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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
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/*
* This contains encryption functions for per - file encryption .
*
* Copyright ( C ) 2015 , Google , Inc .
* Copyright ( C ) 2015 , Motorola Mobility
*
* Written by Michael Halcrow , 2014.
*
* Filename encryption additions
* Uday Savagaonkar , 2014
* Encryption policy handling additions
* Ildar Muslukhov , 2014
* Add fscrypt_pullback_bio_page ( )
* Jaegeuk Kim , 2015.
*
* This has not yet undergone a rigorous security audit .
*
* The usage of AES - XTS should conform to recommendations in NIST
* Special Publication 800 - 38 E and IEEE P1619 / D16 .
*/
# include <linux/pagemap.h>
# include <linux/mempool.h>
# include <linux/module.h>
# include <linux/scatterlist.h>
# include <linux/ratelimit.h>
# include <linux/dcache.h>
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# include <linux/namei.h>
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# include <crypto/aes.h>
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# include <crypto/skcipher.h>
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# include "fscrypt_private.h"
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static unsigned int num_prealloc_crypto_pages = 32 ;
static unsigned int num_prealloc_crypto_ctxs = 128 ;
module_param ( num_prealloc_crypto_pages , uint , 0444 ) ;
MODULE_PARM_DESC ( num_prealloc_crypto_pages ,
" Number of crypto pages to preallocate " ) ;
module_param ( num_prealloc_crypto_ctxs , uint , 0444 ) ;
MODULE_PARM_DESC ( num_prealloc_crypto_ctxs ,
" Number of crypto contexts to preallocate " ) ;
static mempool_t * fscrypt_bounce_page_pool = NULL ;
static LIST_HEAD ( fscrypt_free_ctxs ) ;
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK ( fscrypt_ctx_lock ) ;
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static struct workqueue_struct * fscrypt_read_workqueue ;
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static DEFINE_MUTEX ( fscrypt_init_mutex ) ;
static struct kmem_cache * fscrypt_ctx_cachep ;
struct kmem_cache * fscrypt_info_cachep ;
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void fscrypt_enqueue_decrypt_work ( struct work_struct * work )
{
queue_work ( fscrypt_read_workqueue , work ) ;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL ( fscrypt_enqueue_decrypt_work ) ;
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/**
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* fscrypt_release_ctx ( ) - Release a decryption context
* @ ctx : The decryption context to release .
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*
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* If the decryption context was allocated from the pre - allocated pool , return
* it to that pool . Else , free it .
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*/
void fscrypt_release_ctx ( struct fscrypt_ctx * ctx )
{
unsigned long flags ;
if ( ctx - > flags & FS_CTX_REQUIRES_FREE_ENCRYPT_FL ) {
kmem_cache_free ( fscrypt_ctx_cachep , ctx ) ;
} else {
spin_lock_irqsave ( & fscrypt_ctx_lock , flags ) ;
list_add ( & ctx - > free_list , & fscrypt_free_ctxs ) ;
spin_unlock_irqrestore ( & fscrypt_ctx_lock , flags ) ;
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL ( fscrypt_release_ctx ) ;
/**
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* fscrypt_get_ctx ( ) - Get a decryption context
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* @ gfp_flags : The gfp flag for memory allocation
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*
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* Allocate and initialize a decryption context .
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*
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* Return : A new decryption context on success ; an ERR_PTR ( ) otherwise .
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*/
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struct fscrypt_ctx * fscrypt_get_ctx ( gfp_t gfp_flags )
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{
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struct fscrypt_ctx * ctx ;
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unsigned long flags ;
/*
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* First try getting a ctx from the free list so that we don ' t have to
* call into the slab allocator .
