true", 9) = 9
close(1) = 0
$ cat /proc/sys/kernel/modprobe
/bin/true
Expected behaviour would be to have the sysctl be "AAAA..." capped at
maxlen (in this case KMOD_PATH_LEN: 256), instead of truncating to the
contents of the second write. Similarly, multiple short writes would
not append to the sysctl.
The old behavior is unlike regular POSIX files enough that doing audits
of software that interact with sysctls can end up in unexpected or
dangerous situations. For example, "as long as the input starts with a
trusted path" turns out to be an insufficient filter, as what must also
happen is for the input to be entirely contained in a single write
syscall -- not a common consideration, especially for high level tools.
This provides kernel.sysctl_writes_strict as a way to make this behavior
act in a less surprising manner for strings, and disallows non-zero file
position when writing numeric sysctls (similar to what is already done
when reading from non-zero file positions). For now, the default (0) is
to warn about non-zero file position use, but retain the legacy
behavior. Setting this to -1 disables the warning, and setting this to
1 enables the file position respecting behavior.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: move misplaced hunk, per Randy]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-06-06 14:37:19 -07:00
Control how file position affects the behavior of updating sysctl values
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via the `` /proc/sys `` interface:
sysctl: allow for strict write position handling
When writing to a sysctl string, each write, regardless of VFS position,
begins writing the string from the start. This means the contents of
the last write to the sysctl controls the string contents instead of the
first:
open("/proc/sys/kernel/modprobe", O_WRONLY) = 1
write(1, "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"..., 4096) = 4096
write(1, "/bin/true", 9) = 9
close(1) = 0
$ cat /proc/sys/kernel/modprobe
/bin/true
Expected behaviour would be to have the sysctl be "AAAA..." capped at
maxlen (in this case KMOD_PATH_LEN: 256), instead of truncating to the
contents of the second write. Similarly, multiple short writes would
not append to the sysctl.
The old behavior is unlike regular POSIX files enough that doing audits
of software that interact with sysctls can end up in unexpected or
dangerous situations. For example, "as long as the input starts with a
trusted path" turns out to be an insufficient filter, as what must also
happen is for the input to be entirely contained in a single write
syscall -- not a common consideration, especially for high level tools.
This provides kernel.sysctl_writes_strict as a way to make this behavior
act in a less surprising manner for strings, and disallows non-zero file
position when writing numeric sysctls (similar to what is already done
when reading from non-zero file positions). For now, the default (0) is
to warn about non-zero file position use, but retain the legacy
behavior. Setting this to -1 disables the warning, and setting this to
1 enables the file position respecting behavior.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: move misplaced hunk, per Randy]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-06-06 14:37:19 -07:00
2019-04-18 18:35:54 -03:00
== ======================================================================
-1 Legacy per-write sysctl value handling, with no printk warnings.
sysctl: allow for strict write position handling
When writing to a sysctl string, each write, regardless of VFS position,
begins writing the string from the start. This means the contents of
the last write to the sysctl controls the string contents instead of the
first:
open("/proc/sys/kernel/modprobe", O_WRONLY) = 1
write(1, "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"..., 4096) = 4096
write(1, "/bin/true", 9) = 9
close(1) = 0
$ cat /proc/sys/kernel/modprobe
/bin/true
Expected behaviour would be to have the sysctl be "AAAA..." capped at
maxlen (in this case KMOD_PATH_LEN: 256), instead of truncating to the
contents of the second write. Similarly, multiple short writes would
not append to the sysctl.
The old behavior is unlike regular POSIX files enough that doing audits
of software that interact with sysctls can end up in unexpected or
dangerous situations. For example, "as long as the input starts with a
trusted path" turns out to be an insufficient filter, as what must also
happen is for the input to be entirely contained in a single write
syscall -- not a common consideration, especially for high level tools.
This provides kernel.sysctl_writes_strict as a way to make this behavior
act in a less surprising manner for strings, and disallows non-zero file
position when writing numeric sysctls (similar to what is already done
when reading from non-zero file positions). For now, the default (0) is
to warn about non-zero file position use, but retain the legacy
behavior. Setting this to -1 disables the warning, and setting this to
1 enables the file position respecting behavior.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: move misplaced hunk, per Randy]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-06-06 14:37:19 -07:00
Each write syscall must fully contain the sysctl value to be
written, and multiple writes on the same sysctl file descriptor
will rewrite the sysctl value, regardless of file position.
