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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <asm/bugs.h>
#include <asm/traps.h>
enum cp_error_code {
CP_EC = (1 << 15) - 1,
CP_RET = 1,
CP_IRET = 2,
CP_ENDBR = 3,
CP_RSTRORSSP = 4,
CP_SETSSBSY = 5,
CP_ENCL = 1 << 15,
};
x86/shstk: Add user control-protection fault handler A control-protection fault is triggered when a control-flow transfer attempt violates Shadow Stack or Indirect Branch Tracking constraints. For example, the return address for a RET instruction differs from the copy on the shadow stack. There already exists a control-protection fault handler for handling kernel IBT faults. Refactor this fault handler into separate user and kernel handlers, like the page fault handler. Add a control-protection handler for usermode. To avoid ifdeffery, put them both in a new file cet.c, which is compiled in the case of either of the two CET features supported in the kernel: kernel IBT or user mode shadow stack. Move some static inline functions from traps.c into a header so they can be used in cet.c. Opportunistically fix a comment in the kernel IBT part of the fault handler that is on the end of the line instead of preceding it. Keep the same behavior for the kernel side of the fault handler, except for converting a BUG to a WARN in the case of a #CP happening when the feature is missing. This unifies the behavior with the new shadow stack code, and also prevents the kernel from crashing under this situation which is potentially recoverable. The control-protection fault handler works in a similar way as the general protection fault handler. It provides the si_code SEGV_CPERR to the signal handler. Co-developed-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org> Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com> Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com> Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-28-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
2023-06-12 17:10:53 -07:00
static const char cp_err[][10] = {
[0] = "unknown",
[1] = "near ret",
[2] = "far/iret",
[3] = "endbranch",
[4] = "rstorssp",
[5] = "setssbsy",
};
static const char *cp_err_string(unsigned long error_code)
{
unsigned int cpec = error_code & CP_EC;
if (cpec >= ARRAY_SIZE(cp_err))
cpec = 0;
return cp_err[cpec];
}
static void do_unexpected_cp(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code)
{
WARN_ONCE(1, "Unexpected %s #CP, error_code: %s\n",
user_mode(regs) ? "user mode" : "kernel mode",
cp_err_string(error_code));
}
static DEFINE_RATELIMIT_STATE(cpf_rate, DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_INTERVAL,
DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_BURST);
static void do_user_cp_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code)
{
x86/shstk: Add user control-protection fault handler A control-protection fault is triggered when a control-flow transfer attempt violates Shadow Stack or Indirect Branch Tracking constraints. For example, the return address for a RET instruction differs from the copy on the shadow stack. There already exists a control-protection fault handler for handling kernel IBT faults. Refactor this fault handler into separate user and kernel handlers, like the page fault handler. Add a control-protection handler for usermode. To avoid ifdeffery, put them both in a new file cet.c, which is compiled in the case of either of the two CET features supported in the kernel: kernel IBT or user mode shadow stack. Move some static inline functions from traps.c into a header so they can be used in cet.c. Opportunistically fix a comment in the kernel IBT part of the fault handler that is on the end of the line instead of preceding it. Keep the same behavior for the kernel side of the fault handler, except for converting a BUG to a WARN in the case of a #CP happening when the feature is missing. This unifies the behavior with the new shadow stack code, and also prevents the kernel from crashing under this situation which is potentially recoverable. The control-protection fault handler works in a similar way as the general protection fault handler. It provides the si_code SEGV_CPERR to the signal handler. Co-developed-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org> Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com> Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com> Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-28-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
2023-06-12 17:10:53 -07:00
struct task_struct *tsk;
unsigned long ssp;
/*
* An exception was just taken from userspace. Since interrupts are disabled
* here, no scheduling should have messed with the registers yet and they
* will be whatever is live in userspace. So read the SSP before enabling
* interrupts so locking the fpregs to do it later is not required.
