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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
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/*
* CCM : Counter with CBC - MAC
*
* ( C ) Copyright IBM Corp . 2007 - Joy Latten < latten @ us . ibm . com >
*/
# include <crypto/internal/aead.h>
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# include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
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# include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
# include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
# include <linux/err.h>
# include <linux/init.h>
# include <linux/kernel.h>
# include <linux/module.h>
# include <linux/slab.h>
struct ccm_instance_ctx {
struct crypto_skcipher_spawn ctr ;
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struct crypto_ahash_spawn mac ;
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} ;
struct crypto_ccm_ctx {
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struct crypto_ahash * mac ;
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struct crypto_skcipher * ctr ;
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} ;
struct crypto_rfc4309_ctx {
struct crypto_aead * child ;
u8 nonce [ 3 ] ;
} ;
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struct crypto_rfc4309_req_ctx {
struct scatterlist src [ 3 ] ;
struct scatterlist dst [ 3 ] ;
struct aead_request subreq ;
} ;
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struct crypto_ccm_req_priv_ctx {
u8 odata [ 16 ] ;
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u8 idata [ 16 ] ;
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u8 auth_tag [ 16 ] ;
u32 flags ;
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struct scatterlist src [ 3 ] ;
struct scatterlist dst [ 3 ] ;
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union {
struct ahash_request ahreq ;
struct skcipher_request skreq ;
} ;
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} ;
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struct cbcmac_tfm_ctx {
struct crypto_cipher * child ;
} ;
struct cbcmac_desc_ctx {
unsigned int len ;
} ;
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static inline struct crypto_ccm_req_priv_ctx * crypto_ccm_reqctx (
struct aead_request * req )
{
unsigned long align = crypto_aead_alignmask ( crypto_aead_reqtfm ( req ) ) ;
return ( void * ) PTR_ALIGN ( ( u8 * ) aead_request_ctx ( req ) , align + 1 ) ;
}
static int set_msg_len ( u8 * block , unsigned int msglen , int csize )
{
__be32 data ;
memset ( block , 0 , csize ) ;
block + = csize ;
if ( csize > = 4 )
csize = 4 ;
else if ( msglen > ( 1 < < ( 8 * csize ) ) )
return - EOVERFLOW ;
data = cpu_to_be32 ( msglen ) ;
memcpy ( block - csize , ( u8 * ) & data + 4 - csize , csize ) ;
return 0 ;
}
static int crypto_ccm_setkey ( struct crypto_aead * aead , const u8 * key ,
unsigned int keylen )
{
struct crypto_ccm_ctx * ctx = crypto_aead_ctx ( aead ) ;
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struct crypto_skcipher * ctr = ctx - > ctr ;
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struct crypto_ahash * mac = ctx - > mac ;
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int err ;
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crypto_skcipher_clear_flags ( ctr , CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK ) ;
crypto_skcipher_set_flags ( ctr , crypto_aead_get_flags ( aead ) &
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK ) ;
err = crypto_skcipher_setkey ( ctr , key , keylen ) ;
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if ( err )
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return err ;
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crypto_ahash_clear_flags ( mac , CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK ) ;
crypto_ahash_set_flags ( mac , crypto_aead_get_flags ( aead ) &
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CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK ) ;
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return crypto_ahash_setkey ( mac , key , keylen ) ;
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}
static int crypto_ccm_setauthsize ( struct crypto_aead * tfm ,
unsigned int authsize )
{
switch ( authsize ) {
case 4 :
case 6 :
case 8 :
case 10 :
case 12 :
case 14 :
case 16 :
break ;
default :
return - EINVAL ;
}
return 0 ;
}
static int format_input ( u8 * info , struct aead_request * req ,
unsigned int cryptlen )
{
struct crypto_aead * aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm ( req ) ;
unsigned int lp = req - > iv [ 0 ] ;
unsigned int l = lp + 1 ;
unsigned int m ;
m = crypto_aead_authsize ( aead ) ;
memcpy ( info , req - > iv , 16 ) ;
/* format control info per RFC 3610 and
* NIST Special Publication 800 - 38 C
*/
* info | = ( 8 * ( ( m - 2 ) / 2 ) ) ;
if ( req - > assoclen )
* info | = 64 ;
return set_msg_len ( info + 16 - l , cryptlen , l ) ;
}
static int format_adata ( u8 * adata , unsigned int a )
{
int len = 0 ;
/* add control info for associated data
* RFC 3610 and NIST Special Publication 800 - 38 C
*/
if ( a < 65280 ) {
* ( __be16 * ) adata = cpu_to_be16 ( a ) ;
len = 2 ;
} else {
* ( __be16 * ) adata = cpu_to_be16 ( 0xfffe ) ;
* ( __be32 * ) & adata [ 2 ] = cpu_to_be32 ( a ) ;
len = 6 ;
}
return len ;
}
static int crypto_ccm_auth ( struct aead_request * req , struct scatterlist * plain ,
unsigned int cryptlen )
{
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struct crypto_ccm_req_priv_ctx * pctx = crypto_ccm_reqctx ( req ) ;
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struct crypto_aead * aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm ( req ) ;
struct crypto_ccm_ctx * ctx = crypto_aead_ctx ( aead ) ;
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struct ahash_request * ahreq = & pctx - > ahreq ;
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unsigned int assoclen = req - > assoclen ;
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struct scatterlist sg [ 3 ] ;
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u8 * odata = pctx - > odata ;
u8 * idata = pctx - > idata ;
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int ilen , err ;
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/* format control data for input */
err = format_input ( odata , req , cryptlen ) ;
if ( err )
goto out ;
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sg_init_table ( sg , 3 ) ;
sg_set_buf ( & sg [ 0 ] , odata , 16 ) ;
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/* format associated data and compute into mac */
if ( assoclen ) {
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ilen = format_adata ( idata , assoclen ) ;
sg_set_buf ( & sg [ 1 ] , idata , ilen ) ;
sg_chain ( sg , 3 , req - > src ) ;
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} else {
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ilen = 0 ;
sg_chain ( sg , 2 , req - > src ) ;
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}
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ahash_request_set_tfm ( ahreq , ctx - > mac ) ;
ahash_request_set_callback ( ahreq , pctx - > flags , NULL , NULL ) ;
ahash_request_set_crypt ( ahreq , sg , NULL , assoclen + ilen + 16 ) ;
err = crypto_ahash_init ( ahreq ) ;
if ( err )
goto out ;
err = crypto_ahash_update ( ahreq ) ;
if ( err )
goto out ;
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/* we need to pad the MAC input to a round multiple of the block size */
ilen = 16 - ( assoclen + ilen ) % 16 ;
if ( ilen < 16 ) {
memset ( idata , 0 , ilen ) ;
sg_init_table ( sg , 2 ) ;
sg_set_buf ( & sg [ 0 ] , idata , ilen ) ;
if ( plain )
sg_chain ( sg , 2 , plain ) ;
plain = sg ;
cryptlen + = ilen ;
}
ahash_request_set_crypt ( ahreq , plain , pctx - > odata , cryptlen ) ;
err = crypto_ahash_finup ( ahreq ) ;
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out :
return err ;
}
static void crypto_ccm_encrypt_done ( struct crypto_async_request * areq , int err )
{
struct aead_request * req = areq - > data ;
struct crypto_aead * aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm ( req ) ;
struct crypto_ccm_req_priv_ctx * pctx = crypto_ccm_reqctx ( req ) ;
u8 * odata = pctx - > odata ;
if ( ! err )
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scatterwalk_map_and_copy ( odata , req - > dst ,
req - > assoclen + req - > cryptlen ,
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crypto_aead_authsize ( aead ) , 1 ) ;
aead_request_complete ( req , err ) ;
}
static inline int crypto_ccm_check_iv ( const u8 * iv )
{
/* 2 <= L <= 8, so 1 <= L' <= 7. */
if ( 1 > iv [ 0 ] | | iv [ 0 ] > 7 )
return - EINVAL ;
return 0 ;
}
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static int crypto_ccm_init_crypt ( struct aead_request * req , u8 * tag )
{
struct crypto_ccm_req_priv_ctx * pctx = crypto_ccm_reqctx ( req ) ;
struct scatterlist * sg ;
u8 * iv = req - > iv ;
int err ;
err = crypto_ccm_check_iv ( iv ) ;
if ( err )
return err ;
pctx - > flags = aead_request_flags ( req ) ;
/* Note: rfc 3610 and NIST 800-38C require counter of
* zero to encrypt auth tag .
