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License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 15:07:57 +01:00
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
#ifndef _ARCH_POWERPC_UACCESS_H
#define _ARCH_POWERPC_UACCESS_H
#include <asm/ppc_asm.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
#include <asm/page.h>
#include <asm/extable.h>
#include <asm/kup.h>
#ifdef __powerpc64__
/* We use TASK_SIZE_USER64 as TASK_SIZE is not constant */
#define TASK_SIZE_MAX TASK_SIZE_USER64
#else
#define TASK_SIZE_MAX TASK_SIZE
#endif
static inline bool __access_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
powerpc: Check address limit on user-mode return (TIF_FSCHECK) set_fs() sets the addr_limit, which is used in access_ok() to determine if an address is a user or kernel address. Some code paths use set_fs() to temporarily elevate the addr_limit so that kernel code can read/write kernel memory as if it were user memory. That is fine as long as the code can't ever return to userspace with the addr_limit still elevated. If that did happen, then userspace can read/write kernel memory as if it were user memory, eg. just with write(2). In case it's not clear, that is very bad. It has also happened in the past due to bugs. Commit 5ea0727b163c ("x86/syscalls: Check address limit on user-mode return") added a mechanism to check the addr_limit value before returning to userspace. Any call to set_fs() sets a thread flag, TIF_FSCHECK, and if we see that on the return to userspace we go out of line to check that the addr_limit value is not elevated. For further info see the above commit, as well as: https://lwn.net/Articles/722267/ https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=990 Verified to work on 64-bit Book3S using a POC that objdumps the system call handler, and a modified lkdtm_CORRUPT_USER_DS() that doesn't kill the caller. Before: $ sudo ./test-tif-fscheck ... 0000000000000000 <.data>: 0: e1 f7 8a 79 rldicl. r10,r12,30,63 4: 80 03 82 40 bne 0x384 8: 00 40 8a 71 andi. r10,r12,16384 c: 78 0b 2a 7c mr r10,r1 10: 10 fd 21 38 addi r1,r1,-752 14: 08 00 c2 41 beq- 0x1c 18: 58 09 2d e8 ld r1,2392(r13) 1c: 00 00 41 f9 std r10,0(r1) 20: 70 01 61 f9 std r11,368(r1) 24: 78 01 81 f9 std r12,376(r1) 28: 70 00 01 f8 std r0,112(r1) 2c: 78 00 41 f9 std r10,120(r1) 30: 20 00 82 41 beq 0x50 34: a6 42 4c 7d mftb r10 After: $ sudo ./test-tif-fscheck Killed And in dmesg: Invalid address limit on user-mode return WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 3689 at ../include/linux/syscalls.h:260 do_notify_resume+0x140/0x170 ... NIP [c00000000001ee50] do_notify_resume+0x140/0x170 LR [c00000000001ee4c] do_notify_resume+0x13c/0x170 Call Trace: do_notify_resume+0x13c/0x170 (unreliable) ret_from_except_lite+0x70/0x74 Performance overhead is essentially zero in the usual case, because the bit is checked as part of the existing _TIF_USER_WORK_MASK check. Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2018-05-14 23:03:16 +10:00
{
return addr < TASK_SIZE_MAX && size <= TASK_SIZE_MAX - addr;
powerpc: Check address limit on user-mode return (TIF_FSCHECK) set_fs() sets the addr_limit, which is used in access_ok() to determine if an address is a user or kernel address. Some code paths use set_fs() to temporarily elevate the addr_limit so that kernel code can read/write kernel memory as if it were user memory. That is fine as long as the code can't ever return to userspace with the addr_limit still elevated. If that did happen, then userspace can read/write kernel memory as if it were user memory, eg. just with write(2). In case it's not clear, that is very bad. It has also happened in the past due to bugs. Commit 5ea0727b163c ("x86/syscalls: Check address limit on user-mode return") added a mechanism to check the addr_limit value before returning to userspace. Any call to set_fs() sets a thread flag, TIF_FSCHECK, and if we see that on the return to userspace we go out of line to check that the addr_limit value is not elevated. For further info see the above commit, as well as: https://lwn.net/Articles/722267/ https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=990 Verified to work on 64-bit Book3S using a POC that objdumps the system call handler, and a modified lkdtm_CORRUPT_USER_DS() that doesn't kill the caller. Before: $ sudo ./test-tif-fscheck ... 0000000000000000 <.data>: 0: e1 f7 8a 79 rldicl. r10,r12,30,63 4: 80 03 82 40 bne 0x384 8: 00 40 8a 71 andi. r10,r12,16384 c: 78 0b 2a 7c mr r10,r1 10: 10 fd 21 38 addi r1,r1,-752 14: 08 00 c2 41 beq- 0x1c 18: 58 09 2d e8 ld r1,2392(r13) 1c: 00 00 41 f9 std r10,0(r1) 20: 70 01 61 f9 std r11,368(r1) 24: 78 01 81 f9 std r12,376(r1) 28: 70 00 01 f8 std r0,112(r1) 2c: 78 00 41 f9 std r10,120(r1) 30: 20 00 82 41 beq 0x50 34: a6 42 4c 7d mftb r10 After: $ sudo ./test-tif-fscheck Killed And in dmesg: Invalid address limit on user-mode return WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 3689 at ../include/linux/syscalls.h:260 do_notify_resume+0x140/0x170 ... NIP [c00000000001ee50] do_notify_resume+0x140/0x170 LR [c00000000001ee4c] do_notify_resume+0x13c/0x170 Call Trace: do_notify_resume+0x13c/0x170 (unreliable) ret_from_except_lite+0x70/0x74 Performance overhead is essentially zero in the usual case, because the bit is checked as part of the existing _TIF_USER_WORK_MASK check. Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2018-05-14 23:03:16 +10:00
}
Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand. It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact. A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's just get this done once and for all. This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form. There were a couple of notable cases: - csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias. - the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing really used it) - microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch. I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-03 18:57:57 -08:00
#define access_ok(addr, size) \
(__chk_user_ptr(addr), \
__access_ok((unsigned long)(addr), (size)))
/*
* These are the main single-value transfer routines. They automatically
* use the right size if we just have the right pointer type.
*
* This gets kind of ugly. We want to return _two_ values in "get_user()"
* and yet we don't want to do any pointers, because that is too much
* of a performance impact. Thus we have a few rather ugly macros here,
* and hide all the ugliness from the user.
*
* The "__xxx" versions of the user access functions are versions that
* do not verify the address space, that must have been done previously
* with a separate "access_ok()" call (this is used when we do multiple
* accesses to the same area of user memory).
*
* As we use the same address space for kernel and user data on the
* PowerPC, we can just do these as direct assignments. (Of course, the
* exception handling means that it's no longer "just"...)
*
*/
#define __put_user(x, ptr) \
({ \
long __pu_err; \
__typeof__(*(ptr)) __user *__pu_addr = (ptr); \
__typeof__(*(ptr)) __pu_val = (__typeof__(*(ptr)))(x); \
__typeof__(sizeof(*(ptr))) __pu_size = sizeof(*(ptr)); \
\
might_fault(); \
do { \
__label__ __pu_failed; \
\
allow_write_to_user(__pu_addr, __pu_size); \
__put_user_size_goto(__pu_val, __pu_addr, __pu_size, __pu_failed); \
prevent_write_to_user(__pu_addr, __pu_size); \
__pu_err = 0; \
break; \
\
__pu_failed: \
prevent_write_to_user(__pu_addr, __pu_size); \
__pu_err = -EFAULT; \
} while (0); \
\
__pu_err; \
})
#define put_user(x, ptr) \
({ \
__typeof__(*(ptr)) __user *_pu_addr = (ptr); \
\
access_ok(_pu_addr, sizeof(*(ptr))) ? \
__put_user(x, _pu_addr) : -EFAULT; \
})
/*
* We don't tell gcc that we are accessing memory, but this is OK
* because we do not write to any memory gcc knows about, so there
* are no aliasing issues.
