linux/include/net/inet_frag.h

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License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 17:07:57 +03:00
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
#ifndef __NET_FRAG_H__
#define __NET_FRAG_H__
#include <linux/rhashtable-types.h>
inet: frags: fix use-after-free read in inet_frag_destroy_rcu As caught by syzbot [1], the rcu grace period that is respected before fqdir_rwork_fn() proceeds and frees fqdir is not enough to prevent inet_frag_destroy_rcu() being run after the freeing. We need a proper rcu_barrier() synchronization to replace the one we had in inet_frags_fini() We also have to fix a potential problem at module removal : inet_frags_fini() needs to make sure that all queued work queues (fqdir_rwork_fn) have completed, otherwise we might call kmem_cache_destroy() too soon and get another use-after-free. [1] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in inet_frag_destroy_rcu+0xd9/0xe0 net/ipv4/inet_fragment.c:201 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88806ed47a18 by task swapper/1/0 CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 5.2.0-rc1+ #2 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_address_description.cold+0x7c/0x20d mm/kasan/report.c:188 __kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:317 kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:614 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:132 inet_frag_destroy_rcu+0xd9/0xe0 net/ipv4/inet_fragment.c:201 __rcu_reclaim kernel/rcu/rcu.h:222 [inline] rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2092 [inline] invoke_rcu_callbacks kernel/rcu/tree.c:2310 [inline] rcu_core+0xba5/0x1500 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2291 __do_softirq+0x25c/0x94c kernel/softirq.c:293 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:374 [inline] irq_exit+0x180/0x1d0 kernel/softirq.c:414 exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:536 [inline] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x13b/0x550 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1068 apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:806 </IRQ> RIP: 0010:native_safe_halt+0xe/0x10 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:61 Code: ff ff 48 89 df e8 f2 95 8c fa eb 82 e9 07 00 00 00 0f 00 2d e4 45 4b 00 f4 c3 66 90 e9 07 00 00 00 0f 00 2d d4 45 4b 00 fb f4 <c3> 90 55 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 53 e8 8e 18 42 fa e8 99 RSP: 0018:ffff8880a98e7d78 EFLAGS: 00000282 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff13 RAX: 1ffffffff1164e11 RBX: ffff8880a98d4340 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI: ffff8880a98d4bbc RBP: ffff8880a98e7da8 R08: ffff8880a98d4340 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: ffffffff88b27078 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000000 arch_cpu_idle+0xa/0x10 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:571 default_idle_call+0x36/0x90 kernel/sched/idle.c:94 cpuidle_idle_call kernel/sched/idle.c:154 [inline] do_idle+0x377/0x560 kernel/sched/idle.c:263 cpu_startup_entry+0x1b/0x20 kernel/sched/idle.c:354 start_secondary+0x34e/0x4c0 arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:267 secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S:243 Allocated by task 8877: save_stack+0x23/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:71 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:79 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:489 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xcf/0xe0 mm/kasan/common.c:462 kasan_kmalloc+0x9/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:503 kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x151/0x750 mm/slab.c:3555 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:547 [inline] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:742 [inline] fqdir_init include/net/inet_frag.h:115 [inline] ipv6_frags_init_net+0x48/0x460 net/ipv6/reassembly.c:513 ops_init+0xb3/0x410 net/core/net_namespace.c:130 setup_net+0x2d3/0x740 net/core/net_namespace.c:316 copy_net_ns+0x1df/0x340 net/core/net_namespace.c:439 create_new_namespaces+0x400/0x7b0 kernel/nsproxy.c:107 unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xc2/0x200 kernel/nsproxy.c:206 ksys_unshare+0x440/0x980 kernel/fork.c:2692 __do_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:2760 [inline] __se_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:2758 [inline] __x64_sys_unshare+0x31/0x40 kernel/fork.c:2758 do_syscall_64+0xfd/0x680 arch/x86/entry/common.c:301 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Freed by task 17: save_stack+0x23/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:71 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:79 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:451 kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:459 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3432 [inline] kfree+0xcf/0x220 mm/slab.c:3755 fqdir_rwork_fn+0x33/0x40 net/ipv4/inet_fragment.c:154 process_one_work+0x989/0x1790 kernel/workqueue.c:2269 worker_thread+0x98/0xe40 kernel/workqueue.c:2415 kthread+0x354/0x420 kernel/kthread.c:255 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88806ed47a00 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512 The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of 512-byte region [ffff88806ed47a00, ffff88806ed47c00) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea0001bb51c0 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8880aa400940 index:0x0 flags: 0x1fffc0000000200(slab) raw: 01fffc0000000200 ffffea000282a788 ffffea0001bb53c8 ffff8880aa400940 raw: 0000000000000000 ffff88806ed47000 0000000100000006 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88806ed47900: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff88806ed47980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc >ffff88806ed47a00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff88806ed47a80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff88806ed47b00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb Fixes: 3c8fc8782044 ("inet: frags: rework rhashtable dismantle") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-05-28 02:56:49 +03:00
#include <linux/completion.h>
inet: frags: use rhashtables for reassembly units Some applications still rely on IP fragmentation, and to be fair linux reassembly unit is not working under any serious load. It uses static hash tables of 1024 buckets, and up to 128 items per bucket (!!!) A work queue is supposed to garbage collect items when host is under memory pressure, and doing a hash rebuild, changing seed used in hash computations. This work queue blocks softirqs for up to 25 ms when doing a hash rebuild, occurring every 5 seconds if host is under fire. Then there is the problem of sharing this hash table for all netns. It is time to switch to rhashtables, and allocate one of them per netns to speedup netns dismantle, since this is a critical metric these days. Lookup is now using RCU. A followup patch will even remove the refcount hold/release left from prior implementation and save a couple of atomic operations. Before this patch, 16 cpus (16 RX queue NIC) could not handle more than 1 Mpps frags DDOS. After the patch, I reach 9 Mpps without any tuning, and can use up to 2GB of storage for the fragments (exact number depends on frags being evicted after timeout) $ grep FRAG /proc/net/sockstat FRAG: inuse 1966916 memory 2140004608 A followup patch will change the limits for 64bit arches. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Cc: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Aring <alex.aring@gmail.com> Cc: Stefan Schmidt <stefan@osg.samsung.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-03-31 22:58:49 +03:00
/* Per netns frag queues directory */
struct fqdir {
/* sysctls */
long high_thresh;
long low_thresh;
int timeout;
int max_dist;
struct inet_frags *f;
struct net *net;
