Btrfs: fix an integer overflow check
[ Upstream commit 457ae7268b29c33dee1c0feb143a15f6029d177b ] This isn't super serious because you need CAP_ADMIN to run this code. I added this integer overflow check last year but apparently I am rubbish at writing integer overflow checks... There are two issues. First, access_ok() works on unsigned long type and not u64 so on 32 bit systems the access_ok() could be checking a truncated size. The other issue is that we should be using a stricter limit so we don't overflow the kzalloc() setting ctx->clone_roots later in the function after the access_ok(): alloc_size = sizeof(struct clone_root) * (arg->clone_sources_count + 1); sctx->clone_roots = kzalloc(alloc_size, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN); Fixes: f5ecec3ce21f ("btrfs: send: silence an integer overflow warning") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> [ added comment ] Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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@ -6196,8 +6196,13 @@ long btrfs_ioctl_send(struct file *mnt_file, void __user *arg_)
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goto out;
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}
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/*
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* Check that we don't overflow at later allocations, we request
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* clone_sources_count + 1 items, and compare to unsigned long inside
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* access_ok.
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*/
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if (arg->clone_sources_count >
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ULLONG_MAX / sizeof(*arg->clone_sources)) {
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ULONG_MAX / sizeof(struct clone_root) - 1) {
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ret = -EINVAL;
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goto out;
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}
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