crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - use constant time memory comparison for MACs
commit fec17cb2231733174e039ad9054fa16bb358e2ec upstream. Otherwise, we enable all sorts of forgeries via timing attack. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Suggested-by: Stephan Müller <smueller@chronox.de> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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@ -496,7 +496,7 @@ static int pkcs1pad_verify_complete(struct akcipher_request *req, int err)
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goto done;
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pos++;
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if (memcmp(out_buf + pos, digest_info->data, digest_info->size))
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if (crypto_memneq(out_buf + pos, digest_info->data, digest_info->size))
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goto done;
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pos += digest_info->size;
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