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0 Same behavior as above, but warn about processes that perform writes
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to a sysctl file descriptor when the file position is not 0.
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1 (default) Respect file position when writing sysctl strings. Multiple
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writes will append to the sysctl value buffer. Anything past the max
length of the sysctl value buffer will be ignored. Writes to numeric
sysctl entries must always be at file position 0 and the value must
be fully contained in the buffer sent in the write syscall.
2019-04-18 18:35:54 -03:00
== ======================================================================
sysctl: allow for strict write position handling
When writing to a sysctl string, each write, regardless of VFS position,
begins writing the string from the start. This means the contents of
the last write to the sysctl controls the string contents instead of the
first:
open("/proc/sys/kernel/modprobe", O_WRONLY) = 1
write(1, "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"..., 4096) = 4096
write(1, "/bin/true", 9) = 9
close(1) = 0
$ cat /proc/sys/kernel/modprobe
/bin/true
Expected behaviour would be to have the sysctl be "AAAA..." capped at
maxlen (in this case KMOD_PATH_LEN: 256), instead of truncating to the
contents of the second write. Similarly, multiple short writes would
not append to the sysctl.
The old behavior is unlike regular POSIX files enough that doing audits
of software that interact with sysctls can end up in unexpected or
dangerous situations. For example, "as long as the input starts with a
trusted path" turns out to be an insufficient filter, as what must also
happen is for the input to be entirely contained in a single write
syscall -- not a common consideration, especially for high level tools.
This provides kernel.sysctl_writes_strict as a way to make this behavior
act in a less surprising manner for strings, and disallows non-zero file
position when writing numeric sysctls (similar to what is already done
when reading from non-zero file positions). For now, the default (0) is
to warn about non-zero file position use, but retain the legacy
behavior. Setting this to -1 disables the warning, and setting this to
1 enables the file position respecting behavior.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: move misplaced hunk, per Randy]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-06-06 14:37:19 -07:00
2020-02-18 13:59:16 +01:00
softlockup_all_cpu_backtrace
============================
2014-06-23 13:22:05 -07:00
This value controls the soft lockup detector thread's behavior
when a soft lockup condition is detected as to whether or not
to gather further debug information. If enabled, each cpu will
be issued an NMI and instructed to capture stack trace.
This feature is only applicable for architectures which support
NMI.
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= ============================================
0 Do nothing. This is the default behavior.
1 On detection capture more debug information.
= ============================================
2014-06-23 13:22:05 -07:00
2020-03-10 15:36:49 -03:00
softlockup_panic
=================
This parameter can be used to control whether the kernel panics
when a soft lockup is detected.
= ============================================
0 Don't panic on soft lockup.
1 Panic on soft lockup.
= ============================================
This can also be set using the softlockup_panic kernel parameter.
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soft_watchdog
=============
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This parameter can be used to control the soft lockup detector.
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= =================================
0 Disable the soft lockup detector.
1 Enable the soft lockup detector.
= =================================
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The soft lockup detector monitors CPUs for threads that are hogging the CPUs
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without rescheduling voluntarily, and thus prevent the 'migration/N' threads
from running, causing the watchdog work fail to execute. The mechanism depends
on the CPUs ability to respond to timer interrupts which are needed for the
watchdog work to be queued by the watchdog timer function, otherwise the NMI
watchdog — if enabled — can detect a hard lockup condition.
2015-04-14 15:44:13 -07:00
2020-02-18 13:59:16 +01:00
stack_erasing
=============
2018-08-17 01:17:03 +03:00
This parameter can be used to control kernel stack erasing at the end
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of syscalls for kernels built with `` CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK `` .
2018-08-17 01:17:03 +03:00
That erasing reduces the information which kernel stack leak bugs
can reveal and blocks some uninitialized stack variable attacks.
The tradeoff is the performance impact: on a single CPU system kernel
compilation sees a 1% slowdown, other systems and workloads may vary.
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= ====================================================================
0 Kernel stack erasing is disabled, STACKLEAK_METRICS are not updated.
1 Kernel stack erasing is enabled (default), it is performed before
returning to the userspace at the end of syscalls.