*/
rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, ssp);
cond_local_irq_enable(regs);
tsk = current;
tsk->thread.error_code = error_code;
tsk->thread.trap_nr = X86_TRAP_CP;
/* Ratelimit to prevent log spamming. */
if (show_unhandled_signals && unhandled_signal(tsk, SIGSEGV) &&
__ratelimit(&cpf_rate)) {
pr_emerg("%s[%d] control protection ip:%lx sp:%lx ssp:%lx error:%lx(%s)%s",
tsk->comm, task_pid_nr(tsk),
regs->ip, regs->sp, ssp, error_code,
cp_err_string(error_code),
error_code & CP_ENCL ? " in enclave" : "");
print_vma_addr(KERN_CONT " in ", regs->ip);
pr_cont("\n");
}
x86/shstk: Add user control-protection fault handler A control-protection fault is triggered when a control-flow transfer attempt violates Shadow Stack or Indirect Branch Tracking constraints. For example, the return address for a RET instruction differs from the copy on the shadow stack. There already exists a control-protection fault handler for handling kernel IBT faults. Refactor this fault handler into separate user and kernel handlers, like the page fault handler. Add a control-protection handler for usermode. To avoid ifdeffery, put them both in a new file cet.c, which is compiled in the case of either of the two CET features supported in the kernel: kernel IBT or user mode shadow stack. Move some static inline functions from traps.c into a header so they can be used in cet.c. Opportunistically fix a comment in the kernel IBT part of the fault handler that is on the end of the line instead of preceding it. Keep the same behavior for the kernel side of the fault handler, except for converting a BUG to a WARN in the case of a #CP happening when the feature is missing. This unifies the behavior with the new shadow stack code, and also prevents the kernel from crashing under this situation which is potentially recoverable. The control-protection fault handler works in a similar way as the general protection fault handler. It provides the si_code SEGV_CPERR to the signal handler. Co-developed-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org> Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com> Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com> Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-28-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
2023-06-12 17:10:53 -07:00
force_sig_fault(SIGSEGV, SEGV_CPERR, (void __user *)0);
cond_local_irq_disable(regs);
}
static __ro_after_init bool ibt_fatal = true;
static void do_kernel_cp_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code)
{
if ((error_code & CP_EC) != CP_ENDBR) {
do_unexpected_cp(regs, error_code);
return;
x86/shstk: Add user control-protection fault handler A control-protection fault is triggered when a control-flow transfer attempt violates Shadow Stack or Indirect Branch Tracking constraints. For example, the return address for a RET instruction differs from the copy on the shadow stack. There already exists a control-protection fault handler for handling kernel IBT faults. Refactor this fault handler into separate user and kernel handlers, like the page fault handler. Add a control-protection handler for usermode. To avoid ifdeffery, put them both in a new file cet.c, which is compiled in the case of either of the two CET features supported in the kernel: kernel IBT or user mode shadow stack. Move some static inline functions from traps.c into a header so they can be used in cet.c. Opportunistically fix a comment in the kernel IBT part of the fault handler that is on the end of the line instead of preceding it. Keep the same behavior for the kernel side of the fault handler, except for converting a BUG to a WARN in the case of a #CP happening when the feature is missing. This unifies the behavior with the new shadow stack code, and also prevents the kernel from crashing under this situation which is potentially recoverable. The control-protection fault handler works in a similar way as the general protection fault handler. It provides the si_code SEGV_CPERR to the signal handler. Co-developed-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org> Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com> Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com> Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-28-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
2023-06-12 17:10:53 -07:00
}
if (unlikely(regs->ip == (unsigned long)&ibt_selftest_noendbr)) {
regs->ax = 0;
return;
}
pr_err("Missing ENDBR: %pS\n", (void *)instruction_pointer(regs));
if (!ibt_fatal) {
printk(KERN_DEFAULT CUT_HERE);
__warn(__FILE__, __LINE__, (void *)regs->ip, TAINT_WARN, regs, NULL);
return;
}
BUG();
}
static int __init ibt_setup(char *str)
{
if (!strcmp(str, "off"))
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBT);
if (!strcmp(str, "warn"))
ibt_fatal = false;
return 1;
}
__setup("ibt=", ibt_setup);
x86/shstk: Add user control-protection fault handler A control-protection fault is triggered when a control-flow transfer attempt violates Shadow Stack or Indirect Branch Tracking constraints. For example, the return address for a RET instruction differs from the copy on the shadow stack. There already exists a control-protection fault handler for handling kernel IBT faults. Refactor this fault handler into separate user and kernel handlers, like the page fault handler. Add a control-protection handler for usermode. To avoid ifdeffery, put them both in a new file cet.c, which is compiled in the case of either of the two CET features supported in the kernel: kernel IBT or user mode shadow stack. Move some static inline functions from traps.c into a header so they can be used in cet.c. Opportunistically fix a comment in the kernel IBT part of the fault handler that is on the end of the line instead of preceding it. Keep the same behavior for the kernel side of the fault handler, except for converting a BUG to a WARN in the case of a #CP happening when the feature is missing. This unifies the behavior with the new shadow stack code, and also prevents the kernel from crashing under this situation which is potentially recoverable. The control-protection fault handler works in a similar way as the general protection fault handler. It provides the si_code SEGV_CPERR to the signal handler. Co-developed-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org> Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com> Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com> Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-28-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
2023-06-12 17:10:53 -07:00
DEFINE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(exc_control_protection)
{
if (user_mode(regs)) {
if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK))
do_user_cp_fault(regs, error_code);
else
do_unexpected_cp(regs, error_code);
} else {
if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT))
do_kernel_cp_fault(regs, error_code);
else
do_unexpected_cp(regs, error_code);
}
}