random: use hash function for crng_slow_load()

commit 66e4c2b9541503d721e936cc3898c9f25f4591ff upstream.

Since we have a hash function that's really fast, and the goal of
crng_slow_load() is reportedly to "touch all of the crng's state", we
can just hash the old state together with the new state and call it a
day. This way we dont need to reason about another LFSR or worry about
various attacks there. This code is only ever used at early boot and
then never again.

Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Jason A. Donenfeld 2022-02-08 19:23:17 +01:00 committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent a0a276481b
commit 508bad0b71
4 changed files with 112 additions and 140 deletions

View File

@ -69,7 +69,7 @@
*
* The primary kernel interfaces are:
*
* void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
* void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
* u32 get_random_u32()
* u64 get_random_u64()
* unsigned int get_random_int()
@ -97,14 +97,14 @@
* The current exported interfaces for gathering environmental noise
* from the devices are:
*
* void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size);
* void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size);
* void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
* unsigned int value);
* void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq);
* void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk);
* void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count,
* void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count,
* size_t entropy);
* void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size);
* void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size);
*
* add_device_randomness() is for adding data to the random pool that
* is likely to differ between two devices (or possibly even per boot).
@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ static int crng_init = 0;
#define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init > 1))
static int crng_init_cnt = 0;
static void process_random_ready_list(void);
static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
static struct ratelimit_state unseeded_warning =
RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT("warn_unseeded_randomness", HZ, 3);
@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(ratelimit_disable, "Disable random ratelimit suppression");
static struct {
struct blake2s_state hash;
spinlock_t lock;
int entropy_count;
unsigned int entropy_count;
} input_pool = {
.hash.h = { BLAKE2S_IV0 ^ (0x01010000 | BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE),
BLAKE2S_IV1, BLAKE2S_IV2, BLAKE2S_IV3, BLAKE2S_IV4,
@ -309,18 +309,12 @@ static void crng_reseed(void);
* update the entropy estimate. The caller should call
* credit_entropy_bits if this is appropriate.
*/
static void _mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, int nbytes)
static void _mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, size_t nbytes)
{
blake2s_update(&input_pool.hash, in, nbytes);
}
static void __mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, int nbytes)
{
trace_mix_pool_bytes_nolock(nbytes, _RET_IP_);
_mix_pool_bytes(in, nbytes);
}
static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, int nbytes)
static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, size_t nbytes)
{
unsigned long flags;
@ -384,18 +378,18 @@ static void process_random_ready_list(void)
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
}
static void credit_entropy_bits(int nbits)
static void credit_entropy_bits(size_t nbits)
{
int entropy_count, orig;
unsigned int entropy_count, orig, add;
if (nbits <= 0)
if (!nbits)
return;
nbits = min(nbits, POOL_BITS);
add = min_t(size_t, nbits, POOL_BITS);
do {
orig = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count);
entropy_count = min(POOL_BITS, orig + nbits);
entropy_count = min_t(unsigned int, POOL_BITS, orig + add);
} while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig);
trace_credit_entropy_bits(nbits, entropy_count, _RET_IP_);
@ -442,10 +436,10 @@ static void invalidate_batched_entropy(void);
* path. So we can't afford to dilly-dally. Returns the number of
* bytes processed from cp.
*/
static size_t crng_fast_load(const u8 *cp, size_t len)
static size_t crng_fast_load(const void *cp, size_t len)
{
unsigned long flags;
u8 *p;
const u8 *src = (const u8 *)cp;
size_t ret = 0;
if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags))
@ -454,10 +448,9 @@ static size_t crng_fast_load(const u8 *cp, size_t len)
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
return 0;
}
p = base_crng.key;
while (len > 0 && crng_init_cnt < CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) {
p[crng_init_cnt % sizeof(base_crng.key)] ^= *cp;
cp++; crng_init_cnt++; len--; ret++;
base_crng.key[crng_init_cnt % sizeof(base_crng.key)] ^= *src;
src++; crng_init_cnt++; len--; ret++;
}
