License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 17:07:57 +03:00
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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/*
* NETLINK Generic Netlink Family
*
* Authors : Jamal Hadi Salim
* Thomas Graf < tgraf @ suug . ch >
2007-07-19 02:47:52 +04:00
* Johannes Berg < johannes @ sipsolutions . net >
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
*/
# include <linux/module.h>
# include <linux/kernel.h>
include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h
percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being
included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which
in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files
universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies.
percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for
this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those
headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion
needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is
used as the basis of conversion.
http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py
The script does the followings.
* Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that
only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used,
gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h.
* When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include
blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms
to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains
core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered -
alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there
doesn't seem to be any matching order.
* If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly
because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out
an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the
file.
The conversion was done in the following steps.
1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly
over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h
and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400
files.
2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion,
some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or
embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added
inclusions to around 150 files.
3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits
from #2 to make sure no file was left behind.
4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed.
e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab
APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually.
5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically
editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h
files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h
inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually
wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each
slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as
necessary.
6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h.
7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures
were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my
distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few
more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things
build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq).
* x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config.
* powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig
* sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig
* ia64 SMP allmodconfig
* s390 SMP allmodconfig
* alpha SMP allmodconfig
* um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig
8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as
a separate patch and serve as bisection point.
Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step
6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch.
If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch
headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of
the specific arch.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
2010-03-24 11:04:11 +03:00
# include <linux/slab.h>
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# include <linux/errno.h>
# include <linux/types.h>
# include <linux/socket.h>
# include <linux/string.h>
# include <linux/skbuff.h>
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# include <linux/mutex.h>
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# include <linux/bitmap.h>
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# include <linux/rwsem.h>
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# include <linux/idr.h>
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# include <net/sock.h>
# include <net/genetlink.h>
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static DEFINE_MUTEX ( genl_mutex ) ; /* serialization of message processing */
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static DECLARE_RWSEM ( cb_lock ) ;
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atomic_t genl_sk_destructing_cnt = ATOMIC_INIT ( 0 ) ;
DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD ( genl_sk_destructing_waitq ) ;
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void genl_lock ( void )
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{
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mutex_lock ( & genl_mutex ) ;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL ( genl_lock ) ;
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void genl_unlock ( void )
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{
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mutex_unlock ( & genl_mutex ) ;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL ( genl_unlock ) ;
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static void genl_lock_all ( void )
{
down_write ( & cb_lock ) ;
genl_lock ( ) ;
}
static void genl_unlock_all ( void )
{
genl_unlock ( ) ;
up_write ( & cb_lock ) ;
}
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static DEFINE_IDR ( genl_fam_idr ) ;
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/*
* Bitmap of multicast groups that are currently in use .
*
* To avoid an allocation at boot of just one unsigned long ,
* declare it global instead .
* Bit 0 is marked as already used since group 0 is invalid .
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* Bit 1 is marked as already used since the drop - monitor code
* abuses the API and thinks it can statically use group 1.
* That group will typically conflict with other groups that
* any proper users use .
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* Bit 16 is marked as used since it ' s used for generic netlink
* and the code no longer marks pre - reserved IDs as used .
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* Bit 17 is marked as already used since the VFS quota code
* also abused this API and relied on family = = group ID , we
* cater to that by giving it a static family and group ID .
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* Bit 18 is marked as already used since the PMCRAID driver
* did the same thing as the VFS quota code ( maybe copied ? )
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*/
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static unsigned long mc_group_start = 0x3 | BIT ( GENL_ID_CTRL ) |
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BIT ( GENL_ID_VFS_DQUOT ) |
BIT ( GENL_ID_PMCRAID ) ;
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static unsigned long * mc_groups = & mc_group_start ;
static unsigned long mc_groups_longs = 1 ;
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/* We need the last attribute with non-zero ID therefore a 2-entry array */
static struct nla_policy genl_policy_reject_all [ ] = {
{ . type = NLA_REJECT } ,
{ . type = NLA_REJECT } ,
} ;
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static int genl_ctrl_event ( int event , const struct genl_family * family ,
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const struct genl_multicast_group * grp ,
int grp_id ) ;
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static void
genl_op_fill_in_reject_policy ( const struct genl_family * family ,
struct genl_ops * op )
{
BUILD_BUG_ON ( ARRAY_SIZE ( genl_policy_reject_all ) - 1 ! = 1 ) ;
if ( op - > policy | | op - > cmd < family - > resv_start_op )
return ;
op - > policy = genl_policy_reject_all ;
op - > maxattr = 1 ;
}
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static void
genl_op_fill_in_reject_policy_split ( const struct genl_family * family ,
struct genl_split_ops * op )
{
if ( op - > policy )
return ;
op - > policy = genl_policy_reject_all ;
op - > maxattr = 1 ;
}
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static const struct genl_family * genl_family_find_byid ( unsigned int id )
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{
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return idr_find ( & genl_fam_idr , id ) ;
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}
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static const struct genl_family * genl_family_find_byname ( char * name )
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{
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const struct genl_family * family ;
unsigned int id ;
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idr_for_each_entry ( & genl_fam_idr , family , id )
if ( strcmp ( family - > name , name ) = = 0 )
return family ;
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return NULL ;
}
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struct genl_op_iter {
const struct genl_family * family ;
struct genl_split_ops doit ;
struct genl_split_ops dumpit ;
int cmd_idx ;
int entry_idx ;
u32 cmd ;
u8 flags ;
} ;
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static void genl_op_from_full ( const struct genl_family * family ,
unsigned int i , struct genl_ops * op )
{
* op = family - > ops [ i ] ;
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if ( ! op - > maxattr )
op - > maxattr = family - > maxattr ;
if ( ! op - > policy )
op - > policy = family - > policy ;
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genl_op_fill_in_reject_policy ( family , op ) ;
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}
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static int genl_get_cmd_full ( u32 cmd , const struct genl_family * family ,
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struct genl_ops * op )
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{
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int i ;
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for ( i = 0 ; i < family - > n_ops ; i + + )
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if ( family - > ops [ i ] . cmd = = cmd ) {
genl_op_from_full ( family , i , op ) ;
return 0 ;
}
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return - ENOENT ;
}
static void genl_op_from_small ( const struct genl_family * family ,
unsigned int i , struct genl_ops * op )
{
memset ( op , 0 , sizeof ( * op ) ) ;
op - > doit = family - > small_ops [ i ] . doit ;
op - > dumpit = family - > small_ops [ i ] . dumpit ;
op - > cmd = family - > small_ops [ i ] . cmd ;
op - > internal_flags = family - > small_ops [ i ] . internal_flags ;
op - > flags = family - > small_ops [ i ] . flags ;
op - > validate = family - > small_ops [ i ] . validate ;
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op - > maxattr = family - > maxattr ;
op - > policy = family - > policy ;
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genl_op_fill_in_reject_policy ( family , op ) ;
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}
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static int genl_get_cmd_small ( u32 cmd , const struct genl_family * family ,
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struct genl_ops * op )
{
int i ;
for ( i = 0 ; i < family - > n_small_ops ; i + + )
if ( family - > small_ops [ i ] . cmd = = cmd ) {
genl_op_from_small ( family , i , op ) ;
return 0 ;
}
return - ENOENT ;
}
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static void genl_op_from_split ( struct genl_op_iter * iter )
{
const struct genl_family * family = iter - > family ;
int i , cnt = 0 ;
i = iter - > entry_idx - family - > n_ops - family - > n_small_ops ;
if ( family - > split_ops [ i + cnt ] . flags & GENL_CMD_CAP_DO ) {
iter - > doit = family - > split_ops [ i + cnt ] ;
genl_op_fill_in_reject_policy_split ( family , & iter - > doit ) ;
cnt + + ;
} else {
memset ( & iter - > doit , 0 , sizeof ( iter - > doit ) ) ;
}
if ( i + cnt < family - > n_split_ops & &
family - > split_ops [ i + cnt ] . flags & GENL_CMD_CAP_DUMP ) {
iter - > dumpit = family - > split_ops [ i + cnt ] ;
genl_op_fill_in_reject_policy_split ( family , & iter - > dumpit ) ;
cnt + + ;
} else {
memset ( & iter - > dumpit , 0 , sizeof ( iter - > dumpit ) ) ;
}
WARN_ON ( ! cnt ) ;
iter - > entry_idx + = cnt ;
}
static int
genl_get_cmd_split ( u32 cmd , u8 flag , const struct genl_family * family ,
struct genl_split_ops * op )
{
int i ;
for ( i = 0 ; i < family - > n_split_ops ; i + + )
if ( family - > split_ops [ i ] . cmd = = cmd & &
family - > split_ops [ i ] . flags & flag ) {
* op = family - > split_ops [ i ] ;
return 0 ;
}
return - ENOENT ;
}
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static int
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genl_cmd_full_to_split ( struct genl_split_ops * op ,
const struct genl_family * family ,
const struct genl_ops * full , u8 flags )
{
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if ( ( flags & GENL_CMD_CAP_DO & & ! full - > doit ) | |
( flags & GENL_CMD_CAP_DUMP & & ! full - > dumpit ) ) {
memset ( op , 0 , sizeof ( * op ) ) ;
return - ENOENT ;
}
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if ( flags & GENL_CMD_CAP_DUMP ) {
op - > start = full - > start ;
op - > dumpit = full - > dumpit ;
op - > done = full - > done ;
} else {
op - > pre_doit = family - > pre_doit ;
op - > doit = full - > doit ;
op - > post_doit = family - > post_doit ;
}
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if ( flags & GENL_CMD_CAP_DUMP & &
full - > validate & GENL_DONT_VALIDATE_DUMP ) {
op - > policy = NULL ;
op - > maxattr = 0 ;
} else {
op - > policy = full - > policy ;
op - > maxattr = full - > maxattr ;
}
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op - > cmd = full - > cmd ;
op - > internal_flags = full - > internal_flags ;
op - > flags = full - > flags ;
op - > validate = full - > validate ;
/* Make sure flags include the GENL_CMD_CAP_DO / GENL_CMD_CAP_DUMP */
op - > flags | = flags ;
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return 0 ;
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}
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/* Must make sure that op is initialized to 0 on failure */
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static int
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genl_get_cmd ( u32 cmd , u8 flags , const struct genl_family * family ,
struct genl_split_ops * op )
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{
struct genl_ops full ;
int err ;
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err = genl_get_cmd_full ( cmd , family , & full ) ;
if ( err = = - ENOENT )
err = genl_get_cmd_small ( cmd , family , & full ) ;
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/* Found one of legacy forms */
if ( err = = 0 )
return genl_cmd_full_to_split ( op , family , & full , flags ) ;
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err = genl_get_cmd_split ( cmd , flags , family , op ) ;
if ( err )
memset ( op , 0 , sizeof ( * op ) ) ;
return err ;
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}
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/* For policy dumping only, get ops of both do and dump.
* Fail if both are missing , genl_get_cmd ( ) will zero - init in case of failure .
*/
static int
genl_get_cmd_both ( u32 cmd , const struct genl_family * family ,
struct genl_split_ops * doit , struct genl_split_ops * dumpit )
{
int err1 , err2 ;
err1 = genl_get_cmd ( cmd , GENL_CMD_CAP_DO , family , doit ) ;
err2 = genl_get_cmd ( cmd , GENL_CMD_CAP_DUMP , family , dumpit ) ;
return err1 & & err2 ? - ENOENT : 0 ;
}
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static bool
genl_op_iter_init ( const struct genl_family * family , struct genl_op_iter * iter )
{
iter - > family = family ;
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iter - > cmd_idx = 0 ;
iter - > entry_idx = 0 ;
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iter - > flags = 0 ;
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return iter - > family - > n_ops +
iter - > family - > n_small_ops +
iter - > family - > n_split_ops ;
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}
static bool genl_op_iter_next ( struct genl_op_iter * iter )
{
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const struct genl_family * family = iter - > family ;
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bool legacy_op = true ;
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struct genl_ops op ;
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if ( iter - > entry_idx < family - > n_ops ) {
genl_op_from_full ( family , iter - > entry_idx , & op ) ;
} else if ( iter - > entry_idx < family - > n_ops + family - > n_small_ops ) {
genl_op_from_small ( family , iter - > entry_idx - family - > n_ops ,
& op ) ;
} else if ( iter - > entry_idx <
family - > n_ops + family - > n_small_ops + family - > n_split_ops ) {
legacy_op = false ;
/* updates entry_idx */
genl_op_from_split ( iter ) ;
} else {
2022-11-04 22:13:39 +03:00
return false ;
2022-11-04 22:13:42 +03:00
}
2022-11-04 22:13:39 +03:00
2022-11-04 22:13:42 +03:00
iter - > cmd_idx + + ;
2022-11-04 22:13:39 +03:00
2022-11-04 22:13:42 +03:00
if ( legacy_op ) {
iter - > entry_idx + + ;
genl_cmd_full_to_split ( & iter - > doit , family ,
& op , GENL_CMD_CAP_DO ) ;
genl_cmd_full_to_split ( & iter - > dumpit , family ,
& op , GENL_CMD_CAP_DUMP ) ;
}
2022-11-04 22:13:39 +03:00
iter - > cmd = iter - > doit . cmd | iter - > dumpit . cmd ;
iter - > flags = iter - > doit . flags | iter - > dumpit . flags ;
return true ;
}
static void
genl_op_iter_copy ( struct genl_op_iter * dst , struct genl_op_iter * src )
{
* dst = * src ;
}
static unsigned int genl_op_iter_idx ( struct genl_op_iter * iter )
{
2022-11-04 22:13:42 +03:00
return iter - > cmd_idx ;
2022-11-04 22:13:39 +03:00
}
2013-11-19 18:19:39 +04:00
static int genl_allocate_reserve_groups ( int n_groups , int * first_id )
2007-07-19 02:47:52 +04:00
{
unsigned long * new_groups ;
2013-11-19 18:19:39 +04:00
int start = 0 ;
int i ;
int id ;
bool fits ;
do {
if ( start = = 0 )
id = find_first_zero_bit ( mc_groups ,
mc_groups_longs *
BITS_PER_LONG ) ;
else
id = find_next_zero_bit ( mc_groups ,
mc_groups_longs * BITS_PER_LONG ,
start ) ;
fits = true ;
for ( i = id ;
i < min_t ( int , id + n_groups ,
mc_groups_longs * BITS_PER_LONG ) ;
i + + ) {
if ( test_bit ( i , mc_groups ) ) {
start = i ;
fits = false ;
break ;
}
}
2007-07-19 02:47:52 +04:00
2016-01-13 18:28:06 +03:00
if ( id + n_groups > mc_groups_longs * BITS_PER_LONG ) {
2013-11-19 18:19:39 +04:00
unsigned long new_longs = mc_groups_longs +
BITS_TO_LONGS ( n_groups ) ;
size_t nlen = new_longs * sizeof ( unsigned long ) ;
if ( mc_groups = = & mc_group_start ) {
new_groups = kzalloc ( nlen , GFP_KERNEL ) ;
if ( ! new_groups )
return - ENOMEM ;
mc_groups = new_groups ;
* mc_groups = mc_group_start ;
} else {
new_groups = krealloc ( mc_groups , nlen ,
GFP_KERNEL ) ;
if ( ! new_groups )
return - ENOMEM ;
mc_groups = new_groups ;
for ( i = 0 ; i < BITS_TO_LONGS ( n_groups ) ; i + + )
mc_groups [ mc_groups_longs + i ] = 0 ;
}
mc_groups_longs = new_longs ;
}
} while ( ! fits ) ;
2007-07-19 02:47:52 +04:00
2013-11-19 18:19:39 +04:00
for ( i = id ; i < id + n_groups ; i + + )
set_bit ( i , mc_groups ) ;
* first_id = id ;
return 0 ;
}
static struct genl_family genl_ctrl ;
static int genl_validate_assign_mc_groups ( struct genl_family * family )
{
int first_id ;
int n_groups = family - > n_mcgrps ;
2013-11-23 16:01:50 +04:00
int err = 0 , i ;
2013-11-19 18:19:39 +04:00
bool groups_allocated = false ;
if ( ! n_groups )
return 0 ;
for ( i = 0 ; i < n_groups ; i + + ) {
const struct genl_multicast_group * grp = & family - > mcgrps [ i ] ;
if ( WARN_ON ( grp - > name [ 0 ] = = ' \0 ' ) )
return - EINVAL ;
if ( WARN_ON ( memchr ( grp - > name , ' \0 ' , GENL_NAMSIZ ) = = NULL ) )
return - EINVAL ;
}
2007-07-19 02:47:52 +04:00
2013-11-19 18:19:32 +04:00
/* special-case our own group and hacks */
2013-11-19 18:19:39 +04:00
if ( family = = & genl_ctrl ) {
first_id = GENL_ID_CTRL ;
BUG_ON ( n_groups ! = 1 ) ;
} else if ( strcmp ( family - > name , " NET_DM " ) = = 0 ) {
first_id = 1 ;
BUG_ON ( n_groups ! = 1 ) ;
2013-11-25 00:09:26 +04:00
} else if ( family - > id = = GENL_ID_VFS_DQUOT ) {
2013-11-19 18:19:39 +04:00
first_id = GENL_ID_VFS_DQUOT ;
BUG_ON ( n_groups ! = 1 ) ;
2013-11-25 00:09:26 +04:00
} else if ( family - > id = = GENL_ID_PMCRAID ) {
first_id = GENL_ID_PMCRAID ;
BUG_ON ( n_groups ! = 1 ) ;
2013-11-19 18:19:39 +04:00
} else {
groups_allocated = true ;
err = genl_allocate_reserve_groups ( n_groups , & first_id ) ;
if ( err )
return err ;
2007-07-19 02:47:52 +04:00
}
2013-11-19 18:19:39 +04:00
family - > mcgrp_offset = first_id ;
2020-08-23 02:40:15 +03:00
/* if still initializing, can't and don't need to realloc bitmaps */
2013-11-19 18:19:39 +04:00
if ( ! init_net . genl_sock )
return 0 ;
2009-07-10 13:51:34 +04:00
if ( family - > netnsok ) {
struct net * net ;
2009-09-12 07:03:15 +04:00
netlink_table_grab ( ) ;
2009-07-10 13:51:34 +04:00
rcu_read_lock ( ) ;
for_each_net_rcu ( net ) {
2009-09-12 07:03:15 +04:00
err = __netlink_change_ngroups ( net - > genl_sock ,
2009-07-10 13:51:34 +04:00
mc_groups_longs * BITS_PER_LONG ) ;
if ( err ) {
/*
* No need to roll back , can only fail if
* memory allocation fails and then the
* number of _possible_ groups has been
* increased on some sockets which is ok .