*/
memset ( iv + 15 - iv [ 0 ] , 0 , iv [ 0 ] + 1 ) ;
sg_init_table ( pctx - > src , 3 ) ;
sg_set_buf ( pctx - > src , tag , 16 ) ;
sg = scatterwalk_ffwd ( pctx - > src + 1 , req - > src , req - > assoclen ) ;
if ( sg ! = pctx - > src + 1 )
sg_chain ( pctx - > src , 2 , sg ) ;
if ( req - > src ! = req - > dst ) {
sg_init_table ( pctx - > dst , 3 ) ;
sg_set_buf ( pctx - > dst , tag , 16 ) ;
sg = scatterwalk_ffwd ( pctx - > dst + 1 , req - > dst , req - > assoclen ) ;
if ( sg ! = pctx - > dst + 1 )
sg_chain ( pctx - > dst , 2 , sg ) ;
}
return 0 ;
}
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static int crypto_ccm_encrypt ( struct aead_request * req )
{
struct crypto_aead * aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm ( req ) ;
struct crypto_ccm_ctx * ctx = crypto_aead_ctx ( aead ) ;
struct crypto_ccm_req_priv_ctx * pctx = crypto_ccm_reqctx ( req ) ;
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struct skcipher_request * skreq = & pctx - > skreq ;
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struct scatterlist * dst ;
unsigned int cryptlen = req - > cryptlen ;
u8 * odata = pctx - > odata ;
u8 * iv = req - > iv ;
int err ;
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err = crypto_ccm_init_crypt ( req , odata ) ;
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if ( err )
return err ;
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err = crypto_ccm_auth ( req , sg_next ( pctx - > src ) , cryptlen ) ;
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if ( err )
return err ;
dst = pctx - > src ;
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if ( req - > src ! = req - > dst )
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dst = pctx - > dst ;
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skcipher_request_set_tfm ( skreq , ctx - > ctr ) ;
skcipher_request_set_callback ( skreq , pctx - > flags ,
crypto_ccm_encrypt_done , req ) ;
skcipher_request_set_crypt ( skreq , pctx - > src , dst , cryptlen + 16 , iv ) ;
err = crypto_skcipher_encrypt ( skreq ) ;
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if ( err )
return err ;
/* copy authtag to end of dst */
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scatterwalk_map_and_copy ( odata , sg_next ( dst ) , cryptlen ,
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crypto_aead_authsize ( aead ) , 1 ) ;
return err ;
}
static void crypto_ccm_decrypt_done ( struct crypto_async_request * areq ,
int err )
{
struct aead_request * req = areq - > data ;
struct crypto_ccm_req_priv_ctx * pctx = crypto_ccm_reqctx ( req ) ;
struct crypto_aead * aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm ( req ) ;
unsigned int authsize = crypto_aead_authsize ( aead ) ;
unsigned int cryptlen = req - > cryptlen - authsize ;
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struct scatterlist * dst ;
pctx - > flags = 0 ;
dst = sg_next ( req - > src = = req - > dst ? pctx - > src : pctx - > dst ) ;
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if ( ! err ) {
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err = crypto_ccm_auth ( req , dst , cryptlen ) ;
crypto: crypto_memneq - add equality testing of memory regions w/o timing leaks
When comparing MAC hashes, AEAD authentication tags, or other hash
values in the context of authentication or integrity checking, it
is important not to leak timing information to a potential attacker,
i.e. when communication happens over a network.
Bytewise memory comparisons (such as memcmp) are usually optimized so
that they return a nonzero value as soon as a mismatch is found. E.g,
on x86_64/i5 for 512 bytes this can be ~50 cyc for a full mismatch
and up to ~850 cyc for a full match (cold). This early-return behavior
can leak timing information as a side channel, allowing an attacker to
iteratively guess the correct result.
This patch adds a new method crypto_memneq ("memory not equal to each
other") to the crypto API that compares memory areas of the same length
in roughly "constant time" (cache misses could change the timing, but
since they don't reveal information about the content of the strings
being compared, they are effectively benign). Iow, best and worst case
behaviour take the same amount of time to complete (in contrast to
memcmp).
Note that crypto_memneq (unlike memcmp) can only be used to test for
equality or inequality, NOT for lexicographical order. This, however,
is not an issue for its use-cases within the crypto API.
We tried to locate all of the places in the crypto API where memcmp was
being used for authentication or integrity checking, and convert them
over to crypto_memneq.
crypto_memneq is declared noinline, placed in its own source file,
and compiled with optimizations that might increase code size disabled
("Os") because a smart compiler (or LTO) might notice that the return
value is always compared against zero/nonzero, and might then
reintroduce the same early-return optimization that we are trying to
avoid.
Using #pragma or __attribute__ optimization annotations of the code
for disabling optimization was avoided as it seems to be considered
broken or unmaintained for long time in GCC [1]. Therefore, we work
around that by specifying the compile flag for memneq.o directly in
the Makefile. We found that this seems to be most appropriate.
As we use ("Os"), this patch also provides a loop-free "fast-path" for
frequently used 16 byte digests. Similarly to kernel library string
functions, leave an option for future even further optimized architecture
specific assembler implementations.
This was a joint work of James Yonan and Daniel Borkmann. Also thanks
for feedback from Florian Weimer on this and earlier proposals [2].