*/
powerpc/uaccess: Implement unsafe_put_user() using 'asm goto' unsafe_put_user() is designed to take benefit of 'asm goto'. Instead of using the standard __put_user() approach and branch based on the returned error, use 'asm goto' and make the exception code branch directly to the error label. There is no code anymore in the fixup section. This change significantly simplifies functions using unsafe_put_user() Small exemple of the benefit with the following code: struct test { u32 item1; u16 item2; u8 item3; u64 item4; }; int set_test_to_user(struct test __user *test, u32 item1, u16 item2, u8 item3, u64 item4) { unsafe_put_user(item1, &test->item1, failed); unsafe_put_user(item2, &test->item2, failed); unsafe_put_user(item3, &test->item3, failed); unsafe_put_user(item4, &test->item4, failed); return 0; failed: return -EFAULT; } Before the patch: 00000be8 <set_test_to_user>: be8: 39 20 00 00 li r9,0 bec: 90 83 00 00 stw r4,0(r3) bf0: 2f 89 00 00 cmpwi cr7,r9,0 bf4: 40 9e 00 38 bne cr7,c2c <set_test_to_user+0x44> bf8: b0 a3 00 04 sth r5,4(r3) bfc: 2f 89 00 00 cmpwi cr7,r9,0 c00: 40 9e 00 2c bne cr7,c2c <set_test_to_user+0x44> c04: 98 c3 00 06 stb r6,6(r3) c08: 2f 89 00 00 cmpwi cr7,r9,0 c0c: 40 9e 00 20 bne cr7,c2c <set_test_to_user+0x44> c10: 90 e3 00 08 stw r7,8(r3) c14: 91 03 00 0c stw r8,12(r3) c18: 21 29 00 00 subfic r9,r9,0 c1c: 7d 29 49 10 subfe r9,r9,r9 c20: 38 60 ff f2 li r3,-14 c24: 7d 23 18 38 and r3,r9,r3 c28: 4e 80 00 20 blr c2c: 38 60 ff f2 li r3,-14 c30: 4e 80 00 20 blr 00000000 <.fixup>: ... b8: 39 20 ff f2 li r9,-14 bc: 48 00 00 00 b bc <.fixup+0xbc> bc: R_PPC_REL24 .text+0xbf0 c0: 39 20 ff f2 li r9,-14 c4: 48 00 00 00 b c4 <.fixup+0xc4> c4: R_PPC_REL24 .text+0xbfc c8: 39 20 ff f2 li r9,-14 cc: 48 00 00 00 b cc <.fixup+0xcc> d0: 39 20 ff f2 li r9,-14 d4: 48 00 00 00 b d4 <.fixup+0xd4> d4: R_PPC_REL24 .text+0xc18 00000000 <__ex_table>: ... a0: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xbec a4: R_PPC_REL32 .fixup+0xb8 a8: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xbf8 ac: R_PPC_REL32 .fixup+0xc0 b0: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xc04 b4: R_PPC_REL32 .fixup+0xc8 b8: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xc10 bc: R_PPC_REL32 .fixup+0xd0 c0: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xc14 c4: R_PPC_REL32 .fixup+0xd0 After the patch: 00000be8 <set_test_to_user>: be8: 90 83 00 00 stw r4,0(r3) bec: b0 a3 00 04 sth r5,4(r3) bf0: 98 c3 00 06 stb r6,6(r3) bf4: 90 e3 00 08 stw r7,8(r3) bf8: 91 03 00 0c stw r8,12(r3) bfc: 38 60 00 00 li r3,0 c00: 4e 80 00 20 blr c04: 38 60 ff f2 li r3,-14 c08: 4e 80 00 20 blr 00000000 <__ex_table>: ... a0: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xbe8 a4: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xc04 a8: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xbec ac: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xc04 b0: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xbf0 b4: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xc04 b8: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xbf4 bc: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xc04 c0: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xbf8 c4: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xc04 Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Reviewed-by: Segher Boessenkool <segher@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/23e680624680a9a5405f4b88740d2596d4b17c26.1587143308.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr
2020-04-17 17:08:51 +00:00
#define __put_user_asm_goto(x, addr, label, op) \
powerpc: Use asm_goto_volatile for put_user() Andreas reported that commit ee0a49a6870e ("powerpc/uaccess: Switch __put_user_size_allowed() to __put_user_asm_goto()") broke CLONE_CHILD_SETTID. Further inspection showed that the put_user() in schedule_tail() was missing entirely, the store not emitted by the compiler. <.schedule_tail>: mflr r0 std r0,16(r1) stdu r1,-112(r1) bl <.finish_task_switch> ld r9,2496(r3) cmpdi cr7,r9,0 bne cr7,<.schedule_tail+0x60> ld r3,392(r13) ld r9,1392(r3) cmpdi cr7,r9,0 beq cr7,<.schedule_tail+0x3c> li r4,0 li r5,0 bl <.__task_pid_nr_ns> nop bl <.calculate_sigpending> nop addi r1,r1,112 ld r0,16(r1) mtlr r0 blr nop nop nop bl <.__balance_callback> b <.schedule_tail+0x1c> Notice there are no stores other than to the stack. There should be a stw in there for the store to current->set_child_tid. This is only seen with GCC 4.9 era compilers (tested with 4.9.3 and 4.9.4), and only when CONFIG_PPC_KUAP is disabled. When CONFIG_PPC_KUAP=y, the inline asm that's part of the isync() and mtspr() inlined via allow_user_access() seems to be enough to avoid the bug. We already have a macro to work around this (or a similar bug), called asm_volatile_goto which includes an empty asm block to tickle the compiler into generating the right code. So use that. With this applied the code generation looks more like it will work: <.schedule_tail>: mflr r0 std r31,-8(r1) std r0,16(r1) stdu r1,-144(r1) std r3,112(r1) bl <._mcount> nop ld r3,112(r1) bl <.finish_task_switch> ld r9,2624(r3) cmpdi cr7,r9,0 bne cr7,<.schedule_tail+0xa0> ld r3,2408(r13) ld r31,1856(r3) cmpdi cr7,r31,0 beq cr7,<.schedule_tail+0x80> li r4,0 li r5,0 bl <.__task_pid_nr_ns> nop li r9,-1 clrldi r9,r9,12 cmpld cr7,r31,r9 bgt cr7,<.schedule_tail+0x80> lis r9,16 rldicr r9,r9,32,31 subf r9,r31,r9 cmpldi cr7,r9,3 ble cr7,<.schedule_tail+0x80> li r9,0 stw r3,0(r31) <-- stw nop bl <.calculate_sigpending> nop addi r1,r1,144 ld r0,16(r1) ld r31,-8(r1) mtlr r0 blr nop bl <.__balance_callback> b <.schedule_tail+0x30> Fixes: ee0a49a6870e ("powerpc/uaccess: Switch __put_user_size_allowed() to __put_user_asm_goto()") Reported-by: Andreas Schwab <schwab@linux-m68k.org> Tested-by: Andreas Schwab <schwab@linux-m68k.org> Suggested-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201104111742.672142-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au
2020-11-04 22:17:42 +11:00
asm_volatile_goto( \
powerpc/uaccess: Implement unsafe_put_user() using 'asm goto' unsafe_put_user() is designed to take benefit of 'asm goto'. Instead of using the standard __put_user() approach and branch based on the returned error, use 'asm goto' and make the exception code branch directly to the error label. There is no code anymore in the fixup section. This change significantly simplifies functions using unsafe_put_user() Small exemple of the benefit with the following code: struct test { u32 item1; u16 item2; u8 item3; u64 item4; }; int set_test_to_user(struct test __user *test, u32 item1, u16 item2, u8 item3, u64 item4) { unsafe_put_user(item1, &test->item1, failed); unsafe_put_user(item2, &test->item2, failed); unsafe_put_user(item3, &test->item3, failed); unsafe_put_user(item4, &test->item4, failed); return 0; failed: return -EFAULT; } Before the patch: 00000be8 <set_test_to_user>: be8: 39 20 00 00 li r9,0 bec: 90 83 00 00 stw r4,0(r3) bf0: 2f 89 00 00 cmpwi cr7,r9,0 bf4: 40 9e 00 38 bne cr7,c2c <set_test_to_user+0x44> bf8: b0 a3 00 04 sth r5,4(r3) bfc: 2f 89 00 00 cmpwi cr7,r9,0 c00: 40 9e 00 2c bne cr7,c2c <set_test_to_user+0x44> c04: 98 c3 00 06 stb r6,6(r3) c08: 2f 89 00 00 cmpwi cr7,r9,0 c0c: 40 9e 00 20 bne cr7,c2c <set_test_to_user+0x44> c10: 90 e3 00 08 stw r7,8(r3) c14: 91 03 00 0c stw r8,12(r3) c18: 21 29 00 00 subfic r9,r9,0 c1c: 7d 29 49 10 subfe r9,r9,r9 c20: 38 60 ff f2 li r3,-14 c24: 7d 23 18 38 and r3,r9,r3 c28: 4e 80 00 20 blr c2c: 38 60 ff f2 li r3,-14 c30: 4e 80 00 20 blr 00000000 <.fixup>: ... b8: 39 20 ff f2 li r9,-14 bc: 48 00 00 00 b bc <.fixup+0xbc> bc: R_PPC_REL24 .text+0xbf0 c0: 39 20 ff f2 li r9,-14 c4: 48 00 00 00 b c4 <.fixup+0xc4> c4: R_PPC_REL24 .text+0xbfc c8: 39 20 ff f2 li r9,-14 cc: 48 00 00 00 b cc <.fixup+0xcc> d0: 39 20 ff f2 li r9,-14 d4: 48 00 00 00 b d4 <.fixup+0xd4> d4: R_PPC_REL24 .text+0xc18 00000000 <__ex_table>: ... a0: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xbec a4: R_PPC_REL32 .fixup+0xb8 a8: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xbf8 ac: R_PPC_REL32 .fixup+0xc0 b0: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xc04 b4: R_PPC_REL32 .fixup+0xc8 b8: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xc10 bc: R_PPC_REL32 .fixup+0xd0 c0: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xc14 c4: R_PPC_REL32 .fixup+0xd0 After the patch: 00000be8 <set_test_to_user>: be8: 90 83 00 00 stw r4,0(r3) bec: b0 a3 00 04 sth r5,4(r3) bf0: 98 c3 00 06 stb r6,6(r3) bf4: 90 e3 00 08 stw r7,8(r3) bf8: 91 03 00 0c stw r8,12(r3) bfc: 38 60 00 00 li r3,0 c00: 4e 80 00 20 blr c04: 38 60 ff f2 li r3,-14 c08: 4e 80 00 20 blr 00000000 <__ex_table>: ... a0: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xbe8 a4: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xc04 a8: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xbec ac: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xc04 b0: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xbf0 b4: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xc04 b8: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xbf4 bc: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xc04 c0: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xbf8 c4: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xc04 Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Reviewed-by: Segher Boessenkool <segher@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/23e680624680a9a5405f4b88740d2596d4b17c26.1587143308.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr
2020-04-17 17:08:51 +00:00
"1: " op "%U1%X1 %0,%1 # put_user\n" \
EX_TABLE(1b, %l2) \
: \