inet: frags: rework rhashtable dismantle syszbot found an interesting use-after-free [1] happening while IPv4 fragment rhashtable was destroyed at netns dismantle. While no insertions can possibly happen at the time a dismantling netns is destroying this rhashtable, timers can still fire and attempt to remove elements from this rhashtable. This is forbidden, since rhashtable_free_and_destroy() has no synchronization against concurrent inserts and deletes. Add a new fqdir->dead flag so that timers do not attempt a rhashtable_remove_fast() operation. We also have to respect an RCU grace period before starting the rhashtable_free_and_destroy() from process context, thus we use rcu_work infrastructure. This is a refinement of a prior rough attempt to fix this bug : https://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=153845936820900&w=2 Since the rhashtable cleanup is now deferred to a work queue, netns dismantles should be slightly faster. [1] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __read_once_size include/linux/compiler.h:194 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in rhashtable_last_table+0x162/0x180 lib/rhashtable.c:212 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880a6497b70 by task kworker/0:0/5 CPU: 0 PID: 5 Comm: kworker/0:0 Not tainted 5.2.0-rc1+ #2 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Workqueue: events rht_deferred_worker Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_address_description.cold+0x7c/0x20d mm/kasan/report.c:188 __kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:317 kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:614 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:132 __read_once_size include/linux/compiler.h:194 [inline] rhashtable_last_table+0x162/0x180 lib/rhashtable.c:212 rht_deferred_worker+0x111/0x2030 lib/rhashtable.c:411 process_one_work+0x989/0x1790 kernel/workqueue.c:2269 worker_thread+0x98/0xe40 kernel/workqueue.c:2415 kthread+0x354/0x420 kernel/kthread.c:255 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352 Allocated by task 32687: save_stack+0x23/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:71 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:79 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:489 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xcf/0xe0 mm/kasan/common.c:462 kasan_kmalloc+0x9/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:503 __do_kmalloc_node mm/slab.c:3620 [inline] __kmalloc_node+0x4e/0x70 mm/slab.c:3627 kmalloc_node include/linux/slab.h:590 [inline] kvmalloc_node+0x68/0x100 mm/util.c:431 kvmalloc include/linux/mm.h:637 [inline] kvzalloc include/linux/mm.h:645 [inline] bucket_table_alloc+0x90/0x480 lib/rhashtable.c:178 rhashtable_init+0x3f4/0x7b0 lib/rhashtable.c:1057 inet_frags_init_net include/net/inet_frag.h:109 [inline] ipv4_frags_init_net+0x182/0x410 net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c:683 ops_init+0xb3/0x410 net/core/net_namespace.c:130 setup_net+0x2d3/0x740 net/core/net_namespace.c:316 copy_net_ns+0x1df/0x340 net/core/net_namespace.c:439 create_new_namespaces+0x400/0x7b0 kernel/nsproxy.c:107 unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xc2/0x200 kernel/nsproxy.c:206 ksys_unshare+0x440/0x980 kernel/fork.c:2692 __do_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:2760 [inline] __se_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:2758 [inline] __x64_sys_unshare+0x31/0x40 kernel/fork.c:2758 do_syscall_64+0xfd/0x680 arch/x86/entry/common.c:301 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Freed by task 7: save_stack+0x23/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:71 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:79 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:451 kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:459 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3432 [inline] kfree+0xcf/0x220 mm/slab.c:3755 kvfree+0x61/0x70 mm/util.c:460 bucket_table_free+0x69/0x150 lib/rhashtable.c:108 rhashtable_free_and_destroy+0x165/0x8b0 lib/rhashtable.c:1155 inet_frags_exit_net+0x3d/0x50 net/ipv4/inet_fragment.c:152 ipv4_frags_exit_net+0x73/0x90 net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c:695 ops_exit_list.isra.0+0xaa/0x150 net/core/net_namespace.c:154 cleanup_net+0x3fb/0x960 net/core/net_namespace.c:553 process_one_work+0x989/0x1790 kernel/workqueue.c:2269 worker_thread+0x98/0xe40 kernel/workqueue.c:2415 kthread+0x354/0x420 kernel/kthread.c:255 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880a6497b40 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024 The buggy address is located 48 bytes inside of 1024-byte region [ffff8880a6497b40, ffff8880a6497f40) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea0002992580 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8880aa400ac0 index:0xffff8880a64964c0 compound_mapcount: 0 flags: 0x1fffc0000010200(slab|head) raw: 01fffc0000010200 ffffea0002916e88 ffffea000218fe08 ffff8880aa400ac0 raw: ffff8880a64964c0 ffff8880a6496040 0000000100000005 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff8880a6497a00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff8880a6497a80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc >ffff8880a6497b00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff8880a6497b80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff8880a6497c00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb Fixes: 648700f76b03 ("inet: frags: use rhashtables for reassembly units") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-05-24 19:03:40 +03:00
bool dead;
struct rhashtable rhashtable ____cacheline_aligned_in_smp;
/* Keep atomic mem on separate cachelines in structs that include it */
atomic_long_t mem ____cacheline_aligned_in_smp;
inet: fix various use-after-free in defrags units syzbot reported another issue caused by my recent patches. [1] The issue here is that fqdir_exit() is initiating a work queue and immediately returns. A bit later cleanup_net() was able to free the MIB (percpu data) and the whole struct net was freed, but we had active frag timers that fired and triggered use-after-free. We need to make sure that timers can catch fqdir->dead being set, to bailout. Since RCU is used for the reader side, this means we want to respect an RCU grace period between these operations : 1) qfdir->dead = 1; 2) netns dismantle (freeing of various data structure) This patch uses new new (struct pernet_operations)->pre_exit infrastructure to ensures a full RCU grace period happens between fqdir_pre_exit() and fqdir_exit() This also means we can use a regular work queue, we no longer need rcu_work. Tested: $ time for i in {1..1000}; do unshare -n /bin/false;done real 0m2.585s user 0m0.160s sys 0m2.214s [1] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ip_expire+0x73e/0x800 net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c:152 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88808b9fe330 by task syz-executor.4/11860 CPU: 1 PID: 11860 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 5.2.0-rc2+ #22 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_address_description.cold+0x7c/0x20d mm/kasan/report.c:188 __kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:317 kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:614 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:132 ip_expire+0x73e/0x800 net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c:152 call_timer_fn+0x193/0x720 kernel/time/timer.c:1322 expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1366 [inline] __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1685 [inline] __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1653 [inline] run_timer_softirq+0x66f/0x1740 kernel/time/timer.c:1698 __do_softirq+0x25c/0x94c kernel/softirq.c:293 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:374 [inline] irq_exit+0x180/0x1d0 kernel/softirq.c:414 exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:536 [inline] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x13b/0x550 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1068 apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:806 </IRQ> RIP: 0010:tomoyo_domain_quota_is_ok+0x131/0x540 security/tomoyo/util.c:1035 Code: 24 4c 3b 65 d0 0f 84 