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*/
spin_lock_irqsave ( & fscrypt_ctx_lock , flags ) ;
ctx = list_first_entry_or_null ( & fscrypt_free_ctxs ,
struct fscrypt_ctx , free_list ) ;
if ( ctx )
list_del ( & ctx - > free_list ) ;
spin_unlock_irqrestore ( & fscrypt_ctx_lock , flags ) ;
if ( ! ctx ) {
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ctx = kmem_cache_zalloc ( fscrypt_ctx_cachep , gfp_flags ) ;
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if ( ! ctx )
return ERR_PTR ( - ENOMEM ) ;
ctx - > flags | = FS_CTX_REQUIRES_FREE_ENCRYPT_FL ;
} else {
ctx - > flags & = ~ FS_CTX_REQUIRES_FREE_ENCRYPT_FL ;
}
return ctx ;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL ( fscrypt_get_ctx ) ;
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struct page * fscrypt_alloc_bounce_page ( gfp_t gfp_flags )
{
return mempool_alloc ( fscrypt_bounce_page_pool , gfp_flags ) ;
}
/**
* fscrypt_free_bounce_page ( ) - free a ciphertext bounce page
*
* Free a bounce page that was allocated by fscrypt_encrypt_page ( ) , or by
* fscrypt_alloc_bounce_page ( ) directly .
*/
void fscrypt_free_bounce_page ( struct page * bounce_page )
{
if ( ! bounce_page )
return ;
set_page_private ( bounce_page , ( unsigned long ) NULL ) ;
ClearPagePrivate ( bounce_page ) ;
mempool_free ( bounce_page , fscrypt_bounce_page_pool ) ;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL ( fscrypt_free_bounce_page ) ;
fscrypt: add Adiantum support
Add support for the Adiantum encryption mode to fscrypt. Adiantum is a
tweakable, length-preserving encryption mode with security provably
reducible to that of XChaCha12 and AES-256, subject to a security bound.
It's also a true wide-block mode, unlike XTS. See the paper
"Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for entry-level processors"
(https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.pdf) for more details. Also see
commit 059c2a4d8e16 ("crypto: adiantum - add Adiantum support").
On sufficiently long messages, Adiantum's bottlenecks are XChaCha12 and
the NH hash function. These algorithms are fast even on processors
without dedicated crypto instructions. Adiantum makes it feasible to
enable storage encryption on low-end mobile devices that lack AES
instructions; currently such devices are unencrypted. On ARM Cortex-A7,
on 4096-byte messages Adiantum encryption is about 4 times faster than
AES-256-XTS encryption; decryption is about 5 times faster.
In fscrypt, Adiantum is suitable for encrypting both file contents and
names. With filenames, it fixes a known weakness: when two filenames in
a directory share a common prefix of >= 16 bytes, with CTS-CBC their
encrypted filenames share a common prefix too, leaking information.
Adiantum does not have this problem.
Since Adiantum also accepts long tweaks (IVs), it's also safe to use the
master key directly for Adiantum encryption rather than deriving
per-file keys, provided that the per-file nonce is included in the IVs
and the master key isn't used for any other encryption mode. This
configuration saves memory and improves performance. A new fscrypt
policy flag is added to allow users to opt-in to this configuration.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
2019-01-06 16:36:21 +03:00
void fscrypt_generate_iv ( union fscrypt_iv * iv , u64 lblk_num ,
const struct fscrypt_info * ci )
{
memset ( iv , 0 , ci - > ci_mode - > ivsize ) ;
iv - > lblk_num = cpu_to_le64 ( lblk_num ) ;
if ( ci - > ci_flags & FS_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY )
memcpy ( iv - > nonce , ci - > ci_nonce , FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE ) ;
if ( ci - > ci_essiv_tfm ! = NULL )
crypto_cipher_encrypt_one ( ci - > ci_essiv_tfm , iv - > raw , iv - > raw ) ;
}
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/* Encrypt or decrypt a single filesystem block of file contents */
int fscrypt_crypt_block ( const struct inode * inode , fscrypt_direction_t rw ,
u64 lblk_num , struct page * src_page ,
struct page * dest_page , unsigned int len ,
unsigned int offs , gfp_t gfp_flags )
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{
fscrypt: add Adiantum support
Add support for the Adiantum encryption mode to fscrypt. Adiantum is a
tweakable, length-preserving encryption mode with security provably
reducible to that of XChaCha12 and AES-256, subject to a security bound.
It's also a true wide-block mode, unlike XTS. See the paper
"Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for entry-level processors"
(https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.pdf) for more details. Also see
commit 059c2a4d8e16 ("crypto: adiantum - add Adiantum support").
