2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
/*
* Root Plug sample LSM module
*
* Originally written for a Linux Journal .
*
* Copyright ( C ) 2002 Greg Kroah - Hartman < greg @ kroah . com >
*
* Prevents any programs running with egid = = 0 if a specific USB device
* is not present in the system . Yes , it can be gotten around , but is a
* nice starting point for people to play with , and learn the LSM
* interface .
*
* If you want to turn this into something with a semblance of security ,
* you need to hook the task_ * functions also .
*
* See http : //www.linuxjournal.com/article.php?sid=6279 for more information
* about this code .
*
* This program is free software ; you can redistribute it and / or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
* published by the Free Software Foundation , version 2 of the
* License .
*/
# include <linux/kernel.h>
# include <linux/init.h>
# include <linux/security.h>
# include <linux/usb.h>
2007-10-17 10:31:32 +04:00
# include <linux/moduleparam.h>
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
/* default is a generic type of usb to serial converter */
static int vendor_id = 0x0557 ;
static int product_id = 0x2008 ;
module_param ( vendor_id , uint , 0400 ) ;
module_param ( product_id , uint , 0400 ) ;
/* should we print out debug messages */
static int debug = 0 ;
module_param ( debug , bool , 0600 ) ;
# define MY_NAME "root_plug"
# define root_dbg(fmt, arg...) \
do { \
if ( debug ) \
printk ( KERN_DEBUG " %s: %s: " fmt , \
2008-03-06 02:03:59 +03:00
MY_NAME , __func__ , \
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
# # arg); \
} while ( 0 )
static int rootplug_bprm_check_security ( struct linux_binprm * bprm )
{
struct usb_device * dev ;
root_dbg ( " file %s, e_uid = %d, e_gid = %d \n " ,
bprm - > filename , bprm - > e_uid , bprm - > e_gid ) ;
if ( bprm - > e_gid = = 0 ) {
dev = usb_find_device ( vendor_id , product_id ) ;
if ( ! dev ) {
root_dbg ( " e_gid = 0, and device not found, "
" task not allowed to run... \n " ) ;
return - EPERM ;
}
usb_put_dev ( dev ) ;
}
return 0 ;
}
static struct security_operations rootplug_security_ops = {
/* Use the capability functions for some of the hooks */
security: Fix setting of PF_SUPERPRIV by __capable()
Fix the setting of PF_SUPERPRIV by __capable() as it could corrupt the flags
the target process if that is not the current process and it is trying to
change its own flags in a different way at the same time.
__capable() is using neither atomic ops nor locking to protect t->flags. This
patch removes __capable() and introduces has_capability() that doesn't set
PF_SUPERPRIV on the process being queried.
This patch further splits security_ptrace() in two:
(1) security_ptrace_may_access(). This passes judgement on whether one
process may access another only (PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH for ptrace() and
PTRACE_MODE_READ for /proc), and takes a pointer to the child process.
current is the parent.
(2) security_ptrace_traceme(). This passes judgement on PTRACE_TRACEME only,
and takes only a pointer to the parent process. current is the child.
In Smack and commoncap, this uses has_capability() to determine whether
the parent will be permitted to use PTRACE_ATTACH if normal checks fail.
This does not set PF_SUPERPRIV.
Two of the instances of __capable() actually only act on current, and so have
been changed to calls to capable().
Of the places that were using __capable():
(1) The OOM killer calls __capable() thrice when weighing the killability of a
process. All of these now use has_capability().
(2) cap_ptrace() and smack_ptrace() were using __capable() to check to see
whether the parent was allowed to trace any process. As mentioned above,
these have been split. For PTRACE_ATTACH and /proc, capable() is now
used, and for PTRACE_TRACEME, has_capability() is used.
(3) cap_safe_nice() only ever saw current, so now uses capable().
(4) smack_setprocattr() rejected accesses to tasks other than current just
after calling __capable(), so the order of these two tests have been
switched and capable() is used instead.
(5) In smack_file_send_sigiotask(), we need to allow privileged processes to
receive SIGIO on files they're manipulating.
(6) In smack_task_wait(), we let a process wait for a privileged process,
whether or not the process doing the waiting is privileged.
I've tested this with the LTP SELinux and syscalls testscripts.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-14 14:37:28 +04:00
. ptrace_may_access = cap_ptrace_may_access ,
. ptrace_traceme = cap_ptrace_traceme ,
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
. capget = cap_capget ,
. capset_check = cap_capset_check ,
. capset_set = cap_capset_set ,
. capable = cap_capable ,
. bprm_apply_creds = cap_bprm_apply_creds ,
. bprm_set_security = cap_bprm_set_security ,
. task_post_setuid = cap_task_post_setuid ,
. task_reparent_to_init = cap_task_reparent_to_init ,
2008-04-28 13:13:42 +04:00
. task_prctl = cap_task_prctl ,
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
. bprm_check_security = rootplug_bprm_check_security ,
} ;
static int __init rootplug_init ( void )
{
/* register ourselves with the security framework */
if ( register_security ( & rootplug_security_ops ) ) {
printk ( KERN_INFO
" Failure registering Root Plug module with the kernel \n " ) ;
return - EINVAL ;
}
printk ( KERN_INFO " Root Plug module initialized, "
" vendor_id = %4.4x, product id = %4.4x \n " , vendor_id , product_id ) ;
return 0 ;
}
security_initcall ( rootplug_init ) ;