9c 00 00 00 e8 19 1d 73 fe 49 8d 7c 24 18 48 ba 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 0f b6 04 10 <48> 89 fa 83 e2 07 38 d0 7f 08 84 c0 0f 85 69 03 00 00 41 0f b6 5c RSP: 0018:ffff88806ae079c0 EFLAGS: 00000a02 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff13 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000010 RCX: ffffc9000e655000 RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: ffffffff82fd88a7 RDI: ffff888086202398 RBP: ffff88806ae07a00 R08: ffff88808b6c8700 R09: ffffed100d5c0f4d R10: ffffed100d5c0f4c R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888086202380 R13: 0000000000000030 R14: 00000000000000d3 R15: 0000000000000000 tomoyo_supervisor+0x2e8/0xef0 security/tomoyo/common.c:2087 tomoyo_audit_path_number_log security/tomoyo/file.c:235 [inline] tomoyo_path_number_perm+0x42f/0x520 security/tomoyo/file.c:734 tomoyo_file_ioctl+0x23/0x30 security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c:335 security_file_ioctl+0x77/0xc0 security/security.c:1370 ksys_ioctl+0x57/0xd0 fs/ioctl.c:711 __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:720 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:718 [inline] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x73/0xb0 fs/ioctl.c:718 do_syscall_64+0xfd/0x680 arch/x86/entry/common.c:301 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x4592c9 Code: fd b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 cb b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007f8db5e44c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00000000004592c9 RDX: 0000000020000080 RSI: 00000000000089f1 RDI: 0000000000000006 RBP: 000000000075bf20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f8db5e456d4 R13: 00000000004cc770 R14: 00000000004d5cd8 R15: 00000000ffffffff Allocated by task 9047: save_stack+0x23/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:71 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:79 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:489 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xcf/0xe0 mm/kasan/common.c:462 kasan_slab_alloc+0xf/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:497 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:437 [inline] slab_alloc mm/slab.c:3326 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc+0x11a/0x6f0 mm/slab.c:3488 kmem_cache_zalloc include/linux/slab.h:732 [inline] net_alloc net/core/net_namespace.c:386 [inline] copy_net_ns+0xed/0x340 net/core/net_namespace.c:426 create_new_namespaces+0x400/0x7b0 kernel/nsproxy.c:107 unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xc2/0x200 kernel/nsproxy.c:206 ksys_unshare+0x440/0x980 kernel/fork.c:2692 __do_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:2760 [inline] __se_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:2758 [inline] __x64_sys_unshare+0x31/0x40 kernel/fork.c:2758 do_syscall_64+0xfd/0x680 arch/x86/entry/common.c:301 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Freed by task 2541: save_stack+0x23/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:71 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:79 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:451 kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:459 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3432 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0x86/0x260 mm/slab.c:3698 net_free net/core/net_namespace.c:402 [inline] net_drop_ns.part.0+0x70/0x90 net/core/net_namespace.c:409 net_drop_ns net/core/net_namespace.c:408 [inline] cleanup_net+0x538/0x960 net/core/net_namespace.c:571 process_one_work+0x989/0x1790 kernel/workqueue.c:2269 worker_thread+0x98/0xe40 kernel/workqueue.c:2415 kthread+0x354/0x420 kernel/kthread.c:255 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88808b9fe100 which belongs to the cache net_namespace of size 6784 The buggy address is located 560 bytes inside of 6784-byte region [ffff88808b9fe100, ffff88808b9ffb80) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea00022e7f80 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88821b6f60c0 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0 flags: 0x1fffc0000010200(slab|head) raw: 01fffc0000010200 ffffea000256f288 ffffea0001bbef08 ffff88821b6f60c0 raw: 0000000000000000 ffff88808b9fe100 0000000100000001 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88808b9fe200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff88808b9fe280: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb >ffff88808b9fe300: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff88808b9fe380: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff88808b9fe400: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb Fixes: 3c8fc8782044 ("inet: frags: rework rhashtable dismantle") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-06-18 21:09:00 +03:00
struct work_struct destroy_work;
};
/**
* fragment queue flags
*
* @INET_FRAG_FIRST_IN: first fragment has arrived
* @INET_FRAG_LAST_IN: final fragment has arrived
* @INET_FRAG_COMPLETE: frag queue has been processed and is due for destruction
inet: frags: rework rhashtable dismantle syszbot found an interesting use-after-free [1] happening while IPv4 fragment rhashtable was destroyed at netns dismantle. While no insertions can possibly happen at the time a dismantling netns is destroying this rhashtable, timers can still fire and attempt to remove elements from this rhashtable. This is forbidden, since rhashtable_free_and_destroy() has no synchronization against concurrent inserts and deletes. Add a new fqdir->dead flag so that timers do not attempt a rhashtable_remove_fast() operation. We also have to respect an RCU grace period before starting the rhashtable_free_and_destroy() from process context, thus we use rcu_work infrastructure. This is a refinement of a prior rough attempt to fix this bug : https://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=153845936820900&w=2 Since the rhashtable cleanup is now deferred to a work queue, netns dismantles should be slightly faster. [1] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __read_once_size include/linux/compiler.h:194 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in rhashtable_last_table+0x162/0x180 lib/rhashtable.c:212 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880a6497b70 by task kworker/0:0/5 CPU: 0 PID: 5 Comm: kworker/0:0 Not tainted 5.2.0-rc1+ #2 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Workqueue: events rht_deferred_worker Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_address_description.cold+0x7c/0x20d mm/kasan/report.c:188 __kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:317 kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:614 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:132 __read_once_size include/linux/compiler.h:194 [inline] rhashtable_last_table+0x162/0x180 lib/rhashtable.c:212 rht_deferred_worker+0x111/0x2030 lib/rhashtable.c:411 process_one_work+0x989/0x1790 kernel/workqueue.c:2269 worker_thread+0x98/0xe40 kernel/workqueue.c:2415 kthread+0x354/0x420 kernel/kthread.c:255 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352 Allocated by task 32687: save_stack+0x23/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:71 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:79 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:489 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xcf/0xe0 mm/kasan/common.c:462 kasan_kmalloc+0x9/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:503 __do_kmalloc_node mm/slab.c:3620 [inline] __kmalloc_node+0x4e/0x70 mm/slab.c:3627 kmalloc_node include/linux/slab.h:590 [inline] kvmalloc_node+0x68/0x100 mm/util.c:431 kvmalloc include/linux/mm.h:637 [inline] kvzalloc include/linux/mm.h:645 [inline] bucket_table_alloc+0x90/0x480 lib/rhashtable.c:178 rhashtable_init+0x3f4/0x7b0 lib/rhashtable.c:1057 inet_frags_init_net include/net/inet_frag.h:109 [inline] ipv4_frags_init_net+0x182/0x410 net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c:683 ops_init+0xb3/0x410 net/core/net_namespace.c:130 setup_net+0x2d3/0x740 net/core/net_namespace.c:316 copy_net_ns+0x1df/0x340 