sysctl: Fix data races in proc_doulongvec_minmax().
[ Upstream commit c31bcc8fb89fc2812663900589c6325ba35d9a65 ] A sysctl variable is accessed concurrently, and there is always a chance of data-race. So, all readers and writers need some basic protection to avoid load/store-tearing. This patch changes proc_doulongvec_minmax() to use READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE() internally to fix data-races on the sysctl side. For now, proc_doulongvec_minmax() itself is tolerant to a data-race, but we still need to add annotations on the other subsystem's side. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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@ -1193,9 +1193,9 @@ static int __do_proc_doulongvec_minmax(void *data, struct ctl_table *table,
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err = -EINVAL;
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break;
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}
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*i = val;
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WRITE_ONCE(*i, val);
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} else {
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val = convdiv * (*i) / convmul;
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val = convdiv * READ_ONCE(*i) / convmul;
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if (!first)
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proc_put_char(&buffer, &left, '\t');
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proc_put_long(&buffer, &left, val, false);
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