powerpc/uaccess: Don't use "m<>" constraint with GCC 4.9 GCC 4.9 sometimes fails to build with "m<>" constraint in inline assembly. CC lib/iov_iter.o In file included from ./arch/powerpc/include/asm/cmpxchg.h:6:0, from ./arch/powerpc/include/asm/atomic.h:11, from ./include/linux/atomic.h:7, from ./include/linux/crypto.h:15, from ./include/crypto/hash.h:11, from lib/iov_iter.c:2: lib/iov_iter.c: In function 'iovec_from_user.part.30': ./arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h:287:2: error: 'asm' operand has impossible constraints __asm__ __volatile__( \ ^ ./include/linux/compiler.h:78:42: note: in definition of macro 'unlikely' # define unlikely(x) __builtin_expect(!!(x), 0) ^ ./arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h:583:34: note: in expansion of macro 'unsafe_op_wrap' #define unsafe_get_user(x, p, e) unsafe_op_wrap(__get_user_allowed(x, p), e) ^ ./arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h:329:10: note: in expansion of macro '__get_user_asm' case 4: __get_user_asm(x, (u32 __user *)ptr, retval, "lwz"); break; \ ^ ./arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h:363:3: note: in expansion of macro '__get_user_size_allowed' __get_user_size_allowed(__gu_val, __gu_addr, __gu_size, __gu_err); \ ^ ./arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h:100:2: note: in expansion of macro '__get_user_nocheck' __get_user_nocheck((x), (ptr), sizeof(*(ptr)), false) ^ ./arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h:583:49: note: in expansion of macro '__get_user_allowed' #define unsafe_get_user(x, p, e) unsafe_op_wrap(__get_user_allowed(x, p), e) ^ lib/iov_iter.c:1663:3: note: in expansion of macro 'unsafe_get_user' unsafe_get_user(len, &uiov[i].iov_len, uaccess_end); ^ make[1]: *** [scripts/Makefile.build:283: lib/iov_iter.o] Error 1 Define a UPD_CONSTR macro that is "<>" by default and only "" with GCC prior to GCC 5. Fixes: fcf1f26895a4 ("powerpc/uaccess: Add pre-update addressing to __put_user_asm_goto()") Fixes: 2f279eeb68b8 ("powerpc/uaccess: Add pre-update addressing to __get_user_asm() and __put_user_asm()") Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Acked-by: Segher Boessenkool <segher@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/212d3bc4a52ca71523759517bb9c61f7e477c46a.1603179582.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
2020-10-20 07:40:07 +00:00
: "r" (x), "m"UPD_CONSTR (*addr) \
powerpc/uaccess: Implement unsafe_put_user() using 'asm goto' unsafe_put_user() is designed to take benefit of 'asm goto'. Instead of using the standard __put_user() approach and branch based on the returned error, use 'asm goto' and make the exception code branch directly to the error label. There is no code anymore in the fixup section. This change significantly simplifies functions using unsafe_put_user() Small exemple of the benefit with the following code: struct test { u32 item1; u16 item2; u8 item3; u64 item4; }; int set_test_to_user(struct test __user *test, u32 item1, u16 item2, u8 item3, u64 item4) { unsafe_put_user(item1, &test->item1, failed); unsafe_put_user(item2, &test->item2, failed); unsafe_put_user(item3, &test->item3, failed); unsafe_put_user(item4, &test->item4, failed); return 0; failed: return -EFAULT; } Before the patch: 00000be8 <set_test_to_user>: be8: 39 20 00 00 li r9,0 bec: 90 83 00 00 stw r4,0(r3) bf0: 2f 89 00 00 cmpwi cr7,r9,0 bf4: 40 9e 00 38 bne cr7,c2c <set_test_to_user+0x44> bf8: b0 a3 00 04 sth r5,4(r3) bfc: 2f 89 00 00 cmpwi cr7,r9,0 c00: 40 9e 00 2c bne cr7,c2c <set_test_to_user+0x44> c04: 98 c3 00 06 stb r6,6(r3) c08: 2f 89 00 00 cmpwi cr7,r9,0 c0c: 40 9e 00 20 bne cr7,c2c <set_test_to_user+0x44> c10: 90 e3 00 08 stw r7,8(r3) c14: 91 03 00 0c stw r8,12(r3) c18: 21 29 00 00 subfic r9,r9,0 c1c: 7d 29 49 10 subfe r9,r9,r9 c20: 38 60 ff f2 li r3,-14 c24: 7d 23 18 38 and r3,r9,r3 c28: 4e 80 00 20 blr c2c: 38 60 ff f2 li r3,-14 c30: 4e 80 00 20 blr 00000000 <.fixup>: ... b8: 39 20 ff f2 li r9,-14 bc: 48 00 00 00 b bc <.fixup+0xbc> bc: R_PPC_REL24 .text+0xbf0 c0: 39 20 ff f2 li r9,-14 c4: 48 00 00 00 b c4 <.fixup+0xc4> c4: R_PPC_REL24 .text+0xbfc c8: 39 20 ff f2 li r9,-14 cc: 48 00 00 00 b cc <.fixup+0xcc> d0: 39 20 ff f2 li r9,-14 d4: 48 00 00 00 b d4 <.fixup+0xd4> d4: R_PPC_REL24 .text+0xc18 00000000 <__ex_table>: ... a0: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xbec a4: R_PPC_REL32 .fixup+0xb8 a8: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xbf8 ac: R_PPC_REL32 .fixup+0xc0 b0: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xc04 b4: R_PPC_REL32 .fixup+0xc8 b8: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xc10 bc: R_PPC_REL32 .fixup+0xd0 c0: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xc14 c4: R_PPC_REL32 .fixup+0xd0 After the patch: 00000be8 <set_test_to_user>: be8: 90 83 00 00 stw r4,0(r3) bec: b0 a3 00 04 sth r5,4(r3) bf0: 98 c3 00 06 stb r6,6(r3) bf4: 90 e3 00 08 stw r7,8(r3) bf8: 91 03 00 0c stw r8,12(r3) bfc: 38 60 00 00 li r3,0 c00: 4e 80 00 20 blr c04: 38 60 ff f2 li r3,-14 c08: 4e 80 00 20 blr 00000000 <__ex_table>: ... a0: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xbe8 a4: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xc04 a8: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xbec ac: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xc04 b0: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xbf0 b4: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xc04 b8: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xbf4 bc: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xc04 c0: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xbf8 c4: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xc04 Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Reviewed-by: Segher Boessenkool <segher@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/23e680624680a9a5405f4b88740d2596d4b17c26.1587143308.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr
2020-04-17 17:08:51 +00:00
: \
: label)
#ifdef __powerpc64__
#define __put_user_asm2_goto(x, ptr, label) \
__put_user_asm_goto(x, ptr, label, "std")
#else /* __powerpc64__ */
#define __put_user_asm2_goto(x, addr, label) \
powerpc: Use asm_goto_volatile for put_user() Andreas reported that commit ee0a49a6870e ("powerpc/uaccess: Switch __put_user_size_allowed() to __put_user_asm_goto()") broke CLONE_CHILD_SETTID. Further inspection showed that the put_user() in schedule_tail() was missing entirely, the store not emitted by the compiler. <.schedule_tail>: mflr r0 std r0,16(r1) stdu r1,-112(r1) bl <.finish_task_switch> ld r9,2496(r3) cmpdi cr7,r9,0 bne cr7,<.schedule_tail+0x60> ld r3,392(r13) ld r9,1392(r3) cmpdi cr7,r9,0 beq cr7,<.schedule_tail+0x3c> li r4,0 li r5,0 bl <.__task_pid_nr_ns> nop bl <.calculate_sigpending> nop addi r1,r1,112 ld r0,16(r1) mtlr r0 blr nop nop nop bl <.__balance_callback> b <.schedule_tail+0x1c> Notice there are no stores other than to the stack. There should be a stw in there for the store to current->set_child_tid. This is only seen with GCC 4.9 era compilers (tested with 4.9.3 and 4.9.4), and only when CONFIG_PPC_KUAP is disabled. When CONFIG_PPC_KUAP=y, the inline asm that's part of the isync() and mtspr() inlined via allow_user_access() seems to be enough to avoid the bug. We already have a macro to work around this (or a similar bug), called asm_volatile_goto which includes an empty asm block to tickle the compiler into generating the right code. So use that. With this applied the code generation looks more like it will work: <.schedule_tail>: mflr r0 std r31,-8(r1) std r0,16(r1) stdu r1,-144(r1) std r3,112(r1) bl <._mcount> nop ld r3,112(r1) bl <.finish_task_switch> ld r9,2624(r3) cmpdi cr7,r9,0 bne cr7,<.schedule_tail+0xa0> ld r3,2408(r13) ld r31,1856(r3) cmpdi cr7,r31,0 beq cr7,<.schedule_tail+0x80> li r4,0 li r5,0 bl <.__task_pid_nr_ns> nop li r9,-1 clrldi r9,r9,12 cmpld cr7,r31,r9 bgt cr7,<.schedule_tail+0x80> lis r9,16 rldicr r9,r9,32,31 subf r9,r31,r9 cmpldi cr7,r9,3 ble cr7,<.schedule_tail+0x80> li r9,0 stw r3,0(r31) <-- stw nop bl <.calculate_sigpending> nop addi r1,r1,144 ld r0,16(r1) ld r31,-8(r1) mtlr r0 blr nop bl <.__balance_callback> b <.schedule_tail+0x30> Fixes: ee0a49a6870e ("powerpc/uaccess: Switch __put_user_size_allowed() to __put_user_asm_goto()") Reported-by: Andreas Schwab <schwab@linux-m68k.org> Tested-by: Andreas Schwab <schwab@linux-m68k.org> Suggested-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201104111742.672142-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au
2020-11-04 22:17:42 +11:00
asm_volatile_goto( \