[1] http://gcc.gnu.org/ml/gcc/2012-07/msg00211.html
[2] https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/2/10/131
Signed-off-by: James Yonan <james@openvpn.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2013-09-26 12:20:39 +04:00
if ( ! err & & crypto_memneq ( pctx - > auth_tag , pctx - > odata , authsize ) )
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err = - EBADMSG ;
}
aead_request_complete ( req , err ) ;
}
static int crypto_ccm_decrypt ( struct aead_request * req )
{
struct crypto_aead * aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm ( req ) ;
struct crypto_ccm_ctx * ctx = crypto_aead_ctx ( aead ) ;
struct crypto_ccm_req_priv_ctx * pctx = crypto_ccm_reqctx ( req ) ;
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struct skcipher_request * skreq = & pctx - > skreq ;
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struct scatterlist * dst ;
unsigned int authsize = crypto_aead_authsize ( aead ) ;
unsigned int cryptlen = req - > cryptlen ;
u8 * authtag = pctx - > auth_tag ;
u8 * odata = pctx - > odata ;
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u8 * iv = pctx - > idata ;
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int err ;
cryptlen - = authsize ;
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err = crypto_ccm_init_crypt ( req , authtag ) ;
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if ( err )
return err ;
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scatterwalk_map_and_copy ( authtag , sg_next ( pctx - > src ) , cryptlen ,
authsize , 0 ) ;
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dst = pctx - > src ;
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if ( req - > src ! = req - > dst )
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dst = pctx - > dst ;
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memcpy ( iv , req - > iv , 16 ) ;
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skcipher_request_set_tfm ( skreq , ctx - > ctr ) ;
skcipher_request_set_callback ( skreq , pctx - > flags ,
crypto_ccm_decrypt_done , req ) ;
skcipher_request_set_crypt ( skreq , pctx - > src , dst , cryptlen + 16 , iv ) ;
err = crypto_skcipher_decrypt ( skreq ) ;
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if ( err )
return err ;
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err = crypto_ccm_auth ( req , sg_next ( dst ) , cryptlen ) ;
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if ( err )
return err ;
/* verify */
crypto: crypto_memneq - add equality testing of memory regions w/o timing leaks
When comparing MAC hashes, AEAD authentication tags, or other hash
values in the context of authentication or integrity checking, it
is important not to leak timing information to a potential attacker,
i.e. when communication happens over a network.
Bytewise memory comparisons (such as memcmp) are usually optimized so
that they return a nonzero value as soon as a mismatch is found. E.g,
on x86_64/i5 for 512 bytes this can be ~50 cyc for a full mismatch
and up to ~850 cyc for a full match (cold). This early-return behavior
can leak timing information as a side channel, allowing an attacker to
iteratively guess the correct result.
This patch adds a new method crypto_memneq ("memory not equal to each
other") to the crypto API that compares memory areas of the same length
in roughly "constant time" (cache misses could change the timing, but
since they don't reveal information about the content of the strings
being compared, they are effectively benign). Iow, best and worst case
behaviour take the same amount of time to complete (in contrast to
memcmp).
Note that crypto_memneq (unlike memcmp) can only be used to test for
equality or inequality, NOT for lexicographical order. This, however,
is not an issue for its use-cases within the crypto API.
We tried to locate all of the places in the crypto API where memcmp was
being used for authentication or integrity checking, and convert them
over to crypto_memneq.
crypto_memneq is declared noinline, placed in its own source file,
and compiled with optimizations that might increase code size disabled
("Os") because a smart compiler (or LTO) might notice that the return
value is always compared against zero/nonzero, and might then
reintroduce the same early-return optimization that we are trying to
avoid.
Using #pragma or __attribute__ optimization annotations of the code
for disabling optimization was avoided as it seems to be considered
broken or unmaintained for long time in GCC [1]. Therefore, we work
around that by specifying the compile flag for memneq.o directly in
the Makefile. We found that this seems to be most appropriate.
As we use ("Os"), this patch also provides a loop-free "fast-path" for
frequently used 16 byte digests. Similarly to kernel library string
functions, leave an option for future even further optimized architecture
specific assembler implementations.
This was a joint work of James Yonan and Daniel Borkmann. Also thanks
for feedback from Florian Weimer on this and earlier proposals [2].
[1] http://gcc.gnu.org/ml/gcc/2012-07/msg00211.html
[2] https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/2/10/131
Signed-off-by: James Yonan <james@openvpn.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2013-09-26 12:20:39 +04:00
if ( crypto_memneq ( authtag , odata , authsize ) )
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return - EBADMSG ;
return err ;
}
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static int crypto_ccm_init_tfm ( struct crypto_aead * tfm )
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{
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struct aead_instance * inst = aead_alg_instance ( tfm ) ;
struct ccm_instance_ctx * ictx = aead_instance_ctx ( inst ) ;
struct crypto_ccm_ctx * ctx = crypto_aead_ctx ( tfm ) ;
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struct crypto_ahash * mac ;
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struct crypto_skcipher * ctr ;
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unsigned long align ;
int err ;
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mac = crypto_spawn_ahash ( & ictx - > mac ) ;
if ( IS_ERR ( mac ) )
return PTR_ERR ( mac ) ;
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ctr = crypto_spawn_skcipher ( & ictx - > ctr ) ;
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err = PTR_ERR ( ctr ) ;
if ( IS_ERR ( ctr ) )
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goto err_free_mac ;
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ctx - > mac = mac ;
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ctx - > ctr = ctr ;
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align = crypto_aead_alignmask ( tfm ) ;
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align & = ~ ( crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment ( ) - 1 ) ;
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crypto_aead_set_reqsize (
tfm ,
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align + sizeof ( struct crypto_ccm_req_priv_ctx ) +
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max ( crypto_ahash_reqsize ( mac ) , crypto_skcipher_reqsize ( ctr ) ) ) ;
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return 0 ;
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err_free_mac :
crypto_free_ahash ( mac ) ;
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return err ;
}
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static void crypto_ccm_exit_tfm ( struct crypto_aead * tfm )
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{
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struct crypto_ccm_ctx * ctx = crypto_aead_ctx ( tfm ) ;
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crypto_free_ahash ( ctx - > mac ) ;
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crypto_free_skcipher ( ctx - > ctr ) ;
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}
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static void crypto_ccm_free ( struct aead_instance * inst )
{
struct ccm_instance_ctx * ctx = aead_instance_ctx ( inst ) ;
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crypto_drop_ahash ( & ctx - > mac ) ;
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crypto_drop_skcipher ( & ctx - > ctr ) ;
kfree ( inst ) ;
}
static int crypto_ccm_create_common ( struct crypto_template * tmpl ,
struct rtattr * * tb ,
const char * ctr_name ,
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const char * mac_name )
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{
struct crypto_attr_type * algt ;
2020-01-03 06:58:45 +03:00
u32 mask ;
2015-07-14 11:53:18 +03:00
struct aead_instance * inst ;
2020-01-03 06:58:58 +03:00
struct ccm_instance_ctx * ictx ;
2016-07-12 08:17:38 +03:00
struct skcipher_alg * ctr ;
2017-02-03 17:49:36 +03:00
struct hash_alg_common * mac ;
2007-12-12 15:25:13 +03:00
int err ;
algt = crypto_get_attr_type ( tb ) ;
if ( IS_ERR ( algt ) )
2015-07-14 11:53:18 +03:00
return PTR_ERR ( algt ) ;
2007-12-12 15:25:13 +03:00
2015-08-13 12:29:06 +03:00
if ( ( algt - > type ^ CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD ) & algt - > mask )
2015-07-14 11:53:18 +03:00
return - EINVAL ;
2007-12-12 15:25:13 +03:00
2020-01-03 06:58:45 +03:00
mask = crypto_requires_sync ( algt - > type , algt - > mask ) ;
2007-12-12 15:25:13 +03:00
inst = kzalloc ( sizeof ( * inst ) + sizeof ( * ictx ) , GFP_KERNEL ) ;
if ( ! inst )
2020-01-03 06:58:58 +03:00
return - ENOMEM ;
2015-07-14 11:53:18 +03:00
ictx = aead_instance_ctx ( inst ) ;
2020-01-03 06:58:58 +03:00
err = crypto_grab_ahash ( & ictx - > mac , aead_crypto_instance ( inst ) ,
mac_name , 0 , CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC ) ;
2007-12-12 15:25:13 +03:00
if ( err )
goto err_free_inst ;
2020-01-03 06:58:58 +03:00
mac = crypto_spawn_ahash_alg ( & ictx - > mac ) ;
err = - EINVAL ;
if ( strncmp ( mac - > base . cra_name , " cbcmac( " , 7 ) ! = 0 | |
mac - > digestsize ! = 16 )
goto err_free_inst ;
2007-12-12 15:25:13 +03:00
2020-01-03 06:58:45 +03:00
err = crypto_grab_skcipher ( & ictx - > ctr , aead_crypto_instance ( inst ) ,
ctr_name , 0 , mask ) ;
2007-12-12 15:25:13 +03:00
if ( err )
2020-01-03 06:58:58 +03:00
goto err_free_inst ;
2016-07-12 08:17:38 +03:00
ctr = crypto_spawn_skcipher_alg ( & ictx - > ctr ) ;
2007-12-12 15:25:13 +03:00
crypto: ccm - fix incompatibility between "ccm" and "ccm_base"
CCM instances can be created by either the "ccm" template, which only
allows choosing the block cipher, e.g. "ccm(aes)"; or by "ccm_base",
which allows choosing the ctr and cbcmac implementations, e.g.
