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// SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1
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/*
*
* SMB / CIFS session setup handling routines
*
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* Copyright ( c ) International Business Machines Corp . , 2006 , 2009
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* Author ( s ) : Steve French ( sfrench @ us . ibm . com )
*
*/
# include "cifspdu.h"
# include "cifsglob.h"
# include "cifsproto.h"
# include "cifs_unicode.h"
# include "cifs_debug.h"
# include "ntlmssp.h"
# include "nterr.h"
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# include <linux/utsname.h>
include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h
percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being
included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which
in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files
universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies.
percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for
this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those
headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion
needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is
used as the basis of conversion.
http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py
The script does the followings.
* Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that
only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used,
gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h.
* When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include
blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms
to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains
core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered -
alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there
doesn't seem to be any matching order.
* If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly
because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out
an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the
file.
The conversion was done in the following steps.
1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly
over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h
and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400
files.
2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion,
some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or
embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added
inclusions to around 150 files.
3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits
from #2 to make sure no file was left behind.
4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed.
e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab
APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually.
5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically
editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h
files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h
inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually
wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each
slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as
necessary.
6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h.
7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures
were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my
distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few
more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things
build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq).
* x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config.
* powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig
* sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig
* ia64 SMP allmodconfig
* s390 SMP allmodconfig
* alpha SMP allmodconfig
* um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig
8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as
a separate patch and serve as bisection point.
Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step
6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch.
If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch
headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of
the specific arch.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
2010-03-24 11:04:11 +03:00
# include <linux/slab.h>
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# include <linux/version.h>
# include "cifsfs.h"
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# include "cifs_spnego.h"
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# include "smb2proto.h"
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# include "fs_context.h"
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static int
cifs_ses_add_channel ( struct cifs_sb_info * cifs_sb , struct cifs_ses * ses ,
struct cifs_server_iface * iface ) ;
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bool
is_server_using_iface ( struct TCP_Server_Info * server ,
struct cifs_server_iface * iface )
{
struct sockaddr_in * i4 = ( struct sockaddr_in * ) & iface - > sockaddr ;
struct sockaddr_in6 * i6 = ( struct sockaddr_in6 * ) & iface - > sockaddr ;
struct sockaddr_in * s4 = ( struct sockaddr_in * ) & server - > dstaddr ;
struct sockaddr_in6 * s6 = ( struct sockaddr_in6 * ) & server - > dstaddr ;
if ( server - > dstaddr . ss_family ! = iface - > sockaddr . ss_family )
return false ;
if ( server - > dstaddr . ss_family = = AF_INET ) {
if ( s4 - > sin_addr . s_addr ! = i4 - > sin_addr . s_addr )
return false ;
} else if ( server - > dstaddr . ss_family = = AF_INET6 ) {
if ( memcmp ( & s6 - > sin6_addr , & i6 - > sin6_addr ,
sizeof ( i6 - > sin6_addr ) ) ! = 0 )
return false ;
} else {
/* unknown family.. */
return false ;
}
return true ;
}
bool is_ses_using_iface ( struct cifs_ses * ses , struct cifs_server_iface * iface )
{
int i ;
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spin_lock ( & ses - > chan_lock ) ;
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for ( i = 0 ; i < ses - > chan_count ; i + + ) {
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if ( ses - > chans [ i ] . iface = = iface ) {
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spin_unlock ( & ses - > chan_lock ) ;
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return true ;
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}
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}
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spin_unlock ( & ses - > chan_lock ) ;
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return false ;
}
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/* channel helper functions. assumed that chan_lock is held by caller. */
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unsigned int
cifs_ses_get_chan_index ( struct cifs_ses * ses ,
struct TCP_Server_Info * server )
{
unsigned int i ;
for ( i = 0 ; i < ses - > chan_count ; i + + ) {
if ( ses - > chans [ i ] . server = = server )
return i ;
}
/* If we didn't find the channel, it is likely a bug */
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if ( server )
cifs_dbg ( VFS , " unable to get chan index for server: 0x%llx " ,
server - > conn_id ) ;
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WARN_ON ( 1 ) ;
return 0 ;
}
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void
cifs_chan_set_in_reconnect ( struct cifs_ses * ses ,
struct TCP_Server_Info * server )
{
unsigned int chan_index = cifs_ses_get_chan_index ( ses , server ) ;
ses - > chans [ chan_index ] . in_reconnect = true ;
}
void
cifs_chan_clear_in_reconnect ( struct cifs_ses * ses ,
struct TCP_Server_Info * server )
{
unsigned int chan_index = cifs_ses_get_chan_index ( ses , server ) ;
ses - > chans [ chan_index ] . in_reconnect = false ;
}
bool
cifs_chan_in_reconnect ( struct cifs_ses * ses ,
struct TCP_Server_Info * server )
{
unsigned int chan_index = cifs_ses_get_chan_index ( ses , server ) ;
return CIFS_CHAN_IN_RECONNECT ( ses , chan_index ) ;
}
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void
cifs_chan_set_need_reconnect ( struct cifs_ses * ses ,
struct TCP_Server_Info * server )
{
unsigned int chan_index = cifs_ses_get_chan_index ( ses , server ) ;
set_bit ( chan_index , & ses - > chans_need_reconnect ) ;
cifs_dbg ( FYI , " Set reconnect bitmask for chan %u; now 0x%lx \n " ,
chan_index , ses - > chans_need_reconnect ) ;
}
void
cifs_chan_clear_need_reconnect ( struct cifs_ses * ses ,
struct TCP_Server_Info * server )
{
unsigned int chan_index = cifs_ses_get_chan_index ( ses , server ) ;
clear_bit ( chan_index , & ses - > chans_need_reconnect ) ;
cifs_dbg ( FYI , " Cleared reconnect bitmask for chan %u; now 0x%lx \n " ,
chan_index , ses - > chans_need_reconnect ) ;
}
bool
cifs_chan_needs_reconnect ( struct cifs_ses * ses ,
struct TCP_Server_Info * server )
{
unsigned int chan_index = cifs_ses_get_chan_index ( ses , server ) ;
return CIFS_CHAN_NEEDS_RECONNECT ( ses , chan_index ) ;
}
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bool
cifs_chan_is_iface_active ( struct cifs_ses * ses ,
struct TCP_Server_Info * server )
{
unsigned int chan_index = cifs_ses_get_chan_index ( ses , server ) ;
return ses - > chans [ chan_index ] . iface & &
ses - > chans [ chan_index ] . iface - > is_active ;
}
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/* returns number of channels added */
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int cifs_try_adding_channels ( struct cifs_sb_info * cifs_sb , struct cifs_ses * ses )
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{
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int old_chan_count , new_chan_count ;
int left ;
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int rc = 0 ;
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int tries = 0 ;
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struct cifs_server_iface * iface = NULL , * niface = NULL ;
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spin_lock ( & ses - > chan_lock ) ;
new_chan_count = old_chan_count = ses - > chan_count ;
left = ses - > chan_max - ses - > chan_count ;
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if ( left < = 0 ) {
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spin_unlock ( & ses - > chan_lock ) ;
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cifs_dbg ( FYI ,
" ses already at max_channels (%zu), nothing to open \n " ,
ses - > chan_max ) ;
return 0 ;
}
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if ( ses - > server - > dialect < SMB30_PROT_ID ) {
spin_unlock ( & ses - > chan_lock ) ;
cifs_dbg ( VFS , " multichannel is not supported on this protocol version, use 3.0 or above \n " ) ;
return 0 ;
}
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if ( ! ( ses - > server - > capabilities & SMB2_GLOBAL_CAP_MULTI_CHANNEL ) ) {
ses - > chan_max = 1 ;
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spin_unlock ( & ses - > chan_lock ) ;
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cifs_dbg ( VFS , " server %s does not support multichannel \n " , ses - > server - > hostname ) ;
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return 0 ;
}
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spin_unlock ( & ses - > chan_lock ) ;
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/*
* Keep connecting to same , fastest , iface for all channels as
* long as its RSS . Try next fastest one if not RSS or channel
* creation fails .
*/
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spin_lock ( & ses - > iface_lock ) ;
iface = list_first_entry ( & ses - > iface_list , struct cifs_server_iface ,
iface_head ) ;
spin_unlock ( & ses - > iface_lock ) ;
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while ( left > 0 ) {
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tries + + ;
if ( tries > 3 * ses - > chan_max ) {
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cifs_dbg ( FYI , " too many channel open attempts (%d channels left to open) \n " ,
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left ) ;
break ;
}
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spin_lock ( & ses - > iface_lock ) ;
if ( ! ses - > iface_count ) {
spin_unlock ( & ses - > iface_lock ) ;
break ;
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}
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list_for_each_entry_safe_from ( iface , niface , & ses - > iface_list ,
iface_head ) {
/* skip ifaces that are unusable */
if ( ! iface - > is_active | |
( is_ses_using_iface ( ses , iface ) & &
! iface - > rss_capable ) ) {
continue ;
}
/* take ref before unlock */
kref_get ( & iface - > refcount ) ;
spin_unlock ( & ses - > iface_lock ) ;
rc = cifs_ses_add_channel ( cifs_sb , ses , iface ) ;
spin_lock ( & ses - > iface_lock ) ;
if ( rc ) {
cifs_dbg ( VFS , " failed to open extra channel on iface:%pIS rc=%d \n " ,
& iface - > sockaddr ,
rc ) ;
kref_put ( & iface - > refcount , release_iface ) ;
continue ;
}
cifs_dbg ( FYI , " successfully opened new channel on iface:%pIS \n " ,
& iface - > sockaddr ) ;
break ;
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}
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spin_unlock ( & ses - > iface_lock ) ;
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left - - ;
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new_chan_count + + ;
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}
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return new_chan_count - old_chan_count ;
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}
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/*
* update the iface for the channel if necessary .
cifs: avoid deadlocks while updating iface
We use cifs_tcp_ses_lock to protect a lot of things.
Not only does it protect the lists of connections, sessions,
tree connects, open file lists, etc., we also use it to
protect some fields in each of it's entries.
In this case, cifs_mark_ses_for_reconnect takes the
cifs_tcp_ses_lock to traverse the lists, and then calls
cifs_update_iface. However, that can end up calling
cifs_put_tcp_session, which picks up the same lock again.
Avoid this by taking a ref for the session, drop the lock,
and then call update iface.
Also, in cifs_update_iface, avoid nested locking of iface_lock
and chan_lock, as much as possible. When unavoidable, we need
to pick iface_lock first.
Signed-off-by: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
2022-06-24 12:43:59 +03:00
* will return 0 when iface is updated , 1 if removed , 2 otherwise
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* Must be called with chan_lock held .
*/
int
cifs_chan_update_iface ( struct cifs_ses * ses , struct TCP_Server_Info * server )
{
cifs: avoid deadlocks while updating iface
We use cifs_tcp_ses_lock to protect a lot of things.
Not only does it protect the lists of connections, sessions,
tree connects, open file lists, etc., we also use it to
protect some fields in each of it's entries.
In this case, cifs_mark_ses_for_reconnect takes the
cifs_tcp_ses_lock to traverse the lists, and then calls
cifs_update_iface. However, that can end up calling
cifs_put_tcp_session, which picks up the same lock again.
Avoid this by taking a ref for the session, drop the lock,
and then call update iface.
Also, in cifs_update_iface, avoid nested locking of iface_lock
and chan_lock, as much as possible. When unavoidable, we need
to pick iface_lock first.
Signed-off-by: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
2022-06-24 12:43:59 +03:00
unsigned int chan_index ;
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struct cifs_server_iface * iface = NULL ;
struct cifs_server_iface * old_iface = NULL ;
int rc = 0 ;
cifs: avoid deadlocks while updating iface
We use cifs_tcp_ses_lock to protect a lot of things.
Not only does it protect the lists of connections, sessions,
tree connects, open file lists, etc., we also use it to
protect some fields in each of it's entries.
In this case, cifs_mark_ses_for_reconnect takes the
cifs_tcp_ses_lock to traverse the lists, and then calls
cifs_update_iface. However, that can end up calling
cifs_put_tcp_session, which picks up the same lock again.
Avoid this by taking a ref for the session, drop the lock,
and then call update iface.
Also, in cifs_update_iface, avoid nested locking of iface_lock
and chan_lock, as much as possible. When unavoidable, we need
to pick iface_lock first.
Signed-off-by: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
2022-06-24 12:43:59 +03:00
spin_lock ( & ses - > chan_lock ) ;
chan_index = cifs_ses_get_chan_index ( ses , server ) ;
if ( ! chan_index ) {
spin_unlock ( & ses - > chan_lock ) ;
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return 0 ;
cifs: avoid deadlocks while updating iface
We use cifs_tcp_ses_lock to protect a lot of things.
Not only does it protect the lists of connections, sessions,
tree connects, open file lists, etc., we also use it to
protect some fields in each of it's entries.
In this case, cifs_mark_ses_for_reconnect takes the
cifs_tcp_ses_lock to traverse the lists, and then calls
cifs_update_iface. However, that can end up calling
cifs_put_tcp_session, which picks up the same lock again.
Avoid this by taking a ref for the session, drop the lock,
and then call update iface.
Also, in cifs_update_iface, avoid nested locking of iface_lock
and chan_lock, as much as possible. When unavoidable, we need
to pick iface_lock first.
Signed-off-by: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
2022-06-24 12:43:59 +03:00
}
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if ( ses - > chans [ chan_index ] . iface ) {
old_iface = ses - > chans [ chan_index ] . iface ;
cifs: avoid deadlocks while updating iface
We use cifs_tcp_ses_lock to protect a lot of things.
Not only does it protect the lists of connections, sessions,
tree connects, open file lists, etc., we also use it to
protect some fields in each of it's entries.
In this case, cifs_mark_ses_for_reconnect takes the
cifs_tcp_ses_lock to traverse the lists, and then calls
cifs_update_iface. However, that can end up calling
cifs_put_tcp_session, which picks up the same lock again.
Avoid this by taking a ref for the session, drop the lock,
and then call update iface.
Also, in cifs_update_iface, avoid nested locking of iface_lock
and chan_lock, as much as possible. When unavoidable, we need
to pick iface_lock first.
Signed-off-by: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
2022-06-24 12:43:59 +03:00
if ( old_iface - > is_active ) {
spin_unlock ( & ses - > chan_lock ) ;
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return 1 ;
cifs: avoid deadlocks while updating iface
We use cifs_tcp_ses_lock to protect a lot of things.
Not only does it protect the lists of connections, sessions,
tree connects, open file lists, etc., we also use it to
protect some fields in each of it's entries.