powerpc/uaccess: Implement unsafe_put_user() using 'asm goto' unsafe_put_user() is designed to take benefit of 'asm goto'. Instead of using the standard __put_user() approach and branch based on the returned error, use 'asm goto' and make the exception code branch directly to the error label. There is no code anymore in the fixup section. This change significantly simplifies functions using unsafe_put_user() Small exemple of the benefit with the following code: struct test { u32 item1; u16 item2; u8 item3; u64 item4; }; int set_test_to_user(struct test __user *test, u32 item1, u16 item2, u8 item3, u64 item4) { unsafe_put_user(item1, &test->item1, failed); unsafe_put_user(item2, &test->item2, failed); unsafe_put_user(item3, &test->item3, failed); unsafe_put_user(item4, &test->item4, failed); return 0; failed: return -EFAULT; } Before the patch: 00000be8 <set_test_to_user>: be8: 39 20 00 00 li r9,0 bec: 90 83 00 00 stw r4,0(r3) bf0: 2f 89 00 00 cmpwi cr7,r9,0 bf4: 40 9e 00 38 bne cr7,c2c <set_test_to_user+0x44> bf8: b0 a3 00 04 sth r5,4(r3) bfc: 2f 89 00 00 cmpwi cr7,r9,0 c00: 40 9e 00 2c bne cr7,c2c <set_test_to_user+0x44> c04: 98 c3 00 06 stb r6,6(r3) c08: 2f 89 00 00 cmpwi cr7,r9,0 c0c: 40 9e 00 20 bne cr7,c2c <set_test_to_user+0x44> c10: 90 e3 00 08 stw r7,8(r3) c14: 91 03 00 0c stw r8,12(r3) c18: 21 29 00 00 subfic r9,r9,0 c1c: 7d 29 49 10 subfe r9,r9,r9 c20: 38 60 ff f2 li r3,-14 c24: 7d 23 18 38 and r3,r9,r3 c28: 4e 80 00 20 blr c2c: 38 60 ff f2 li r3,-14 c30: 4e 80 00 20 blr 00000000 <.fixup>: ... b8: 39 20 ff f2 li r9,-14 bc: 48 00 00 00 b bc <.fixup+0xbc> bc: R_PPC_REL24 .text+0xbf0 c0: 39 20 ff f2 li r9,-14 c4: 48 00 00 00 b c4 <.fixup+0xc4> c4: R_PPC_REL24 .text+0xbfc c8: 39 20 ff f2 li r9,-14 cc: 48 00 00 00 b cc <.fixup+0xcc> d0: 39 20 ff f2 li r9,-14 d4: 48 00 00 00 b d4 <.fixup+0xd4> d4: R_PPC_REL24 .text+0xc18 00000000 <__ex_table>: ... a0: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xbec a4: R_PPC_REL32 .fixup+0xb8 a8: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xbf8 ac: R_PPC_REL32 .fixup+0xc0 b0: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xc04 b4: R_PPC_REL32 .fixup+0xc8 b8: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xc10 bc: R_PPC_REL32 .fixup+0xd0 c0: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xc14 c4: R_PPC_REL32 .fixup+0xd0 After the patch: 00000be8 <set_test_to_user>: be8: 90 83 00 00 stw r4,0(r3) bec: b0 a3 00 04 sth r5,4(r3) bf0: 98 c3 00 06 stb r6,6(r3) bf4: 90 e3 00 08 stw r7,8(r3) bf8: 91 03 00 0c stw r8,12(r3) bfc: 38 60 00 00 li r3,0 c00: 4e 80 00 20 blr c04: 38 60 ff f2 li r3,-14 c08: 4e 80 00 20 blr 00000000 <__ex_table>: ... a0: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xbe8 a4: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xc04 a8: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xbec ac: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xc04 b0: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xbf0 b4: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xc04 b8: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xbf4 bc: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xc04 c0: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xbf8 c4: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xc04 Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Reviewed-by: Segher Boessenkool <segher@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/23e680624680a9a5405f4b88740d2596d4b17c26.1587143308.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr
2020-04-17 17:08:51 +00:00
"1: stw%X1 %0, %1\n" \
"2: stw%X1 %L0, %L1\n" \
EX_TABLE(1b, %l2) \
EX_TABLE(2b, %l2) \
: \
: "r" (x), "m" (*addr) \
: \
: label)
#endif /* __powerpc64__ */
#define __put_user_size_goto(x, ptr, size, label) \
do { \
__typeof__(*(ptr)) __user *__pus_addr = (ptr); \
\
powerpc/uaccess: Implement unsafe_put_user() using 'asm goto' unsafe_put_user() is designed to take benefit of 'asm goto'. Instead of using the standard __put_user() approach and branch based on the returned error, use 'asm goto' and make the exception code branch directly to the error label. There is no code anymore in the fixup section. This change significantly simplifies functions using unsafe_put_user() Small exemple of the benefit with the following code: struct test { u32 item1; u16 item2; u8 item3; u64 item4; }; int set_test_to_user(struct test __user *test, u32 item1, u16 item2, u8 item3, u64 item4) { unsafe_put_user(item1, &test->item1, failed); unsafe_put_user(item2, &test->item2, failed); unsafe_put_user(item3, &test->item3, failed); unsafe_put_user(item4, &test->item4, failed); return 0; failed: return -EFAULT; } Before the patch: 00000be8 <set_test_to_user>: be8: 39 20 00 00 li r9,0 bec: 90 83 00 00 stw r4,0(r3) bf0: 2f 89 00 00 cmpwi cr7,r9,0 bf4: 40 9e 00 38 bne cr7,c2c <set_test_to_user+0x44> bf8: b0 a3 00 04 sth r5,4(r3) bfc: 2f 89 00 00 cmpwi cr7,r9,0 c00: 40 9e 00 2c bne cr7,c2c <set_test_to_user+0x44> c04: 98 c3 00 06 stb r6,6(r3) c08: 2f 89 00 00 cmpwi cr7,r9,0 c0c: 40 9e 00 20 bne cr7,c2c <set_test_to_user+0x44> c10: 90 e3 00 08 stw r7,8(r3) c14: 91 03 00 0c stw r8,12(r3) c18: 21 29 00 00 subfic r9,r9,0 c1c: 7d 29 49 10 subfe r9,r9,r9 c20: 38 60 ff f2 li r3,-14 c24: 7d 23 18 38 and r3,r9,r3 c28: 4e 80 00 20 blr c2c: 38 60 ff f2 li r3,-14 c30: 4e 80 00 20 blr 00000000 <.fixup>: ... b8: 39 20 ff f2 li r9,-14 bc: 48 00 00 00 b bc <.fixup+0xbc> bc: R_PPC_REL24 .text+0xbf0 c0: 39 20 ff f2 li r9,-14 c4: 48 00 00 00 b c4 <.fixup+0xc4> c4: R_PPC_REL24 .text+0xbfc c8: 39 20 ff f2 li r9,-14 cc: 48 00 00 00 b cc <.fixup+0xcc> d0: 39 20 ff f2 li r9,-14 d4: 48 00 00 00 b d4 <.fixup+0xd4> d4: R_PPC_REL24 .text+0xc18 00000000 <__ex_table>: ... a0: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xbec a4: R_PPC_REL32 .fixup+0xb8 a8: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xbf8 ac: R_PPC_REL32 .fixup+0xc0 b0: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xc04 b4: R_PPC_REL32 .fixup+0xc8 b8: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xc10 bc: R_PPC_REL32 .fixup+0xd0 c0: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xc14 c4: R_PPC_REL32 .fixup+0xd0 After the patch: 00000be8 <set_test_to_user>: be8: 90 83 00 00 stw r4,0(r3) bec: b0 a3 00 04 sth r5,4(r3) bf0: 98 c3 00 06 stb r6,6(r3) bf4: 90 e3 00 08 stw r7,8(r3) bf8: 91 03 00 0c stw r8,12(r3) bfc: 38 60 00 00 li r3,0 c00: 4e 80 00 20 blr c04: 38 60 ff f2 li r3,-14 c08: 4e 80 00 20 blr 00000000 <__ex_table>: ... a0: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xbe8 a4: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xc04 a8: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xbec ac: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xc04 b0: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xbf0 b4: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xc04 b8: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xbf4 bc: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xc04 c0: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xbf8 c4: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xc04 Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Reviewed-by: Segher Boessenkool <segher@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/23e680624680a9a5405f4b88740d2596d4b17c26.1587143308.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr
2020-04-17 17:08:51 +00:00
switch (size) { \
case 1: __put_user_asm_goto(x, __pus_addr, label, "stb"); break; \
case 2: __put_user_asm_goto(x, __pus_addr, label, "sth"); break; \
case 4: __put_user_asm_goto(x, __pus_addr, label, "stw"); break; \
case 8: __put_user_asm2_goto(x, __pus_addr, label); break; \
default: BUILD_BUG(); \
powerpc/uaccess: Implement unsafe_put_user() using 'asm goto' unsafe_put_user() is designed to take benefit of 'asm goto'. Instead of using the standard __put_user() approach and branch based on the returned error, use 'asm goto' and make the exception code branch directly to the error label. There is no code anymore in the fixup section. This change significantly simplifies functions using unsafe_put_user() Small exemple of the benefit with the following code: struct test { u32 item1; u16 item2; u8 item3; u64 item4; }; int set_test_to_user(struct test __user *test, u32 item1, u16 item2, u8 item3, u64 item4) { unsafe_put_user(item1, &test->item1, failed); unsafe_put_user(item2, &test->item2, failed); unsafe_put_user(item3, &test->item3, failed); unsafe_put_user(item4, &test->item4, failed); return 0; failed: return -EFAULT; } Before the patch: 00000be8 <set_test_to_user>: be8: 39 20 00 00 li r9,0 bec: 90 83 00 00 stw r4,0(r3) bf0: 2f 89 00 00 cmpwi cr7,r9,0 bf4: 40 9e 00 38 bne cr7,c2c <set_test_to_user+0x44> bf8: b0 a3 00 04 sth r5,4(r3) bfc: 2f 89 00 00 cmpwi cr7,r9,0 c00: 40 9e 00 2c bne cr7,c2c <set_test_to_user+0x44> c04: 98 c3 00 06 stb r6,6(r3) c08: 2f 89 00 00 cmpwi cr7,r9,0 c0c: 40 9e 00 20 bne cr7,c2c <set_test_to_user+0x44> c10: 90 e3 00 08 stw r7,8(r3) c14: 91 03 00 0c stw r8,12(r3) c18: 21 29 00 00 subfic r9,r9,0 c1c: 7d 29 49 10 subfe r9,r9,r9 c20: 38 60 ff f2 li r3,-14 c24: 7d 23 18 38 and r3,r9,r3 c28: 4e 80 00 20 blr c2c: 38 60 ff f2 li r3,-14 c30: 4e 80 00 20 blr 00000000 <.fixup>: ... b8: 39 20 ff f2 li r9,-14 bc: 48 00 00 00 b bc <.fixup+0xbc> bc: R_PPC_REL24 .text+0xbf0 c0: 39 20 ff f2 li r9,-14 c4: 48 00 00 00 b c4 <.fixup+0xc4> c4: R_PPC_REL24 .text+0xbfc c8: 39 20 ff f2 li r9,-14 cc: 48 00 00 00 b cc <.fixup+0xcc> d0: 39 20 ff f2 li r9,-14 d4: 48 00 00 00 b d4 <.fixup+0xd4> d4: R_PPC_REL24 .text+0xc18 00000000 <__ex_table>: ... a0: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xbec a4: R_PPC_REL32 .fixup+0xb8 a8: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xbf8 ac: R_PPC_REL32 .fixup+0xc0 b0: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xc04 b4: R_PPC_REL32 .fixup+0xc8 b8: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xc10 bc: R_PPC_REL32 .fixup+0xd0 c0: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xc14 c4: R_PPC_REL32 .fixup+0xd0 After the patch: 00000be8 <set_test_to_user>: be8: 90 83 00 00 stw r4,0(r3) bec: b0 a3 00 04 sth r5,4(r3) bf0: 98 c3 00 06 stb r6,6(r3) bf4: 90 e3 00 08 stw r7,8(r3) bf8: 91 03 00 0c stw r8,12(r3) bfc: 38 60 00 00 li r3,0 c00: 4e 80 00 20 blr c04: 38 60 ff f2 li r3,-14 c08: 4e 80 00 20 blr 00000000 <__ex_table>: ... a0: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xbe8 a4: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xc04 a8: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xbec ac: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xc04 b0: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xbf0 b4: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xc04 b8: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xbf4 bc: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xc04 c0: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xbf8 c4: R_PPC_REL32 .text+0xc04 Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Reviewed-by: Segher Boessenkool <segher@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/23e680624680a9a5405f4b88740d2596d4b17c26.1587143308.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr
2020-04-17 17:08:51 +00:00
} \
} while (0)
/*
* This does an atomic 128 byte aligned load from userspace.
