Five small fixes. The nested migration bug will be fixed
with a better API in 5.10 or 5.11, for now this is a fix that works with existing userspace but keeps the current ugly API. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQFIBAABCAAyFiEE8TM4V0tmI4mGbHaCv/vSX3jHroMFAl9ufLMUHHBib256aW5p QHJlZGhhdC5jb20ACgkQv/vSX3jHroMe9AgAgU3YQ2SktkqEOXjHMLqCH5Y3PKFI S2anYpoKlH36Q6kzoqtkCj0GVagvdh5+Envz3I/tMdhv3Y/JgZaX1wHAe4cUl9BT VyoiDBTWkhYRmpUbLYA8AtmgxQw1Hp8srH86rnvVGmLG6zdAa/rgUAKiQgT688Ej CQvF5H7Zi3viPo2rInNSkgTIgewduqSWkwJ6+h4AQMmNJpbRaeZs45yMYyyu/FIi hUazy7Rwk2vkWcuTd/sqH9b9y3VCYpN9juRaehEiK8qxXT3ydTU4Tub25BHmvXdr dx5pShG4P3nAGnfV1qKAemyQcY7sjfMieqN1F3QcsRcxqZgySUm11o2JRw== =sHsX -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm Pull more kvm fixes from Paolo Bonzini: "Five small fixes. The nested migration bug will be fixed with a better API in 5.10 or 5.11, for now this is a fix that works with existing userspace but keeps the current ugly API" * tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: KVM: SVM: Add a dedicated INVD intercept routine KVM: x86: Reset MMU context if guest toggles CR4.SMAP or CR4.PKE KVM: x86: fix MSR_IA32_TSC read for nested migration selftests: kvm: Fix assert failure in single-step test KVM: x86: VMX: Make smaller physical guest address space support user-configurable
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commit
7c7ec3226f
@ -2183,6 +2183,12 @@ static int iret_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
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return 1;
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}
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static int invd_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
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{
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/* Treat an INVD instruction as a NOP and just skip it. */
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return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(&svm->vcpu);
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}
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static int invlpg_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
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{
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if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_DECODEASSISTS))
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@ -2774,7 +2780,7 @@ static int (*const svm_exit_handlers[])(struct vcpu_svm *svm) = {
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[SVM_EXIT_RDPMC] = rdpmc_interception,
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[SVM_EXIT_CPUID] = cpuid_interception,
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[SVM_EXIT_IRET] = iret_interception,
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[SVM_EXIT_INVD] = emulate_on_interception,
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[SVM_EXIT_INVD] = invd_interception,
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[SVM_EXIT_PAUSE] = pause_interception,
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[SVM_EXIT_HLT] = halt_interception,
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[SVM_EXIT_INVLPG] = invlpg_interception,
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@ -129,6 +129,9 @@ static bool __read_mostly enable_preemption_timer = 1;
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module_param_named(preemption_timer, enable_preemption_timer, bool, S_IRUGO);
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#endif
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extern bool __read_mostly allow_smaller_maxphyaddr;
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module_param(allow_smaller_maxphyaddr, bool, S_IRUGO);
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#define KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_OFF (X86_CR0_NW | X86_CR0_CD)
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#define KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_ON_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST X86_CR0_NE
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#define KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_ON \
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@ -4803,6 +4806,7 @@ static int handle_exception_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
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* EPT will cause page fault only if we need to
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* detect illegal GPAs.
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*/
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WARN_ON_ONCE(!allow_smaller_maxphyaddr);
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kvm_fixup_and_inject_pf_error(vcpu, cr2, error_code);
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return 1;
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} else
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@ -5331,7 +5335,7 @@ static int handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
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* would also use advanced VM-exit information for EPT violations to
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* reconstruct the page fault error code.
