x86/srso: Set CPUID feature bits independently of bug or mitigation status
Booting with mitigations=off incorrectly prevents the
X86_FEATURE_{IBPB_BRTYPE,SBPB} CPUID bits from getting set.
Also, future CPUs without X86_BUG_SRSO might still have IBPB with branch
type prediction flushing, in which case SBPB should be used instead of
IBPB. The current code doesn't allow for that.
Also, cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode() has some surprising side effects
and the setting of these feature bits really doesn't belong in the
mitigation code anyway. Move it to earlier.
Fixes: fb3bd914b3
("x86/srso: Add a Speculative RAS Overflow mitigation")
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/869a1709abfe13b673bdd10c2f4332ca253a40bc.1693889988.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
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@ -683,13 +683,11 @@ extern u16 get_llc_id(unsigned int cpu);
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#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SUP_AMD
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extern u32 amd_get_nodes_per_socket(void);
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extern u32 amd_get_highest_perf(void);
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extern bool cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode(void);
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extern void amd_clear_divider(void);
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extern void amd_check_microcode(void);
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#else
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static inline u32 amd_get_nodes_per_socket(void) { return 0; }
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static inline u32 amd_get_highest_perf(void) { return 0; }
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static inline bool cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode(void) { return false; }
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static inline void amd_clear_divider(void) { }
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static inline void amd_check_microcode(void) { }
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#endif
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@ -766,6 +766,15 @@ static void early_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
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if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_TOPOEXT))
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smp_num_siblings = ((cpuid_ebx(0x8000001e) >> 8) & 0xff) + 1;
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if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE)) {
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if (c->x86 == 0x17 && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB))
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setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE);
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else if (c->x86 >= 0x19 && !wrmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_SBPB)) {
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setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE);
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setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SBPB);
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}
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}
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}
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static void init_amd_k8(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
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@ -1301,25 +1310,6 @@ void amd_check_microcode(void)
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on_each_cpu(zenbleed_check_cpu, NULL, 1);
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}
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bool cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode(void)
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{
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switch (boot_cpu_data.x86) {
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/* Zen1/2 IBPB flushes branch type predictions too. */
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case 0x17:
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return boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB);
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case 0x19:
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/* Poke the MSR bit on Zen3/4 to check its presence. */
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if (!wrmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_SBPB)) {
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setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SBPB);
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return true;
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} else {
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return false;
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}
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default:
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return false;
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}
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}
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/*
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* Issue a DIV 0/1 insn to clear any division data from previous DIV
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* operations.
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@ -2404,26 +2404,15 @@ early_param("spec_rstack_overflow", srso_parse_cmdline);
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static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
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{
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bool has_microcode;
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bool has_microcode = boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE);
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if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRSO) || cpu_mitigations_off())
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goto pred_cmd;
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/*
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* The first check is for the kernel running as a guest in order
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* for guests to verify whether IBPB is a viable mitigation.
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*/
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has_microcode = boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE) || cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode();
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if (!has_microcode) {
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pr_warn("IBPB-extending microcode not applied!\n");
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pr_warn(SRSO_NOTICE);
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} else {
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/*
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* Enable the synthetic (even if in a real CPUID leaf)
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* flags for guests.
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*/
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setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE);
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/*
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* Zen1/2 with SMT off aren't vulnerable after the right
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* IBPB microcode has been applied.
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