[IPSEC]: Fix bogus usage of u64 on input sequence number

Al Viro spotted a bogus use of u64 on the input sequence number which
is big-endian.  This patch fixes it by giving the input sequence number
its own member in the xfrm_skb_cb structure.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This commit is contained in:
Herbert Xu 2008-02-12 22:50:35 -08:00 committed by David S. Miller
parent 45b5035482
commit b318e0e4ef
7 changed files with 15 additions and 10 deletions

View File

@ -508,7 +508,10 @@ struct xfrm_skb_cb {
} header;
/* Sequence number for replay protection. */
u64 seq;
union {
u64 output;
__be32 input;
} seq;
};
#define XFRM_SKB_CB(__skb) ((struct xfrm_skb_cb *)&((__skb)->cb[0]))

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@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ static int ah_output(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)
ah->reserved = 0;
ah->spi = x->id.spi;
ah->seq_no = htonl(XFRM_SKB_CB(skb)->seq);
ah->seq_no = htonl(XFRM_SKB_CB(skb)->seq.output);
spin_lock_bh(&x->lock);
err = ah_mac_digest(ahp, skb, ah->auth_data);

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@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ static int esp_output(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)
}
esph->spi = x->id.spi;
esph->seq_no = htonl(XFRM_SKB_CB(skb)->seq);
esph->seq_no = htonl(XFRM_SKB_CB(skb)->seq.output);
sg_init_table(sg, nfrags);
skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg,
@ -210,7 +210,8 @@ static int esp_output(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)
aead_givcrypt_set_callback(req, 0, esp_output_done, skb);
aead_givcrypt_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, clen, iv);
aead_givcrypt_set_assoc(req, asg, sizeof(*esph));
aead_givcrypt_set_giv(req, esph->enc_data, XFRM_SKB_CB(skb)->seq);
aead_givcrypt_set_giv(req, esph->enc_data,
XFRM_SKB_CB(skb)->seq.output);
ESP_SKB_CB(skb)->tmp = tmp;
err = crypto_aead_givencrypt(req);

View File

@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ static int ah6_output(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)
ah->reserved = 0;
ah->spi = x->id.spi;
ah->seq_no = htonl(XFRM_SKB_CB(skb)->seq);
ah->seq_no = htonl(XFRM_SKB_CB(skb)->seq.output);
spin_lock_bh(&x->lock);
err = ah_mac_digest(ahp, skb, ah->auth_data);

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@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ static int esp6_output(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)
*skb_mac_header(skb) = IPPROTO_ESP;
esph->spi = x->id.spi;
esph->seq_no = htonl(XFRM_SKB_CB(skb)->seq);
esph->seq_no = htonl(XFRM_SKB_CB(skb)->seq.output);
sg_init_table(sg, nfrags);
skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg,
@ -199,7 +199,8 @@ static int esp6_output(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)
aead_givcrypt_set_callback(req, 0, esp_output_done, skb);
aead_givcrypt_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, clen, iv);
aead_givcrypt_set_assoc(req, asg, sizeof(*esph));
aead_givcrypt_set_giv(req, esph->enc_data, XFRM_SKB_CB(skb)->seq);
aead_givcrypt_set_giv(req, esph->enc_data,
XFRM_SKB_CB(skb)->seq.output);
ESP_SKB_CB(skb)->tmp = tmp;
err = crypto_aead_givencrypt(req);

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@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ int xfrm_input(struct sk_buff *skb, int nexthdr, __be32 spi, int encap_type)
if (encap_type < 0) {
async = 1;
x = xfrm_input_state(skb);
seq = XFRM_SKB_CB(skb)->seq;
seq = XFRM_SKB_CB(skb)->seq.input;
goto resume;
}
@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ int xfrm_input(struct sk_buff *skb, int nexthdr, __be32 spi, int encap_type)
spin_unlock(&x->lock);
XFRM_SKB_CB(skb)->seq = seq;
XFRM_SKB_CB(skb)->seq.input = seq;
nexthdr = x->type->input(x, skb);

View File

@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ static int xfrm_output_one(struct sk_buff *skb, int err)
}
if (x->type->flags & XFRM_TYPE_REPLAY_PROT) {
XFRM_SKB_CB(skb)->seq = ++x->replay.oseq;
XFRM_SKB_CB(skb)->seq.output = ++x->replay.oseq;
if (unlikely(x->replay.oseq == 0)) {
XFRM_INC_STATS(LINUX_MIB_XFRMOUTSTATESEQERROR);
x->replay.oseq--;