if (crng_init_cnt >= CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) {
invalidate_batched_entropy();
@ -527,42 +520,30 @@ static struct crng_state *select_crng(void)
* all), and (2) it doesn't have the performance constraints of
* crng_fast_load().
*
* So we do something more comprehensive which is guaranteed to touch
* all of the primary_crng's state, and which uses a LFSR with a
* period of 255 as part of the mixing algorithm. Finally, we do
* *not* advance crng_init_cnt since buffer we may get may be something
* like a fixed DMI table (for example), which might very well be
* unique to the machine, but is otherwise unvarying.
* So, we simply hash the contents in with the current key. Finally,
* we do *not* advance crng_init_cnt since buffer we may get may be
* something like a fixed DMI table (for example), which might very
* well be unique to the machine, but is otherwise unvarying.
*/
static int crng_slow_load(const u8 *cp, size_t len)
static void crng_slow_load(const void *cp, size_t len)
{
unsigned long flags;
static u8 lfsr = 1;
u8 tmp;
unsigned int i, max = sizeof(base_crng.key);
const u8 *src_buf = cp;
u8 *dest_buf = base_crng.key;
struct blake2s_state hash;
blake2s_init(&hash, sizeof(base_crng.key));
if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags))
return 0;
return;
if (crng_init != 0) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
return 0;
return;
}
if (len > max)
max = len;
for (i = 0; i < max; i++) {
tmp = lfsr;
lfsr >>= 1;
if (tmp & 1)
lfsr ^= 0xE1;
tmp = dest_buf[i % sizeof(base_crng.key)];
dest_buf[i % sizeof(base_crng.key)] ^= src_buf[i % len] ^ lfsr;
lfsr += (tmp << 3) | (tmp >> 5);
}
blake2s_update(&hash, base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key));
blake2s_update(&hash, cp, len);
blake2s_final(&hash, base_crng.key);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
return 1;
}
static void crng_reseed(void)
@ -718,14 +699,15 @@ static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_state[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)],
static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes)
{
bool large_request = nbytes > 256;
ssize_t ret = 0, len;
ssize_t ret = 0;
size_t len;
u32 chacha_state[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)];
u8 output[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE];
if (!nbytes)
return 0;
len = min_t(ssize_t, 32, nbytes);
len = min_t(size_t, 32, nbytes);
crng_make_state(chacha_state, output, len);
if (copy_to_user(buf, output, len))
@ -745,7 +727,7 @@ static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes)
if (unlikely(chacha_state[12] == 0))
++chacha_state[13];
len = min_t(ssize_t, nbytes, CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE);
len = min_t(size_t, nbytes, CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE);
if (copy_to_user(buf, output, len)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
@ -783,7 +765,7 @@ struct timer_rand_state {
* the entropy pool having similar initial state across largely
* identical devices.
*/
void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size)
void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size)
{
unsigned long time = random_get_entropy() ^ jiffies;
unsigned long flags;
@ -811,7 +793,7 @@ static struct timer_rand_state input_timer_state = INIT_TIMER_RAND_STATE;
* keyboard scan codes, and 256 upwards for interrupts.
*
*/
static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned num)
static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned int num)
{
struct {
long jiffies;
@ -855,7 +837,7 @@ static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned num)
* Round down by 1 bit on general principles,
* and limit entropy estimate to 12 bits.
*/
credit_entropy_bits(min_t(int, fls(delta >> 1), 11));
credit_entropy_bits(min_t(unsigned int, fls(delta >> 1), 11));
}
void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
@ -936,8 +918,8 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq)
add_interrupt_bench(cycles);
if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) {
if ((fast_pool->count >= 64) &&
crng_fast_load((u8 *)fast_pool->pool, sizeof(fast_pool->pool)) > 0) {
if (fast_pool->count >= 64 &&
crng_fast_load(fast_pool->pool, sizeof(fast_pool->pool)) > 0) {
fast_pool->count = 0;
fast_pool->last = now;
if (spin_trylock(&input_pool.lock)) {
@ -955,7 +937,7 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq)
return;
fast_pool->last = now;
__mix_pool_bytes(&fast_pool->pool, sizeof(fast_pool->pool));
_mix_pool_bytes(&fast_pool->pool, sizeof(fast_pool->pool));
spin_unlock(&input_pool.lock);
fast_pool->count = 0;
@ -1064,18 +1046,18 @@ static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(const char *func_name, void *caller, void
* wait_for_random_bytes() should be called and return 0 at least once
* at any point prior.
*/
static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes)
static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