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*/
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if (unlikely(kvm_mmu_is_illegal_gpa(vcpu, gpa)))
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if (unlikely(allow_smaller_maxphyaddr && kvm_mmu_is_illegal_gpa(vcpu, gpa)))
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return kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, 0);
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return kvm_mmu_page_fault(vcpu, gpa, error_code, NULL, 0);
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@ -8305,11 +8309,12 @@ static int __init vmx_init(void)
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vmx_check_vmcs12_offsets();
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/*
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* Intel processors don't have problems with
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* GUEST_MAXPHYADDR < HOST_MAXPHYADDR so enable
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* it for VMX by default
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* Shadow paging doesn't have a (further) performance penalty
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* from GUEST_MAXPHYADDR < HOST_MAXPHYADDR so enable it
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* by default
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*/
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allow_smaller_maxphyaddr = true;
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if (!enable_ept)
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allow_smaller_maxphyaddr = true;
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return 0;
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}
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@ -552,7 +552,10 @@ static inline bool vmx_has_waitpkg(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
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static inline bool vmx_need_pf_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
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{
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return !enable_ept || cpuid_maxphyaddr(vcpu) < boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits;
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if (!enable_ept)
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return true;
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return allow_smaller_maxphyaddr && cpuid_maxphyaddr(vcpu) < boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits;
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}
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void dump_vmcs(void);
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@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ static struct kvm_shared_msrs __percpu *shared_msrs;
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u64 __read_mostly host_efer;
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(host_efer);
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bool __read_mostly allow_smaller_maxphyaddr;
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bool __read_mostly allow_smaller_maxphyaddr = 0;
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(allow_smaller_maxphyaddr);
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static u64 __read_mostly host_xss;
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@ -976,6 +976,7 @@ int kvm_set_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4)
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unsigned long old_cr4 = kvm_read_cr4(vcpu);
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unsigned long pdptr_bits = X86_CR4_PGE | X86_CR4_PSE | X86_CR4_PAE |
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X86_CR4_SMEP;
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unsigned long mmu_role_bits = pdptr_bits | X86_CR4_SMAP | X86_CR4_PKE;
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if (kvm_valid_cr4(vcpu, cr4))
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return 1;
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@ -1003,7 +1004,7 @@ int kvm_set_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4)
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if (kvm_x86_ops.set_cr4(vcpu, cr4))
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return 1;
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if (((cr4 ^ old_cr4) & pdptr_bits) ||
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if (((cr4 ^ old_cr4) & mmu_role_bits) ||
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(!(cr4 & X86_CR4_PCIDE) && (old_cr4 & X86_CR4_PCIDE)))
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kvm_mmu_reset_context(vcpu);
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@ -3221,9 +3222,22 @@ int kvm_get_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
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case MSR_IA32_POWER_CTL:
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msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.msr_ia32_power_ctl;
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break;
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case MSR_IA32_TSC:
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msr_info->data = kvm_scale_tsc(vcpu, rdtsc()) + vcpu->arch.tsc_offset;
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case MSR_IA32_TSC: {
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/*
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* Intel SDM states that MSR_IA32_TSC read adds the TSC offset
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* even when not intercepted. AMD manual doesn't explicitly
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* state this but appears to behave the same.
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*
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* On userspace reads and writes, however, we unconditionally
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* operate L1's TSC value to ensure backwards-compatible
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* behavior for migration.
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*/
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u64 tsc_offset = msr_info->host_initiated ? vcpu->arch.l1_tsc_offset :
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vcpu->arch.tsc_offset;
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msr_info->data = kvm_scale_tsc(vcpu, rdtsc()) + tsc_offset;
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break;
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}
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case MSR_MTRRcap:
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case 0x200 ... 0x2ff:
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return kvm_mtrr_get_msr(vcpu, msr_info->index, &msr_info->data);
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@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ int main(void)
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int i;
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/* Instruction lengths starting at ss_start */
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int ss_size[4] = {
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3, /* xor */
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2, /* xor */
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2, /* cpuid */
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5, /* mov */
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2, /* rdmsr */
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