* Upto caller to do enable_kernel_vmx() before calling!
*/
#define __get_user_atomic_128_aligned(kaddr, uaddr, err) \
__asm__ __volatile__( \
"1: lvx 0,0,%1 # get user\n" \
" stvx 0,0,%2 # put kernel\n" \
"2:\n" \
".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n" \
"3: li %0,%3\n" \
" b 2b\n" \
".previous\n" \
EX_TABLE(1b, 3b) \
: "=r" (err) \
: "b" (uaddr), "b" (kaddr), "i" (-EFAULT), "0" (err))
#ifdef CONFIG_CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO_OUTPUT
#define __get_user_asm_goto(x, addr, label, op) \
asm_volatile_goto( \
"1: "op"%U1%X1 %0, %1 # get_user\n" \
EX_TABLE(1b, %l2) \
: "=r" (x) \
: "m"UPD_CONSTR (*addr) \
: \
: label)
#ifdef __powerpc64__
#define __get_user_asm2_goto(x, addr, label) \
__get_user_asm_goto(x, addr, label, "ld")
#else /* __powerpc64__ */
#define __get_user_asm2_goto(x, addr, label) \
asm_volatile_goto( \
"1: lwz%X1 %0, %1\n" \
"2: lwz%X1 %L0, %L1\n" \
EX_TABLE(1b, %l2) \
EX_TABLE(2b, %l2) \
: "=r" (x) \
: "m" (*addr) \
: \
: label)
#endif /* __powerpc64__ */
#define __get_user_size_goto(x, ptr, size, label) \
do { \
BUILD_BUG_ON(size > sizeof(x)); \
switch (size) { \
case 1: __get_user_asm_goto(x, (u8 __user *)ptr, label, "lbz"); break; \
case 2: __get_user_asm_goto(x, (u16 __user *)ptr, label, "lhz"); break; \
case 4: __get_user_asm_goto(x, (u32 __user *)ptr, label, "lwz"); break; \
case 8: __get_user_asm2_goto(x, (u64 __user *)ptr, label); break; \
default: x = 0; BUILD_BUG(); \
} \
} while (0)
#define __get_user_size_allowed(x, ptr, size, retval) \
do { \
__label__ __gus_failed; \
\
__get_user_size_goto(x, ptr, size, __gus_failed); \
retval = 0; \
break; \
__gus_failed: \
x = 0; \
retval = -EFAULT; \
} while (0)
#else /* CONFIG_CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO_OUTPUT */
#define __get_user_asm(x, addr, err, op) \
__asm__ __volatile__( \
"1: "op"%U2%X2 %1, %2 # get_user\n" \
"2:\n" \
".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n" \
"3: li %0,%3\n" \
" li %1,0\n" \
" b 2b\n" \
".previous\n" \
EX_TABLE(1b, 3b) \
: "=r" (err), "=r" (x) \
powerpc/uaccess: Don't use "m<>" constraint with GCC 4.9 GCC 4.9 sometimes fails to build with "m<>" constraint in inline assembly. CC lib/iov_iter.o In file included from ./arch/powerpc/include/asm/cmpxchg.h:6:0, from ./arch/powerpc/include/asm/atomic.h:11, from ./include/linux/atomic.h:7, from ./include/linux/crypto.h:15, from ./include/crypto/hash.h:11, from lib/iov_iter.c:2: lib/iov_iter.c: In function 'iovec_from_user.part.30': ./arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h:287:2: error: 'asm' operand has impossible constraints __asm__ __volatile__( \ ^ ./include/linux/compiler.h:78:42: note: in definition of macro 'unlikely' # define unlikely(x) __builtin_expect(!!(x), 0) ^ ./arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h:583:34: note: in expansion of macro 'unsafe_op_wrap' #define unsafe_get_user(x, p, e) unsafe_op_wrap(__get_user_allowed(x, p), e) ^ ./arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h:329:10: note: in expansion of macro '__get_user_asm' case 4: __get_user_asm(x, (u32 __user *)ptr, retval, "lwz"); break; \ ^ ./arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h:363:3: note: in expansion of macro '__get_user_size_allowed' __get_user_size_allowed(__gu_val, __gu_addr, __gu_size, __gu_err); \ ^ ./arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h:100:2: note: in expansion of macro '__get_user_nocheck' __get_user_nocheck((x), (ptr), sizeof(*(ptr)), false) ^ ./arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h:583:49: note: in expansion of macro '__get_user_allowed' #define unsafe_get_user(x, p, e) unsafe_op_wrap(__get_user_allowed(x, p), e) ^ lib/iov_iter.c:1663:3: note: in expansion of macro 'unsafe_get_user' unsafe_get_user(len, &uiov[i].iov_len, uaccess_end); ^ make[1]: *** [scripts/Makefile.build:283: lib/iov_iter.o] Error 1 Define a UPD_CONSTR macro that is "<>" by default and only "" with GCC prior to GCC 5. Fixes: fcf1f26895a4 ("powerpc/uaccess: Add pre-update addressing to __put_user_asm_goto()") Fixes: 2f279eeb68b8 ("powerpc/uaccess: Add pre-update addressing to __get_user_asm() and __put_user_asm()") Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Acked-by: Segher Boessenkool <segher@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/212d3bc4a52ca71523759517bb9c61f7e477c46a.1603179582.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
2020-10-20 07:40:07 +00:00
: "m"UPD_CONSTR (*addr), "i" (-EFAULT), "0" (err))
#ifdef __powerpc64__
#define __get_user_asm2(x, addr, err) \
__get_user_asm(x, addr, err, "ld")
#else /* __powerpc64__ */
#define __get_user_asm2(x, addr, err) \
__asm__ __volatile__( \
powerpc/uaccess: Use flexible addressing with __put_user()/__get_user() At the time being, __put_user()/__get_user() and friends only use D-form addressing, with 0 offset. Ex: lwz reg1, 0(reg2) Give the compiler the opportunity to use other adressing modes whenever possible, to get more optimised code. Hereunder is a small exemple: struct test { u32 item1; u16 item2; u8 item3; u64 item4; }; int set_test_user(struct test __user *from, struct test __user *to) { int err; u32 item1; u16 item2; u8 item3; u64 item4; err = __get_user(item1, &from->item1); err |= __get_user(item2, &from->item2); err |= __get_user(item3, &from->item3); err |= __get_user(item4, &from->item4); err |= __put_user(item1, &to->item1); err |= __put_user(item2, &to->item2); err |= __put_user(item3, &to->item3); err |= __put_user(item4, &to->item4); return err; } Before the patch: 00000df0 <set_test_user>: df0: 94 21 ff f0 stwu r1,-16(r1) df4: 39 40 00 00 li r10,0 df8: 93 c1 00 08 stw r30,8(r1) dfc: 93 e1 00 0c stw r31,12(r1) e00: 7d 49 53 78 mr r9,r10 e04: 80 a3 00 00 lwz r5,0(r3) e08: 38 e3 00 04 addi r7,r3,4 e0c: 7d 46 53 78 mr r6,r10 e10: a0 e7 00 00 lhz r7,0(r7) e14: 7d 29 33 78 or r9,r9,r6 e18: 39 03 00 06 addi r8,r3,6 e1c: 7d 46 53 78 mr r6,r10 e20: 89 08 00 00 lbz r8,0(r8) e24: 7d 29 33 78 or r9,r9,r6 e28: 38 63 00 08 addi r3,r3,8 e2c: 7d 46 53 78 mr r6,r10 e30: 83 c3 00 00 lwz r30,0(r3) e34: 83 e3 00 04 lwz r31,4(r3) e38: 7d 29 33 78 or r9,r9,r6 e3c: 7d 43 53 78 mr r3,r10 e40: 90 a4 00 00 stw r5,0(r4) e44: 7d 29 1b 78 or r9,r9,r3 e48: 38 c4 00 04 addi r6,r4,4 e4c: 7d 43 53 78 mr r3,r10 e50: b0 e6 00 00 sth r7,0(r6) e54: 7d 29 1b 78 or r9,r9,r3 e58: 38 e4 00 06 addi r7,r4,6 e5c: 7d 43 53 78 mr r3,r10 e60: 99 07 00 00 stb r8,0(r7) e64: 7d 23 1b 78 or r3,r9,r3 e68: 38 84 00 08 addi r4,r4,8 e6c: 93 c4 00 00 stw r30,0(r4) e70: 93 e4 00 04 stw r31,4(r4) e74: 7c 63 53 78 or r3,r3,r10 e78: 83 c1 00 08 lwz r30,8(r1) e7c: 83 e1 00 0c lwz r31,12(r1) e80: 38 21 00 10 addi r1,r1,16 e84: 4e 80 00 20 blr After the patch: 00000dbc <set_test_user>: dbc: 39 40 00 00 li r10,0 dc0: 7d 49 53 78 mr r9,r10 dc4: 80 03 00 00 lwz r0,0(r3) dc8: 7d 48 53 78 mr r8,r10 dcc: a1 63 00 04 lhz r11,4(r3) dd0: 7d 29 43 78 or r9,r9,r8 dd4: 7d 48 53 78 mr r8,r10 dd8: 88 a3 00 06 lbz r5,6(r3) ddc: 7d 29 43 78 or r9,r9,r8 de0: 7d 48 53 78 mr r8,r10 de4: 80 c3 00 08 lwz r6,8(r3) de8: 80 e3 00 0c lwz r7,12(r3) dec: 7d 29 43 78 or r9,r9,r8 df0: 7d 43 53 78 mr r3,r10 df4: 90 04 00 00 stw r0,0(r4) df8: 7d 29 1b 78 or r9,r9,r3 dfc: 7d 43 53 78 mr r3,r10 e00: b1 64 00 04 sth r11,4(r4) e04: 7d 29 1b 78 or r9,r9,r3 e08: 7d 43 53 78 mr r3,r10 e0c: 98 a4 00 06 stb r5,6(r4) e10: 7d 23 1b 78 or r3,r9,r3 e14: 90 c4 00 08 stw r6,8(r4) e18: 90 e4 00 0c stw r7,12(r4) e1c: 7c 63 53 78 or r3,r3,r10 e20: 4e 80 00 20 blr Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Reviewed-by: Segher Boessenkool <segher@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/c27bc4e598daf3bbb225de7a1f5c52121cf1e279.1597235091.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
2020-08-12 12:25:16 +00:00
"1: lwz%X2 %1, %2\n" \
"2: lwz%X2 %L1, %L2\n" \
"3:\n" \
".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n" \
"4: li %0,%3\n" \
" li %1,0\n" \
" li %1+1,0\n" \
" b 3b\n" \
".previous\n" \
EX_TABLE(1b, 4b) \
EX_TABLE(2b, 4b) \
: "=r" (err), "=&r" (x) \
