net: qdisc_pkt_len_init() should be more robust
[ Upstream commit 7c68d1a6b4db9012790af7ac0f0fdc0d2083422a ] Without proper validation of DODGY packets, we might very well feed qdisc_pkt_len_init() with invalid GSO packets. tcp_hdrlen() might access out-of-bound data, so let's use skb_header_pointer() and proper checks. Whole story is described in commit d0c081b49137 ("flow_dissector: properly cap thoff field") We have the goal of validating DODGY packets earlier in the stack, so we might very well revert this fix in the future. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Reported-by: syzbot+9da69ebac7dddd804552@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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@ -3128,10 +3128,21 @@ static void qdisc_pkt_len_init(struct sk_buff *skb)
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hdr_len = skb_transport_header(skb) - skb_mac_header(skb);
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/* + transport layer */
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if (likely(shinfo->gso_type & (SKB_GSO_TCPV4 | SKB_GSO_TCPV6)))
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hdr_len += tcp_hdrlen(skb);
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else
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hdr_len += sizeof(struct udphdr);
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if (likely(shinfo->gso_type & (SKB_GSO_TCPV4 | SKB_GSO_TCPV6))) {
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const struct tcphdr *th;
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struct tcphdr _tcphdr;
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th = skb_header_pointer(skb, skb_transport_offset(skb),
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sizeof(_tcphdr), &_tcphdr);
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if (likely(th))
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hdr_len += __tcp_hdrlen(th);
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} else {
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struct udphdr _udphdr;
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if (skb_header_pointer(skb, skb_transport_offset(skb),
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sizeof(_udphdr), &_udphdr))
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hdr_len += sizeof(struct udphdr);
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}
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if (shinfo->gso_type & SKB_GSO_DODGY)
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gso_segs = DIV_ROUND_UP(skb->len - hdr_len,
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