"ccm_base(ctr(aes-generic),cbcmac(aes-generic))".
However, a "ccm_base" instance prevents a "ccm" instance from being
registered using the same implementations. Nor will the instance be
found by lookups of "ccm". This can be used as a denial of service.
Moreover, "ccm_base" instances are never tested by the crypto
self-tests, even if there are compatible "ccm" tests.
The root cause of these problems is that instances of the two templates
use different cra_names. Therefore, fix these problems by making
"ccm_base" instances set the same cra_name as "ccm" instances, e.g.
"ccm(aes)" instead of "ccm_base(ctr(aes-generic),cbcmac(aes-generic))".
This requires extracting the block cipher name from the name of the ctr
and cbcmac algorithms. It also requires starting to verify that the
algorithms are really ctr and cbcmac using the same block cipher, not
something else entirely. But it would be bizarre if anyone were
actually using non-ccm-compatible algorithms with ccm_base, so this
shouldn't break anyone in practice.
Fixes: 4a49b499dfa0 ("[CRYPTO] ccm: Added CCM mode")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2019-04-19 00:44:27 +03:00
/* The skcipher algorithm must be CTR mode, using 16-byte blocks. */
2007-12-12 15:25:13 +03:00
err = - EINVAL ;
crypto: ccm - fix incompatibility between "ccm" and "ccm_base"
CCM instances can be created by either the "ccm" template, which only
allows choosing the block cipher, e.g. "ccm(aes)"; or by "ccm_base",
which allows choosing the ctr and cbcmac implementations, e.g.
"ccm_base(ctr(aes-generic),cbcmac(aes-generic))".
However, a "ccm_base" instance prevents a "ccm" instance from being
registered using the same implementations. Nor will the instance be
found by lookups of "ccm". This can be used as a denial of service.
Moreover, "ccm_base" instances are never tested by the crypto
self-tests, even if there are compatible "ccm" tests.
The root cause of these problems is that instances of the two templates
use different cra_names. Therefore, fix these problems by making
"ccm_base" instances set the same cra_name as "ccm" instances, e.g.
"ccm(aes)" instead of "ccm_base(ctr(aes-generic),cbcmac(aes-generic))".
This requires extracting the block cipher name from the name of the ctr
and cbcmac algorithms. It also requires starting to verify that the
algorithms are really ctr and cbcmac using the same block cipher, not
something else entirely. But it would be bizarre if anyone were
actually using non-ccm-compatible algorithms with ccm_base, so this
shouldn't break anyone in practice.
Fixes: 4a49b499dfa0 ("[CRYPTO] ccm: Added CCM mode")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2019-04-19 00:44:27 +03:00
if ( strncmp ( ctr - > base . cra_name , " ctr( " , 4 ) ! = 0 | |
crypto_skcipher_alg_ivsize ( ctr ) ! = 16 | |
ctr - > base . cra_blocksize ! = 1 )
2020-01-03 06:58:58 +03:00
goto err_free_inst ;
2007-12-12 15:25:13 +03:00
crypto: ccm - fix incompatibility between "ccm" and "ccm_base"
CCM instances can be created by either the "ccm" template, which only
allows choosing the block cipher, e.g. "ccm(aes)"; or by "ccm_base",
which allows choosing the ctr and cbcmac implementations, e.g.
"ccm_base(ctr(aes-generic),cbcmac(aes-generic))".
However, a "ccm_base" instance prevents a "ccm" instance from being
registered using the same implementations. Nor will the instance be
found by lookups of "ccm". This can be used as a denial of service.
Moreover, "ccm_base" instances are never tested by the crypto
self-tests, even if there are compatible "ccm" tests.
The root cause of these problems is that instances of the two templates
use different cra_names. Therefore, fix these problems by making
"ccm_base" instances set the same cra_name as "ccm" instances, e.g.
"ccm(aes)" instead of "ccm_base(ctr(aes-generic),cbcmac(aes-generic))".
This requires extracting the block cipher name from the name of the ctr
and cbcmac algorithms. It also requires starting to verify that the
algorithms are really ctr and cbcmac using the same block cipher, not
something else entirely. But it would be bizarre if anyone were
actually using non-ccm-compatible algorithms with ccm_base, so this
shouldn't break anyone in practice.
Fixes: 4a49b499dfa0 ("[CRYPTO] ccm: Added CCM mode")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2019-04-19 00:44:27 +03:00
/* ctr and cbcmac must use the same underlying block cipher. */
if ( strcmp ( ctr - > base . cra_name + 4 , mac - > base . cra_name + 7 ) ! = 0 )
2020-01-03 06:58:58 +03:00
goto err_free_inst ;
2007-12-12 15:25:13 +03:00
err = - ENAMETOOLONG ;
crypto: ccm - fix incompatibility between "ccm" and "ccm_base"
CCM instances can be created by either the "ccm" template, which only
allows choosing the block cipher, e.g. "ccm(aes)"; or by "ccm_base",
which allows choosing the ctr and cbcmac implementations, e.g.
"ccm_base(ctr(aes-generic),cbcmac(aes-generic))".
However, a "ccm_base" instance prevents a "ccm" instance from being
registered using the same implementations. Nor will the instance be
found by lookups of "ccm". This can be used as a denial of service.
Moreover, "ccm_base" instances are never tested by the crypto
self-tests, even if there are compatible "ccm" tests.
The root cause of these problems is that instances of the two templates
use different cra_names. Therefore, fix these problems by making
"ccm_base" instances set the same cra_name as "ccm" instances, e.g.
"ccm(aes)" instead of "ccm_base(ctr(aes-generic),cbcmac(aes-generic))".
This requires extracting the block cipher name from the name of the ctr
and cbcmac algorithms. It also requires starting to verify that the
algorithms are really ctr and cbcmac using the same block cipher, not
something else entirely. But it would be bizarre if anyone were
actually using non-ccm-compatible algorithms with ccm_base, so this
shouldn't break anyone in practice.
Fixes: 4a49b499dfa0 ("[CRYPTO] ccm: Added CCM mode")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2019-04-19 00:44:27 +03:00
if ( snprintf ( inst - > alg . base . cra_name , CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME ,
" ccm(%s " , ctr - > base . cra_name + 4 ) > = CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME )
2020-01-03 06:58:58 +03:00
goto err_free_inst ;
crypto: ccm - fix incompatibility between "ccm" and "ccm_base"
CCM instances can be created by either the "ccm" template, which only
allows choosing the block cipher, e.g. "ccm(aes)"; or by "ccm_base",
which allows choosing the ctr and cbcmac implementations, e.g.