In this case, cifs_mark_ses_for_reconnect takes the
cifs_tcp_ses_lock to traverse the lists, and then calls
cifs_update_iface. However, that can end up calling
cifs_put_tcp_session, which picks up the same lock again.
Avoid this by taking a ref for the session, drop the lock,
and then call update iface.
Also, in cifs_update_iface, avoid nested locking of iface_lock
and chan_lock, as much as possible. When unavoidable, we need
to pick iface_lock first.
Signed-off-by: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
2022-06-24 12:43:59 +03:00
}
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}
cifs: avoid deadlocks while updating iface
We use cifs_tcp_ses_lock to protect a lot of things.
Not only does it protect the lists of connections, sessions,
tree connects, open file lists, etc., we also use it to
protect some fields in each of it's entries.
In this case, cifs_mark_ses_for_reconnect takes the
cifs_tcp_ses_lock to traverse the lists, and then calls
cifs_update_iface. However, that can end up calling
cifs_put_tcp_session, which picks up the same lock again.
Avoid this by taking a ref for the session, drop the lock,
and then call update iface.
Also, in cifs_update_iface, avoid nested locking of iface_lock
and chan_lock, as much as possible. When unavoidable, we need
to pick iface_lock first.
Signed-off-by: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
2022-06-24 12:43:59 +03:00
spin_unlock ( & ses - > chan_lock ) ;
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spin_lock ( & ses - > iface_lock ) ;
/* then look for a new one */
list_for_each_entry ( iface , & ses - > iface_list , iface_head ) {
if ( ! iface - > is_active | |
( is_ses_using_iface ( ses , iface ) & &
! iface - > rss_capable ) ) {
continue ;
}
kref_get ( & iface - > refcount ) ;
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break ;
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}
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if ( list_entry_is_head ( iface , & ses - > iface_list , iface_head ) ) {
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rc = 1 ;
iface = NULL ;
cifs_dbg ( FYI , " unable to find a suitable iface \n " ) ;
}
/* now drop the ref to the current iface */
if ( old_iface & & iface ) {
cifs_dbg ( FYI , " replacing iface: %pIS with %pIS \n " ,
& old_iface - > sockaddr ,
& iface - > sockaddr ) ;
kref_put ( & old_iface - > refcount , release_iface ) ;
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} else if ( old_iface ) {
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cifs_dbg ( FYI , " releasing ref to iface: %pIS \n " ,
& old_iface - > sockaddr ) ;
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kref_put ( & old_iface - > refcount , release_iface ) ;
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} else {
WARN_ON ( ! iface ) ;
cifs_dbg ( FYI , " adding new iface: %pIS \n " , & iface - > sockaddr ) ;
}
spin_unlock ( & ses - > iface_lock ) ;
cifs: avoid deadlocks while updating iface
We use cifs_tcp_ses_lock to protect a lot of things.
Not only does it protect the lists of connections, sessions,
tree connects, open file lists, etc., we also use it to
protect some fields in each of it's entries.
In this case, cifs_mark_ses_for_reconnect takes the
cifs_tcp_ses_lock to traverse the lists, and then calls
cifs_update_iface. However, that can end up calling
cifs_put_tcp_session, which picks up the same lock again.
Avoid this by taking a ref for the session, drop the lock,
and then call update iface.
Also, in cifs_update_iface, avoid nested locking of iface_lock
and chan_lock, as much as possible. When unavoidable, we need
to pick iface_lock first.
Signed-off-by: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
2022-06-24 12:43:59 +03:00
spin_lock ( & ses - > chan_lock ) ;
chan_index = cifs_ses_get_chan_index ( ses , server ) ;
ses - > chans [ chan_index ] . iface = iface ;
2022-01-03 11:47:30 +03:00
/* No iface is found. if secondary chan, drop connection */
cifs: avoid deadlocks while updating iface
We use cifs_tcp_ses_lock to protect a lot of things.
Not only does it protect the lists of connections, sessions,
tree connects, open file lists, etc., we also use it to
protect some fields in each of it's entries.
In this case, cifs_mark_ses_for_reconnect takes the
cifs_tcp_ses_lock to traverse the lists, and then calls
cifs_update_iface. However, that can end up calling
cifs_put_tcp_session, which picks up the same lock again.
Avoid this by taking a ref for the session, drop the lock,
and then call update iface.
Also, in cifs_update_iface, avoid nested locking of iface_lock
and chan_lock, as much as possible. When unavoidable, we need
to pick iface_lock first.
Signed-off-by: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
2022-06-24 12:43:59 +03:00
if ( ! iface & & CIFS_SERVER_IS_CHAN ( server ) )
2022-01-03 11:47:30 +03:00
ses - > chans [ chan_index ] . server = NULL ;
cifs: avoid deadlocks while updating iface
We use cifs_tcp_ses_lock to protect a lot of things.
Not only does it protect the lists of connections, sessions,
tree connects, open file lists, etc., we also use it to
protect some fields in each of it's entries.
In this case, cifs_mark_ses_for_reconnect takes the
cifs_tcp_ses_lock to traverse the lists, and then calls
cifs_update_iface. However, that can end up calling
cifs_put_tcp_session, which picks up the same lock again.
Avoid this by taking a ref for the session, drop the lock,
and then call update iface.
Also, in cifs_update_iface, avoid nested locking of iface_lock
and chan_lock, as much as possible. When unavoidable, we need
to pick iface_lock first.
Signed-off-by: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
2022-06-24 12:43:59 +03:00
spin_unlock ( & ses - > chan_lock ) ;
if ( ! iface & & CIFS_SERVER_IS_CHAN ( server ) )
cifs_put_tcp_session ( server , false ) ;
2022-01-03 11:47:30 +03:00
return rc ;
}
2020-04-24 17:55:31 +03:00
/*
* If server is a channel of ses , return the corresponding enclosing
* cifs_chan otherwise return NULL .
*/
struct cifs_chan *
cifs_ses_find_chan ( struct cifs_ses * ses , struct TCP_Server_Info * server )
{
int i ;
2021-07-19 13:54:46 +03:00
spin_lock ( & ses - > chan_lock ) ;
2020-04-24 17:55:31 +03:00
for ( i = 0 ; i < ses - > chan_count ; i + + ) {
2021-07-19 13:54:46 +03:00
if ( ses - > chans [ i ] . server = = server ) {
spin_unlock ( & ses - > chan_lock ) ;
2020-04-24 17:55:31 +03:00
return & ses - > chans [ i ] ;
2021-07-19 13:54:46 +03:00
}
2020-04-24 17:55:31 +03:00
}
2021-07-19 13:54:46 +03:00
spin_unlock ( & ses - > chan_lock ) ;
2020-04-24 17:55:31 +03:00
return NULL ;
}
2020-12-14 09:40:20 +03:00
static int
cifs_ses_add_channel ( struct cifs_sb_info * cifs_sb , struct cifs_ses * ses ,
struct cifs_server_iface * iface )
2019-09-20 07:31:10 +03:00
{
2021-07-19 13:54:46 +03:00
struct TCP_Server_Info * chan_server ;
2019-09-20 07:31:10 +03:00
struct cifs_chan * chan ;
2020-12-10 08:07:12 +03:00
struct smb3_fs_context ctx = { NULL } ;
2019-09-20 07:31:10 +03:00
static const char unc_fmt [ ] = " \\ %s \\ foo " ;
char unc [ sizeof ( unc_fmt ) + SERVER_NAME_LEN_WITH_NULL ] = { 0 } ;
struct sockaddr_in * ipv4 = ( struct sockaddr_in * ) & iface - > sockaddr ;
struct sockaddr_in6 * ipv6 = ( struct sockaddr_in6 * ) & iface - > sockaddr ;
int rc ;
unsigned int xid = get_xid ( ) ;
if ( iface - > sockaddr . ss_family = = AF_INET )
2020-04-15 08:42:53 +03:00
cifs_dbg ( FYI , " adding channel to ses %p (speed:%zu bps rdma:%s ip:%pI4) \n " ,
ses , iface - > speed , iface - > rdma_capable ? " yes " : " no " ,
& ipv4 - > sin_addr ) ;
2019-09-20 07:31:10 +03:00
else
2021-05-28 17:32:48 +03:00
cifs_dbg ( FYI , " adding channel to ses %p (speed:%zu bps rdma:%s ip:%pI6) \n " ,
2020-04-15 08:42:53 +03:00
ses , iface - > speed , iface - > rdma_capable ? " yes " : " no " ,
& ipv6 - > sin6_addr ) ;
2019-09-20 07:31:10 +03:00
/*
2020-12-10 08:07:12 +03:00
* Setup a ctx with mostly the same info as the existing
2019-09-20 07:31:10 +03:00
* session and overwrite it with the requested iface data .
*
* We need to setup at least the fields used for negprot and
* sesssetup .
*
2020-12-10 09:06:02 +03:00
* We only need the ctx here , so we can reuse memory from
2019-09-20 07:31:10 +03:00
* the session and server without caring about memory
* management .
*/
/* Always make new connection for now (TODO?) */
2020-12-10 08:07:12 +03:00
ctx . nosharesock = true ;
2019-09-20 07:31:10 +03:00
/* Auth */
2020-12-10 08:07:12 +03:00
ctx . domainauto = ses - > domainAuto ;
ctx . domainname = ses - > domainName ;
2022-06-06 12:52:46 +03:00
/* no hostname for extra channels */
ctx . server_hostname = " " ;
2020-12-10 08:07:12 +03:00
ctx . username = ses - > user_name ;
ctx . password = ses - > password ;
ctx . sectype = ses - > sectype ;
ctx . sign = ses - > sign ;
2019-09-20 07:31:10 +03:00
/* UNC and paths */
/* XXX: Use ses->server->hostname? */
2021-02-21 04:24:11 +03:00
sprintf ( unc , unc_fmt , ses - > ip_addr ) ;
2020-12-10 08:07:12 +03:00
ctx . UNC = unc ;
ctx . prepath = " " ;
2019-09-20 07:31:10 +03:00
2020-05-31 01:29:50 +03:00
/* Reuse same version as master connection */
2020-12-10 08:07:12 +03:00
ctx . vals = ses - > server - > vals ;
ctx . ops = ses - > server - > ops ;
2019-09-20 07:31:10 +03:00
2020-12-10 08:07:12 +03:00
ctx . noblocksnd = ses - > server - > noblocksnd ;
ctx . noautotune = ses - > server - > noautotune ;
ctx . sockopt_tcp_nodelay = ses - > server - > tcp_nodelay ;
ctx . echo_interval = ses - > server - > echo_interval / HZ ;
2021-03-04 20:42:21 +03:00
ctx . max_credits = ses - > server - > max_credits ;
2019-09-20 07:31:10 +03:00
/*
* This will be used for encoding / decoding user / domain / pw
* during sess setup auth .
*/
2020-12-14 09:40:20 +03:00
ctx . local_nls = cifs_sb - > local_nls ;
2019-09-20 07:31:10 +03:00
/* Use RDMA if possible */
2020-12-10 08:07:12 +03:00
ctx . rdma = iface - > rdma_capable ;
memcpy ( & ctx . dstaddr , & iface - > sockaddr , sizeof ( struct sockaddr_storage ) ) ;
2019-09-20 07:31:10 +03:00
/* reuse master con client guid */
2020-12-10 08:07:12 +03:00
memcpy ( & ctx . client_guid , ses - > server - > client_guid ,
2019-09-20 07:31:10 +03:00
SMB2_CLIENT_GUID_SIZE ) ;
2020-12-10 08:07:12 +03:00
ctx . use_client_guid = true ;
2019-09-20 07:31:10 +03:00
2021-07-19 14:26:24 +03:00
chan_server = cifs_get_tcp_session ( & ctx , ses - > server ) ;
2019-09-20 07:31:10 +03:00
2021-07-19 13:54:46 +03:00
spin_lock ( & ses - > chan_lock ) ;
2021-07-19 16:54:16 +03:00
chan = & ses - > chans [ ses - > chan_count ] ;
2021-07-19 13:54:46 +03:00
chan - > server = chan_server ;
2019-09-20 07:31:10 +03:00
if ( IS_ERR ( chan - > server ) ) {
rc = PTR_ERR ( chan - > server ) ;
chan - > server = NULL ;
2021-07-19 13:54:46 +03:00
spin_unlock ( & ses - > chan_lock ) ;
2019-09-20 07:31:10 +03:00
goto out ;
}
2022-01-01 15:50:21 +03:00
chan - > iface = iface ;
2021-07-19 16:54:16 +03:00
ses - > chan_count + + ;
atomic_set ( & ses - > chan_seq , 0 ) ;
/* Mark this channel as needing connect/setup */
cifs_chan_set_need_reconnect ( ses , chan - > server ) ;
2021-07-19 13:54:46 +03:00
spin_unlock ( & ses - > chan_lock ) ;
2021-07-19 20:37:52 +03:00
mutex_lock ( & ses - > session_mutex ) ;
2019-09-20 07:31:10 +03:00
/*
* We need to allocate the server crypto now as we will need
* to sign packets before we generate the channel signing key
* ( we sign with the session key )
*/
rc = smb311_crypto_shash_allocate ( chan - > server ) ;
if ( rc ) {
cifs_dbg ( VFS , " %s: crypto alloc failed \n " , __func__ ) ;
2021-07-19 20:37:52 +03:00
mutex_unlock ( & ses - > session_mutex ) ;
2019-09-20 07:31:10 +03:00
goto out ;
}
2021-07-19 16:54:16 +03:00
rc = cifs_negotiate_protocol ( xid , ses , chan - > server ) ;
if ( ! rc )
rc = cifs_setup_session ( xid , ses , chan - > server , cifs_sb - > local_nls ) ;
2021-07-19 13:54:46 +03:00
2021-07-19 20:37:52 +03:00
mutex_unlock ( & ses - > session_mutex ) ;
2019-09-20 07:31:10 +03:00
out :
2021-07-19 15:46:53 +03:00
if ( rc & & chan - > server ) {
2022-07-05 14:16:24 +03:00
/*
* we should avoid race with these delayed works before we
* remove this channel
*/
cancel_delayed_work_sync ( & chan - > server - > echo ) ;
cancel_delayed_work_sync ( & chan - > server - > resolve ) ;
cancel_delayed_work_sync ( & chan - > server - > reconnect ) ;
2021-07-19 16:54:16 +03:00
spin_lock ( & ses - > chan_lock ) ;
2021-07-19 15:46:53 +03:00
/* we rely on all bits beyond chan_count to be clear */
cifs_chan_clear_need_reconnect ( ses , chan - > server ) ;
ses - > chan_count - - ;
2021-07-19 17:04:11 +03:00
/*
* chan_count should never reach 0 as at least the primary
* channel is always allocated
*/
WARN_ON ( ses - > chan_count < 1 ) ;
2021-07-19 16:54:16 +03:00
spin_unlock ( & ses - > chan_lock ) ;
2021-07-19 15:46:53 +03:00
2019-09-20 07:31:10 +03:00
cifs_put_tcp_session ( chan - > server , 0 ) ;
2022-07-05 14:16:24 +03:00
}
2019-09-20 07:31:10 +03:00
2022-10-17 17:45:24 +03:00
free_xid ( xid ) ;
2019-09-20 07:31:10 +03:00
return rc ;
}
2006-06-01 02:40:51 +04:00
2022-08-01 19:17:46 +03:00
# ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_ALLOW_INSECURE_LEGACY
2021-07-19 16:54:16 +03:00
static __u32 cifs_ssetup_hdr ( struct cifs_ses * ses ,
struct TCP_Server_Info * server ,
SESSION_SETUP_ANDX * pSMB )
2006-06-01 02:40:51 +04:00
{
__u32 capabilities = 0 ;
/* init fields common to all four types of SessSetup */
[CIFS] Fix multiuser mounts so server does not invalidate earlier security contexts
When two different users mount the same Windows 2003 Server share using CIFS,
the first session mounted can be invalidated. Some servers invalidate the first
smb session when a second similar user (e.g. two users who get mapped by server to "guest")
authenticates an smb session from the same client.