net/core/net_namespace.c:439 create_new_namespaces+0x400/0x7b0 kernel/nsproxy.c:107 unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xc2/0x200 kernel/nsproxy.c:206 ksys_unshare+0x440/0x980 kernel/fork.c:2692 __do_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:2760 [inline] __se_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:2758 [inline] __x64_sys_unshare+0x31/0x40 kernel/fork.c:2758 do_syscall_64+0xfd/0x680 arch/x86/entry/common.c:301 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Freed by task 7: save_stack+0x23/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:71 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:79 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:451 kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:459 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3432 [inline] kfree+0xcf/0x220 mm/slab.c:3755 kvfree+0x61/0x70 mm/util.c:460 bucket_table_free+0x69/0x150 lib/rhashtable.c:108 rhashtable_free_and_destroy+0x165/0x8b0 lib/rhashtable.c:1155 inet_frags_exit_net+0x3d/0x50 net/ipv4/inet_fragment.c:152 ipv4_frags_exit_net+0x73/0x90 net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c:695 ops_exit_list.isra.0+0xaa/0x150 net/core/net_namespace.c:154 cleanup_net+0x3fb/0x960 net/core/net_namespace.c:553 process_one_work+0x989/0x1790 kernel/workqueue.c:2269 worker_thread+0x98/0xe40 kernel/workqueue.c:2415 kthread+0x354/0x420 kernel/kthread.c:255 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880a6497b40 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024 The buggy address is located 48 bytes inside of 1024-byte region [ffff8880a6497b40, ffff8880a6497f40) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea0002992580 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8880aa400ac0 index:0xffff8880a64964c0 compound_mapcount: 0 flags: 0x1fffc0000010200(slab|head) raw: 01fffc0000010200 ffffea0002916e88 ffffea000218fe08 ffff8880aa400ac0 raw: ffff8880a64964c0 ffff8880a6496040 0000000100000005 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff8880a6497a00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff8880a6497a80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc >ffff8880a6497b00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff8880a6497b80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff8880a6497c00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb Fixes: 648700f76b03 ("inet: frags: use rhashtables for reassembly units") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-05-24 19:03:40 +03:00
* @INET_FRAG_HASH_DEAD: inet_frag_kill() has not removed fq from rhashtable
*/
enum {
INET_FRAG_FIRST_IN = BIT(0),
INET_FRAG_LAST_IN = BIT(1),
INET_FRAG_COMPLETE = BIT(2),
inet: frags: rework rhashtable dismantle syszbot found an interesting use-after-free [1] happening while IPv4 fragment rhashtable was destroyed at netns dismantle. While no insertions can possibly happen at the time a dismantling netns is destroying this rhashtable, timers can still fire and attempt to remove elements from this rhashtable. This is forbidden, since rhashtable_free_and_destroy() has no synchronization against concurrent inserts and deletes. Add a new fqdir->dead flag so that timers do not attempt a rhashtable_remove_fast() operation. We also have to respect an RCU grace period before starting the rhashtable_free_and_destroy() from process context, thus we use rcu_work infrastructure. This is a refinement of a prior rough attempt to fix this bug : https://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=153845936820900&w=2 Since the rhashtable cleanup is now deferred to a work queue, netns dismantles should be slightly faster. [1] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __read_once_size include/linux/compiler.h:194 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in rhashtable_last_table+0x162/0x180 lib/rhashtable.c:212 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880a6497b70 by task kworker/0:0/5 CPU: 0 PID: 5 Comm: kworker/0:0 Not tainted 5.2.0-rc1+ #2 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Workqueue: events rht_deferred_worker Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_address_description.cold+0x7c/0x20d mm/kasan/report.c:188 __kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:317 kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:614 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:132 __read_once_size include/linux/compiler.h:194 [inline] rhashtable_last_table+0x162/0x180 lib/rhashtable.c:212 rht_deferred_worker+0x111/0x2030 lib/rhashtable.c:411 process_one_work+0x989/0x1790 kernel/workqueue.c:2269 worker_thread+0x98/0xe40 kernel/workqueue.c:2415 kthread+0x354/0x420 kernel/kthread.c:255 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352 Allocated by task 32687: save_stack+0x23/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:71 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:79 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:489 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xcf/0xe0 mm/kasan/common.c:462 kasan_kmalloc+0x9/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:503 __do_kmalloc_node mm/slab.c:3620 [inline] __kmalloc_node+0x4e/0x70 mm/slab.c:3627 kmalloc_node include/linux/slab.h:590 [inline] kvmalloc_node+0x68/0x100 mm/util.c:431 kvmalloc include/linux/mm.h:637 [inline] kvzalloc include/linux/mm.h:645 [inline] bucket_table_alloc+0x90/0x480 lib/rhashtable.c:178 rhashtable_init+0x3f4/0x7b0 lib/rhashtable.c:1057 inet_frags_init_net include/net/inet_frag.h:109 [inline] ipv4_frags_init_net+0x182/0x410 net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c:683 ops_init+0xb3/0x410 net/core/net_namespace.c:130 setup_net+0x2d3/0x740 net/core/net_namespace.c:316 copy_net_ns+0x1df/0x340 net/core/net_namespace.c:439 create_new_namespaces+0x400/0x7b0 kernel/nsproxy.c:107 unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xc2/0x200 kernel/nsproxy.c:206 ksys_unshare+0x440/0x980 kernel/fork.c:2692 __do_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:2760 [inline] __se_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:2758 [inline] __x64_sys_unshare+0x31/0x40 kernel/fork.c:2758 do_syscall_64+0xfd/0x680 arch/x86/entry/common.c:301 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Freed by task 7: save_stack+0x23/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:71 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:79 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:451 kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:459 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3432 [inline] kfree+0xcf/0x220 mm/slab.c:3755 kvfree+0x61/0x70 mm/util.c:460 bucket_table_free+0x69/0x150 lib/rhashtable.c:108 rhashtable_free_and_destroy+0x165/0x8b0 lib/rhashtable.c:1155 inet_frags_exit_net+0x3d/0x50 net/ipv4/inet_fragment.c:152 ipv4_frags_exit_net+0x73/0x90 net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c:695 ops_exit_list.isra.0+0xaa/0x150 net/core/net_namespace.c:154 cleanup_net+0x3fb/0x960 net/core/net_namespace.c:553 process_one_work+0x989/0x1790 kernel/workqueue.c:2269 worker_thread+0x98/0xe40 kernel/workqueue.c:2415 kthread+0x354/0x420 kernel/kthread.c:255 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880a6497b40 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024 The buggy address is located 48 bytes inside of 1024-byte region [ffff8880a6497b40, ffff8880a6497f40) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea0002992580 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8880aa400ac0 index:0xffff8880a64964c0 compound_mapcount: 0 flags: 0x1fffc0000010200(slab|head) raw: 01fffc0000010200 ffffea0002916e88 ffffea000218fe08 ffff8880aa400ac0 raw: ffff8880a64964c0 ffff8880a6496040 0000000100000005 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff8880a6497a00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff8880a6497a80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc >ffff8880a6497b00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff8880a6497b80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff8880a6497c00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb Fixes: 648700f76b03 ("inet: frags: use rhashtables for reassembly units") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-05-24 19:03:40 +03:00
