CIFS: Fix memory over bound bug in cifs_parse_mount_options
While password processing we can get out of options array bound if the next character after array is delimiter. The patch adds a check if we reach the end. Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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@ -807,8 +807,7 @@ static int
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cifs_parse_mount_options(char *options, const char *devname,
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struct smb_vol *vol)
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{
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char *value;
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char *data;
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char *value, *data, *end;
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unsigned int temp_len, i, j;
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char separator[2];
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short int override_uid = -1;
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@ -851,6 +850,7 @@ cifs_parse_mount_options(char *options, const char *devname,
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if (!options)
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return 1;
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end = options + strlen(options);
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if (strncmp(options, "sep=", 4) == 0) {
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if (options[4] != 0) {
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separator[0] = options[4];
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@ -916,6 +916,7 @@ cifs_parse_mount_options(char *options, const char *devname,
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the only illegal character in a password is null */
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if ((value[temp_len] == 0) &&
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(value + temp_len < end) &&
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(value[temp_len+1] == separator[0])) {
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/* reinsert comma */
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value[temp_len] = separator[0];
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