powerpc/uaccess: Use flexible addressing with __put_user()/__get_user() At the time being, __put_user()/__get_user() and friends only use D-form addressing, with 0 offset. Ex: lwz reg1, 0(reg2) Give the compiler the opportunity to use other adressing modes whenever possible, to get more optimised code. Hereunder is a small exemple: struct test { u32 item1; u16 item2; u8 item3; u64 item4; }; int set_test_user(struct test __user *from, struct test __user *to) { int err; u32 item1; u16 item2; u8 item3; u64 item4; err = __get_user(item1, &from->item1); err |= __get_user(item2, &from->item2); err |= __get_user(item3, &from->item3); err |= __get_user(item4, &from->item4); err |= __put_user(item1, &to->item1); err |= __put_user(item2, &to->item2); err |= __put_user(item3, &to->item3); err |= __put_user(item4, &to->item4); return err; } Before the patch: 00000df0 <set_test_user>: df0: 94 21 ff f0 stwu r1,-16(r1) df4: 39 40 00 00 li r10,0 df8: 93 c1 00 08 stw r30,8(r1) dfc: 93 e1 00 0c stw r31,12(r1) e00: 7d 49 53 78 mr r9,r10 e04: 80 a3 00 00 lwz r5,0(r3) e08: 38 e3 00 04 addi r7,r3,4 e0c: 7d 46 53 78 mr r6,r10 e10: a0 e7 00 00 lhz r7,0(r7) e14: 7d 29 33 78 or r9,r9,r6 e18: 39 03 00 06 addi r8,r3,6 e1c: 7d 46 53 78 mr r6,r10 e20: 89 08 00 00 lbz r8,0(r8) e24: 7d 29 33 78 or r9,r9,r6 e28: 38 63 00 08 addi r3,r3,8 e2c: 7d 46 53 78 mr r6,r10 e30: 83 c3 00 00 lwz r30,0(r3) e34: 83 e3 00 04 lwz r31,4(r3) e38: 7d 29 33 78 or r9,r9,r6 e3c: 7d 43 53 78 mr r3,r10 e40: 90 a4 00 00 stw r5,0(r4) e44: 7d 29 1b 78 or r9,r9,r3 e48: 38 c4 00 04 addi r6,r4,4 e4c: 7d 43 53 78 mr r3,r10 e50: b0 e6 00 00 sth r7,0(r6) e54: 7d 29 1b 78 or r9,r9,r3 e58: 38 e4 00 06 addi r7,r4,6 e5c: 7d 43 53 78 mr r3,r10 e60: 99 07 00 00 stb r8,0(r7) e64: 7d 23 1b 78 or r3,r9,r3 e68: 38 84 00 08 addi r4,r4,8 e6c: 93 c4 00 00 stw r30,0(r4) e70: 93 e4 00 04 stw r31,4(r4) e74: 7c 63 53 78 or r3,r3,r10 e78: 83 c1 00 08 lwz r30,8(r1) e7c: 83 e1 00 0c lwz r31,12(r1) e80: 38 21 00 10 addi r1,r1,16 e84: 4e 80 00 20 blr After the patch: 00000dbc <set_test_user>: dbc: 39 40 00 00 li r10,0 dc0: 7d 49 53 78 mr r9,r10 dc4: 80 03 00 00 lwz r0,0(r3) dc8: 7d 48 53 78 mr r8,r10 dcc: a1 63 00 04 lhz r11,4(r3) dd0: 7d 29 43 78 or r9,r9,r8 dd4: 7d 48 53 78 mr r8,r10 dd8: 88 a3 00 06 lbz r5,6(r3) ddc: 7d 29 43 78 or r9,r9,r8 de0: 7d 48 53 78 mr r8,r10 de4: 80 c3 00 08 lwz r6,8(r3) de8: 80 e3 00 0c lwz r7,12(r3) dec: 7d 29 43 78 or r9,r9,r8 df0: 7d 43 53 78 mr r3,r10 df4: 90 04 00 00 stw r0,0(r4) df8: 7d 29 1b 78 or r9,r9,r3 dfc: 7d 43 53 78 mr r3,r10 e00: b1 64 00 04 sth r11,4(r4) e04: 7d 29 1b 78 or r9,r9,r3 e08: 7d 43 53 78 mr r3,r10 e0c: 98 a4 00 06 stb r5,6(r4) e10: 7d 23 1b 78 or r3,r9,r3 e14: 90 c4 00 08 stw r6,8(r4) e18: 90 e4 00 0c stw r7,12(r4) e1c: 7c 63 53 78 or r3,r3,r10 e20: 4e 80 00 20 blr Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Reviewed-by: Segher Boessenkool <segher@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/c27bc4e598daf3bbb225de7a1f5c52121cf1e279.1597235091.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
2020-08-12 12:25:16 +00:00
: "m" (*addr), "i" (-EFAULT), "0" (err))
#endif /* __powerpc64__ */
#define __get_user_size_allowed(x, ptr, size, retval) \
do { \
retval = 0; \
BUILD_BUG_ON(size > sizeof(x)); \
switch (size) { \
powerpc/uaccess: Use flexible addressing with __put_user()/__get_user() At the time being, __put_user()/__get_user() and friends only use D-form addressing, with 0 offset. Ex: lwz reg1, 0(reg2) Give the compiler the opportunity to use other adressing modes whenever possible, to get more optimised code. Hereunder is a small exemple: struct test { u32 item1; u16 item2; u8 item3; u64 item4; }; int set_test_user(struct test __user *from, struct test __user *to) { int err; u32 item1; u16 item2; u8 item3; u64 item4; err = __get_user(item1, &from->item1); err |= __get_user(item2, &from->item2); err |= __get_user(item3, &from->item3); err |= __get_user(item4, &from->item4); err |= __put_user(item1, &to->item1); err |= __put_user(item2, &to->item2); err |= __put_user(item3, &to->item3); err |= __put_user(item4, &to->item4); return err; } Before the patch: 00000df0 <set_test_user>: df0: 94 21 ff f0 stwu r1,-16(r1) df4: 39 40 00 00 li r10,0 df8: 93 c1 00 08 stw r30,8(r1) dfc: 93 e1 00 0c stw r31,12(r1) e00: 7d 49 53 78 mr r9,r10 e04: 80 a3 00 00 lwz r5,0(r3) e08: 38 e3 00 04 addi r7,r3,4 e0c: 7d 46 53 78 mr r6,r10 e10: a0 e7 00 00 lhz r7,0(r7) e14: 7d 29 33 78 or r9,r9,r6 e18: 39 03 00 06 addi r8,r3,6 e1c: 7d 46 53 78 mr r6,r10 e20: 89 08 00 00 lbz r8,0(r8) e24: 7d 29 33 78 or r9,r9,r6 e28: 38 63 00 08 addi r3,r3,8 e2c: 7d 46 53 78 mr r6,r10 e30: 83 c3 00 00 lwz r30,0(r3) e34: 83 e3 00 04 lwz r31,4(r3) e38: 7d 29 33 78 or r9,r9,r6 e3c: 7d 43 53 78 mr r3,r10 e40: 90 a4 00 00 stw r5,0(r4) e44: 7d 29 1b 78 or r9,r9,r3 e48: 38 c4 00 04 addi r6,r4,4 e4c: 7d 43 53 78 mr r3,r10 e50: b0 e6 00 00 sth r7,0(r6) e54: 7d 29 1b 78 or r9,r9,r3 e58: 38 e4 00 06 addi r7,r4,6 e5c: 7d 43 53 78 mr r3,r10 e60: 99 07 00 00 stb r8,0(r7) e64: 7d 23 1b 78 or r3,r9,r3 e68: 38 84 00 08 addi r4,r4,8 e6c: 93 c4 00 00 stw r30,0(r4) e70: 93 e4 00 04 stw r31,4(r4) e74: 7c 63 53 78 or r3,r3,r10 e78: 83 c1 00 08 lwz r30,8(r1) e7c: 83 e1 00 0c lwz r31,12(r1) e80: 38 21 00 10 addi r1,r1,16 e84: 4e 80 00 20 blr After the patch: 00000dbc <set_test_user>: dbc: 39 40 00 00 li r10,0 dc0: 7d 49 53 78 mr r9,r10 dc4: 80 03 00 00 lwz r0,0(r3) dc8: 7d 48 53 78 mr r8,r10 dcc: a1 63 00 04 lhz r11,4(r3) dd0: 7d 29 43 78 or r9,r9,r8 dd4: 7d 48 53 78 mr r8,r10 dd8: 88 a3 00 06 lbz r5,6(r3) ddc: 7d 29 43 78 or r9,r9,r8 de0: 7d 48 53 78 mr r8,r10 de4: 80 c3 00 08 lwz r6,8(r3) de8: 80 e3 00 0c lwz r7,12(r3) dec: 7d 29 43 78 or r9,r9,r8 df0: 7d 43 53 78 mr r3,r10 df4: 90 04 00 00 stw r0,0(r4) df8: 7d 29 1b 78 or r9,r9,r3 dfc: 7d 43 53 78 mr r3,r10 e00: b1 64 00 04 sth r11,4(r4) e04: 7d 29 1b 78 or r9,r9,r3 e08: 7d 43 53 78 mr r3,r10 e0c: 98 a4 00 06 stb r5,6(r4) e10: 7d 23 1b 78 or r3,r9,r3 e14: 90 c4 00 08 stw r6,8(r4) e18: 90 e4 00 0c stw r7,12(r4) e1c: 7c 63 53 78 or r3,r3,r10 e20: 4e 80 00 20 blr Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Reviewed-by: Segher Boessenkool <segher@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/c27bc4e598daf3bbb225de7a1f5c52121cf1e279.1597235091.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
2020-08-12 12:25:16 +00:00
case 1: __get_user_asm(x, (u8 __user *)ptr, retval, "lbz"); break; \
case 2: __get_user_asm(x, (u16 __user *)ptr, retval, "lhz"); break; \
case 4: __get_user_asm(x, (u32 __user *)ptr, retval, "lwz"); break; \
case 8: __get_user_asm2(x, (u64 __user *)ptr, retval); break; \
powerpc: Avoid clang uninitialized warning in __get_user_size_allowed Commit 9975f852ce1b ("powerpc/uaccess: Remove calls to __get_user_bad() and __put_user_bad()") switch to BUILD_BUG() in the default case, which leaves x uninitialized. This will not be an issue because the build will be broken in that case but clang does static analysis before it realizes the default case will be done so it warns about x being uninitialized (trimmed for brevity): In file included from mm/mprotect.c:13: In file included from ./include/linux/hugetlb.h:28: In file included from ./include/linux/mempolicy.h:16: ./include/linux/pagemap.h:772:16: warning: variable '__gu_val' is used uninitialized whenever switch default is taken [-Wsometimes-uninitialized] if (unlikely(__get_user(c, uaddr) != 0)) ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ./arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h:266:2: note: expanded from macro '__get_user' __get_user_size_allowed(__gu_val, __gu_addr, __gu_size, __gu_err); \ ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ./arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h:235:2: note: expanded from macro '__get_user_size_allowed' default: BUILD_BUG(); \ ^~~~~~~ Commit 5cd29b1fd3e8 ("powerpc/uaccess: Use asm goto for get_user when compiler supports it") added an initialization for x because of the same reason. Do the same thing here so there is no warning across all versions of clang. Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Acked-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1359 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210426203518.981550-1-nathan@kernel.org
2021-04-26 13:35:18 -07:00
default: x = 0; BUILD_BUG(); \
} \
} while (0)
#define __get_user_size_goto(x, ptr, size, label) \
do { \
long __gus_retval; \
\
__get_user_size_allowed(x, ptr, size, __gus_retval); \
if (__gus_retval) \
goto label; \
} while (0)
#endif /* CONFIG_CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO_OUTPUT */
/*
* This is a type: either unsigned long, if the argument fits into
* that type, or otherwise unsigned long long.