By making sure that we set the 2nd and subsequent vc numbers to nonzero values,
this ensures that we will not have this problem.
Fixes Samba bug 6004, problem description follows:
How to reproduce:
- configure an "open share" (full permissions to Guest user) on Windows 2003
Server (I couldn't reproduce the problem with Samba server or Windows older
than 2003)
- mount the share twice with different users who will be authenticated as guest.
noacl,noperm,user=john,dir_mode=0700,domain=DOMAIN,rw
noacl,noperm,user=jeff,dir_mode=0700,domain=DOMAIN,rw
Result:
- just the mount point mounted last is accessible:
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2009-02-20 08:43:09 +03:00
/* Note that offsets for first seven fields in req struct are same */
/* in CIFS Specs so does not matter which of 3 forms of struct */
/* that we use in next few lines */
/* Note that header is initialized to zero in header_assemble */
2006-06-01 02:40:51 +04:00
pSMB - > req . AndXCommand = 0xFF ;
2011-10-11 14:41:32 +04:00
pSMB - > req . MaxBufferSize = cpu_to_le16 ( min_t ( u32 ,
CIFSMaxBufSize + MAX_CIFS_HDR_SIZE - 4 ,
USHRT_MAX ) ) ;
2021-07-19 16:54:16 +03:00
pSMB - > req . MaxMpxCount = cpu_to_le16 ( server - > maxReq ) ;
2014-12-11 02:41:15 +03:00
pSMB - > req . VcNumber = cpu_to_le16 ( 1 ) ;
2006-06-01 02:40:51 +04:00
/* Now no need to set SMBFLG_CASELESS or obsolete CANONICAL PATH */
2007-07-07 23:25:05 +04:00
/* BB verify whether signing required on neg or just on auth frame
2006-06-01 02:40:51 +04:00
( and NTLM case ) */
capabilities = CAP_LARGE_FILES | CAP_NT_SMBS | CAP_LEVEL_II_OPLOCKS |
CAP_LARGE_WRITE_X | CAP_LARGE_READ_X ;
2021-07-19 16:54:16 +03:00
if ( server - > sign )
2006-06-01 02:40:51 +04:00
pSMB - > req . hdr . Flags2 | = SMBFLG2_SECURITY_SIGNATURE ;
if ( ses - > capabilities & CAP_UNICODE ) {
pSMB - > req . hdr . Flags2 | = SMBFLG2_UNICODE ;
capabilities | = CAP_UNICODE ;
}
if ( ses - > capabilities & CAP_STATUS32 ) {
pSMB - > req . hdr . Flags2 | = SMBFLG2_ERR_STATUS ;
capabilities | = CAP_STATUS32 ;
}
if ( ses - > capabilities & CAP_DFS ) {
pSMB - > req . hdr . Flags2 | = SMBFLG2_DFS ;
capabilities | = CAP_DFS ;
}
2007-08-31 02:09:15 +04:00
if ( ses - > capabilities & CAP_UNIX )
2006-06-01 02:40:51 +04:00
capabilities | = CAP_UNIX ;
return capabilities ;
}
2007-10-16 21:32:19 +04:00
static void
unicode_oslm_strings ( char * * pbcc_area , const struct nls_table * nls_cp )
{
char * bcc_ptr = * pbcc_area ;
int bytes_ret = 0 ;
/* Copy OS version */
2012-01-19 08:32:33 +04:00
bytes_ret = cifs_strtoUTF16 ( ( __le16 * ) bcc_ptr , " Linux version " , 32 ,
nls_cp ) ;
2007-10-16 21:32:19 +04:00
bcc_ptr + = 2 * bytes_ret ;
2012-01-19 08:32:33 +04:00
bytes_ret = cifs_strtoUTF16 ( ( __le16 * ) bcc_ptr , init_utsname ( ) - > release ,
32 , nls_cp ) ;
2007-10-16 21:32:19 +04:00
bcc_ptr + = 2 * bytes_ret ;
bcc_ptr + = 2 ; /* trailing null */
2012-01-19 08:32:33 +04:00
bytes_ret = cifs_strtoUTF16 ( ( __le16 * ) bcc_ptr , CIFS_NETWORK_OPSYS ,
32 , nls_cp ) ;
2007-10-16 21:32:19 +04:00
bcc_ptr + = 2 * bytes_ret ;
bcc_ptr + = 2 ; /* trailing null */
* pbcc_area = bcc_ptr ;
}
2011-05-27 08:34:02 +04:00
static void unicode_domain_string ( char * * pbcc_area , struct cifs_ses * ses ,
2007-10-16 21:32:19 +04:00
const struct nls_table * nls_cp )
{
char * bcc_ptr = * pbcc_area ;
int bytes_ret = 0 ;
/* copy domain */
if ( ses - > domainName = = NULL ) {
/* Sending null domain better than using a bogus domain name (as
we did briefly in 2.6 .18 ) since server will use its default */
* bcc_ptr = 0 ;
* ( bcc_ptr + 1 ) = 0 ;
bytes_ret = 0 ;
} else
2012-01-19 08:32:33 +04:00
bytes_ret = cifs_strtoUTF16 ( ( __le16 * ) bcc_ptr , ses - > domainName ,
2013-07-19 05:01:36 +04:00
CIFS_MAX_DOMAINNAME_LEN , nls_cp ) ;
2007-10-16 21:32:19 +04:00
bcc_ptr + = 2 * bytes_ret ;
bcc_ptr + = 2 ; /* account for null terminator */
* pbcc_area = bcc_ptr ;
}
2011-05-27 08:34:02 +04:00
static void unicode_ssetup_strings ( char * * pbcc_area , struct cifs_ses * ses ,
2007-07-07 23:25:05 +04:00
const struct nls_table * nls_cp )
2006-06-01 02:40:51 +04:00
{
2007-07-07 23:25:05 +04:00
char * bcc_ptr = * pbcc_area ;
2006-06-01 02:40:51 +04:00
int bytes_ret = 0 ;
/* BB FIXME add check that strings total less
than 335 or will need to send them as arrays */
/* copy user */
2011-02-25 10:11:56 +03:00
if ( ses - > user_name = = NULL ) {
2006-11-09 02:10:46 +03:00
/* null user mount */
* bcc_ptr = 0 ;
* ( bcc_ptr + 1 ) = 0 ;
2010-02-06 10:08:53 +03:00
} else {
2012-01-19 08:32:33 +04:00
bytes_ret = cifs_strtoUTF16 ( ( __le16 * ) bcc_ptr , ses - > user_name ,
2013-08-09 16:47:17 +04:00
CIFS_MAX_USERNAME_LEN , nls_cp ) ;
2006-06-01 02:40:51 +04:00
}
bcc_ptr + = 2 * bytes_ret ;
bcc_ptr + = 2 ; /* account for null termination */
2007-10-16 21:32:19 +04:00
unicode_domain_string ( & bcc_ptr , ses , nls_cp ) ;
unicode_oslm_strings ( & bcc_ptr , nls_cp ) ;
2006-06-01 02:40:51 +04:00
* pbcc_area = bcc_ptr ;
}
2011-05-27 08:34:02 +04:00
static void ascii_ssetup_strings ( char * * pbcc_area , struct cifs_ses * ses ,
2007-07-07 23:25:05 +04:00
const struct nls_table * nls_cp )
2006-06-01 02:40:51 +04:00
{
2007-07-07 23:25:05 +04:00
char * bcc_ptr = * pbcc_area ;
2019-08-27 02:30:14 +03:00
int len ;
2006-06-01 02:40:51 +04:00
/* copy user */
/* BB what about null user mounts - check that we do this BB */
2007-07-07 23:25:05 +04:00
/* copy user */
2012-02-03 01:28:28 +04:00
if ( ses - > user_name ! = NULL ) {
2019-08-27 02:30:14 +03:00
len = strscpy ( bcc_ptr , ses - > user_name , CIFS_MAX_USERNAME_LEN ) ;
if ( WARN_ON_ONCE ( len < 0 ) )
len = CIFS_MAX_USERNAME_LEN - 1 ;
bcc_ptr + = len ;
2012-02-03 01:28:28 +04:00
}
2011-02-25 10:11:56 +03:00
/* else null user mount */
2006-06-01 02:40:51 +04:00
* bcc_ptr = 0 ;
2007-07-07 23:25:05 +04:00
bcc_ptr + + ; /* account for null termination */
2006-06-01 02:40:51 +04:00
2007-07-07 23:25:05 +04:00
/* copy domain */
if ( ses - > domainName ! = NULL ) {
2019-08-27 02:30:14 +03:00
len = strscpy ( bcc_ptr , ses - > domainName , CIFS_MAX_DOMAINNAME_LEN ) ;
if ( WARN_ON_ONCE ( len < 0 ) )
len = CIFS_MAX_DOMAINNAME_LEN - 1 ;
bcc_ptr + = len ;
2007-07-07 23:25:05 +04:00
} /* else we will send a null domain name
2006-11-09 02:10:46 +03:00
so the server will default to its own domain */
2006-06-01 02:40:51 +04:00
* bcc_ptr = 0 ;
bcc_ptr + + ;
/* BB check for overflow here */
strcpy ( bcc_ptr , " Linux version " ) ;
bcc_ptr + = strlen ( " Linux version " ) ;
2006-10-02 13:18:13 +04:00
strcpy ( bcc_ptr , init_utsname ( ) - > release ) ;
bcc_ptr + = strlen ( init_utsname ( ) - > release ) + 1 ;
2006-06-01 02:40:51 +04:00
strcpy ( bcc_ptr , CIFS_NETWORK_OPSYS ) ;
bcc_ptr + = strlen ( CIFS_NETWORK_OPSYS ) + 1 ;
2007-07-07 23:25:05 +04:00
* pbcc_area = bcc_ptr ;
2006-06-01 02:40:51 +04:00
}
2009-04-30 15:16:21 +04:00
static void
2011-05-27 08:34:02 +04:00
decode_unicode_ssetup ( char * * pbcc_area , int bleft , struct cifs_ses * ses ,
2009-04-30 15:16:21 +04:00
const struct nls_table * nls_cp )
2006-06-01 02:40:51 +04:00
{
2009-04-30 15:16:21 +04:00
int len ;
2007-07-07 23:25:05 +04:00
char * data = * pbcc_area ;
2006-06-01 02:40:51 +04:00
2013-05-05 07:12:25 +04:00
cifs_dbg ( FYI , " bleft %d \n " , bleft ) ;
2006-06-01 02:40:51 +04:00
2007-08-31 02:09:15 +04:00
kfree ( ses - > serverOS ) ;
2012-01-19 08:32:33 +04:00
ses - > serverOS = cifs_strndup_from_utf16 ( data , bleft , true , nls_cp ) ;
2013-05-05 07:12:25 +04:00
cifs_dbg ( FYI , " serverOS=%s \n " , ses - > serverOS ) ;
2009-04-30 15:16:21 +04:00
len = ( UniStrnlen ( ( wchar_t * ) data , bleft / 2 ) * 2 ) + 2 ;
data + = len ;
bleft - = len ;
if ( bleft < = 0 )
return ;
2006-06-01 02:40:51 +04:00
2007-08-31 02:09:15 +04:00
kfree ( ses - > serverNOS ) ;
2012-01-19 08:32:33 +04:00
ses - > serverNOS = cifs_strndup_from_utf16 ( data , bleft , true , nls_cp ) ;
2013-05-05 07:12:25 +04:00
cifs_dbg ( FYI , " serverNOS=%s \n " , ses - > serverNOS ) ;
2009-04-30 15:16:21 +04:00
len = ( UniStrnlen ( ( wchar_t * ) data , bleft / 2 ) * 2 ) + 2 ;
data + = len ;
bleft - = len ;
if ( bleft < = 0 )
return ;
2007-07-07 23:25:05 +04:00
2007-08-31 02:09:15 +04:00
kfree ( ses - > serverDomain ) ;
2012-01-19 08:32:33 +04:00
ses - > serverDomain = cifs_strndup_from_utf16 ( data , bleft , true , nls_cp ) ;
2013-05-05 07:12:25 +04:00
cifs_dbg ( FYI , " serverDomain=%s \n " , ses - > serverDomain ) ;
2007-07-07 23:25:05 +04:00
2009-04-30 15:16:21 +04:00
return ;
2006-06-01 02:40:51 +04:00
}
2013-05-24 15:41:00 +04:00
static void decode_ascii_ssetup ( char * * pbcc_area , __u16 bleft ,
struct cifs_ses * ses ,
const struct nls_table * nls_cp )
2006-06-01 02:40:51 +04:00
{
int len ;
2007-07-07 23:25:05 +04:00
char * bcc_ptr = * pbcc_area ;
2006-06-01 02:40:51 +04:00
2013-05-05 07:12:25 +04:00
cifs_dbg ( FYI , " decode sessetup ascii. bleft %d \n " , bleft ) ;
2007-07-13 04:33:32 +04:00
2006-06-01 02:40:51 +04:00
len = strnlen ( bcc_ptr , bleft ) ;
2007-07-07 23:25:05 +04:00
if ( len > = bleft )
2013-05-24 15:41:00 +04:00
return ;
2007-07-13 04:33:32 +04:00
2007-08-31 02:09:15 +04:00
kfree ( ses - > serverOS ) ;
2006-06-01 02:40:51 +04:00
2019-08-27 02:30:14 +03:00
ses - > serverOS = kmalloc ( len + 1 , GFP_KERNEL ) ;
2014-08-20 14:39:28 +04:00
if ( ses - > serverOS ) {
2019-08-27 02:30:14 +03:00
memcpy ( ses - > serverOS , bcc_ptr , len ) ;
ses - > serverOS [ len ] = 0 ;
2014-08-20 14:39:28 +04:00
if ( strncmp ( ses - > serverOS , " OS/2 " , 4 ) = = 0 )
cifs_dbg ( FYI , " OS/2 server \n " ) ;
}
2006-06-01 02:40:51 +04:00
bcc_ptr + = len + 1 ;
bleft - = len + 1 ;
len = strnlen ( bcc_ptr , bleft ) ;
2007-07-07 23:25:05 +04:00
if ( len > = bleft )
2013-05-24 15:41:00 +04:00
return ;
2006-06-01 02:40:51 +04:00
2007-08-31 02:09:15 +04:00
kfree ( ses - > serverNOS ) ;
2006-06-01 02:40:51 +04:00
2019-08-27 02:30:14 +03:00
ses - > serverNOS = kmalloc ( len + 1 , GFP_KERNEL ) ;
if ( ses - > serverNOS ) {
memcpy ( ses - > serverNOS , bcc_ptr , len ) ;
ses - > serverNOS [ len ] = 0 ;
}
2006-06-01 02:40:51 +04:00
bcc_ptr + = len + 1 ;
bleft - = len + 1 ;
2007-07-07 23:25:05 +04:00
len = strnlen ( bcc_ptr , bleft ) ;
if ( len > bleft )
2013-05-24 15:41:00 +04:00
return ;
2006-06-01 02:40:51 +04:00
2006-09-30 08:13:17 +04:00
/* No domain field in LANMAN case. Domain is
returned by old servers in the SMB negprot response */
/* BB For newer servers which do not support Unicode,
but thus do return domain here we could add parsing
for it later , but it is not very important */
2013-05-05 07:12:25 +04:00
cifs_dbg ( FYI , " ascii: bytes left %d \n " , bleft ) ;
2006-06-01 02:40:51 +04:00
}
2022-08-01 19:17:46 +03:00
# endif /* CONFIG_CIFS_ALLOW_INSECURE_LEGACY */
2006-06-01 02:40:51 +04:00
2011-12-27 16:22:00 +04:00
int decode_ntlmssp_challenge ( char * bcc_ptr , int blob_len ,
2011-05-27 08:34:02 +04:00
struct cifs_ses * ses )
2009-05-04 12:37:12 +04:00
{
cifs NTLMv2/NTLMSSP ntlmv2 within ntlmssp autentication code
Attribue Value (AV) pairs or Target Info (TI) pairs are part of
ntlmv2 authentication.
