random: avoid initializing twice in credit race
commit fed7ef061686cc813b1f3d8d0edc6c35b4d3537b upstream. Since all changes of crng_init now go through credit_init_bits(), we can fix a long standing race in which two concurrent callers of credit_init_bits() have the new bit count >= some threshold, but are doing so with crng_init as a lower threshold, checked outside of a lock, resulting in crng_reseed() or similar being called twice. In order to fix this, we can use the original cmpxchg value of the bit count, and only change crng_init when the bit count transitions from below a threshold to meeting the threshold. Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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@ -265,7 +265,6 @@ static void crng_reseed(void)
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unsigned long flags;
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unsigned long next_gen;
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u8 key[CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE];
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bool finalize_init = false;
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extract_entropy(key, sizeof(key));
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@ -282,28 +281,10 @@ static void crng_reseed(void)
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++next_gen;
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WRITE_ONCE(base_crng.generation, next_gen);
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WRITE_ONCE(base_crng.birth, jiffies);
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if (!crng_ready()) {
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if (!crng_ready())
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crng_init = CRNG_READY;
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finalize_init = true;
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}
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spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
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memzero_explicit(key, sizeof(key));
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if (finalize_init) {
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process_random_ready_list();
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wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait);
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kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
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pr_notice("crng init done\n");
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if (unseeded_warning.missed) {
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pr_notice("%d get_random_xx warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n",
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unseeded_warning.missed);
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unseeded_warning.missed = 0;
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}
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if (urandom_warning.missed) {
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pr_notice("%d urandom warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n",
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urandom_warning.missed);
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urandom_warning.missed = 0;
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}
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}
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}
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/*
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@ -819,7 +800,7 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
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static void credit_init_bits(size_t nbits)
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{
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unsigned int init_bits, orig, add;
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unsigned int new, orig, add;
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unsigned long flags;
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if (crng_ready() || !nbits)
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@ -829,13 +810,28 @@ static void credit_init_bits(size_t nbits)
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do {
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orig = READ_ONCE(input_pool.init_bits);
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init_bits = min_t(unsigned int, POOL_BITS, orig + add);
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} while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.init_bits, orig, init_bits) != orig);
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new = min_t(unsigned int, POOL_BITS, orig + add);
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} while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.init_bits, orig, new) != orig);
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if (!crng_ready() && init_bits >= POOL_READY_BITS)
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crng_reseed();
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else if (unlikely(crng_init == CRNG_EMPTY && init_bits >= POOL_EARLY_BITS)) {
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if (orig < POOL_READY_BITS && new >= POOL_READY_BITS) {
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crng_reseed(); /* Sets crng_init to CRNG_READY under base_crng.lock. */
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process_random_ready_list();
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wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait);
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kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
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pr_notice("crng init done\n");
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if (unseeded_warning.missed) {
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pr_notice("%d get_random_xx warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n",
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unseeded_warning.missed);
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unseeded_warning.missed = 0;
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}
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if (urandom_warning.missed) {
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pr_notice("%d urandom warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n",
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urandom_warning.missed);
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urandom_warning.missed = 0;
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}
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} else if (orig < POOL_EARLY_BITS && new >= POOL_EARLY_BITS) {
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spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags);
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/* Check if crng_init is CRNG_EMPTY, to avoid race with crng_reseed(). */
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if (crng_init == CRNG_EMPTY) {
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extract_entropy(base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key));
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crng_init = CRNG_EARLY;
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