*/
2013-11-19 18:19:39 +04:00
break ;
2009-07-10 13:51:34 +04:00
}
}
rcu_read_unlock ( ) ;
2009-09-12 07:03:15 +04:00
netlink_table_ungrab ( ) ;
2009-07-10 13:51:34 +04:00
} else {
err = netlink_change_ngroups ( init_net . genl_sock ,
mc_groups_longs * BITS_PER_LONG ) ;
}
2007-07-19 02:47:52 +04:00
2013-11-19 18:19:39 +04:00
if ( groups_allocated & & err ) {
for ( i = 0 ; i < family - > n_mcgrps ; i + + )
clear_bit ( family - > mcgrp_offset + i , mc_groups ) ;
}
2007-07-19 02:47:52 +04:00
2007-07-25 02:34:53 +04:00
return err ;
2007-07-19 02:47:52 +04:00
}
2016-10-24 15:40:04 +03:00
static void genl_unregister_mc_groups ( const struct genl_family * family )
2007-07-25 02:32:46 +04:00
{
2009-07-10 13:51:34 +04:00
struct net * net ;
2013-11-19 18:19:39 +04:00
int i ;
2009-07-10 13:51:34 +04:00
2009-09-25 02:44:05 +04:00
netlink_table_grab ( ) ;
2009-07-10 13:51:34 +04:00
rcu_read_lock ( ) ;
2013-11-19 18:19:39 +04:00
for_each_net_rcu ( net ) {
for ( i = 0 ; i < family - > n_mcgrps ; i + + )
__netlink_clear_multicast_users (
net - > genl_sock , family - > mcgrp_offset + i ) ;
}
2009-07-10 13:51:34 +04:00
rcu_read_unlock ( ) ;
2009-09-25 02:44:05 +04:00
netlink_table_ungrab ( ) ;
2009-07-10 13:51:34 +04:00
2013-11-19 18:19:39 +04:00
for ( i = 0 ; i < family - > n_mcgrps ; i + + ) {
int grp_id = family - > mcgrp_offset + i ;
2007-07-19 02:47:52 +04:00
2013-11-19 18:19:39 +04:00
if ( grp_id ! = 1 )
clear_bit ( grp_id , mc_groups ) ;
genl_ctrl_event ( CTRL_CMD_DELMCAST_GRP , family ,
& family - > mcgrps [ i ] , grp_id ) ;
}
2007-07-19 02:47:52 +04:00
}
2022-11-04 22:13:42 +03:00
static bool genl_split_op_check ( const struct genl_split_ops * op )
{
if ( WARN_ON ( hweight8 ( op - > flags & ( GENL_CMD_CAP_DO |
GENL_CMD_CAP_DUMP ) ) ! = 1 ) )
return true ;
return false ;
}
2014-06-02 12:18:01 +04:00
static int genl_validate_ops ( const struct genl_family * family )
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
{
2022-11-04 22:13:39 +03:00
struct genl_op_iter i , j ;
2022-11-04 22:13:42 +03:00
unsigned int s ;
2013-11-14 20:14:44 +04:00
2020-10-03 00:49:53 +03:00
if ( WARN_ON ( family - > n_ops & & ! family - > ops ) | |
2022-11-04 22:13:42 +03:00
WARN_ON ( family - > n_small_ops & & ! family - > small_ops ) | |
WARN_ON ( family - > n_split_ops & & ! family - > split_ops ) )
2013-11-15 17:19:08 +04:00
return - EINVAL ;
2022-11-04 22:13:39 +03:00
for ( genl_op_iter_init ( family , & i ) ; genl_op_iter_next ( & i ) ; ) {
if ( ! ( i . flags & ( GENL_CMD_CAP_DO | GENL_CMD_CAP_DUMP ) ) )
2013-11-14 20:14:44 +04:00
return - EINVAL ;
2022-11-04 22:13:39 +03:00
if ( WARN_ON ( i . cmd > = family - > resv_start_op & &
( i . doit . validate | | i . dumpit . validate ) ) )
2022-10-26 03:15:24 +03:00
return - EINVAL ;
2020-10-03 00:49:53 +03:00
2022-11-04 22:13:39 +03:00
genl_op_iter_copy ( & j , & i ) ;
while ( genl_op_iter_next ( & j ) ) {
if ( i . cmd = = j . cmd )
2013-11-14 20:14:44 +04:00
return - EINVAL ;
2020-10-03 00:49:53 +03:00
}
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
}
2022-11-04 22:13:42 +03:00
if ( family - > n_split_ops ) {
if ( genl_split_op_check ( & family - > split_ops [ 0 ] ) )
return - EINVAL ;
}
for ( s = 1 ; s < family - > n_split_ops ; s + + ) {
const struct genl_split_ops * a , * b ;
a = & family - > split_ops [ s - 1 ] ;
b = & family - > split_ops [ s ] ;
if ( genl_split_op_check ( b ) )
return - EINVAL ;
/* Check sort order */
if ( a - > cmd < b - > cmd )
continue ;
if ( a - > internal_flags ! = b - > internal_flags | |
( ( a - > flags ^ b - > flags ) & ~ ( GENL_CMD_CAP_DO |
GENL_CMD_CAP_DUMP ) ) ) {
WARN_ON ( 1 ) ;
return - EINVAL ;
}
if ( ( a - > flags & GENL_CMD_CAP_DO ) & &
( b - > flags & GENL_CMD_CAP_DUMP ) )
continue ;
WARN_ON ( 1 ) ;
return - EINVAL ;
}
2013-11-14 20:14:44 +04:00
return 0 ;
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
}
/**
2016-10-24 15:40:03 +03:00
* genl_register_family - register a generic netlink family
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
* @ family : generic netlink family
*
* Registers the specified family after validating it first . Only one
* family may be registered with the same family name or identifier .
*
2016-10-24 15:40:03 +03:00
* The family ' s ops , multicast groups and module pointer must already
* be assigned .
2013-11-15 17:19:08 +04:00
*
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
* Return 0 on success or a negative error code .
*/
2016-10-24 15:40:03 +03:00
int genl_register_family ( struct genl_family * family )
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
{
2016-10-24 15:40:02 +03:00
int err , i ;
2016-10-24 15:40:04 +03:00
int start = GENL_START_ALLOC , end = GENL_MAX_ID ;
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
2013-11-15 17:19:08 +04:00
err = genl_validate_ops ( family ) ;
if ( err )
return err ;
2013-04-23 11:48:30 +04:00
genl_lock_all ( ) ;
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
if ( genl_family_find_byname ( family - > name ) ) {
err = - EEXIST ;
goto errout_locked ;
}
2016-10-24 15:40:04 +03:00
/*
* Sadly , a few cases need to be special - cased
* due to them having previously abused the API
* and having used their family ID also as their
* multicast group ID , so we use reserved IDs
* for both to be sure we can do that mapping .
*/
2016-10-24 15:40:02 +03:00
if ( family = = & genl_ctrl ) {
2016-10-24 15:40:04 +03:00
/* and this needs to be special for initial family lookups */
start = end = GENL_ID_CTRL ;
} else if ( strcmp ( family - > name , " pmcraid " ) = = 0 ) {
start = end = GENL_ID_PMCRAID ;
} else if ( strcmp ( family - > name , " VFS_DQUOT " ) = = 0 ) {
start = end = GENL_ID_VFS_DQUOT ;
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
}
2019-04-24 23:18:53 +03:00
family - > id = idr_alloc_cyclic ( & genl_fam_idr , family ,
start , end + 1 , GFP_KERNEL ) ;
2016-11-01 17:45:52 +03:00
if ( family - > id < 0 ) {
err = family - > id ;
2020-06-27 10:12:24 +03:00
goto errout_locked ;
2016-11-01 17:45:52 +03:00
}
2016-10-24 15:40:04 +03:00
2013-11-19 18:19:39 +04:00
err = genl_validate_assign_mc_groups ( family ) ;
if ( err )
2016-10-24 15:40:04 +03:00
goto errout_remove ;
2013-11-19 18:19:39 +04:00
2013-04-23 11:48:30 +04:00
genl_unlock_all ( ) ;
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
2013-11-19 18:19:39 +04:00
/* send all events */
genl_ctrl_event ( CTRL_CMD_NEWFAMILY , family , NULL , 0 ) ;
for ( i = 0 ; i < family - > n_mcgrps ; i + + )
genl_ctrl_event ( CTRL_CMD_NEWMCAST_GRP , family ,
& family - > mcgrps [ i ] , family - > mcgrp_offset + i ) ;
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
return 0 ;
2016-10-24 15:40:04 +03:00
errout_remove :
idr_remove ( & genl_fam_idr , family - > id ) ;
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
errout_locked :
2013-04-23 11:48:30 +04:00
genl_unlock_all ( ) ;
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
return err ;
}
2016-10-24 15:40:03 +03:00
EXPORT_SYMBOL ( genl_register_family ) ;
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
/**
* genl_unregister_family - unregister generic netlink family
* @ family : generic netlink family
*
* Unregisters the specified family .
*
* Returns 0 on success or a negative error code .
*/
2016-10-24 15:40:04 +03:00
int genl_unregister_family ( const struct genl_family * family )
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
{
2013-04-23 11:48:30 +04:00
genl_lock_all ( ) ;
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
2016-10-29 02:01:41 +03:00
if ( ! genl_family_find_byid ( family - > id ) ) {
2016-10-24 15:40:04 +03:00
genl_unlock_all ( ) ;
return - ENOENT ;
}
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
2016-10-24 15:40:04 +03:00
genl_unregister_mc_groups ( family ) ;
2015-01-16 13:37:14 +03:00
2016-10-24 15:40:04 +03:00
idr_remove ( & genl_fam_idr , family - > id ) ;
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
2016-10-24 15:40:04 +03:00
up_write ( & cb_lock ) ;
wait_event ( genl_sk_destructing_waitq ,
atomic_read ( & genl_sk_destructing_cnt ) = = 0 ) ;
genl_unlock ( ) ;
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
2016-10-24 15:40:04 +03:00
genl_ctrl_event ( CTRL_CMD_DELFAMILY , family , NULL , 0 ) ;
return 0 ;
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
}
2010-07-26 00:46:01 +04:00
EXPORT_SYMBOL ( genl_unregister_family ) ;
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
2012-01-31 00:22:06 +04:00
/**
* genlmsg_put - Add generic netlink header to netlink message
* @ skb : socket buffer holding the message
2012-09-08 00:12:54 +04:00
* @ portid : netlink portid the message is addressed to
2012-01-31 00:22:06 +04:00
* @ seq : sequence number ( usually the one of the sender )
* @ family : generic netlink family
2012-07-10 14:55:09 +04:00
* @ flags : netlink message flags
2012-01-31 00:22:06 +04:00
* @ cmd : generic netlink command
*
* Returns pointer to user specific header
*/
2012-09-08 00:12:54 +04:00
void * genlmsg_put ( struct sk_buff * skb , u32 portid , u32 seq ,
2016-10-24 15:40:04 +03:00
const struct genl_family * family , int flags , u8 cmd )
2012-01-31 00:22:06 +04:00
{
struct nlmsghdr * nlh ;
struct genlmsghdr * hdr ;
2012-09-08 00:12:54 +04:00
nlh = nlmsg_put ( skb , portid , seq , family - > id , GENL_HDRLEN +
2012-01-31 00:22:06 +04:00
family - > hdrsize , flags ) ;
if ( nlh = = NULL )
return NULL ;
hdr = nlmsg_data ( nlh ) ;
hdr - > cmd = cmd ;
hdr - > version = family - > version ;
hdr - > reserved = 0 ;
return ( char * ) hdr + GENL_HDRLEN ;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL ( genlmsg_put ) ;
2019-10-05 21:04:34 +03:00
static struct genl_dumpit_info * genl_dumpit_info_alloc ( void )
{
return kmalloc ( sizeof ( struct genl_dumpit_info ) , GFP_KERNEL ) ;
}
static void genl_dumpit_info_free ( const struct genl_dumpit_info * info )
{
kfree ( info ) ;
}
2019-10-05 21:04:35 +03:00
static struct nlattr * *
genl_family_rcv_msg_attrs_parse ( const struct genl_family * family ,
struct nlmsghdr * nlh ,
struct netlink_ext_ack * extack ,
2022-11-04 22:13:33 +03:00
const struct genl_split_ops * ops ,
2019-10-05 21:04:35 +03:00
int hdrlen ,
2020-06-12 10:16:55 +03:00
enum genl_validate_flags no_strict_flag )
2019-10-05 21:04:35 +03:00
{
enum netlink_validation validate = ops - > validate & no_strict_flag ?
