fbdev/omapfb: fix omapfb_memory_read infoleak
commit 1bafcbf59f
upstream.
OMAPFB_MEMORY_READ ioctl reads pixels from the LCD's memory and copies
them to a userspace buffer. The code has two issues:
- The user provided width and height could be large enough to overflow
the calculations
- The copy_to_user() can copy uninitialized memory to the userspace,
which might contain sensitive kernel information.
Fix these by limiting the width & height parameters, and only copying
the amount of data that we actually received from the LCD.
Signed-off-by: Tomi Valkeinen <tomi.valkeinen@ti.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: security@kernel.org
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <b.zolnierkie@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
committed by
Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent
e308fb9f14
commit
22feb4d4f4
@ -496,6 +496,9 @@ static int omapfb_memory_read(struct fb_info *fbi,
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if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, mr->buffer, mr->buffer_size))
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return -EFAULT;
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if (mr->w > 4096 || mr->h > 4096)
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return -EINVAL;
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if (mr->w * mr->h * 3 > mr->buffer_size)
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return -EINVAL;
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@ -509,7 +512,7 @@ static int omapfb_memory_read(struct fb_info *fbi,
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mr->x, mr->y, mr->w, mr->h);
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if (r > 0) {
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if (copy_to_user(mr->buffer, buf, mr->buffer_size))
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if (copy_to_user(mr->buffer, buf, r))
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r = -EFAULT;
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}
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