bpf: Restrict bpf_sys_bpf to CAP_PERFMON
The verifier cannot perform sufficient validation of any pointers passed into bpf_attr and treats them as integers rather than pointers. The helper will then read from arbitrary pointers passed into it. Restrict the helper to CAP_PERFMON since the security model in BPF of arbitrary kernel read is CAP_BPF + CAP_PERFMON. Fixes: af2ac3e13e45 ("bpf: Prepare bpf syscall to be used from kernel and user space.") Signed-off-by: YiFei Zhu <zhuyifei@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220816205517.682470-1-zhuyifei@google.com
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@ -5197,7 +5197,7 @@ syscall_prog_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id, const struct bpf_prog *prog)
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{
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{
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switch (func_id) {
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switch (func_id) {
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case BPF_FUNC_sys_bpf:
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case BPF_FUNC_sys_bpf:
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return &bpf_sys_bpf_proto;
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return !perfmon_capable() ? NULL : &bpf_sys_bpf_proto;
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case BPF_FUNC_btf_find_by_name_kind:
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case BPF_FUNC_btf_find_by_name_kind:
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return &bpf_btf_find_by_name_kind_proto;
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return &bpf_btf_find_by_name_kind_proto;
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case BPF_FUNC_sys_close:
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case BPF_FUNC_sys_close:
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