NL_VALIDATE_LIBERAL :
NL_VALIDATE_STRICT ;
struct nlattr * * attrbuf ;
int err ;
2020-10-03 00:49:57 +03:00
if ( ! ops - > maxattr )
2019-10-11 10:40:09 +03:00
return NULL ;
2020-10-03 00:49:57 +03:00
attrbuf = kmalloc_array ( ops - > maxattr + 1 ,
2020-06-27 10:12:24 +03:00
sizeof ( struct nlattr * ) , GFP_KERNEL ) ;
if ( ! attrbuf )
return ERR_PTR ( - ENOMEM ) ;
2019-10-05 21:04:35 +03:00
2020-10-03 00:49:57 +03:00
err = __nlmsg_parse ( nlh , hdrlen , attrbuf , ops - > maxattr , ops - > policy ,
validate , extack ) ;
2020-02-21 21:42:13 +03:00
if ( err ) {
2020-06-27 10:12:24 +03:00
kfree ( attrbuf ) ;
2019-10-05 21:04:35 +03:00
return ERR_PTR ( err ) ;
}
return attrbuf ;
}
2020-06-27 10:12:24 +03:00
static void genl_family_rcv_msg_attrs_free ( struct nlattr * * attrbuf )
2019-10-05 21:04:35 +03:00
{
2020-06-27 10:12:24 +03:00
kfree ( attrbuf ) ;
2019-10-05 21:04:35 +03:00
}
genetlink: fix memory leaks in genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit()
There are two kinds of memory leaks in genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit():
1. Before we call ops->start(), whenever an error happens, we forget
to free the memory allocated in genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit().
2. When ops->start() fails, the 'info' has been already installed on
the per socket control block, so we should not free it here. More
importantly, nlk->cb_running is still false at this point, so
netlink_sock_destruct() cannot free it either.
The first kind of memory leaks is easier to resolve, but the second
one requires some deeper thoughts.
After reviewing how netfilter handles this, the most elegant solution
I find is just to use a similar way to allocate the memory, that is,
moving memory allocations from caller into ops->start(). With this,
we can solve both kinds of memory leaks: for 1), no memory allocation
happens before ops->start(); for 2), ops->start() handles its own
failures and 'info' is installed to the socket control block only
when success. The only ugliness here is we have to pass all local
variables on stack via a struct, but this is not hard to understand.
Alternatively, we can introduce a ops->free() to solve this too,
but it is overkill as only genetlink has this problem so far.
Fixes: 1927f41a22a0 ("net: genetlink: introduce dump info struct to be available during dumpit op")
Reported-by: syzbot+21f04f481f449c8db840@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Cc: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Cc: Shaochun Chen <cscnull@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-06-03 07:49:10 +03:00
struct genl_start_context {
const struct genl_family * family ;
struct nlmsghdr * nlh ;
struct netlink_ext_ack * extack ;
2022-11-04 22:13:33 +03:00
const struct genl_split_ops * ops ;
genetlink: fix memory leaks in genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit()
There are two kinds of memory leaks in genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit():
1. Before we call ops->start(), whenever an error happens, we forget
to free the memory allocated in genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit().
2. When ops->start() fails, the 'info' has been already installed on
the per socket control block, so we should not free it here. More
importantly, nlk->cb_running is still false at this point, so
netlink_sock_destruct() cannot free it either.
The first kind of memory leaks is easier to resolve, but the second
one requires some deeper thoughts.
After reviewing how netfilter handles this, the most elegant solution
I find is just to use a similar way to allocate the memory, that is,
moving memory allocations from caller into ops->start(). With this,
we can solve both kinds of memory leaks: for 1), no memory allocation
happens before ops->start(); for 2), ops->start() handles its own
failures and 'info' is installed to the socket control block only
when success. The only ugliness here is we have to pass all local
variables on stack via a struct, but this is not hard to understand.
Alternatively, we can introduce a ops->free() to solve this too,
but it is overkill as only genetlink has this problem so far.
Fixes: 1927f41a22a0 ("net: genetlink: introduce dump info struct to be available during dumpit op")
Reported-by: syzbot+21f04f481f449c8db840@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Cc: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Cc: Shaochun Chen <cscnull@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-06-03 07:49:10 +03:00
int hdrlen ;
} ;
static int genl_start ( struct netlink_callback * cb )
2015-12-16 02:41:37 +03:00
{
genetlink: fix memory leaks in genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit()
There are two kinds of memory leaks in genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit():
1. Before we call ops->start(), whenever an error happens, we forget
to free the memory allocated in genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit().
2. When ops->start() fails, the 'info' has been already installed on
the per socket control block, so we should not free it here. More
importantly, nlk->cb_running is still false at this point, so
netlink_sock_destruct() cannot free it either.
The first kind of memory leaks is easier to resolve, but the second
one requires some deeper thoughts.
After reviewing how netfilter handles this, the most elegant solution
I find is just to use a similar way to allocate the memory, that is,
moving memory allocations from caller into ops->start(). With this,
we can solve both kinds of memory leaks: for 1), no memory allocation
happens before ops->start(); for 2), ops->start() handles its own
failures and 'info' is installed to the socket control block only
when success. The only ugliness here is we have to pass all local
variables on stack via a struct, but this is not hard to understand.
Alternatively, we can introduce a ops->free() to solve this too,
but it is overkill as only genetlink has this problem so far.
Fixes: 1927f41a22a0 ("net: genetlink: introduce dump info struct to be available during dumpit op")
Reported-by: syzbot+21f04f481f449c8db840@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Cc: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Cc: Shaochun Chen <cscnull@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-06-03 07:49:10 +03:00
struct genl_start_context * ctx = cb - > data ;
2022-11-04 22:13:33 +03:00
const struct genl_split_ops * ops ;
genetlink: fix memory leaks in genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit()
There are two kinds of memory leaks in genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit():
1. Before we call ops->start(), whenever an error happens, we forget
to free the memory allocated in genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit().
2. When ops->start() fails, the 'info' has been already installed on
the per socket control block, so we should not free it here. More
importantly, nlk->cb_running is still false at this point, so
netlink_sock_destruct() cannot free it either.
The first kind of memory leaks is easier to resolve, but the second
one requires some deeper thoughts.
After reviewing how netfilter handles this, the most elegant solution
I find is just to use a similar way to allocate the memory, that is,
moving memory allocations from caller into ops->start(). With this,
we can solve both kinds of memory leaks: for 1), no memory allocation
happens before ops->start(); for 2), ops->start() handles its own
failures and 'info' is installed to the socket control block only
when success. The only ugliness here is we have to pass all local
variables on stack via a struct, but this is not hard to understand.
Alternatively, we can introduce a ops->free() to solve this too,
but it is overkill as only genetlink has this problem so far.
Fixes: 1927f41a22a0 ("net: genetlink: introduce dump info struct to be available during dumpit op")
Reported-by: syzbot+21f04f481f449c8db840@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Cc: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Cc: Shaochun Chen <cscnull@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-06-03 07:49:10 +03:00
struct genl_dumpit_info * info ;
struct nlattr * * attrs = NULL ;
2015-12-16 02:41:37 +03:00
int rc = 0 ;
2022-11-04 22:13:33 +03:00
ops = ctx - > ops ;
2022-11-04 22:13:34 +03:00
if ( ! ( ops - > validate & GENL_DONT_VALIDATE_DUMP ) & &
ctx - > nlh - > nlmsg_len < nlmsg_msg_size ( ctx - > hdrlen ) )
genetlink: fix memory leaks in genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit()
There are two kinds of memory leaks in genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit():
1. Before we call ops->start(), whenever an error happens, we forget
to free the memory allocated in genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit().
2. When ops->start() fails, the 'info' has been already installed on
the per socket control block, so we should not free it here. More
importantly, nlk->cb_running is still false at this point, so
netlink_sock_destruct() cannot free it either.
The first kind of memory leaks is easier to resolve, but the second
one requires some deeper thoughts.
After reviewing how netfilter handles this, the most elegant solution
I find is just to use a similar way to allocate the memory, that is,
moving memory allocations from caller into ops->start(). With this,
we can solve both kinds of memory leaks: for 1), no memory allocation
happens before ops->start(); for 2), ops->start() handles its own
failures and 'info' is installed to the socket control block only
when success. The only ugliness here is we have to pass all local
variables on stack via a struct, but this is not hard to understand.
Alternatively, we can introduce a ops->free() to solve this too,
but it is overkill as only genetlink has this problem so far.
Fixes: 1927f41a22a0 ("net: genetlink: introduce dump info struct to be available during dumpit op")
Reported-by: syzbot+21f04f481f449c8db840@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Cc: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Cc: Shaochun Chen <cscnull@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-06-03 07:49:10 +03:00
return - EINVAL ;
attrs = genl_family_rcv_msg_attrs_parse ( ctx - > family , ctx - > nlh , ctx - > extack ,
ops , ctx - > hdrlen ,
2020-06-12 10:16:55 +03:00
GENL_DONT_VALIDATE_DUMP_STRICT ) ;
genetlink: fix memory leaks in genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit()
There are two kinds of memory leaks in genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit():
1. Before we call ops->start(), whenever an error happens, we forget
to free the memory allocated in genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit().
2. When ops->start() fails, the 'info' has been already installed on
the per socket control block, so we should not free it here. More
importantly, nlk->cb_running is still false at this point, so
netlink_sock_destruct() cannot free it either.
The first kind of memory leaks is easier to resolve, but the second
one requires some deeper thoughts.
After reviewing how netfilter handles this, the most elegant solution
I find is just to use a similar way to allocate the memory, that is,
moving memory allocations from caller into ops->start(). With this,
we can solve both kinds of memory leaks: for 1), no memory allocation
happens before ops->start(); for 2), ops->start() handles its own
failures and 'info' is installed to the socket control block only
when success. The only ugliness here is we have to pass all local
variables on stack via a struct, but this is not hard to understand.
Alternatively, we can introduce a ops->free() to solve this too,
but it is overkill as only genetlink has this problem so far.
Fixes: 1927f41a22a0 ("net: genetlink: introduce dump info struct to be available during dumpit op")
Reported-by: syzbot+21f04f481f449c8db840@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Cc: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Cc: Shaochun Chen <cscnull@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-06-03 07:49:10 +03:00
if ( IS_ERR ( attrs ) )
return PTR_ERR ( attrs ) ;
info = genl_dumpit_info_alloc ( ) ;
if ( ! info ) {
2020-06-27 10:12:24 +03:00
genl_family_rcv_msg_attrs_free ( attrs ) ;
genetlink: fix memory leaks in genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit()
There are two kinds of memory leaks in genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit():
1. Before we call ops->start(), whenever an error happens, we forget
to free the memory allocated in genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit().
2. When ops->start() fails, the 'info' has been already installed on
the per socket control block, so we should not free it here. More
importantly, nlk->cb_running is still false at this point, so
netlink_sock_destruct() cannot free it either.
The first kind of memory leaks is easier to resolve, but the second
one requires some deeper thoughts.
After reviewing how netfilter handles this, the most elegant solution
I find is just to use a similar way to allocate the memory, that is,
moving memory allocations from caller into ops->start(). With this,
we can solve both kinds of memory leaks: for 1), no memory allocation
happens before ops->start(); for 2), ops->start() handles its own
failures and 'info' is installed to the socket control block only
when success. The only ugliness here is we have to pass all local
variables on stack via a struct, but this is not hard to understand.
Alternatively, we can introduce a ops->free() to solve this too,
but it is overkill as only genetlink has this problem so far.
Fixes: 1927f41a22a0 ("net: genetlink: introduce dump info struct to be available during dumpit op")
Reported-by: syzbot+21f04f481f449c8db840@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Cc: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Cc: Shaochun Chen <cscnull@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-06-03 07:49:10 +03:00
return - ENOMEM ;
}
info - > family = ctx - > family ;
2020-10-03 00:49:53 +03:00
info - > op = * ops ;
genetlink: fix memory leaks in genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit()
There are two kinds of memory leaks in genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit():
1. Before we call ops->start(), whenever an error happens, we forget
to free the memory allocated in genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit().
2. When ops->start() fails, the 'info' has been already installed on
the per socket control block, so we should not free it here. More
importantly, nlk->cb_running is still false at this point, so
netlink_sock_destruct() cannot free it either.
The first kind of memory leaks is easier to resolve, but the second
one requires some deeper thoughts.
After reviewing how netfilter handles this, the most elegant solution
I find is just to use a similar way to allocate the memory, that is,
moving memory allocations from caller into ops->start(). With this,
we can solve both kinds of memory leaks: for 1), no memory allocation
happens before ops->start(); for 2), ops->start() handles its own
failures and 'info' is installed to the socket control block only
when success. The only ugliness here is we have to pass all local
variables on stack via a struct, but this is not hard to understand.
Alternatively, we can introduce a ops->free() to solve this too,
but it is overkill as only genetlink has this problem so far.
Fixes: 1927f41a22a0 ("net: genetlink: introduce dump info struct to be available during dumpit op")
Reported-by: syzbot+21f04f481f449c8db840@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Cc: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Cc: Shaochun Chen <cscnull@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-06-03 07:49:10 +03:00
info - > attrs = attrs ;
cb - > data = info ;
2015-12-16 02:41:37 +03:00
if ( ops - > start ) {
genetlink: fix memory leaks in genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit()
There are two kinds of memory leaks in genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit():
1. Before we call ops->start(), whenever an error happens, we forget
to free the memory allocated in genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit().
2. When ops->start() fails, the 'info' has been already installed on
the per socket control block, so we should not free it here. More
importantly, nlk->cb_running is still false at this point, so
netlink_sock_destruct() cannot free it either.
The first kind of memory leaks is easier to resolve, but the second
one requires some deeper thoughts.
After reviewing how netfilter handles this, the most elegant solution
I find is just to use a similar way to allocate the memory, that is,
moving memory allocations from caller into ops->start(). With this,
we can solve both kinds of memory leaks: for 1), no memory allocation
happens before ops->start(); for 2), ops->start() handles its own
failures and 'info' is installed to the socket control block only
when success. The only ugliness here is we have to pass all local
variables on stack via a struct, but this is not hard to understand.
Alternatively, we can introduce a ops->free() to solve this too,
but it is overkill as only genetlink has this problem so far.
