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net: Only allow init netns to set default tcp cong to a restricted algo

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commit 8d432592f30fcc34ef5a10aac4887b4897884493 upstream.

tcp_set_default_congestion_control() is netns-safe in that it writes
to &net->ipv4.tcp_congestion_control, but it also sets
ca->flags |= TCP_CONG_NON_RESTRICTED which is not namespaced.
This has the unintended side-effect of changing the global
net.ipv4.tcp_allowed_congestion_control sysctl, despite the fact that it
is read-only: 97684f0970f6 ("net: Make tcp_allowed_congestion_control
readonly in non-init netns")

Resolve this netns "leak" by only allowing the init netns to set the
default algorithm to one that is restricted. This restriction could be
removed if tcp_allowed_congestion_control were namespace-ified in the
future.

This bug was uncovered with
https://github.com/JonathonReinhart/linux-netns-sysctl-verify

Fixes: 6670e1524477 ("tcp: Namespace-ify sysctl_tcp_default_congestion_control")
Signed-off-by: Jonathon Reinhart <jonathon.reinhart@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Jonathon Reinhart 2021-05-01 04:28:22 -04:00 committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent 2281df0b02
commit 6c1ea8bee7
1 changed files with 4 additions and 0 deletions
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4
net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c
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@ -230,6 +230,10 @@ int tcp_set_default_congestion_control(struct net *net, const char *name)
ret = -ENOENT;
} else if (!bpf_try_module_get(ca, ca->owner)) {
ret = -EBUSY;
} else if (!net_eq(net, &init_net) &&
!(ca->flags & TCP_CONG_NON_RESTRICTED)) {
/* Only init netns can set default to a restricted algorithm */
ret = -EPERM;
} else {
prev = xchg(&net->ipv4.tcp_congestion_control, ca);
if (prev)