"ccm_base(ctr(aes-generic),cbcmac(aes-generic))".
However, a "ccm_base" instance prevents a "ccm" instance from being
registered using the same implementations. Nor will the instance be
found by lookups of "ccm". This can be used as a denial of service.
Moreover, "ccm_base" instances are never tested by the crypto
self-tests, even if there are compatible "ccm" tests.
The root cause of these problems is that instances of the two templates
use different cra_names. Therefore, fix these problems by making
"ccm_base" instances set the same cra_name as "ccm" instances, e.g.
"ccm(aes)" instead of "ccm_base(ctr(aes-generic),cbcmac(aes-generic))".
This requires extracting the block cipher name from the name of the ctr
and cbcmac algorithms. It also requires starting to verify that the
algorithms are really ctr and cbcmac using the same block cipher, not
something else entirely. But it would be bizarre if anyone were
actually using non-ccm-compatible algorithms with ccm_base, so this
shouldn't break anyone in practice.
Fixes: 4a49b499dfa0 ("[CRYPTO] ccm: Added CCM mode")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2019-04-19 00:44:27 +03:00
2015-07-14 11:53:18 +03:00
if ( snprintf ( inst - > alg . base . cra_driver_name , CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME ,
2016-07-12 08:17:38 +03:00
" ccm_base(%s,%s) " , ctr - > base . cra_driver_name ,
2017-02-03 17:49:36 +03:00
mac - > base . cra_driver_name ) > = CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME )
2020-01-03 06:58:58 +03:00
goto err_free_inst ;
2007-12-12 15:25:13 +03:00
2016-07-12 08:17:38 +03:00
inst - > alg . base . cra_flags = ctr - > base . cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC ;
2017-02-03 17:49:36 +03:00
inst - > alg . base . cra_priority = ( mac - > base . cra_priority +
2016-07-12 08:17:38 +03:00
ctr - > base . cra_priority ) / 2 ;
2015-07-14 11:53:18 +03:00
inst - > alg . base . cra_blocksize = 1 ;
2017-02-03 17:49:36 +03:00
inst - > alg . base . cra_alignmask = mac - > base . cra_alignmask |
2017-02-11 22:25:22 +03:00
ctr - > base . cra_alignmask ;
2015-07-14 11:53:18 +03:00
inst - > alg . ivsize = 16 ;
2016-07-12 08:17:38 +03:00
inst - > alg . chunksize = crypto_skcipher_alg_chunksize ( ctr ) ;
2015-07-14 11:53:18 +03:00
inst - > alg . maxauthsize = 16 ;
inst - > alg . base . cra_ctxsize = sizeof ( struct crypto_ccm_ctx ) ;
inst - > alg . init = crypto_ccm_init_tfm ;
inst - > alg . exit = crypto_ccm_exit_tfm ;
inst - > alg . setkey = crypto_ccm_setkey ;
inst - > alg . setauthsize = crypto_ccm_setauthsize ;
inst - > alg . encrypt = crypto_ccm_encrypt ;
inst - > alg . decrypt = crypto_ccm_decrypt ;
inst - > free = crypto_ccm_free ;
err = aead_register_instance ( tmpl , inst ) ;
2020-01-03 06:58:58 +03:00
if ( err ) {
2007-12-12 15:25:13 +03:00
err_free_inst :
2020-01-03 06:58:58 +03:00
crypto_ccm_free ( inst ) ;
}
return err ;
2007-12-12 15:25:13 +03:00
}
2015-07-14 11:53:18 +03:00
static int crypto_ccm_create ( struct crypto_template * tmpl , struct rtattr * * tb )
2007-12-12 15:25:13 +03:00
{
const char * cipher_name ;
char ctr_name [ CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME ] ;
2017-02-03 17:49:36 +03:00
char mac_name [ CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME ] ;
2007-12-12 15:25:13 +03:00
cipher_name = crypto_attr_alg_name ( tb [ 1 ] ) ;
if ( IS_ERR ( cipher_name ) )
2015-07-14 11:53:18 +03:00
return PTR_ERR ( cipher_name ) ;
2007-12-12 15:25:13 +03:00
if ( snprintf ( ctr_name , CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME , " ctr(%s) " ,
cipher_name ) > = CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME )
2015-07-14 11:53:18 +03:00
return - ENAMETOOLONG ;
2007-12-12 15:25:13 +03:00
2017-02-03 17:49:36 +03:00
if ( snprintf ( mac_name , CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME , " cbcmac(%s) " ,
cipher_name ) > = CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME )
return - ENAMETOOLONG ;
crypto: ccm - fix incompatibility between "ccm" and "ccm_base"
CCM instances can be created by either the "ccm" template, which only
allows choosing the block cipher, e.g. "ccm(aes)"; or by "ccm_base",
which allows choosing the ctr and cbcmac implementations, e.g.
"ccm_base(ctr(aes-generic),cbcmac(aes-generic))".
However, a "ccm_base" instance prevents a "ccm" instance from being
registered using the same implementations. Nor will the instance be
found by lookups of "ccm". This can be used as a denial of service.
Moreover, "ccm_base" instances are never tested by the crypto
self-tests, even if there are compatible "ccm" tests.
The root cause of these problems is that instances of the two templates
use different cra_names. Therefore, fix these problems by making
"ccm_base" instances set the same cra_name as "ccm" instances, e.g.
"ccm(aes)" instead of "ccm_base(ctr(aes-generic),cbcmac(aes-generic))".
This requires extracting the block cipher name from the name of the ctr
and cbcmac algorithms. It also requires starting to verify that the
algorithms are really ctr and cbcmac using the same block cipher, not
something else entirely. But it would be bizarre if anyone were
actually using non-ccm-compatible algorithms with ccm_base, so this
shouldn't break anyone in practice.
Fixes: 4a49b499dfa0 ("[CRYPTO] ccm: Added CCM mode")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2019-04-19 00:44:27 +03:00
return crypto_ccm_create_common ( tmpl , tb , ctr_name , mac_name ) ;
2007-12-12 15:25:13 +03:00
}
2015-07-14 11:53:18 +03:00
static int crypto_ccm_base_create ( struct crypto_template * tmpl ,
struct rtattr * * tb )
2007-12-12 15:25:13 +03:00
{
const char * ctr_name ;
crypto: ccm - fix incompatibility between "ccm" and "ccm_base"
CCM instances can be created by either the "ccm" template, which only
allows choosing the block cipher, e.g. "ccm(aes)"; or by "ccm_base",
which allows choosing the ctr and cbcmac implementations, e.g.
"ccm_base(ctr(aes-generic),cbcmac(aes-generic))".
However, a "ccm_base" instance prevents a "ccm" instance from being
registered using the same implementations. Nor will the instance be
found by lookups of "ccm". This can be used as a denial of service.
Moreover, "ccm_base" instances are never tested by the crypto
self-tests, even if there are compatible "ccm" tests.
The root cause of these problems is that instances of the two templates
use different cra_names. Therefore, fix these problems by making
"ccm_base" instances set the same cra_name as "ccm" instances, e.g.
"ccm(aes)" instead of "ccm_base(ctr(aes-generic),cbcmac(aes-generic))".