Fixes: 1927f41a22a0 ("net: genetlink: introduce dump info struct to be available during dumpit op")
Reported-by: syzbot+21f04f481f449c8db840@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Cc: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Cc: Shaochun Chen <cscnull@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-06-03 07:49:10 +03:00
if ( ! ctx - > family - > parallel_ops )
genl_lock ( ) ;
2015-12-16 02:41:37 +03:00
rc = ops - > start ( cb ) ;
genetlink: fix memory leaks in genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit()
There are two kinds of memory leaks in genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit():
1. Before we call ops->start(), whenever an error happens, we forget
to free the memory allocated in genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit().
2. When ops->start() fails, the 'info' has been already installed on
the per socket control block, so we should not free it here. More
importantly, nlk->cb_running is still false at this point, so
netlink_sock_destruct() cannot free it either.
The first kind of memory leaks is easier to resolve, but the second
one requires some deeper thoughts.
After reviewing how netfilter handles this, the most elegant solution
I find is just to use a similar way to allocate the memory, that is,
moving memory allocations from caller into ops->start(). With this,
we can solve both kinds of memory leaks: for 1), no memory allocation
happens before ops->start(); for 2), ops->start() handles its own
failures and 'info' is installed to the socket control block only
when success. The only ugliness here is we have to pass all local
variables on stack via a struct, but this is not hard to understand.
Alternatively, we can introduce a ops->free() to solve this too,
but it is overkill as only genetlink has this problem so far.
Fixes: 1927f41a22a0 ("net: genetlink: introduce dump info struct to be available during dumpit op")
Reported-by: syzbot+21f04f481f449c8db840@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Cc: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Cc: Shaochun Chen <cscnull@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-06-03 07:49:10 +03:00
if ( ! ctx - > family - > parallel_ops )
genl_unlock ( ) ;
}
if ( rc ) {
2020-06-27 10:12:24 +03:00
genl_family_rcv_msg_attrs_free ( info - > attrs ) ;
genetlink: fix memory leaks in genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit()
There are two kinds of memory leaks in genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit():
1. Before we call ops->start(), whenever an error happens, we forget
to free the memory allocated in genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit().
2. When ops->start() fails, the 'info' has been already installed on
the per socket control block, so we should not free it here. More
importantly, nlk->cb_running is still false at this point, so
netlink_sock_destruct() cannot free it either.
The first kind of memory leaks is easier to resolve, but the second
one requires some deeper thoughts.
After reviewing how netfilter handles this, the most elegant solution
I find is just to use a similar way to allocate the memory, that is,
moving memory allocations from caller into ops->start(). With this,
we can solve both kinds of memory leaks: for 1), no memory allocation
happens before ops->start(); for 2), ops->start() handles its own
failures and 'info' is installed to the socket control block only
when success. The only ugliness here is we have to pass all local
variables on stack via a struct, but this is not hard to understand.
Alternatively, we can introduce a ops->free() to solve this too,
but it is overkill as only genetlink has this problem so far.
Fixes: 1927f41a22a0 ("net: genetlink: introduce dump info struct to be available during dumpit op")
Reported-by: syzbot+21f04f481f449c8db840@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Cc: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Cc: Shaochun Chen <cscnull@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-06-03 07:49:10 +03:00
genl_dumpit_info_free ( info ) ;
cb - > data = NULL ;
2015-12-16 02:41:37 +03:00
}
return rc ;
}
2013-08-23 23:44:55 +04:00
static int genl_lock_dumpit ( struct sk_buff * skb , struct netlink_callback * cb )
{
2022-11-04 22:13:33 +03:00
const struct genl_split_ops * ops = & genl_dumpit_info ( cb ) - > op ;
2013-08-23 23:44:55 +04:00
int rc ;
genl_lock ( ) ;
rc = ops - > dumpit ( skb , cb ) ;
genl_unlock ( ) ;
return rc ;
}
static int genl_lock_done ( struct netlink_callback * cb )
{
2019-10-05 21:04:34 +03:00
const struct genl_dumpit_info * info = genl_dumpit_info ( cb ) ;
2022-11-04 22:13:33 +03:00
const struct genl_split_ops * ops = & info - > op ;
2013-08-23 23:44:55 +04:00
int rc = 0 ;
if ( ops - > done ) {
genl_lock ( ) ;
rc = ops - > done ( cb ) ;
genl_unlock ( ) ;
}
2020-06-27 10:12:24 +03:00
genl_family_rcv_msg_attrs_free ( info - > attrs ) ;
2019-10-05 21:04:34 +03:00
genl_dumpit_info_free ( info ) ;
return rc ;
}
static int genl_parallel_done ( struct netlink_callback * cb )
{
const struct genl_dumpit_info * info = genl_dumpit_info ( cb ) ;
2022-11-04 22:13:33 +03:00
const struct genl_split_ops * ops = & info - > op ;
2019-10-05 21:04:34 +03:00
int rc = 0 ;
if ( ops - > done )
rc = ops - > done ( cb ) ;
2020-06-27 10:12:24 +03:00
genl_family_rcv_msg_attrs_free ( info - > attrs ) ;
2019-10-05 21:04:34 +03:00
genl_dumpit_info_free ( info ) ;
2013-08-23 23:44:55 +04:00
return rc ;
}
2019-10-05 21:04:33 +03:00
static int genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit ( const struct genl_family * family ,
struct sk_buff * skb ,
struct nlmsghdr * nlh ,
struct netlink_ext_ack * extack ,
2022-11-04 22:13:33 +03:00
const struct genl_split_ops * ops ,
2019-10-05 21:04:33 +03:00
int hdrlen , struct net * net )
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
{
genetlink: fix memory leaks in genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit()
There are two kinds of memory leaks in genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit():
1. Before we call ops->start(), whenever an error happens, we forget
to free the memory allocated in genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit().
2. When ops->start() fails, the 'info' has been already installed on
the per socket control block, so we should not free it here. More
importantly, nlk->cb_running is still false at this point, so
netlink_sock_destruct() cannot free it either.
The first kind of memory leaks is easier to resolve, but the second
one requires some deeper thoughts.
After reviewing how netfilter handles this, the most elegant solution
I find is just to use a similar way to allocate the memory, that is,
moving memory allocations from caller into ops->start(). With this,
we can solve both kinds of memory leaks: for 1), no memory allocation
happens before ops->start(); for 2), ops->start() handles its own
failures and 'info' is installed to the socket control block only
when success. The only ugliness here is we have to pass all local
variables on stack via a struct, but this is not hard to understand.
Alternatively, we can introduce a ops->free() to solve this too,
but it is overkill as only genetlink has this problem so far.
Fixes: 1927f41a22a0 ("net: genetlink: introduce dump info struct to be available during dumpit op")
Reported-by: syzbot+21f04f481f449c8db840@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Cc: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Cc: Shaochun Chen <cscnull@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-06-03 07:49:10 +03:00
struct genl_start_context ctx ;
2019-10-05 21:04:33 +03:00
int err ;
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
genetlink: fix memory leaks in genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit()
There are two kinds of memory leaks in genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit():
1. Before we call ops->start(), whenever an error happens, we forget
to free the memory allocated in genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit().
2. When ops->start() fails, the 'info' has been already installed on
the per socket control block, so we should not free it here. More
importantly, nlk->cb_running is still false at this point, so
netlink_sock_destruct() cannot free it either.
The first kind of memory leaks is easier to resolve, but the second
one requires some deeper thoughts.
After reviewing how netfilter handles this, the most elegant solution
I find is just to use a similar way to allocate the memory, that is,
moving memory allocations from caller into ops->start(). With this,
we can solve both kinds of memory leaks: for 1), no memory allocation
happens before ops->start(); for 2), ops->start() handles its own
failures and 'info' is installed to the socket control block only
when success. The only ugliness here is we have to pass all local
variables on stack via a struct, but this is not hard to understand.
Alternatively, we can introduce a ops->free() to solve this too,
but it is overkill as only genetlink has this problem so far.
Fixes: 1927f41a22a0 ("net: genetlink: introduce dump info struct to be available during dumpit op")
Reported-by: syzbot+21f04f481f449c8db840@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Cc: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Cc: Shaochun Chen <cscnull@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-06-03 07:49:10 +03:00
ctx . family = family ;
ctx . nlh = nlh ;
ctx . extack = extack ;
ctx . ops = ops ;
ctx . hdrlen = hdrlen ;
2019-10-05 21:04:34 +03:00
2019-10-05 21:04:33 +03:00
if ( ! family - > parallel_ops ) {
struct netlink_dump_control c = {
. module = family - > module ,
genetlink: fix memory leaks in genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit()
There are two kinds of memory leaks in genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit():
1. Before we call ops->start(), whenever an error happens, we forget
to free the memory allocated in genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit().
2. When ops->start() fails, the 'info' has been already installed on
the per socket control block, so we should not free it here. More
importantly, nlk->cb_running is still false at this point, so
netlink_sock_destruct() cannot free it either.
The first kind of memory leaks is easier to resolve, but the second
one requires some deeper thoughts.
After reviewing how netfilter handles this, the most elegant solution
I find is just to use a similar way to allocate the memory, that is,
moving memory allocations from caller into ops->start(). With this,
we can solve both kinds of memory leaks: for 1), no memory allocation
happens before ops->start(); for 2), ops->start() handles its own
failures and 'info' is installed to the socket control block only
when success. The only ugliness here is we have to pass all local
variables on stack via a struct, but this is not hard to understand.
Alternatively, we can introduce a ops->free() to solve this too,
but it is overkill as only genetlink has this problem so far.
Fixes: 1927f41a22a0 ("net: genetlink: introduce dump info struct to be available during dumpit op")
Reported-by: syzbot+21f04f481f449c8db840@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Cc: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Cc: Shaochun Chen <cscnull@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-06-03 07:49:10 +03:00
. data = & ctx ,
. start = genl_start ,
2019-10-05 21:04:33 +03:00
. dump = genl_lock_dumpit ,
. done = genl_lock_done ,
} ;
2019-04-26 15:07:31 +03:00
2019-10-05 21:04:33 +03:00
genl_unlock ( ) ;
err = __netlink_dump_start ( net - > genl_sock , skb , nlh , & c ) ;
genl_lock ( ) ;
} else {
struct netlink_dump_control c = {
. module = family - > module ,
genetlink: fix memory leaks in genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit()
There are two kinds of memory leaks in genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit():
1. Before we call ops->start(), whenever an error happens, we forget
to free the memory allocated in genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit().
2. When ops->start() fails, the 'info' has been already installed on
the per socket control block, so we should not free it here. More
importantly, nlk->cb_running is still false at this point, so
netlink_sock_destruct() cannot free it either.
The first kind of memory leaks is easier to resolve, but the second
one requires some deeper thoughts.
After reviewing how netfilter handles this, the most elegant solution
I find is just to use a similar way to allocate the memory, that is,
moving memory allocations from caller into ops->start(). With this,
we can solve both kinds of memory leaks: for 1), no memory allocation
happens before ops->start(); for 2), ops->start() handles its own
failures and 'info' is installed to the socket control block only
when success. The only ugliness here is we have to pass all local
variables on stack via a struct, but this is not hard to understand.
Alternatively, we can introduce a ops->free() to solve this too,
but it is overkill as only genetlink has this problem so far.
Fixes: 1927f41a22a0 ("net: genetlink: introduce dump info struct to be available during dumpit op")
Reported-by: syzbot+21f04f481f449c8db840@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Cc: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Cc: Shaochun Chen <cscnull@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-06-03 07:49:10 +03:00
. data = & ctx ,
. start = genl_start ,
2019-10-05 21:04:33 +03:00
. dump = ops - > dumpit ,
2019-10-05 21:04:34 +03:00
. done = genl_parallel_done ,
2019-10-05 21:04:33 +03:00
} ;
err = __netlink_dump_start ( net - > genl_sock , skb , nlh , & c ) ;
}
2019-04-26 15:07:31 +03:00
2019-10-05 21:04:33 +03:00
return err ;
}
2013-08-23 23:44:55 +04:00
2019-10-05 21:04:33 +03:00
static int genl_family_rcv_msg_doit ( const struct genl_family * family ,
struct sk_buff * skb ,
struct nlmsghdr * nlh ,
struct netlink_ext_ack * extack ,
2022-11-04 22:13:33 +03:00
const struct genl_split_ops * ops ,
2019-10-05 21:04:33 +03:00
int hdrlen , struct net * net )
{
struct nlattr * * attrbuf ;
struct genl_info info ;
int err ;
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
2019-10-05 21:04:35 +03:00
attrbuf = genl_family_rcv_msg_attrs_parse ( family , nlh , extack ,
ops , hdrlen ,
2020-06-12 10:16:55 +03:00
GENL_DONT_VALIDATE_STRICT ) ;
2019-10-05 21:04:35 +03:00
if ( IS_ERR ( attrbuf ) )
return PTR_ERR ( attrbuf ) ;
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
info . snd_seq = nlh - > nlmsg_seq ;
2012-09-08 00:12:54 +04:00
info . snd_portid = NETLINK_CB ( skb ) . portid ;
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
info . nlhdr = nlh ;
info . genlhdr = nlmsg_data ( nlh ) ;
info . userhdr = nlmsg_data ( nlh ) + GENL_HDRLEN ;
2013-04-23 11:48:30 +04:00
info . attrs = attrbuf ;
2017-04-12 15:34:05 +03:00
info . extack = extack ;
2009-07-10 13:51:34 +04:00
genl_info_net_set ( & info , net ) ;
2010-10-04 23:14:03 +04:00
memset ( & info . user_ptr , 0 , sizeof ( info . user_ptr ) ) ;
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
2022-11-04 22:13:33 +03:00
if ( ops - > pre_doit ) {
err = ops - > pre_doit ( ops , skb , & info ) ;
2010-10-04 23:14:03 +04:00
if ( err )
2013-04-26 19:34:16 +04:00
goto out ;
2010-10-04 23:14:03 +04:00
}
err = ops - > doit ( skb , & info ) ;
2022-11-04 22:13:33 +03:00
if ( ops - > post_doit )
ops - > post_doit ( ops , skb , & info ) ;
2010-10-04 23:14:03 +04:00
2013-04-26 19:34:16 +04:00
out :
2020-06-27 10:12:24 +03:00
genl_family_rcv_msg_attrs_free ( attrbuf ) ;
2013-04-23 11:48:30 +04:00
return err ;
}
2022-09-29 17:28:09 +03:00
static int genl_header_check ( const struct genl_family * family ,
struct nlmsghdr * nlh , struct genlmsghdr * hdr ,
struct netlink_ext_ack * extack )
{
u16 flags ;
/* Only for commands added after we started validating */
if ( hdr - > cmd < family - > resv_start_op )
return 0 ;
if ( hdr - > reserved ) {
NL_SET_ERR_MSG ( extack , " genlmsghdr.reserved field is not 0 " ) ;
return - EINVAL ;
}
/* Old netlink flags have pretty loose semantics, allow only the flags
* consumed by the core where we can enforce the meaning .