INET_FRAG_HASH_DEAD = BIT(3),
};
inet: frags: use rhashtables for reassembly units Some applications still rely on IP fragmentation, and to be fair linux reassembly unit is not working under any serious load. It uses static hash tables of 1024 buckets, and up to 128 items per bucket (!!!) A work queue is supposed to garbage collect items when host is under memory pressure, and doing a hash rebuild, changing seed used in hash computations. This work queue blocks softirqs for up to 25 ms when doing a hash rebuild, occurring every 5 seconds if host is under fire. Then there is the problem of sharing this hash table for all netns. It is time to switch to rhashtables, and allocate one of them per netns to speedup netns dismantle, since this is a critical metric these days. Lookup is now using RCU. A followup patch will even remove the refcount hold/release left from prior implementation and save a couple of atomic operations. Before this patch, 16 cpus (16 RX queue NIC) could not handle more than 1 Mpps frags DDOS. After the patch, I reach 9 Mpps without any tuning, and can use up to 2GB of storage for the fragments (exact number depends on frags being evicted after timeout) $ grep FRAG /proc/net/sockstat FRAG: inuse 1966916 memory 2140004608 A followup patch will change the limits for 64bit arches. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Cc: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Aring <alex.aring@gmail.com> Cc: Stefan Schmidt <stefan@osg.samsung.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-03-31 22:58:49 +03:00
struct frag_v4_compare_key {
__be32 saddr;
__be32 daddr;
u32 user;
u32 vif;
__be16 id;
u16 protocol;
};
struct frag_v6_compare_key {
struct in6_addr saddr;
struct in6_addr daddr;
u32 user;
__be32 id;
u32 iif;
};
/**
* struct inet_frag_queue - fragment queue
*
inet: frags: use rhashtables for reassembly units Some applications still rely on IP fragmentation, and to be fair linux reassembly unit is not working under any serious load. It uses static hash tables of 1024 buckets, and up to 128 items per bucket (!!!) A work queue is supposed to garbage collect items when host is under memory pressure, and doing a hash rebuild, changing seed used in hash computations. This work queue blocks softirqs for up to 25 ms when doing a hash rebuild, occurring every 5 seconds if host is under fire. Then there is the problem of sharing this hash table for all netns. It is time to switch to rhashtables, and allocate one of them per netns to speedup netns dismantle, since this is a critical metric these days. Lookup is now using RCU. A followup patch will even remove the refcount hold/release left from prior implementation and save a couple of atomic operations. Before this patch, 16 cpus (16 RX queue NIC) could not handle more than 1 Mpps frags DDOS. After the patch, I reach 9 Mpps without any tuning, and can use up to 2GB of storage for the fragments (exact number depends on frags being evicted after timeout) $ grep FRAG /proc/net/sockstat FRAG: inuse 1966916 memory 2140004608 A followup patch will change the limits for 64bit arches. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Cc: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Aring <alex.aring@gmail.com> Cc: Stefan Schmidt <stefan@osg.samsung.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-03-31 22:58:49 +03:00
* @node: rhash node
* @key: keys identifying this frag.
* @timer: queue expiration timer
inet: frags: use rhashtables for reassembly units Some applications still rely on IP fragmentation, and to be fair linux reassembly unit is not working under any serious load. It uses static hash tables of 1024 buckets, and up to 128 items per bucket (!!!) A work queue is supposed to garbage collect items when host is under memory pressure, and doing a hash rebuild, changing seed used in hash computations. This work queue blocks softirqs for up to 25 ms when doing a hash rebuild, occurring every 5 seconds if host is under fire. Then there is the problem of sharing this hash table for all netns. It is time to switch to rhashtables, and allocate one of them per netns to speedup netns dismantle, since this is a critical metric these days. Lookup is now using RCU. A followup patch will even remove the refcount hold/release left from prior implementation and save a couple of atomic operations. Before this patch, 16 cpus (16 RX queue NIC) could not handle more than 1 Mpps frags DDOS. After the patch, I reach 9 Mpps without any tuning, and can use up to 2GB of storage for the fragments (exact number depends on frags being evicted after timeout) $ grep FRAG /proc/net/sockstat FRAG: inuse 1966916 memory 2140004608 A followup patch will change the limits for 64bit arches. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Cc: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Aring <alex.aring@gmail.com> Cc: Stefan Schmidt <stefan@osg.samsung.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-03-31 22:58:49 +03:00
* @lock: spinlock protecting this frag
* @refcnt: reference count of the queue
* @rb_fragments: received fragments rb-tree root
* @fragments_tail: received fragments tail
* @last_run_head: the head of the last "run". see ip_fragment.c
* @stamp: timestamp of the last received fragment
* @len: total length of the original datagram
* @meat: length of received fragments so far
* @flags: fragment queue flags
2015-05-22 17:32:51 +03:00
* @max_size: maximum received fragment size
* @fqdir: pointer to struct fqdir
inet: frags: use rhashtables for reassembly units Some applications still rely on IP fragmentation, and to be fair linux reassembly unit is not working under any serious load. It uses static hash tables of 1024 buckets, and up to 128 items per bucket (!!!) A work queue is supposed to garbage collect items when host is under memory pressure, and doing a hash rebuild, changing seed used in hash computations. This work queue blocks softirqs for up to 25 ms when doing a hash rebuild, occurring every 5 seconds if host is under fire. Then there is the problem of sharing this hash table for all netns. It is time to switch to rhashtables, and allocate one of them per netns to speedup netns dismantle, since this is a critical metric these days. Lookup is now using RCU. A followup patch will even remove the refcount hold/release left from prior implementation and save a couple of atomic operations. Before this patch, 16 cpus (16 RX queue NIC) could not handle more than 1 Mpps frags DDOS. After the patch, I reach 9 Mpps without any tuning, and can use up to 2GB of storage for the fragments (exact number depends on frags being evicted after timeout) $ grep FRAG /proc/net/sockstat FRAG: inuse 1966916 memory 2140004608 A followup patch will change the limits for 64bit arches. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Cc: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Aring <alex.aring@gmail.com> Cc: Stefan Schmidt <stefan@osg.samsung.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-03-31 22:58:49 +03:00
* @rcu: rcu head for freeing deferall
*/
struct inet_frag_queue {
inet: frags: use rhashtables for reassembly units Some applications still rely on IP fragmentation, and to be fair linux reassembly unit is not working under any serious load. It uses static hash tables of 1024 buckets, and up to 128 items per bucket (!!!) A work queue is supposed to garbage collect items when host is under memory pressure, and doing a hash rebuild, changing seed used in hash computations. This work queue blocks softirqs for up to 25 ms when doing a hash rebuild, occurring every 5 seconds if host is under fire. Then there is the problem of sharing this hash table for all netns. It is time to switch to rhashtables, and allocate one of them per netns to speedup netns dismantle, since this is a critical metric these days. Lookup is now using RCU. A followup patch will even remove the refcount hold/release left from prior implementation and save a couple of atomic operations. Before this patch, 16 cpus (16 RX queue NIC) could not handle more than 1 Mpps frags DDOS. After the patch, I reach 9 Mpps without any tuning, and can use up to 2GB of storage for the fragments (exact number depends on frags being evicted after timeout) $ grep FRAG /proc/net/sockstat FRAG: inuse 1966916 memory 2140004608 A followup patch will change the limits for 64bit arches. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Cc: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Aring <alex.aring@gmail.com> Cc: Stefan Schmidt <stefan@osg.samsung.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-03-31 22:58:49 +03:00