{
u32 chacha_state[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)];
u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE];
ssize_t len;
size_t len;
trace_get_random_bytes(nbytes, _RET_IP_);
if (!nbytes)
return;
len = min_t(ssize_t, 32, nbytes);
len = min_t(size_t, 32, nbytes);
crng_make_state(chacha_state, buf, len);
nbytes -= len;
buf += len;
@ -1098,7 +1080,7 @@ static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes)
memzero_explicit(chacha_state, sizeof(chacha_state));
}
void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes)
void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
{
static void *previous;
@ -1259,25 +1241,19 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(del_random_ready_callback);
/*
* This function will use the architecture-specific hardware random
* number generator if it is available. The arch-specific hw RNG will
* almost certainly be faster than what we can do in software, but it
* is impossible to verify that it is implemented securely (as
* opposed, to, say, the AES encryption of a sequence number using a
* key known by the NSA). So it's useful if we need the speed, but
* only if we're willing to trust the hardware manufacturer not to
* have put in a back door.
*
* Return number of bytes filled in.
* number generator if it is available. It is not recommended for
* use. Use get_random_bytes() instead. It returns the number of
* bytes filled in.
*/
int __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes)
size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
{
int left = nbytes;
size_t left = nbytes;
u8 *p = buf;
trace_get_random_bytes_arch(left, _RET_IP_);
while (left) {
unsigned long v;
int chunk = min_t(int, left, sizeof(unsigned long));
size_t chunk = min_t(size_t, left, sizeof(unsigned long));
if (!arch_get_random_long(&v))
break;
@ -1310,12 +1286,12 @@ early_param("random.trust_cpu", parse_trust_cpu);
*/
int __init rand_initialize(void)
{
int i;
size_t i;
ktime_t now = ktime_get_real();
bool arch_init = true;
unsigned long rv;
for (i = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; i > 0; i -= sizeof(rv)) {
for (i = 0; i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; i += sizeof(rv)) {
if (!arch_get_random_seed_long_early(&rv) &&
!arch_get_random_long_early(&rv)) {
rv = random_get_entropy();
@ -1364,7 +1340,7 @@ static ssize_t urandom_read_nowarn(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
nbytes = min_t(size_t, nbytes, INT_MAX >> 6);
ret = get_random_bytes_user(buf, nbytes);
trace_urandom_read(8 * nbytes, 0, input_pool.entropy_count);
trace_urandom_read(nbytes, input_pool.entropy_count);
return ret;
}
@ -1408,19 +1384,18 @@ static unsigned int random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
return mask;
}
static int write_pool(const char __user *buffer, size_t count)
static int write_pool(const char __user *ubuf, size_t count)
{
size_t bytes;
u8 buf[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE];
const char __user *p = buffer;
size_t len;
u8 block[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE];
while (count > 0) {
bytes = min(count, sizeof(buf));
if (copy_from_user(buf, p, bytes))
while (count) {
len = min(count, sizeof(block));
if (copy_from_user(block, ubuf, len))
return -EFAULT;
count -= bytes;
p += bytes;
mix_pool_bytes(buf, bytes);
count -= len;
ubuf += len;
mix_pool_bytes(block, len);
cond_resched();
}
@ -1430,7 +1405,7 @@ static int write_pool(const char __user *buffer, size_t count)
static ssize_t random_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
size_t ret;
int ret;
ret = write_pool(buffer, count);
if (ret)
@ -1524,8 +1499,6 @@ const struct file_operations urandom_fops = {
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count, unsigned int,
flags)
{
int ret;
if (flags & ~(GRND_NONBLOCK | GRND_RANDOM | GRND_INSECURE))
return -EINVAL;
@ -1540,6 +1513,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count, unsigned int,
count = INT_MAX;
if (!(flags & GRND_INSECURE) && !crng_ready()) {
int ret;
if (flags & GRND_NONBLOCK)
return -EAGAIN;
ret = wait_for_random_bytes();
@ -1798,7 +1773,7 @@ unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range)
* Those devices may produce endless random bits and will be throttled
* when our pool is full.
*/
void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count,
void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count,
size_t entropy)
{
if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) {
@ -1829,7 +1804,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_randomness);
* it would be regarded as device data.
* The decision is controlled by CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER.
*/
void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size)
void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size)
{
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER))
add_hwgenerator_randomness(buf, size, size * 8);