= ====================================================================
stop-a (SPARC only)
===================
2018-08-17 01:17:03 +03:00
2020-02-18 13:59:20 +01:00
Controls Stop-A:
= ====================================
0 Stop-A has no effect.
1 Stop-A breaks to the PROM (default).
= ====================================
Stop-A is always enabled on a panic, so that the user can return to
the boot PROM.
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sysrq
=====
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See Documentation/admin-guide/sysrq.rst.
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2018-08-17 01:17:03 +03:00
2019-01-08 20:40:07 +01:00
tainted
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=======
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
2018-04-10 16:32:29 -07:00
Non-zero if the kernel has been tainted. Numeric values, which can be
ORed together. The letters are seen in "Tainted" line of Oops reports.
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====== ===== ==============================================================
1 `(P)` proprietary module was loaded
2 `(F)` module was force loaded
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4 `(S)` kernel running on an out of specification system
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8 `(R)` module was force unloaded
16 `(M)` processor reported a Machine Check Exception (MCE)
32 `(B)` bad page referenced or some unexpected page flags
64 `(U)` taint requested by userspace application
128 `(D)` kernel died recently, i.e. there was an OOPS or BUG
256 `(A)` an ACPI table was overridden by user
512 `(W)` kernel issued warning
1024 `(C)` staging driver was loaded
2048 `(I)` workaround for bug in platform firmware applied
4096 `(O)` externally-built ("out-of-tree") module was loaded
8192 `(E)` unsigned module was loaded
16384 `(L)` soft lockup occurred
32768 `(K)` kernel has been live patched
65536 `(X)` Auxiliary taint, defined and used by for distros
131072 `(T)` The kernel was built with the struct randomization plugin
====== ===== ==============================================================
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2021-06-16 08:27:20 +02:00
See Documentation/admin-guide/tainted-kernels.rst for more information.
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2020-06-07 21:40:17 -07:00
Note:
writes to this sysctl interface will fail with `` EINVAL `` if the kernel is
booted with the command line option `` panic_on_taint=<bitmask>,nousertaint ``
and any of the ORed together values being written to `` tainted `` match with
the bitmask declared on panic_on_taint.
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See Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.rst for more details on
that particular kernel command line option and its optional
`` nousertaint `` switch.
2009-04-02 16:57:20 -07:00
2020-02-18 13:59:16 +01:00
threads-max
===========
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This value controls the maximum number of threads that can be created
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using `` fork() `` .
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During initialization the kernel sets this value such that even if the
maximum number of threads is created, the thread structures occupy only
a part (1/8th) of the available RAM pages.
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The minimum value that can be written to `` threads-max `` is 1.
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2020-02-18 13:59:16 +01:00
The maximum value that can be written to `` threads-max `` is given by the
constant `` FUTEX_TID_MASK `` (0x3fffffff).
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2020-02-18 13:59:16 +01:00
If a value outside of this range is written to `` threads-max `` an
`` EINVAL `` error occurs.
2015-04-16 12:47:53 -07:00
2020-04-29 22:57:56 +02:00
traceoff_on_warning
===================
2021-06-16 08:27:20 +02:00
When set, disables tracing (see Documentation/trace/ftrace.rst) when a
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`` WARN() `` is hit.
tracepoint_printk
=================
When tracepoints are sent to printk() (enabled by the `` tp_printk ``
boot parameter), this entry provides runtime control::
echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/tracepoint_printk
will stop tracepoints from being sent to printk(), and::
echo 1 > /proc/sys/kernel/tracepoint_printk
will send them to printk() again.
This only works if the kernel was booted with `` tp_printk `` enabled.
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See Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.rst and
Documentation/trace/boottime-trace.rst.
2020-04-29 22:57:56 +02:00
2020-05-15 23:24:44 +02:00
.. _unaligned-dump-stack:
unaligned-dump-stack (ia64)
===========================
When logging unaligned accesses, controls whether the stack is
dumped.
= ===================================================
0 Do not dump the stack. This is the default setting.
1 Dump the stack.
= ===================================================
See also `ignore-unaligned-usertrap`_ .
unaligned-trap
==============
On architectures where unaligned accesses cause traps, and where this
feature is supported (`` CONFIG_SYSCTL_ARCH_UNALIGN_ALLOW `` ; currently,
`` arc `` and `` parisc `` ), controls whether unaligned traps are caught
and emulated (instead of failing).