struct rhash_head node;
union {
struct frag_v4_compare_key v4;
struct frag_v6_compare_key v6;
} key;
struct timer_list timer;
inet: frags: use rhashtables for reassembly units Some applications still rely on IP fragmentation, and to be fair linux reassembly unit is not working under any serious load. It uses static hash tables of 1024 buckets, and up to 128 items per bucket (!!!) A work queue is supposed to garbage collect items when host is under memory pressure, and doing a hash rebuild, changing seed used in hash computations. This work queue blocks softirqs for up to 25 ms when doing a hash rebuild, occurring every 5 seconds if host is under fire. Then there is the problem of sharing this hash table for all netns. It is time to switch to rhashtables, and allocate one of them per netns to speedup netns dismantle, since this is a critical metric these days. Lookup is now using RCU. A followup patch will even remove the refcount hold/release left from prior implementation and save a couple of atomic operations. Before this patch, 16 cpus (16 RX queue NIC) could not handle more than 1 Mpps frags DDOS. After the patch, I reach 9 Mpps without any tuning, and can use up to 2GB of storage for the fragments (exact number depends on frags being evicted after timeout) $ grep FRAG /proc/net/sockstat FRAG: inuse 1966916 memory 2140004608 A followup patch will change the limits for 64bit arches. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Cc: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Aring <alex.aring@gmail.com> Cc: Stefan Schmidt <stefan@osg.samsung.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-03-31 22:58:49 +03:00
spinlock_t lock;
refcount_t refcnt;
struct rb_root rb_fragments;
struct sk_buff *fragments_tail;
struct sk_buff *last_run_head;
ktime_t stamp;
int len;
int meat;
__u8 flags;
u16 max_size;
struct fqdir *fqdir;
inet: frags: use rhashtables for reassembly units Some applications still rely on IP fragmentation, and to be fair linux reassembly unit is not working under any serious load. It uses static hash tables of 1024 buckets, and up to 128 items per bucket (!!!) A work queue is supposed to garbage collect items when host is under memory pressure, and doing a hash rebuild, changing seed used in hash computations. This work queue blocks softirqs for up to 25 ms when doing a hash rebuild, occurring every 5 seconds if host is under fire. Then there is the problem of sharing this hash table for all netns. It is time to switch to rhashtables, and allocate one of them per netns to speedup netns dismantle, since this is a critical metric these days. Lookup is now using RCU. A followup patch will even remove the refcount hold/release left from prior implementation and save a couple of atomic operations. Before this patch, 16 cpus (16 RX queue NIC) could not handle more than 1 Mpps frags DDOS. After the patch, I reach 9 Mpps without any tuning, and can use up to 2GB of storage for the fragments (exact number depends on frags being evicted after timeout) $ grep FRAG /proc/net/sockstat FRAG: inuse 1966916 memory 2140004608 A followup patch will change the limits for 64bit arches. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Cc: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Aring <alex.aring@gmail.com> Cc: Stefan Schmidt <stefan@osg.samsung.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-03-31 22:58:49 +03:00
struct rcu_head rcu;
net: frag queue per hash bucket locking This patch implements per hash bucket locking for the frag queue hash. This removes two write locks, and the only remaining write lock is for protecting hash rebuild. This essentially reduce the readers-writer lock to a rebuild lock. This patch is part of "net: frag performance followup" http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.network/263644 of which two patches have already been accepted: Same test setup as previous: (http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.network/257155) Two 10G interfaces, on seperate NUMA nodes, are under-test, and uses Ethernet flow-control. A third interface is used for generating the DoS attack (with trafgen). Notice, I have changed the frag DoS generator script to be more efficient/deadly. Before it would only hit one RX queue, now its sending packets causing multi-queue RX, due to "better" RX hashing. Test types summary (netperf UDP_STREAM): Test-20G64K == 2x10G with 65K fragments Test-20G3F == 2x10G with 3x fragments (3*1472 bytes) Test-20G64K+DoS == Same as 20G64K with frag DoS Test-20G3F+DoS == Same as 20G3F with frag DoS Test-20G64K+MQ == Same as 20G64K with Multi-Queue frag DoS Test-20G3F+MQ == Same as 20G3F with Multi-Queue frag DoS When I rebased this-patch(03) (on top of net-next commit a210576c) and removed the _bh spinlock, I saw a performance regression. BUT this was caused by some unrelated change in-between. See tests below. Test (A) is what I reported before for patch-02, accepted in commit 1b5ab0de. Test (B) verifying-retest of commit 1b5ab0de corrospond to patch-02. Test (C) is what I reported before for this-patch Test (D) is net-next master HEAD (commit a210576c), which reveals some (unknown) performance regression (compared against test (B)). Test (D) function as a new base-test. Performance table summary (in Mbit/s): (#) Test-type: 20G64K 20G3F 20G64K+DoS 20G3F+DoS 20G64K+MQ 20G3F+MQ ---------- ------- ------- ---------- --------- -------- ------- (A) Patch-02 : 18848.7 13230.1 4103.04 5310.36 130.0 440.2 (B) 1b5ab0de : 18841.5 13156.8 4101.08 5314.57 129.0 424.2 (C) Patch-03v1: 18838.0 13490.5 4405.11 6814.72 196.6 461.6 (D) a210576c : 18321.5 11250.4 3635.34 5160.13 119.1 405.2 (E) with _bh : 17247.3 11492.6 3994.74 6405.29 166.7 413.6 (F) without bh: 17471.3 11298.7 3818.05 6102.11 165.7 406.3 Test (E) and (F) is this-patch(03), with(V1) and without(V2) the _bh spinlocks. I cannot explain the slow down for 20G64K (but its an artificial "lab-test" so I'm not worried). But the other results does show improvements. And test (E) "with _bh" version is slightly better. Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com> Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> ---- V2: - By analysis from Hannes Frederic Sowa and Eric Dumazet, we don't need the spinlock _bh versions, as Netfilter currently does a local_bh_disable() before entering inet_fragment. - Fold-in desc from cover-mail V3: - Drop the chain_len counter per hash bucket. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-04-04 03:38:16 +04:00
};
struct inet_frags {
unsigned int qsize;
void (*constructor)(struct inet_frag_queue *q,
const void *arg);
void (*destructor)(struct inet_frag_queue *);
void (*frag_expire)(struct timer_list *t);
struct kmem_cache *frags_cachep;
const char *frags_cache_name;