This requires extracting the block cipher name from the name of the ctr
and cbcmac algorithms. It also requires starting to verify that the
algorithms are really ctr and cbcmac using the same block cipher, not
something else entirely. But it would be bizarre if anyone were
actually using non-ccm-compatible algorithms with ccm_base, so this
shouldn't break anyone in practice.
Fixes: 4a49b499dfa0 ("[CRYPTO] ccm: Added CCM mode")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2019-04-19 00:44:27 +03:00
const char * mac_name ;
2007-12-12 15:25:13 +03:00
ctr_name = crypto_attr_alg_name ( tb [ 1 ] ) ;
if ( IS_ERR ( ctr_name ) )
2015-07-14 11:53:18 +03:00
return PTR_ERR ( ctr_name ) ;
2007-12-12 15:25:13 +03:00
crypto: ccm - fix incompatibility between "ccm" and "ccm_base"
CCM instances can be created by either the "ccm" template, which only
allows choosing the block cipher, e.g. "ccm(aes)"; or by "ccm_base",
which allows choosing the ctr and cbcmac implementations, e.g.
"ccm_base(ctr(aes-generic),cbcmac(aes-generic))".
However, a "ccm_base" instance prevents a "ccm" instance from being
registered using the same implementations. Nor will the instance be
found by lookups of "ccm". This can be used as a denial of service.
Moreover, "ccm_base" instances are never tested by the crypto
self-tests, even if there are compatible "ccm" tests.
The root cause of these problems is that instances of the two templates
use different cra_names. Therefore, fix these problems by making
"ccm_base" instances set the same cra_name as "ccm" instances, e.g.
"ccm(aes)" instead of "ccm_base(ctr(aes-generic),cbcmac(aes-generic))".
This requires extracting the block cipher name from the name of the ctr
and cbcmac algorithms. It also requires starting to verify that the
algorithms are really ctr and cbcmac using the same block cipher, not
something else entirely. But it would be bizarre if anyone were
actually using non-ccm-compatible algorithms with ccm_base, so this
shouldn't break anyone in practice.
Fixes: 4a49b499dfa0 ("[CRYPTO] ccm: Added CCM mode")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2019-04-19 00:44:27 +03:00
mac_name = crypto_attr_alg_name ( tb [ 2 ] ) ;
if ( IS_ERR ( mac_name ) )
return PTR_ERR ( mac_name ) ;
2007-12-12 15:25:13 +03:00
crypto: ccm - fix incompatibility between "ccm" and "ccm_base"
CCM instances can be created by either the "ccm" template, which only
allows choosing the block cipher, e.g. "ccm(aes)"; or by "ccm_base",
which allows choosing the ctr and cbcmac implementations, e.g.
"ccm_base(ctr(aes-generic),cbcmac(aes-generic))".
However, a "ccm_base" instance prevents a "ccm" instance from being
registered using the same implementations. Nor will the instance be
found by lookups of "ccm". This can be used as a denial of service.
Moreover, "ccm_base" instances are never tested by the crypto
self-tests, even if there are compatible "ccm" tests.
The root cause of these problems is that instances of the two templates
use different cra_names. Therefore, fix these problems by making
"ccm_base" instances set the same cra_name as "ccm" instances, e.g.
"ccm(aes)" instead of "ccm_base(ctr(aes-generic),cbcmac(aes-generic))".
This requires extracting the block cipher name from the name of the ctr
and cbcmac algorithms. It also requires starting to verify that the
algorithms are really ctr and cbcmac using the same block cipher, not
something else entirely. But it would be bizarre if anyone were
actually using non-ccm-compatible algorithms with ccm_base, so this
shouldn't break anyone in practice.
Fixes: 4a49b499dfa0 ("[CRYPTO] ccm: Added CCM mode")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2019-04-19 00:44:27 +03:00
return crypto_ccm_create_common ( tmpl , tb , ctr_name , mac_name ) ;
2007-12-12 15:25:13 +03:00
}
static int crypto_rfc4309_setkey ( struct crypto_aead * parent , const u8 * key ,
unsigned int keylen )
{
struct crypto_rfc4309_ctx * ctx = crypto_aead_ctx ( parent ) ;
struct crypto_aead * child = ctx - > child ;
if ( keylen < 3 )
return - EINVAL ;
keylen - = 3 ;
memcpy ( ctx - > nonce , key + keylen , 3 ) ;
crypto_aead_clear_flags ( child , CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK ) ;
crypto_aead_set_flags ( child , crypto_aead_get_flags ( parent ) &
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK ) ;
2019-12-31 06:19:38 +03:00
return crypto_aead_setkey ( child , key , keylen ) ;
2007-12-12 15:25:13 +03:00
}
static int crypto_rfc4309_setauthsize ( struct crypto_aead * parent ,
unsigned int authsize )
{
struct crypto_rfc4309_ctx * ctx = crypto_aead_ctx ( parent ) ;
switch ( authsize ) {
case 8 :
case 12 :
case 16 :
break ;
default :
return - EINVAL ;
}
return crypto_aead_setauthsize ( ctx - > child , authsize ) ;
}
static struct aead_request * crypto_rfc4309_crypt ( struct aead_request * req )
{
2015-07-14 11:53:18 +03:00
struct crypto_rfc4309_req_ctx * rctx = aead_request_ctx ( req ) ;
struct aead_request * subreq = & rctx - > subreq ;
2007-12-12 15:25:13 +03:00
struct crypto_aead * aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm ( req ) ;
struct crypto_rfc4309_ctx * ctx = crypto_aead_ctx ( aead ) ;
struct crypto_aead * child = ctx - > child ;
2015-07-14 11:53:18 +03:00
struct scatterlist * sg ;
2007-12-12 15:25:13 +03:00
u8 * iv = PTR_ALIGN ( ( u8 * ) ( subreq + 1 ) + crypto_aead_reqsize ( child ) ,
crypto_aead_alignmask ( child ) + 1 ) ;
/* L' */
iv [ 0 ] = 3 ;
memcpy ( iv + 1 , ctx - > nonce , 3 ) ;
memcpy ( iv + 4 , req - > iv , 8 ) ;
2015-07-14 11:53:18 +03:00
scatterwalk_map_and_copy ( iv + 16 , req - > src , 0 , req - > assoclen - 8 , 0 ) ;
sg_init_table ( rctx - > src , 3 ) ;
sg_set_buf ( rctx - > src , iv + 16 , req - > assoclen - 8 ) ;
sg = scatterwalk_ffwd ( rctx - > src + 1 , req - > src , req - > assoclen ) ;
if ( sg ! = rctx - > src + 1 )
sg_chain ( rctx - > src , 2 , sg ) ;
if ( req - > src ! = req - > dst ) {
sg_init_table ( rctx - > dst , 3 ) ;
sg_set_buf ( rctx - > dst , iv + 16 , req - > assoclen - 8 ) ;
sg = scatterwalk_ffwd ( rctx - > dst + 1 , req - > dst , req - > assoclen ) ;
if ( sg ! = rctx - > dst + 1 )
sg_chain ( rctx - > dst , 2 , sg ) ;
}
2007-12-12 15:25:13 +03:00
aead_request_set_tfm ( subreq , child ) ;
aead_request_set_callback ( subreq , req - > base . flags , req - > base . complete ,
req - > base . data ) ;
2015-07-14 11:53:18 +03:00
aead_request_set_crypt ( subreq , rctx - > src ,
req - > src = = req - > dst ? rctx - > src : rctx - > dst ,
req - > cryptlen , iv ) ;
aead_request_set_ad ( subreq , req - > assoclen - 8 ) ;
2007-12-12 15:25:13 +03:00
return subreq ;
}
static int crypto_rfc4309_encrypt ( struct aead_request * req )
{
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if ( req - > assoclen ! = 16 & & req - > assoclen ! = 20 )