*/
flags = nlh - > nlmsg_flags ;
if ( ( flags & NLM_F_DUMP ) = = NLM_F_DUMP ) /* DUMP is 2 bits */
flags & = ~ NLM_F_DUMP ;
if ( flags & ~ ( NLM_F_REQUEST | NLM_F_ACK | NLM_F_ECHO ) ) {
NL_SET_ERR_MSG ( extack ,
" ambiguous or reserved bits set in nlmsg_flags " ) ;
return - EINVAL ;
}
return 0 ;
}
2019-10-05 21:04:33 +03:00
static int genl_family_rcv_msg ( const struct genl_family * family ,
struct sk_buff * skb ,
struct nlmsghdr * nlh ,
struct netlink_ext_ack * extack )
{
struct net * net = sock_net ( skb - > sk ) ;
struct genlmsghdr * hdr = nlmsg_data ( nlh ) ;
2022-11-04 22:13:33 +03:00
struct genl_split_ops op ;
2019-10-05 21:04:33 +03:00
int hdrlen ;
2022-11-04 22:13:33 +03:00
u8 flags ;
2019-10-05 21:04:33 +03:00
/* this family doesn't exist in this netns */
if ( ! family - > netnsok & & ! net_eq ( net , & init_net ) )
return - ENOENT ;
hdrlen = GENL_HDRLEN + family - > hdrsize ;
if ( nlh - > nlmsg_len < nlmsg_msg_size ( hdrlen ) )
return - EINVAL ;
2022-09-29 17:28:09 +03:00
if ( genl_header_check ( family , nlh , hdr , extack ) )
2022-08-25 03:18:30 +03:00
return - EINVAL ;
2022-11-04 22:13:33 +03:00
flags = ( nlh - > nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_DUMP ) = = NLM_F_DUMP ?
GENL_CMD_CAP_DUMP : GENL_CMD_CAP_DO ;
2022-11-04 22:13:38 +03:00
if ( genl_get_cmd ( hdr - > cmd , flags , family , & op ) )
2019-10-05 21:04:33 +03:00
return - EOPNOTSUPP ;
2020-10-03 00:49:53 +03:00
if ( ( op . flags & GENL_ADMIN_PERM ) & &
2019-10-05 21:04:33 +03:00
! netlink_capable ( skb , CAP_NET_ADMIN ) )
return - EPERM ;
2020-10-03 00:49:53 +03:00
if ( ( op . flags & GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM ) & &
2019-10-05 21:04:33 +03:00
! netlink_ns_capable ( skb , net - > user_ns , CAP_NET_ADMIN ) )
return - EPERM ;
2022-11-04 22:13:33 +03:00
if ( flags & GENL_CMD_CAP_DUMP )
2019-10-05 21:04:33 +03:00
return genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit ( family , skb , nlh , extack ,
2020-10-03 00:49:53 +03:00
& op , hdrlen , net ) ;
2019-10-05 21:04:33 +03:00
else
return genl_family_rcv_msg_doit ( family , skb , nlh , extack ,
2020-10-03 00:49:53 +03:00
& op , hdrlen , net ) ;
2019-10-05 21:04:33 +03:00
}
2017-04-12 15:34:04 +03:00
static int genl_rcv_msg ( struct sk_buff * skb , struct nlmsghdr * nlh ,
struct netlink_ext_ack * extack )
2013-04-23 11:48:30 +04:00
{
2016-10-24 15:40:04 +03:00
const struct genl_family * family ;
2013-04-23 11:48:30 +04:00
int err ;
family = genl_family_find_byid ( nlh - > nlmsg_type ) ;
if ( family = = NULL )
return - ENOENT ;
if ( ! family - > parallel_ops )
genl_lock ( ) ;
2017-04-12 15:34:05 +03:00
err = genl_family_rcv_msg ( family , skb , nlh , extack ) ;
2013-04-23 11:48:30 +04:00
if ( ! family - > parallel_ops )
genl_unlock ( ) ;
2010-10-04 23:14:03 +04:00
return err ;
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
}
2007-10-11 08:15:29 +04:00
static void genl_rcv ( struct sk_buff * skb )
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
{
2013-04-23 11:48:30 +04:00
down_read ( & cb_lock ) ;
2007-10-11 08:15:29 +04:00
netlink_rcv_skb ( skb , & genl_rcv_msg ) ;
2013-04-23 11:48:30 +04:00
up_read ( & cb_lock ) ;
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
}
/**************************************************************************
* Controller
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
2016-10-24 15:40:03 +03:00
static struct genl_family genl_ctrl ;
2006-11-15 06:46:02 +03:00
2016-10-24 15:40:04 +03:00
static int ctrl_fill_info ( const struct genl_family * family , u32 portid , u32 seq ,
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
u32 flags , struct sk_buff * skb , u8 cmd )
{
2022-11-04 22:13:39 +03:00
struct genl_op_iter i ;
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
void * hdr ;
2012-09-08 00:12:54 +04:00
hdr = genlmsg_put ( skb , portid , seq , & genl_ctrl , flags , cmd ) ;
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
if ( hdr = = NULL )
return - 1 ;
2012-03-30 07:25:11 +04:00
if ( nla_put_string ( skb , CTRL_ATTR_FAMILY_NAME , family - > name ) | |
nla_put_u16 ( skb , CTRL_ATTR_FAMILY_ID , family - > id ) | |
nla_put_u32 ( skb , CTRL_ATTR_VERSION , family - > version ) | |
nla_put_u32 ( skb , CTRL_ATTR_HDRSIZE , family - > hdrsize ) | |
nla_put_u32 ( skb , CTRL_ATTR_MAXATTR , family - > maxattr ) )
goto nla_put_failure ;
2006-09-18 11:01:59 +04:00
2022-11-04 22:13:39 +03:00
if ( genl_op_iter_init ( family , & i ) ) {
2006-11-23 22:44:37 +03:00
struct nlattr * nla_ops ;
2006-09-18 11:01:59 +04:00
2019-04-26 12:13:06 +03:00
nla_ops = nla_nest_start_noflag ( skb , CTRL_ATTR_OPS ) ;
2006-11-23 22:44:37 +03:00
if ( nla_ops = = NULL )
2006-09-18 11:01:59 +04:00
goto nla_put_failure ;
2022-11-04 22:13:39 +03:00
while ( genl_op_iter_next ( & i ) ) {
2006-11-23 22:44:37 +03:00
struct nlattr * nest ;
2020-10-03 00:49:53 +03:00
u32 op_flags ;
2013-11-14 20:14:45 +04:00
2022-11-04 22:13:39 +03:00
op_flags = i . flags ;
if ( i . doit . policy | | i . dumpit . policy )
2013-11-18 23:54:58 +04:00
op_flags | = GENL_CMD_CAP_HASPOL ;
2006-09-18 11:01:59 +04:00
2022-11-04 22:13:39 +03:00
nest = nla_nest_start_noflag ( skb , genl_op_iter_idx ( & i ) ) ;
2006-11-23 22:44:37 +03:00
if ( nest = = NULL )
goto nla_put_failure ;
2006-09-18 11:01:59 +04:00
2022-11-04 22:13:39 +03:00
if ( nla_put_u32 ( skb , CTRL_ATTR_OP_ID , i . cmd ) | |
2013-11-18 23:54:58 +04:00
nla_put_u32 ( skb , CTRL_ATTR_OP_FLAGS , op_flags ) )
2012-03-30 07:25:11 +04:00
goto nla_put_failure ;
2006-09-18 11:01:59 +04:00
2006-11-23 22:44:37 +03:00
nla_nest_end ( skb , nest ) ;
}
nla_nest_end ( skb , nla_ops ) ;
}
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
2013-11-19 18:19:39 +04:00
if ( family - > n_mcgrps ) {
2007-07-19 02:47:52 +04:00
struct nlattr * nla_grps ;
2013-11-19 18:19:39 +04:00
int i ;
2007-07-19 02:47:52 +04:00
2019-04-26 12:13:06 +03:00
nla_grps = nla_nest_start_noflag ( skb , CTRL_ATTR_MCAST_GROUPS ) ;
2007-07-19 02:47:52 +04:00
if ( nla_grps = = NULL )
goto nla_put_failure ;
2013-11-19 18:19:39 +04:00
for ( i = 0 ; i < family - > n_mcgrps ; i + + ) {
2007-07-19 02:47:52 +04:00
struct nlattr * nest ;
2013-11-19 18:19:39 +04:00
const struct genl_multicast_group * grp ;
2007-07-19 02:47:52 +04:00
2013-11-19 18:19:39 +04:00
grp = & family - > mcgrps [ i ] ;
2019-04-26 12:13:06 +03:00
nest = nla_nest_start_noflag ( skb , i + 1 ) ;
2007-07-19 02:47:52 +04:00
if ( nest = = NULL )
goto nla_put_failure ;
2013-11-19 18:19:39 +04:00
if ( nla_put_u32 ( skb , CTRL_ATTR_MCAST_GRP_ID ,
family - > mcgrp_offset + i ) | |
2012-03-30 07:25:11 +04:00
nla_put_string ( skb , CTRL_ATTR_MCAST_GRP_NAME ,
grp - > name ) )
goto nla_put_failure ;
2007-07-19 02:47:52 +04:00
nla_nest_end ( skb , nest ) ;
}
nla_nest_end ( skb , nla_grps ) ;
}
2015-01-17 00:09:00 +03:00
genlmsg_end ( skb , hdr ) ;
return 0 ;
2007-07-19 02:47:52 +04:00
nla_put_failure :
2008-06-04 03:36:54 +04:00
genlmsg_cancel ( skb , hdr ) ;
return - EMSGSIZE ;
2007-07-19 02:47:52 +04:00
}
2016-10-24 15:40:04 +03:00
static int ctrl_fill_mcgrp_info ( const struct genl_family * family ,
2013-11-19 18:19:39 +04:00
const struct genl_multicast_group * grp ,
int grp_id , u32 portid , u32 seq , u32 flags ,
struct sk_buff * skb , u8 cmd )
2007-07-19 02:47:52 +04:00
{
void * hdr ;
struct nlattr * nla_grps ;
struct nlattr * nest ;
2012-09-08 00:12:54 +04:00
hdr = genlmsg_put ( skb , portid , seq , & genl_ctrl , flags , cmd ) ;
2007-07-19 02:47:52 +04:00
if ( hdr = = NULL )
return - 1 ;
2013-11-19 18:19:36 +04:00
if ( nla_put_string ( skb , CTRL_ATTR_FAMILY_NAME , family - > name ) | |
nla_put_u16 ( skb , CTRL_ATTR_FAMILY_ID , family - > id ) )
2012-03-30 07:25:11 +04:00
goto nla_put_failure ;
2007-07-19 02:47:52 +04:00
2019-04-26 12:13:06 +03:00
nla_grps = nla_nest_start_noflag ( skb , CTRL_ATTR_MCAST_GROUPS ) ;
2007-07-19 02:47:52 +04:00
if ( nla_grps = = NULL )
goto nla_put_failure ;
2019-04-26 12:13:06 +03:00
nest = nla_nest_start_noflag ( skb , 1 ) ;
2007-07-19 02:47:52 +04:00
if ( nest = = NULL )
goto nla_put_failure ;
2013-11-19 18:19:39 +04:00
if ( nla_put_u32 ( skb , CTRL_ATTR_MCAST_GRP_ID , grp_id ) | |
2012-03-30 07:25:11 +04:00
nla_put_string ( skb , CTRL_ATTR_MCAST_GRP_NAME ,
grp - > name ) )
goto nla_put_failure ;
2007-07-19 02:47:52 +04:00
nla_nest_end ( skb , nest ) ;
nla_nest_end ( skb , nla_grps ) ;
2015-01-17 00:09:00 +03:00
genlmsg_end ( skb , hdr ) ;
return 0 ;
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
nla_put_failure :
2008-06-04 03:36:54 +04:00
genlmsg_cancel ( skb , hdr ) ;
return - EMSGSIZE ;
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
}
static int ctrl_dumpfamily ( struct sk_buff * skb , struct netlink_callback * cb )
{
2016-10-24 15:40:04 +03:00
int n = 0 ;
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
struct genl_family * rt ;
2009-07-10 13:51:34 +04:00
struct net * net = sock_net ( skb - > sk ) ;
2016-10-24 15:40:04 +03:00
int fams_to_skip = cb - > args [ 0 ] ;
unsigned int id ;
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
2016-10-24 15:40:04 +03:00
idr_for_each_entry ( & genl_fam_idr , rt , id ) {
if ( ! rt - > netnsok & & ! net_eq ( net , & init_net ) )
continue ;
if ( n + + < fams_to_skip )
continue ;
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
2016-10-24 15:40:04 +03:00
if ( ctrl_fill_info ( rt , NETLINK_CB ( cb - > skb ) . portid ,
cb - > nlh - > nlmsg_seq , NLM_F_MULTI ,
2017-03-22 18:08:33 +03:00
skb , CTRL_CMD_NEWFAMILY ) < 0 ) {
n - - ;
2016-10-24 15:40:04 +03:00
break ;
2017-03-22 18:08:33 +03:00
}
2016-10-24 15:40:04 +03:00
}
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
2016-10-24 15:40:04 +03:00
cb - > args [ 0 ] = n ;
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
return skb - > len ;
}
2016-10-24 15:40:04 +03:00
static struct sk_buff * ctrl_build_family_msg ( const struct genl_family * family ,
2012-09-08 00:12:54 +04:00
u32 portid , int seq , u8 cmd )
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
{
struct sk_buff * skb ;
int err ;
2006-11-11 01:10:15 +03:00
skb = nlmsg_new ( NLMSG_DEFAULT_SIZE , GFP_KERNEL ) ;
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
if ( skb = = NULL )
return ERR_PTR ( - ENOBUFS ) ;
2012-09-08 00:12:54 +04:00
err = ctrl_fill_info ( family , portid , seq , 0 , skb , cmd ) ;
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
if ( err < 0 ) {
nlmsg_free ( skb ) ;
return ERR_PTR ( err ) ;
}
return skb ;
}
2013-11-19 18:19:39 +04:00
static struct sk_buff *
2016-10-24 15:40:04 +03:00
ctrl_build_mcgrp_msg ( const struct genl_family * family ,
2013-11-19 18:19:39 +04:00
const struct genl_multicast_group * grp ,
int grp_id , u32 portid , int seq , u8 cmd )
2007-07-19 02:47:52 +04:00
{
struct sk_buff * skb ;
int err ;
skb = nlmsg_new ( NLMSG_DEFAULT_SIZE , GFP_KERNEL ) ;
if ( skb = = NULL )
return ERR_PTR ( - ENOBUFS ) ;
2013-11-19 18:19:39 +04:00
err = ctrl_fill_mcgrp_info ( family , grp , grp_id , portid ,
seq , 0 , skb , cmd ) ;
2007-07-19 02:47:52 +04:00
if ( err < 0 ) {
nlmsg_free ( skb ) ;
return ERR_PTR ( err ) ;
}
return skb ;
}
2020-10-03 00:50:00 +03:00
static const struct nla_policy ctrl_policy_family [ ] = {
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
[ CTRL_ATTR_FAMILY_ID ] = { . type = NLA_U16 } ,
2006-08-27 07:13:18 +04:00
[ CTRL_ATTR_FAMILY_NAME ] = { . type = NLA_NUL_STRING ,
. len = GENL_NAMSIZ - 1 } ,
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
} ;
static int ctrl_getfamily ( struct sk_buff * skb , struct genl_info * info )
{
struct sk_buff * msg ;
2016-10-24 15:40:04 +03:00
const struct genl_family * res = NULL ;
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
int err = - EINVAL ;
if ( info - > attrs [ CTRL_ATTR_FAMILY_ID ] ) {
u16 id = nla_get_u16 ( info - > attrs [ CTRL_ATTR_FAMILY_ID ] ) ;
res = genl_family_find_byid ( id ) ;
2009-07-10 13:51:34 +04:00
err = - ENOENT ;
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
}
if ( info - > attrs [ CTRL_ATTR_FAMILY_NAME ] ) {
2006-08-27 07:13:18 +04:00
char * name ;
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
2006-08-27 07:13:18 +04:00
name = nla_data ( info - > attrs [ CTRL_ATTR_FAMILY_NAME ] ) ;
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
res = genl_family_find_byname ( name ) ;
2011-12-28 22:48:55 +04:00
# ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
if ( res = = NULL ) {
genl_unlock ( ) ;
2013-07-26 13:00:10 +04:00
up_read ( & cb_lock ) ;
2012-05-29 13:30:41 +04:00
request_module ( " net-pf-%d-proto-%d-family-%s " ,
2011-12-28 22:48:55 +04:00
PF_NETLINK , NETLINK_GENERIC , name ) ;
2013-07-26 13:00:10 +04:00
down_read ( & cb_lock ) ;
2011-12-28 22:48:55 +04:00
genl_lock ( ) ;
res = genl_family_find_byname ( name ) ;
}
# endif
2009-07-10 13:51:34 +04:00
err = - ENOENT ;
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
}
2009-07-10 13:51:34 +04:00
if ( res = = NULL )
return err ;
if ( ! res - > netnsok & & ! net_eq ( genl_info_net ( info ) , & init_net ) ) {
/* family doesn't exist here */
return - ENOENT ;
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
}
2012-09-08 00:12:54 +04:00
msg = ctrl_build_family_msg ( res , info - > snd_portid , info - > snd_seq ,
2007-07-19 02:47:52 +04:00
