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Smack: onlycap limits on CAP_MAC_ADMIN

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Smack is integrated with the POSIX capabilities scheme,
using the capabilities CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE and CAP_MAC_ADMIN to
determine if a process is allowed to ignore Smack checks or
change Smack related data respectively. Smack provides an
additional restriction that if an onlycap value is set
by writing to /smack/onlycap only tasks with that Smack
label are allowed to use CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE.

This change adds CAP_MAC_ADMIN as a capability that is affected
by the onlycap mechanism.

Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
This commit is contained in:
Casey Schaufler
2012-06-05 15:28:30 -07:00
parent eb982cb4cf
commit 1880eff77e
4 changed files with 34 additions and 26 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

21
security/smack/smackfs.c
View File

@ -595,13 +595,12 @@ static int smk_open_load(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
static ssize_t smk_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
/*
* Must have privilege.
* No partial writes.
* Enough data must be present.
*/
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
return smk_write_rules_list(file, buf, count, ppos, NULL, NULL,
@ -787,7 +786,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_set_cipso(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
* No partial writes.
* Enough data must be present.
*/
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (*ppos != 0)
return -EINVAL;
@ -1090,7 +1089,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_netlbladdr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
* "<addr/mask, as a.b.c.d/e><space><label>"
* "<addr, as a.b.c.d><space><label>"
*/
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (*ppos != 0)
return -EINVAL;
@ -1267,7 +1266,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_doi(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
char temp[80];
int i;
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0)
@ -1334,7 +1333,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_direct(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
char temp[80];
int i;
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0)
@ -1412,7 +1411,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_mapped(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
char temp[80];
int i;
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0)
@ -1503,7 +1502,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_ambient(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
char *data;
int rc = count;
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
data = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
@ -1586,7 +1585,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_onlycap(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
char *sp = smk_of_task(current->cred->security);
int rc = count;
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
/*
@ -1664,7 +1663,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_logging(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
char temp[32];
int i;
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0)
@ -1885,7 +1884,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_load2(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
/*
* Must have privilege.
*/
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
return smk_write_rules_list(file, buf, count, ppos, NULL, NULL,