On sufficiently long messages, Adiantum's bottlenecks are XChaCha12 and
the NH hash function. These algorithms are fast even on processors
without dedicated crypto instructions. Adiantum makes it feasible to
enable storage encryption on low-end mobile devices that lack AES
instructions; currently such devices are unencrypted. On ARM Cortex-A7,
on 4096-byte messages Adiantum encryption is about 4 times faster than
AES-256-XTS encryption; decryption is about 5 times faster.
In fscrypt, Adiantum is suitable for encrypting both file contents and
names. With filenames, it fixes a known weakness: when two filenames in
a directory share a common prefix of >= 16 bytes, with CTS-CBC their
encrypted filenames share a common prefix too, leaking information.
Adiantum does not have this problem.
Since Adiantum also accepts long tweaks (IVs), it's also safe to use the
master key directly for Adiantum encryption rather than deriving
per-file keys, provided that the per-file nonce is included in the IVs
and the master key isn't used for any other encryption mode. This
configuration saves memory and improves performance. A new fscrypt
policy flag is added to allow users to opt-in to this configuration.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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union fscrypt_iv iv ;
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struct skcipher_request * req = NULL ;
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DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT ( wait ) ;
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struct scatterlist dst , src ;
struct fscrypt_info * ci = inode - > i_crypt_info ;
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struct crypto_skcipher * tfm = ci - > ci_ctfm ;
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int res = 0 ;
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BUG_ON ( len = = 0 ) ;
fscrypt: add Adiantum support
Add support for the Adiantum encryption mode to fscrypt. Adiantum is a
tweakable, length-preserving encryption mode with security provably
reducible to that of XChaCha12 and AES-256, subject to a security bound.
It's also a true wide-block mode, unlike XTS. See the paper
"Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for entry-level processors"
(https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.pdf) for more details. Also see
commit 059c2a4d8e16 ("crypto: adiantum - add Adiantum support").
On sufficiently long messages, Adiantum's bottlenecks are XChaCha12 and
the NH hash function. These algorithms are fast even on processors
without dedicated crypto instructions. Adiantum makes it feasible to
enable storage encryption on low-end mobile devices that lack AES
instructions; currently such devices are unencrypted. On ARM Cortex-A7,
on 4096-byte messages Adiantum encryption is about 4 times faster than
AES-256-XTS encryption; decryption is about 5 times faster.
In fscrypt, Adiantum is suitable for encrypting both file contents and
names. With filenames, it fixes a known weakness: when two filenames in
a directory share a common prefix of >= 16 bytes, with CTS-CBC their
encrypted filenames share a common prefix too, leaking information.
Adiantum does not have this problem.
Since Adiantum also accepts long tweaks (IVs), it's also safe to use the
master key directly for Adiantum encryption rather than deriving
per-file keys, provided that the per-file nonce is included in the IVs
and the master key isn't used for any other encryption mode. This
configuration saves memory and improves performance. A new fscrypt
policy flag is added to allow users to opt-in to this configuration.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
2019-01-06 16:36:21 +03:00
fscrypt_generate_iv ( & iv , lblk_num , ci ) ;
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req = skcipher_request_alloc ( tfm , gfp_flags ) ;
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if ( ! req )
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return - ENOMEM ;
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skcipher_request_set_callback (
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req , CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP ,
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crypto_req_done , & wait ) ;
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sg_init_table ( & dst , 1 ) ;
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sg_set_page ( & dst , dest_page , len , offs ) ;
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sg_init_table ( & src , 1 ) ;
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sg_set_page ( & src , src_page , len , offs ) ;
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skcipher_request_set_crypt ( req , & src , & dst , len , & iv ) ;
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if ( rw = = FS_DECRYPT )
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res = crypto_wait_req ( crypto_skcipher_decrypt ( req ) , & wait ) ;
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else
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res = crypto_wait_req ( crypto_skcipher_encrypt ( req ) , & wait ) ;
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skcipher_request_free ( req ) ;
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if ( res ) {
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fscrypt_err ( inode - > i_sb ,
" %scryption failed for inode %lu, block %llu: %d " ,
( rw = = FS_DECRYPT ? " de " : " en " ) ,
inode - > i_ino , lblk_num , res ) ;
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return res ;
}
return 0 ;
}
/**
* fscypt_encrypt_page ( ) - Encrypts a page
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* @ inode : The inode for which the encryption should take place
* @ page : The page to encrypt . Must be locked for bounce - page
* encryption .