*/
#define __long_type(x) \
__typeof__(__builtin_choose_expr(sizeof(x) > sizeof(0UL), 0ULL, 0UL))
#define __get_user(x, ptr) \
({ \
long __gu_err; \
__long_type(*(ptr)) __gu_val; \
__typeof__(*(ptr)) __user *__gu_addr = (ptr); \
__typeof__(sizeof(*(ptr))) __gu_size = sizeof(*(ptr)); \
\
might_fault(); \
allow_read_from_user(__gu_addr, __gu_size); \
__get_user_size_allowed(__gu_val, __gu_addr, __gu_size, __gu_err); \
prevent_read_from_user(__gu_addr, __gu_size); \
(x) = (__typeof__(*(ptr)))__gu_val; \
\
__gu_err; \
})
#define get_user(x, ptr) \
({ \
__typeof__(*(ptr)) __user *_gu_addr = (ptr); \
\
access_ok(_gu_addr, sizeof(*(ptr))) ? \
__get_user(x, _gu_addr) : \
((x) = (__force __typeof__(*(ptr)))0, -EFAULT); \
})
/* more complex routines */
extern unsigned long __copy_tofrom_user(void __user *to,
const void __user *from, unsigned long size);
#ifdef __powerpc64__
static inline unsigned long
raw_copy_in_user(void __user *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
{
unsigned long ret;
powerpc/kuap: Fix set direction in allow/prevent_user_access() __builtin_constant_p() always return 0 for pointers, so on RADIX we always end up opening both direction (by writing 0 in SPR29): 0000000000000170 <._copy_to_user>: ... 1b0: 4c 00 01 2c isync 1b4: 39 20 00 00 li r9,0 1b8: 7d 3d 03 a6 mtspr 29,r9 1bc: 4c 00 01 2c isync 1c0: 48 00 00 01 bl 1c0 <._copy_to_user+0x50> 1c0: R_PPC64_REL24 .__copy_tofrom_user ... 0000000000000220 <._copy_from_user>: ... 2ac: 4c 00 01 2c isync 2b0: 39 20 00 00 li r9,0 2b4: 7d 3d 03 a6 mtspr 29,r9 2b8: 4c 00 01 2c isync 2bc: 7f c5 f3 78 mr r5,r30 2c0: 7f 83 e3 78 mr r3,r28 2c4: 48 00 00 01 bl 2c4 <._copy_from_user+0xa4> 2c4: R_PPC64_REL24 .__copy_tofrom_user ... Use an explicit parameter for direction selection, so that GCC is able to see it is a constant: 00000000000001b0 <._copy_to_user>: ... 1f0: 4c 00 01 2c isync 1f4: 3d 20 40 00 lis r9,16384 1f8: 79 29 07 c6 rldicr r9,r9,32,31 1fc: 7d 3d 03 a6 mtspr 29,r9 200: 4c 00 01 2c isync 204: 48 00 00 01 bl 204 <._copy_to_user+0x54> 204: R_PPC64_REL24 .__copy_tofrom_user ... 0000000000000260 <._copy_from_user>: ... 2ec: 4c 00 01 2c isync 2f0: 39 20 ff ff li r9,-1 2f4: 79 29 00 04 rldicr r9,r9,0,0 2f8: 7d 3d 03 a6 mtspr 29,r9 2fc: 4c 00 01 2c isync 300: 7f c5 f3 78 mr r5,r30 304: 7f 83 e3 78 mr r3,r28 308: 48 00 00 01 bl 308 <._copy_from_user+0xa8> 308: R_PPC64_REL24 .__copy_tofrom_user ... Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> [mpe: Spell out the directions, s/KUAP_R/KUAP_READ/ etc.] Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/f4e88ec4941d5facb35ce75026b0112f980086c3.1579866752.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr
2020-01-24 11:54:41 +00:00
allow_read_write_user(to, from, n);
ret = __copy_tofrom_user(to, from, n);
powerpc/kuap: Fix set direction in allow/prevent_user_access() __builtin_constant_p() always return 0 for pointers, so on RADIX we always end up opening both direction (by writing 0 in SPR29): 0000000000000170 <._copy_to_user>: ... 1b0: 4c 00 01 2c isync 1b4: 39 20 00 00 li r9,0 1b8: 7d 3d 03 a6 mtspr 29,r9 1bc: 4c 00 01 2c isync 1c0: 48 00 00 01 bl 1c0 <._copy_to_user+0x50> 1c0: R_PPC64_REL24 .__copy_tofrom_user ... 0000000000000220 <._copy_from_user>: ... 2ac: 4c 00 01 2c isync 2b0: 39 20 00 00 li r9,0 2b4: 7d 3d 03 a6 mtspr 29,r9 2b8: 4c 00 01 2c isync 2bc: 7f c5 f3 78 mr r5,r30 2c0: 7f 83 e3 78 mr r3,r28 2c4: 48 00 00 01 bl 2c4 <._copy_from_user+0xa4> 2c4: R_PPC64_REL24 .__copy_tofrom_user ... Use an explicit parameter for direction selection, so that GCC is able to see it is a constant: 00000000000001b0 <._copy_to_user>: ... 1f0: 4c 00 01 2c isync 1f4: 3d 20 40 00 lis r9,16384 1f8: 79 29 07 c6 rldicr r9,r9,32,31 1fc: 7d 3d 03 a6 mtspr 29,r9 200: 4c 00 01 2c isync 204: 48 00 00 01 bl 204 <._copy_to_user+0x54> 204: R_PPC64_REL24 .__copy_tofrom_user ... 0000000000000260 <._copy_from_user>: ... 2ec: 4c 00 01 2c isync 2f0: 39 20 ff ff li r9,-1 2f4: 79 29 00 04 rldicr r9,r9,0,0 2f8: 7d 3d 03 a6 mtspr 29,r9 2fc: 4c 00 01 2c isync 300: 7f c5 f3 78 mr r5,r30 304: 7f 83 e3 78 mr r3,r28 308: 48 00 00 01 bl 308 <._copy_from_user+0xa8> 308: R_PPC64_REL24 .__copy_tofrom_user ... Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> [mpe: Spell out the directions, s/KUAP_R/KUAP_READ/ etc.] Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/f4e88ec4941d5facb35ce75026b0112f980086c3.1579866752.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr
2020-01-24 11:54:41 +00:00
prevent_read_write_user(to, from, n);
return ret;
}
#endif /* __powerpc64__ */
static inline unsigned long raw_copy_from_user(void *to,
const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
{
unsigned long ret;
allow_read_from_user(from, n);
ret = __copy_tofrom_user((__force void __user *)to, from, n);
prevent_read_from_user(from, n);
return ret;
}
static inline unsigned long
raw_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
{
unsigned long ret;
allow_write_to_user(to, n);
ret = __copy_tofrom_user(to, (__force const void __user *)from, n);
prevent_write_to_user(to, n);
return ret;
}
unsigned long __arch_clear_user(void __user *addr, unsigned long size);
static inline unsigned long __clear_user(void __user *addr, unsigned long size)
{
unsigned long ret;
might_fault();
allow_write_to_user(addr, size);
ret = __arch_clear_user(addr, size);
prevent_write_to_user(addr, size);
return ret;
}
static inline unsigned long clear_user(void __user *addr, unsigned long size)
{
return likely(access_ok(addr, size)) ? __clear_user(addr, size) : size;
}
extern long strncpy_from_user(char *dst, const char __user *src, long count);
extern __must_check long strnlen_user(const char __user *str, long n);
#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_COPY_MC
unsigned long __must_check
copy_mc_generic(void *to, const void *from, unsigned long size);
static inline unsigned long __must_check
copy_mc_to_kernel(void *to, const void *from, unsigned long size)
{
return copy_mc_generic(to, from, size);
}
#define copy_mc_to_kernel copy_mc_to_kernel
static inline unsigned long __must_check
copy_mc_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
{
if (likely(check_copy_size(from, n, true))) {
if (access_ok(to, n)) {
allow_write_to_user(to, n);
n = copy_mc_generic((void *)to, from, n);
prevent_write_to_user(to, n);
}
}
return n;
}
#endif
extern long __copy_from_user_flushcache(void *dst, const void __user *src,
unsigned size);
extern void memcpy_page_flushcache(char *to, struct page *page, size_t offset,
size_t len);
static __must_check inline bool user_access_begin(const void __user *ptr, size_t len)
{
if (unlikely(!access_ok(ptr, len)))
return false;
powerpc/uaccess: Avoid might_fault() when user access is enabled The amount of code executed with enabled user space access (unlocked KUAP) should be minimal. However with CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING or CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP enabled, might_fault() calls into various parts of the kernel, and may even end up replaying interrupts which in turn may access user space and forget to restore the KUAP state. The problem places are: 1. strncpy_from_user (and similar) which unlock KUAP and call unsafe_get_user -> __get_user_allowed -> __get_user_nocheck() with do_allow=false to skip KUAP as the caller took care of it. 2. __unsafe_put_user_goto() which is called with unlocked KUAP. eg: WARNING: CPU: 30 PID: 1 at arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/kup.h:324 arch_local_irq_restore+0x160/0x190 NIP arch_local_irq_restore+0x160/0x190 LR lock_is_held_type+0x140/0x200 Call Trace: 0xc00000007f392ff8 (unreliable) ___might_sleep+0x180/0x320 __might_fault+0x50/0xe0 filldir64+0x2d0/0x5d0 call_filldir+0xc8/0x180 ext4_readdir+0x948/0xb40 iterate_dir+0x1ec/0x240 sys_getdents64+0x80/0x290 system_call_exception+0x160/0x280 system_call_common+0xf0/0x27c Change __get_user_nocheck() to look at `do_allow` to decide whether to skip might_fault(). Since strncpy_from_user/etc call might_fault() anyway before unlocking KUAP, there should be no visible change. Drop might_fault() in __unsafe_put_user_goto() as it is only called from unsafe_put_user(), which already has KUAP unlocked. Since keeping might_fault() is still desirable for debugging, add calls to it in user_[read|write]_access_begin(). That also allows us to drop the is_kernel_addr() test, because there should be no code using user_[read|write]_access_begin() in order to access a kernel address. Fixes: de78a9c42a79 ("powerpc: Add a framework for Kernel Userspace Access Protection") Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru> [mpe: Combine with related patch from myself, merge change logs] Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210204121612.32721-1-aik@ozlabs.ru