Structure ntlmv2_resp had only definition for two av pairs.
So removed it, and now allocation of av pairs is dynamic.
For servers like Windows 7/2008, av pairs sent by server in
challege packet (type 2 in the ntlmssp exchange/negotiation) can
vary.
Server sends them during ntlmssp negotiation. So when ntlmssp is used
as an authentication mechanism, type 2 challenge packet from server
has this information. Pluck it and use the entire blob for
authenticaiton purpose. If user has not specified, extract
(netbios) domain name from the av pairs which is used to calculate
ntlmv2 hash. Servers like Windows 7 are particular about the AV pair
blob.
Servers like Windows 2003, are not very strict about the contents
of av pair blob used during ntlmv2 authentication.
So when security mechanism such as ntlmv2 is used (not ntlmv2 in ntlmssp),
there is no negotiation and so genereate a minimal blob that gets
used in ntlmv2 authentication as well as gets sent.
Fields tilen and tilbob are session specific. AV pair values are defined.
To calculate ntlmv2 response we need ti/av pair blob.
For sec mech like ntlmssp, the blob is plucked from type 2 response from
the server. From this blob, netbios name of the domain is retrieved,
if user has not already provided, to be included in the Target String
as part of ntlmv2 hash calculations.
For sec mech like ntlmv2, create a minimal, two av pair blob.
The allocated blob is freed in case of error. In case there is no error,
this blob is used in calculating ntlmv2 response (in CalcNTLMv2_response)
and is also copied on the response to the server, and then freed.
The type 3 ntlmssp response is prepared on a buffer,
5 * sizeof of struct _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE, an empirical value large
enough to hold _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE plus a blob with max possible
10 values as part of ntlmv2 response and lmv2 keys and domain, user,
workstation names etc.
Also, kerberos gets selected as a default mechanism if server supports it,
over the other security mechanisms.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-09-19 07:02:18 +04:00
unsigned int tioffset ; /* challenge message target info area */
unsigned int tilen ; /* challenge message target info area length */
2009-05-04 12:37:12 +04:00
CHALLENGE_MESSAGE * pblob = ( CHALLENGE_MESSAGE * ) bcc_ptr ;
2021-12-08 04:51:04 +03:00
__u32 server_flags ;
2009-05-04 12:37:12 +04:00
if ( blob_len < sizeof ( CHALLENGE_MESSAGE ) ) {
2013-05-05 07:12:25 +04:00
cifs_dbg ( VFS , " challenge blob len %d too small \n " , blob_len ) ;
2009-05-04 12:37:12 +04:00
return - EINVAL ;
}
if ( memcmp ( pblob - > Signature , " NTLMSSP " , 8 ) ) {
2013-05-05 07:12:25 +04:00
cifs_dbg ( VFS , " blob signature incorrect %s \n " ,
pblob - > Signature ) ;
2009-05-04 12:37:12 +04:00
return - EINVAL ;
}
if ( pblob - > MessageType ! = NtLmChallenge ) {
2013-05-05 07:12:25 +04:00
cifs_dbg ( VFS , " Incorrect message type %d \n " ,
pblob - > MessageType ) ;
2009-05-04 12:37:12 +04:00
return - EINVAL ;
}
2021-12-08 04:51:04 +03:00
server_flags = le32_to_cpu ( pblob - > NegotiateFlags ) ;
cifs_dbg ( FYI , " %s: negotiate=0x%08x challenge=0x%08x \n " , __func__ ,
ses - > ntlmssp - > client_flags , server_flags ) ;
if ( ( ses - > ntlmssp - > client_flags & ( NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN ) ) & &
( ! ( server_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56 ) & & ! ( server_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128 ) ) ) {
cifs_dbg ( VFS , " %s: requested signing/encryption but server did not return either 56-bit or 128-bit session key size \n " ,
__func__ ) ;
return - EINVAL ;
}
if ( ! ( server_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM ) & & ! ( server_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SEC ) ) {
cifs_dbg ( VFS , " %s: server does not seem to support either NTLMv1 or NTLMv2 \n " , __func__ ) ;
return - EINVAL ;
}
if ( ses - > server - > sign & & ! ( server_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN ) ) {
cifs_dbg ( VFS , " %s: forced packet signing but server does not seem to support it \n " ,
__func__ ) ;
return - EOPNOTSUPP ;
}
if ( ( ses - > ntlmssp - > client_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_XCH ) & &
! ( server_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_XCH ) )
pr_warn_once ( " %s: authentication has been weakened as server does not support key exchange \n " ,
__func__ ) ;
ses - > ntlmssp - > server_flags = server_flags ;
2010-10-28 18:53:07 +04:00
memcpy ( ses - > ntlmssp - > cryptkey , pblob - > Challenge , CIFS_CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE ) ;
2009-05-04 12:37:12 +04:00
/* In particular we can examine sign flags */
/* BB spec says that if AvId field of MsvAvTimestamp is populated then
we must set the MIC field of the AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE */
2021-12-08 04:51:04 +03:00
2011-03-13 08:08:25 +03:00
tioffset = le32_to_cpu ( pblob - > TargetInfoArray . BufferOffset ) ;
tilen = le16_to_cpu ( pblob - > TargetInfoArray . Length ) ;
2012-01-31 12:52:01 +04:00
if ( tioffset > blob_len | | tioffset + tilen > blob_len ) {
2020-04-15 08:42:53 +03:00
cifs_dbg ( VFS , " tioffset + tilen too high %u + %u \n " ,
tioffset , tilen ) ;
2012-01-31 12:52:01 +04:00
return - EINVAL ;
}
2010-10-28 18:53:07 +04:00
if ( tilen ) {
2023-01-11 02:35:46 +03:00
kfree_sensitive ( ses - > auth_key . response ) ;
2013-03-11 20:22:32 +04:00
ses - > auth_key . response = kmemdup ( bcc_ptr + tioffset , tilen ,
GFP_KERNEL ) ;
2010-10-28 18:53:07 +04:00
if ( ! ses - > auth_key . response ) {
2020-04-15 08:42:53 +03:00
cifs_dbg ( VFS , " Challenge target info alloc failure \n " ) ;
cifs NTLMv2/NTLMSSP ntlmv2 within ntlmssp autentication code
Attribue Value (AV) pairs or Target Info (TI) pairs are part of
ntlmv2 authentication.
Structure ntlmv2_resp had only definition for two av pairs.
So removed it, and now allocation of av pairs is dynamic.
For servers like Windows 7/2008, av pairs sent by server in
challege packet (type 2 in the ntlmssp exchange/negotiation) can
vary.
Server sends them during ntlmssp negotiation. So when ntlmssp is used
as an authentication mechanism, type 2 challenge packet from server
has this information. Pluck it and use the entire blob for
authenticaiton purpose. If user has not specified, extract
(netbios) domain name from the av pairs which is used to calculate
ntlmv2 hash. Servers like Windows 7 are particular about the AV pair
blob.
Servers like Windows 2003, are not very strict about the contents
of av pair blob used during ntlmv2 authentication.
So when security mechanism such as ntlmv2 is used (not ntlmv2 in ntlmssp),
there is no negotiation and so genereate a minimal blob that gets
used in ntlmv2 authentication as well as gets sent.
Fields tilen and tilbob are session specific. AV pair values are defined.
To calculate ntlmv2 response we need ti/av pair blob.
For sec mech like ntlmssp, the blob is plucked from type 2 response from
the server. From this blob, netbios name of the domain is retrieved,
if user has not already provided, to be included in the Target String
as part of ntlmv2 hash calculations.
For sec mech like ntlmv2, create a minimal, two av pair blob.
The allocated blob is freed in case of error. In case there is no error,
this blob is used in calculating ntlmv2 response (in CalcNTLMv2_response)
and is also copied on the response to the server, and then freed.
The type 3 ntlmssp response is prepared on a buffer,
5 * sizeof of struct _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE, an empirical value large
enough to hold _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE plus a blob with max possible
10 values as part of ntlmv2 response and lmv2 keys and domain, user,
workstation names etc.
Also, kerberos gets selected as a default mechanism if server supports it,
over the other security mechanisms.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-09-19 07:02:18 +04:00
return - ENOMEM ;
}
2010-10-28 18:53:07 +04:00
ses - > auth_key . len = tilen ;
cifs NTLMv2/NTLMSSP ntlmv2 within ntlmssp autentication code
Attribue Value (AV) pairs or Target Info (TI) pairs are part of
ntlmv2 authentication.
Structure ntlmv2_resp had only definition for two av pairs.
So removed it, and now allocation of av pairs is dynamic.
For servers like Windows 7/2008, av pairs sent by server in
challege packet (type 2 in the ntlmssp exchange/negotiation) can
vary.
Server sends them during ntlmssp negotiation. So when ntlmssp is used
as an authentication mechanism, type 2 challenge packet from server
has this information. Pluck it and use the entire blob for
authenticaiton purpose. If user has not specified, extract
(netbios) domain name from the av pairs which is used to calculate
ntlmv2 hash. Servers like Windows 7 are particular about the AV pair
blob.
Servers like Windows 2003, are not very strict about the contents
of av pair blob used during ntlmv2 authentication.
So when security mechanism such as ntlmv2 is used (not ntlmv2 in ntlmssp),
there is no negotiation and so genereate a minimal blob that gets
used in ntlmv2 authentication as well as gets sent.
Fields tilen and tilbob are session specific. AV pair values are defined.
To calculate ntlmv2 response we need ti/av pair blob.
For sec mech like ntlmssp, the blob is plucked from type 2 response from
the server. From this blob, netbios name of the domain is retrieved,
if user has not already provided, to be included in the Target String
as part of ntlmv2 hash calculations.
For sec mech like ntlmv2, create a minimal, two av pair blob.
The allocated blob is freed in case of error. In case there is no error,
this blob is used in calculating ntlmv2 response (in CalcNTLMv2_response)
and is also copied on the response to the server, and then freed.
The type 3 ntlmssp response is prepared on a buffer,
5 * sizeof of struct _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE, an empirical value large
enough to hold _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE plus a blob with max possible
10 values as part of ntlmv2 response and lmv2 keys and domain, user,
workstation names etc.
