tcp: rate limit ACK sent by SYN_RECV request sockets
Attackers like to use SYNFLOOD targeting one 5-tuple, as they hit a single RX queue (and cpu) on the victim. If they use random sequence numbers in their SYN, we detect they do not match the expected window and send back an ACK. This patch adds a rate limitation, so that the effect of such attacks is limited to ingress only. We roughly double our ability to absorb such attacks. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Cc: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com> Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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@ -704,7 +704,10 @@ struct sock *tcp_check_req(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
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if (paws_reject || !tcp_in_window(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq,
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tcp_rsk(req)->rcv_nxt, tcp_rsk(req)->rcv_nxt + req->rsk_rcv_wnd)) {
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/* Out of window: send ACK and drop. */
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if (!(flg & TCP_FLAG_RST))
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if (!(flg & TCP_FLAG_RST) &&
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!tcp_oow_rate_limited(sock_net(sk), skb,
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LINUX_MIB_TCPACKSKIPPEDSYNRECV,
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&tcp_rsk(req)->last_oow_ack_time))
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req->rsk_ops->send_ack(sk, skb, req);
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if (paws_reject)
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NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_PAWSESTABREJECTED);
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