View File

@ -61,6 +61,6 @@ extern int devm_hwrng_register(struct device *dev, struct hwrng *rng);
extern void hwrng_unregister(struct hwrng *rng);
extern void devm_hwrng_unregister(struct device *dve, struct hwrng *rng);
/** Feed random bits into the pool. */
extern void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count, size_t entropy);
extern void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count, size_t entropy);
#endif /* LINUX_HWRANDOM_H_ */

View File

@ -19,8 +19,8 @@ struct random_ready_callback {
struct module *owner;
};
extern void add_device_randomness(const void *, unsigned int);
extern void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *, unsigned int);
extern void add_device_randomness(const void *, size_t);
extern void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *, size_t);
#if defined(LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN) && !defined(__CHECKER__)
static inline void add_latent_entropy(void)
@ -36,13 +36,13 @@ extern void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
unsigned int value) __latent_entropy;
extern void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) __latent_entropy;
extern void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
extern void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
extern int wait_for_random_bytes(void);
extern int __init rand_initialize(void);
extern bool rng_is_initialized(void);
extern int add_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy);
extern void del_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy);
extern int __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes);
extern size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
#ifndef MODULE
extern const struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops;
@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ static inline unsigned long get_random_long(void)
/* Calls wait_for_random_bytes() and then calls get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes).
* Returns the result of the call to wait_for_random_bytes. */
static inline int get_random_bytes_wait(void *buf, int nbytes)
static inline int get_random_bytes_wait(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
{
int ret = wait_for_random_bytes();
get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes);

