proc: Check /proc/$pid/attr/ writes against file opener
commit bfb819ea20ce8bbeeba17e1a6418bf8bda91fc28 upstream. Fix another "confused deputy" weakness[1]. Writes to /proc/$pid/attr/ files need to check the opener credentials, since these fds do not transition state across execve(). Without this, it is possible to trick another process (which may have different credentials) to write to its own /proc/$pid/attr/ files, leading to unexpected and possibly exploitable behaviors. [1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/security/credentials.html?highlight=confused#open-file-credentials Fixes: 1da177e4c3f41 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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@ -2522,6 +2522,10 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
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ssize_t length;
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struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode);
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/* A task may only write when it was the opener. */
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if (file->f_cred != current_real_cred())
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return -EPERM;
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length = -ESRCH;
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if (!task)
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goto out_no_task;
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