return - EINVAL ;
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req = crypto_rfc4309_crypt ( req ) ;
return crypto_aead_encrypt ( req ) ;
}
static int crypto_rfc4309_decrypt ( struct aead_request * req )
{
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if ( req - > assoclen ! = 16 & & req - > assoclen ! = 20 )
return - EINVAL ;
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req = crypto_rfc4309_crypt ( req ) ;
return crypto_aead_decrypt ( req ) ;
}
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static int crypto_rfc4309_init_tfm ( struct crypto_aead * tfm )
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{
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struct aead_instance * inst = aead_alg_instance ( tfm ) ;
struct crypto_aead_spawn * spawn = aead_instance_ctx ( inst ) ;
struct crypto_rfc4309_ctx * ctx = crypto_aead_ctx ( tfm ) ;
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struct crypto_aead * aead ;
unsigned long align ;
aead = crypto_spawn_aead ( spawn ) ;
if ( IS_ERR ( aead ) )
return PTR_ERR ( aead ) ;
ctx - > child = aead ;
align = crypto_aead_alignmask ( aead ) ;
align & = ~ ( crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment ( ) - 1 ) ;
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crypto_aead_set_reqsize (
tfm ,
sizeof ( struct crypto_rfc4309_req_ctx ) +
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ALIGN ( crypto_aead_reqsize ( aead ) , crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment ( ) ) +
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align + 32 ) ;
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return 0 ;
}
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static void crypto_rfc4309_exit_tfm ( struct crypto_aead * tfm )
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{
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struct crypto_rfc4309_ctx * ctx = crypto_aead_ctx ( tfm ) ;
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crypto_free_aead ( ctx - > child ) ;
}
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static void crypto_rfc4309_free ( struct aead_instance * inst )
{
crypto_drop_aead ( aead_instance_ctx ( inst ) ) ;
kfree ( inst ) ;
}
static int crypto_rfc4309_create ( struct crypto_template * tmpl ,
struct rtattr * * tb )
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{
struct crypto_attr_type * algt ;
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u32 mask ;
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struct aead_instance * inst ;
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struct crypto_aead_spawn * spawn ;
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struct aead_alg * alg ;
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const char * ccm_name ;
int err ;
algt = crypto_get_attr_type ( tb ) ;
if ( IS_ERR ( algt ) )
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return PTR_ERR ( algt ) ;
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if ( ( algt - > type ^ CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD ) & algt - > mask )
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return - EINVAL ;
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mask = crypto_requires_sync ( algt - > type , algt - > mask ) ;
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ccm_name = crypto_attr_alg_name ( tb [ 1 ] ) ;
if ( IS_ERR ( ccm_name ) )
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return PTR_ERR ( ccm_name ) ;
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inst = kzalloc ( sizeof ( * inst ) + sizeof ( * spawn ) , GFP_KERNEL ) ;
if ( ! inst )
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return - ENOMEM ;
2007-12-12 15:25:13 +03:00
2015-07-14 11:53:18 +03:00
spawn = aead_instance_ctx ( inst ) ;
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err = crypto_grab_aead ( spawn , aead_crypto_instance ( inst ) ,
ccm_name , 0 , mask ) ;
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if ( err )
goto out_free_inst ;
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alg = crypto_spawn_aead_alg ( spawn ) ;
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err = - EINVAL ;
/* We only support 16-byte blocks. */
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if ( crypto_aead_alg_ivsize ( alg ) ! = 16 )
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goto out_drop_alg ;
/* Not a stream cipher? */
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if ( alg - > base . cra_blocksize ! = 1 )
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goto out_drop_alg ;
err = - ENAMETOOLONG ;
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if ( snprintf ( inst - > alg . base . cra_name , CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME ,
" rfc4309(%s) " , alg - > base . cra_name ) > =
CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME | |
snprintf ( inst - > alg . base . cra_driver_name , CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME ,
" rfc4309(%s) " , alg - > base . cra_driver_name ) > =
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CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME )
goto out_drop_alg ;
2015-07-14 11:53:18 +03:00
inst - > alg . base . cra_flags = alg - > base . cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC ;
inst - > alg . base . cra_priority = alg - > base . cra_priority ;
inst - > alg . base . cra_blocksize = 1 ;
inst - > alg . base . cra_alignmask = alg - > base . cra_alignmask ;
2007-12-12 15:25:13 +03:00
2015-07-14 11:53:18 +03:00
inst - > alg . ivsize = 8 ;
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inst - > alg . chunksize = crypto_aead_alg_chunksize ( alg ) ;
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inst - > alg . maxauthsize = 16 ;
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inst - > alg . base . cra_ctxsize = sizeof ( struct crypto_rfc4309_ctx ) ;
2007-12-12 15:25:13 +03:00
2015-07-14 11:53:18 +03:00
inst - > alg . init = crypto_rfc4309_init_tfm ;
inst - > alg . exit = crypto_rfc4309_exit_tfm ;
2007-12-12 15:25:13 +03:00
2015-07-14 11:53:18 +03:00
inst - > alg . setkey = crypto_rfc4309_setkey ;
inst - > alg . setauthsize = crypto_rfc4309_setauthsize ;
inst - > alg . encrypt = crypto_rfc4309_encrypt ;
inst - > alg . decrypt = crypto_rfc4309_decrypt ;
2007-12-12 15:25:13 +03:00
2015-07-14 11:53:18 +03:00
inst - > free = crypto_rfc4309_free ;
err = aead_register_instance ( tmpl , inst ) ;
if ( err )
goto out_drop_alg ;
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out :
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return err ;
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out_drop_alg :
crypto_drop_aead ( spawn ) ;
