exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()
While the defense-in-depth RLIMIT_STACK limit on setuid processes was protected against races from other threads calling setrlimit(), I missed protecting it against races from external processes calling prlimit(). This adds locking around the change and makes sure that rlim_max is set too. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171127193457.GA11348@beast Fixes: 64701dee4178e ("exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec") Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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@ -1340,10 +1340,15 @@ void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
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* avoid bad behavior from the prior rlimits. This has to
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* happen before arch_pick_mmap_layout(), which examines
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* RLIMIT_STACK, but after the point of no return to avoid
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* needing to clean up the change on failure.
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* races from other threads changing the limits. This also
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* must be protected from races with prlimit() calls.
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*/
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task_lock(current->group_leader);
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if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur > _STK_LIM)
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current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur = _STK_LIM;
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if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_max > _STK_LIM)
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current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_max = _STK_LIM;
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task_unlock(current->group_leader);
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}
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arch_pick_mmap_layout(current->mm);
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