inet: frags: use rhashtables for reassembly units Some applications still rely on IP fragmentation, and to be fair linux reassembly unit is not working under any serious load. It uses static hash tables of 1024 buckets, and up to 128 items per bucket (!!!) A work queue is supposed to garbage collect items when host is under memory pressure, and doing a hash rebuild, changing seed used in hash computations. This work queue blocks softirqs for up to 25 ms when doing a hash rebuild, occurring every 5 seconds if host is under fire. Then there is the problem of sharing this hash table for all netns. It is time to switch to rhashtables, and allocate one of them per netns to speedup netns dismantle, since this is a critical metric these days. Lookup is now using RCU. A followup patch will even remove the refcount hold/release left from prior implementation and save a couple of atomic operations. Before this patch, 16 cpus (16 RX queue NIC) could not handle more than 1 Mpps frags DDOS. After the patch, I reach 9 Mpps without any tuning, and can use up to 2GB of storage for the fragments (exact number depends on frags being evicted after timeout) $ grep FRAG /proc/net/sockstat FRAG: inuse 1966916 memory 2140004608 A followup patch will change the limits for 64bit arches. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Cc: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Aring <alex.aring@gmail.com> Cc: Stefan Schmidt <stefan@osg.samsung.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-03-31 22:58:49 +03:00
struct rhashtable_params rhash_params;
inet: frags: fix use-after-free read in inet_frag_destroy_rcu As caught by syzbot [1], the rcu grace period that is respected before fqdir_rwork_fn() proceeds and frees fqdir is not enough to prevent inet_frag_destroy_rcu() being run after the freeing. We need a proper rcu_barrier() synchronization to replace the one we had in inet_frags_fini() We also have to fix a potential problem at module removal : inet_frags_fini() needs to make sure that all queued work queues (fqdir_rwork_fn) have completed, otherwise we might call kmem_cache_destroy() too soon and get another use-after-free. [1] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in inet_frag_destroy_rcu+0xd9/0xe0 net/ipv4/inet_fragment.c:201 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88806ed47a18 by task swapper/1/0 CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 5.2.0-rc1+ #2 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_address_description.cold+0x7c/0x20d mm/kasan/report.c:188 __kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:317 kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:614 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:132 inet_frag_destroy_rcu+0xd9/0xe0 net/ipv4/inet_fragment.c:201 __rcu_reclaim kernel/rcu/rcu.h:222 [inline] rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2092 [inline] invoke_rcu_callbacks kernel/rcu/tree.c:2310 [inline] rcu_core+0xba5/0x1500 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2291 __do_softirq+0x25c/0x94c kernel/softirq.c:293 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:374 [inline] irq_exit+0x180/0x1d0 kernel/softirq.c:414 exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:536 [inline] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x13b/0x550 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1068 apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:806 </IRQ> RIP: 0010:native_safe_halt+0xe/0x10 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:61 Code: ff ff 48 89 df e8 f2 95 8c fa eb 82 e9 07 00 00 00 0f 00 2d e4 45 4b 00 f4 c3 66 90 e9 07 00 00 00 0f 00 2d d4 45 4b 00 fb f4 <c3> 90 55 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 53 e8 8e 18 42 fa e8 99 RSP: 0018:ffff8880a98e7d78 EFLAGS: 00000282 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff13 RAX: 1ffffffff1164e11 RBX: ffff8880a98d4340 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI: ffff8880a98d4bbc RBP: ffff8880a98e7da8 R08: ffff8880a98d4340 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: ffffffff88b27078 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000000 arch_cpu_idle+0xa/0x10 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:571 default_idle_call+0x36/0x90 kernel/sched/idle.c:94 cpuidle_idle_call kernel/sched/idle.c:154 [inline] do_idle+0x377/0x560 kernel/sched/idle.c:263 cpu_startup_entry+0x1b/0x20 kernel/sched/idle.c:354 start_secondary+0x34e/0x4c0 arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:267 secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S:243 Allocated by task 8877: save_stack+0x23/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:71 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:79 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:489 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xcf/0xe0 mm/kasan/common.c:462 kasan_kmalloc+0x9/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:503 kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x151/0x750 mm/slab.c:3555 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:547 [inline] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:742 [inline] fqdir_init include/net/inet_frag.h:115 [inline] ipv6_frags_init_net+0x48/0x460 net/ipv6/reassembly.c:513 ops_init+0xb3/0x410 net/core/net_namespace.c:130 setup_net+0x2d3/0x740 net/core/net_namespace.c:316 copy_net_ns+0x1df/0x340 net/core/net_namespace.c:439 create_new_namespaces+0x400/0x7b0 kernel/nsproxy.c:107 unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xc2/0x200 kernel/nsproxy.c:206 ksys_unshare+0x440/0x980 kernel/fork.c:2692 __do_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:2760 [inline] __se_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:2758 [inline] __x64_sys_unshare+0x31/0x40 kernel/fork.c:2758 do_syscall_64+0xfd/0x680 arch/x86/entry/common.c:301 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Freed by task 17: save_stack+0x23/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:71 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:79 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:451 kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:459 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3432 [inline] kfree+0xcf/0x220 mm/slab.c:3755 fqdir_rwork_fn+0x33/0x40 net/ipv4/inet_fragment.c:154 process_one_work+0x989/0x1790 kernel/workqueue.c:2269 worker_thread+0x98/0xe40 kernel/workqueue.c:2415 kthread+0x354/0x420 kernel/kthread.c:255 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88806ed47a00 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512 The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of 512-byte region [ffff88806ed47a00, ffff88806ed47c00) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea0001bb51c0 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8880aa400940 index:0x0 flags: 0x1fffc0000000200(slab) raw: 01fffc0000000200 ffffea000282a788 ffffea0001bb53c8 ffff8880aa400940 raw: 0000000000000000 ffff88806ed47000 0000000100000006 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88806ed47900: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff88806ed47980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc >ffff88806ed47a00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff88806ed47a80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff88806ed47b00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb Fixes: 3c8fc8782044 ("inet: frags: rework rhashtable dismantle") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-05-28 02:56:49 +03:00
refcount_t refcnt;
struct completion completion;
};
int inet_frags_init(struct inet_frags *);
void inet_frags_fini(struct inet_frags *);
int fqdir_init(struct fqdir **fqdirp, struct inet_frags *f, struct net *net);