View File

@ -8,13 +8,13 @@
#include <linux/tracepoint.h>
TRACE_EVENT(add_device_randomness,
TP_PROTO(int bytes, unsigned long IP),
TP_PROTO(size_t bytes, unsigned long IP),
TP_ARGS(bytes, IP),
TP_STRUCT__entry(
__field( int, bytes )
__field(unsigned long, IP )
__field(size_t, bytes )
__field(unsigned long, IP )
),
TP_fast_assign(
@ -22,18 +22,18 @@ TRACE_EVENT(add_device_randomness,
__entry->IP = IP;
),
TP_printk("bytes %d caller %pS",
TP_printk("bytes %zu caller %pS",
__entry->bytes, (void *)__entry->IP)
);
DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__mix_pool_bytes,
TP_PROTO(int bytes, unsigned long IP),
TP_PROTO(size_t bytes, unsigned long IP),
TP_ARGS(bytes, IP),
TP_STRUCT__entry(
__field( int, bytes )
__field(unsigned long, IP )
__field(size_t, bytes )
__field(unsigned long, IP )
),
TP_fast_assign(
@ -41,12 +41,12 @@ DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__mix_pool_bytes,
__entry->IP = IP;
),
TP_printk("input pool: bytes %d caller %pS",
TP_printk("input pool: bytes %zu caller %pS",
__entry->bytes, (void *)__entry->IP)
);
DEFINE_EVENT(random__mix_pool_bytes, mix_pool_bytes,
TP_PROTO(int bytes, unsigned long IP),
TP_PROTO(size_t bytes, unsigned long IP),
TP_ARGS(bytes, IP)
);
@ -58,13 +58,13 @@ DEFINE_EVENT(random__mix_pool_bytes, mix_pool_bytes_nolock,
);
TRACE_EVENT(credit_entropy_bits,
TP_PROTO(int bits, int entropy_count, unsigned long IP),
TP_PROTO(size_t bits, size_t entropy_count, unsigned long IP),
TP_ARGS(bits, entropy_count, IP),
TP_STRUCT__entry(
__field( int, bits )
__field( int, entropy_count )
__field(size_t, bits )
__field(size_t, entropy_count )
__field(unsigned long, IP )
),
@ -74,34 +74,34 @@ TRACE_EVENT(credit_entropy_bits,
__entry->IP = IP;
),
TP_printk("input pool: bits %d entropy_count %d caller %pS",
TP_printk("input pool: bits %zu entropy_count %zu caller %pS",
__entry->bits, __entry->entropy_count, (void *)__entry->IP)
);
TRACE_EVENT(add_input_randomness,
TP_PROTO(int input_bits),
TP_PROTO(size_t input_bits),
TP_ARGS(input_bits),
TP_STRUCT__entry(
__field( int, input_bits )
__field(size_t, input_bits )
),
TP_fast_assign(
__entry->input_bits = input_bits;
),
TP_printk("input_pool_bits %d", __entry->input_bits)
TP_printk("input_pool_bits %zu", __entry->input_bits)
);
TRACE_EVENT(add_disk_randomness,
TP_PROTO(dev_t dev, int input_bits),
TP_PROTO(dev_t dev, size_t input_bits),
TP_ARGS(dev, input_bits),
TP_STRUCT__entry(
__field( dev_t, dev )
__field( int, input_bits )
__field(dev_t, dev )
__field(size_t, input_bits )
),
TP_fast_assign(
@ -109,17 +109,17 @@ TRACE_EVENT(add_disk_randomness,
__entry->input_bits = input_bits;
),
TP_printk("dev %d,%d input_pool_bits %d", MAJOR(__entry->dev),
TP_printk("dev %d,%d input_pool_bits %zu", MAJOR(__entry->dev),
MINOR(__entry->dev), __entry->input_bits)
);
DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__get_random_bytes,
TP_PROTO(int nbytes, unsigned long IP),
TP_PROTO(size_t nbytes, unsigned long IP),
TP_ARGS(nbytes, IP),
TP_STRUCT__entry(
__field( int, nbytes )
__field(size_t, nbytes )
__field(unsigned long, IP )
),
@ -128,29 +128,29 @@ DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__get_random_bytes,
__entry->IP = IP;
),
TP_printk("nbytes %d caller %pS", __entry->nbytes, (void *)__entry->IP)
TP_printk("nbytes %zu caller %pS", __entry->nbytes, (void *)__entry->IP)
);
DEFINE_EVENT(random__get_random_bytes, get_random_bytes,
TP_PROTO(int nbytes, unsigned long IP),
TP_PROTO(size_t nbytes, unsigned long IP),
TP_ARGS(nbytes, IP)
);
DEFINE_EVENT(random__get_random_bytes, get_random_bytes_arch,
TP_PROTO(int nbytes, unsigned long IP),
TP_PROTO(size_t nbytes, unsigned long IP),
TP_ARGS(nbytes, IP)
);
DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__extract_entropy,
TP_PROTO(int nbytes, int entropy_count),
TP_PROTO(size_t nbytes, size_t entropy_count),
TP_ARGS(nbytes, entropy_count),
TP_STRUCT__entry(
__field( int, nbytes )
__field( int, entropy_count )
__field( size_t, nbytes )
__field( size_t, entropy_count )
),
TP_fast_assign(
@ -158,37 +158,34 @@ DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__extract_entropy,
__entry->entropy_count = entropy_count;
),
TP_printk("input pool: nbytes %d entropy_count %d",
TP_printk("input pool: nbytes %zu entropy_count %zu",
__entry->nbytes, __entry->entropy_count)
);
DEFINE_EVENT(random__extract_entropy, extract_entropy,
TP_PROTO(int nbytes, int entropy_count),
TP_PROTO(size_t nbytes, size_t entropy_count),
TP_ARGS(nbytes, entropy_count)
);
TRACE_EVENT(urandom_read,
TP_PROTO(int got_bits, int pool_left, int input_left),
TP_PROTO(size_t nbytes, size_t entropy_count),
TP_ARGS(got_bits, pool_left, input_left),
TP_ARGS(nbytes, entropy_count),
TP_STRUCT__entry(
__field( int, got_bits )
__field( int, pool_left )
__field( int, input_left )
__field( size_t, nbytes )
__field( size_t, entropy_count )
),
TP_fast_assign(
__entry->got_bits = got_bits;
__entry->pool_left = pool_left;
__entry->input_left = input_left;
__entry->nbytes = nbytes;
__entry->entropy_count = entropy_count;
),
TP_printk("got_bits %d nonblocking_pool_entropy_left %d "
"input_entropy_left %d", __entry->got_bits,
__entry->pool_left, __entry->input_left)
TP_printk("reading: nbytes %zu entropy_count %zu",
__entry->nbytes, __entry->entropy_count)
);
#endif /* _TRACE_RANDOM_H */