2021-02-08 16:57:40 +11:00
might_fault();
allow_read_write_user((void __user *)ptr, ptr, len);
return true;
}
#define user_access_begin user_access_begin
#define user_access_end prevent_current_access_user
#define user_access_save prevent_user_access_return
#define user_access_restore restore_user_access
static __must_check inline bool
user_read_access_begin(const void __user *ptr, size_t len)
{
if (unlikely(!access_ok(ptr, len)))
return false;
powerpc/uaccess: Avoid might_fault() when user access is enabled The amount of code executed with enabled user space access (unlocked KUAP) should be minimal. However with CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING or CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP enabled, might_fault() calls into various parts of the kernel, and may even end up replaying interrupts which in turn may access user space and forget to restore the KUAP state. The problem places are: 1. strncpy_from_user (and similar) which unlock KUAP and call unsafe_get_user -> __get_user_allowed -> __get_user_nocheck() with do_allow=false to skip KUAP as the caller took care of it. 2. __unsafe_put_user_goto() which is called with unlocked KUAP. eg: WARNING: CPU: 30 PID: 1 at arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/kup.h:324 arch_local_irq_restore+0x160/0x190 NIP arch_local_irq_restore+0x160/0x190 LR lock_is_held_type+0x140/0x200 Call Trace: 0xc00000007f392ff8 (unreliable) ___might_sleep+0x180/0x320 __might_fault+0x50/0xe0 filldir64+0x2d0/0x5d0 call_filldir+0xc8/0x180 ext4_readdir+0x948/0xb40 iterate_dir+0x1ec/0x240 sys_getdents64+0x80/0x290 system_call_exception+0x160/0x280 system_call_common+0xf0/0x27c Change __get_user_nocheck() to look at `do_allow` to decide whether to skip might_fault(). Since strncpy_from_user/etc call might_fault() anyway before unlocking KUAP, there should be no visible change. Drop might_fault() in __unsafe_put_user_goto() as it is only called from unsafe_put_user(), which already has KUAP unlocked. Since keeping might_fault() is still desirable for debugging, add calls to it in user_[read|write]_access_begin(). That also allows us to drop the is_kernel_addr() test, because there should be no code using user_[read|write]_access_begin() in order to access a kernel address. Fixes: de78a9c42a79 ("powerpc: Add a framework for Kernel Userspace Access Protection") Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru> [mpe: Combine with related patch from myself, merge change logs] Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210204121612.32721-1-aik@ozlabs.ru
2021-02-08 16:57:40 +11:00
might_fault();
allow_read_from_user(ptr, len);
return true;
}
#define user_read_access_begin user_read_access_begin
#define user_read_access_end prevent_current_read_from_user
static __must_check inline bool
user_write_access_begin(const void __user *ptr, size_t len)
{
if (unlikely(!access_ok(ptr, len)))
return false;
powerpc/uaccess: Avoid might_fault() when user access is enabled The amount of code executed with enabled user space access (unlocked KUAP) should be minimal. However with CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING or CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP enabled, might_fault() calls into various parts of the kernel, and may even end up replaying interrupts which in turn may access user space and forget to restore the KUAP state. The problem places are: 1. strncpy_from_user (and similar) which unlock KUAP and call unsafe_get_user -> __get_user_allowed -> __get_user_nocheck() with do_allow=false to skip KUAP as the caller took care of it. 2. __unsafe_put_user_goto() which is called with unlocked KUAP. eg: WARNING: CPU: 30 PID: 1 at arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/kup.h:324 arch_local_irq_restore+0x160/0x190 NIP arch_local_irq_restore+0x160/0x190 LR lock_is_held_type+0x140/0x200 Call Trace: 0xc00000007f392ff8 (unreliable) ___might_sleep+0x180/0x320 __might_fault+0x50/0xe0 filldir64+0x2d0/0x5d0 call_filldir+0xc8/0x180 ext4_readdir+0x948/0xb40 iterate_dir+0x1ec/0x240 sys_getdents64+0x80/0x290 system_call_exception+0x160/0x280 system_call_common+0xf0/0x27c Change __get_user_nocheck() to look at `do_allow` to decide whether to skip might_fault(). Since strncpy_from_user/etc call might_fault() anyway before unlocking KUAP, there should be no visible change. Drop might_fault() in __unsafe_put_user_goto() as it is only called from unsafe_put_user(), which already has KUAP unlocked. Since keeping might_fault() is still desirable for debugging, add calls to it in user_[read|write]_access_begin(). That also allows us to drop the is_kernel_addr() test, because there should be no code using user_[read|write]_access_begin() in order to access a kernel address. Fixes: de78a9c42a79 ("powerpc: Add a framework for Kernel Userspace Access Protection") Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru> [mpe: Combine with related patch from myself, merge change logs] Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210204121612.32721-1-aik@ozlabs.ru
2021-02-08 16:57:40 +11:00
might_fault();
allow_write_to_user((void __user *)ptr, len);
return true;
}
#define user_write_access_begin user_write_access_begin
#define user_write_access_end prevent_current_write_to_user
#define unsafe_get_user(x, p, e) do { \
__long_type(*(p)) __gu_val; \
__typeof__(*(p)) __user *__gu_addr = (p); \
\
__get_user_size_goto(__gu_val, __gu_addr, sizeof(*(p)), e); \
(x) = (__typeof__(*(p)))__gu_val; \
} while (0)
#define unsafe_put_user(x, p, e) \
__put_user_size_goto((__typeof__(*(p)))(x), (p), sizeof(*(p)), e)
#define unsafe_copy_from_user(d, s, l, e) \
do { \
u8 *_dst = (u8 *)(d); \
const u8 __user *_src = (const u8 __user *)(s); \
size_t _len = (l); \
int _i; \
\
for (_i = 0; _i < (_len & ~(sizeof(u64) - 1)); _i += sizeof(u64)) \
unsafe_get_user(*(u64 *)(_dst + _i), (u64 __user *)(_src + _i), e); \
if (_len & 4) { \
unsafe_get_user(*(u32 *)(_dst + _i), (u32 __user *)(_src + _i), e); \
_i += 4; \
} \
if (_len & 2) { \
unsafe_get_user(*(u16 *)(_dst + _i), (u16 __user *)(_src + _i), e); \
_i += 2; \
} \
if (_len & 1) \
unsafe_get_user(*(u8 *)(_dst + _i), (u8 __user *)(_src + _i), e); \
} while (0)
#define unsafe_copy_to_user(d, s, l, e) \
do { \
u8 __user *_dst = (u8 __user *)(d); \
const u8 *_src = (const u8 *)(s); \
size_t _len = (l); \
int _i; \
\
for (_i = 0; _i < (_len & ~(sizeof(u64) - 1)); _i += sizeof(u64)) \
unsafe_put_user(*(u64 *)(_src + _i), (u64 __user *)(_dst + _i), e); \
if (_len & 4) { \
unsafe_put_user(*(u32*)(_src + _i), (u32 __user *)(_dst + _i), e); \
_i += 4; \
} \
if (_len & 2) { \
unsafe_put_user(*(u16*)(_src + _i), (u16 __user *)(_dst + _i), e); \
_i += 2; \
} \
if (_len & 1) \
unsafe_put_user(*(u8*)(_src + _i), (u8 __user *)(_dst + _i), e); \
} while (0)
#define HAVE_GET_KERNEL_NOFAULT
#define __get_kernel_nofault(dst, src, type, err_label) \
__get_user_size_goto(*((type *)(dst)), \
(__force type __user *)(src), sizeof(type), err_label)
#define __put_kernel_nofault(dst, src, type, err_label) \
__put_user_size_goto(*((type *)(src)), \
(__force type __user *)(dst), sizeof(type), err_label)
#endif /* _ARCH_POWERPC_UACCESS_H */