= ========================================================
0 Do not emulate unaligned accesses.
1 Emulate unaligned accesses. This is the default setting.
= ========================================================
See also `ignore-unaligned-usertrap`_ .
2020-02-18 13:59:16 +01:00
unknown_nmi_panic
=================
2009-04-02 16:57:20 -07:00
2011-07-23 10:39:29 -07:00
The value in this file affects behavior of handling NMI. When the
value is non-zero, unknown NMI is trapped and then panic occurs. At
that time, kernel debugging information is displayed on console.
2009-04-02 16:57:20 -07:00
2011-07-23 10:39:29 -07:00
NMI switch that most IA32 servers have fires unknown NMI up, for
example. If a system hangs up, try pressing the NMI switch.
2013-05-17 10:31:20 +08:00
2020-03-15 13:26:48 +01:00
unprivileged_bpf_disabled
=========================
Writing 1 to this entry will disable unprivileged calls to `` bpf() `` ;
2021-05-11 22:35:17 +02:00
once disabled, calling `` bpf() `` without `` CAP_SYS_ADMIN `` or `` CAP_BPF ``
will return `` -EPERM `` . Once set to 1, this can't be cleared from the
running kernel anymore.
2020-03-15 13:26:48 +01:00
2021-05-11 22:35:17 +02:00
Writing 2 to this entry will also disable unprivileged calls to `` bpf() `` ,
however, an admin can still change this setting later on, if needed, by
writing 0 or 1 to this entry.
2020-03-15 13:26:48 +01:00
2021-05-11 22:35:17 +02:00
If `` BPF_UNPRIV_DEFAULT_OFF `` is enabled in the kernel config, then this
entry will default to 2 instead of 0.
= =============================================================
0 Unprivileged calls to `` bpf() `` are enabled
1 Unprivileged calls to `` bpf() `` are disabled without recovery
2 Unprivileged calls to `` bpf() `` are disabled
= =============================================================
2020-03-15 13:26:48 +01:00
2020-02-18 13:59:16 +01:00
watchdog
========
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This parameter can be used to disable or enable the soft lockup detector
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*and* the NMI watchdog (i.e. the hard lockup detector) at the same time.
2015-04-14 15:44:13 -07:00
2020-02-18 13:59:16 +01:00
= ==============================
0 Disable both lockup detectors.
1 Enable both lockup detectors.
= ==============================
2015-04-14 15:44:13 -07:00
The soft lockup detector and the NMI watchdog can also be disabled or
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enabled individually, using the `` soft_watchdog `` and `` nmi_watchdog ``
parameters.
If the `` watchdog `` parameter is read, for example by executing::
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cat /proc/sys/kernel/watchdog
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the output of this command (0 or 1) shows the logical OR of
`` soft_watchdog `` and `` nmi_watchdog `` .
2015-04-14 15:44:13 -07:00
2020-02-18 13:59:16 +01:00
watchdog_cpumask
================
2015-06-24 16:55:45 -07:00
This value can be used to control on which cpus the watchdog may run.
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The default cpumask is all possible cores, but if `` NO_HZ_FULL `` is
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enabled in the kernel config, and cores are specified with the
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`` nohz_full= `` boot argument, those cores are excluded by default.
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Offline cores can be included in this mask, and if the core is later
brought online, the watchdog will be started based on the mask value.
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Typically this value would only be touched in the `` nohz_full `` case
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to re-enable cores that by default were not running the watchdog,
if a kernel lockup was suspected on those cores.
The argument value is the standard cpulist format for cpumasks,
so for example to enable the watchdog on cores 0, 2, 3, and 4 you
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might say::
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echo 0,2-4 > /proc/sys/kernel/watchdog_cpumask
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watchdog_thresh
===============
2013-05-17 10:31:20 +08:00
This value can be used to control the frequency of hrtimer and NMI
events and the soft and hard lockup thresholds. The default threshold
is 10 seconds.
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The softlockup threshold is (`` 2 * watchdog_thresh `` ). Setting this
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tunable to zero will disable lockup detection altogether.