KVM: x86: Clean up KVM_CAP_X86_USER_SPACE_MSR documentation

Clean up the KVM_CAP_X86_USER_SPACE_MSR documentation to eliminate
misleading and/or inconsistent verbiage, and to actually document what
accesses are intercepted by which flags.

  - s/will/may since not all #GPs are guaranteed to be intercepted
  - s/deflect/intercept to align with common KVM terminology
  - s/user space/userspace to align with the majority of KVM docs
  - Avoid using "trap" terminology, as KVM exits to userspace _before_
    stepping, i.e. doesn't exhibit trap-like behavior
  - Actually document the flags

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220831001706.4075399-4-seanjc@google.com
This commit is contained in:
Sean Christopherson 2022-08-31 00:17:06 +00:00
parent b93d2ec34e
commit 1f15814718

View File

@ -6473,11 +6473,11 @@ if it decides to decode and emulate the instruction.
Used on x86 systems. When the VM capability KVM_CAP_X86_USER_SPACE_MSR is
enabled, MSR accesses to registers that would invoke a #GP by KVM kernel code
will instead trigger a KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR exit for reads and KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR
may instead trigger a KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR exit for reads and KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR
exit for writes.
The "reason" field specifies why the MSR trap occurred. User space will only
receive MSR exit traps when a particular reason was requested during through
The "reason" field specifies why the MSR interception occurred. Userspace will
only receive MSR exits when a particular reason was requested during through
ENABLE_CAP. Currently valid exit reasons are:
KVM_MSR_EXIT_REASON_UNKNOWN - access to MSR that is unknown to KVM
@ -7265,8 +7265,8 @@ the module parameter for the target VM.
:Parameters: args[0] contains the mask of KVM_MSR_EXIT_REASON_* events to report
:Returns: 0 on success; -1 on error
This capability enables trapping of #GP invoking RDMSR and WRMSR instructions
into user space.
This capability allows userspace to intercept RDMSR and WRMSR instructions if
access to an MSR is denied. By default, KVM injects #GP on denied accesses.
When a guest requests to read or write an MSR, KVM may not implement all MSRs
that are relevant to a respective system. It also does not differentiate by
@ -7274,10 +7274,18 @@ CPU type.
To allow more fine grained control over MSR handling, userspace may enable
this capability. With it enabled, MSR accesses that match the mask specified in
args[0] and trigger a #GP event inside the guest by KVM will instead trigger
KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR and KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR exit notifications which user space
can then handle to implement model specific MSR handling and/or user notifications
to inform a user that an MSR was not handled.
args[0] and would trigger a #GP inside the guest will instead trigger
KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR and KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR exit notifications. Userspace
can then implement model specific MSR handling and/or user notifications
to inform a user that an MSR was not emulated/virtualized by KVM.
The valid mask flags are:
KVM_MSR_EXIT_REASON_UNKNOWN - intercept accesses to unknown (to KVM) MSRs
KVM_MSR_EXIT_REASON_INVAL - intercept accesses that are architecturally
invalid according to the vCPU model and/or mode
KVM_MSR_EXIT_REASON_FILTER - intercept accesses that are denied by userspace
via KVM_X86_SET_MSR_FILTER
7.22 KVM_CAP_X86_BUS_LOCK_EXIT
-------------------------------