netfilter: add back stackpointer size checks

commit 57ebd808a97d7c5b1e1afb937c2db22beba3c1f8 upstream.

The rationale for removing the check is only correct for rulesets
generated by ip(6)tables.

In iptables, a jump can only occur to a user-defined chain, i.e.
because we size the stack based on number of user-defined chains we
cannot exceed stack size.

However, the underlying binary format has no such restriction,
and the validation step only ensures that the jump target is a
valid rule start point.

IOW, its possible to build a rule blob that has no user-defined
chains but does contain a jump.

If this happens, no jump stack gets allocated and crash occurs
because no jumpstack was allocated.

Fixes: 7814b6ec6d0d6 ("netfilter: xtables: don't save/restore jumpstack offset")
Reported-by: syzbot+e783f671527912cd9403@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Florian Westphal 2018-02-07 13:46:25 +01:00 committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent 310f286ded
commit 638c2e4eff
3 changed files with 14 additions and 1 deletions

View File

@ -257,6 +257,10 @@ unsigned int arpt_do_table(struct sk_buff *skb,
}
if (table_base + v
!= arpt_next_entry(e)) {
if (unlikely(stackidx >= private->stacksize)) {
verdict = NF_DROP;
break;
}
jumpstack[stackidx++] = e;
}

View File

@ -335,8 +335,13 @@ ipt_do_table(struct sk_buff *skb,
continue;
}
if (table_base + v != ipt_next_entry(e) &&
!(e->ip.flags & IPT_F_GOTO))
!(e->ip.flags & IPT_F_GOTO)) {
if (unlikely(stackidx >= private->stacksize)) {
verdict = NF_DROP;
break;
}
jumpstack[stackidx++] = e;
}
e = get_entry(table_base, v);
continue;

View File

@ -357,6 +357,10 @@ ip6t_do_table(struct sk_buff *skb,
}
if (table_base + v != ip6t_next_entry(e) &&
!(e->ipv6.flags & IP6T_F_GOTO)) {
if (unlikely(stackidx >= private->stacksize)) {
verdict = NF_DROP;
break;
}
jumpstack[stackidx++] = e;
}