* @ len : Length of data to encrypt in @ page and encrypted
* data in returned page .
* @ offs : Offset of data within @ page and returned
* page holding encrypted data .
* @ lblk_num : Logical block number . This must be unique for multiple
* calls with same inode , except when overwriting
* previously written data .
* @ gfp_flags : The gfp flag for memory allocation
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*
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* Encrypts @ page . If the filesystem set FS_CFLG_OWN_PAGES , then the data is
* encrypted in - place and @ page is returned . Else , a bounce page is allocated ,
* the data is encrypted into the bounce page , and the bounce page is returned .
* The caller is responsible for calling fscrypt_free_bounce_page ( ) .
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*
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* Return : A page containing the encrypted data on success , else an ERR_PTR ( )
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*/
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struct page * fscrypt_encrypt_page ( const struct inode * inode ,
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struct page * page ,
unsigned int len ,
unsigned int offs ,
u64 lblk_num , gfp_t gfp_flags )
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{
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struct page * ciphertext_page = page ;
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int err ;
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BUG_ON ( len % FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE ! = 0 ) ;
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if ( inode - > i_sb - > s_cop - > flags & FS_CFLG_OWN_PAGES ) {
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/* with inplace-encryption we just encrypt the page */
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err = fscrypt_crypt_block ( inode , FS_ENCRYPT , lblk_num , page ,
ciphertext_page , len , offs ,
gfp_flags ) ;
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if ( err )
return ERR_PTR ( err ) ;
return ciphertext_page ;
}
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BUG_ON ( ! PageLocked ( page ) ) ;
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/* The encryption operation will require a bounce page. */
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ciphertext_page = fscrypt_alloc_bounce_page ( gfp_flags ) ;
if ( ! ciphertext_page )
return ERR_PTR ( - ENOMEM ) ;
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err = fscrypt_crypt_block ( inode , FS_ENCRYPT , lblk_num , page ,
ciphertext_page , len , offs , gfp_flags ) ;
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if ( err ) {
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fscrypt_free_bounce_page ( ciphertext_page ) ;
return ERR_PTR ( err ) ;
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}
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SetPagePrivate ( ciphertext_page ) ;
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set_page_private ( ciphertext_page , ( unsigned long ) page ) ;
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return ciphertext_page ;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL ( fscrypt_encrypt_page ) ;
/**
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* fscrypt_decrypt_page ( ) - Decrypts a page in - place
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* @ inode : The corresponding inode for the page to decrypt .
* @ page : The page to decrypt . Must be locked in case
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* it is a writeback page ( FS_CFLG_OWN_PAGES unset ) .
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* @ len : Number of bytes in @ page to be decrypted .
* @ offs : Start of data in @ page .
* @ lblk_num : Logical block number .
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*
* Decrypts page in - place using the ctx encryption context .
*
* Called from the read completion callback .
*
* Return : Zero on success , non - zero otherwise .
*/
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int fscrypt_decrypt_page ( const struct inode * inode , struct page * page ,
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unsigned int len , unsigned int offs , u64 lblk_num )
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{
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if ( ! ( inode - > i_sb - > s_cop - > flags & FS_CFLG_OWN_PAGES ) )
BUG_ON ( ! PageLocked ( page ) ) ;
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return fscrypt_crypt_block ( inode , FS_DECRYPT , lblk_num , page , page ,
len , offs , GFP_NOFS ) ;
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}
EXPORT_SYMBOL ( fscrypt_decrypt_page ) ;
/*
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* Validate dentries in encrypted directories to make sure we aren ' t potentially
* caching stale dentries after a key has been added .
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*/
static int fscrypt_d_revalidate ( struct dentry * dentry , unsigned int flags )
{
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struct dentry * dir ;
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int err ;
int valid ;
/*
* Plaintext names are always valid , since fscrypt doesn ' t support
* reverting to ciphertext names without evicting the directory ' s inode
* - - which implies eviction of the dentries in the directory .