CTRL_CMD_NEWFAMILY ) ;
2009-07-10 13:51:34 +04:00
if ( IS_ERR ( msg ) )
return PTR_ERR ( msg ) ;
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
2009-07-10 13:51:34 +04:00
return genlmsg_reply ( msg , info ) ;
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
}
2016-10-24 15:40:04 +03:00
static int genl_ctrl_event ( int event , const struct genl_family * family ,
2013-11-19 18:19:39 +04:00
const struct genl_multicast_group * grp ,
int grp_id )
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
{
struct sk_buff * msg ;
2009-07-10 13:51:34 +04:00
/* genl is still initialising */
if ( ! init_net . genl_sock )
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
return 0 ;
switch ( event ) {
case CTRL_CMD_NEWFAMILY :
case CTRL_CMD_DELFAMILY :
2013-11-19 18:19:36 +04:00
WARN_ON ( grp ) ;
2009-07-10 13:51:34 +04:00
msg = ctrl_build_family_msg ( family , 0 , 0 , event ) ;
2007-07-19 02:47:52 +04:00
break ;
case CTRL_CMD_NEWMCAST_GRP :
case CTRL_CMD_DELMCAST_GRP :
2013-11-19 18:19:36 +04:00
BUG_ON ( ! grp ) ;
2013-11-19 18:19:39 +04:00
msg = ctrl_build_mcgrp_msg ( family , grp , grp_id , 0 , 0 , event ) ;
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
break ;
2009-07-10 13:51:34 +04:00
default :
return - EINVAL ;
}
if ( IS_ERR ( msg ) )
return PTR_ERR ( msg ) ;
if ( ! family - > netnsok ) {
2013-11-19 18:19:38 +04:00
genlmsg_multicast_netns ( & genl_ctrl , & init_net , msg , 0 ,
2013-11-19 18:19:39 +04:00
0 , GFP_KERNEL ) ;
2009-07-10 13:51:34 +04:00
} else {
rcu_read_lock ( ) ;
2013-11-19 18:19:38 +04:00
genlmsg_multicast_allns ( & genl_ctrl , msg , 0 ,
2013-11-19 18:19:39 +04:00
0 , GFP_ATOMIC ) ;
2009-07-10 13:51:34 +04:00
rcu_read_unlock ( ) ;
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
}
return 0 ;
}
2020-10-03 00:49:55 +03:00
struct ctrl_dump_policy_ctx {
struct netlink_policy_dump_state * state ;
2020-10-03 11:44:45 +03:00
const struct genl_family * rt ;
2022-11-04 22:13:40 +03:00
struct genl_op_iter * op_iter ;
2020-10-03 11:44:46 +03:00
u32 op ;
2020-10-03 00:49:55 +03:00
u16 fam_id ;
2022-11-04 22:13:40 +03:00
u8 dump_map : 1 ,
2020-10-03 11:44:46 +03:00
single_op : 1 ;
2020-10-03 00:49:55 +03:00
} ;
2020-10-03 00:50:00 +03:00
static const struct nla_policy ctrl_policy_policy [ ] = {
[ CTRL_ATTR_FAMILY_ID ] = { . type = NLA_U16 } ,
[ CTRL_ATTR_FAMILY_NAME ] = { . type = NLA_NUL_STRING ,
. len = GENL_NAMSIZ - 1 } ,
2020-10-03 11:44:46 +03:00
[ CTRL_ATTR_OP ] = { . type = NLA_U32 } ,
2020-10-03 00:50:00 +03:00
} ;
2020-10-03 00:49:56 +03:00
static int ctrl_dumppolicy_start ( struct netlink_callback * cb )
netlink: add infrastructure to expose policies to userspace
Add, and use in generic netlink, helpers to dump out a netlink
policy to userspace, including all the range validation data,
nested policies etc.
This lets userspace discover what the kernel understands.
For families/commands other than generic netlink, the helpers
need to be used directly in an appropriate command, or we can
add some infrastructure (a new netlink family) that those can
register their policies with for introspection. I'm not that
familiar with non-generic netlink, so that's left out for now.
The data exposed to userspace also includes min and max length
for binary/string data, I've done that instead of letting the
userspace tools figure out whether min/max is intended based
on the type so that we can extend this later in the kernel, we
might want to just use the range data for example.
Because of this, I opted to not directly expose the NLA_*
values, even if some of them are already exposed via BPF, as
with min/max length we don't need to have different types here
for NLA_BINARY/NLA_MIN_LEN/NLA_EXACT_LEN, we just make them
all NL_ATTR_TYPE_BINARY with min/max length optionally set.
Similarly, we don't really need NLA_MSECS, and perhaps can
remove it in the future - but not if we encode it into the
userspace API now. It gets mapped to NL_ATTR_TYPE_U64 here.
Note that the exposing here corresponds to the strict policy
interpretation, and NLA_UNSPEC items are omitted entirely.
To get those, change them to NLA_MIN_LEN which behaves in
exactly the same way, but is exposed.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-04-30 23:13:12 +03:00
{
2020-10-03 00:49:59 +03:00
const struct genl_dumpit_info * info = genl_dumpit_info ( cb ) ;
2020-10-03 00:49:55 +03:00
struct ctrl_dump_policy_ctx * ctx = ( void * ) cb - > ctx ;
2020-10-03 00:49:59 +03:00
struct nlattr * * tb = info - > attrs ;
netlink: add infrastructure to expose policies to userspace
Add, and use in generic netlink, helpers to dump out a netlink
policy to userspace, including all the range validation data,
nested policies etc.
This lets userspace discover what the kernel understands.
For families/commands other than generic netlink, the helpers
need to be used directly in an appropriate command, or we can
add some infrastructure (a new netlink family) that those can
register their policies with for introspection. I'm not that
familiar with non-generic netlink, so that's left out for now.
The data exposed to userspace also includes min and max length
for binary/string data, I've done that instead of letting the
userspace tools figure out whether min/max is intended based
on the type so that we can extend this later in the kernel, we
might want to just use the range data for example.
Because of this, I opted to not directly expose the NLA_*
values, even if some of them are already exposed via BPF, as
with min/max length we don't need to have different types here
for NLA_BINARY/NLA_MIN_LEN/NLA_EXACT_LEN, we just make them
all NL_ATTR_TYPE_BINARY with min/max length optionally set.
Similarly, we don't really need NLA_MSECS, and perhaps can
remove it in the future - but not if we encode it into the
userspace API now. It gets mapped to NL_ATTR_TYPE_U64 here.
Note that the exposing here corresponds to the strict policy
interpretation, and NLA_UNSPEC items are omitted entirely.
To get those, change them to NLA_MIN_LEN which behaves in
exactly the same way, but is exposed.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-04-30 23:13:12 +03:00
const struct genl_family * rt ;
2022-11-04 22:13:39 +03:00
struct genl_op_iter i ;
int err ;
netlink: add infrastructure to expose policies to userspace
Add, and use in generic netlink, helpers to dump out a netlink
policy to userspace, including all the range validation data,
nested policies etc.
This lets userspace discover what the kernel understands.
For families/commands other than generic netlink, the helpers
need to be used directly in an appropriate command, or we can
add some infrastructure (a new netlink family) that those can
register their policies with for introspection. I'm not that
familiar with non-generic netlink, so that's left out for now.
The data exposed to userspace also includes min and max length
for binary/string data, I've done that instead of letting the
userspace tools figure out whether min/max is intended based
on the type so that we can extend this later in the kernel, we
might want to just use the range data for example.
Because of this, I opted to not directly expose the NLA_*
values, even if some of them are already exposed via BPF, as
with min/max length we don't need to have different types here
for NLA_BINARY/NLA_MIN_LEN/NLA_EXACT_LEN, we just make them
all NL_ATTR_TYPE_BINARY with min/max length optionally set.
Similarly, we don't really need NLA_MSECS, and perhaps can
remove it in the future - but not if we encode it into the
userspace API now. It gets mapped to NL_ATTR_TYPE_U64 here.
Note that the exposing here corresponds to the strict policy
interpretation, and NLA_UNSPEC items are omitted entirely.
To get those, change them to NLA_MIN_LEN which behaves in
exactly the same way, but is exposed.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-04-30 23:13:12 +03:00
2020-10-03 00:49:55 +03:00
BUILD_BUG_ON ( sizeof ( * ctx ) > sizeof ( cb - > ctx ) ) ;
2020-10-03 00:49:56 +03:00
if ( ! tb [ CTRL_ATTR_FAMILY_ID ] & & ! tb [ CTRL_ATTR_FAMILY_NAME ] )
return - EINVAL ;
netlink: add infrastructure to expose policies to userspace
Add, and use in generic netlink, helpers to dump out a netlink
policy to userspace, including all the range validation data,
nested policies etc.
This lets userspace discover what the kernel understands.
For families/commands other than generic netlink, the helpers
need to be used directly in an appropriate command, or we can
add some infrastructure (a new netlink family) that those can
register their policies with for introspection. I'm not that
familiar with non-generic netlink, so that's left out for now.
The data exposed to userspace also includes min and max length
for binary/string data, I've done that instead of letting the
userspace tools figure out whether min/max is intended based
on the type so that we can extend this later in the kernel, we
might want to just use the range data for example.
Because of this, I opted to not directly expose the NLA_*
values, even if some of them are already exposed via BPF, as
with min/max length we don't need to have different types here
for NLA_BINARY/NLA_MIN_LEN/NLA_EXACT_LEN, we just make them
all NL_ATTR_TYPE_BINARY with min/max length optionally set.
Similarly, we don't really need NLA_MSECS, and perhaps can
remove it in the future - but not if we encode it into the
userspace API now. It gets mapped to NL_ATTR_TYPE_U64 here.
Note that the exposing here corresponds to the strict policy
interpretation, and NLA_UNSPEC items are omitted entirely.
To get those, change them to NLA_MIN_LEN which behaves in
exactly the same way, but is exposed.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-04-30 23:13:12 +03:00
2020-10-03 00:49:56 +03:00
if ( tb [ CTRL_ATTR_FAMILY_ID ] ) {
ctx - > fam_id = nla_get_u16 ( tb [ CTRL_ATTR_FAMILY_ID ] ) ;
} else {
rt = genl_family_find_byname (
nla_data ( tb [ CTRL_ATTR_FAMILY_NAME ] ) ) ;
if ( ! rt )
return - ENOENT ;
ctx - > fam_id = rt - > id ;
netlink: add infrastructure to expose policies to userspace
Add, and use in generic netlink, helpers to dump out a netlink
policy to userspace, including all the range validation data,
nested policies etc.
This lets userspace discover what the kernel understands.
For families/commands other than generic netlink, the helpers
need to be used directly in an appropriate command, or we can
add some infrastructure (a new netlink family) that those can
register their policies with for introspection. I'm not that
familiar with non-generic netlink, so that's left out for now.
The data exposed to userspace also includes min and max length
for binary/string data, I've done that instead of letting the
userspace tools figure out whether min/max is intended based
on the type so that we can extend this later in the kernel, we
might want to just use the range data for example.
Because of this, I opted to not directly expose the NLA_*
values, even if some of them are already exposed via BPF, as
with min/max length we don't need to have different types here
for NLA_BINARY/NLA_MIN_LEN/NLA_EXACT_LEN, we just make them
all NL_ATTR_TYPE_BINARY with min/max length optionally set.
Similarly, we don't really need NLA_MSECS, and perhaps can
remove it in the future - but not if we encode it into the
userspace API now. It gets mapped to NL_ATTR_TYPE_U64 here.
Note that the exposing here corresponds to the strict policy
interpretation, and NLA_UNSPEC items are omitted entirely.
To get those, change them to NLA_MIN_LEN which behaves in
exactly the same way, but is exposed.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-04-30 23:13:12 +03:00
}
2020-10-03 00:49:55 +03:00
rt = genl_family_find_byid ( ctx - > fam_id ) ;
netlink: add infrastructure to expose policies to userspace
Add, and use in generic netlink, helpers to dump out a netlink
policy to userspace, including all the range validation data,
nested policies etc.
This lets userspace discover what the kernel understands.
For families/commands other than generic netlink, the helpers
need to be used directly in an appropriate command, or we can
add some infrastructure (a new netlink family) that those can
register their policies with for introspection. I'm not that
familiar with non-generic netlink, so that's left out for now.
The data exposed to userspace also includes min and max length
for binary/string data, I've done that instead of letting the
userspace tools figure out whether min/max is intended based
on the type so that we can extend this later in the kernel, we
might want to just use the range data for example.
Because of this, I opted to not directly expose the NLA_*
values, even if some of them are already exposed via BPF, as
with min/max length we don't need to have different types here
for NLA_BINARY/NLA_MIN_LEN/NLA_EXACT_LEN, we just make them
all NL_ATTR_TYPE_BINARY with min/max length optionally set.
Similarly, we don't really need NLA_MSECS, and perhaps can
remove it in the future - but not if we encode it into the
userspace API now. It gets mapped to NL_ATTR_TYPE_U64 here.
Note that the exposing here corresponds to the strict policy
interpretation, and NLA_UNSPEC items are omitted entirely.
