diff --git a/include/linux/nospec.h b/include/linux/nospec.h
index 0c5ef54fd416..207ef2a20e48 100644
--- a/include/linux/nospec.h
+++ b/include/linux/nospec.h
@@ -9,6 +9,10 @@
 
 struct task_struct;
 
+#ifndef barrier_nospec
+# define barrier_nospec() do { } while (0)
+#endif
+
 /**
  * array_index_mask_nospec() - generate a ~0 mask when index < size, 0 otherwise
  * @index: array element index
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c
index 6b33a8a148b8..556d67afc493 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/core.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c
@@ -1567,9 +1567,7 @@ out:
 		 * reuse preexisting logic from Spectre v1 mitigation that
 		 * happens to produce the required code on x86 for v4 as well.
 		 */
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86
 		barrier_nospec();
-#endif
 		CONT;
 #define LDST(SIZEOP, SIZE)						\
 	STX_MEM_##SIZEOP:						\
diff --git a/lib/usercopy.c b/lib/usercopy.c
index cbb4d9ec00f2..82881e0bcaa1 100644
--- a/lib/usercopy.c
+++ b/lib/usercopy.c
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 
 /* out-of-line parts */
 
@@ -10,6 +11,12 @@ unsigned long _copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n
 	unsigned long res = n;
 	might_fault();
 	if (likely(access_ok(from, n))) {
+		/*
+		 * Ensure that bad access_ok() speculation will not
+		 * lead to nasty side effects *after* the copy is
+		 * finished:
+		 */
+		barrier_nospec();
 		kasan_check_write(to, n);
 		res = raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
 	}