nf_conntrack: avoid kernel pointer value leak in slab name
commit 31b0b385f69d8d5491a4bca288e25e63f1d945d0 upstream. The slab name ends up being visible in the directory structure under /sys, and even if you don't have access rights to the file you can see the filenames. Just use a 64-bit counter instead of the pointer to the 'net' structure to generate a unique name. This code will go away in 4.7 when the conntrack code moves to a single kmemcache, but this is the backportable simple solution to avoiding leaking kernel pointers to user space. Fixes: 5b3501faa874 ("netfilter: nf_conntrack: per netns nf_conntrack_cachep") Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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@ -1757,6 +1757,7 @@ void nf_conntrack_init_end(void)
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int nf_conntrack_init_net(struct net *net)
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{
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static atomic64_t unique_id;
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int ret = -ENOMEM;
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int cpu;
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@ -1779,7 +1780,8 @@ int nf_conntrack_init_net(struct net *net)
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if (!net->ct.stat)
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goto err_pcpu_lists;
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net->ct.slabname = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "nf_conntrack_%p", net);
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net->ct.slabname = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "nf_conntrack_%llu",
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(u64)atomic64_inc_return(&unique_id));
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if (!net->ct.slabname)
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goto err_slabname;
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