To get those, change them to NLA_MIN_LEN which behaves in
exactly the same way, but is exposed.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-04-30 23:13:12 +03:00
if ( ! rt )
return - ENOENT ;
2020-10-03 11:44:45 +03:00
ctx - > rt = rt ;
2020-10-03 11:44:46 +03:00
if ( tb [ CTRL_ATTR_OP ] ) {
2022-11-04 22:13:36 +03:00
struct genl_split_ops doit , dump ;
2020-10-03 11:44:46 +03:00
ctx - > single_op = true ;
ctx - > op = nla_get_u32 ( tb [ CTRL_ATTR_OP ] ) ;
2022-11-09 21:32:54 +03:00
err = genl_get_cmd_both ( ctx - > op , rt , & doit , & dump ) ;
if ( err ) {
2020-10-03 11:44:46 +03:00
NL_SET_BAD_ATTR ( cb - > extack , tb [ CTRL_ATTR_OP ] ) ;
2022-11-09 21:32:54 +03:00
return err ;
2020-10-03 11:44:46 +03:00
}
2022-11-04 22:13:36 +03:00
if ( doit . policy ) {
err = netlink_policy_dump_add_policy ( & ctx - > state ,
doit . policy ,
doit . maxattr ) ;
if ( err )
goto err_free_state ;
}
if ( dump . policy ) {
err = netlink_policy_dump_add_policy ( & ctx - > state ,
dump . policy ,
dump . maxattr ) ;
if ( err )
goto err_free_state ;
}
2020-10-03 11:44:46 +03:00
2022-11-04 22:13:36 +03:00
if ( ! ctx - > state )
return - ENODATA ;
2022-11-04 22:13:40 +03:00
ctx - > dump_map = 1 ;
2022-11-04 22:13:36 +03:00
return 0 ;
2020-10-03 11:44:46 +03:00
}
2022-11-04 22:13:40 +03:00
ctx - > op_iter = kmalloc ( sizeof ( * ctx - > op_iter ) , GFP_KERNEL ) ;
if ( ! ctx - > op_iter )
return - ENOMEM ;
2022-11-08 23:41:28 +03:00
genl_op_iter_init ( rt , ctx - > op_iter ) ;
ctx - > dump_map = genl_op_iter_next ( ctx - > op_iter ) ;
2022-11-04 22:13:40 +03:00
2022-11-04 22:13:39 +03:00
for ( genl_op_iter_init ( rt , & i ) ; genl_op_iter_next ( & i ) ; ) {
if ( i . doit . policy ) {
2022-11-04 22:13:36 +03:00
err = netlink_policy_dump_add_policy ( & ctx - > state ,
2022-11-04 22:13:39 +03:00
i . doit . policy ,
i . doit . maxattr ) ;
2022-11-04 22:13:36 +03:00
if ( err )
goto err_free_state ;
}
2022-11-04 22:13:39 +03:00
if ( i . dumpit . policy ) {
2020-10-03 11:44:45 +03:00
err = netlink_policy_dump_add_policy ( & ctx - > state ,
2022-11-04 22:13:39 +03:00
i . dumpit . policy ,
i . dumpit . maxattr ) ;
2020-10-03 11:44:45 +03:00
if ( err )
2022-08-16 19:19:39 +03:00
goto err_free_state ;
2020-10-03 11:44:45 +03:00
}
}
netlink: add infrastructure to expose policies to userspace
Add, and use in generic netlink, helpers to dump out a netlink
policy to userspace, including all the range validation data,
nested policies etc.
This lets userspace discover what the kernel understands.
For families/commands other than generic netlink, the helpers
need to be used directly in an appropriate command, or we can
add some infrastructure (a new netlink family) that those can
register their policies with for introspection. I'm not that
familiar with non-generic netlink, so that's left out for now.
The data exposed to userspace also includes min and max length
for binary/string data, I've done that instead of letting the
userspace tools figure out whether min/max is intended based
on the type so that we can extend this later in the kernel, we
might want to just use the range data for example.
Because of this, I opted to not directly expose the NLA_*
values, even if some of them are already exposed via BPF, as
with min/max length we don't need to have different types here
for NLA_BINARY/NLA_MIN_LEN/NLA_EXACT_LEN, we just make them
all NL_ATTR_TYPE_BINARY with min/max length optionally set.
Similarly, we don't really need NLA_MSECS, and perhaps can
remove it in the future - but not if we encode it into the
userspace API now. It gets mapped to NL_ATTR_TYPE_U64 here.
Note that the exposing here corresponds to the strict policy
interpretation, and NLA_UNSPEC items are omitted entirely.
To get those, change them to NLA_MIN_LEN which behaves in
exactly the same way, but is exposed.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-04-30 23:13:12 +03:00
2022-11-04 22:13:40 +03:00
if ( ! ctx - > state ) {
err = - ENODATA ;
goto err_free_op_iter ;
}
2020-10-03 11:44:45 +03:00
return 0 ;
2022-08-16 19:19:39 +03:00
err_free_state :
netlink_policy_dump_free ( ctx - > state ) ;
2022-11-04 22:13:40 +03:00
err_free_op_iter :
kfree ( ctx - > op_iter ) ;
2022-08-16 19:19:39 +03:00
return err ;
2020-10-03 00:49:56 +03:00
}
2020-10-03 11:44:44 +03:00
static void * ctrl_dumppolicy_prep ( struct sk_buff * skb ,
struct netlink_callback * cb )
{
struct ctrl_dump_policy_ctx * ctx = ( void * ) cb - > ctx ;
void * hdr ;
hdr = genlmsg_put ( skb , NETLINK_CB ( cb - > skb ) . portid ,
cb - > nlh - > nlmsg_seq , & genl_ctrl ,
NLM_F_MULTI , CTRL_CMD_GETPOLICY ) ;
if ( ! hdr )
return NULL ;
if ( nla_put_u16 ( skb , CTRL_ATTR_FAMILY_ID , ctx - > fam_id ) )
return NULL ;
return hdr ;
}
2020-10-03 11:44:45 +03:00
static int ctrl_dumppolicy_put_op ( struct sk_buff * skb ,
struct netlink_callback * cb ,
2022-11-04 22:13:37 +03:00
struct genl_split_ops * doit ,
struct genl_split_ops * dumpit )
2020-10-03 11:44:45 +03:00
{
struct ctrl_dump_policy_ctx * ctx = ( void * ) cb - > ctx ;
struct nlattr * nest_pol , * nest_op ;
void * hdr ;
int idx ;
/* skip if we have nothing to show */
2022-11-04 22:13:37 +03:00
if ( ! doit - > policy & & ! dumpit - > policy )
2020-10-03 11:44:45 +03:00
return 0 ;
hdr = ctrl_dumppolicy_prep ( skb , cb ) ;
if ( ! hdr )
return - ENOBUFS ;
nest_pol = nla_nest_start ( skb , CTRL_ATTR_OP_POLICY ) ;
if ( ! nest_pol )
goto err ;
2022-11-04 22:13:37 +03:00
nest_op = nla_nest_start ( skb , doit - > cmd ) ;
2020-10-03 11:44:45 +03:00
if ( ! nest_op )
goto err ;
2022-11-04 22:13:37 +03:00
if ( doit - > policy ) {
idx = netlink_policy_dump_get_policy_idx ( ctx - > state ,
doit - > policy ,
doit - > maxattr ) ;
2020-10-03 11:44:45 +03:00
2022-11-04 22:13:37 +03:00
if ( nla_put_u32 ( skb , CTRL_ATTR_POLICY_DO , idx ) )
goto err ;
}
if ( dumpit - > policy ) {
idx = netlink_policy_dump_get_policy_idx ( ctx - > state ,
dumpit - > policy ,
dumpit - > maxattr ) ;
2020-10-03 11:44:45 +03:00
2022-11-04 22:13:37 +03:00
if ( nla_put_u32 ( skb , CTRL_ATTR_POLICY_DUMP , idx ) )
goto err ;
}
2020-10-03 11:44:45 +03:00
nla_nest_end ( skb , nest_op ) ;
nla_nest_end ( skb , nest_pol ) ;
genlmsg_end ( skb , hdr ) ;
return 0 ;
err :
genlmsg_cancel ( skb , hdr ) ;
return - ENOBUFS ;
}
2020-10-03 00:49:56 +03:00
static int ctrl_dumppolicy ( struct sk_buff * skb , struct netlink_callback * cb )
{
struct ctrl_dump_policy_ctx * ctx = ( void * ) cb - > ctx ;
2020-10-03 11:44:45 +03:00
void * hdr ;
2022-11-04 22:13:40 +03:00
if ( ctx - > dump_map ) {
2022-11-04 22:13:31 +03:00
if ( ctx - > single_op ) {
2022-11-04 22:13:40 +03:00
struct genl_split_ops doit , dumpit ;
2022-11-09 21:32:54 +03:00
if ( WARN_ON ( genl_get_cmd_both ( ctx - > op , ctx - > rt ,
& doit , & dumpit ) ) )
2022-11-04 22:13:37 +03:00
return - ENOENT ;
2020-10-03 11:44:46 +03:00
2022-11-04 22:13:37 +03:00
if ( ctrl_dumppolicy_put_op ( skb , cb , & doit , & dumpit ) )
2022-11-04 22:13:31 +03:00
return skb - > len ;
2022-11-04 22:13:40 +03:00
/* done with the per-op policy index list */
ctx - > dump_map = 0 ;
2022-11-04 22:13:31 +03:00
}
2022-11-04 22:13:40 +03:00
while ( ctx - > dump_map ) {
if ( ctrl_dumppolicy_put_op ( skb , cb ,
& ctx - > op_iter - > doit ,
& ctx - > op_iter - > dumpit ) )
2020-10-03 11:44:45 +03:00
return skb - > len ;
2022-11-04 22:13:40 +03:00
ctx - > dump_map = genl_op_iter_next ( ctx - > op_iter ) ;
2020-10-03 11:44:45 +03:00
}
}
netlink: add infrastructure to expose policies to userspace
Add, and use in generic netlink, helpers to dump out a netlink
policy to userspace, including all the range validation data,
nested policies etc.
This lets userspace discover what the kernel understands.
For families/commands other than generic netlink, the helpers
need to be used directly in an appropriate command, or we can
add some infrastructure (a new netlink family) that those can
register their policies with for introspection. I'm not that
familiar with non-generic netlink, so that's left out for now.
The data exposed to userspace also includes min and max length
for binary/string data, I've done that instead of letting the
userspace tools figure out whether min/max is intended based
on the type so that we can extend this later in the kernel, we
might want to just use the range data for example.
Because of this, I opted to not directly expose the NLA_*
values, even if some of them are already exposed via BPF, as
with min/max length we don't need to have different types here
for NLA_BINARY/NLA_MIN_LEN/NLA_EXACT_LEN, we just make them
all NL_ATTR_TYPE_BINARY with min/max length optionally set.
Similarly, we don't really need NLA_MSECS, and perhaps can
remove it in the future - but not if we encode it into the
userspace API now. It gets mapped to NL_ATTR_TYPE_U64 here.
Note that the exposing here corresponds to the strict policy
interpretation, and NLA_UNSPEC items are omitted entirely.
To get those, change them to NLA_MIN_LEN which behaves in
exactly the same way, but is exposed.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-04-30 23:13:12 +03:00
2020-10-03 00:49:55 +03:00
while ( netlink_policy_dump_loop ( ctx - > state ) ) {
netlink: add infrastructure to expose policies to userspace
Add, and use in generic netlink, helpers to dump out a netlink
policy to userspace, including all the range validation data,
nested policies etc.
This lets userspace discover what the kernel understands.
For families/commands other than generic netlink, the helpers
need to be used directly in an appropriate command, or we can
add some infrastructure (a new netlink family) that those can
register their policies with for introspection. I'm not that
familiar with non-generic netlink, so that's left out for now.
The data exposed to userspace also includes min and max length
for binary/string data, I've done that instead of letting the
userspace tools figure out whether min/max is intended based
on the type so that we can extend this later in the kernel, we
might want to just use the range data for example.
Because of this, I opted to not directly expose the NLA_*
values, even if some of them are already exposed via BPF, as
with min/max length we don't need to have different types here
for NLA_BINARY/NLA_MIN_LEN/NLA_EXACT_LEN, we just make them
all NL_ATTR_TYPE_BINARY with min/max length optionally set.
Similarly, we don't really need NLA_MSECS, and perhaps can
remove it in the future - but not if we encode it into the
userspace API now. It gets mapped to NL_ATTR_TYPE_U64 here.
Note that the exposing here corresponds to the strict policy
interpretation, and NLA_UNSPEC items are omitted entirely.
To get those, change them to NLA_MIN_LEN which behaves in
exactly the same way, but is exposed.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-04-30 23:13:12 +03:00
struct nlattr * nest ;
2020-10-03 11:44:44 +03:00
hdr = ctrl_dumppolicy_prep ( skb , cb ) ;
netlink: add infrastructure to expose policies to userspace
Add, and use in generic netlink, helpers to dump out a netlink
policy to userspace, including all the range validation data,
nested policies etc.
This lets userspace discover what the kernel understands.
For families/commands other than generic netlink, the helpers
need to be used directly in an appropriate command, or we can
add some infrastructure (a new netlink family) that those can
register their policies with for introspection. I'm not that
familiar with non-generic netlink, so that's left out for now.
The data exposed to userspace also includes min and max length
for binary/string data, I've done that instead of letting the
userspace tools figure out whether min/max is intended based
on the type so that we can extend this later in the kernel, we
might want to just use the range data for example.
Because of this, I opted to not directly expose the NLA_*
values, even if some of them are already exposed via BPF, as
with min/max length we don't need to have different types here
for NLA_BINARY/NLA_MIN_LEN/NLA_EXACT_LEN, we just make them
all NL_ATTR_TYPE_BINARY with min/max length optionally set.
Similarly, we don't really need NLA_MSECS, and perhaps can
remove it in the future - but not if we encode it into the
userspace API now. It gets mapped to NL_ATTR_TYPE_U64 here.
Note that the exposing here corresponds to the strict policy
interpretation, and NLA_UNSPEC items are omitted entirely.
To get those, change them to NLA_MIN_LEN which behaves in
exactly the same way, but is exposed.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-04-30 23:13:12 +03:00
if ( ! hdr )
goto nla_put_failure ;
nest = nla_nest_start ( skb , CTRL_ATTR_POLICY ) ;
if ( ! nest )
goto nla_put_failure ;
2020-10-03 00:49:55 +03:00
if ( netlink_policy_dump_write ( skb , ctx - > state ) )
netlink: add infrastructure to expose policies to userspace
Add, and use in generic netlink, helpers to dump out a netlink
policy to userspace, including all the range validation data,
nested policies etc.
This lets userspace discover what the kernel understands.
For families/commands other than generic netlink, the helpers
need to be used directly in an appropriate command, or we can
add some infrastructure (a new netlink family) that those can
register their policies with for introspection. I'm not that
familiar with non-generic netlink, so that's left out for now.
The data exposed to userspace also includes min and max length
for binary/string data, I've done that instead of letting the
userspace tools figure out whether min/max is intended based
on the type so that we can extend this later in the kernel, we
might want to just use the range data for example.
Because of this, I opted to not directly expose the NLA_*
values, even if some of them are already exposed via BPF, as
with min/max length we don't need to have different types here
for NLA_BINARY/NLA_MIN_LEN/NLA_EXACT_LEN, we just make them
all NL_ATTR_TYPE_BINARY with min/max length optionally set.
Similarly, we don't really need NLA_MSECS, and perhaps can
remove it in the future - but not if we encode it into the
userspace API now. It gets mapped to NL_ATTR_TYPE_U64 here.
Note that the exposing here corresponds to the strict policy
interpretation, and NLA_UNSPEC items are omitted entirely.