Also, kerberos gets selected as a default mechanism if server supports it,
over the other security mechanisms.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-09-19 07:02:18 +04:00
}
2009-05-04 12:37:12 +04:00
return 0 ;
}
2021-11-05 22:03:57 +03:00
static int size_of_ntlmssp_blob ( struct cifs_ses * ses , int base_size )
{
int sz = base_size + ses - > auth_key . len
- CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE + CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE + 2 ;
if ( ses - > domainName )
sz + = sizeof ( __le16 ) * strnlen ( ses - > domainName , CIFS_MAX_DOMAINNAME_LEN ) ;
else
sz + = sizeof ( __le16 ) ;
if ( ses - > user_name )
sz + = sizeof ( __le16 ) * strnlen ( ses - > user_name , CIFS_MAX_USERNAME_LEN ) ;
else
sz + = sizeof ( __le16 ) ;
2022-05-25 15:37:04 +03:00
if ( ses - > workstation_name [ 0 ] )
2021-12-22 19:04:05 +03:00
sz + = sizeof ( __le16 ) * strnlen ( ses - > workstation_name ,
2022-05-25 15:37:04 +03:00
ntlmssp_workstation_name_size ( ses ) ) ;
2021-12-22 19:04:05 +03:00
else
sz + = sizeof ( __le16 ) ;
2021-11-05 22:03:57 +03:00
return sz ;
}
static inline void cifs_security_buffer_from_str ( SECURITY_BUFFER * pbuf ,
char * str_value ,
int str_length ,
unsigned char * pstart ,
unsigned char * * pcur ,
const struct nls_table * nls_cp )
{
unsigned char * tmp = pstart ;
int len ;
if ( ! pbuf )
return ;
if ( ! pcur )
pcur = & tmp ;
if ( ! str_value ) {
pbuf - > BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32 ( * pcur - pstart ) ;
pbuf - > Length = 0 ;
pbuf - > MaximumLength = 0 ;
* pcur + = sizeof ( __le16 ) ;
} else {
len = cifs_strtoUTF16 ( ( __le16 * ) * pcur ,
str_value ,
str_length ,
nls_cp ) ;
len * = sizeof ( __le16 ) ;
pbuf - > BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32 ( * pcur - pstart ) ;
pbuf - > Length = cpu_to_le16 ( len ) ;
pbuf - > MaximumLength = cpu_to_le16 ( len ) ;
* pcur + = len ;
}
}
2009-05-04 12:37:12 +04:00
/* BB Move to ntlmssp.c eventually */
2021-11-05 22:03:57 +03:00
int build_ntlmssp_negotiate_blob ( unsigned char * * pbuffer ,
u16 * buflen ,
struct cifs_ses * ses ,
2021-07-19 16:54:16 +03:00
struct TCP_Server_Info * server ,
2021-11-05 22:03:57 +03:00
const struct nls_table * nls_cp )
2009-05-04 12:37:12 +04:00
{
2021-11-05 22:03:57 +03:00
int rc = 0 ;
NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE * sec_blob ;
2009-05-04 12:37:12 +04:00
__u32 flags ;
2021-11-05 22:03:57 +03:00
unsigned char * tmp ;
int len ;
len = size_of_ntlmssp_blob ( ses , sizeof ( NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE ) ) ;
* pbuffer = kmalloc ( len , GFP_KERNEL ) ;
if ( ! * pbuffer ) {
rc = - ENOMEM ;
cifs_dbg ( VFS , " Error %d during NTLMSSP allocation \n " , rc ) ;
* buflen = 0 ;
goto setup_ntlm_neg_ret ;
}
sec_blob = ( NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE * ) * pbuffer ;
2009-05-04 12:37:12 +04:00
2021-11-05 22:03:57 +03:00
memset ( * pbuffer , 0 , sizeof ( NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE ) ) ;
2009-05-04 12:37:12 +04:00
memcpy ( sec_blob - > Signature , NTLMSSP_SIGNATURE , 8 ) ;
sec_blob - > MessageType = NtLmNegotiate ;
/* BB is NTLMV2 session security format easier to use here? */
flags = NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56 | NTLMSSP_REQUEST_TARGET |
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128 | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE |
2016-11-08 05:20:50 +03:00
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SEC |
2021-12-08 04:51:04 +03:00
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_ALWAYS_SIGN | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL |
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN ;
2019-09-20 07:22:14 +03:00
if ( ! server - > session_estab | | ses - > ntlmssp - > sesskey_per_smbsess )
2016-11-08 05:20:50 +03:00
flags | = NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_XCH ;
2009-05-04 12:37:12 +04:00
2021-11-05 22:03:57 +03:00
tmp = * pbuffer + sizeof ( NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE ) ;
2021-12-08 04:51:04 +03:00
ses - > ntlmssp - > client_flags = flags ;
2010-12-11 23:19:22 +03:00
sec_blob - > NegotiateFlags = cpu_to_le32 ( flags ) ;
2009-05-04 12:37:12 +04:00
2021-11-05 22:03:57 +03:00
/* these fields should be null in negotiate phase MS-NLMP 3.1.5.1.1 */
cifs_security_buffer_from_str ( & sec_blob - > DomainName ,
NULL ,
CIFS_MAX_DOMAINNAME_LEN ,
* pbuffer , & tmp ,
nls_cp ) ;
2009-05-04 12:37:12 +04:00
2021-11-05 22:03:57 +03:00
cifs_security_buffer_from_str ( & sec_blob - > WorkstationName ,
NULL ,
CIFS_MAX_WORKSTATION_LEN ,
* pbuffer , & tmp ,
nls_cp ) ;
2016-05-26 12:52:25 +03:00
2021-11-05 22:03:57 +03:00
* buflen = tmp - * pbuffer ;
setup_ntlm_neg_ret :
return rc ;
2016-05-26 12:52:25 +03:00
}
2022-01-20 07:00:29 +03:00
/*
* Build ntlmssp blob with additional fields , such as version ,
* supported by modern servers . For safety limit to SMB3 or later
* See notes in MS - NLMP Section 2.2 .2 .1 e . g .
*/
int build_ntlmssp_smb3_negotiate_blob ( unsigned char * * pbuffer ,
u16 * buflen ,
struct cifs_ses * ses ,
struct TCP_Server_Info * server ,
const struct nls_table * nls_cp )
{
int rc = 0 ;
struct negotiate_message * sec_blob ;
__u32 flags ;
unsigned char * tmp ;
int len ;
len = size_of_ntlmssp_blob ( ses , sizeof ( struct negotiate_message ) ) ;
* pbuffer = kmalloc ( len , GFP_KERNEL ) ;
if ( ! * pbuffer ) {
rc = - ENOMEM ;
cifs_dbg ( VFS , " Error %d during NTLMSSP allocation \n " , rc ) ;
* buflen = 0 ;
goto setup_ntlm_smb3_neg_ret ;
}
sec_blob = ( struct negotiate_message * ) * pbuffer ;
memset ( * pbuffer , 0 , sizeof ( struct negotiate_message ) ) ;
memcpy ( sec_blob - > Signature , NTLMSSP_SIGNATURE , 8 ) ;
sec_blob - > MessageType = NtLmNegotiate ;
/* BB is NTLMV2 session security format easier to use here? */
flags = NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56 | NTLMSSP_REQUEST_TARGET |
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128 | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE |
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SEC |
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_ALWAYS_SIGN | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL |
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_VERSION ;
if ( ! server - > session_estab | | ses - > ntlmssp - > sesskey_per_smbsess )
flags | = NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_XCH ;
sec_blob - > Version . ProductMajorVersion = LINUX_VERSION_MAJOR ;
sec_blob - > Version . ProductMinorVersion = LINUX_VERSION_PATCHLEVEL ;
sec_blob - > Version . ProductBuild = cpu_to_le16 ( SMB3_PRODUCT_BUILD ) ;
sec_blob - > Version . NTLMRevisionCurrent = NTLMSSP_REVISION_W2K3 ;
tmp = * pbuffer + sizeof ( struct negotiate_message ) ;
ses - > ntlmssp - > client_flags = flags ;
sec_blob - > NegotiateFlags = cpu_to_le32 ( flags ) ;
/* these fields should be null in negotiate phase MS-NLMP 3.1.5.1.1 */
cifs_security_buffer_from_str ( & sec_blob - > DomainName ,
NULL ,
CIFS_MAX_DOMAINNAME_LEN ,
* pbuffer , & tmp ,
nls_cp ) ;
cifs_security_buffer_from_str ( & sec_blob - > WorkstationName ,
NULL ,
CIFS_MAX_WORKSTATION_LEN ,
* pbuffer , & tmp ,
nls_cp ) ;
* buflen = tmp - * pbuffer ;
setup_ntlm_smb3_neg_ret :
return rc ;
}
2016-05-26 12:52:25 +03:00
int build_ntlmssp_auth_blob ( unsigned char * * pbuffer ,
2010-10-19 20:47:52 +04:00
u16 * buflen ,
2011-05-27 08:34:02 +04:00
struct cifs_ses * ses ,
2021-07-19 16:54:16 +03:00
struct TCP_Server_Info * server ,
cifs NTLMv2/NTLMSSP ntlmv2 within ntlmssp autentication code
Attribue Value (AV) pairs or Target Info (TI) pairs are part of
ntlmv2 authentication.
Structure ntlmv2_resp had only definition for two av pairs.
So removed it, and now allocation of av pairs is dynamic.
For servers like Windows 7/2008, av pairs sent by server in
challege packet (type 2 in the ntlmssp exchange/negotiation) can
vary.
Server sends them during ntlmssp negotiation. So when ntlmssp is used
as an authentication mechanism, type 2 challenge packet from server
has this information. Pluck it and use the entire blob for
authenticaiton purpose. If user has not specified, extract
(netbios) domain name from the av pairs which is used to calculate
ntlmv2 hash. Servers like Windows 7 are particular about the AV pair
blob.
Servers like Windows 2003, are not very strict about the contents
of av pair blob used during ntlmv2 authentication.
So when security mechanism such as ntlmv2 is used (not ntlmv2 in ntlmssp),
there is no negotiation and so genereate a minimal blob that gets
used in ntlmv2 authentication as well as gets sent.
Fields tilen and tilbob are session specific. AV pair values are defined.
To calculate ntlmv2 response we need ti/av pair blob.
For sec mech like ntlmssp, the blob is plucked from type 2 response from
the server. From this blob, netbios name of the domain is retrieved,
if user has not already provided, to be included in the Target String
as part of ntlmv2 hash calculations.
For sec mech like ntlmv2, create a minimal, two av pair blob.
The allocated blob is freed in case of error. In case there is no error,
this blob is used in calculating ntlmv2 response (in CalcNTLMv2_response)
and is also copied on the response to the server, and then freed.
The type 3 ntlmssp response is prepared on a buffer,
5 * sizeof of struct _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE, an empirical value large
enough to hold _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE plus a blob with max possible
10 values as part of ntlmv2 response and lmv2 keys and domain, user,
workstation names etc.
Also, kerberos gets selected as a default mechanism if server supports it,
over the other security mechanisms.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-09-19 07:02:18 +04:00
const struct nls_table * nls_cp )
2009-05-04 12:37:12 +04:00
{
cifs NTLMv2/NTLMSSP ntlmv2 within ntlmssp autentication code
Attribue Value (AV) pairs or Target Info (TI) pairs are part of
ntlmv2 authentication.
Structure ntlmv2_resp had only definition for two av pairs.
So removed it, and now allocation of av pairs is dynamic.
For servers like Windows 7/2008, av pairs sent by server in
challege packet (type 2 in the ntlmssp exchange/negotiation) can
vary.
Server sends them during ntlmssp negotiation. So when ntlmssp is used
as an authentication mechanism, type 2 challenge packet from server
has this information. Pluck it and use the entire blob for
authenticaiton purpose. If user has not specified, extract
(netbios) domain name from the av pairs which is used to calculate
ntlmv2 hash. Servers like Windows 7 are particular about the AV pair
blob.
Servers like Windows 2003, are not very strict about the contents
of av pair blob used during ntlmv2 authentication.
So when security mechanism such as ntlmv2 is used (not ntlmv2 in ntlmssp),
there is no negotiation and so genereate a minimal blob that gets
used in ntlmv2 authentication as well as gets sent.
Fields tilen and tilbob are session specific. AV pair values are defined.
To calculate ntlmv2 response we need ti/av pair blob.
For sec mech like ntlmssp, the blob is plucked from type 2 response from
the server. From this blob, netbios name of the domain is retrieved,
if user has not already provided, to be included in the Target String
as part of ntlmv2 hash calculations.
For sec mech like ntlmv2, create a minimal, two av pair blob.
The allocated blob is freed in case of error. In case there is no error,
this blob is used in calculating ntlmv2 response (in CalcNTLMv2_response)
and is also copied on the response to the server, and then freed.
The type 3 ntlmssp response is prepared on a buffer,
5 * sizeof of struct _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE, an empirical value large
enough to hold _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE plus a blob with max possible
10 values as part of ntlmv2 response and lmv2 keys and domain, user,
workstation names etc.
Also, kerberos gets selected as a default mechanism if server supports it,
over the other security mechanisms.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-09-19 07:02:18 +04:00
int rc ;
2016-05-26 12:52:25 +03:00
AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE * sec_blob ;
2009-05-04 12:37:12 +04:00
__u32 flags ;
unsigned char * tmp ;
2021-11-05 22:03:57 +03:00
int len ;
2009-05-04 12:37:12 +04:00
2016-05-26 12:52:25 +03:00
rc = setup_ntlmv2_rsp ( ses , nls_cp ) ;
if ( rc ) {
cifs_dbg ( VFS , " Error %d during NTLMSSP authentication \n " , rc ) ;
* buflen = 0 ;
goto setup_ntlmv2_ret ;
}
2021-11-05 22:03:57 +03:00
len = size_of_ntlmssp_blob ( ses , sizeof ( AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE ) ) ;
* pbuffer = kmalloc ( len , GFP_KERNEL ) ;
2018-08-23 13:24:02 +03:00
if ( ! * pbuffer ) {
rc = - ENOMEM ;
cifs_dbg ( VFS , " Error %d during NTLMSSP allocation \n " , rc ) ;
* buflen = 0 ;
goto setup_ntlmv2_ret ;
}
2016-05-26 12:52:25 +03:00
sec_blob = ( AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE * ) * pbuffer ;
2009-05-04 12:37:12 +04:00
memcpy ( sec_blob - > Signature , NTLMSSP_SIGNATURE , 8 ) ;
sec_blob - > MessageType = NtLmAuthenticate ;
2021-12-08 04:51:04 +03:00
flags = ses - > ntlmssp - > server_flags | NTLMSSP_REQUEST_TARGET |
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_TARGET_INFO | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_WORKSTATION_SUPPLIED ;
2009-05-04 12:37:12 +04:00
2016-05-26 12:52:25 +03:00
tmp = * pbuffer + sizeof ( AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE ) ;
2010-12-11 23:19:22 +03:00
sec_blob - > NegotiateFlags = cpu_to_le32 ( flags ) ;
2009-05-04 12:37:12 +04:00
sec_blob - > LmChallengeResponse . BufferOffset =
cpu_to_le32 ( sizeof ( AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE ) ) ;
sec_blob - > LmChallengeResponse . Length = 0 ;
sec_blob - > LmChallengeResponse . MaximumLength = 0 ;
2016-05-26 12:52:25 +03:00
sec_blob - > NtChallengeResponse . BufferOffset =
cpu_to_le32 ( tmp - * pbuffer ) ;
2016-05-03 11:52:30 +03:00
if ( ses - > user_name ! = NULL ) {
memcpy ( tmp , ses - > auth_key . response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE ,
ses - > auth_key . len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE ) ;
tmp + = ses - > auth_key . len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE ;
sec_blob - > NtChallengeResponse . Length =
cpu_to_le16 ( ses - > auth_key . len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE ) ;
sec_blob - > NtChallengeResponse . MaximumLength =
cpu_to_le16 ( ses - > auth_key . len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE ) ;
} else {
/*
* don ' t send an NT Response for anonymous access
*/
sec_blob - > NtChallengeResponse . Length = 0 ;
sec_blob - > NtChallengeResponse . MaximumLength = 0 ;
cifs NTLMv2/NTLMSSP ntlmv2 within ntlmssp autentication code
Attribue Value (AV) pairs or Target Info (TI) pairs are part of
ntlmv2 authentication.
Structure ntlmv2_resp had only definition for two av pairs.
So removed it, and now allocation of av pairs is dynamic.
For servers like Windows 7/2008, av pairs sent by server in
challege packet (type 2 in the ntlmssp exchange/negotiation) can
vary.