out_free_inst :
kfree ( inst ) ;
goto out ;
}
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static int crypto_cbcmac_digest_setkey ( struct crypto_shash * parent ,
const u8 * inkey , unsigned int keylen )
{
struct cbcmac_tfm_ctx * ctx = crypto_shash_ctx ( parent ) ;
return crypto_cipher_setkey ( ctx - > child , inkey , keylen ) ;
}
static int crypto_cbcmac_digest_init ( struct shash_desc * pdesc )
{
struct cbcmac_desc_ctx * ctx = shash_desc_ctx ( pdesc ) ;
int bs = crypto_shash_digestsize ( pdesc - > tfm ) ;
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u8 * dg = ( u8 * ) ctx + crypto_shash_descsize ( pdesc - > tfm ) - bs ;
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ctx - > len = 0 ;
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memset ( dg , 0 , bs ) ;
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return 0 ;
}
static int crypto_cbcmac_digest_update ( struct shash_desc * pdesc , const u8 * p ,
unsigned int len )
{
struct crypto_shash * parent = pdesc - > tfm ;
struct cbcmac_tfm_ctx * tctx = crypto_shash_ctx ( parent ) ;
struct cbcmac_desc_ctx * ctx = shash_desc_ctx ( pdesc ) ;
struct crypto_cipher * tfm = tctx - > child ;
int bs = crypto_shash_digestsize ( parent ) ;
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u8 * dg = ( u8 * ) ctx + crypto_shash_descsize ( parent ) - bs ;
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while ( len > 0 ) {
unsigned int l = min ( len , bs - ctx - > len ) ;
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crypto_xor ( dg + ctx - > len , p , l ) ;
2017-02-03 17:49:36 +03:00
ctx - > len + = l ;
len - = l ;
p + = l ;
if ( ctx - > len = = bs ) {
2017-02-11 22:25:21 +03:00
crypto_cipher_encrypt_one ( tfm , dg , dg ) ;
2017-02-03 17:49:36 +03:00
ctx - > len = 0 ;
}
}
return 0 ;
}
static int crypto_cbcmac_digest_final ( struct shash_desc * pdesc , u8 * out )
{
struct crypto_shash * parent = pdesc - > tfm ;
struct cbcmac_tfm_ctx * tctx = crypto_shash_ctx ( parent ) ;
struct cbcmac_desc_ctx * ctx = shash_desc_ctx ( pdesc ) ;
struct crypto_cipher * tfm = tctx - > child ;
int bs = crypto_shash_digestsize ( parent ) ;
2017-02-11 22:25:21 +03:00
u8 * dg = ( u8 * ) ctx + crypto_shash_descsize ( parent ) - bs ;
2017-02-03 17:49:36 +03:00
if ( ctx - > len )
2017-02-11 22:25:21 +03:00
crypto_cipher_encrypt_one ( tfm , dg , dg ) ;
2017-02-03 17:49:36 +03:00
2017-02-11 22:25:21 +03:00
memcpy ( out , dg , bs ) ;
2017-02-03 17:49:36 +03:00
return 0 ;
}
static int cbcmac_init_tfm ( struct crypto_tfm * tfm )
{
struct crypto_cipher * cipher ;
struct crypto_instance * inst = ( void * ) tfm - > __crt_alg ;
2020-01-03 06:59:05 +03:00
struct crypto_cipher_spawn * spawn = crypto_instance_ctx ( inst ) ;
2017-02-03 17:49:36 +03:00
struct cbcmac_tfm_ctx * ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx ( tfm ) ;
cipher = crypto_spawn_cipher ( spawn ) ;
if ( IS_ERR ( cipher ) )
return PTR_ERR ( cipher ) ;
ctx - > child = cipher ;
return 0 ;
} ;
static void cbcmac_exit_tfm ( struct crypto_tfm * tfm )
{
struct cbcmac_tfm_ctx * ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx ( tfm ) ;
crypto_free_cipher ( ctx - > child ) ;
}
static int cbcmac_create ( struct crypto_template * tmpl , struct rtattr * * tb )
{
struct shash_instance * inst ;
2020-01-03 06:59:01 +03:00
struct crypto_cipher_spawn * spawn ;
2017-02-03 17:49:36 +03:00
struct crypto_alg * alg ;
int err ;
err = crypto_check_attr_type ( tb , CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SHASH ) ;
if ( err )
return err ;
2020-01-03 06:59:01 +03:00
inst = kzalloc ( sizeof ( * inst ) + sizeof ( * spawn ) , GFP_KERNEL ) ;
if ( ! inst )
return - ENOMEM ;
spawn = shash_instance_ctx ( inst ) ;
2017-02-03 17:49:36 +03:00
2020-01-03 06:59:01 +03:00
err = crypto_grab_cipher ( spawn , shash_crypto_instance ( inst ) ,
crypto_attr_alg_name ( tb [ 1 ] ) , 0 , 0 ) ;
if ( err )
goto err_free_inst ;
alg = crypto_spawn_cipher_alg ( spawn ) ;
2017-02-03 17:49:36 +03:00
2020-01-03 06:59:01 +03:00
err = crypto_inst_setname ( shash_crypto_instance ( inst ) , tmpl - > name , alg ) ;
2017-02-03 17:49:36 +03:00
if ( err )
2020-01-03 06:59:01 +03:00
goto err_free_inst ;
2017-02-03 17:49:36 +03:00
inst - > alg . base . cra_priority = alg - > cra_priority ;
inst - > alg . base . cra_blocksize = 1 ;
inst - > alg . digestsize = alg - > cra_blocksize ;
2017-02-11 22:25:21 +03:00
inst - > alg . descsize = ALIGN ( sizeof ( struct cbcmac_desc_ctx ) ,
alg - > cra_alignmask + 1 ) +
2017-02-03 17:49:36 +03:00
alg - > cra_blocksize ;
inst - > alg . base . cra_ctxsize = sizeof ( struct cbcmac_tfm_ctx ) ;
inst - > alg . base . cra_init = cbcmac_init_tfm ;
inst - > alg . base . cra_exit = cbcmac_exit_tfm ;
inst - > alg . init = crypto_cbcmac_digest_init ;
inst - > alg . update = crypto_cbcmac_digest_update ;
inst - > alg . final = crypto_cbcmac_digest_final ;
inst - > alg . setkey = crypto_cbcmac_digest_setkey ;
2020-01-03 07:04:38 +03:00
inst - > free = shash_free_singlespawn_instance ;
2017-02-03 17:49:36 +03:00
err = shash_register_instance ( tmpl , inst ) ;
2020-01-03 06:59:01 +03:00
if ( err ) {
err_free_inst :
2020-01-03 07:04:38 +03:00
shash_free_singlespawn_instance ( inst ) ;
2020-01-03 06:59:01 +03:00
}
2017-02-03 17:49:36 +03:00
return err ;
}
2019-01-18 08:58:12 +03:00
static struct crypto_template crypto_ccm_tmpls [ ] = {
{
. name = " cbcmac " ,
. create = cbcmac_create ,
. module = THIS_MODULE ,
} , {
. name = " ccm_base " ,
. create = crypto_ccm_base_create ,
. module = THIS_MODULE ,
} , {
. name = " ccm " ,
. create = crypto_ccm_create ,
. module = THIS_MODULE ,
} , {
. name = " rfc4309 " ,
. create = crypto_rfc4309_create ,
. module = THIS_MODULE ,
} ,
2017-02-03 17:49:36 +03:00
} ;
2007-12-12 15:25:13 +03:00
static int __init crypto_ccm_module_init ( void )
{
2019-01-18 08:58:12 +03:00
return crypto_register_templates ( crypto_ccm_tmpls ,
ARRAY_SIZE ( crypto_ccm_tmpls ) ) ;
2007-12-12 15:25:13 +03:00
}
static void __exit crypto_ccm_module_exit ( void )
{
2019-01-18 08:58:12 +03:00
crypto_unregister_templates ( crypto_ccm_tmpls ,
ARRAY_SIZE ( crypto_ccm_tmpls ) ) ;
2007-12-12 15:25:13 +03:00
}
2019-04-12 07:57:42 +03:00
subsys_initcall ( crypto_ccm_module_init ) ;
2007-12-12 15:25:13 +03:00
module_exit ( crypto_ccm_module_exit ) ;
MODULE_LICENSE ( " GPL " ) ;
MODULE_DESCRIPTION ( " Counter with CBC MAC " ) ;
2014-11-21 04:05:53 +03:00
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO ( " ccm_base " ) ;
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO ( " rfc4309 " ) ;
2014-11-25 03:32:38 +03:00
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO ( " ccm " ) ;
2019-06-17 11:18:48 +03:00
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO ( " cbcmac " ) ;