To get those, change them to NLA_MIN_LEN which behaves in
exactly the same way, but is exposed.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-04-30 23:13:12 +03:00
goto nla_put_failure ;
nla_nest_end ( skb , nest ) ;
genlmsg_end ( skb , hdr ) ;
}
return skb - > len ;
2020-10-03 11:44:45 +03:00
nla_put_failure :
genlmsg_cancel ( skb , hdr ) ;
return skb - > len ;
netlink: add infrastructure to expose policies to userspace
Add, and use in generic netlink, helpers to dump out a netlink
policy to userspace, including all the range validation data,
nested policies etc.
This lets userspace discover what the kernel understands.
For families/commands other than generic netlink, the helpers
need to be used directly in an appropriate command, or we can
add some infrastructure (a new netlink family) that those can
register their policies with for introspection. I'm not that
familiar with non-generic netlink, so that's left out for now.
The data exposed to userspace also includes min and max length
for binary/string data, I've done that instead of letting the
userspace tools figure out whether min/max is intended based
on the type so that we can extend this later in the kernel, we
might want to just use the range data for example.
Because of this, I opted to not directly expose the NLA_*
values, even if some of them are already exposed via BPF, as
with min/max length we don't need to have different types here
for NLA_BINARY/NLA_MIN_LEN/NLA_EXACT_LEN, we just make them
all NL_ATTR_TYPE_BINARY with min/max length optionally set.
Similarly, we don't really need NLA_MSECS, and perhaps can
remove it in the future - but not if we encode it into the
userspace API now. It gets mapped to NL_ATTR_TYPE_U64 here.
Note that the exposing here corresponds to the strict policy
interpretation, and NLA_UNSPEC items are omitted entirely.
To get those, change them to NLA_MIN_LEN which behaves in
exactly the same way, but is exposed.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-04-30 23:13:12 +03:00
}
2020-10-02 10:46:04 +03:00
static int ctrl_dumppolicy_done ( struct netlink_callback * cb )
{
2020-10-03 00:49:55 +03:00
struct ctrl_dump_policy_ctx * ctx = ( void * ) cb - > ctx ;
2022-11-04 22:13:40 +03:00
kfree ( ctx - > op_iter ) ;
2020-10-03 00:49:55 +03:00
netlink_policy_dump_free ( ctx - > state ) ;
2020-10-02 10:46:04 +03:00
return 0 ;
}
2022-11-04 22:13:43 +03:00
static const struct genl_split_ops genl_ctrl_ops [ ] = {
2013-11-19 18:19:31 +04:00
{
. cmd = CTRL_CMD_GETFAMILY ,
2022-11-04 22:13:43 +03:00
. validate = GENL_DONT_VALIDATE_STRICT ,
2020-10-03 00:50:00 +03:00
. policy = ctrl_policy_family ,
. maxattr = ARRAY_SIZE ( ctrl_policy_family ) - 1 ,
2013-11-19 18:19:31 +04:00
. doit = ctrl_getfamily ,
2022-11-04 22:13:43 +03:00
. flags = GENL_CMD_CAP_DO ,
} ,
{
. cmd = CTRL_CMD_GETFAMILY ,
. validate = GENL_DONT_VALIDATE_DUMP ,
. policy = ctrl_policy_family ,
. maxattr = ARRAY_SIZE ( ctrl_policy_family ) - 1 ,
2013-11-19 18:19:31 +04:00
. dumpit = ctrl_dumpfamily ,
2022-11-04 22:13:43 +03:00
. flags = GENL_CMD_CAP_DUMP ,
2013-11-19 18:19:31 +04:00
} ,
netlink: add infrastructure to expose policies to userspace
Add, and use in generic netlink, helpers to dump out a netlink
policy to userspace, including all the range validation data,
nested policies etc.
This lets userspace discover what the kernel understands.
For families/commands other than generic netlink, the helpers
need to be used directly in an appropriate command, or we can
add some infrastructure (a new netlink family) that those can
register their policies with for introspection. I'm not that
familiar with non-generic netlink, so that's left out for now.
The data exposed to userspace also includes min and max length
for binary/string data, I've done that instead of letting the
userspace tools figure out whether min/max is intended based
on the type so that we can extend this later in the kernel, we
might want to just use the range data for example.
Because of this, I opted to not directly expose the NLA_*
values, even if some of them are already exposed via BPF, as
with min/max length we don't need to have different types here
for NLA_BINARY/NLA_MIN_LEN/NLA_EXACT_LEN, we just make them
all NL_ATTR_TYPE_BINARY with min/max length optionally set.
Similarly, we don't really need NLA_MSECS, and perhaps can
remove it in the future - but not if we encode it into the
userspace API now. It gets mapped to NL_ATTR_TYPE_U64 here.
Note that the exposing here corresponds to the strict policy
interpretation, and NLA_UNSPEC items are omitted entirely.
To get those, change them to NLA_MIN_LEN which behaves in
exactly the same way, but is exposed.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-04-30 23:13:12 +03:00
{
. cmd = CTRL_CMD_GETPOLICY ,
2020-10-03 00:50:00 +03:00
. policy = ctrl_policy_policy ,
. maxattr = ARRAY_SIZE ( ctrl_policy_policy ) - 1 ,
2020-10-03 00:49:56 +03:00
. start = ctrl_dumppolicy_start ,
netlink: add infrastructure to expose policies to userspace
Add, and use in generic netlink, helpers to dump out a netlink
policy to userspace, including all the range validation data,
nested policies etc.
This lets userspace discover what the kernel understands.
For families/commands other than generic netlink, the helpers
need to be used directly in an appropriate command, or we can
add some infrastructure (a new netlink family) that those can
register their policies with for introspection. I'm not that
familiar with non-generic netlink, so that's left out for now.
The data exposed to userspace also includes min and max length
for binary/string data, I've done that instead of letting the
userspace tools figure out whether min/max is intended based
on the type so that we can extend this later in the kernel, we
might want to just use the range data for example.
Because of this, I opted to not directly expose the NLA_*
values, even if some of them are already exposed via BPF, as
with min/max length we don't need to have different types here
for NLA_BINARY/NLA_MIN_LEN/NLA_EXACT_LEN, we just make them
all NL_ATTR_TYPE_BINARY with min/max length optionally set.
Similarly, we don't really need NLA_MSECS, and perhaps can
remove it in the future - but not if we encode it into the
userspace API now. It gets mapped to NL_ATTR_TYPE_U64 here.
Note that the exposing here corresponds to the strict policy
interpretation, and NLA_UNSPEC items are omitted entirely.
To get those, change them to NLA_MIN_LEN which behaves in
exactly the same way, but is exposed.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-04-30 23:13:12 +03:00
. dumpit = ctrl_dumppolicy ,
2020-10-02 10:46:04 +03:00
. done = ctrl_dumppolicy_done ,
2022-11-04 22:13:43 +03:00
. flags = GENL_CMD_CAP_DUMP ,
netlink: add infrastructure to expose policies to userspace
Add, and use in generic netlink, helpers to dump out a netlink
policy to userspace, including all the range validation data,
nested policies etc.
This lets userspace discover what the kernel understands.
For families/commands other than generic netlink, the helpers
need to be used directly in an appropriate command, or we can
add some infrastructure (a new netlink family) that those can
register their policies with for introspection. I'm not that
familiar with non-generic netlink, so that's left out for now.
The data exposed to userspace also includes min and max length
for binary/string data, I've done that instead of letting the
userspace tools figure out whether min/max is intended based
on the type so that we can extend this later in the kernel, we
might want to just use the range data for example.
Because of this, I opted to not directly expose the NLA_*
values, even if some of them are already exposed via BPF, as
with min/max length we don't need to have different types here
for NLA_BINARY/NLA_MIN_LEN/NLA_EXACT_LEN, we just make them
all NL_ATTR_TYPE_BINARY with min/max length optionally set.
Similarly, we don't really need NLA_MSECS, and perhaps can
remove it in the future - but not if we encode it into the
userspace API now. It gets mapped to NL_ATTR_TYPE_U64 here.
Note that the exposing here corresponds to the strict policy
interpretation, and NLA_UNSPEC items are omitted entirely.
To get those, change them to NLA_MIN_LEN which behaves in
exactly the same way, but is exposed.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-04-30 23:13:12 +03:00
} ,
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
} ;
2016-09-01 01:22:00 +03:00
static const struct genl_multicast_group genl_ctrl_groups [ ] = {
2013-11-19 18:19:39 +04:00
{ . name = " notify " , } ,
2007-07-19 02:47:52 +04:00
} ;
2016-10-24 15:40:05 +03:00
static struct genl_family genl_ctrl __ro_after_init = {
2016-10-24 15:40:03 +03:00
. module = THIS_MODULE ,
2022-11-04 22:13:43 +03:00
. split_ops = genl_ctrl_ops ,
. n_split_ops = ARRAY_SIZE ( genl_ctrl_ops ) ,
2022-08-25 03:18:30 +03:00
. resv_start_op = CTRL_CMD_GETPOLICY + 1 ,
2016-10-24 15:40:03 +03:00
. mcgrps = genl_ctrl_groups ,
. n_mcgrps = ARRAY_SIZE ( genl_ctrl_groups ) ,
. id = GENL_ID_CTRL ,
. name = " nlctrl " ,
. version = 0x2 ,
. netnsok = true ,
} ;
2021-02-13 02:59:59 +03:00
static int genl_bind ( struct net * net , int group )
{
const struct genl_family * family ;
unsigned int id ;
int ret = 0 ;
2022-08-25 11:19:40 +03:00
down_read ( & cb_lock ) ;
2021-02-13 02:59:59 +03:00
idr_for_each_entry ( & genl_fam_idr , family , id ) {
const struct genl_multicast_group * grp ;
int i ;
if ( family - > n_mcgrps = = 0 )
continue ;
i = group - family - > mcgrp_offset ;
if ( i < 0 | | i > = family - > n_mcgrps )
continue ;
grp = & family - > mcgrps [ i ] ;
if ( ( grp - > flags & GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM ) & &
! ns_capable ( net - > user_ns , CAP_NET_ADMIN ) )
ret = - EPERM ;
break ;
}
2022-08-25 11:19:40 +03:00
up_read ( & cb_lock ) ;
2021-02-13 02:59:59 +03:00
return ret ;
}
2009-07-10 13:51:34 +04:00
static int __net_init genl_pernet_init ( struct net * net )
{
2012-06-29 10:15:21 +04:00
struct netlink_kernel_cfg cfg = {
. input = genl_rcv ,
2012-09-08 06:53:53 +04:00
. flags = NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_RECV ,
2021-02-13 02:59:59 +03:00
. bind = genl_bind ,
2012-06-29 10:15:21 +04:00
} ;
2009-07-10 13:51:34 +04:00
/* we'll bump the group number right afterwards */
2012-09-08 06:53:54 +04:00
net - > genl_sock = netlink_kernel_create ( net , NETLINK_GENERIC , & cfg ) ;
2009-07-10 13:51:34 +04:00
if ( ! net - > genl_sock & & net_eq ( net , & init_net ) )
panic ( " GENL: Cannot initialize generic netlink \n " ) ;
if ( ! net - > genl_sock )
return - ENOMEM ;
return 0 ;
}
static void __net_exit genl_pernet_exit ( struct net * net )
{
netlink_kernel_release ( net - > genl_sock ) ;
net - > genl_sock = NULL ;
}
static struct pernet_operations genl_pernet_ops = {
. init = genl_pernet_init ,
. exit = genl_pernet_exit ,
} ;
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
static int __init genl_init ( void )
{
2016-10-24 15:40:04 +03:00
int err ;
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
2016-10-24 15:40:03 +03:00
err = genl_register_family ( & genl_ctrl ) ;
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
if ( err < 0 )
2009-07-10 13:51:34 +04:00
goto problem ;
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
2009-07-10 13:51:34 +04:00
err = register_pernet_subsys ( & genl_pernet_ops ) ;
if ( err )
goto problem ;
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
return 0 ;
2009-07-10 13:51:34 +04:00
problem :
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
panic ( " GENL: Cannot register controller: %d \n " , err ) ;
}
2020-07-15 10:41:18 +03:00
core_initcall ( genl_init ) ;
2005-11-10 04:25:56 +03:00
2012-09-08 00:12:54 +04:00
static int genlmsg_mcast ( struct sk_buff * skb , u32 portid , unsigned long group ,
2009-07-10 13:51:34 +04:00
gfp_t flags )
{
struct sk_buff * tmp ;
struct net * net , * prev = NULL ;
2018-02-06 16:48:32 +03:00
bool delivered = false ;
2009-07-10 13:51:34 +04:00
int err ;
for_each_net_rcu ( net ) {
if ( prev ) {
tmp = skb_clone ( skb , flags ) ;
if ( ! tmp ) {
err = - ENOMEM ;
goto error ;
}
err = nlmsg_multicast ( prev - > genl_sock , tmp ,
2012-09-08 00:12:54 +04:00
portid , group , flags ) ;
2018-02-06 16:48:32 +03:00
if ( ! err )
delivered = true ;
else if ( err ! = - ESRCH )
2009-07-10 13:51:34 +04:00
goto error ;
}
prev = net ;
}
2018-02-06 16:48:32 +03:00
err = nlmsg_multicast ( prev - > genl_sock , skb , portid , group , flags ) ;
if ( ! err )
delivered = true ;
else if ( err ! = - ESRCH )
2018-03-14 23:10:23 +03:00
return err ;
2018-02-06 16:48:32 +03:00
return delivered ? 0 : - ESRCH ;
2009-07-10 13:51:34 +04:00
error :
kfree_skb ( skb ) ;
return err ;
}
2016-10-24 15:40:04 +03:00
int genlmsg_multicast_allns ( const struct genl_family * family ,
struct sk_buff * skb , u32 portid ,
unsigned int group , gfp_t flags )
2009-07-10 13:51:34 +04:00
{
2013-11-21 21:17:04 +04:00
if ( WARN_ON_ONCE ( group > = family - > n_mcgrps ) )
2013-11-19 18:19:39 +04:00
return - EINVAL ;
2021-07-27 06:41:41 +03:00
2013-11-19 18:19:39 +04:00
group = family - > mcgrp_offset + group ;
2012-09-08 00:12:54 +04:00
return genlmsg_mcast ( skb , portid , group , flags ) ;
2009-07-10 13:51:34 +04:00
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL ( genlmsg_multicast_allns ) ;
2011-11-11 07:14:37 +04:00
2016-10-24 15:40:04 +03:00
void genl_notify ( const struct genl_family * family , struct sk_buff * skb ,
2015-09-22 19:56:43 +03:00
struct genl_info * info , u32 group , gfp_t flags )
2011-11-11 07:14:37 +04:00
{
2015-09-22 19:56:43 +03:00
struct net * net = genl_info_net ( info ) ;
2011-11-11 07:14:37 +04:00
struct sock * sk = net - > genl_sock ;
2013-11-21 21:17:04 +04:00
if ( WARN_ON_ONCE ( group > = family - > n_mcgrps ) )
2013-11-19 18:19:39 +04:00
return ;
2021-07-27 06:41:41 +03:00
2013-11-19 18:19:39 +04:00
group = family - > mcgrp_offset + group ;
2021-07-27 06:41:41 +03:00
nlmsg_notify ( sk , skb , info - > snd_portid , group ,
nlmsg_report ( info - > nlhdr ) , flags ) ;
2011-11-11 07:14:37 +04:00
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL ( genl_notify ) ;