Server sends them during ntlmssp negotiation. So when ntlmssp is used
as an authentication mechanism, type 2 challenge packet from server
has this information. Pluck it and use the entire blob for
authenticaiton purpose. If user has not specified, extract
(netbios) domain name from the av pairs which is used to calculate
ntlmv2 hash. Servers like Windows 7 are particular about the AV pair
blob.
Servers like Windows 2003, are not very strict about the contents
of av pair blob used during ntlmv2 authentication.
So when security mechanism such as ntlmv2 is used (not ntlmv2 in ntlmssp),
there is no negotiation and so genereate a minimal blob that gets
used in ntlmv2 authentication as well as gets sent.
Fields tilen and tilbob are session specific. AV pair values are defined.
To calculate ntlmv2 response we need ti/av pair blob.
For sec mech like ntlmssp, the blob is plucked from type 2 response from
the server. From this blob, netbios name of the domain is retrieved,
if user has not already provided, to be included in the Target String
as part of ntlmv2 hash calculations.
For sec mech like ntlmv2, create a minimal, two av pair blob.
The allocated blob is freed in case of error. In case there is no error,
this blob is used in calculating ntlmv2 response (in CalcNTLMv2_response)
and is also copied on the response to the server, and then freed.
The type 3 ntlmssp response is prepared on a buffer,
5 * sizeof of struct _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE, an empirical value large
enough to hold _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE plus a blob with max possible
10 values as part of ntlmv2 response and lmv2 keys and domain, user,
workstation names etc.
Also, kerberos gets selected as a default mechanism if server supports it,
over the other security mechanisms.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-09-19 07:02:18 +04:00
}
2009-05-04 12:37:12 +04:00
2021-11-05 22:03:57 +03:00
cifs_security_buffer_from_str ( & sec_blob - > DomainName ,
ses - > domainName ,
CIFS_MAX_DOMAINNAME_LEN ,
* pbuffer , & tmp ,
nls_cp ) ;
2009-05-04 12:37:12 +04:00
2021-11-05 22:03:57 +03:00
cifs_security_buffer_from_str ( & sec_blob - > UserName ,
ses - > user_name ,
CIFS_MAX_USERNAME_LEN ,
* pbuffer , & tmp ,
nls_cp ) ;
2009-05-04 12:37:12 +04:00
2021-11-05 22:03:57 +03:00
cifs_security_buffer_from_str ( & sec_blob - > WorkstationName ,
ses - > workstation_name ,
2022-05-25 15:37:04 +03:00
ntlmssp_workstation_name_size ( ses ) ,
2021-11-05 22:03:57 +03:00
* pbuffer , & tmp ,
nls_cp ) ;
2009-05-04 12:37:12 +04:00
2021-12-08 04:51:04 +03:00
if ( ( ses - > ntlmssp - > server_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_XCH ) & &
( ! ses - > server - > session_estab | | ses - > ntlmssp - > sesskey_per_smbsess ) & &
! calc_seckey ( ses ) ) {
2010-10-28 18:53:07 +04:00
memcpy ( tmp , ses - > ntlmssp - > ciphertext , CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE ) ;
2016-05-26 12:52:25 +03:00
sec_blob - > SessionKey . BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32 ( tmp - * pbuffer ) ;
2010-10-21 23:25:08 +04:00
sec_blob - > SessionKey . Length = cpu_to_le16 ( CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE ) ;
sec_blob - > SessionKey . MaximumLength =
cpu_to_le16 ( CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE ) ;
tmp + = CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE ;
} else {
2016-05-26 12:52:25 +03:00
sec_blob - > SessionKey . BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32 ( tmp - * pbuffer ) ;
2010-10-21 23:25:08 +04:00
sec_blob - > SessionKey . Length = 0 ;
sec_blob - > SessionKey . MaximumLength = 0 ;
}
cifs NTLMv2/NTLMSSP ntlmv2 within ntlmssp autentication code
Attribue Value (AV) pairs or Target Info (TI) pairs are part of
ntlmv2 authentication.
Structure ntlmv2_resp had only definition for two av pairs.
So removed it, and now allocation of av pairs is dynamic.
For servers like Windows 7/2008, av pairs sent by server in
challege packet (type 2 in the ntlmssp exchange/negotiation) can
vary.
Server sends them during ntlmssp negotiation. So when ntlmssp is used
as an authentication mechanism, type 2 challenge packet from server
has this information. Pluck it and use the entire blob for
authenticaiton purpose. If user has not specified, extract
(netbios) domain name from the av pairs which is used to calculate
ntlmv2 hash. Servers like Windows 7 are particular about the AV pair
blob.
Servers like Windows 2003, are not very strict about the contents
of av pair blob used during ntlmv2 authentication.
So when security mechanism such as ntlmv2 is used (not ntlmv2 in ntlmssp),
there is no negotiation and so genereate a minimal blob that gets
used in ntlmv2 authentication as well as gets sent.
Fields tilen and tilbob are session specific. AV pair values are defined.
To calculate ntlmv2 response we need ti/av pair blob.
For sec mech like ntlmssp, the blob is plucked from type 2 response from
the server. From this blob, netbios name of the domain is retrieved,
if user has not already provided, to be included in the Target String
as part of ntlmv2 hash calculations.
For sec mech like ntlmv2, create a minimal, two av pair blob.
The allocated blob is freed in case of error. In case there is no error,
this blob is used in calculating ntlmv2 response (in CalcNTLMv2_response)
and is also copied on the response to the server, and then freed.
The type 3 ntlmssp response is prepared on a buffer,
5 * sizeof of struct _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE, an empirical value large
enough to hold _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE plus a blob with max possible
10 values as part of ntlmv2 response and lmv2 keys and domain, user,
workstation names etc.
Also, kerberos gets selected as a default mechanism if server supports it,
over the other security mechanisms.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-09-19 07:02:18 +04:00
2016-05-26 12:52:25 +03:00
* buflen = tmp - * pbuffer ;
cifs NTLMv2/NTLMSSP ntlmv2 within ntlmssp autentication code
Attribue Value (AV) pairs or Target Info (TI) pairs are part of
ntlmv2 authentication.
Structure ntlmv2_resp had only definition for two av pairs.
So removed it, and now allocation of av pairs is dynamic.
For servers like Windows 7/2008, av pairs sent by server in
challege packet (type 2 in the ntlmssp exchange/negotiation) can
vary.
Server sends them during ntlmssp negotiation. So when ntlmssp is used
as an authentication mechanism, type 2 challenge packet from server
has this information. Pluck it and use the entire blob for
authenticaiton purpose. If user has not specified, extract
(netbios) domain name from the av pairs which is used to calculate
ntlmv2 hash. Servers like Windows 7 are particular about the AV pair
blob.
Servers like Windows 2003, are not very strict about the contents
of av pair blob used during ntlmv2 authentication.
So when security mechanism such as ntlmv2 is used (not ntlmv2 in ntlmssp),
there is no negotiation and so genereate a minimal blob that gets
used in ntlmv2 authentication as well as gets sent.
Fields tilen and tilbob are session specific. AV pair values are defined.
To calculate ntlmv2 response we need ti/av pair blob.
For sec mech like ntlmssp, the blob is plucked from type 2 response from
the server. From this blob, netbios name of the domain is retrieved,
if user has not already provided, to be included in the Target String
as part of ntlmv2 hash calculations.
For sec mech like ntlmv2, create a minimal, two av pair blob.
The allocated blob is freed in case of error. In case there is no error,
this blob is used in calculating ntlmv2 response (in CalcNTLMv2_response)
and is also copied on the response to the server, and then freed.
The type 3 ntlmssp response is prepared on a buffer,
5 * sizeof of struct _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE, an empirical value large
enough to hold _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE plus a blob with max possible
10 values as part of ntlmv2 response and lmv2 keys and domain, user,
workstation names etc.
Also, kerberos gets selected as a default mechanism if server supports it,
over the other security mechanisms.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-09-19 07:02:18 +04:00
setup_ntlmv2_ret :
2010-10-19 20:47:52 +04:00
return rc ;
2009-05-04 12:37:12 +04:00
}
2013-06-13 04:52:14 +04:00
enum securityEnum
2017-01-18 13:05:57 +03:00
cifs_select_sectype ( struct TCP_Server_Info * server , enum securityEnum requested )
2013-06-13 04:52:14 +04:00
{
switch ( server - > negflavor ) {
case CIFS_NEGFLAVOR_EXTENDED :
switch ( requested ) {
case Kerberos :
case RawNTLMSSP :
return requested ;
case Unspecified :
if ( server - > sec_ntlmssp & &
( global_secflags & CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLMSSP ) )
return RawNTLMSSP ;
if ( ( server - > sec_kerberos | | server - > sec_mskerberos ) & &
( global_secflags & CIFSSEC_MAY_KRB5 ) )
return Kerberos ;
2020-08-24 01:36:59 +03:00
fallthrough ;
2013-06-13 04:52:14 +04:00
default :
return Unspecified ;
}
case CIFS_NEGFLAVOR_UNENCAP :
switch ( requested ) {
case NTLMv2 :
return requested ;
case Unspecified :
if ( global_secflags & CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLMV2 )
return NTLMv2 ;
2020-11-20 21:24:14 +03:00
break ;
2013-06-13 04:52:14 +04:00
default :
2013-09-27 21:35:42 +04:00
break ;
2013-06-13 04:52:14 +04:00
}
2021-08-19 13:34:58 +03:00
fallthrough ;
2013-06-13 04:52:14 +04:00
default :
return Unspecified ;
}
}
2014-06-16 18:35:25 +04:00
struct sess_data {
unsigned int xid ;
struct cifs_ses * ses ;
2021-07-19 16:54:16 +03:00
struct TCP_Server_Info * server ;
2014-06-16 18:35:25 +04:00
struct nls_table * nls_cp ;
void ( * func ) ( struct sess_data * ) ;
int result ;
/* we will send the SMB in three pieces:
* a fixed length beginning part , an optional
* SPNEGO blob ( which can be zero length ) , and a
* last part which will include the strings
* and rest of bcc area . This allows us to avoid
* a large buffer 17 K allocation
*/
int buf0_type ;
struct kvec iov [ 3 ] ;
} ;
2022-08-01 19:17:46 +03:00
# ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_ALLOW_INSECURE_LEGACY
2014-06-16 18:35:25 +04:00
static int
sess_alloc_buffer ( struct sess_data * sess_data , int wct )
{
int rc ;
struct cifs_ses * ses = sess_data - > ses ;
struct smb_hdr * smb_buf ;
rc = small_smb_init_no_tc ( SMB_COM_SESSION_SETUP_ANDX , wct , ses ,
( void * * ) & smb_buf ) ;
if ( rc )
return rc ;
sess_data - > iov [ 0 ] . iov_base = ( char * ) smb_buf ;
sess_data - > iov [ 0 ] . iov_len = be32_to_cpu ( smb_buf - > smb_buf_length ) + 4 ;
/*
* This variable will be used to clear the buffer
* allocated above in case of any error in the calling function .
*/
sess_data - > buf0_type = CIFS_SMALL_BUFFER ;
/* 2000 big enough to fit max user, domain, NOS name etc. */
sess_data - > iov [ 2 ] . iov_base = kmalloc ( 2000 , GFP_KERNEL ) ;
if ( ! sess_data - > iov [ 2 ] . iov_base ) {
rc = - ENOMEM ;
goto out_free_smb_buf ;
}
return 0 ;
out_free_smb_buf :
2021-08-17 17:55:10 +03:00
cifs_small_buf_release ( smb_buf ) ;
2014-06-16 18:35:25 +04:00
sess_data - > iov [ 0 ] . iov_base = NULL ;
sess_data - > iov [ 0 ] . iov_len = 0 ;
sess_data - > buf0_type = CIFS_NO_BUFFER ;
return rc ;
}
static void
sess_free_buffer ( struct sess_data * sess_data )
{
2022-10-14 23:14:54 +03:00
struct kvec * iov = sess_data - > iov ;
2022-09-20 21:10:35 +03:00
2022-10-14 23:14:54 +03:00
/*
* Zero the session data before freeing , as it might contain sensitive info ( keys , etc ) .
* Note that iov [ 1 ] is already freed by caller .
