ipv4: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerability
[ Upstream commit 5648451e30a0d13d11796574919a359025d52cce ] vr.vifi is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: net/ipv4/ipmr.c:1616 ipmr_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'mrt->vif_table' [r] (local cap) net/ipv4/ipmr.c:1690 ipmr_compat_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'mrt->vif_table' [r] (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing vr.vifi before using it to index mrt->vif_table' Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
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#include <net/netlink.h>
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#include <net/fib_rules.h>
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#include <linux/netconf.h>
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#include <linux/nospec.h>
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#if defined(CONFIG_IP_PIMSM_V1) || defined(CONFIG_IP_PIMSM_V2)
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#define CONFIG_IP_PIMSM 1
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@ -1574,6 +1575,7 @@ int ipmr_compat_ioctl(struct sock *sk, unsigned int cmd, void __user *arg)
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return -EFAULT;
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if (vr.vifi >= mrt->maxvif)
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return -EINVAL;
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vr.vifi = array_index_nospec(vr.vifi, mrt->maxvif);
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read_lock(&mrt_lock);
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vif = &mrt->vif_table[vr.vifi];
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if (VIF_EXISTS(mrt, vr.vifi)) {
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