*/
if ( ! ( dentry - > d_flags & DCACHE_ENCRYPTED_NAME ) )
return 1 ;
/*
* Ciphertext name ; valid if the directory ' s key is still unavailable .
*
* Although fscrypt forbids rename ( ) on ciphertext names , we still must
* use dget_parent ( ) here rather than use - > d_parent directly . That ' s
* because a corrupted fs image may contain directory hard links , which
* the VFS handles by moving the directory ' s dentry tree in the dcache
* each time - > lookup ( ) finds the directory and it already has a dentry
* elsewhere . Thus - > d_parent can be changing , and we must safely grab
* a reference to some - > d_parent to prevent it from being freed .
*/
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if ( flags & LOOKUP_RCU )
return - ECHILD ;
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dir = dget_parent ( dentry ) ;
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err = fscrypt_get_encryption_info ( d_inode ( dir ) ) ;
valid = ! fscrypt_has_encryption_key ( d_inode ( dir ) ) ;
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dput ( dir ) ;
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if ( err < 0 )
return err ;
return valid ;
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}
const struct dentry_operations fscrypt_d_ops = {
. d_revalidate = fscrypt_d_revalidate ,
} ;
static void fscrypt_destroy ( void )
{
struct fscrypt_ctx * pos , * n ;
list_for_each_entry_safe ( pos , n , & fscrypt_free_ctxs , free_list )
kmem_cache_free ( fscrypt_ctx_cachep , pos ) ;
INIT_LIST_HEAD ( & fscrypt_free_ctxs ) ;
mempool_destroy ( fscrypt_bounce_page_pool ) ;
fscrypt_bounce_page_pool = NULL ;
}
/**
* fscrypt_initialize ( ) - allocate major buffers for fs encryption .
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* @ cop_flags : fscrypt operations flags
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*
* We only call this when we start accessing encrypted files , since it
* results in memory getting allocated that wouldn ' t otherwise be used .
*
* Return : Zero on success , non - zero otherwise .
*/
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int fscrypt_initialize ( unsigned int cop_flags )
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{
int i , res = - ENOMEM ;
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/* No need to allocate a bounce page pool if this FS won't use it. */
if ( cop_flags & FS_CFLG_OWN_PAGES )
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return 0 ;
mutex_lock ( & fscrypt_init_mutex ) ;
if ( fscrypt_bounce_page_pool )
goto already_initialized ;
for ( i = 0 ; i < num_prealloc_crypto_ctxs ; i + + ) {
struct fscrypt_ctx * ctx ;
ctx = kmem_cache_zalloc ( fscrypt_ctx_cachep , GFP_NOFS ) ;
if ( ! ctx )
goto fail ;
list_add ( & ctx - > free_list , & fscrypt_free_ctxs ) ;
}
fscrypt_bounce_page_pool =
mempool_create_page_pool ( num_prealloc_crypto_pages , 0 ) ;
if ( ! fscrypt_bounce_page_pool )
goto fail ;
already_initialized :
mutex_unlock ( & fscrypt_init_mutex ) ;
return 0 ;
fail :
fscrypt_destroy ( ) ;
mutex_unlock ( & fscrypt_init_mutex ) ;
return res ;
}
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void fscrypt_msg ( struct super_block * sb , const char * level ,
const char * fmt , . . . )
{
static DEFINE_RATELIMIT_STATE ( rs , DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_INTERVAL ,
DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_BURST ) ;
struct va_format vaf ;
va_list args ;
if ( ! __ratelimit ( & rs ) )
return ;
va_start ( args , fmt ) ;
vaf . fmt = fmt ;
vaf . va = & args ;
if ( sb )
printk ( " %sfscrypt (%s): %pV \n " , level , sb - > s_id , & vaf ) ;
else
printk ( " %sfscrypt: %pV \n " , level , & vaf ) ;
va_end ( args ) ;
}
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/**
* fscrypt_init ( ) - Set up for fs encryption .