*/
if ( sess_data - > buf0_type ! = CIFS_NO_BUFFER & & iov [ 0 ] . iov_base )
memzero_explicit ( iov [ 0 ] . iov_base , iov [ 0 ] . iov_len ) ;
2014-06-16 18:35:25 +04:00
2022-10-14 23:14:54 +03:00
free_rsp_buf ( sess_data - > buf0_type , iov [ 0 ] . iov_base ) ;
2014-06-16 18:35:25 +04:00
sess_data - > buf0_type = CIFS_NO_BUFFER ;
2022-10-14 23:14:54 +03:00
kfree_sensitive ( iov [ 2 ] . iov_base ) ;
2014-06-16 18:35:25 +04:00
}
static int
sess_establish_session ( struct sess_data * sess_data )
{
struct cifs_ses * ses = sess_data - > ses ;
2021-07-19 16:54:16 +03:00
struct TCP_Server_Info * server = sess_data - > server ;
2014-06-16 18:35:25 +04:00
2022-06-01 08:03:18 +03:00
cifs_server_lock ( server ) ;
2021-07-19 16:54:16 +03:00
if ( ! server - > session_estab ) {
if ( server - > sign ) {
server - > session_key . response =
2014-06-16 18:35:25 +04:00
kmemdup ( ses - > auth_key . response ,
ses - > auth_key . len , GFP_KERNEL ) ;
2021-07-19 16:54:16 +03:00
if ( ! server - > session_key . response ) {
2022-06-01 08:03:18 +03:00
cifs_server_unlock ( server ) ;
2014-06-16 18:35:25 +04:00
return - ENOMEM ;
}
2021-07-19 16:54:16 +03:00
server - > session_key . len =
2014-06-16 18:35:25 +04:00
ses - > auth_key . len ;
}
2021-07-19 16:54:16 +03:00
server - > sequence_number = 0x2 ;
server - > session_estab = true ;
2014-06-16 18:35:25 +04:00
}
2022-06-01 08:03:18 +03:00
cifs_server_unlock ( server ) ;
2014-06-16 18:35:25 +04:00
cifs_dbg ( FYI , " CIFS session established successfully \n " ) ;
return 0 ;
}
static int
sess_sendreceive ( struct sess_data * sess_data )
{
int rc ;
struct smb_hdr * smb_buf = ( struct smb_hdr * ) sess_data - > iov [ 0 ] . iov_base ;
__u16 count ;
2016-10-25 21:38:47 +03:00
struct kvec rsp_iov = { NULL , 0 } ;
2014-06-16 18:35:25 +04:00
count = sess_data - > iov [ 1 ] . iov_len + sess_data - > iov [ 2 ] . iov_len ;
2020-07-25 11:56:01 +03:00
be32_add_cpu ( & smb_buf - > smb_buf_length , count ) ;
2014-06-16 18:35:25 +04:00
put_bcc ( count , smb_buf ) ;
rc = SendReceive2 ( sess_data - > xid , sess_data - > ses ,
sess_data - > iov , 3 /* num_iovecs */ ,
& sess_data - > buf0_type ,
2016-10-25 21:38:47 +03:00
CIFS_LOG_ERROR , & rsp_iov ) ;
cifs_small_buf_release ( sess_data - > iov [ 0 ] . iov_base ) ;
memcpy ( & sess_data - > iov [ 0 ] , & rsp_iov , sizeof ( struct kvec ) ) ;
2014-06-16 18:35:25 +04:00
return rc ;
}
2014-06-16 18:35:26 +04:00
static void
sess_auth_ntlmv2 ( struct sess_data * sess_data )
{
int rc = 0 ;
struct smb_hdr * smb_buf ;
SESSION_SETUP_ANDX * pSMB ;
char * bcc_ptr ;
struct cifs_ses * ses = sess_data - > ses ;
2021-07-19 16:54:16 +03:00
struct TCP_Server_Info * server = sess_data - > server ;
2014-06-16 18:35:26 +04:00
__u32 capabilities ;
__u16 bytes_remaining ;
/* old style NTLM sessionsetup */
/* wct = 13 */
rc = sess_alloc_buffer ( sess_data , 13 ) ;
if ( rc )
goto out ;
pSMB = ( SESSION_SETUP_ANDX * ) sess_data - > iov [ 0 ] . iov_base ;
bcc_ptr = sess_data - > iov [ 2 ] . iov_base ;
2021-07-19 16:54:16 +03:00
capabilities = cifs_ssetup_hdr ( ses , server , pSMB ) ;
2014-06-16 18:35:26 +04:00
pSMB - > req_no_secext . Capabilities = cpu_to_le32 ( capabilities ) ;
/* LM2 password would be here if we supported it */
pSMB - > req_no_secext . CaseInsensitivePasswordLength = 0 ;
2016-05-03 11:52:30 +03:00
if ( ses - > user_name ! = NULL ) {
/* calculate nlmv2 response and session key */
rc = setup_ntlmv2_rsp ( ses , sess_data - > nls_cp ) ;
if ( rc ) {
cifs_dbg ( VFS , " Error %d during NTLMv2 authentication \n " , rc ) ;
goto out ;
}
2014-06-16 18:35:26 +04:00
2016-05-03 11:52:30 +03:00
memcpy ( bcc_ptr , ses - > auth_key . response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE ,
ses - > auth_key . len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE ) ;
bcc_ptr + = ses - > auth_key . len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE ;
2014-06-16 18:35:26 +04:00
2016-05-03 11:52:30 +03:00
/* set case sensitive password length after tilen may get
* assigned , tilen is 0 otherwise .
*/
pSMB - > req_no_secext . CaseSensitivePasswordLength =
cpu_to_le16 ( ses - > auth_key . len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE ) ;
} else {
pSMB - > req_no_secext . CaseSensitivePasswordLength = 0 ;
}
2014-06-16 18:35:26 +04:00
if ( ses - > capabilities & CAP_UNICODE ) {
2022-10-13 06:53:09 +03:00
if ( ! IS_ALIGNED ( sess_data - > iov [ 0 ] . iov_len , 2 ) ) {
2014-06-16 18:35:26 +04:00
* bcc_ptr = 0 ;
bcc_ptr + + ;
}
unicode_ssetup_strings ( & bcc_ptr , ses , sess_data - > nls_cp ) ;
} else {
ascii_ssetup_strings ( & bcc_ptr , ses , sess_data - > nls_cp ) ;
}
sess_data - > iov [ 2 ] . iov_len = ( long ) bcc_ptr -
( long ) sess_data - > iov [ 2 ] . iov_base ;
rc = sess_sendreceive ( sess_data ) ;
if ( rc )
goto out ;
pSMB = ( SESSION_SETUP_ANDX * ) sess_data - > iov [ 0 ] . iov_base ;
smb_buf = ( struct smb_hdr * ) sess_data - > iov [ 0 ] . iov_base ;
if ( smb_buf - > WordCount ! = 3 ) {
rc = - EIO ;
cifs_dbg ( VFS , " bad word count %d \n " , smb_buf - > WordCount ) ;
goto out ;
}
if ( le16_to_cpu ( pSMB - > resp . Action ) & GUEST_LOGIN )
cifs_dbg ( FYI , " Guest login \n " ) ; /* BB mark SesInfo struct? */
ses - > Suid = smb_buf - > Uid ; /* UID left in wire format (le) */
cifs_dbg ( FYI , " UID = %llu \n " , ses - > Suid ) ;
bytes_remaining = get_bcc ( smb_buf ) ;
bcc_ptr = pByteArea ( smb_buf ) ;
/* BB check if Unicode and decode strings */
if ( bytes_remaining = = 0 ) {
/* no string area to decode, do nothing */
} else if ( smb_buf - > Flags2 & SMBFLG2_UNICODE ) {
/* unicode string area must be word-aligned */
2022-10-13 06:53:09 +03:00
if ( ! IS_ALIGNED ( ( unsigned long ) bcc_ptr - ( unsigned long ) smb_buf , 2 ) ) {
2014-06-16 18:35:26 +04:00
+ + bcc_ptr ;
- - bytes_remaining ;
}
decode_unicode_ssetup ( & bcc_ptr , bytes_remaining , ses ,
sess_data - > nls_cp ) ;
} else {
decode_ascii_ssetup ( & bcc_ptr , bytes_remaining , ses ,
sess_data - > nls_cp ) ;
}
rc = sess_establish_session ( sess_data ) ;
out :
sess_data - > result = rc ;
sess_data - > func = NULL ;
sess_free_buffer ( sess_data ) ;
2022-09-20 21:10:35 +03:00
kfree_sensitive ( ses - > auth_key . response ) ;
2014-06-16 18:35:26 +04:00
ses - > auth_key . response = NULL ;
}
2014-06-16 18:35:27 +04:00
# ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_UPCALL
static void
sess_auth_kerberos ( struct sess_data * sess_data )
{
int rc = 0 ;
struct smb_hdr * smb_buf ;
SESSION_SETUP_ANDX * pSMB ;
char * bcc_ptr ;
struct cifs_ses * ses = sess_data - > ses ;
2021-07-19 16:54:16 +03:00
struct TCP_Server_Info * server = sess_data - > server ;
2014-06-16 18:35:27 +04:00
__u32 capabilities ;
__u16 bytes_remaining ;
struct key * spnego_key = NULL ;
struct cifs_spnego_msg * msg ;
u16 blob_len ;
/* extended security */
/* wct = 12 */
rc = sess_alloc_buffer ( sess_data , 12 ) ;
if ( rc )
goto out ;
pSMB = ( SESSION_SETUP_ANDX * ) sess_data - > iov [ 0 ] . iov_base ;
bcc_ptr = sess_data - > iov [ 2 ] . iov_base ;
2021-07-19 16:54:16 +03:00
capabilities = cifs_ssetup_hdr ( ses , server , pSMB ) ;
2014-06-16 18:35:27 +04:00
2021-07-19 16:54:16 +03:00
spnego_key = cifs_get_spnego_key ( ses , server ) ;
2014-06-16 18:35:27 +04:00
if ( IS_ERR ( spnego_key ) ) {
rc = PTR_ERR ( spnego_key ) ;
spnego_key = NULL ;
goto out ;
}
2015-10-21 16:04:48 +03:00
msg = spnego_key - > payload . data [ 0 ] ;
2014-06-16 18:35:27 +04:00
/*
* check version field to make sure that cifs . upcall is
* sending us a response in an expected form
*/
if ( msg - > version ! = CIFS_SPNEGO_UPCALL_VERSION ) {
2020-04-15 08:42:53 +03:00
cifs_dbg ( VFS , " incorrect version of cifs.upcall (expected %d but got %d) \n " ,
CIFS_SPNEGO_UPCALL_VERSION , msg - > version ) ;
2014-06-16 18:35:27 +04:00
rc = - EKEYREJECTED ;
goto out_put_spnego_key ;
}
2023-01-11 02:35:46 +03:00
kfree_sensitive ( ses - > auth_key . response ) ;
2014-06-16 18:35:27 +04:00
ses - > auth_key . response = kmemdup ( msg - > data , msg - > sesskey_len ,
GFP_KERNEL ) ;
if ( ! ses - > auth_key . response ) {
2020-04-15 08:42:53 +03:00
cifs_dbg ( VFS , " Kerberos can't allocate (%u bytes) memory \n " ,
msg - > sesskey_len ) ;
2014-06-16 18:35:27 +04:00
rc = - ENOMEM ;
goto out_put_spnego_key ;
}
ses - > auth_key . len = msg - > sesskey_len ;
pSMB - > req . hdr . Flags2 | = SMBFLG2_EXT_SEC ;
capabilities | = CAP_EXTENDED_SECURITY ;
pSMB - > req . Capabilities = cpu_to_le32 ( capabilities ) ;
sess_data - > iov [ 1 ] . iov_base = msg - > data + msg - > sesskey_len ;
sess_data - > iov [ 1 ] . iov_len = msg - > secblob_len ;
pSMB - > req . SecurityBlobLength = cpu_to_le16 ( sess_data - > iov [ 1 ] . iov_len ) ;
if ( ses - > capabilities & CAP_UNICODE ) {
/* unicode strings must be word aligned */
2022-10-13 06:53:09 +03:00
if ( ! IS_ALIGNED ( sess_data - > iov [ 0 ] . iov_len + sess_data - > iov [ 1 ] . iov_len , 2 ) ) {
2014-06-16 18:35:27 +04:00
* bcc_ptr = 0 ;
bcc_ptr + + ;
}
unicode_oslm_strings ( & bcc_ptr , sess_data - > nls_cp ) ;
unicode_domain_string ( & bcc_ptr , ses , sess_data - > nls_cp ) ;
} else {
/* BB: is this right? */
ascii_ssetup_strings ( & bcc_ptr , ses , sess_data - > nls_cp ) ;
}
sess_data - > iov [ 2 ] . iov_len = ( long ) bcc_ptr -
( long ) sess_data - > iov [ 2 ] . iov_base ;
rc = sess_sendreceive ( sess_data ) ;
if ( rc )
goto out_put_spnego_key ;
pSMB = ( SESSION_SETUP_ANDX * ) sess_data - > iov [ 0 ] . iov_base ;
smb_buf = ( struct smb_hdr * ) sess_data - > iov [ 0 ] . iov_base ;
if ( smb_buf - > WordCount ! = 4 ) {
rc = - EIO ;
cifs_dbg ( VFS , " bad word count %d \n " , smb_buf - > WordCount ) ;
goto out_put_spnego_key ;
}
if ( le16_to_cpu ( pSMB - > resp . Action ) & GUEST_LOGIN )
cifs_dbg ( FYI , " Guest login \n " ) ; /* BB mark SesInfo struct? */
ses - > Suid = smb_buf - > Uid ; /* UID left in wire format (le) */
cifs_dbg ( FYI , " UID = %llu \n " , ses - > Suid ) ;
bytes_remaining = get_bcc ( smb_buf ) ;
bcc_ptr = pByteArea ( smb_buf ) ;
blob_len = le16_to_cpu ( pSMB - > resp . SecurityBlobLength ) ;
if ( blob_len > bytes_remaining ) {
cifs_dbg ( VFS , " bad security blob length %d \n " ,
blob_len ) ;
rc = - EINVAL ;
goto out_put_spnego_key ;
}
bcc_ptr + = blob_len ;
bytes_remaining - = blob_len ;
/* BB check if Unicode and decode strings */
if ( bytes_remaining = = 0 ) {
/* no string area to decode, do nothing */
} else if ( smb_buf - > Flags2 & SMBFLG2_UNICODE ) {
/* unicode string area must be word-aligned */
2022-10-13 06:53:09 +03:00
if ( ! IS_ALIGNED ( ( unsigned long ) bcc_ptr - ( unsigned long ) smb_buf , 2 ) ) {
2014-06-16 18:35:27 +04:00
+ + bcc_ptr ;
- - bytes_remaining ;
}
decode_unicode_ssetup ( & bcc_ptr , bytes_remaining , ses ,
sess_data - > nls_cp ) ;
} else {
decode_ascii_ssetup ( & bcc_ptr , bytes_remaining , ses ,
sess_data - > nls_cp ) ;
}
rc = sess_establish_session ( sess_data ) ;
out_put_spnego_key :
key_invalidate ( spnego_key ) ;
key_put ( spnego_key ) ;
out :
sess_data - > result = rc ;
sess_data - > func = NULL ;
sess_free_buffer ( sess_data ) ;
2022-09-20 21:10:35 +03:00
kfree_sensitive ( ses - > auth_key . response ) ;
2014-06-16 18:35:27 +04:00
ses - > auth_key . response = NULL ;
}
# endif /* ! CONFIG_CIFS_UPCALL */
2014-06-16 18:35:26 +04:00
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
/*
* The required kvec buffers have to be allocated before calling this
* function .
*/
static int
_sess_auth_rawntlmssp_assemble_req ( struct sess_data * sess_data )
2006-06-01 02:40:51 +04:00
{
SESSION_SETUP_ANDX * pSMB ;
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
struct cifs_ses * ses = sess_data - > ses ;
2021-07-19 16:54:16 +03:00
struct TCP_Server_Info * server = sess_data - > server ;
2006-06-01 02:40:51 +04:00
__u32 capabilities ;
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
char * bcc_ptr ;
2006-06-04 09:53:15 +04:00
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
pSMB = ( SESSION_SETUP_ANDX * ) sess_data - > iov [ 0 ] . iov_base ;
2021-07-19 16:54:16 +03:00
capabilities = cifs_ssetup_hdr ( ses , server , pSMB ) ;
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
if ( ( pSMB - > req . hdr . Flags2 & SMBFLG2_UNICODE ) = = 0 ) {
cifs_dbg ( VFS , " NTLMSSP requires Unicode support \n " ) ;
return - ENOSYS ;
2013-05-24 15:41:01 +04:00
}
2006-06-01 02:40:51 +04:00
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
pSMB - > req . hdr . Flags2 | = SMBFLG2_EXT_SEC ;
capabilities | = CAP_EXTENDED_SECURITY ;
pSMB - > req . Capabilities | = cpu_to_le32 ( capabilities ) ;
2014-06-16 18:35:25 +04:00
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
bcc_ptr = sess_data - > iov [ 2 ] . iov_base ;
/* unicode strings must be word aligned */
2022-10-13 06:53:09 +03:00
if ( ! IS_ALIGNED ( sess_data - > iov [ 0 ] . iov_len + sess_data - > iov [ 1 ] . iov_len , 2 ) ) {
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
* bcc_ptr = 0 ;
bcc_ptr + + ;
2013-06-13 04:52:14 +04:00
}
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
unicode_oslm_strings ( & bcc_ptr , sess_data - > nls_cp ) ;
2013-06-13 04:52:14 +04:00
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
sess_data - > iov [ 2 ] . iov_len = ( long ) bcc_ptr -
( long ) sess_data - > iov [ 2 ] . iov_base ;
2014-06-16 18:35:25 +04:00
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
return 0 ;
}
static void
sess_auth_rawntlmssp_authenticate ( struct sess_data * sess_data ) ;
static void
sess_auth_rawntlmssp_negotiate ( struct sess_data * sess_data )
{
int rc ;
struct smb_hdr * smb_buf ;
SESSION_SETUP_ANDX * pSMB ;
struct cifs_ses * ses = sess_data - > ses ;
2021-07-19 16:54:16 +03:00
struct TCP_Server_Info * server = sess_data - > server ;
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
__u16 bytes_remaining ;
char * bcc_ptr ;
2021-11-05 22:03:57 +03:00
unsigned char * ntlmsspblob = NULL ;
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
u16 blob_len ;
cifs_dbg ( FYI , " rawntlmssp session setup negotiate phase \n " ) ;
2013-08-29 17:35:10 +04:00
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
/*
* if memory allocation is successful , caller of this function
* frees it .
