KVM: x86: Fix pkru save/restore when guest CR4.PKE=0, move it to x86.c
commit 37486135d3a7b03acc7755b63627a130437f066a upstream. Though rdpkru and wrpkru are contingent upon CR4.PKE, the PKRU resource isn't. It can be read with XSAVE and written with XRSTOR. So, if we don't set the guest PKRU value here(kvm_load_guest_xsave_state), the guest can read the host value. In case of kvm_load_host_xsave_state, guest with CR4.PKE clear could potentially use XRSTOR to change the host PKRU value. While at it, move pkru state save/restore to common code and the host_pkru field to kvm_vcpu_arch. This will let SVM support protection keys. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Message-Id: <158932794619.44260.14508381096663848853.stgit@naples-babu.amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
parent
1c3d707d7d
commit
99e392a497
@ -550,6 +550,7 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_arch {
|
||||
unsigned long cr4;
|
||||
unsigned long cr4_guest_owned_bits;
|
||||
unsigned long cr8;
|
||||
u32 host_pkru;
|
||||
u32 pkru;
|
||||
u32 hflags;
|
||||
u64 efer;
|
||||
|
@ -1360,7 +1360,6 @@ void vmx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
|
||||
|
||||
vmx_vcpu_pi_load(vcpu, cpu);
|
||||
|
||||
vmx->host_pkru = read_pkru();
|
||||
vmx->host_debugctlmsr = get_debugctlmsr();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -6521,11 +6520,6 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
|
||||
|
||||
kvm_load_guest_xcr0(vcpu);
|
||||
|
||||
if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PKU) &&
|
||||
kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_PKE) &&
|
||||
vcpu->arch.pkru != vmx->host_pkru)
|
||||
__write_pkru(vcpu->arch.pkru);
|
||||
|
||||
pt_guest_enter(vmx);
|
||||
|
||||
atomic_switch_perf_msrs(vmx);
|
||||
@ -6614,18 +6608,6 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
|
||||
|
||||
pt_guest_exit(vmx);
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* eager fpu is enabled if PKEY is supported and CR4 is switched
|
||||
* back on host, so it is safe to read guest PKRU from current
|
||||
* XSAVE.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PKU) &&
|
||||
kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_PKE)) {
|
||||
vcpu->arch.pkru = rdpkru();
|
||||
if (vcpu->arch.pkru != vmx->host_pkru)
|
||||
__write_pkru(vmx->host_pkru);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
kvm_put_guest_xcr0(vcpu);
|
||||
|
||||
vmx->nested.nested_run_pending = 0;
|
||||
|
@ -832,11 +832,25 @@ void kvm_load_guest_xcr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
|
||||
xsetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK, vcpu->arch.xcr0);
|
||||
vcpu->guest_xcr0_loaded = 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PKU) &&
|
||||
(kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_PKE) ||
|
||||
(vcpu->arch.xcr0 & XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU)) &&
|
||||
vcpu->arch.pkru != vcpu->arch.host_pkru)
|
||||
__write_pkru(vcpu->arch.pkru);
|
||||
}
|
||||
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_load_guest_xcr0);
|
||||
|
||||
void kvm_put_guest_xcr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PKU) &&
|
||||
(kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_PKE) ||
|
||||
(vcpu->arch.xcr0 & XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU))) {
|
||||
vcpu->arch.pkru = rdpkru();
|
||||
if (vcpu->arch.pkru != vcpu->arch.host_pkru)
|
||||
__write_pkru(vcpu->arch.host_pkru);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (vcpu->guest_xcr0_loaded) {
|
||||
if (vcpu->arch.xcr0 != host_xcr0)
|
||||
xsetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK, host_xcr0);
|
||||
@ -8222,6 +8236,9 @@ static int vcpu_enter_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
|
||||
trace_kvm_entry(vcpu->vcpu_id);
|
||||
guest_enter_irqoff();
|
||||
|
||||
/* Save host pkru register if supported */
|
||||
vcpu->arch.host_pkru = read_pkru();
|
||||
|
||||
fpregs_assert_state_consistent();
|
||||
if (test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD))
|
||||
switch_fpu_return();
|
||||
|
Loading…
x
Reference in New Issue
Block a user