*/
static int __init fscrypt_init ( void )
{
fscrypt: use unbound workqueue for decryption
Improve fscrypt read performance by switching the decryption workqueue
from bound to unbound. With the bound workqueue, when multiple bios
completed on the same CPU, they were decrypted on that same CPU. But
with the unbound queue, they are now decrypted in parallel on any CPU.
Although fscrypt read performance can be tough to measure due to the
many sources of variation, this change is most beneficial when
decryption is slow, e.g. on CPUs without AES instructions. For example,
I timed tarring up encrypted directories on f2fs. On x86 with AES-NI
instructions disabled, the unbound workqueue improved performance by
about 25-35%, using 1 to NUM_CPUs jobs with 4 or 8 CPUs available. But
with AES-NI enabled, performance was unchanged to within ~2%.
I also did the same test on a quad-core ARM CPU using xts-speck128-neon
encryption. There performance was usually about 10% better with the
unbound workqueue, bringing it closer to the unencrypted speed.
The unbound workqueue may be worse in some cases due to worse locality,
but I think it's still the better default. dm-crypt uses an unbound
workqueue by default too, so this change makes fscrypt match.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
2018-04-21 02:30:02 +03:00
/*
* Use an unbound workqueue to allow bios to be decrypted in parallel
* even when they happen to complete on the same CPU . This sacrifices
* locality , but it ' s worthwhile since decryption is CPU - intensive .
*
* Also use a high - priority workqueue to prioritize decryption work ,
* which blocks reads from completing , over regular application tasks .
*/
2015-05-16 02:26:10 +03:00
fscrypt_read_workqueue = alloc_workqueue ( " fscrypt_read_queue " ,
fscrypt: use unbound workqueue for decryption
Improve fscrypt read performance by switching the decryption workqueue
from bound to unbound. With the bound workqueue, when multiple bios
completed on the same CPU, they were decrypted on that same CPU. But
with the unbound queue, they are now decrypted in parallel on any CPU.
Although fscrypt read performance can be tough to measure due to the
many sources of variation, this change is most beneficial when
decryption is slow, e.g. on CPUs without AES instructions. For example,
I timed tarring up encrypted directories on f2fs. On x86 with AES-NI
instructions disabled, the unbound workqueue improved performance by
about 25-35%, using 1 to NUM_CPUs jobs with 4 or 8 CPUs available. But
with AES-NI enabled, performance was unchanged to within ~2%.
I also did the same test on a quad-core ARM CPU using xts-speck128-neon
encryption. There performance was usually about 10% better with the
unbound workqueue, bringing it closer to the unencrypted speed.
The unbound workqueue may be worse in some cases due to worse locality,
but I think it's still the better default. dm-crypt uses an unbound
workqueue by default too, so this change makes fscrypt match.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
2018-04-21 02:30:02 +03:00
WQ_UNBOUND | WQ_HIGHPRI ,
num_online_cpus ( ) ) ;
2015-05-16 02:26:10 +03:00
if ( ! fscrypt_read_workqueue )
goto fail ;
fscrypt_ctx_cachep = KMEM_CACHE ( fscrypt_ctx , SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT ) ;
if ( ! fscrypt_ctx_cachep )
goto fail_free_queue ;
fscrypt_info_cachep = KMEM_CACHE ( fscrypt_info , SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT ) ;
if ( ! fscrypt_info_cachep )
goto fail_free_ctx ;
return 0 ;
fail_free_ctx :
kmem_cache_destroy ( fscrypt_ctx_cachep ) ;
fail_free_queue :
destroy_workqueue ( fscrypt_read_workqueue ) ;
fail :
return - ENOMEM ;
}
module_init ( fscrypt_init )
/**
* fscrypt_exit ( ) - Shutdown the fs encryption system
*/
static void __exit fscrypt_exit ( void )
{
fscrypt_destroy ( ) ;
if ( fscrypt_read_workqueue )
destroy_workqueue ( fscrypt_read_workqueue ) ;
kmem_cache_destroy ( fscrypt_ctx_cachep ) ;
kmem_cache_destroy ( fscrypt_info_cachep ) ;
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fscrypt_essiv_cleanup ( ) ;
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}
module_exit ( fscrypt_exit ) ;
MODULE_LICENSE ( " GPL " ) ;