*/
ses - > ntlmssp = kmalloc ( sizeof ( struct ntlmssp_auth ) , GFP_KERNEL ) ;
if ( ! ses - > ntlmssp ) {
rc = - ENOMEM ;
goto out ;
2010-10-28 18:53:07 +04:00
}
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
ses - > ntlmssp - > sesskey_per_smbsess = false ;
2010-10-28 18:53:07 +04:00
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
/* wct = 12 */
rc = sess_alloc_buffer ( sess_data , 12 ) ;
if ( rc )
goto out ;
2009-05-04 12:37:12 +04:00
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
pSMB = ( SESSION_SETUP_ANDX * ) sess_data - > iov [ 0 ] . iov_base ;
2006-06-01 02:40:51 +04:00
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
/* Build security blob before we assemble the request */
2021-11-05 22:03:57 +03:00
rc = build_ntlmssp_negotiate_blob ( & ntlmsspblob ,
2021-07-19 16:54:16 +03:00
& blob_len , ses , server ,
2021-11-05 22:03:57 +03:00
sess_data - > nls_cp ) ;
if ( rc )
2022-01-17 09:20:47 +03:00
goto out_free_ntlmsspblob ;
2021-11-05 22:03:57 +03:00
sess_data - > iov [ 1 ] . iov_len = blob_len ;
sess_data - > iov [ 1 ] . iov_base = ntlmsspblob ;
pSMB - > req . SecurityBlobLength = cpu_to_le16 ( blob_len ) ;
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
rc = _sess_auth_rawntlmssp_assemble_req ( sess_data ) ;
2007-07-07 23:25:05 +04:00
if ( rc )
2022-01-17 09:20:47 +03:00
goto out_free_ntlmsspblob ;
2006-06-01 02:40:51 +04:00
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
rc = sess_sendreceive ( sess_data ) ;
2006-06-01 02:40:51 +04:00
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
pSMB = ( SESSION_SETUP_ANDX * ) sess_data - > iov [ 0 ] . iov_base ;
smb_buf = ( struct smb_hdr * ) sess_data - > iov [ 0 ] . iov_base ;
2006-06-27 10:28:30 +04:00
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
/* If true, rc here is expected and not an error */
if ( sess_data - > buf0_type ! = CIFS_NO_BUFFER & &
smb_buf - > Status . CifsError = =
cpu_to_le32 ( NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED ) )
rc = 0 ;
2007-11-17 02:37:35 +03:00
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
if ( rc )
2022-01-17 09:20:47 +03:00
goto out_free_ntlmsspblob ;
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
cifs_dbg ( FYI , " rawntlmssp session setup challenge phase \n " ) ;
if ( smb_buf - > WordCount ! = 4 ) {
rc = - EIO ;
cifs_dbg ( VFS , " bad word count %d \n " , smb_buf - > WordCount ) ;
2022-01-17 09:20:47 +03:00
goto out_free_ntlmsspblob ;
2007-08-18 04:15:20 +04:00
}
2006-06-01 02:40:51 +04:00
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
ses - > Suid = smb_buf - > Uid ; /* UID left in wire format (le) */
cifs_dbg ( FYI , " UID = %llu \n " , ses - > Suid ) ;
2007-11-17 02:37:35 +03:00
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
bytes_remaining = get_bcc ( smb_buf ) ;
bcc_ptr = pByteArea ( smb_buf ) ;
2011-01-07 19:30:28 +03:00
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
blob_len = le16_to_cpu ( pSMB - > resp . SecurityBlobLength ) ;
if ( blob_len > bytes_remaining ) {
cifs_dbg ( VFS , " bad security blob length %d \n " ,
blob_len ) ;
rc = - EINVAL ;
2022-01-17 09:20:47 +03:00
goto out_free_ntlmsspblob ;
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
}
2009-05-04 12:37:12 +04:00
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
rc = decode_ntlmssp_challenge ( bcc_ptr , blob_len , ses ) ;
2022-01-17 09:20:47 +03:00
out_free_ntlmsspblob :
2022-09-20 21:10:35 +03:00
kfree_sensitive ( ntlmsspblob ) ;
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
out :
sess_free_buffer ( sess_data ) ;
if ( ! rc ) {
sess_data - > func = sess_auth_rawntlmssp_authenticate ;
return ;
2006-06-01 02:40:51 +04:00
}
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
/* Else error. Cleanup */
2022-09-20 21:10:35 +03:00
kfree_sensitive ( ses - > auth_key . response ) ;
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
ses - > auth_key . response = NULL ;
2022-09-20 21:10:35 +03:00
kfree_sensitive ( ses - > ntlmssp ) ;
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
ses - > ntlmssp = NULL ;
2007-11-17 02:37:35 +03:00
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
sess_data - > func = NULL ;
sess_data - > result = rc ;
}
2006-06-01 02:40:51 +04:00
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
static void
sess_auth_rawntlmssp_authenticate ( struct sess_data * sess_data )
{
int rc ;
struct smb_hdr * smb_buf ;
SESSION_SETUP_ANDX * pSMB ;
struct cifs_ses * ses = sess_data - > ses ;
2021-07-19 16:54:16 +03:00
struct TCP_Server_Info * server = sess_data - > server ;
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
__u16 bytes_remaining ;
char * bcc_ptr ;
2016-05-26 12:52:25 +03:00
unsigned char * ntlmsspblob = NULL ;
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
u16 blob_len ;
2006-06-01 02:40:51 +04:00
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
cifs_dbg ( FYI , " rawntlmssp session setup authenticate phase \n " ) ;
2006-06-01 02:40:51 +04:00
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
/* wct = 12 */
rc = sess_alloc_buffer ( sess_data , 12 ) ;
if ( rc )
goto out ;
2006-06-01 02:40:51 +04:00
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
/* Build security blob before we assemble the request */
pSMB = ( SESSION_SETUP_ANDX * ) sess_data - > iov [ 0 ] . iov_base ;
smb_buf = ( struct smb_hdr * ) pSMB ;
2016-05-26 12:52:25 +03:00
rc = build_ntlmssp_auth_blob ( & ntlmsspblob ,
2021-07-19 16:54:16 +03:00
& blob_len , ses , server ,
sess_data - > nls_cp ) ;
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
if ( rc )
goto out_free_ntlmsspblob ;
sess_data - > iov [ 1 ] . iov_len = blob_len ;
sess_data - > iov [ 1 ] . iov_base = ntlmsspblob ;
pSMB - > req . SecurityBlobLength = cpu_to_le16 ( blob_len ) ;
/*
* Make sure that we tell the server that we are using
* the uid that it just gave us back on the response
* ( challenge )
*/
smb_buf - > Uid = ses - > Suid ;
rc = _sess_auth_rawntlmssp_assemble_req ( sess_data ) ;
2009-05-04 12:37:12 +04:00
if ( rc )
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
goto out_free_ntlmsspblob ;
2009-05-04 12:37:12 +04:00
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
rc = sess_sendreceive ( sess_data ) ;
if ( rc )
goto out_free_ntlmsspblob ;
pSMB = ( SESSION_SETUP_ANDX * ) sess_data - > iov [ 0 ] . iov_base ;
smb_buf = ( struct smb_hdr * ) sess_data - > iov [ 0 ] . iov_base ;
2014-06-16 18:35:26 +04:00
if ( smb_buf - > WordCount ! = 4 ) {
2006-06-01 02:40:51 +04:00
rc = - EIO ;
2013-05-05 07:12:25 +04:00
cifs_dbg ( VFS , " bad word count %d \n " , smb_buf - > WordCount ) ;
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
goto out_free_ntlmsspblob ;
2006-06-01 02:40:51 +04:00
}
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
if ( le16_to_cpu ( pSMB - > resp . Action ) & GUEST_LOGIN )
2013-05-05 07:12:25 +04:00
cifs_dbg ( FYI , " Guest login \n " ) ; /* BB mark SesInfo struct? */
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
2014-12-03 15:26:36 +03:00
if ( ses - > Suid ! = smb_buf - > Uid ) {
ses - > Suid = smb_buf - > Uid ;
cifs_dbg ( FYI , " UID changed! new UID = %llu \n " , ses - > Suid ) ;
}
2011-01-20 21:36:51 +03:00
bytes_remaining = get_bcc ( smb_buf ) ;
2006-06-01 02:40:51 +04:00
bcc_ptr = pByteArea ( smb_buf ) ;
2014-06-16 18:35:26 +04:00
blob_len = le16_to_cpu ( pSMB - > resp . SecurityBlobLength ) ;
if ( blob_len > bytes_remaining ) {
cifs_dbg ( VFS , " bad security blob length %d \n " ,
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
blob_len ) ;
2014-06-16 18:35:26 +04:00
rc = - EINVAL ;
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
goto out_free_ntlmsspblob ;
2007-07-07 23:25:05 +04:00
}
2014-06-16 18:35:26 +04:00
bcc_ptr + = blob_len ;
bytes_remaining - = blob_len ;
2006-06-01 02:40:51 +04:00
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
2006-06-01 02:40:51 +04:00
/* BB check if Unicode and decode strings */
2011-04-27 21:25:51 +04:00
if ( bytes_remaining = = 0 ) {
/* no string area to decode, do nothing */
} else if ( smb_buf - > Flags2 & SMBFLG2_UNICODE ) {
2009-04-14 19:00:53 +04:00
/* unicode string area must be word-aligned */
2022-10-13 06:53:09 +03:00
if ( ! IS_ALIGNED ( ( unsigned long ) bcc_ptr - ( unsigned long ) smb_buf , 2 ) ) {
2009-04-14 19:00:53 +04:00
+ + bcc_ptr ;
- - bytes_remaining ;
}
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
decode_unicode_ssetup ( & bcc_ptr , bytes_remaining , ses ,
sess_data - > nls_cp ) ;
2009-04-14 19:00:53 +04:00
} else {
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
decode_ascii_ssetup ( & bcc_ptr , bytes_remaining , ses ,
sess_data - > nls_cp ) ;
2009-04-14 19:00:53 +04:00
}
2007-07-13 04:33:32 +04:00
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
out_free_ntlmsspblob :
2022-09-20 21:10:35 +03:00
kfree_sensitive ( ntlmsspblob ) ;
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
out :
sess_free_buffer ( sess_data ) ;
2013-08-29 17:35:09 +04:00
2022-01-17 04:11:30 +03:00
if ( ! rc )
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
rc = sess_establish_session ( sess_data ) ;
2013-08-29 17:35:09 +04:00
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
/* Cleanup */
2022-09-20 21:10:35 +03:00
kfree_sensitive ( ses - > auth_key . response ) ;
2013-08-29 17:35:09 +04:00
ses - > auth_key . response = NULL ;
2022-09-20 21:10:35 +03:00
kfree_sensitive ( ses - > ntlmssp ) ;
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
ses - > ntlmssp = NULL ;
2013-08-29 17:35:09 +04:00
2014-06-16 18:35:28 +04:00
sess_data - > func = NULL ;
sess_data - > result = rc ;
}
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static int select_sec ( struct sess_data * sess_data )
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{
int type ;
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struct cifs_ses * ses = sess_data - > ses ;
struct TCP_Server_Info * server = sess_data - > server ;
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type = cifs_select_sectype ( server , ses - > sectype ) ;
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cifs_dbg ( FYI , " sess setup type %d \n " , type ) ;
if ( type = = Unspecified ) {
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cifs_dbg ( VFS , " Unable to select appropriate authentication method! \n " ) ;
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return - EINVAL ;
}
switch ( type ) {
case NTLMv2 :
sess_data - > func = sess_auth_ntlmv2 ;
break ;
case Kerberos :
# ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_UPCALL
sess_data - > func = sess_auth_kerberos ;
break ;
# else
cifs_dbg ( VFS , " Kerberos negotiated but upcall support disabled! \n " ) ;
return - ENOSYS ;
# endif /* CONFIG_CIFS_UPCALL */
case RawNTLMSSP :
sess_data - > func = sess_auth_rawntlmssp_negotiate ;
break ;
default :
cifs_dbg ( VFS , " secType %d not supported! \n " , type ) ;
return - ENOSYS ;
}
return 0 ;
}
int CIFS_SessSetup ( const unsigned int xid , struct cifs_ses * ses ,
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struct TCP_Server_Info * server ,
const struct nls_table * nls_cp )
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{
int rc = 0 ;
struct sess_data * sess_data ;
if ( ses = = NULL ) {
WARN ( 1 , " %s: ses == NULL! " , __func__ ) ;
return - EINVAL ;
}
sess_data = kzalloc ( sizeof ( struct sess_data ) , GFP_KERNEL ) ;
if ( ! sess_data )
return - ENOMEM ;
sess_data - > xid = xid ;
sess_data - > ses = ses ;
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sess_data - > server = server ;
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sess_data - > buf0_type = CIFS_NO_BUFFER ;
sess_data - > nls_cp = ( struct nls_table * ) nls_cp ;
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rc = select_sec ( sess_data ) ;
if ( rc )
goto out ;
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while ( sess_data - > func )
sess_data - > func ( sess_data ) ;
/* Store result before we free sess_data */
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rc = sess_data - > result ;
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out :
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kfree_sensitive ( sess_data ) ;
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return rc ;
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}
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# endif /* CONFIG_CIFS_ALLOW_INSECURE_LEGACY */