Drivers: hv: vmbus: Initialize unload_event statically
If a malicious or compromised Hyper-V sends a spurious message of type CHANNELMSG_UNLOAD_RESPONSE, the function vmbus_unload_response() will call complete() on an uninitialized event, and cause an oops. Reported-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Andrea Parri (Microsoft) <parri.andrea@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210420014350.2002-1-parri.andrea@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
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@ -826,6 +826,11 @@ static void vmbus_unload_response(struct vmbus_channel_message_header *hdr)
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/*
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* This is a global event; just wakeup the waiting thread.
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* Once we successfully unload, we can cleanup the monitor state.
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*
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* NB. A malicious or compromised Hyper-V could send a spurious
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* message of type CHANNELMSG_UNLOAD_RESPONSE, and trigger a call
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* of the complete() below. Make sure that unload_event has been
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* initialized by the time this complete() is executed.
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*/
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complete(&vmbus_connection.unload_event);
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}
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@ -841,7 +846,7 @@ void vmbus_initiate_unload(bool crash)
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if (vmbus_proto_version < VERSION_WIN8_1)
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return;
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init_completion(&vmbus_connection.unload_event);
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reinit_completion(&vmbus_connection.unload_event);
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memset(&hdr, 0, sizeof(struct vmbus_channel_message_header));
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hdr.msgtype = CHANNELMSG_UNLOAD;
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vmbus_post_msg(&hdr, sizeof(struct vmbus_channel_message_header),
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@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
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struct vmbus_connection vmbus_connection = {
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.conn_state = DISCONNECTED,
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.unload_event = COMPLETION_INITIALIZER(
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vmbus_connection.unload_event),
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.next_gpadl_handle = ATOMIC_INIT(0xE1E10),
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.ready_for_suspend_event = COMPLETION_INITIALIZER(
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