inet: fix various use-after-free in defrags units syzbot reported another issue caused by my recent patches. [1] The issue here is that fqdir_exit() is initiating a work queue and immediately returns. A bit later cleanup_net() was able to free the MIB (percpu data) and the whole struct net was freed, but we had active frag timers that fired and triggered use-after-free. We need to make sure that timers can catch fqdir->dead being set, to bailout. Since RCU is used for the reader side, this means we want to respect an RCU grace period between these operations : 1) qfdir->dead = 1; 2) netns dismantle (freeing of various data structure) This patch uses new new (struct pernet_operations)->pre_exit infrastructure to ensures a full RCU grace period happens between fqdir_pre_exit() and fqdir_exit() This also means we can use a regular work queue, we no longer need rcu_work. Tested: $ time for i in {1..1000}; do unshare -n /bin/false;done real 0m2.585s user 0m0.160s sys 0m2.214s [1] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ip_expire+0x73e/0x800 net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c:152 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88808b9fe330 by task syz-executor.4/11860 CPU: 1 PID: 11860 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 5.2.0-rc2+ #22 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_address_description.cold+0x7c/0x20d mm/kasan/report.c:188 __kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:317 kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:614 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:132 ip_expire+0x73e/0x800 net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c:152 call_timer_fn+0x193/0x720 kernel/time/timer.c:1322 expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1366 [inline] __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1685 [inline] __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1653 [inline] run_timer_softirq+0x66f/0x1740 kernel/time/timer.c:1698 __do_softirq+0x25c/0x94c kernel/softirq.c:293 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:374 [inline] irq_exit+0x180/0x1d0 kernel/softirq.c:414 exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:536 [inline] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x13b/0x550 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1068 apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:806 </IRQ> RIP: 0010:tomoyo_domain_quota_is_ok+0x131/0x540 security/tomoyo/util.c:1035 Code: 24 4c 3b 65 d0 0f 84 9c 00 00 00 e8 19 1d 73 fe 49 8d 7c 24 18 48 ba 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 0f b6 04 10 <48> 89 fa 83 e2 07 38 d0 7f 08 84 c0 0f 85 69 03 00 00 41 0f b6 5c RSP: 0018:ffff88806ae079c0 EFLAGS: 00000a02 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff13 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000010 RCX: ffffc9000e655000 RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: ffffffff82fd88a7 RDI: ffff888086202398 RBP: ffff88806ae07a00 R08: ffff88808b6c8700 R09: ffffed100d5c0f4d R10: ffffed100d5c0f4c R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888086202380 R13: 0000000000000030 R14: 00000000000000d3 R15: 0000000000000000 tomoyo_supervisor+0x2e8/0xef0 security/tomoyo/common.c:2087 tomoyo_audit_path_number_log security/tomoyo/file.c:235 [inline] tomoyo_path_number_perm+0x42f/0x520 security/tomoyo/file.c:734 tomoyo_file_ioctl+0x23/0x30 security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c:335 security_file_ioctl+0x77/0xc0 security/security.c:1370 ksys_ioctl+0x57/0xd0 fs/ioctl.c:711 __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:720 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:718 [inline] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x73/0xb0 fs/ioctl.c:718 do_syscall_64+0xfd/0x680 arch/x86/entry/common.c:301 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x4592c9 Code: fd b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 cb b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007f8db5e44c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00000000004592c9 RDX: 0000000020000080 RSI: 00000000000089f1 RDI: 0000000000000006 RBP: 000000000075bf20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f8db5e456d4 R13: 00000000004cc770 R14: 00000000004d5cd8 R15: 00000000ffffffff Allocated by task 9047: save_stack+0x23/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:71 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:79 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:489 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xcf/0xe0 mm/kasan/common.c:462 kasan_slab_alloc+0xf/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:497 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:437 [inline] slab_alloc mm/slab.c:3326 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc+0x11a/0x6f0 mm/slab.c:3488 kmem_cache_zalloc include/linux/slab.h:732 [inline] net_alloc net/core/net_namespace.c:386 [inline] copy_net_ns+0xed/0x340 net/core/net_namespace.c:426 create_new_namespaces+0x400/0x7b0 kernel/nsproxy.c:107 unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xc2/0x200 kernel/nsproxy.c:206 ksys_unshare+0x440/0x980 kernel/fork.c:2692 __do_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:2760 [inline] __se_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:2758 [inline] __x64_sys_unshare+0x31/0x40 kernel/fork.c:2758 do_syscall_64+0xfd/0x680 arch/x86/entry/common.c:301 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Freed by task 2541: save_stack+0x23/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:71 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:79 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:451 kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:459 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3432 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0x86/0x260 mm/slab.c:3698 net_free net/core/net_namespace.c:402 [inline] net_drop_ns.part.0+0x70/0x90 net/core/net_namespace.c:409 net_drop_ns net/core/net_namespace.c:408 [inline] cleanup_net+0x538/0x960 net/core/net_namespace.c:571 process_one_work+0x989/0x1790 kernel/workqueue.c:2269 worker_thread+0x98/0xe40 kernel/workqueue.c:2415 kthread+0x354/0x420 kernel/kthread.c:255 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88808b9fe100 which belongs to the cache net_namespace of size 6784 The buggy address is located 560 bytes inside of 6784-byte region [ffff88808b9fe100, ffff88808b9ffb80) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea00022e7f80 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88821b6f60c0 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0 flags: 0x1fffc0000010200(slab|head) raw: 01fffc0000010200 ffffea000256f288 ffffea0001bbef08 ffff88821b6f60c0 raw: 0000000000000000 ffff88808b9fe100 0000000100000001 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88808b9fe200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff88808b9fe280: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb >ffff88808b9fe300: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff88808b9fe380: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff88808b9fe400: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb Fixes: 3c8fc8782044 ("inet: frags: rework rhashtable dismantle") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-06-18 21:09:00 +03:00
static void inline fqdir_pre_exit(struct fqdir *fqdir)
{
fqdir->high_thresh = 0; /* prevent creation of new frags */
fqdir->dead = true;
}
void fqdir_exit(struct fqdir *fqdir);
void inet_frag_kill(struct inet_frag_queue *q);
void inet_frag_destroy(struct inet_frag_queue *q);
struct inet_frag_queue *inet_frag_find(struct fqdir *fqdir, void *key);
/* Free all skbs in the queue; return the sum of their truesizes. */
unsigned int inet_frag_rbtree_purge(struct rb_root *root);
static inline void inet_frag_put(struct inet_frag_queue *q)
{
if (refcount_dec_and_test(&q->refcnt))
inet_frag_destroy(q);
}
/* Memory Tracking Functions. */
static inline long frag_mem_limit(const struct fqdir *fqdir)
{
return atomic_long_read(&fqdir->mem);
}
static inline void sub_frag_mem_limit(struct fqdir *fqdir, long val)
{
atomic_long_sub(val, &fqdir->mem);
}
static inline void add_frag_mem_limit(struct fqdir *fqdir, long val)
{
atomic_long_add(val, &fqdir->mem);
}
/* RFC 3168 support :
* We want to check ECN values of all fragments, do detect invalid combinations.
* In ipq->ecn, we store the OR value of each ip4_frag_ecn() fragment value.
*/
#define IPFRAG_ECN_NOT_ECT 0x01 /* one frag had ECN_NOT_ECT */
#define IPFRAG_ECN_ECT_1 0x02 /* one frag had ECN_ECT_1 */
#define IPFRAG_ECN_ECT_0 0x04 /* one frag had ECN_ECT_0 */
#define IPFRAG_ECN_CE 0x08 /* one frag had ECN_CE */
extern const u8 ip_frag_ecn_table[16];
/* Return values of inet_frag_queue_insert() */
#define IPFRAG_OK 0
#define IPFRAG_DUP 1
#define IPFRAG_OVERLAP 2
int inet_frag_queue_insert(struct inet_frag_queue *q, struct sk_buff *skb,
int offset, int end);
void *inet_frag_reasm_prepare(struct inet_frag_queue *q, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct sk_buff *parent);
void inet_frag_reasm_finish(struct inet_frag_queue *q, struct sk_buff *head,
void *reasm_data);
struct sk_buff *inet_frag_pull_head(struct inet_frag_queue *q);
#endif